



CONTENTS

	Page
United Nations Operations in the Congo: 1961 cost estimates and financing (<i>continued</i>).....	19

Chairman: Mr. Mario MAJOLI (Italy).

**UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO:
 1961 COST ESTIMATES AND FINANCING (A/4703,
 A/4713, A/C.5/860, A/C.5/L.657) (*continued*)**

1. The CHAIRMAN read out the following draft resolution submitted by India (A/C.5/L.657, provisional text):

"The General Assembly,

"Bearing in mind that the authorization contained in its resolution 1590 (XV) of 20 December 1960 relating to the expenditures in 1961 for the United Nations operations in the Congo covers the period from 1 January to 31 March 1961 only,

"Recognizing that the question of the 1961 cost estimates and financing of these operations is currently under consideration,

"Authorizes the Secretary-General, pending action by the General Assembly at its resumed fifteenth session, and without prejudice to such action, to continue until 21 April 1961 to incur commitments for the United Nations operations in the Congo at a level not to exceed \$8,000,000 per month."

2. Mr. B. K. NEHRU (India) said he wished to make it clear that, in submitting the draft resolution, he had no wish in any way to prejudice the decision the General Assembly might take with regard to the substance of the problem; the main purpose of his proposal was to ensure that the United Nations operations in the Congo should not be interrupted as a result of an oversight on the part of the General Assembly. The proposal should therefore be considered solely from the procedural angle. His delegation had abstained in the vote on General Assembly resolution 1590 (XV), but it considered that the Secretary-General should be given the funds to carry on the action which had been undertaken until further notice.

3. Mr. ARRAÍZ (Venezuela) said that in his view the draft resolution was indispensable and, as the Indian representative had said, was merely a matter of procedure. Nevertheless, the first preambular paragraph referred to resolution 1590 (XV), which in turn referred to resolution 1583 (XV) in which the General Assembly recognized that the expenses involved in the United Nations operations in the Congo for 1960 constituted expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessment thereof against Member

States created binding legal obligations on such States to pay their assessed shares. It would not be appropriate for the General Assembly to refer even indirectly to that resolution while at the same time recognizing that the question of cost estimates and financing of the operations was currently under consideration. The first preambular paragraph, which was not strictly necessary, could accordingly be deleted; that would entail a change in the wording of the second preambular paragraph.

4. In accordance with the position which it had adopted, his delegation would in any case abstain from voting on the draft resolution in question; if, however, its suggestion was not accepted, it would have to vote against it.

5. Mr. B. K. NEHRU (India) said that he acknowledged the cogency of the Venezuelan representative's remarks and was prepared to accept his proposal, particularly as the Indian delegation, when it had voted against resolution 1583 (XV), had stated that it did not regard the expenditure in question as "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter.

6. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) thought that to treat the draft resolution as a procedural matter was to underestimate its importance. What in fact was being proposed was that the Secretary-General should be authorized to continue to incur commitments in the Congo; that had great political significance. Moreover, his delegation did not agree that the General Assembly and the Committee had the right to consider and to take a decision on that matter. The Security Council alone could decide whether the operations in the Congo should be continued and, if so, on what scale. Lastly, such expenditure was contrary to the purposes of the Security Council resolutions of 14 July, 22 July and 9 August 1960,¹ and to other decisions taken subsequently.

7. In view of the importance of the issue, it was necessary that representatives should be given time to receive instructions and to state the position of their delegations. He found it surprising that the Chairman should be asking for a vote to be taken so soon, in view of the fact that rules 80 and 121 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly stipulated that, as a general rule, no proposal should be discussed or put to the vote at any meeting unless copies of it had been circulated to all delegations not later than the day preceding the meeting. It was not right to curtail the discussion in that way when the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom had been able to speak at their convenience. In any case, hasty decisions should be avoided.

8. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the rules of procedure referred to by the USSR representative also provided that the Chairman might permit the discussion

¹ Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, documents S/4387, S/4405, and S/4426, respectively.

and consideration of amendments, or of motions as to procedure, even though those amendments and motions had not been circulated or had only been circulated the same day. As the representatives of India and Venezuela had said, the decision to be taken in no way prejudged those of the General Assembly. Lastly, the decision was a matter of urgency, since the authorization given to the Secretary-General under resolution 1590 (XV) was valid only until 31 March.

9. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he saw no reason for departing from the normal procedure. The question of the financing of the operations in the Congo had been under consideration for a long time; there was no justification for waiting until the last minute to submit a proposal of that kind and then pleading that the situation was urgent.

10. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) expressed his thanks to the Indian representative for having accepted the Venezuelan representative's suggestion. He would have been compelled to vote against the original text of draft resolution A/C.5/L.657 for the same reasons as those given by the representative of Venezuela. He would abstain from voting on the amended text. Unfortunately, it was not the first time that the Committee was faced with a draft resolution of that kind: requests were made to it for appropriations, while the question of how those appropriations would be financed was postponed until a later date. Methods of financing were subsequently adopted despite the serious objections raised by many countries.

11. Nevertheless, he agreed that the draft resolution should be put to the vote as soon as possible in view of the fact that the authorization granted to the Secretary-General would expire very shortly.

12. Mr. MOLEROV (Bulgaria) associated himself with the comments made by the USSR representative. The matter had been raised at short notice and many delegations had been unable to ascertain the views of the chairman of their delegation. It was particularly undesirable that a hasty decision should be taken in view of the fact that the matter was one on which there were far-reaching differences of opinion.

13. The CHAIRMAN put the Indian draft resolution, as amended, to the vote.

The draft resolution, as amended (A/C.5/L.657), was adopted by 38 votes to 9, with 23 abstentions.

14. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Committee should authorize the Rapporteur to report directly to the General Assembly on the decision taken.

It was so decided.

15. Mr. ANDONI (Albania) said that he had intended to ask for a roll-call vote but, in the prevailing atmosphere of haste, he had been unable to do so. His delegation had voted against the draft resolution because, like everything relating to ONUC, it was solely a matter for the Security Council. His country would not make any contribution towards the financing of such an illegal operation.

16. Mr. GREZ (Chile) said that he had voted for the draft resolution since it would make it possible to avoid bringing the United Nations operation in the Congo to a full stop. Any share in that expenditure that might be taken by his country would depend on the approval of the Chilean Parliament and on the attitude of the other Latin American countries.

17. Mr. QUIJANO (Argentina) said that he had voted for the draft resolution since, without in any way

prejudging the substance of the question of the Congo operation, it enabled the Secretary-General to continue to carry out the instructions which he had been given, pending a decision by the General Assembly.

18. Mr. PENTEADO (Brazil) explained that, while he had voted for the draft resolution, his vote in no way committed his country with regard to the methods whereby the operation would be financed.

19. Mr. CUTTS (Australia) thought it regrettable that it should have been necessary to depart from the terms of rule 80 (121) of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly; a draft resolution could quite as easily have been circulated to delegations during the preceding few days. The fault did not lie with the Secretary-General, any more than it did with the members of delegations who, like the Secretary-General, had long known the urgency of the position and had been aware of the date on which the authorization previously granted to the Secretary-General would expire. But, regrettable though it was, the departure from the rules of procedure was fully justified by the urgency of the situation.

20. The Indian representative had been perfectly right to stress the fact that the draft resolution which had just been approved was of a purely provisional and technical nature and in no way prejudged the decisions which would be taken by the General Assembly. Speaking as Rapporteur, he said that, in submitting the draft resolution to the General Assembly, he would stress those two aspects of the proposal.

21. Mr. MOLEROV (Bulgaria) said that, during the first part of the session, he had voted against resolution 1590 (XV); he had just voted against the draft resolution for the same reasons. In accordance with Articles 11, 43 and 48 of the Charter, any measure of that kind came solely within the province of the Security Council. It followed that the Fifth Committee had no authority to take a decision of any kind until the Security Council had dealt with the matter. The Fifth Committee had taken an improper course which had had disastrous effects on the budget of the Organization. If matters continued in that way, it was not only the budget that would be destroyed but the United Nations itself. In his view, contrary to what the representative of India had said, the resolution which had just been adopted did in fact affect the substance of the question and it had been for that reason that he had voted against it.

22. Mr. SIM NHOK (Cambodia) said that, as he had already stated, his country could not pay more than one million old French francs. He had abstained in the recent vote because Cambodia was faced with serious difficulties; many of his fellow countrymen had had to return to the country as refugees as a result of the ill-treatment which they had received in the Republic of Viet-Nam. The appeals which Cambodia had made to the United Nations in that connexion had always fallen on deaf ears.

23. U AUNG THANT (Burma) thought that the draft resolution submitted by India was necessary in order to bridge the gap which would have occurred between the date of expiry of the authorization given to the Secretary-General in connexion with the financing of the operation and the decision which would be reached by the General Assembly. His delegation had abstained, not because it did not realize the difficulties of the position, but because it could not as yet accept any definite financial commitments. He hoped nevertheless that he would soon be able to inform the Committee of his Government's

position with regard to the financing of ONUC expenditure.

24. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, as his delegation had already pointed out, the question of the 1961 cost estimates for the "United Nations operations" in the Congo had to be decided in the light of the decisions taken by the Security Council concerning, in particular, the extent and duration of those operations and the dispatch of contingents by individual Member States, since such questions, which were associated with "measures" for the maintenance of international peace and security, came within the exclusive province of the Security Council and could not be settled by the General Assembly; they certainly could not be settled by the Secretary-General. His delegation had already drawn attention to the fact that Mr. Hammarskjöld's attempts to secure the Fifth Committee's endorsement of the decisions which he had taken on those matters constituted a flagrant violation of the Charter, a violation which would have grave consequences for the Organization itself and for the peace of the world. His delegation had stated that any decision by the General Assembly to make an appropriation of \$135 million for ONUC in 1961 would be invalid and would be disregarded by the USSR; it proposed that the report of the Secretariat (A/4703), which was dealing with matters solely within the province of the Security Council, should be forwarded to the Council.

25. The "United Nations operations" in the Congo were organized in a one-sided way which was contrary to the interests of the Congolese people and to those of the countries of the African continent as a whole. It was an acknowledged fact that, in any operation and above all in an operation of a highly political nature, the recruitment and distribution of staff was of particular importance; that was especially true where the operations in the Congo were concerned. Their purpose, according to the directives given by the Security Council, was to assist the Congolese Government headed by Mr. Patrice Lumumba to repel the aggression on the part of the Belgian colonialists, whose aim it was to dismember the young Republic with a view to retaining their hold over Katanga and Kasai, where the Union minière was making enormous profits. In the event, as a result of the way in which Mr. Hammarskjöld had recruited and distributed the staff, United Nations action had had exactly the opposite effect: it was the colonialists who had been helped, while the lawful Government had been prevented from fulfilling its functions, and conditions had been created which had favoured the transfer of power to the accents of the colonialists.

26. All the senior posts were held by nationals of the United States and of other countries belonging to the Western military alliances. For example, 62 per cent of the staff appointed to the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General were nationals of the Western Powers; the heads of the administrative and financial departments were United States nationals. It was hardly necessary to say that that staff did not include a single national of the USSR or of the other socialist countries; not only so, but—and that was a strange thing in the case of operations associated with an African problem of major importance—there were only two nationals of African countries on the staff of the Special Representative. It was clear that, in the matter of the distribution of staff assigned to that Office, the Secretary-General was following the same policy as in the case of the staff of the Secretariat as a whole.

27. As for the military staff—which did not include a single national of the socialist countries—more than 60 per cent were nationals of the Western countries. In reply to the representative of Canada, who had claimed that there were no Canadian military personnel in the Congo, he would point out that the information on which the Soviet delegation had based itself had in no way been invented and had been provided by the Secretariat itself. There were only twelve Africans, all of whom were in subordinate posts. At the Kamina base, out of a total staff of thirty-seven, twenty-seven were nationals of countries which were members of Western military alliances and there was not a single African. In all, 40.8 per cent of the staff assigned to "civilian operations" were nationals of those countries and all the senior posts were held by representatives of countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Office of the Chief of Civilian Operations, which contained only one Ghanaian and one Guinean, had been set up without the authority of the Security Council; it had taken over control and it had allowed the government of Mr. Patrice Lumumba to be deprived of all economic and financial aid and had permitted conditions to be created which were favourable to the *coup d'état* by Mobutu's gangs. In the general services and in the field offices, 60 per cent of the staff came from countries which were members of Western blocs and there were only five Africans. In all, 45 per cent of all the staff involved in "United Nations operations" in the Congo were nationals of countries which were members of Western alliances and nationals of those countries occupied all the senior posts; the Africans represented a negligible percentage.

28. The question of the Congo being one of major political importance, one would have thought that responsibility for dealing with it at Headquarters would have been entrusted exclusively to the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs. Mr. Hammarskjöld, however, obviously held other views, as that Department was headed by a USSR national. In actual fact, the over-all direction of the operations at Headquarters was in the hands of Mr. Cordier, a United States national, and of Mr. Bunche and his two immediate associates, all three of whom were likewise United States nationals.

