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**GENERAL
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**FIFTH COMMITTEE, 768th
MEETING**

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Chairman: Mr. Mario MAJOLI (Italy).

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Chelli (Tunisia),
Vice-Chairman, took the Chair*

AGENDA ITEM 50

**Budget estimates for the financial year 1961 (A/4370,
A/4408, A/C.5/828 and Corr.1, A/C.5/829) (continued)**

General Discussion (continued)

1. Mr. WIDDOWSON (Union of South Africa) said that the most significant aspect of the 1961 budget estimates (A/4370) was the steep upward trend in expenditure which they revealed. At the previous session, his delegation had been heartened by the fact that the upward trend which had been so marked in the years 1957-1959 appeared to have been to some degree arrested. The Committee was now faced with estimates which, although they represented an increase of \$3,794,450 over those for 1960, were sound. They had been carefully studied by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions which had recommended certain reductions.

2. The Secretary-General, who framed the estimates, was only too well aware of the criticisms which they would evoke, but his hands were in large measure tied. In the foreword to the budget estimates, the Secretary-General had placed the onus for budgetary expansion clearly where it belonged—on delegations and the Governments they represented. While in the Fifth Committee, Governments expressed their concern at the alarming increases in United Nations expenditure, which would impose a heavy and, in some cases, intolerable burden on States, they pleaded in other places for the creation of new programmes and the expansion of those in progress. Such enthusiasm was understandable, but it should be recognized that the resources of Governments were limited and that only a strictly-applied system of priorities could prevent an ever-expanding budget.

3. His delegation wished to record its appreciation of the report of the Advisory Committee (A/4408), whose recommendations it would support. It would comment later on the proposals with respect to the various sections of the budget.

4. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the administrative and financial activities

of the Secretary-General, as the chief administrative officer of the United Nations, had assumed great political significance at the current session because of his incorrect position and illegal acts in the Congo, his illegal dispatch of representatives to different parts of the world, the one-sided recruitment and distribution of Secretariat staff, and the excessive and uneconomic expenditure of United Nations funds. Those activities had been subjected to detailed and well-founded criticism in plenary meetings of the General Assembly by Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Podgorny, the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Mr. Mazurov, the representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, and others. The Fifth Committee, which, in the course of its examination of the budget estimates for 1961, had to review the Secretary-General's activities over the past year and to lay down directives for his future work, should devote special attention to the recruitment and distribution of staff. That subject would, it was true, be discussed separately under agenda item 60, but it should also be considered in the general discussion because it related to one of the Secretary-General's most important functions and affected the direction and progress of the Secretariat's work, the correctness with which the decisions of United Nations organs were interpreted and, consequently, the proper implementation, in accordance with Article 100, paragraph 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, of the tasks assigned to the Secretariat.

5. To ensure the impartiality and independence of the Secretariat, the first necessity was that staff should be selected and distributed on a truly international basis; that no country or group of countries should have a dominating influence on the Secretariat's work; and that staff should be recruited from all Member States without discrimination. It was essential that the three principal groups of States represented in the United Nations—the socialist countries; the countries members of the Western Powers' blocs; and the neutralist countries—and likewise all parts of the world, including Asia and Africa, should be properly represented in the Secretariat. Those essential conditions were, however, being violated in a most inadmissible manner. Where the selection and distribution of its staff and the trend of its work was concerned, the Secretariat was essentially representative of the interests of the United States of America and other Western Powers. At the 885th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the representative of the Ukrainian SSR had pointed out that, of 1,170 officials selected under the principle of geographical distribution, 800, or about 65 per cent, were citizens of the United States and of its allies in military blocs, while the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other socialist countries had only 84 officials, or about 7 per cent.

6. A more detailed scrutiny revealed an even worse situation. Of 28 posts at the Under-Secretary level, 6 were held by nationals of the United States of

America, and 11 by nationals of other countries in the Western bloc, while the USSR had only 1 national at that level and the other socialist countries none. Of the 34 officials at the D-2 level or in posts of equivalent rank, 14 were nationals of the United States, 4 of France, 3 of the United Kingdom, 4 of Canada and 2 of Australia; one post was held by a member of the Chiang Kai-shek clique; Indian nationals held 3 posts; and nationals of Austria, Venezuela and the USSR held 1 post each. Thus the United States and its military allies held 28, or over 80 per cent of those posts, while the USSR and the other socialist countries had only 1 representing 3 per cent of the total. The position in other categories of staff was similar if not worse.

