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*Chairman:* Mr. Jan Paul BANNIER  
 (Netherlands).

AGENDA ITEM 70

*Personnel questions (continued):*

- (a) *Geographical distribution of the staff of the Secretariat: report of the Secretary-General (A/5270, A/C.5/933 and Corr.1, A/C.5/L.727 and Add.1 and Corr.1, A/C.5/L.747/Rev.1, A/C.5/L.751, A/C.5/L.757) (continued);*
- (b) *Proportion of fixed-term staff (A/C.5/938, A/C.5/L.749 and Corr.1) (continued)*

1. Mr. MALHOTRA (Nepal) said that his delegation's position on the geographical distribution of posts in the Secretariat was based on a desire to maintain the integrity, impartiality and international character of the Secretariat. The inequitable distribution of posts had resulted from an unduly restrictive interpretation of the last sentence of Article 101, paragraph 3, of the Charter and from reliance on the scale of assessments for the regular budget of the United Nations as the sole criterion for the allocation of posts to Member States. At the sixteenth session, the Committee had recognized that those were the basic reasons for the existing imbalances in the geographical distribution of staff and had agreed that the factors of membership and population should also be taken into account in determining the desirable range. The only ideal factor was that of membership because it was based on the Charter principles of the universality of the Organization and the sovereign equality of States and because it was uniformly applicable to all Member States. How-

ever, as had been pointed out in the thirteen-Power draft resolution which Nepal had co-sponsored at the sixteenth session,<sup>1/</sup> unless the three factors of membership, population and contributions were given the proper relative weight, the existing imbalances could not be corrected.

2. Nepal appreciated the efforts made by the Acting Secretary-General to improve the geographical distribution of the staff during the short period he had been in office, and had been gratified by his recognition (A/5270, para. 13) that membership in the Organization should be one of the basic factors in the composition of the staff and that every effort should be made by the Secretariat and the Governments concerned to include nationals of all Member States in the Secretariat. Nevertheless, so long as posts continued to be allocated in accordance with a desirable range computed on the basis of contributions, the principle of equity could not be effectively applied. He therefore took exception to the assumption in paragraph 10 of the Secretary-General's report (A/5270) that the composition of the Secretariat could be adjusted to changes in membership and in the desirable targets without resort to drastic measures, providing sufficient time was allowed. That assumption would have been valid if the goal had been merely to achieve a wider geographical distribution of posts; it was not valid when the goal was an equitable geographical distribution of the staff.

3. On the other hand, he recognized that population, like contributions, was not a criterion which could be uniformly applied to all Member States and he was prepared to accept the Secretary-General's suggestion (*ibid.*, para. 23) that the population factor should be used only as a corrective in determining the desirable range of posts. The essential need was to give more careful weighting to the factors of membership and contributions.

4. The Secretary-General had suggested (*ibid.*, para. 15) that the minimum range for any Member State on the basis of membership alone should be provisionally established at one to five. In practice, the median of three posts, not the ceiling of five, was likely to be the average number allocated to each State on the strength of membership alone. Consequently, the relative weight of the membership factor would not be 33 1/3 per cent, as had been suggested, but 20 per cent, since some 330 posts, not 550, out of the total of 1,500 subject to geographical distribution, would be distributed on the basis of membership. He pointed out that it was not the absolute weight, but the relative weight attached to any one of the three factors, namely, membership, contributions and population, that would vitally affect the distribution of posts. For example, if, as the Secretary-General suggested, only 6 per cent of posts were allocated on the basis of population as a corrective

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 64, document A/5063, annex II.

