

UNITED NATIONS  
**General Assembly**  
FORTY-FOURTH SESSION  
*Official Records*

FIRST COMMITTEE  
13th meeting  
held on  
Tuesday, 24 October 1989  
at 10 a.m.  
New York

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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 13th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela)

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Distr. GENERAL  
A/C.1/44/PV.13  
27 October 1989  
ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 49 TO 69 AND 151 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Mr. MASHHADI (Islamic Republic of Iran): The wind of change is blowing in the four corners of the world, but there is a need for us all to adopt a responsible attitude to direct that wind for the benefit of all mankind. Standing at a critical juncture of history, we all bear a heavy duty and obligation with regard to all developments taking place in our world today. Conflicts in several regions of the world have come to an end, and prospects for halting the arms race have rarely appeared so promising.

Our global obligation calls us to treat international developments in a just way. The element of justice is the most important stabilizing factor in international relations. If the peoples of the world are convinced that, in the event of their rights being trampled on, the international community will come to their assistance in a just way, they will not feel obliged to resort to accumulating arms to protect their security.

Perception of threat and lack of security will cause international tensions, disputes and conflicts, which provide reasons for acquiring new weapons and more weapons, while this acquisition of weapons in turn exacerbates the international situation. Just and responsible behaviour is the key phrase in international relations. Seeking security at the expense of the insecurity of others will harm international security.

One clear example of lack of a responsible attitude is well manifested in the implementation of Security Council resolution 598 (1987). More than a year has elapsed since the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq came into effect, yet implementation of the resolution has not gone beyond half of its first paragraph. Unfortunately, the Security Council has not lived up to its responsibility under the United Nations Charter, as well as under the resolution itself, to guarantee

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compliance with the resolution. If the resolution is not fully and rapidly implemented, the credibility of the Security Council, which adopted the resolution with massive publicity, will be seriously undermined. The Islamic Republic of Iran calls for the immediate, unconditional and full implementation of the resolution. Our behaviour in the past year, manifested in our co-operation with the Secretary-General and our acceptance of his proposals, illustrates our readiness to embark upon such a course of action. This should be reciprocated.

The arms race is a multi-dimensional process, including political, economic, technological and - more important - security elements. The interrelationship between disarmament and security should be considered from this angle. According to the report of the Palme Commission, released on 14 April this year, technological changes have made traditional concepts of national security obsolete, and nations can no longer hope to protect their citizens by unilateral military measures. Even the most powerful States are dependent in the end upon the good sense and restraint of other nations. The report underlines that no one State can organize global security, and that nations will have to co-operate and establish stronger forms of international order, with a stable legal and political framework adequate for peace and security, disarmament and sustainable development. It is important to bear in mind that persuading States to disarm requires that they gain confidence in the capabilities of international law to protect their security.

Unfortunately, an important international instrument, such as the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which is internationally recognized as jus cogens, did not help us avoid falling prey to the most aggressive form of chemical attack in contemporary history. Modern efforts to control chemical weapons have a long history, dating from the turn of the century. The Hague International Peace Conference of 1899 and 1907 both resulted in agreement not to use projectiles

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containing poison gas in war. That early agreement, however, broke down in the course of the First World War, under the pressure to find a means to break the stalemate of trench warfare. As a result, there was widespread use of several different types of chemical agents, including chlorine and mustard gas, by both sides.

Revulsion over gas warfare led to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, whose preamble also referred to "all analogous liquids, materials or devices". Sporadic use of chemical weapons from the time of the First World War to 1980 appeared to be isolated exceptions to the norm, and the Geneva Protocol remained the main international legal constraint on chemical weapons. It is sad, however, to note that in this decade the use of chemical weapons has become routine and a fact of life, mainly owing to the lack of a responsible attitude on the part of all those who are now complaining that chemical weapons are a global problem and that the accelerating proliferation and use of chemical weapons present immediate threats to the security of all members of the world community.