7. That one-sided distribution of staff made it impossible for the Secretariat to function properly and impartially. Indeed, given the present distribution of forces and cadres, it could not be regarded as an international organ at all.

8. In the Offices of the Secretary-General, which included the General Assembly Section, the Office of Legal Affairs, the Office of the Controller and the Office of Personnel, the overwhelming majority, and in some cases all, the senior posts were filled by nationals of the United States and of countries associated with it in military blocs; no African, neutral Asian or socialist countries were represented. In the Office of Legal Affairs, 22 out of 30 Professional posts were held by nationals of the United States and its military allies; nationals of the United States itself held 8 posts, those of the USSR none, those of East European countries one, and those of African countries none. A similar situation prevailed in other Departments of the Secretariat. The selection and distribution of personnel obviously determined the political trend of the Secretariat's work as a whole.

9. The same situation prevailed with regard to United Nations missions. Of 14 senior posts on the staff of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) at Gaza, 4 were held by United States nationals and 8 by nationals of Western countries linked with the United States in military alliances; of 20 auxiliary staff, 11 were United States nationals. Of 3 members of the UNEF staff at Pisa, Italy, 2 came from the United States and 1 from the United Kingdom. A similar distribution might be observed in all United Nations missions. Thus, of 9 members of the staff of the former United Nations Advisory Council for Somaliland under Italian administration, 3 had come from the United States, 4 from the United Kingdom, 1 from France and 1 from Jordan. In the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Amman, Jordan, a staff of 11 included 3 United States, 3 Canadian and 2 Italian nationals, and 1 Swede. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Guinea was a Netherlands national and his administrative assistant a Belgian. The United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan was a United States national. It was evident that nationals of the United States and the other Western countries occupied a predominant position in the staff assigned to missions and offices of representatives of the Secretary-General while the nationals of socialist countries were almost completely absent and those of neutral States formed an insignificant minority. There could be no assurance that missions so one-sided in composition would function impartially

and independently as the United Nations Charter required.

10. The technical assistance experts sent to under-developed countries were for the most part nationals of Western countries. Of approximately 3,700 experts sent out in the years 1955-1959, over 2,000, or 55 per cent, had been nationals of colonial Powers. The socialist countries had had the opportunity to send out only 70, or less than 2 per cent of the total; 45 per cent had been nationals of 4 countries—the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, which was not even a Member State; nationals of the USSR had numbered only 40, or 1 per cent.

11. A similar situation obtained with regard to other forms of assistance to under-developed countries. Of 78 United Nations observers sent to supervise plebiscites in the former Trust Territories of Togoland under United Kingdom and French administration, respectively, and the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration, 55, or 70 per cent, had been nationals of the United States or of countries associated with it in military blocs, including 19 nationals of the United States alone; there had been none from the USSR. Thirty-six—or 50 per cent—had been nationals of colonial Powers and only 4 had been nationals of African countries. Of the 260 members of the United Nations Field Service, some 170, or 63 per cent, came from the United States and countries belonging to the Western blocs, 13—less than 1 per cent—from neutral Asian, and 2 from African countries. The one-sided selection of Secretariat personnel and experts clearly revealed by the above figures, showed that in that field of his work the Secretary-General was assuming an incorrect and biased position, contrary to the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, and that he was pursuing a policy representative of the interests of only one group of Members of the United Nations—the United States and the other Western Powers—to the prejudice of the lawful interests of other Member States.

12. The status and functions of the Secretary-General were defined in Article 97 of the Charter. The intention of those who had drafted that provision had been that the Secretary-General should not become involved in any political controversy among Member States in order to avoid partisanship, with all the undesirable consequences that that would produce. It was nevertheless plain from recent events that the Secretary-General was increasingly overstepping the limits prescribed for his activities by the Charter, and was becoming increasingly involved in a political struggle.

