

United Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Official Records



FOURTH SPECIAL SESSION

FIFTH COMMITTEE, 986th
MEETING

Wednesday, 22 May 1963,
at 10.50 a.m.

NEW YORK

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Chairman: Mr. Jan Paul BANNIER
(Netherlands).

AGENDA ITEM 7

Consideration of the financial situation of the Organization in the light of the report of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations (A/5187, A/5274, A/5407 and Corr.1, A/5416, A/5421, A/C.5/974, A/C.5/975, A/AC.113/1-27) (continued)

1. Mr. PATIÑO (Colombia) congratulated the Chairman and the officers of the Committee on their election.

2. There was a striking disproportion between the gravity of the United Nations financial crisis and the relative insignificance of the events which had caused it. It was not surprising that United Nations expenditures should be mounting at a time when government expenditure in all countries was constantly increasing; in fact, in the case of the United Nations, the rate of growth was slower than that in the public sector of national economies, and excessive financial conservatism was as inappropriate to the one as it was to the other. The contributions which Member States were asked to make towards the maintenance of peace were minimal as compared with the outlays on armaments being made by most countries, and the sums involved were too small to jeopardize the execution of priority programmes provided under national budgets. It was inadmissible that the existence of the United Nations should be endangered because of activities which were deemed essential by the competent organs and which did not represent an intolerable burden for national budgets. "Fiscal terrorism" of that kind was indefensible and should cease.

3. Like other countries, Colombia had reserved its position on the peace-keeping expenses of the United Nations pending receipt of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.^{1/} When that opinion

had been given binding force through the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1854 (XVII), his Government had at once acknowledged that the expenses in question constituted expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Articles 17 and 19 of the Charter and had settled all its commitments in respect of the operations in the Congo and the Middle East. His delegation knew that that interpretation of Article 19 might have rather serious consequences; in its view, however, while it was advisable to spare no effort to avoid those consequences, the effective operation of the norm laid down in that Article was unquestionable and could not be the subject of negotiations. He considered that the General Assembly, at its fourth special session, should endeavour to settle the matter once and for all on the basis of the report of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations (A/5407 and Corr.1) and should not content itself with adopting further provisional measures. He thought that a special scale should be established for the assessment of peace-keeping costs in the light of such criteria as the capacity of Member States to pay and the special responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council. His Government could accept the formula proposed in the memorandum of seven members of the Working Group—Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and the United Arab Republic—(see A/5407, para. 9) if it obtained general support, even though it placed a heavier burden on the developing countries. If, however, the Committee was obliged to adopt provisional measures once again, his delegation considered that such measures should be based on the principles applied previously and on that subject it agreed with the view expressed by the Brazilian delegation. He endorsed the Secretary-General's proposal (see A/C.5/974, para. 20) to prolong the period for subscription to the United Nations bond issue.

4. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), after paying tribute to the memory of Mr. Loutfi, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, welcomed the re-election of the Chairman of the Committee.

5. The problem before the Fifth Committee could not by any means be reduced to a mere financial matter. The true question at issue was the consequences of flagrant violations of the Charter, particularly of the Articles establishing the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security Council in respect of peace-keeping operations undertaken by the United Nations. The Committee must therefore concern itself with the symptoms of the evil, but with its underlying causes. Chapter VII of the Charter was explicit in giving jurisdiction to the Security Council in all questions concerning the use of United Nations armed forces and entrusted to the Council, acting in consultation with the Military Staff Committee, the direction of military operations conducted by the Organization.

^{1/} Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962; I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 51, transmitted to Members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/5161 and Corr.1).