factor, the actual weight of the factor of contributions would be more than 60 per cent; indeed, it would be as high as 74 per cent, the figure given in the formula suggested by the Committee of Experts on the Review of the Activities and Organization of the Secretariat.<sup>2/</sup> Moreover, if there were a significant increase in the number of posts subject to geographical distribution, the desirable range would still reflect the fact that the contributions factor would automatically be given greater weight whereas the weight given to other factors would remain fixed. Indeed, unless there was an upward revision of the range based on membership and equal weight were given, so far as practicable, to the membership and contributions factors, there could be no truly equitable distribution of staff. Nepal would not press that view because the Secretary-General had specifically stated that the minimum range of one to five on the basis of membership would be established provisionally, thus suggesting the possibility of later revision. He would, however, be glad if the Director of Personnel would elucidate the precise meaning of the last sentence of paragraph 15 of the Secretary-General's report (A/5270), which had been incorporated in operative paragraph 1 (b) of the joint draft resolution (A/C.5/L.747/Rev.1). He hoped it was intended to mean that, in applying the one to five range, the Secretary-General would aim at the upper limit of five rather than the lower limit of one or three.

5. Since adjustment of the proportion of fixed-term staff was one of the means by which the Secretary-General could improve geographical distribution without detriment to the career staff, he would have preferred the two questions to have been dealt with in one draft resolution. The Nepalese delegation believed in a career service and regarded the system of fixed-term contracts as a device which gave the Secretary-General flexibility in recruitment and enabled Member States to release their nationals for short-term service in the Secretariat, to the mutual benefit of the Organization and the countries concerned. He had an open mind regarding the ratio of fixed-term to permanent contracts; the fact that the proportion of fixed-term contracts had already reached 25.4 per cent should not, however, be used as pretext for making no further fixed-term appointments if such appointments were felt to be necessary. As a matter of fact until a minimum of five posts had been filled by nationals of under-represented countries on the basis of membership alone, nationals of States whose quotas had been filled should be appointed on fixed-term contracts only. When every Member State had filled its quota, a decision might be taken to fix the desirable ratio of fixed-term to permanent staff, if that was thought to be necessary. For the time being, the matter should be left to the discretion of the Secretary-General, and it was in that sense that he interpreted operative paragraph 1 (e) of the joint draft resolution.

6. For all those reasons, the delegation of Nepal could not support the Czechoslovak draft resolution as worded (A/C.5/L.749 and Corr.1). It did not share the conviction expressed in the third preambular paragraph and felt that operative paragraphs (a) and (b) required substantial qualifying amendments.

7. He would vote in favour of the joint draft resolution (A/C.5/L.747/Rev.1) as a whole on the understanding that the Secretary-General's proposal concerning the weight to be given to the fact of membership, as in-

corporated in operative paragraph 1 (b), was of a provisional nature, and in the hope that the range he had specified would be improved.

8. Sir Alexander MacFARQUHAR (Director of Personnel) said that the Committee might be interested to have some information about the procedure for the review of permanent contracts. The Preparatory Commission of the United Nations had suggested that contracts for an indeterminate period should be subject to review every five years,<sup>3/</sup> and that recommendation had been incorporated in General Assembly resolution 13 (I). The quinquennial review had, however, been abandoned in 1955, when the Secretary-General had come to the conclusion that contracts should be subject to review only once, at the end of the first five years following permanent appointment.

9. His reasons had been the following: (a) the original provision had been based on League of Nations practice, under which continuing staff had been appointed for a period of seven years subject to review; (b) the appointment policy developed by the United Nations provided sufficient safeguards for achieving the purposes of the repetitive review; (c) the five-year review provided no basis for termination which was not otherwise available to the Administration at all times; (d) the cost and the administrative burden would be considerable and would not be justified by the results to be expected; (e) the principle of periodic review was not consistent with the concept of a permanent appointment.

10. The Secretary-General had therefore proposed to revise the Staff Rules in that sense. However, as the modification changed one aspect of the policy governing the appointment of staff, he had wished to inform the General Assembly of his intention. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions had commented that it was satisfied that the safeguards recommended by the Secretary-General were adequate for the purposes which the process of formal recurrent review had been intended to serve, and that it would be sufficient if, in lieu of an amendment to the Staff Rule concerned, the General Assembly were to authorize the Secretary-General to dispense, at his discretion, with the provisions of that rule in so far as reviews after the first one were concerned. The Advisory Committee had stated in its report that its suggestion was "prompted by the further consideration that any review of appointments is essentially an internal matter to be entrusted to the Secretary-General".<sup>4/</sup> The Fifth Committee had agreed that the matter of the review of permanent appointments was within the discretion of the Secretary-General and although some members had felt that the recurrent review should be maintained, the majority had approved the Secretary-General's intention.

