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*Chairman:* Mr. Jan Paul BANNIER  
(Netherlands).

AGENDA ITEM 7

Consideration of the financial situation of the Organization in the light of the report of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations (A/5187, A/5274, A/5407 and Corr.1, A/5416, A/5421, A/C.5/974, A/C.5/975, A/AC.113/1-27) (continued)\*

1. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) paid a tribute to the memory of His Holiness Pope John XXIII. He also associated himself with previous speakers in mourning the loss of the late Mr. Omar Loutfi, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs.

2. Despite their uninterrupted work over the past few years, neither the Working Group of Fifteen on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations nor its successor, the Working group of twenty-one members, had succeeded in arriving at a generally acceptable solution to the Organization's financial difficulties. That was no accident, for it was doubtful whether any United Nations body could find a way of legalizing violation of the Organization's basic principles and at the same time creating the conditions for further such violations. In essence the problem was not so much financial as political, inasmuch as the so-called financial crisis was the direct result of gross violations of the United Nations Charter.

3. The unlawful steps taken in connexion with the financing of the operations in the Middle East and the Congo had provoked strong opposition on the part of many Member States. Knowing in advance that their actions would not be endorsed by the Security Council, the instigators of those operations had embarked on a series of gross violations of the Charter, stopping at nothing in the pursuit of their selfish interests. Once they had succeeded in securing those interests, the colonial Powers headed by the United States had decided that they must find some way of whitewashing their aggressive acts; to give the operations in the Middle East and in the Congo the appearance of legal-

ty, therefore, they had imposed resolution 1731 (XVI) on the General Assembly, referring the matter to the International Court of Justice. Armed with the so-called advisory opinion of the Court,<sup>1/</sup> those Powers had then attempted to amend certain extremely important provisions of the Charter by placing upon them their own unlawful interpretation, though well aware that there was a special procedure for making amendments to the Charter, as well as a separate procedure for the adoption of interpretations of the Charter binding on all Member States. They were also aware that the special sub-committee set up by the United Nations Conference on International Organization<sup>2/</sup> to consider the question of the interpretation of the Charter had concluded that in the absence of general agreement on a particular interpretation of the Charter and also in cases where it was desirable to establish an authoritative interpretation as a precedent, it might prove necessary to include such an interpretation in the Charter as an amendment, having recourse to the procedure provided for that purpose. It was perfectly clear from that conclusion, which had been unanimously endorsed by the Conference, that the General Assembly could not take decisions concerning the interpretation of the Charter binding on all Members; still less could it take decisions which contradicted the basic provisions of the Charter. It was equally clear that the Security Council bore the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and those responsible for conducting the operations in the Congo and the Middle East in circumvention of the Security Council knew that under Article 43 of the Charter only the Security Council was empowered to require Members to make available the appropriate facilities, including financial resources. The colonial Powers had thus acted in deliberate violation of the Charter, and their invocation of the so-called Advisory Opinion was simply an attempt to justify their aggressive acts and mislead world public opinion. They had tried to create the impression that the General Assembly was competent to decide how the aforementioned operations were to be financed, and that they had in fact conducted those operations for the sole purpose of maintaining peace and security. In so doing, the United States and its allies had made much of the fact that they had allegedly helped the United Nations by providing the funds necessary for the Congo operation at the very outset.

4. The Western Powers had acted as they did in the certain knowledge that if the Security Council had handled the affair the Congo operation could have been concluded in a matter of weeks, which would not have suited their aggressive plans at all; neither would it

<sup>1/</sup> Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter). Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962; I. C. J. Reports 1962, p. 151, transmitted to the Members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/5161 and Corr.1).

<sup>2/</sup> See United Nations Conference on International Organization, IV/2/B/1.

