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CONTENTS

	Page
<i>Financial implications of the draft resolutions submitted by the First Committee in document A/5279 on agenda item 77.</i>	151
<i>Agenda item 62:</i>	
<i>Budget estimates for the financial year 1963 (continued)</i>	
<i>First reading (continued)</i>	
<i>Part V. Technical programmes (continued):</i>	
<i>section 13. Economic development; section 14. Social activities; section 15. Human rights activities; section 16. Public administration; section 17. Narcotic drugs control</i>	152

Chairman: Mr. Jan Paul BANNIER
(Netherlands).

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE FIRST COMMITTEE IN DOCUMENT A/5279 ON AGENDA ITEM 77* (A/C.5/940)

1. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee, in accordance with rule 154 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, to consider the financial implications of the draft resolutions submitted by the First Committee in paragraph 16 of document A/5279. The Secretary-General had submitted a statement of financial implications (A/C.5/940) which had just been considered by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

2. Mr. AGHNIDES (Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) said that as it was uncertain whether the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests and the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament would meet concurrently and where the latter would meet, an amount of about \$31,000 a week (assuming the session lasted approximately four weeks) appeared to be a reasonable estimate of expenditure if the Eighteen-Nation Committee met at Geneva and if the Sub-Committee did not meet simultaneously. Provision should also be made for non-recurring expenditure estimated at \$20,000 in respect of travel of temporary and Headquarters staff. On the other hand, if the two bodies met concurrently at Geneva, the estimated expenditure would be increased by \$17,000 a week. The Advisory Committee understood that if the Eighteen-Nation Committee should decide to hold all or some of its meetings at Headquarters, the level of expenditure would be significantly lower.

* The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests.

3. Mr. MALHOTRA (Nepal) pointed out that the Secretary-General's statement of financial implications appeared to be based on the assumption that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would again meet at Geneva. However, as the Chairman of the Advisory Committee had said that the costs would be substantially lower if the meetings were held in New York, the representative of the Secretary-General might wish to indicate whether the Secretariat was of the same opinion.

4. Mr. KIRKBRIDE (Secretariat) said that it was not yet possible for the Secretariat to estimate what the cost of holding the meetings in New York would be. It would be difficult to provide full interpretation services, verbatim records and translation into four languages in the middle of a General Assembly session. It was also necessary to consider the impact of such meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on the workload of Headquarters and to decide what proportion of the workload would have to be carried over to 1963 and what the financial consequences of those adjustments would be. Furthermore, it was not yet known how many meetings the Eighteen-Nation Committee would hold at Geneva or in New York. He could, however, confirm the comment made by the Chairman of the Advisory Committee concerning the difference in cost between New York and Geneva.

5. The CHAIRMAN said that, if the Committee agreed, he proposed to inform the President of the General Assembly that the adoption of the draft resolutions recommended by the First Committee could give rise to additional expenditure estimated at not more than \$213,000 or \$145,000 depending on whether the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests met at Geneva concurrently or not, and that the Secretary-General proposed to report again on the matter later in the present session, as soon as it was possible to submit a precise estimate of the supplementary provision required in the 1962 budget for those purposes.

6. Mr. SOKIRKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) thought that the Chairman should point out in his communication to the President of the General Assembly that the expenditure would be lower if the meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee were held in New York.

7. Mr. MALHOTRA (Nepal) supported that suggestion and requested the Chairman also to mention the difficulty of organizing the meetings in New York while the Assembly was in session.

8. The CHAIRMAN agreed to those suggestions and proposed that, subject to those amendments, the Committee should approve the text which he had just read out and which he would transmit immediately to the President of the General Assembly.

It was so decided.

AGENDA ITEM 62

Budget estimates for the financial year 1963 (A/5121 and Corr.1, A/5179, A/5205, A/5207, A/5243, A/5263, A/5267, A/5272 and Corr.1, A/5280, A/C.5/919, A/C.5/925, A/C.5/926, A/C.5/928, A/C.5/930, A/C.5/931 and Corr.1, A/C.5/935, A/C.5/937, A/C.5/942, A/C.5/L.726, A/C.5/L.730, A/C.5/L.733, A/C.5/L.734, A/C.5/L.735, A/C.5/L.736) (continued)

First reading (A/C.5/L.726) (continued)

PART V. TECHNICAL PROGRAMMES (A/5205, A/5207, A/C.5/937, A/C.5/L.736) (continued): SECTION 13. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; SECTION 14. SOCIAL ACTIVITIES; SECTION 15. HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVITIES; SECTION 16. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION; SECTION 17. NARCOTIC DRUGS CONTROL

9. Mr. MORRIS (Liberia) noted that the trend of the discussion on section 13 and 14, and on chapter I (Training, Consultation and Research) of section 16, seemed to be in favour of the Secretary-General relying to an ever-increasing extent on voluntary contributions for the expansion of technical programmes. In his eloquent statement (938th meeting) on the two different methods of financing technical assistance programmes, the Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs had expressed the view that the General Assembly would continue to support that twofold method of financing. The Liberian delegation shared that view.