From as early as 1981, when chemical weapons were used against Iranian soldiers on the southern fronts on a relatively limited scale, the Islamic Republic of Iran has warned the world community of the dangers inherent in the attitude of indifference and acquiescence towards this menace. As a result of this irresponsible behaviour, the use of chemical weapons gained momentum and was extended from soldiers to Iranian civilians and cities, such as Sardasht, and finally led to the massacre of Halabja.

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Halabja has become a turning-point in the history of the use of these abhorrent weapons. It was the first time that a Government had used chemical weapons against its own people, and that changed the whole picture of the use of such weapons in future guerrilla warfare and in the behaviour of Governments towards their own ethnic minorities. If in the Second World War people were taken to gas chambers, in Halabja the gas was taken to the houses of the people. The Swedish representative in the First Committee eloquently compared Hiroshima to Halabja in the sense that the victims of both massacres were mainly women and children.

It now seems that, finally, the lost lives of thousands of innocent Iranians and non-Iranians have awakened the conscience of those who turned a blind eye to the facts and neglected the negative outcome of their abrasiveness, which resulted in the steady erosion of existing international rules banning chemical weapons. It is certainly a relief that the new trend is leading to a demonstration of positive attitudes. In the past year we have followed with interest developments in that field: the Paris and Canberra Conferences, progress in the negotiations at Geneva to conclude a comprehensive convention eliminating chemical weapons from the face of the earth and the recent agreements between the super-Powers.

One hundred and forty-nine nations met at Paris for a Conference on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. Despite the commendable effort by the French Government, that Conference did not register a remarkable breakthrough. In the first paragraph of the Final Declaration, on the subject of use, a realistic assessment of the recent past was not made and the relevant United Nations documents, the reports of the investigation teams dispatched by the Secretary-General, statements and, particularly, Security Council resolutions 612 (1988) and 620 (1988) were not properly reflected. Furthermore,

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taking into account all the reservations embodied in the Geneva Protocol, the first paragraph was more a paragraph regulating future use than one prohibiting it.

Another development in the area of prohibition of chemical weapons was the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons convened by Australia at Canberra from 18 to 22 September 1989. The Conference was successful in achieving its purposes, namely, to assist in the resolution of technical issues and in the identification of workable and realistic solutions to other outstanding problems to enable the early conclusion of the convention and to convey a clear understanding of the concerns of industry. The outcome of the Conference, as reflected in the Chairman's statement, underlines that

"There was clearly evident total support for the achievement of a chemical-weapons convention of comprehensive scope, which would be effective, verifiable and workable in practice, non-discriminatory in impact and attract universal adherence."

The Conference acknowledged that no interim régime could be a substitute for such a convention.

At the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva negotiations towards a chemical-weapons convention did not achieve what the Chairman, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, called "the point of no return". This year the Ad Hoc Committee recorded substantial progress, but not a breakthrough. Under the relentless efforts of Ambassador Morel and the five chairmen of the working groups, groundbreaking work was done in several sensitive areas, including the conduct of challenge inspection. In the meantime much work still needs to be done on article X: "Assistance and protection against chemical weapons" and article XI: "Economic and technological co-operation", and also on sanctions against violators of the convention. The draft convention still lacks clauses giving adequate incentives for joining it and providing for collective action against those

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violating it. Both of those elements are vital for the universality of the future convention. In order to renounce the chemical option nations need guarantees, so that what happened to the Iranian people would not be repeated with them.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has always maintained that those with the largest arsenals of chemical weapons should start destroying their stockpiles prior to the conclusion of a chemical-weapons convention. This is an important step in the direction of building confidence and would also help them reduce the cost of destruction in the 10-year period envisaged in the draft convention. As victims of chemical weapons we need guarantees from those neighbours possessing chemical weapons or having a history of such use. That action will undoubtedly be considered a gigantic leap forward in confidence-building among the countries of the region. In that context we welcome the Soviet-United States initiative to reduce the size of their chemical arsenals. However, in this respect virtue should not be made out of a necessity, and the weapons destroyed should not be only those that are obsolete and that would, according to the law, have to be destroyed by 1997. The destruction of chemical weapons must also begin with the most lethal and modern of them.