However, no sooner had the Security Council, in response to the appeal made to it by Mr. Lumumba, the Prime Minister of the Congo, adopted resolution S/4387^{2/} to provide military assistance to the Congolese Government, than that rule of the Council's exclusive jurisdiction had been infringed. In his book To Katanga and Back, Mr. Conor Cruise O'Brien stated that the Congo operations had been directed not by the Security Council but by a "Congo Club" of the Secretariat composed mainly of Americans gathered around Mr. Hammarskjöld. As almost all the costs of the operation had been defrayed by the United States, that country had thought itself entitled to fix a policy putting an end to the career of the very person who had appealed to the United Nations, namely Mr. Lumumba. The colonialist Powers and the Union minière du Haut-Katanga had done all they could to sabotage the United Nations action by supplying aircraft to Mr. Tshombé, preventing his arrest, hampering the operations of the United Nations forces in Katanga, endeavouring to have officials who sought to give effect to the resolutions of the Security Council superseded, and so forth. The Western countries and their monopolies, ignoring the anguish of the Congolese people, had blatantly used the United Nations to achieve their own ends and to seize control of the natural resources of the Congo. The Western Powers, furthermore, had fought among themselves for spheres of influence, and today it was no longer Belgium but the United Kingdom which controlled the Union minière; the latter possessed 31 per cent of the voting shares whereas Belgium currently held only 7 per cent. It was clear from talks held at the end of 1962 between Mr. Spaak, an official of the Union minière and a representative of the United States Government, that United States monopolies had also tried to get their share of the booty. Indeed, the United States considered the Congo to be within its zone of influence and openly stated that if the United Nations had not intervened, it would have been forced to do so itself, and that it had everything to gain by the United Nations remaining there to protect its interests. Had it not been for the selfish interference of the Western countries over the past three years, attempting to pursue their colonialist or neo-colonialist activities under the United Nations flag, the whole matter could undoubtedly have been settled in a few weeks. There were no grounds for asserting today that the Congo operation would wind up at the end of 1963, as now envisaged. It was claimed in defence of the United Nations presence in the Congo that the withdrawal of its troops would lead to chaos; however, the success of the national liberation movements of African peoples which possessed nothing like the wealth of the Congo showed that argument to be worthless; it was essential to recognize without delay the Congolese people's right to settle its own affairs in accordance with its national interests, and in particular to put an end to the secessionist movement in Katanga. The withdrawal of United Nations forces would enable the Leopoldville Government to extend its jurisdiction over the entire country. The Soviet Government, which for its part had no selfish designs on territories still languishing under one or other form of colonial domination, considered it its duty to unmask the colonialist intrigues and to continue to combat

every attempt to employ the United Nations flag for purposes that were anything but peaceful.

6. The General Assembly, too, had exceeded its competence and encroached upon the rights of the Security Council when, under resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956, it had decided to create UNEF. The history of the United Nations operations in the Middle East was well known: though their aggression had been repelled, the Western Powers had taken advantage of it to establish their influence in that part of the world by inducing the United Nations to station forces in the country that had been the victim of the aggression. Since the Security Council could obviously not have approved of such manoeuvres, the Western Powers had had recourse to the General Assembly. Over \$100 million had so far been spent on those illegal operations, and there was no telling how long the expenditure would continue.

7. The general problem raised by those operations was of equal importance. The contention that the Security Council could be replaced in matters concerning peace-keeping operations by the General Assembly or by the United Nations Secretariat was incompatible with one of the principles on which the Organization was founded, namely, that all decisions in such matters must be adopted by the members of the Security Council acting unanimously. The principle of the unanimity of the members of the Security Council was not, as some had tried to make out, the prerogative of certain Member States; on the contrary, it ensured that the United Nations flag would not be used for selfish purposes contrary to the Charter. The Soviet Union for one would never agree to so flagrant a breach of the Charter's principles. For the peace-loving countries to ignore those machinations would be to capitulate to the aggressors. What had occurred in the Congo and in Egypt could happen in any newly independent country whose policies did not please the colonialist Powers. Hence, there must be no yielding to the colonialist aggressors; on the contrary, they must be made to comply with the Charter.

8. The Western Powers and their accomplices were alone responsible for the expenses occasioned by those illegal operations which were now the cause of the United Nations financial difficulties, and it was they who should bear those costs, so that the prestige of the United Nations might be maintained. Moreover, fifty-six Member States had refused to recognize any compulsory liability for the expenses connected with UNEF and sixty-seven had done likewise with respect to the expenses connected with the operation in the Congo. Those countries had to face the threats and blackmail of the Western Powers, even when they had supported them in endorsing other illegal decisions, such as the bond issue. The USSR understood perfectly the position of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America which refused to assume financial responsibility for those unlawful operations.