10. In his statement the Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs had emphasized that the Secretariat was well aware of the concerns and attitudes of the Governments contributing to the voluntary programmes and of the principal contributors to the regular budget. It would appear that the latter were in favour of reducing the proportion of the regular budget allocated to technical assistance and of increasing the volume of voluntary contributions. However, too much reliance should not be placed on programmes financed from voluntary contributions because, as the Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs had said, the bodies responsible for the execution of technical assistance programmes could not help observing that the increase in total contributions announced at the 1962 United Nations Pledging Conference on the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund had been smaller than expected. In an area like technical assistance where needs were far in excess of the available resources, it therefore seemed necessary to provide assistance from the regular budget. Furthermore, the programmes financed by voluntary contributions seemed to have what might be described as a missionary flavour, the beneficiaries being apparently expected to act as passive recipients of the gifts bestowed upon them while the major contributors showed off their wealth. On the other hand, technical assistance financed from the regular budget enabled the beneficiary Governments to participate more actively and made them more aware of their responsibilities and of the source of the funds. In conclusion, he said he thought that the appropriation of \$6.4 million requested by the Secretary-General was a realistic figure and that he was also prepared to support the controlled expansion of staff which should make it possible fully to achieve the objectives of the technical assistance programmes.

11. Mr. HODGES (United Kingdom) recalled that during the general discussion on the budget estimates, his delegation had said that it would be unable to support the Secretary-General's proposal in the 1963 estimates for part V to be maintained at the same level as the appropriations for 1962. The debate now in progress was important not only because it dealt with the real and urgent needs of the less developed countries, but also because it raised serious questions of financial principle. The United Kingdom did not object to a "token" provision for technical assistance being included in the regular budget for financing by all Member States. However, the Committee and the other bodies concerned should reflect thoroughly on all aspects of the problem before deciding on the appropriation level.

12. In his statement at the 938th meeting, the Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs had sought to defend the Secretary-General's proposal to maintain the 1963 appropriations at the same level as in 1962 in the absence of policy decisions by the General Assembly or specific recommendations by the Economic and Social Council or TAB. The United Kingdom delegation would not dispute that the Secretary-General was legally entitled to request whatever appropriations he thought necessary, but it must not be forgotten that the high level of the 1962 appropriations had been attributable to special circumstances. A quite arbitrary estimate could not be justified merely by listing the 1962 commitments which had continued into 1963 and giving a very brief account of the new requests already received. A different approach would have caused less difficulty to the Committee. Until 1960 the level of expenditure under part V had been maintained at around \$2.5 million a year. In 1960, the General Assembly had granted the Secretary-General a special augmentation of \$5 million under sections 13, 14 and 16 for the period 1961-1962. His case had been well put and carefully documented, and the United Kingdom delegation, while maintaining its position of principle, had accepted the steep increase for that biennium. It had then been a question of an emergency situation. If it was claimed now that the emergency still prevailed, on the ground that requests for assistance were multiplying while contributions to the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund had not yet reached the target of \$150 million, he wished to point out that the Expanded Programme's share of that sum of \$150 million represented only one-third and that the pledges announced for 1963 were in fact already only 2 per cent below that target. It would perhaps be unreasonable to return to the pre-1960 level of appropriations, but the case had not been made for continuing the accidentally inflated 1962 level of appropriations into 1963. At all events, if 1962 was taken as a guide, the relevant figure should be that of actual expenditure rather than that of the appropriation approved. Perhaps the Controller could give some indication of how much of the current year's appropriation would be spent.

13. With regard to the twofold method of financing technical assistance activities, the Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs, while not claiming that there should be anything like an equal division had said that financing from the regular budget presented certain advantages. For his delegation, programmes financed by voluntary contributions had even greater advantages. For instance, the Expanded Programme covered the whole range of technical assistance, thanks to which it was able to avoid dup-

lication and to establish priorities. Any rigidity with which the funds of the Expanded Programme had initially been allocated had certainly been relaxed. For example, the Executive Chairman of TAB was now authorized to make contingency allocations up to 10 per cent of estimated resources, which was sufficient to meet many emergency requests. With an authorization of only 7 1/2 per cent, nearly \$4.25 million was used for that purpose in 1962.