29. The reason Mr. Hammarskjöld had adopted such a biased attitude in the recruitment and deployment of personnel was that his Congo policy was aimed not at consolidating that country's institutions and lawful Government but, on the contrary, at strengthening the hand of the dissident and pro-colonialist forces aligned behind Mobutu, Tshombe, Ileo and Kalonji, as numerous representatives, including Mr. Nkrumah, had pointed out at the current session. At the beginning of December 1960, the United Nations senior consultant on finance had made the necessary arrangements for a loan of 500 million Congolese francs from the Ruanda-Urundi Bank of issue, which was entirely under Belgian control, for the purpose of strengthening the position of the puppets, Ileo and Mobutu. The United Nations had also played an active part in the granting of another loan of 250 million Congolese francs to Mobutu's gangs which had sent Mr. Patrice Lumumba to Katanga and were responsible for his death. The United Nations had done nothing to prevent Mr. Patrice Lumumba from being handed over to the colonialists; it had, on the contrary, deprived the lawful Government of the use of the broadcasting station and airfields and had hindered its efforts to re-establish order in the country. Far from having even tried to prevent the disintegration of the young Republic it had, on the contrary, actually contributed to that process. For

instance, Mr. Hammarskjöld, who had not wished to meet Mr. Patrice Lumumba, had hastened to call on Mr. Tshombe and had formally reviewed the latter's military gangs, thus providing the subject for a photograph which was reproduced on the cover of the *United Nations Review* of September 1960 as a touching testimony to the unity between Mr. Hammarskjöld and Mr. Tshombe.

30. In view of the fact that the conduct of the operations in the Congo had run directly counter to the decisions taken by the Security Council on 14 July, 22 July and 9 August 1960,² the USSR delegation had already indicated during the first part of the current session that it saw no reason to contribute to their financing; it had stated at the same time that it waived all claims for the reimbursement of the expenditure incurred by the USSR in transporting Ghanaian troops. It had pointed out that those mainly responsible, the Belgian colonialists, should bear the major burden of the expenses, and had stressed the need for urgent measures to put an end to the irresponsible spending in the Congo in order to arrest the financial crisis confronting the United Nations. Lastly, it had proposed that the operations should be terminated within one month and all foreign troops withdrawn, so that the Congolese people could run their own affairs.

31. As he had said before, the only correct solution to the crisis facing the United Nations was strict compliance with the relevant provisions of the Charter, namely, Articles 11, 43 and 48, which made it clear that questions relating to the maintenance of peace and security were within the province of the Security Council. The General Assembly was not competent to deal with the questions covered in the Secretariat's report on operations which had been conducted in contravention of the Security Council decisions and to which the United Nations as such was not committed. It was only by adopting that solution that the United Nations would avoid irretrievable damage to its prestige in the eyes of the Member States with all the serious consequences which that would entail.

32. Mr. KLUTZNICK (United States of America), exercising his right of reply, said that the USSR representative had merely restated the same idea, namely, that the question should be referred to the Security Council with the result that one began to wonder whether the USSR was or was not a member of the Council. Since the USSR was so anxious that the matter should be

referred to the Security Council, why did it not do so itself? Continuous repetition did not make that idea any more convincing, especially as it was being repeated by a delegation with a seat in the Security Council.

33. No sooner had the United States offered a voluntary contribution than the USSR representative had interpreted that step as a method of influencing and controlling the Fifth Committee. In point of fact, the United States Government would welcome proposals for an alternative solution, which would relieve it of that exceptional burden. The United States Government having offered a contribution, it was now for the delegations as a whole to decide whether the offer should be accepted and, if so, on what conditions and to what extent; that was a collective responsibility. It was wholly incorrect to claim that the United States Government had offered help as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the Committee.

34. In his approach to the problem he, a new-comer to the General Assembly, had the best interests of the United Nations at heart. There was no need to open a new chapter in the cold war. He would now ask the USSR representative in public, having already made the same request in private, to put forward constructive proposals instead of making constant references to the Security Council and avoiding the real problem, which was that of the allocation of responsibility and expenses. The United States was prepared to offer the USSR and all other States sincere and constructive co-operation.

35. Mr. N'SELE (Congo (Leopoldville)) said he could not refrain from commenting on the tendentious statements by certain States whose ill-will was obvious and which resorted to delaying tactics instead of dealing with the questions on which the Fifth Committee had to take a decision, namely, those relating to the financing of the costs incurred in the Congo and of the economic aid which he had requested in his capacity as representative of the Congo. The question of the legality of the Congolese Government would not be decided in Prague or in any other capital. Whereas the United Nations should be relieving the poverty of the small and the weak, certain of its Members were acting exclusively in their own private interests and were asking that the issue should be referred to the Security Council so as to give the rank weeds they had sown in the Congo time to grow. A clear-cut decision, that would enable the Congolese Government, in its turn, to take the appropriate measures, should be adopted without delay.

The meeting rose at 5.5 p.m.

² *Ibid.*