9. Nine of the members of the International Court of Justice had given an advisory opinion which was tendentious and contrary to the Charter, but five of them had taken an opposite view. When the opinion of the Court had been submitted to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session, forty-two delegations had voted against its acceptance, as shown by the vote on the Jordanian delegation's amendment.^{3/} Simi-

^{2/} Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960.

^{3/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 64, document A/5380, para. 9 (a).

larly, within the Working Group and in the Fifth Committee itself, many representatives had stated that their Governments were not willing to assume the burden of financing the operations in question.

10. A plan had been submitted to the Working Group which would almost entirely relieve the under-developed countries of the financial burdens of those operations, though at the same time involving them politically in the aggression which had been committed by the Western Powers. The United States and its allies obviously had everything to gain by the acceptance of that plan, as it would enable them to continue to flout the provisions of the Charter in future with impunity. It was obvious, however, that any attempt of that kind was utterly unacceptable.

11. The advisory opinion of the Court had no legal or moral force, and could not impose on Member States any obligation additional to those contained in the Charter, which prescribed only the obligation to finance the legitimate expenditure of the United Nations, as included in the regular budget. The Soviet Union's attitude had been clearly set forth in the memorandum addressed to the Court and later circulated as a Fifth Committee document.^{4/} The Court's opinion conflicted with Article 50 of the Charter. At the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, the representative of the Union of South Africa had submitted a proposal^{5/} to include in the Charter an additional Article concerning the methods of financing preventive or enforcement measures decided on by the Security Council in order to maintain peace. The United States representative had at that time opposed that proposal, pointing out that it duplicated Article 50. He had thus confirmed that such problems fell within the competence of the Security Council, not of the General Assembly, and indeed his opinion had been shared by all the participants in the Conference.^{6/} It had therefore been clearly understood that the financing of preventive or enforcement measures taken by the Security Council did not come under Article 17 of the Charter.

12. Similarly, the special sub-committee which had been given the task, at the San Francisco Conference, of studying the application of the provisions of the Charter, had stated^{7/} that it was to be understood that if an interpretation of the Charter made by any organ of the Organization or by a committee of jurists was not generally acceptable, it would be without binding force. The special sub-committee had further stated that in such circumstances, or in cases where it was desired to establish an authoritative interpretation as a precedent for the future, it might be necessary to embody the interpretation in an amendment to the Charter. That decision, which had been formally approved on 25 June 1945 at the ninth plenary meeting,^{7/} was perfectly clear and had force of law for all Member States. It was clear furthermore from Article 10 of the Charter that the General Assembly could only adopt recommendations, which could therefore have no binding legal force for Member States.

13. For those reasons, neither the advisory opinion of the Court nor General Assembly resolution 1854

(XVII) could be binding on Member States. They were merely attempts to legalize unlawful actions which, if they succeeded, would deal the United Nations a blow from which it could not easily recover. The more unlawful decisions were allowed to accumulate, the more the stability of the United Nations as a whole was threatened.

14. The financial situation of the United Nations also had other abnormal features. Each year unlawful expenditure was illegally included in the regular budget, including expenditure for such purposes as special missions, the United Nations field service, and the re-payment of the loan floated in order to finance the Congo operation. The United Nations continued to spend large sums on missions which had been set up ten or fifteen years before and which now served no purpose. The technical assistance activities included in the regular budget also continued to grow, and expenditure on them in 1963 would amount to \$6.4 million. Such practices were unjustifiable, and all such expenses should be eliminated from the regular budget. Technical assistance should be financed solely by voluntary contributions, which Member States would make in their national currency, if they so wished.

15. Although the Soviet Union was making enormous efforts on behalf of technical assistance activities, the sums which it contributed under the regular budget were being badly used under the direction of certain departments of the Secretariat which had a Western bias. The technical assistance services of the United Nations recruited their personnel on a unilateral basis, and the great majority of the experts sent to developing countries were nationals of colonialist Powers, whereas the socialist countries, although their contributions accounted for 20 per cent of all technical assistance funds, were denied direct contact with the developing countries.