14. His delegation's critical attitude towards the Secretary-General's proposals did not mean that it was insensitive to the needs of the countries submitting requests for assistance. The United Kingdom Government was itself supplying very substantial bilateral aid particularly to the newer and emerging members of the Commonwealth. Furthermore, it had recently announced an increase of 25 per cent in its voluntary contributions to the Expanded Programme and the Special Fund, in the belief that United Nations technical assistance could best be provided and any increase met through the main programmes financed from voluntary contributions.

15. The United Kingdom also considered that the Committee should examine the estimates for technical programmes in the context of the regular budget as a whole and of the financial situation of the Organization. As long as the Organization was moving inexorably towards either bankruptcy or a severe reduction in its activities, a policy of controlled expansion would remain as unacceptable for technical programmes as for staffing. As the Committee had no policy decisions to guide it, it should try to reach agreement on an appropriate sum and to establish a reasonable basis for future planning and financing. A reasonable approach would be to approve another special increase of \$5 million for 1963 and 1964, as for 1961 and 1962; the total amount of the 1963 appropriations for part V would be almost \$5 million. Another approach would follow the Argentine delegation's analysis by sections. His delegation was prepared to support the Advisory Committee's recommendations concerning sections 15 and 17 and also chapter II (operational executive and administrative personnel) of section 16: it was convinced that OPEX had proved its worth, and was not surprised at the number and the scope of new requests relating to that programme for 1963. In that connexion, he reminded the Committee that, as the Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs had explained to the Sudanese representative (939th meeting), the new requests received could not be taken as a reliable guide to the optimum level of appropriations; some of them would have to be eliminated or considered at a later date, and others transferred to more appropriate programmes.

16. For sections 13, 14 and 16 (chapter I), the Secretary-General was requesting total appropriations of \$5,335,000, the same figure as in 1962. The United Kingdom would be able to support a total under those headings of \$4.5 or \$4.75 million, thus bringing the total appropriations for part V to about \$5.75 million. That would involve reducing the appropriations under sections 13, 14 and 16 (chapter I) by about \$700,000, a reduction which some delegations might fear was excessive in the light of the magnitude and urgency of the needs to be met. But it was probable that the total contributions to the Expanded Programme for 1963 would exceed \$50 million and that the surplus would be enough to compensate for that reduction.

17. Not only would a total of \$5.75 million be reasonable for 1963 but the appropriations for 1964 and subsequent years could be stabilized at that level. That stabilization of expenditure under part V would help to rationalize the planning of technical assistance programmes, which should take into account technical assistance activities and needs as a whole and the total funds available from voluntary contributions. In that connexion, he welcomed the observations of the Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs on the need to work out better methods of matching programmes and resources.

18. In conclusion, he unreservedly supported the Advisory Committee's recommendation in paragraph 267 of its report (A/5207) that the normal practice of surrendering unobligated balances at the end of the year should again become applicable to sections 13, 14 and 16 (chapter I), whatever the 1963 level of appropriations for those sections. Many countries, including the United Kingdom, applied that method in the field of technical assistance without its giving rise to undue difficulties. If the Secretary-General found that requirement inconvenient, that could only serve to confirm his delegation's preference for the greater flexibility of the Expanded Programme.

19. Mr. KLUTZNICK (United States of America) stressed that the need to determine the level of appropriations for technical programmes in the regular budget presented the members of the Fifth Committee with a very difficult problem. The real problem was, of course, that there were more requests for technical assistance than could be met from the available funds, whether voluntarily contributed or assessed through the regular budget.

20. The United States Government had shown the importance it attached to technical assistance programmes by making substantial contributions to the Expanded Programme and to the operations of the Special Fund, by regularly paying its assessed share of the United Nations regular budget and the creation of the largest of the bilateral technical assistance programmes. Any proposals that his delegation might have to make in connexion with part V of the budget should therefore be viewed in the light of his country's deep concern about the importance of the programme as a whole.

21. It must be realized that the regular budget covered only a small part of the technical assistance made available through the United Nations family as a whole. The operations of the Expanded Programme and the Special Fund, the technical assistance activities of the specialized agencies, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and other bodies would continue to increase. All those programmes, most of which were financed from voluntary contributions, encountered the same problem of how best to satisfy priority needs. It was clear that a way must be found to rationalize not only one such programme but all of them in relation to one another. The multiplication of separate assistance programmes each confronted with priority demands, could only complicate the technical problem and must ultimately prove detrimental to the genuine priorities of recipient countries.