\*Resumed from the 990th meeting.

have served the interests of the imperialist monopolies, either those which had long since entrenched themselves in the Congo or those which had hastened to that country at the outbreak of the so-called Congo crisis. If the Security Council had handled the operation, Patrice Lumumba would surely be alive today, and the riches of the Congo would now be in the hands of their rightful owners, the Congolese people. Instead, the operation had been conducted in such a way as to allow the "Congo Club", described by Mr. Conor Cruise O'Brien in his book *To Katanga and Back*,<sup>3/</sup> to pursue a policy resulting in Lumumba's death. If the operation had not been conducted in circumvention of the Security Council—and largely paid for by Washington, as Mr. O'Brien revealed in his book—it would have been impossible to protect the colonial profits extracted by the Union minière du Haut-Katanga or to redistribute that company's shares among United States, United Kingdom and other monopolies. The struggle among the Western monopolies for dominant positions in that concern for the purpose of exploiting the wealth of Katanga had not, of course, prevented them from acting in concert when it had come to crushing the national liberation movement in that country.

5. Having concluded their dark dealings in the Congo, the instigators of the operation had decided that the time had come to enlist the authority of the United Nations once again by compelling all Members to share in the expenses entailed by their aggressive acts, seeking to transfer responsibility for those acts to the whole membership and at the same time create a precedent for future circumvention of the Security Council in peace-keeping matters. That was a dangerous course and to embark on it would threaten the very existence of the Organization.

6. It was surprising that a number of countries, which had not only had no hand in the operations in the Congo and the Middle East but had evinced concern at the aggressive policies pursued by certain Western States, were now endorsing the so-called principle of collective responsibility for the Organizations's financial difficulties. But to apply that concept in the present instance would mean making all Members answerable for the events in the Congo. The representative of Australia, a military ally of the United States, had tried to prove that peace-keeping operations were no different from any other United Nations activities, including administrative activities, and that peace-keeping costs were consequently equivalent to administrative costs. The Australian representative characterized peace-keeping activities as completely normal, no doubt hoping to use that principle to justify future operations conducted in circumvention of the Security Council and in pursuit of their selfish interests by Australia's imperialistic allies. It should be noted that the Australian delegation had long been trying to expunge from the Charter the principle that Security Council decisions pertaining to international peace and security must be unanimous, and thus set the Organization on a course which could lead only to its downfall.

7. It should also be stressed that, while the United Nations was necessary to large and small States alike, the latter were necessarily more concerned for its survival since they lacked both financial and military resources sufficient to defend themselves against aggression. It was therefore surprising that a number of delegations, including that of Brazil, should affirm

the legality of procedures adopted by the General Assembly in certain circumstances; while frankly admitting that such procedures represented a divergence from the Charter, those delegations affirmed that they must nevertheless be accepted, maintaining further that in the absence of agreement among all Member States the United Nations would have no choice but to by-pass the Security Council and use the General Assembly. The purpose of such Charter violations was alleged to be the maintenance of peace and security, but that was hardly likely to be achieved by undermining the very foundations on which the Organization rested. To think thus, and to allow the imperialists to have their way, would be to stand by in silence while unlawful acts having nothing in common with the maintenance of peace and security were committed in the name of the United Nations. That was something to which his country would never consent.

8. The United States and its colonial allies were now attempting to get out of their difficult position by trying to change the clear provisions of the Charter and to secure the support of as many Members as possible; but no matter how large a majority they managed to put together they could not amend the Charter or impose their own interpretation without having recourse to the proper procedure, and the adoption of an unlawful resolution to that end would be a serious blow to the Organization. His delegation urged all Members to resist those who advocated such a course.

9. As to the question who should defray the costs of the United Nations operations, it was clear that those responsible for instigating the operations should pay—in the case of the Congo, the Belgian monopolists and their supporters. In point of fact, the United States and its allies had already paid almost all the costs involved; if they had refrained from paying the full amount, it was so that they might have a pretext for asking the General Assembly to assume responsibility for their aggressive policies. He was convinced that Members would not be parties to such a manoeuvre.

10. Over the years, his delegation had repeatedly affirmed that Bulgaria would not help to finance operations conducted in circumvention of the Security Council and in violation of the Charter. To improve the atmosphere and to encourage Members not to tolerate the unlawful acts of a few colonialist Powers, his Government had decided that from 1963 onwards it would no longer contribute to the maintenance of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, the United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Korea, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine and all other undertakings at variance with the Charter. Bulgaria would naturally also refuse to pay any part of the expenses arising from the peace-keeping operations under discussion, including redemption of the United Nations bonds and payment of interest on them.