16. In conclusion, the Soviet delegation wished to make the following statements: first, it would consider as unacceptable any decision taken in violation of the Charter and in usurpation of the prerogatives of the Security Council, which sought to compel Member States to participate in financing the costs of the Middle East and Congo operations. Such a decision could have no legal force. Secondly, the Soviet delegation considered that it was right that all such expenses should be borne by the countries responsible for them. Thirdly, from 1963 on, the Soviet Union would not pay that part of its contribution to the regular budget which was intended to finance the redemption of the bonds unlawfully issued to finance the Congo operation. Fourthly, in the future, any decision concerning the financing of peace-keeping operations could only be taken, in accordance with the Charter, by the Security Council. Fifthly, from 1963 on, the Soviet Union would no longer contribute to the financing of the following activities, which had been unlawfully included in the regular budget: the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea; the United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Korea; the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, and the United Nations Field Service. Lastly, the Soviet Union would continue to take part in technical assistance activities by sending experts and equipment to the developing countries, but it was no longer willing to finance the sending of experts and deliveries of equipment from other countries, particularly the United States. For 1963, the Soviet Union would pay its due share of

^{4/} *Ibid.*, document A/C.5/957.

^{5/} See United Nations Conference on International Organization, III/3/34.

^{6/} *Ibid.*, IV/2/B/1.

^{7/} *Ibid.*, P/20.

the total of \$6.4 million appropriated for technical assistance, that was to say, rather more than \$1.1 million in its national currency, and the money could be used to pay for the dispatch of Soviet equipment and experts to the receiving countries. No threats or attempts at blackmail could succeed in changing the Soviet Union's attitude.

17. As Mr. Khrushchev had stated on television in the United States on 9 October 1960, the two-thirds-majority system, which was perfectly acceptable in a parliament responsible for considering a country's internal problems, could not be applied in an international body in which each State's sovereignty had to be respected. The Western Powers should not, therefore, abuse the temporary majority which they enjoyed in the United Nations in an attempt to impose their opinion on the rest of the world.

18. The present situation was really simply the financial consequence of the political defeat which the colonial Powers had suffered in their attempt to violate the provisions of the Charter, and those Powers ran the risk of suffering even more resounding defeats if they continued in the same course.

19. Mr. MORRIS (Liberia) noted with satisfaction that, as its Chairman, Mr. Adebo, had stated (984th meeting) the Working Group had made considerable progress and had been able to submit a number of concrete proposals for the financing of peace-keeping operations. The task facing the Working Group had been immense, particularly as most Member States, though accepting the principle of collective responsibility, could not, for political or financial reasons, agree on fixed criteria for the apportionment of expenditure arising out of peace-keeping operations.

20. While admitting the justice of the principle of collective responsibility with respect to operations authorized by the General Assembly and the Security Council, the delegation of Liberia felt that the Committee should give careful attention to all proposals which might enable the resulting financial burden on various countries to be lightened. His delegation would therefore be inclined to support several of the criteria proposed by Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and the United Arab Republic (see A/5407, para. 9), namely the criterion of Member States' capacity to pay, the principle of increasing the share of certain Member States and decreasing that of certain others according to the magnitude of the expenditure involved, and, lastly, the principle that the permanent members of the Security Council should assume increased financial responsibility for peace-keeping expenditures.

21. Furthermore, in certain circumstances his delegation would also be prepared to support the principle that those States which benefited politically and economically from United Nations peace-keeping operations should pay larger contributions. After all, no one could deny that some nations were more peaceful than others.

22. The Liberian delegation wished to confine itself, at the present stage of the debate, to giving a general idea of its position and making it clear that, in its opinion, the principles which had been defined should not necessarily be applied rigidly. Like many other countries, Liberia was faced with the urgent task of developing its resources for the benefit of all its people, but it had always scrupulously observed its responsibilities regarding the financing of peace-

keeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo. Liberia had made the sacrifices implicit in that attitude solely because it was convinced that, when the conditions necessitating such operations existed, the operations were the responsibility of all Member States.

23. The role which the developing countries could play in the matter was obviously limited by their capacity to contribute to the expenses involved. While it was quite true that all countries benefited one way or another from the maintenance of peace in a given area, it nevertheless went without saying that the resulting financial responsibilities should be borne primarily by the countries which had the means to do so. The contribution which the developing countries could make should chiefly serve the purpose of preserving the collective nature of the peace-keeping operations involved and making them more readily acceptable to the countries directly concerned.