One of the difficult issues in the negotiations on a draft chemical-weapons convention had been the security stocks, and this seems, unfortunately, to have re-emerged. The condition of retaining some chemical weapons and continuing their production poses major problems. One should practice what one preaches. It is not justifiable to continue production and, at the same time, to want others not to follow suit. The representative of Brazil eloquently illustrated this way of thinking when he stated:

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"... the militarily significant States urge other States to keep away from the same categories of armaments they deem essential for their self-defence. The notion of a world where some will keep for an indefinite time most of their overwhelming military power is obviously abhorrent and morally unacceptable to the international community as a whole." (A/C.1/44/PV.6, p. 36)

The relationship between bilateral and multilateral talks is a topic of major importance. Those two processes are complementary, and one should not be sought at the expense of the other. We are all potential victims of a super-Power confrontation and, as the representative of Brazil so rightly said, we have an inherent right to participate in something that is essential to our survival, the failure of which could endanger us all. We welcome any genuine move by the super-Powers towards reduction of weapons and arms limitation, but, at the same time, parallel efforts should continue at the multilateral level. The United Nations Secretary-General, in his 1989 report on the work of the Organization, mentioned that:

"The steps towards arms reduction taken by the two militarily most powerful States and the proposals under consideration between the two major alliances present a marked contrast to the lack of comparable progress elsewhere."

(A/44/1, p. 13)

The quantitative arms race between the super-Powers may have been subdued for the time being, but the question remains whether the qualitative arms race, by means of the modernization of weapons and weapons systems, has not been substituted for the quantitative arms race. In fact, there are reports to the effect that all five nuclear-weapon Powers have been involved, in one way or another, in the modernization of their nuclear arsenals. The 1988 Stockholm Declaration states that:



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"The strategic nuclear weapons pose a mortal threat all over the world. ... Agreements to reduce existing nuclear arsenals must be backed up by decisive measures to check the unbridled development of new generations of even more dreadful and sophisticated nuclear weapons. The single most effective measure would be to end all nuclear-weapon tests, by all States." (A/43/125, pp. 5-6)

In this respect, my country is among those formally asking for a partial test-ban Treaty amendment conference.

In 1963 the super-Powers expressed their determination to seek ways and means for the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons. That determination was restated five years later, through the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as the will to achieve, at the earliest possible date, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race. Unfortunately, today there is no negotiation on a comprehensive test-ban.

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The nuclear-weapon States have not fulfilled their obligations embodied in article VI of the Treaty, while all non-nuclear-weapon States have carried out their commitments. This state of discriminatory attitudes can not last forever, since the foundations of a treaty that does not guarantee the security of States equally are fragile and shaky. The nuclear-weapon States should take action-oriented steps with tangible results before a decision is made on the future of the Treaty. For the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has no nuclear weapons and has no intention of acquiring them, this is an issue of utmost importance, given that some States in our region either possess nuclear weapons or are trying to acquire them. In a bid to check this menace, in 1974 Iran first proposed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region. This has been the subject of a resolution every year in this Committee. Due to the sensitivity and geopolitical situation of our region, we firmly believe that the Middle East must be free from any kind of weapons of mass destruction and that a hands-off policy must be pursued by the big Powers. Since it is located as a bridge between South Asia and the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran is also supportive of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

My country, a non-aligned and non-nuclear-weapon State, is located in the neighbourhood of the two military alliances of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It therefore attaches great significance to the issue of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. As the current chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances, of the Conference on Disarmament, my delegation introduced a non-paper to contribute to a search for a common approach on the substance of negative security assurances and, in particular, on a "common formula". In the view of the majority of Conference on

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Disarmament members, it is necessary that the nuclear-weapon States concerned should respond in a positive manner to the repeated call of the non-nuclear-weapon States for the security assurances that are necessary for an effective non-proliferation régime. There is agreement on the idea of an international convention to provide effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as reflected in General Assembly resolution 43/69, adopted with no vote against it. This resolution appealed, inter alia, to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will to reach agreement on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. The Security Council, as the guarantor of international peace and security, should play its due role for the actualization of such an instrument.