11. His delegation wished to draw attention to the gravity of the situation which might result if the General Assembly attempted to resolve the so-called financial crisis by adopting resolutions in violation of the Charter. That was what the Western Powers were exerting every effort to attain, hoping thus to present their actions in the Congo and the Middle East in a more favourable light and to change the basic provisions of the Charter by destroying the principle of great-Power unanimity in peace-keeping matters. The adoption of such resolutions would strike at the foundations of the Organization. His delegation hoped that both

<sup>3/</sup> London: Hutchinson and Co. (Publishers) Ltd.

those who were making such attempts and those who were ready to agree with them for the sake of a solution to the temporary financial crisis would think again. The United Nations was necessary not only to the socialist States, but to all States concerned for the maintenance of peace and security.

12. Mr. RAHNEMA (Iran) paid a tribute to the memory of His Holiness Pope John XXIII, whose death was an irreparable loss to all mankind, and expressed his delegation's sorrow at the death of Mr. Loutfi.

13. There was little new to be said on the item under discussion, particularly with regard to the distressing differences of opinion which appeared to be irreconcilable, but which his delegation had never regarded as such. It was essential to determine at the outset whether the problem was a political or a purely economic and financial one, and both sides to the controversy appeared to agree that, despite its financial aspects, the problem was political in that the present situation had arisen from major political differences between certain Member States. Another political aspect of the problem was that it involved the preservation of the authority, or even the existence, of the United Nations as the supreme international organ for the maintenance of peace.

14. A debate between those who maintained that expenses had been incurred for purposes alien to the United Nations and in violation of its Charter and that the parties "responsible" for the situation must meet the cost, and those who held that a group of Members which refused to honour their financial commitments because they had been unable to use the United Nations for their own political ends must be made to admit their faults and, if necessary, be subjected to the sanctions prescribed in Article 19 of the Charter, might register some telling points for both sides, but it would scarcely be conducive to a practical solution of the problem. The question must therefore be approached from a different angle, and the overriding consideration must be the actual survival of the United Nations. Imperfect as the Organization might be by the standards of any single delegation, the fact remained that, for various reasons, and first and foremost because there was no alternative, every Member State wished it to survive as an instrument for international co-operation and peace. That was the basic and objective fact which should form the background to the debate.

15. The continued existence of the United Nations as "a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of ... common ends", in the wording of Article 1, paragraph 4, of the Charter, was all the more vital at a time when the post-war world, weary of crises, seemed on the threshold of a new and more propitious age.

16. When trouble erupted, as in the Middle East and the Congo, there were always some responsible parties to be punished and some who succeeded in escaping punishment. The crisis in the Congo, in particular, had been of such gravity that the United Nations had had to intervene—with the approval, in principle, of the Security Council, although differences had subsequently arisen concerning methods. Nevertheless, after much bloodshed, the operation had led to the restoration of order, but it had left the United Nations with a most serious problem. The more extreme solutions that had been proposed lacked realism and would defeat their own ends. Merely to castigate those considered guilty

of aggression or to pass a resolution threatening certain Members with the loss of their voting rights could lead to another serious crisis, which might further paralyse the United Nations and diminish its authority without solving the central problem.

17. The only answer was to be found in the spirit of the Charter and in the understanding and sense of responsibility of Member States. General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII), together with the report of the Working Group (A/5407 and Corr.1), indicated certain points which might provide a basis for agreement. In the first place, the resolution had recognized the "special financial responsibility of members of the Security Council", with particular reference to the permanent members of the Council. His delegation believed that the permanent members did have such a responsibility by reason of the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" conferred on them by Article 24 of the Charter, and the authors of the seven-Power memorandum (A/AC.113/18) had taken a similar view.