22. It was regrettable that the Technical Assistance Committee had not devoted adequate time at its summer session to consideration of the total problem occasioned by the ending of the two-year period for

which the emergency appropriation of \$5 million had been made in the regular budget. It was equally regrettable that the Economic and Social Council had not considered the impact of a changed condition. Thus no attempt had been made by competent bodies to determine the level of appropriations under part V of the budget in the context of the technical assistance programmes as a whole. Governmental bodies had therefore defaulted and they could not now find fault with the Secretary-General for requesting an appropriation at the same level as for 1962. On the other hand, to accept the Secretary-General's estimate blindly, without regard to its implications for the future and without provision for a careful examination of the situation of the technical assistance programmes as a whole and the position of the United Nations budget itself, would only compound an error already made.

23. It was true that contributions to the regular budget had always been paid more or less regularly. But some States which had been tardy in making their payments pleaded they did not have the money to pay. Care must be taken not to create a situation in which the regular budget might become insolvent. As the unavoidable expenditures under the regular budget would continue to increase, it was essential to avoid including in the budget any item of expenditure which could be financed otherwise. The United Nations must not reach beyond its means.

24. The United States delegation had long urged increased voluntary contributions to the Expanded Programme and the Special Fund. At the 1962 United Nations Pledging Conference on the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund, the United States Government had pledged \$60 million for the two programmes, subject to a matching formula of 40 per cent. If the needs of the recipient countries were to be met, it was essential to reach the goal of \$150 million which the General Assembly had set for the Expanded Programme and the Special Fund as soon as possible. If any other pathway was followed, the regular budget would soon reach a level that would make it unlikely that many of the smaller States would be able to pay their assessments.

25. The special appropriation of \$5 million for the two-year period 1961-1962 had been voted only to meet an emergency until the funds of the Expanded Programme and the Special Fund were adequate to handle the requests for assistance, including those from the new States. To continue such a practice indefinitely in face of the constantly growing needs for technical assistance would be to change the basic principle that technical assistance programmes should be financed mainly from voluntary funds.

26. In that connexion, he reminded the Committee that the figure of \$6.4 million was at best an accident. Originally, the Secretary-General had intended to spend the major portion of the special appropriation of \$5 million in 1961 and not in 1962. The fact that the figures he had originally given had been reversed during the execution of the programme was not sufficient justification for an appropriation of \$6.4 million in 1963. The Secretary-General was perfectly right in saying that there were not enough resources available to meet all the requests for technical assistance that was so badly needed; but the Committee would not solve that grave problem by adopting an accidental event as the base for appropriations for part V of the budget.

27. While sympathetic to suggestions made for holding the budget to a lower level, the United States delegation would not oppose the Secretary-General's recommendation, because it could not prove that it was unnecessary. But in supporting the Secretary-General's recommendation, it did so on the assumption that it would be the last time that an appropriation was requested under part V of the budget without consideration by the appropriate inter-governmental bodies of all the underlying questions which the Committee could not answer at the present time.

28. The United States delegation wished to make the following suggestions:

(i) For 1963, the appropriations for sections 13 to 17 should be made on the understanding that the Secretary-General would programme for those items within the approved amounts.

(ii) It should be agreed that, for 1963 and future years, the appropriation should not be supplemented by the carrying forward of funds or the re-appropriation of prior year funds for those activities.

(iii) The Secretary-General should avoid making any commitments in 1963 which might raise the budget for 1964 to a higher level than the 1963 appropriations or which would make it impossible or difficult reasonably to reduce the level for 1964, should the General Assembly so decide.

(iv) At its November 1962 session, TAC should be requested to analyse the relationship between the various programmes of technical assistance under its mandate and the regular budget programme with a view to providing guidance in order to ensure that all genuine priority needs were met under one or other of the programmes, to determine the effect on other programmes if the United Nations regular technical assistance programme was frozen at the level adopted for 1963, to establish the interrelationship, if any, between the activities financed from the regular budget and those financed otherwise, and to advise on such other matters as would be helpful to the General Assembly in considering at its eighteenth session the level of the appropriations for technical assistance to be included in the regular budget in future years.

(v) The views of TAC should be communicated promptly to the Secretary-General and to the Advisory Committee for review.

(vi) The Advisory Committee should report to the General Assembly, as a matter of urgency, its findings and recommendations on the possibility of stabilizing the appropriations for technical assistance in the regular budget for 1964.

(vii) The Advisory Committee should also make such other recommendations as might assist the Secretary-General and the General Assembly in rationalizing the relationship between the regular programme of technical assistance and the programmes financed from other sources.