11. With regard to the point raised by the Nepalese representative regarding paragraph 15 of the Secretary-General's report (A/5270), he said that any ambiguity in the sentence in question was removed by the second sentence of operative paragraph 1 (b) of the joint draft resolution (A/C.5/L.747/Rev.1). The Secretary-General hoped to bring the number of staff recruited from each Member State on the basis of membership up to five as soon as was practicable.

<sup>3/</sup> Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (PC/20), chap. VIII, section 2, para. 60.

<sup>4/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 56, document A/3036, para. 13.

<sup>2/</sup> *Ibid.*, agenda item 61, document A/4776.

12. The CHAIRMAN invited representatives wishing to do so to explain their votes before the joint draft resolution (A/C.5/L.747/Rev.1) and the Ukrainian and Polish amendments (A/C.5/L.751 and A/C.5/L.757) were put to the vote.

13. Mr. MOLEROV (Bulgaria) said that he would vote for the Ukrainian amendments (A/C.5/L.751) because he was in favour of a resolution drafted in general terms. If those amendments were not adopted, he would vote for the Polish amendments (A/C.5/L.757), the third one of which specified that the G-5 level posts at Headquarters should be included in the posts subject to geographical distribution. If those posts were not included, there would be less possibility of improving the present imbalance in geographical distribution, which favoured the Western countries at the expense of the Eastern European countries. In addition, as the work done by staff at the G-5 level was often more important and responsible than that done by staff at the lower levels of the Professional category, the principle of geographical distribution should obviously apply to that level.

14. Replying to a question by Mr. ALEXANDRIDES (Cyprus), Mr. SANU (Nigeria), speaking on behalf of the sponsors of the joint draft resolution (A/C.5/L.747/Rev.1), said that the Ukrainian amendments (A/C.5/L.751) were not acceptable because they would have the effect of denying the Secretary-General the guidance he had requested. The Polish amendments (A/C.5/L.757) were not acceptable because they would materially alter the substance of the joint draft resolution on which agreement had been reached after consultation with many delegations.

15. The CHAIRMAN put the Ukrainian amendments (A/C.5/L.751) to the vote.

*The Ukrainian amendments were rejected by 61 votes to 12, with 15 abstentions.*

16. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on the Polish amendments (A/C.5/L.757), paragraph by paragraph.

*The amendment in paragraph 1 was rejected by 53 votes to 13, with 24 abstentions.*

*The amendment in paragraph 2 was rejected by 57 votes to 11, with 25 abstentions.*

*At the request of the Czechoslovak representative, a vote was taken by roll-call on the amendment in paragraph 3 (a).*

*Brazil, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Indonesia, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania.

*Against:* Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia.

*Abstaining:* Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, France, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yemen, Algeria.

*The amendment in paragraph 3 (a) was rejected by 44 votes to 14, with 36 abstentions.*

*The amendment in paragraph 3 (b) was rejected by 67 votes to 12, with 12 abstentions.*

*At the request of the Liberian representative, a vote was taken by roll-call on the amendment in paragraph 4.*

*The United States of America, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*Against:* United States of America, Venezuela, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Denmark, Federation of Malaya, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

*Abstaining:* Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Haiti, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Republic.

*The amendment in paragraph 4 was rejected by 39 votes to 11, with 46 abstentions.*

17. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on the revised joint draft resolution (A/C.5/L.747/Rev.1), paragraph by paragraph.

*The first paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 86 votes to none, with 11 abstentions.*

*The second paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 95 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.*

*The third paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 83 votes to 10, with 1 abstention.*

*The fourth paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 93 votes to 1.*

*The fifth paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 93 votes to 1.*

*Operative paragraph 1 was adopted by 82 votes to 11, with 1 abstention.*

*Operative paragraph 2 was adopted by 92 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.*

*Operative paragraph 3 was adopted by 93 votes to none, with 1 abstention.*

18. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on the revised draft resolution (A/C.5/L.747/Rev.1) as a whole.