24. The Liberian delegation therefore appealed to all Member States which had the means to do so to follow the example of most of the less wealthy countries and pay their share of peace-keeping expenditures. It was only in that way that mankind could make its ideals of peace and freedom a reality, and the price which Member States were called on to pay for that was certainly not excessive.

25. Mr. PLIMPTON (United States of America) associated himself with the tribute to the memory of Mr. Loutfi, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs. He also wished to congratulate the Chairman and the other officers of the Fifth Committee on their re-election to their respective posts.

26. Exercising his right of reply, he recalled first that the Secretary-General had warned the Fifth Committee at its 961st meeting that the financial problem of the Organization was a vital one, since a financially bankrupt United Nations would be an ineffective United Nations if, indeed, it could survive on such a basis. The financial issue thus transcended political controversy.

27. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union representative had chosen to disregard that appeal and to indulge in the very political controversy the Secretary-General had hoped could be transcended. The United States representative did not intend to imitate him.

28. In defence of his country's refusal to pay its just assessments for the peace-keeping operations, a refusal which was pushing the United Nations towards financial bankruptcy, the Soviet Union representative had repeated the same arguments that his country had made before the International Court of Justice, then before the Fifth Committee and lastly before the General Assembly at its seventeenth session. Those arguments had been rejected by the Court in its advisory opinion of 20 July 1962 and by the General Assembly's acceptance of that opinion by the overwhelming vote of 76 votes in favour, 17 against and 8 abstentions. The Court's advisory opinion, as approved by the General Assembly (resolution 1854 A (XVII)), established that the costs of UNEF and of ONUC, which had been assessed by the General Assembly against Member States, were "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 17 of the Charter and thus were covered by the provisions of Article 19. The repetition of such arguments could not conceal that the Soviet bloc was repudiating its Charter obligations and was doing its worst to drive the United Nations towards bankruptcy.

29. Although he had no intention of discussing the Soviet Union's arguments, he wished to point out to the 105 Members of the United Nations which were not permanent members of the Security Council that despite the provisions of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter, the Soviet Union would have the expenses arising from peace-keeping operations apportioned by the Security Council. In other words, it would have eleven countries determine what the other 100 States Members of the United Nations should pay. Fortunately, that proposal, which was on its face contrary to the express wording of the Charter, had been conclusively rejected by the International Court and by the General Assembly.

30. There was no need to comment in detail on the stale accusations of the Soviet Union representative concerning ONUC. That operation had been authorized by the Security Council itself, with the affirmative vote of the Soviet Union, and its principles and procedures had been repeatedly affirmed by the General Assembly. It had been carried out under the direction of two Secretaries-General, who had been careful to consult the Advisory Committee on the Congo on the major issues as they had arisen. The Government of the Congo itself had expressed its strong desire to have the United Nations operation in its country continue. Recently, in a letter^{8/} addressed to the Secretary-General, that Government had refuted the Soviet Union's contentions about the operation and had rejected the Soviet Union's demand for withdrawal of the United Nations forces from the Congo.

31. Thus, while pretending to attack the so-called colonialists and so-called foreign monopolies, the Soviet Union representative in fact was attacking the Security Council and the General Assembly, the Advisory Committee on the Congo and the Congolese Government itself.

32. It was unnecessary to remind the Committee that the Soviet Union had refused to contribute to ONUC and to related economic and technical assistance projects. On the contrary, the Soviet Union had tried to sabotage that operation, because it could not control the operation for its own imperialistic purposes.

33. No Soviet misrepresentation could conceal the fact that ONUC was succeeding or that the Soviet Union had consistently opposed it or that the United States had whole-heartedly supported it. The United States had contributed by way of assessments and voluntary payments \$114 million to the Congo operation; the Soviet Union had contributed nothing but \$32 million in arrears. The United States had contributed or pledged \$31 million to the United Nations Fund for the Congo; it had, through the United Nations, supplied \$70 million for the Congo import support programme and it had contributed under the United Nations/FAO World Food Programme \$40 million in food for the Congo; the Soviet Union had contributed not one kopek to any of those programmes.