(viii) If justified by the urgency of the needs for technical assistance which could not be met under the regular budget or the Expanded Programme, an emergency pledging conference should be convened early in 1963 to attempt to reach the goal of \$150 million.

29. If its suggestions were well received by the Committee, the United States delegation would prepare

a draft resolution covering the principal points just made.

30. Mr. CURTIS (Australia) considered that it would be unrealistic to maintain the regular budgetary appropriations for technical programmes at the same level as in 1960. The increase in the number of Member States and in technical assistance requirements, the more coherent and effective expressions of those requirements and the impetus which the United Nations Development Decade had given technical assistance activities, indicated that it was undesirable to contemplate returning to the 1960 level.

31. When it came to deciding how much to appropriate under the 1963 budget, the situation was less clear. The figure \$6.4 million was wholly arbitrary and accidental. It might have been more reasonable to consider the level of United Nations technical assistance activities for the two-year period (1961 to 1962) with which the General Assembly was concerned, that was \$10 million for the two years or an average of \$5 million a year. The argument that an appropriation of \$6.4 million was necessary to meet genuine needs could not be carried too far because from the point of view of needs an even larger amount might be inadequate.

32. It should be recognized that the regular programme of technical assistance should not represent more than a small part of technical assistance activities as a whole; one of its main purposes was to enable the Secretary-General to grant technical assistance requests which were unsuitable for the Expanded Programme. Care must be taken not to upset the balance between the regular United Nations programme and the Expanded Programme and between part V and the rest of the regular budget. However the fact that the United Nations had had \$6.4 million at its disposal for one year's technical assistance activities had inevitably had its repercussions in practice. New needs had emerged and new requests for assistance had been made. The Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs had noted that the question should be viewed in terms of an evolving, dynamic situation. The situation had changed since 1960 and even since last year. For example, six new Members had just been admitted to the United Nations, the budget was increasing in size, staff resources had been increased by about 5 per cent and the ceiling on the expenses of OPI had been raised. Furthermore, the results of the 1962 United Nations Pledging Conference on the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund had fallen short of some expectations. It would be unrealistic not to take all those factors into account in setting the level of United Nations technical assistance activities for 1963. It appeared, furthermore, that the recipient countries might have been led to expect that \$6.4 million would be appropriated for 1963.

33. It was true that TAC had not gone into the matter in detail. However, it had taken note favourably of the proposal that the programme should be kept at the same level in 1963 as in 1962.

34. He therefore felt able to go along with the sum of \$6.4 million requested by the Secretary-General for the financial year 1963 on the understanding that efforts would be made to stabilize the level of appropriations thereafter, and that the whole complex of problems relating to United Nations technical assistance activities would be thoroughly re-examined taking

into account the suggestions just made by the United States representative.

35. He agreed with the Advisory Committee that the normal practice of surrender of unobligated balances at the year's end should continue to apply to part V of the budget estimates. Obligations extending from one financial year to the next should be met out of new appropriations.

36. Again, he did not think that fellowships which were not taken up should be kept open for a two-year period. The Technical Assistance Committee had taken no definite decision on that matter, and it might be re-examined, perhaps after further consideration by the Advisory Committee.

37. Mr. TURNER (Controller) explained in reply to the United Kingdom representative that the only activities which would show a saving at the end of the financial year were those provided for in section 13 and section 16, chapter I. So far as could now be foreseen, those savings would probably amount to some \$300,000.

38. Mr. FEKKES (Netherlands) said that, after hearing the statement by the Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs, he was more than ever convinced of the need—already made very plain by the Secretary-General—to maintain the appropriations under part V at the 1962 level. Those programmes were bound to expand: that was abundantly clear from their success and from the number of valid requests.

39. Some delegations objected to the inclusion of estimates appropriations for technical programmes in the regular budget. His delegation had consistently held that it would be wrong to separate operational activities from administrative activities in the budget. There was nothing in the Charter to warrant any such separation. The United Nations should not be dependent on voluntary contributions for the execution of the main tasks entrusted to it, whether they were economic, social or political in character.

40. Some delegations likewise considered that the OPEX programme should not be included among the technical programmes. That was entirely within their rights, but it was not for the Fifth Committee to debate the usefulness of the OPEX programme or its proper place in the budget.

41. The level of the estimate had also given rise to objections. Some representatives had asked for it to be reduced, and from a strictly budgetary point of view their arguments were clearly well founded. It was plain, however, that the Assembly had been over-optimistic in estimating, in 1960, that the emergency which had justified a supplementary appropriation of \$5 million would not last more than two years.