*At the request of the Iraqi representative, a vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Mauritania, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, France, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali.

*Against:* Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary.

*Abstaining:* Mongolia, Israel.

*The revised draft resolution (A/C.5/L.747/Rev.1) was adopted by 84 votes to 10, with 2 abstentions.*

19. Mr. ALLOTT (United States of America) said that his delegation had voted for the joint draft resolution for several compelling reasons. First, the text recognized the paramount considerations of efficiency, competence and integrity in the selection of staff, as required by Article 101, paragraph 3 of the Charter, and the fact that those considerations did not conflict with equitable geographical distribution. Secondly, although the draft resolution laid down rather more specific guidelines for the Secretary-General than his delegation would have wished, the United States delegation interpreted it as being consistent with the Secretary-General's report (A/5270). It was on that basis that the United States had withdrawn its amendments (A/C.5/L.754). He welcomed the assurance given at the 956th meeting by the representative of Brazil, speaking as co-sponsor of the draft resolution, that although the text did not cover all the proposals put forward by the Secretary-General, that did not imply that the sponsors took a negative approach to any part of that report. As the Norwegian representative had pointed out at the same meeting, the draft resolution should prove satisfactory to the Secretary-General, since it implicitly endorsed those parts of the latter's report which it did not specifically mention. Thirdly, the draft resolution would preserve the integrity and independence of the Secretariat and the international career service responsible only to the Organization.

20. Lastly, it was the understanding of the United States delegation that, in recommending that the Secretary-General should seek more equitable geographical distribution "within the general framework of his report (A/5270)", the Committee wished him to

be guided by the report as a whole. For example, in taking population into account in the geographical distribution of posts, as suggested in paragraph 69 (b) of his report, the Secretary-General would also be guided by paragraph 25, in which he made it clear that population was to be considered not as a separate factor but as a corrective adjustment to the contribution factor.

21. Mr. PRICE (Canada) said that, before explaining his vote, he wished to associate himself very closely with the sympathy expressed with the Netherlands delegation at the 958th meeting in connexion with the death of H.R.H. Princess Wilhelmina.

22. He welcomed the fact that the Committee had been able to adopt a satisfactory draft resolution. His delegation had voted for the joint draft resolution on the understanding that, although it emphasized certain aspects of the Secretary-General's report (A/5270), omitted others and introduced some new factors or principles, the Secretary-General would be free to act within the framework of the report as a whole. The Canadian delegation would have preferred a specific endorsement of the report as a whole but it had voted for the joint draft resolution because it gave the Secretary-General the definite guidance he had requested. It trusted that the Secretary-General would take account of the views expressed during the debate, the points contained in his report and the directives laid down in the draft resolution; it was essential that he should be allowed considerable flexibility in the action he took under the Charter and the Staff Rules.

23. Mr. ARBOLEDA (Colombia) said that his delegation had always supported the principle of a career staff. He had voted against the Polish amendments (A/C.5/L.757) particularly the one in paragraph 3 (a) because the Polish view of geographical distribution was not compatible with a career service.

24. Mr. LIVERAN (Israel), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation had voted against or abstained on many of the draft amendments, because it had voted on each proposal solely on its merits. The only criterion it had applied had been whether or not the proposal was consistent with the Charter and it had taken no account of the source of the proposal or of the reasons for which it had been made. The general intention of the joint draft resolution itself was merely to ask the Secretary-General to proceed as he wished to proceed, although it did so in somewhat complex language; his delegation had therefore found it possible to abstain on that proposal.

25. Mr. MALHOTRA (Nepal), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation had voted against the Ukrainian amendments (A/C.5/L.751) to the joint draft resolution for obvious reasons.