34. The Soviet Union said, as did all other Members, that it was a peace-loving country. Did it desire peace in the Middle East? The United Nations Emergency Force established by the Members of the General Assembly had helped to keep that peace, but the Soviet Union continued to claim that it was an illegal

operation and should be withdrawn, and would not pay for it. What did it want in the Middle East and why did it oppose the United Nations operation which had succeeded in keeping peace in the Middle East?

35. The United States was proud of the fact that its policies and those of the United Nations coincided. The United States wanted a world of independent, sovereign States free from all foreign domination or outside totalitarian parties. Like the United Nations, the United States wanted developing States to be given all possible assistance in their task of developing their own economic and human resources. It heard with astonishment the Soviet Union representative's statement that his country would refuse to share in the technical assistance projects of the United Nations, the aims of which the United States for its part fully supported.

36. Its aims being the same as those of the United Nations, the United States delegation was determined that, despite Soviet obstructionism and Soviet attempts to bankrupt the Organization, the joint aims of the United States and the United Nations would be realized, and was confident that all Members of the Organization sharing those aims would stand fast in their determination that the Organization should not be bankrupt and should survive.

37. Mr. JACKLING (United Kingdom) also paid a tribute to the memory of Mr. Loutfi, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs. He congratulated the Chairman and the other officers of the Committee on their election.

38. In exercise of his right of reply, he stated that the accusations against his Government made by the USSR representative were groundless. His delegation reserved the right to reply to them at a later stage in the discussion when it would state its position on the financial situation of the Organization.

39. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) admired the promptness with which the United States representative had been willing to reply to the statement just made by Mr. Fedorenko. Unfortunately, haste was not always a wise counsellor, and Mr. Plimpton had not been able to dispute the political and legal arguments of the Soviet Union representative. That method of avoiding debate certainly would not help the Fifth Committee to achieve concrete results.

40. In his haste, the United States representative had gone so far as to distort the words of the USSR representative. Thus, Mr. Fedorenko had never said that the Soviet Union would refuse to participate in the United Nations technical assistance programme. He had declared that the Soviet Union was prepared to participate in those programmes by furnishing experts and equipment but that it was not prepared to finance the sending of experts and equipment from other countries, especially the United States of America. Mr. Fedorenko had then announced that in 1963 the USSR would pay its contribution to technical assistance—more than \$1.1 million—in national currency and would request that its contribution should be used for sending Soviet experts and equipment to the recipient countries.

41. The United States representative had carefully refrained from analysing the provisions of the Charter on which the USSR position was based. He had confined himself to representing the Soviet Union as the enemy of the United Nations, because it defended the

^{8/} Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1963, document S/5277.

Charter and protested against the use which had been made of the United Nations forces in the Congo. According to him, the United States, which had supported that illegal operation, was the true defender of the international Organization.

42. Certainly nobody could deny that the financial contribution of the United States and other Western Powers to the Congo operation was large. There was no connexion, however, between that generosity and devotion to the United Nations Charter. On 30 June 1963, the total expenditure made for UNEF and ONUC had amounted to \$425 million, and the contribution of the United States of America and its allies, including the purchase of bonds, had amounted to \$298 million, or some 70 per cent of the total.

43. In the opinion of the Soviet Union that was merely a very natural attitude on the part of the countries which had been the main beneficiaries of the United Nations action in that regard. Yet, those countries now wished to place those operations in a light which bore no relation to reality; by alleging that the United Nations was on the verge of bankruptcy, they sought to make all the Member States share the political responsibility for decisions which constituted flagrant violations of the Charter. In the opinion of the

Soviet Union, the political responsibility for such decisions must be clearly defined and established in order to thwart that manoeuvre. The task of the General Assembly now was to see that such circumstances did not recur, and for that reason the Soviet Union urged all Member States to consider carefully the legal and political arguments it had submitted. Ignoring them was not the way to reach a solution.

44. Mr. PLIMPTON (United States of America) thought that the Soviet Union representative had been unduly complimentary to him as to the difficulty of preparing in advance replies to Soviet contentions. When one had heard a cracked phonograph record played so many times despite the rejection of the tune by the International Court of Justice and the General Assembly, one had no difficulty in remembering the old words.

45. He hoped that further discussions and conferences, leading to some solution of the financial difficulties, would be held on the basis suggested by the Secretary-General and that members of the Committee would conduct themselves in a way that would lead to solutions and not against solutions.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.