The present state of the relationship between the super-Powers and the relaxation of international tensions should give way to the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, which will greatly contribute to strengthening international peace and security. Further procrastination in convening the Conference on the Indian Ocean will not be justifiable. By its resolution 43/79 of 7 December 1988, the General Assembly, after taking note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, reaffirmed its full support for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and reiterated and emphasized its decision to Convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo. The group of 11 Western countries that had made termination of major regional conflicts a prerequisite for implementation of the Declaration now have no excuse, after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the establishment of a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq. The Islamic Republic of Iran, which enjoys the longest coastal border with the Persian

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Gulf, a natural extension of the Indian Ocean, calls for the declaration of the Indian Ocean and its waterways as a zone of peace. The military presence of alien States constitutes a threat to the national security of littoral States and creates an atmosphere of mistrust and insecurity among them. We call for the unconditional withdrawal of all foreign forces and the dismantling of their military bases in the region.

The naval arms race is increasingly becoming a threat to international peace and security. The major nuclear Powers are involved in stationing more and more of their nuclear arsenals at sea, and with any new arms control agreement between the two super-Powers, the chances of transferring land-based nuclear weapons to sea becomes even greater. Another negative aspect of the naval arms race is the increasing presence of the major Powers' navies in the vicinity and territorial waters of other countries, especially those that are not members of any military bloc. This trend constitutes a serious threat to the security and sovereignty of littoral States. On the other hand, a tendency is shown by some major Powers to revive the old and discredited gunboat diplomacy in pursuit of their policy of intimidation and dominance. The big Powers should restrict their navies to their national defence and protection of their own territorial waters.

Outer space is increasingly becoming another battlefield of rivalry in the game of dominance. Today, with the advancement of technology, the use of outer space is more than ever an important concern of the international community. Outer space is the common heritage of mankind and should be utilized only for peaceful purposes and the benefit of human society. As different reports indicate, more than 70 per cent of space activities are of a military nature: these include observation of military activities and detection of nuclear explosions. Space Powers claim that most of these activities are related to direct application of

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arms control and disarmament. My delegation does not share those views. Spy satellites or military information-gathering by satellites directly interfere with the sovereign rights of nations, and therefore should not be permitted. In this context, we believe the proposals presented this year by the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France and the Federal Republic of Germany to the Ad Hoc Committee on prevention of an arms race in outer space are worth serious study.

The prospect of a new era of détente and stability has now raised a spirit of optimism in the United Nations that deserves to be fully utilized and translated into concrete disarmament measures. Having this in mind, our task in this Committee calls for change in attitudes and a new constructive approach to the issues before us. Our efforts should therefore focus on the most acute problems through judgement based on justice and our global obligation. We should be pragmatic and realistic in our work, and at the same time strive to achieve the ideals of a better world in which all peoples are treated equally, since God the Almighty has created us equal.

Mrs. TOURE (Mali) (interpretation from French): I am very happy to extend to you, Sir, on behalf of my delegation, our warm congratulations on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. Our congratulations also go to the other members of the Bureau.

The Charter of the United Nations, in Article 1, asks Member States to "take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace". Thus since the very creation of our Organization disarmament has been one of the objectives of Member States. To reach this objective of general and complete disarmament, the United Nations is duty-bound to establish a climate of trust and solidarity.

(Mrs. Toure, Mali)

As many delegations have emphasized, the world is on the threshold of a new era, as is shown in particular by the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, developments with regard to certain regional conflicts and renewed confidence in the United Nations.