42. His delegation considered that a reasonable appropriation for the technical programmes should be made in the regular budget in order to supplement the assistance provided under the Expanded Programme, which was financed by voluntary contributions. The amount proposed by the Secretary-General seemed reasonable in the light of the developing countries' needs and the total amount of the regular budget.

43. Lastly, he considered that the Secretary-General had been fully entitled to follow the procedure he had chosen. The technical programmes had been approved by TAC and the Economic and Social Council, and a report from the Second or Third Committee would probably have made little difference. For all those

reasons his delegation would support the Secretary-General's proposals.

44. Mr. TEMPLETON (New Zealand) said that he attached great importance to the United Nations regular programme of technical assistance and would be unhappy if the Secretary-General proved unable, for lack of funds, to meet all the requests made under that programme in fields essential for economic development. Considering that the emergency situation for which the Assembly had made provision for the period 1961-1962 still existed; that more new countries would attain independence; that their technical assistance requirements would take their place alongside those of earlier recipients; and that the latter's needs were increasing at the same time, he considered it imperative to fix the appropriations for United Nations technical assistance at a level higher than that of 1960.

45. Since approval of the Secretary-General's estimate of \$6.4 million involved a major policy decision, his delegation would have preferred to see the estimate based on more cogent considerations, and not merely on the fact that the 1961 appropriations had not been used until 1962.

46. However, the increase proposed was not such as to upset the existing balance between the regular programme and the Expanded Programme. Furthermore the number of valid requests for assistance had increased considerably, and the Advisory Committee itself recognized (A/5207, para. 264) that serious practical difficulties, involving delicate problems, would arise if any sharp reduction were to occur in the level of funds for the technical assistance programme. Consequently his delegation was prepared to vote in favour of the appropriation requested, the more so since the Development Decade required a special effort in the matter of technical assistance. Any cut-back in programmes would be detrimental not only to the countries concerned but also to the United Nations itself.

47. His delegation would accordingly vote in favour of the estimate, but would do so on the understanding that the normal practice would be restored and there would be no carry-over of unspent funds at the year's end.

48. On the other hand, it did not seem possible at the present time to fix a satisfactory new norm for United Nations technical assistance activities; the Organization's financial situation was too precarious for that. The number of Members would not increase indefinitely, and it would gradually become possible to meet new States' requests for assistance out of the Expanded Programme, whose resources could be expected to increase as time went on.

49. It would appear that the only way to determine the proper level of United Nations technical activities would be to make a thorough survey of future technical assistance needs. He therefore supported the United States delegation's proposal that TAC should make a detailed and comprehensive study of the problems involved in technical assistance activities and that the Advisory Committee should make recommendations on the subject to the General Assembly.

50. Mr. MUZIK (Czechoslovakia) recalled that during the general discussion (923rd meeting) his delegation had proposed, in the interests of all Member States and of the technical assistance programme itself, that

the sum of \$6.4 million appropriated for the regular United Nations programme of technical assistance should be transferred to the Expanded Programme, and that the two programmes should be merged. That would eliminate all duplication of effort, would make for economies, and would make it possible to standardize the rules and principles governing the entire field of technical assistance. Moreover, Member States would be able, as they already were in the case of the Expanded Programme to pay all their contributions to technical assistance in their national currencies; that would facilitate the payment of regular budget contributions in convertible currency and enable Member States to provide larger sums for the technical assistance programmes. Only on those terms could his delegation agree to keep the appropriations for technical assistance at the level of \$6.4 million.

51. The Technical Assistance Committee had repeatedly stressed that the fundamental principle was to leave developing countries free in the choice of projects and in the establishment of priorities. To split up United Nations technical assistance into two programmes between which the recipient countries had no freedom of choice was fundamentally contrary to that principle, especially since the total appropriation for the regular programme was further divided into rigid sections. The rigidity of technical assistance financed out of the regular budget ran counter to the efforts that had been made over the same period to make the Expanded Programme more flexible, for example, by eliminating the fixed percentages assigned hitherto to the specialized agencies.

52. In that connexion, he was not entirely satisfied with the reply which the Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs had given at the 939th meeting to his question regarding the proportion of United Nations technical assistance appropriations that was allocated to industrialization projects. The correct solution would not be found by maintaining the present system of fixed appropriations under the various technical assistance sections, a system which compelled Member States to confirm their requests for assistance within the limits of each section, even in the case of the OPEX programme, to which many delegations were flatly opposed. The correct course to follow was that which had been followed in the case of the Expanded Programme: namely, to eliminate all the rigid subdivisions of the regular programme, especially the division of the total appropriation into several sections, each with a fixed budget. If those internal partitions were removed and if the Expanded Programme and the regular programme were merged, the developing countries would have an entirely free choice of the projects and the types of assistance they needed.