18. General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII) had also put forward in operative paragraph 2 (b) the very important principle of "a variation in the sharing of the costs of the operation". The main argument in favour of that principle was the differences in the degree of economic development of Member States, for it was clearly more difficult for a developing country than for a highly developed one to share in the heavy expenditures involved in peace-keeping operations without jeopardizing its own development. To require such a country to pay out more than it was receiving from the United Nations in technical assistance would endanger the whole philosophy of technical assistance and, in particular, of the United Nations Development Decade; furthermore any formula which disregarded the special position of the developing countries might seriously jeopardize their national development plans and create among their peoples a lack of enthusiasm for the United Nations, with unfortunate long-term results. Those countries were trying to achieve in a few years what other peoples had taken centuries to accomplish; Iran, for instance, was engaged in a very bold programme of agrarian reform, reduction of illiteracy, and social advancement, which required the imposition of national austerity measures. At the same time, Iran was contributing more than \$1 million annually to various United Nations activities and had pledged itself to purchase United Nations bonds to the value of \$500,000. Naturally, his Government claimed no credit for a policy which it was proud to pursue, but it was obvious that such efforts placed a heavy burden on the taxpayer in a developing country. It was with that in mind that the representative of Mexico had stated, at the 985th meeting, that the poorer countries should not be put in a position in which they would be forced to assess the marginal utility of the United Nations.

19. Another factor which had led to the inclusion in resolution 1854 B (XVII) of the principle of "a variation in the sharing of the costs" was the situation of the victims of acts necessitating peace-keeping operations and of the States responsible for such acts. His delegation disagreed with those who would entirely disregard such criteria, but at the same time it considered it unrealistic to rely for the necessary funds on the States considered responsible. Just as, under national legislations, all citizens were taxed for the maintenance of law and order, the principle of collective responsibility required that all Members should join in providing

the United Nations with the means of, *inter alia*, punishing the guilty or compensating the victims.

20. The collective financial responsibility of Member States was the fourth principle mentioned in resolution 1854 B (XVII). Iran had supported the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice because it believed that expenditures approved by the United Nations should be met by its Members—although every delegation was, of course, entitled to contest the manner in which decisions were taken and to expect that they would be in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Charter. Similarly, there might be disagreement concerning the way in which the expenses were to be apportioned among Members, but to question the principle of collective financial responsibility itself could seriously impair the prestige of the United Nations as the organization responsible for the maintenance of peace.

21. His conclusion was that, in the light of the financial crisis threatening the very existence of the United Nations, the collective responsibility of Member States required them to make every sacrifice in the interest of the Organization's moral and material authority and to support the Secretary-General in his untiring efforts to overcome the present difficulties. His delegation therefore appealed to the Powers concerned, and most of all to the permanent members of the Security Council whose co-operation was still the corner-stone of the Organization, to make a special effort to uphold the United Nations as a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations. The under-developed countries could do little to improve the Organization's financial condition, but countries which were spending over \$300 million daily for military purposes could surely find the relatively small amount needed to rescue the United Nations from a difficult and humiliating position. He believed that joint efforts by the Secretary-General and all delegations would lead to a mutually acceptable, if only temporary, solution. Some progress had undoubtedly been made since the seventeenth regular session of the General Assembly, as was shown by the positions of delegations in the current debate. He would be happy to support any proposals which took account of the considerations he had expressed and which would enable the General Assembly to overcome the present difficulties in the spirit of the Charter. He was pleased to announce that the Government of Iran would spare no effort to pay, as soon as possible, the amounts which it owed for the Congo operations and for its contribution to the regular budget for 1963.

22. Mr. BUDO (Albania) conveyed the condolences of his delegation to the Secretary-General and to the delegation of the United Arab Republic upon the death of Mr. Loutfi.

23. The question before the special session concerned the spirit and letter of the Charter and touched upon some of its basic principles. A characteristic feature of the problem was the fact that certain Western Powers, under the leadership of the United States of America, were deliberately and obstinately seeking by various manoeuvres and subterfuges, including an attempt to disguise the issue merely as a financial one, to persuade other Members to bear the financial burden resulting from their acts of aggression in the Congo and the Middle East. It was not by chance that the United States Government had undertaken the difficult task of imposing its arbitrary and illegal viewpoint on other Members. In doing so, it was following its policy of using the United Nations as a tool in the service of its colonialist and neo-colonialist policies. That explained

all the clamour which had been raised concerning the so-called financial crisis of the United Nations as well as the pressures of all kinds that had been exerted by the United States on other Members. Such manoeuvres deceived no one. The Organization could only be strengthened through strict observance of the Charter and resolute defence against any violation of its principles. The opposition voiced by many States to the procedure suggested for defraying the costs of peace-keeping operations revealed the illegal, unjust and unacceptable character of the claims being made by the colonialist Powers.