26. Where the Polish amendments (A/C.5/L.757) were concerned, his delegation had abstained on the one in paragraph 1 because it would have preferred a different formulation; "equitable geographical distribution" and "the paramount considerations of employment of staff" although separate were not mutually exclusive concepts. It had also abstained on the amendment in paragraph 2 because, as he had explained earlier, the Secretary-General's recommendations were of a provisional nature and he (Mr. Malhotra) had therefore interpreted the words "within the general framework of his report" accordingly. His delegation had also abstained on the amendment in paragraph 3 (a) because it felt that if geographical

distribution was to be extended to G-5 posts, then it should be applied to all such posts and not only to those at Headquarters. On the other hand, his delegation had voted against the amendment in paragraph 3 (b) since it felt that it was not sufficient simply to ask the Secretary-General to take account of the three factors concerned without any reference to their relative weighting. His delegation had also voted against the amendment in paragraph 4 because it supported the practice of making career appointments.

27. Mr. DEMETROPOULOS (Greece) recalled that, at the 957th meeting, he had said that his delegation would support any draft resolution approving the proposals in the Secretary-General's report (A/5270). His delegation had therefore voted against those amendments which might have impaired the Secretary-General's freedom of action to carry out his proposals.

28. Mr. TEMPLETON (New Zealand) said his delegation had hoped a consensus of opinion might be reached on the subject under discussion. It was clear, however, that not all delegations felt able to endorse every point in the Secretary-General's report. In the circumstances, the joint draft resolution offered as broad an area of agreement, within the general framework of the Secretary-General's report, as it seemed possible to secure. His delegation had therefore voted for the draft resolution.

29. Mr. MHEDHEBI (Tunisia), speaking on behalf of the sponsors of the joint draft resolution, expressed his satisfaction at what he felt was a reasonable and constructive conclusion to the debate. At all events, he was gratified that contributions were no longer regarded as the sole factor determining the number of nationals of a given State to serve in the Secretariat and that the Committee was united in recognizing the importance of membership as a factor. There remained the question of the weightage to be given to the senior posts in the Secretariat; he hoped the Secretary-General would intensify his efforts to correct the serious imbalances at that level.

30. Mr. MYSLIL (Czechoslovakia), speaking on a point of order, said that he would not press his delegation's draft resolution (A/C.5/L.749 and Corr.1) to a vote. He had explained in detail at the 954th meeting his delegation's reasons for submitting that draft resolution; those reasons were still valid and his delegation had only chosen to withdraw the proposal because it had failed to command overwhelming support. He trusted, however, that the support of many members for a further increase in the proportion of fixed-term staff would be reflected in the Committee's report.

31. There was nothing to justify the accusations of certain delegations that the proposal had been intended to destroy the career staff or even the Organization itself.

32. Mr. SANGUIANA (Guinea) said that the Czechoslovak draft resolution would have been acceptable to his delegation, because it recognized the need to increase the proportion of fixed-term contracts and to resume the practice of reviewing permanent contracts every five years.

33. Mr. CURTIS (Australia) said that the Czechoslovak draft resolution had been one of the most important proposals before the Fifth Committee at its present session, for it was a policy declaration with wide implications. The motion had been withdrawn,

but it was important that there should be no misunderstanding as to the real issues. The ostensible motive of the Czechoslovak delegation in submitting its draft resolution had been to facilitate a solution of the problem of geographical distribution and that impression had been carefully fostered by other delegations. However, a close study of the debate revealed that the true purpose had been to change the basic character of the Secretariat, to transform it into a clerical machine run by officials for whom their term of office represented but a passing phase in their national careers. Some delegations had made that quite clear: both the USSR and the Polish representatives had said that they were opposed to the whole concept of a career service. The Czechoslovak draft resolution had not been inspired exclusively or primarily by a simple desire to improve geographical distribution, and a certain group of delegations were using the problem of geographical distribution as a lever with which to change the structure of the Secretariat in a way which he believed was not acceptable to the large majority of Member States.

34. Mr. MYSLIL (Czechoslovakia), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, categorically rejected the Australian representative's unfounded accusations. His delegation had introduced the draft resolution because it had seen fit to do so, for the reasons which he had explained at the 954th meeting. There were no other motives than those mentioned in that earlier statement.