However, many causes of concern remain, such as continued tests of nuclear weapons in order to modernize them; slow progress in negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons; difficulties in reaching agreement on banning chemical weapons; delays in the negotiations on reducing conventional forces; and failure to respect the Declarations on the de-nuclearization of certain zones.

Similarly, the waste of considerable financial resources on the arms race continues unabated. Even worse, the impoverishment of our world is accelerated, and the destruction of the environment threatens life itself in some regions of the world, which are victims of the dumping of radioactive waste.

This apocalyptic picture should not make us lose sight of our objective of reaching the year 2000 with no nuclear, neutron or chemical weapons remaining, and with the lowest possible level of conventional weapons. The suicidal logic of the arms race gave rise, and then developed, an awareness in countries the world over of the imperative need for disarmament. There is a new dynamic which has brought the realization that the arms race has become the basic cause of international insecurity and the risk of a nuclear war that cannot be won. Because disarmament has become one of the most pressing needs of our time, other measures must be adopted for the destruction of weapons.

At this juncture my delegation would recall that the United Nations is our common organization, and what happens there is the business of everyone. The countries of the third world, including those belonging to the Movement of

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Non-Aligned Countries and the Organization of African Unity, are always concerned about disarmament measures. However, their concerns are not always taken into account.

For example, the Declaration concerning the de-nuclearization of Africa is far from being implemented. The delegation of Mali once again condemns South Africa's nuclear capability, which is a threat to the countries and peoples of the continent. Any nuclear collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa is a flagrant violation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the provisions of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations, devoted to disarmament, which says:

"Indeed, the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm. It is, therefore, essential for purposes of disarmament to prevent any further acquisition of arms or arms technology by such régimes, especially through strict adherence by all States to relevant decisions of the Security Council." (S-10/2, para. 12)

My delegation also wishes to emphasize the unbreakable link between disarmament and development. Disarmament is vital in order to bring about the development of the countries of the third world, through scientific, industrial and commercial co-operation, which they require on the basis of reciprocity and respect for their national political choices. Disarmament is also indispensable today for the development of the industrialized countries. Thus, disarmament would give a new dimension, a new content, to economic co-operation and exchanges.

Reducing and then halting expenditure on the over-armament of the great Powers would free enormous economic potentials. Economic co-operation would make it

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possible to move towards the establishment of a new international economic order, based on détente, peace, equity and solidarity.

Mali continues to support all initiatives aimed at bringing about general and complete disarmament, geared to the development of all States. Development requires a sound physical and human environment. With regard to the environment, my delegation fully agrees with the concern expressed by the General Assembly in resolution 43/75 T, dealing with the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa. That dumping is a mortal danger to the African continent, which is already shaken by many other disasters. My delegation hopes that the Committee will approve by consensus the similar draft resolution put forward at this session.

With regard to chemical weapons, my delegation hopes that the Conference on Disarmament will soon conclude a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

My country, which sent a delegation to the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons, welcomes the results of the Conference, which made a big contribution to fostering the current negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. It reaffirmed the validity of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. It also reaffirmed its full support for the Secretary-General of the United Nations in carrying out his responsibilities for investigations in the event of alleged violations of the Protocol. The Conference also noted the unanimous desire of the participants to eliminate chemical weapons from the face of the Earth.



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My delegation wishes to conclude on a hopeful note. The new situation created since 8 December 1987 by the United States-Soviet decision to destroy short-range and intermediate-range nuclear weapons must be encouraged. It was a considerable historic event, paving the way to attaining the objective enshrined in our Charter of a world free of any threat to international peace and security. The proposals made by the United States and Soviet delegations during the current session give us reason for optimism, especially if the first agreement leads to a second agreement resulting in, among other things, the destruction of 50 per cent of long-range nuclear weapons.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): The year 1988 was a year of hope. In late autumn last year we parted here in New York with the understanding that we would give concrete dimensions to hope of a world with fewer weapons.