24. The acts of aggression committed by the imperialist Powers in the Middle East and the Congo had brought heavy losses to the peoples of those regions, had seriously endangered their security and had jeopardized international peace. The dangerous situation in the Middle East had been created by the armed aggression against Egypt and the expenses incurred by the United Nations forces in that area must be borne by the Western Powers which had perpetrated the aggression. The Congo, immediately after the proclamation of its independence, had been the victim of armed aggression by Belgium, while the United States, together with other Western Powers, had exploited the situation in order to keep their hold on the country's great natural wealth. In particular, it was due to the efforts of the United States Government and under its leadership that the United Nations force had been sent to the Congo, in flagrant violation of the Charter. It was well known that immediately after the arrival of United Nations troops in the Congo the Prime Minister of the young Republic had been arrested and assassinated while the United Nations forces did nothing to help him. It was also well known that in order to justify the prolonged stationing of United Nations troops in the Congo, the imperialists had used as their tool Moïse Tshombé and his separatist Katanga clique. The tragic events in the Congo had shown once again the real nature of colonialism and what the colonialists were capable of when their egoistic and inhuman interests were at stake.

25. The brutal interference in the internal affairs of the Congo by the United States and its allies had inevitably undermined the prestige and authority of the United Nations throughout the world. Events in the Congo had shown that the United States and other Western Powers had used the United Nations flag as a cover for their military intervention and for their attempt to suppress the national liberation movement and overthrow the legitimate Government in order to continue their colonialist domination and exploitation. Obviously, the only solution which was in conformity with the vital interests of the Congolese people was the immediate departure of United Nations troops as well as of the colonialists. The Congolese people should be left alone to settle their own affairs in accordance with their national interests.

26. Clearly, the problem before the special session was not merely financial: it was a political problem directly related to the maintenance of international peace and security. The only approach to the problem which would serve the cause of peace and strengthen the United Nations was to abide strictly by the principles of the Charter. Since the Western Powers had created the dangerous situation in the Middle East and in the Congo, they must bear the consequences of their acts, including the financial consequences of sending United Nations forces into those regions. Such a solution was not only in conformity with the elementary

principles of justice and morality but also with the basic task of the United Nations of defending the peace against the aggressive acts of the imperialists in the future.

27. The decisions adopted by the General Assembly at preceding sessions, especially the adoption of resolution 1861 (XVII), were unjust, illegal and contrary to the Charter. In particular, that resolution confused the regular expenses of the United Nations within the meaning of Article 17 of the Charter with the exceptional expenses resulting from the acts of aggression of certain Western Powers in the Congo and the Middle East, which fell under Article 43. The essential difference between those two kinds of expenses was confirmed by the documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization concerning Articles 17 and 43 of the Charter and also by General Assembly resolutions 1619 (XV) and 1732 (XVI). The assumption by the General Assembly of powers which belonged exclusively to the Security Council constituted yet another violation of the Charter. Similarly, the opinion of the International Court of Justice was unfounded and incompatible with the Charter and therefore unacceptable.

28. In the light of those considerations, the Albanian Government had transmitted to the Secretary-General a letter dated 13 May 1963 (A/C.5/975) stating its position on the problem before the special session. Particular attention should be drawn to the penultimate paragraph of that letter. The Albanian Government did not consider itself bound by resolution 1861 (XVII); it would not accept any proposal to defray the cost of ONUC and UNEF by increasing Members' assessments; it would deduct from its contribution for 1963 the amount intended to help defray the cost of those operations. It could not assume obligations except those which were in strict conformity with the Charter. It also deplored the tendency to increase the budget each year with illegal and unjustified expenditures such as those relating to special missions and the Field Service. For the financial year 1963 it would not contribute to the expenses of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, the United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Korea, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine or the Field Service. The increasing expenses of technical assistance should be financed solely by voluntary contributions and in national currencies by States who wished to do so.