13. Apart from the well-founded criticism directed at the Secretary-General in plenary meetings at the current session, much more could be said regarding the manner in which he was exceeding his powers under the Charter by taking political action. At the Committee's 765th meeting, the USSR delegation had pointed out that by sending a Sub-Committee to Laos and by providing it with staff and funds, the Secretary-General had clearly exceeded his duty; such action would have been warranted only in virtue of a decision of the Security Council and none had been taken to that effect. After the Sub-Committee had returned to Headquarters, the Secretary-General had sent to Laos a mission of 28 persons, ostensibly for the purpose of urgent economic rehabilitation under General As-

sembly resolution 1444 (XIV), paragraph 1 (a). That resolution, however, clearly related solely to expenditure incurred in implementing decisions of the Security Council or of the General Assembly. According to the Secretary-General, the function of the Special Consultant who headed that mission had been to co-ordinate United Nations activities in Laos; but, as his delegation had pointed out at the 763rd meeting, there was no justification for spending \$260,000 in order to co-ordinate technical assistance costing only \$213,000. It might be felt that the Secretary-General's action in sending that mission to Laos had been connected with the efforts of the United States to draw Laos into the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and that his purpose had been to co-ordinate United States interference in the domestic affairs of Laos.

14. It might also be wondered what administrative problems had impelled the Secretary-General himself to visit Laos in November 1959. It might be thought that his visit had had some connexion with the political needs of the United States in that area. In his annual report on the work of the Organization (A/4390), the Secretary-General stated that "the visit ... had no implication regarding the international situation in Laos"; but that assertion clearly conflicted with the facts. The Secretary-General's visit had coincided with a tense internal political struggle; with the consideration of the situation by the Security Council; and with the illegal despatch of a mission to conduct inquiries. In making a political visit of that nature without the requisite authorization from the Security Council, the Secretary-General had exceeded his competence.

15. Nor was Laos the only country affected by the Secretary-General's growing practice of sending representatives, on the pretext of the need for urgent economic measures, to various points of the globe where events took place that caused concern to the United States and its partners in military blocs. A case in point was the despatch of a Special Representative to Guinea in 1958 at a cost of \$39,300; all that that mission had done, however, had been to establish that Guinea needed no special form of technical assistance.

16. The Secretary-General's position and activities in connexion with the Congo had been the subject of criticism at plenary meetings of the General Assembly, and much more could be said on the subject. In view of the political importance of events in the Congo, it was essential that the Secretary-General should comply strictly with the Security Council's decisions and avoid following the line of the United States and other colonial Powers in the matter. The Secretary-General had nevertheless followed that line in every respect, especially with regard to the geographical distribution of the military and non-military staff sent to the Congo. Acting under the Security Council resolution of 14 July 1960,^{1/} the Secretary-General had set up a United Nations military headquarters, which on 8 September 1960 had had a staff of 86 persons, of whom 37 had been nationals of countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 4 nationals of SEATO countries, and 4 nationals of ANZUS countries, i.e., of Parties to the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America. Those 45 nationals accounted for

over half the staff, which included no nationals of socialist countries. The administrative military units serving the United Nations in the Congo on 8 September 1960 had comprised 710 men of whom 306 had come from NATO countries and 240 from SEATO countries, giving a total of 77 per cent from countries in United States military blocs, as against none from the socialist countries and only 164, or 23 per cent, from the neutral countries, and 24, or 3 per cent from African countries. The Secretary-General had also sent to the Congo a large non-military staff to guide, direct and co-ordinate policy. On 30 September 1960, of a total staff of 360, no less than 220, or 61 per cent, had been nationals of the United States and its allies in NATO, SEATO and other pacts, and only 58, or 16 per cent, had been from African or Asian countries. The USSR had had no nationals on the staff, and the other socialist countries only 4.

17. The selection of personnel, whether military or non-military, for service in the Congo was of greatest political importance. The Secretary-General's selection however, could not be regarded as correct, impartial, or suited to the task facing the United Nations as an international organization. In sending to the Congo a staff of which three-quarters came from countries in NATO, SEATO and other Western blocs, the Secretary-General had acted, not impartially and independently as the chief administrative officer of the United Nations, but as the executant of the policy of the United States and other colonial Powers. If he had pursued an independent policy in the interest of all Member States, his selection of senior and non-military personnel would have been different. As matters stood, the United States and its Western allies had been given a dominating position in all categories of staff sent to the Congo under the United Nations flag.

18. The facts he had quoted fully justified the evaluation of the Secretary-General's activities in the Congo which had been given in plenary meetings of the General Assembly by Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Podgorny, the representative of the Ukrainian SSR, and other Chairmen of delegations. The Secretary-General had stated at the 871st plenary meeting of the General Assembly that it was a question not of a man but of an institution; namely, the Secretariat. So much the worse for him, and for the United Nations as a whole. His words meant that the Secretary-General had committed not only himself to one side in a political struggle but also the Secretariat which he headed.