The year 1989 has thus become a year of expectation - the expectation that the disarmament process now under way will be continued expeditiously, with the aim of achieving tangible results.

Let us make the 1990s the years of fulfilment.

The peoples rightly call for effective disarmament steps leading to lasting peace and prosperity for all. For this to come true, the German Democratic Republic expects this session to provide decisive impulses - impulses for arms limitation and disarmament and for the future work of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

A good many issues have seen progress over the past year. Paris, Geneva, Vienna, Belgrade, Canberra and Jackson Hole, too, are indications of it. This matter has been thoroughly discussed in the General Assembly and in the general debate in the First Committee. Nobody underestimates the results produced. In fact, they prove to be a solid foundation for further substantial steps. This year's report of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament testifies to it as well, but at the same time it reveals that much still remains to be done to achieve a real breakthrough. We all know how things stand at the moment. We all know about the deficiencies, but we are also cognizant of the possibilities that need to be explored in order to arrive at constructive solutions to the pending issues of contention.

Let us therefore centre our efforts on negotiating those essential questions concerning the draft convention on chemical weapons that remain unresolved. Let us finally turn to the substantive issues in terms of a nuclear-test ban, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. Let us establish the long-overdue subsidiary organ of the Conference on Disarmament on a nuclear-test ban. Let us make the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space an effective forum for deliberations on military, strategic, scientific, technological and legal problems related to it. Let us get down to business at the negotiations on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States and on radiological weapons. And let us find a constructive solution to the questions connected with the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Is it not imperative to halt the continued stockpiling of weapons and their modernization? Is the level of military confrontation not still unjustifiably high and dangerous? Is it not time, then, to rid oneself of concepts of deterrence? And is it not necessary to search for solutions that would enable everyone to

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dispense with nuclear weapons without infringing anyone's security? The German Democratic Republic advocates such measures. More favourable political conditions in general do not necessarily produce the advances urgently needed in the disarmament process, as has become obvious to all of us in recent months. Yet those advances would be attainable if all sides matched their will and preparedness to that end with practical deeds.

Would it not be appropriate, in the face of recent developments, to come to an agreement on the issue of defensive security concepts? A point in favour of this is the fact that an intensive dialogue is being conducted on that question, regionally and globally, which could be substantially promoted if it were to receive an impetus from the General Assembly at this session. Our delegation has drawn up a draft resolution on the subject and will be ready to submit it after consultation with other Member States.

General Assembly resolutions, which are oriented towards alternatives to the military use of science and technology, carry the same weight, from our point of view. The proposal by India adopted as resolution 43/77 A has undoubtedly lent momentum to endeavours in this direction. My delegation has developed ideas on the use of the latest scientific and technological findings for purposes relevant to disarmament and has submitted them for discussion.

The negotiations on a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons are entering their seventh year. Indeed, the time is more than ripe for banning those weapons of mass destruction from our globe. A clear signal to that effect was given by the Paris Conference, for the organization of which we would like once again to thank France. The Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons recently held at Canberra, thanks to the initiative of Australia, also attests to that. No doubt some progress has been made in the concrete work on the

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chemical-weapons convention. After all, we have made headway with regard to technical questions involved in the verification of the prohibition of chemical-weapons production. Understanding has been reached on the chemicals to be verified.

There is a similar situation with respect to the protection of confidential information in future verification activities. The problem of the transition period from the entry into force of the convention to the final destruction of chemical weapons has for the first time been considered in depth. Confidence-building measures, such as trial inspections and exchanges of information and data, have continued. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Morel, deserves special credit for his committed guidance of the negotiations.

But does this suffice to keep the commitment all of us made in the Paris Declaration to conclude the convention at the earliest date? Are those steps adequate to make 1990 the crucial year of concluding a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, as well as on their destruction? No one would, I think, want to make that claim. What is needed are decisions indicating the genuine resolve for a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons at the earliest date. My country has pronounced itself in favour of such decisions, without "if's," "and's" or "but's". Evidence of that is the fact that the German Democratic Republic does not possess chemical weapons, nor does it have such weapons of other States stationed on its territory. Further evidence is the fact that it is not engaged in the development of chemical weapons nor does it have the equipment for their production. Our concrete participation in Geneva is proof of this as well.