29. Mr. ANUMAN-RAJADHON (Thailand) associated himself with the tributes paid to the memory of His Holiness Pope John XXIII.

30. His delegation wished to express its appreciation of the report of the Working Group (A/5407 and Corr.1), which had made a more thorough examination of the financial problem than had ever been done before. The history of that problem was too well known to require repetition; it had resulted from the failure or refusal of many Members to pay their assessments for the Middle East and Congo operations. As the representative of a country which had always paid promptly its assessments for the two operations and for the regular budget, he was glad that the special session had been convened with a view to finding a solution to replace the *ad hoc* arrangements of recent years. However, though some measure of agreement had been reached, it was apparent that no long-term cost-sharing arrangement would result from the current session and that resort would again be had to *ad hoc* methods.

31. In considering the financial problem, his delegation was guided by four broad principles. First, the costs of peace-keeping operations were the collective responsibility of all Members, which shared the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security and, consequently, the responsibility for financing operations undertaken for that purpose. Under Article 1 of the Charter, the maintenance of peace was the principal activity of the United Nations, and the costs involved did not differ from the costs of other normal activities of the Organization. The acceptance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice by the General Assembly had established beyond dispute that the UNEF and ONUC expenditures constituted lawful expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17 of the Charter.

32. Secondly, apportionment of the costs should be in accordance with the capacity of each Member to pay—a principle long accepted and reflected in the regular scale of assessments, and constituting the only criterion in the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and the Financial Regulations of the United Nations. However, in view of the excessive burden of heavy peace-keeping costs, the poorer countries and particularly those receiving economic assistance, must be allowed reductions, above a fixed ceiling, in their assessments according to the regular scale.

33. Thirdly, his delegation would support any just and equitable formula, acceptable to a large majority of Members, for financing the Middle East and Congo operations for the remainder of 1963, and another formula for future operations if one was devised. It would also support any arrangement for the payment of arrears of assessments. Since any formula lost its intrinsic value if some Members continued to refuse to pay their assessments, the General Assembly must include in any arrangement appropriate and effective measures making it incumbent upon all Members, without exception, to pay their share.

34. Fourthly, voluntary contributions by Members should be encouraged, since they would help to ease the strain on the finances of the Organization.

35. It was most deplorable that many Members, including some major Powers, had refused to fulfil their legal and financial obligations and had evaded their responsibilities under the Charter. Their irresponsible attitude was an affront to the United Nations, a breach of the Charter and a threat to the Organization's existence. It was inconceivable that their aim could be to bankrupt the United Nations; but whatever their real intentions, it served no useful purpose to reproach any Member for the present state of affairs. All Members were partially responsible for allowing the situation to develop, and all must do what they could to save the Organization by paying what they owed for its services, on their behalf, for the preservation of international peace.

36. The inability of some Members to pay owing to their limited capacity was understandable, and suitable arrangements should be made to enable them to pay without too great a strain. However, it was unjust that Members which were in a position to pay simply refused to do so, while others, including many small and by no means wealthy countries, had paid their assessments in full. It was encouraging to note that some had now paid or had promised to pay their arrears, and he hoped that others would follow suit. To suggest that

the sanctions prescribed in Article 19 should not be applied in the case of non-payment of financial contributions would create a very bad precedent, which might lead to the repudiation of other provisions of the Charter and thus to the destruction of the United Nations.

37. While his delegation was not over-optimistic, it still believed that, with a spirit of compromise, flexibility and co-operation, the Committee could find a generally acceptable solution to the whole problem. The vast majority of Members knew that the United Nations was the most important organization for the maintenance of peace, and it had always overcome crises in the past because its Members had united in upholding the lofty purposes and principles of the Charter. His delegation had no doubt that they would do so again in the present instance.