19. In reviewing the Secretary-General's activities over the past year, it was also necessary to consider his policy and practice with regard to the finances of the United Nations. Even without the expected additional estimates, which would raise the total budget for 1961 far beyond \$70 million, the budget estimates for the financial year 1961, (A/4370) totalled almost \$67.5 million. That unjustifiably high figure exceeded the appropriations for 1960 by \$3,794,450 and the actual expenses in 1959 by some \$5.6 million. The Secretary-General stated in paragraph 1 of his foreword to those budget estimates that they were a first modest departure from the policy of stabilization applied in earlier years; that it would surprise very few that the budget estimates of the Organization for 1961 were at a higher level than they had been in 1954; and that times had changed, and the issues to be faced

^{1/} Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, document S/4387.

had changed with the times. The USSR delegation could not accept the assertion that a policy of stabilization had been applied in earlier years. It was refuted by the uninterrupted and substantial growth in appropriations and expenditure, from \$48.5 million in 1954, through \$50 million in 1955 and \$53.2 million in 1957, to an estimated \$67.5 million in 1961. The expenditure of the United Nations had increased by \$20 million, or almost 50 per cent, in the six years of Mr. Hammarskjöld's tenure of office as Secretary-General. Far from pursuing a policy of stabilization, the Secretary-General had clearly pursued a policy of increasing expenditure year by year.

20. In his delegation's opinion, the main causes of that steady increase had been an unwarranted rise in the cost of maintaining the Secretariat; the expenditure of United Nations funds in an unbusinesslike and an uneconomic manner; and the weakening of financial and administrative control over the planning and execution of the Secretariat's activities. Those conclusions had been borne out by the Committee's examination of the supplementary estimates for 1960 at the 763rd to 765th meetings. He had already pointed to the disparity between the money spent on technical assistance in Laos and the larger sum spent on co-ordinating it, and to the \$39,300 spent in Guinea to ascertain that no special form of technical assistance was required there, and he had referred at the 763rd meeting to the \$56,000 spent in Guinea to co-ordinate technical assistance to the value of \$131,000. Large sums were being spent to maintain representatives of and consultants to the Secretary-General and they were being supplied with expensive motor-cars, in countries where the need for their presence was either doubtful or non-existent. Such representatives should be despatched only in exceptional cases and in virtue of a decision of the Security Council or the General Assembly.

21. Furthermore there was no justification for increasing the size of the Secretariat by establishing new offices and missions in order to meet new tasks, instead of making better-planned and more productive use of existing personnel. His delegation strongly objected to any increase in the budget estimates above the level of the actual expenditure incurred in 1959.

The total net expenditure to be covered in accordance with the regular scale of assessments should be stabilized at a level not exceeding \$50 million. Every effort should be made to regularize expenditure, to strengthen financial and administrative control over the disbursement of funds, to eliminate unnecessary links in the Secretariat machinery in New York and elsewhere, and to make the Secretariat more compact and more efficient so that the existing establishment could be reduced.

22. The USSR delegation therefore considered that, to improve the operation of the Secretariat and to adapt it to the tasks confronting the United Nations, the following action should be taken: firstly, a programme for the reorganization of the Secretariat should be worked out and adopted, under which the staff would be selected on a strictly international basis and would be thus adapted to the tasks of the United Nations. Secondly, the Secretary-General should desist from the practice of sending missions and representatives to different countries otherwise than in virtue of a Security Council or General Assembly decision and from staffing such missions on a one-sided basis, predominantly with nationals of the United States and the other Western countries; he should recall those missions which he had sent out unlawfully. Thirdly, the activities of the Secretary-General should be confined within the framework of the Charter, and he should cease pursuing, in the name of the United Nations, a policy which reflected the interests only of one part of its membership, to the prejudice of the interests of the remainder. Fourthly, the expenditures of the United Nations should be prevented from increasing year by year; a fixed limit should be set to the over-all budget; the excessive establishment of the Secretariat should be reduced; and the expenditure of funds contributed by Member States should be placed under stricter control, and thus on a more economic and rational basis. Lastly, the structure of the United Nations Secretariat should be altered so that all three groups of States—the socialist countries, the countries members of the Western Powers' blocs, and the neutralist countries—were represented on an equal footing.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.