#### (c) Other personnel questions

#### PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE STAFF REGULATIONS (A/C.5/932)

35. The CHAIRMAN said that, after consultation with the Advisory Committee, the Secretary-General had decided that he would prefer not to submit his proposed amendments to the staff regulations for consideration until the eighteenth session. He therefore suggested that the Committee should take no action on the matter at the present time.

*It was so decided.*

#### AGENDA ITEM 66

**Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly (continued)\*:**

**(d) Investments Committee: confirmation of the appointments made by the Secretary-General (A/5158/Rev.1)**

36. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to document A/5158/Rev.1, which gave details of appointments made by the Secretary-General to membership of the Investments Committee, after consultation with the Advisory Committee. In accordance with article XXV of the Regulations of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund, those appointments were subject to confirmation by the General Assembly and he therefore suggested that the Fifth Committee should recommend to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:

"The General Assembly

Confirms the appointment by the Secretary-General of Mr. B. K. Nehru, Mr. Eugene Black and Mr. Jacques Rueff as members of the Investments

\*Resumed from the 949th meeting.

Committee, Mr. Nehru for a three-year term which began on 1 January 1962, and Mr. Black and Mr. Rueff for terms ending on 31 December 1964."

*It was so decided.*

37. Mr. ALLOTT (United States of America) paid a tribute to the memory of Mr. William Fiske Frazier who, throughout his many years of service on the Investments Committee, had devoted himself unsparingly to promoting the interests of the United Nations.

**(e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal (A/5159, A/C.5/L.752, A/C.5/L.753)**

38. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to the note by the Secretary-General (A/5159), which gave details of the three vacancies to be filled on the United Nations Administrative Tribunal. One vacancy had arisen in the course of 1962 as the result of the resignation of one of the members of the Tribunal. He invited the Committee to vote on the two candidates who had been proposed for appointment to that vacancy (A/C.5/L.752).

*At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Kraft (Denmark) and Mr. Alvarado (Venezuela) acted as tellers.*

*A vote was taken by secret ballot.*

<i>Number of ballot papers:</i>	90
<i>Invalid ballots:</i>	2
<i>Number of valid ballots:</i>	88
<i>Abstentions:</i>	0
<i>Number of members voting:</i>	88
<i>Required majority:</i>	45

*Number of votes obtained:*

Mr. Ignacio-Pinto (Dahomey) . . . . .	51
Mr. Tarazi (Syria) . . . . .	37

*Mr. Louis Ignacio-Pinto (Dahomey) having obtained the required majority, the Committee recommended that he should be appointed a member of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal for a three-year term to begin on the date of election and to end on 31 December 1964.*

39. The CHAIRMAN said that two other vacancies on the Administrative Tribunal would arise on 1 January 1963 as a result of the expiry of the term of office of

two existing members. He invited the Committee to vote on the two candidates who had been proposed for appointment to those vacancies (A/C.5/L.753).

*At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Kraft (Denmark) and Mr. Alvarado (Venezuela) acted as tellers.*

*A vote was taken by secret ballot.*

<i>Number of ballot papers:</i>	86
<i>Invalid ballots:</i>	0
<i>Number of valid ballots:</i>	86
<i>Abstentions:</i>	2
<i>Number of members voting:</i>	84
<i>Required majority:</i>	43

*Number of votes obtained:*

Mr. Barco (United States of America) . .	80
The Right Honourable Lord Crook (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) . . . . .	78

*Mr. James W. Barco (United States of America) and Lord Crook (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) having obtained the required majority, the Committee recommended that they should be appointed members of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal for a three-year term to begin on 1 January 1963.*

**FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE APPOINTMENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS (AGENDA ITEM 18)\*\***

40. The CHAIRMAN said that he had received a letter, dated 28 November 1962, from the President of the General Assembly concerning the appointment of the Secretary-General. As that item might have financial implications, the President of the General Assembly had asked that the Fifth Committee should consider it as a matter of priority. He (the Chairman) therefore suggested that the matter should be referred immediately to the Advisory Committee.

*It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.

\*\*Appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.