We believe that there must be no departure from the essential elements already agreed upon at Geneva in the draft convention on chemical weapons. That is why we

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have always come out against attempts to circumvent the prohibition clearly stipulated in the draft on the cessation of chemical-weapons production upon the entering into force of the convention. We act in this way because we believe that such circumvention would not only bring about delays in the negotiations but that it would indeed favour the proliferation of chemical weapons.

The German Democratic Republic stands by its offer to undertake trial inspections in a bilateral and multilateral framework. It continues its efforts towards the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe because that, we feel, would really facilitate a global solution. We are prepared to report soon at Geneva on the outcome of a national trial inspection on challenge. The German Democratic Republic advocates focusing the ongoing negotiations on the chemical-weapons convention on the truly essentially issues. Basically, one of those issues is, we believe, challenge inspections. Other issues are the order of destruction of chemical-weapon stocks, the problem of sanctions in cases of violations of convention provisions and the composition of the executive council of the future organization. Any movement on those questions will help promptly to clarify many of the details still pending.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

We, too, are against artificial deadlines. According to our understanding, this does not mean that no deadline should be set, but rather that a realistic negotiating period should be agreed on. If it is deemed possible to reach agreements in Vienna within six months or one year, then there is all the more reason to believe that the conclusion of a chemical-weapons convention within the period from 1990 to 1991 constitutes a realistic goal, especially since nobody denies the urgency of its conclusion any longer. In Paris, the Foreign Ministers of 149 States approved of a consensus in principle on the outlawing of chemical weapons. What actually speaks against taking the last decisive step along this road in Geneva, by holding a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of those States that are participating in the negotiations? It would, in our view, be appropriate to include in the resolution on the prohibition of chemical weapons to be adopted at this session of the General Assembly the idea of a meeting of the Geneva Conference at the Foreign Ministers' level. Due to the recent proposals of the Soviet Union and the United States on the prohibition of chemical weapons, we feel confirmed in our belief that concrete agreements can be reached on the said questions. We hope that the ideas advanced by President Bush and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on chemical weapons will be translated into real steps and be of considerable help in concluding a convention on the prohibition of those weapons.

My delegation welcomes that the proposal made by the German Democratic Republic last year concerning a special meeting here in New York on chemical weapons will be implemented this year. We think this will provide an opportunity for all delegations to find out in detail about the current state of negotiations. Furthermore, this meeting will furnish new ideas for national measures. The German Democratic Republic expects this General Assembly session, appreciating properly

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what has been achieved to date, to entrust the Geneva Disarmament Conference with a mandate to finalize the elaboration of the chemical-weapons convention.

Nuclear disarmament means first and foremost a nuclear-test ban - and not only to us. The prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests continues to be an issue of priority, because it is the key to genuine nuclear disarmament. On that score, my country, together with other Warsaw Treaty member States, advocated, at their Bucharest session, first, that the immediate cessation of nuclear-weapon tests should be discussed single-mindedly at the Geneva Conference; secondly, that the verification protocols to the Soviet-American agreements of 1974 and 1976 should be rapidly finalized and their implementation should serve the complete cessation of nuclear tests, and, thirdly, that the applicability of the 1963 Moscow Partial Test-Ban Treaty should also be extended to underground testing, in order to promote the prohibition of all nuclear tests.

It is in this spirit that the German Democratic Republic lends its support to the appeal made by the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United States Congress concerning the imposition - of course, on the basis of reciprocity - of a moratorium on nuclear explosions and the complete cessation of all nuclear testing, and it is along these lines that the German Democratic Republic presented a working paper in Geneva on the verification of a nuclear-test ban.