38. Mr. NIELSEN (Norway) associated himself with those representatives who had expressed their deep sorrow on the death of His Holiness Pope John XXIII.

39. Some aspects of the problems facing the special session were not explicitly dealt with by the United Nations Charter. In particular, the Charter envisaged no difficulty in raising the necessary funds for the work which the United Nations was called upon to carry out. It contained no special provisions to cover the financing of specific actions for the maintenance of peace and security, carried out in accordance with its political stipulations. Nor did the Charter say anything about Members whose declared policy it was not to pay certain of their contributions. From the provisions of Article 19 it must be concluded that the authors of the Charter saw no reason to condone arrears beyond a certain size, whether or not the arrears were the result of a refusal to pay. In other words, they did not agree that any Member had the right to refuse to pay the contributions assessed on it by the requisite majority of the General Assembly.

40. The Norwegian delegation sympathized with those Members which had not stated that they would not pay but which nevertheless were in serious arrears with their payments owing to special circumstances. It had always felt that considerable moderation should be shown as regards that group of countries, in the spirit of the latter part of Article 19. It was gratifying to note that many of them had already taken steps to pay their contributions for the peace-keeping operations, while many others had expressed their intention of settling their debts as soon as possible. Also welcome was the acceptance by those States of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and their adoption of the principle that the financing of peace-keeping operations was the collective responsibility of all Members. Thus, the position of the large majority of Members had been greatly clarified during the last few months. That development was encouraging and reflected an awareness on the part of an overwhelming majority of Members that financial hindrances should not be permitted to impede necessary political actions for which there was a collective financial responsibility. The United Nations had reached a turning point where nearly all Members had recognized their financial role within the Organization. Such recognition boded well for the future sessions of the General Assembly which might be called upon to consider the apportioning of the cost of future peace-keeping operations.

41. Various other ways of financing peace-keeping operations had been mentioned, including borrowing from private persons and corporations or from such institutions as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Such procedures had not been foreseen by the Charter and for very good reason. Resort to such methods would lower the prestige of the United Nations and should be avoided.

42. It had been stated that the problems faced by the special session were political rather than financial and therefore should be solved in their political context. The decisions to initiate the operations in the Congo and the Middle East were certainly political, just as the opposition to them was political. It was only natural that those States which did not support those decisions should use legitimate means, sanctioned by the Charter, to change them. But it was regrettable that they should also impede the operations through non-payment of assessments, apportioned in the manner prescribed by the Charter. The Charter made no distinction between Members with regard to their financial obligations and right. Consequently individual Members were not entitled to exert financial control over the actions of the Organization by refusing to pay for those of its activities to which they had political objections.

43. Unfortunately, the report of the Working Group seemed to indicate that the time was not yet ripe for the adoption of a permanent scale of contributions for financing future peace-keeping operations. His delegation agreed that the Organization would greatly benefit if such a permanent solution could be found. However, it seemed to be generally recognized that the Assembly would have to restrict itself to adopting resolutions concerning the financing of UNEF and ONUC for the second half of 1963, extending the time-limit for the purchase of United Nations bonds, dealing with the problem of arrears on the lines suggested by the less developed countries represented in the Working Group, and establishing general principles which would serve as guidelines for apportioning the cost of future peace-keeping operations.

44. His Government was prepared to propose to the Norwegian Parliament that Norway should accept an increased financial burden in recognition of the principle that less developed countries had a lesser capacity to pay for large-scale peace-keeping operations. His delegation hoped that the informal consultations in progress would lead to complete agreement as soon as possible. It was essential to show that, following the acceptance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, the great majority of Members would be ready to agree on the question of financing UNEF and ONUC along mutually acceptable lines. His delegation saw no particular difficulty in agreeing to a resolution recommending an extension of the time-limit for the bond issue. It would also support an appeal to those Members which were in arrears with their contributions. If all the countries which upheld the principle of collective financial responsibility met their obligations promptly, the more intransigent Members might reconsider their position. Lastly, the special session should adopt the general principles suggested by the Working Group: they would facilitate the task of future General Assemblies and help to lay the groundwork for a permanent scale of contributions.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.