53. The advantages of that proposal were obvious, both for the recipient countries and for those which contribute to the financing of technical assistance. Each Member State could undertake to pay to the Expanded Programme, in its national currency, a sum at least equal to that which it had hitherto been paying in convertible currency to the regular budget. In that way, instead of shrinking, the availability of funds for technical assistance would rapidly increase.

54. Moreover, that proposal was justified by the fact that the offers of assistance made by Czechoslovakia in 1961 had not been fully utilized under the regular programme of technical assistance. The 382 experts

sent on mission under the regular programme had not included one Czechoslovak expert, and among the 753 fellowships awarded under the same programme not a single fellowship-holder had been sent to Czechoslovakia. In contrast, the Czechoslovak contribution to the Expanded Programme during the same period had been fully utilized; nine Czechoslovak experts had been sent abroad, and fourteen fellowship-holders had received training in Czechoslovakia under the Expanded Programme.

55. That state of affairs made it obvious that senior officials of the United Nations Secretariat were openly discriminating against Czechoslovakia. That was possible because there was no authority to direct and supervise the activities of the regular programme as TAC directed those of the Expanded Programme.

56. Czechoslovakia was anxious to participate in technical assistance activities to the full extent of its resources, as was shown by the 50 per cent increase in its pledged contributions to the Expanded Programme for 1963. Nevertheless his delegation could not support the estimates for part V unless the present structure of UNTA was changed.

57. Mr. KITTANI (Iraq), said that he wished first of all to state his Government's general position on part V. He had already pointed out that technical assistance activities were a fundamental and unquestionable obligation laid on the United Nations by the Charter and by several General Assembly resolutions. His delegation could not side with those who seemed to regard the regular United Nations programme of technical assistance as a stop-gap for the shortcomings of the Expanded Programme. It had often been said that the appropriations for the regular programme could be reduced when the total appropriations for technical assistance had reached \$150 million. That was not the case. In the first place the figure of \$150 million was not the final goal but an immediate objective which had been set a few years previously and which, in any case, had not yet been reached, all of which seemed a very poor argument for reducing the appropriations for the regular programme. In the second place, both technical assistance programmes were indispensable. They were mutually complementary and must be kept in balance. If the funds allotted to the Expanded Programme and the Special Fund were increasing and the total regular budget was doing the same, it was natural that larger appropriations should also be made for part V of the budget. Moreover, the appropriations for part V would form a smaller proportion of the total budget in 1963 than they had in 1962.

58. He could not agree with those delegations which, although not excessively disturbed by the increase in the total budget, seemed worried beyond measure by the prospect that the appropriations under part V of the budget might be increased or even maintained at their present level. Most of the countries concerned were not recipients of technical assistance but countries which helped to finance it.

59. Since a general increase in the budget estimates had been accepted; since, moreover, the emergency situation that had given rise to the special programme of technical assistance for 1961 and 1962 had persisted and even intensified; and lastly, since the United Nations had shown, *inter alia* by launching the United Nations Development Decade, its willingness to meet the economic and social needs of the under-developed

countries, it was essential to increase the appropriations for all the United Nations technical assistance programmes—the Expanded Programme, the Special Fund and the regular programme.

60. From the budgetary point of view, part V differed essentially from the other parts of the budget. The appropriations made for part V were of necessity fixed in an arbitrary fashion, for the countries' needs were always far in excess of the funds available. Since the number of requests for assistance addressed to the United Nations was increasing at an incredible rate, it was obvious that the Secretary-General could not have requested a smaller appropriation for 1963 than he had received for 1962. The appropriations for part V had gone through a long period of stagnation prior to 1960, but those activities had been given fresh impetus by the institution of a programme for 1961-1962, and the appropriation now requested by the Secretary-General represented a strict minimum. His delegation would support the Secretary-General's request and unreservedly associate itself with the Advisory Committee in asking the Fifth Committee to take a decision of principle on the subject.

61. Mr. NOLAN (Ireland) said that he would support the Secretary-General's request for an appropriation of \$6.4 million for sections 13 to 17 of the 1963 budget estimates. Those sections formed the very basis of the United Nations regular programme of technical assistance, and their inclusion in the budget merely reflected the responsibility of the Member States under the Charter for economic and social development. Therefore, if certain delegations wished to challenge that principle, it was not for the Fifth Committee to take a general policy decision of such importance. Furthermore, in the existing circumstances, such action would only widen the area of disagreement about the financing of United Nations operational programmes and the very aims of the Organization. For those various reasons his delegation would oppose any attempt to delete from the regular budget the provision of funds for a technical assistance programme.

62. For the same reasons it would also oppose any proposal to eliminate activities approved by other United Nations organs, including the OPEX programme, which the Irish delegation had always supported. That programme was an essential part of the United Nations technical assistance operations and, if certain delegations wished to challenge its very existence, the Second Committee would seem a more suitable forum in which to raise that problem.

63. Since the amount of the appropriations for technical assistance had to be determined in the light of existing realities, resources available, and the relationship of those resources to the over-all activities of the United Nations, the figure of \$6.4 million proposed by the Secretary-General did not seem excessive as compared, for instance, with the \$6 million appropriated for public information activities in 1963 or with commercial income—a secondary income, after all—which would exceed \$6 million in 1963. The same might be said of any sum of that magnitude—say \$5 million or \$7 million—but the figure of \$6.4 million requested by the Secretary-General had been fixed in accordance with the present level of technical assistance activities. Any reduction in the appropriation below that figure would entail a reduction in the technical assistance activities, which would not be consistent with the present realities including, in particular, the urgent needs of the developing countries. It

would not make much sense to reduce the level of technical assistance activities below that of the previous year. On the other hand it would be desirable to fix a stable level of appropriations which would facilitate forward planning by the Secretariat. In that connexion he favoured the detailed study which the United States representative had requested.

64. He wished to draw the Committee's attention to the difficulty of fixing priorities for technical assistance programmes without prejudice to essential activities. His delegation also considered it necessary to reinstate the normal budgetary practice of surrendering unobligated balances at the end of each financial year. An exception to that practice had been made in the past two years in respect of some appropriations for technical assistance programmes but in supporting the credit of \$6.4 million his delegation assumed that the orthodox procedure would now be revived.

65. Mr. AKE (Ivory Coast) expressed regret that he had not had an opportunity to speak earlier. He thanked the Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs for his statements, which had been of great assistance in the discussion of the complex problem before the Committee.

66. Countries receiving technical assistance were ill-placed to challenge the arguments of other countries' delegations. United Nations technical assistance, however financed, was the necessary complement of bilateral or multilateral assistance; it was essential to young, poor countries which needed to develop their economic resources and to make social progress in order to give meaning to their political independence. Therefore technical assistance should be readily accessible, rigidity and formality should be eliminated, wherever possible, and only the needs of the under-developed countries should be taken into consideration.

67. The legal foundation for United Nations technical assistance had been laid in a number of relevant General Assembly resolutions. The problem now was to determine whether to revert to the norms applied before 1961 or to set new ones. The Advisory Committee stated that problem in very clear terms and rightly considered that it was for the General Assembly to take a decision either to maintain the appropriations at the 1961-1962 level or to reduce them to their previous level. There was nothing to prevent the General Assembly from taking such a decision, and its course was clear, for everyone agreed that the 1960 figures were no longer realistic (A/C.5/937, para. 1).

68. Since valid requests for technical assistance amounted to some \$11 million, the figure of \$6.4 million requested by the Secretary-General was by no means excessive, still less arbitrary, since it had been fixed in the light of the under-developed countries' urgent needs and the budgetary capacity of the United Nations. If the Secretary-General was denied that appropriation he would be compelled to reject the requests submitted to him by Member States, thus dealing the countries concerned a profound disappointment on the eve of the Development Decade.

69. The time had come to abandon temporary stop-gaps and to make long-term arrangements. Some would say that that meant inflating the budget, and that the poorest Member States would no longer be able to meet their obligations. It was true that those obligations were heavy, but the under-developed countries would meet them gladly if they felt that they were contributing to the common cause.

70. His delegation would support the appropriation of \$6.4 million requested by the Secretary-General, and it appealed to the United Kingdom and Argentine representatives not to propose the approval of a smaller amount. He was glad the Czechoslovak representative agreed that the appropriations for technical assistance should be maintained at the level of \$6.4 million, but his delegation could not consent simply to turn those appropriations over to the Expanded Programme. On the other hand it would be willing to see those funds included in the regular budget and then transferred to the Expanded Programme for apportionment; that seemed to be the situation in any case, since the regular budget appropriations for operational activities were administered jointly with the funds from the Special Account of the Expanded Programme.

71. He appealed to the Czechoslovak representative to withdraw his proposal to support those countries which simply wished, by participating in United Nations technical assistance activities, to give that essential part of the work of the United Nations its full significance.

72. The OPEX programme had proved its worth, and Governments which had used it should not be prevented from continuing to do so. For his delegation, part V was the most important part of the United Nations budget, on which it could consider no compromise.

The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m.