We are in favour of holding a conference on the extension of the partial test-ban Treaty to underground testing, because we believe that in the wake of such a conference, the Conference on Disarmament could receive decisive momentum. This would undoubtedly have a favourable impact also on the strengthening of the régime governing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This year, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has provided a sound foundation for further conceptual development with regard to a global seismic

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

data-exchange system for monitoring compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test ban - and not just that. A number of recommendations have already been put to good use for the conduct of the global seismic data exchange test, the so-called GSETT-2, whose second phase is to start in January 1990. We would welcome it if all nuclear-weapon States declared a moratorium, as suggested some days ago by India, on the totality of their nuclear tests for the period of the experiment.

All this reaffirms the expectation to set up a subsidiary organ of the Geneva Conference now for actual discussion of a nuclear-test ban. Our Japanese colleague, Ambassador Yamada, has made great efforts in the past month with a view to arriving at a mutually agreed solution. More or less all Conference on Disarmament member States have pronounced themselves in favour of it. It falls within the competence of this session of the General Assembly, in our view, to recommend to the Geneva Conference that its current president, Ambassador Benhima of Morocco, continue the consultations with the aim of facilitating the establishment of an ad hoc committee at the beginning of the Conference on Disarmament's 1990 session, and we believe that the First Committee is the right place to prepare a consensus for such a decision.

We are concerned that the Conference on Disarmament has not made headway in respect of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. We do, of course, take into account that the Soviet-American negotiations on halving their strategic offensive weapons deserve a central place. Yet is this reason to sit back? What forum, if not the Conference on Disarmament, would be better suited to mould the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free world into shape, the more so since all nuclear-weapon States are represented there. Non-aligned and socialist countries have more than once sought to accommodate the proposals of the other side and submitted compromise formulas. We can only hope that the other side will respond



(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic  
Republic)

by coming up with similar moves. I should like in this connection to recall the proposal to establish a subsidiary organ of the Conference on Disarmament on these questions, or at least to conduct a structured debate. And I also wish to recall the proposal of my country to begin with the elaboration of principles to govern nuclear disarmament. We will submit the relevant details to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

At this juncture, let me point to the offer of the Warsaw Treaty States to open separate talks on the reduction and eventual elimination of tactical nuclear arms. I think it is understandable that my country has a vital interest in this. There is no sound argument for postponing such talks. The danger of a surprise attack will not be removed as long as tactical nuclear arms remain on the European continent. We therefore speak up for negotiations on their reduction and eventual elimination, to start without delay.

Is it not true that the Soviet proposals on the verifiable cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes open up a significant new area for practical activities against the qualitative and quantitative nuclear-arms race?

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

We propose that the General Assembly at this session take a substantive decision advocating in-depth discussion of nuclear disarmament at the Conference on Disarmament. Our delegation has prepared a draft resolution to this end. Resolutions aimed at the prevention of first use of nuclear weapons are equally important. As sponsor of resolution 43/78 B, the German Democratic Republic is prepared to advance another pertinent initiative, and expresses the hope that this will have the support of Member States.

The German Democratic Republic still holds that our commitment to peace requires that we end the arms race on Earth and prevent it from spilling over into outer space. Thanks to the committed work of Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia, a considerable list of projects providing for the prevention of an arms race in outer space is before us. We appreciate the conclusions drawn from it as well as the report.

My delegation advocates that the debate in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space should be conducted in a more structured and intensive manner, with experts being included. In this endeavour a step-by-step approach seems to be practicable. Here we have in mind the consideration of confidence-building measures to ensure the immunity of space objects, such as those measures submitted by France in the form of a code of conduct in outer space. The German Democratic Republic endorses Argentina's call on all States to declare whether they have any weapons deployed in outer space. In this connection, we would also refer to the implementation of the Soviet proposal concerning the establishment of an international system of verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space.

In our view, the Soviet initiative on the setting up of an international space inspectorate, the Canadian PAXSAT concept, the French proposal on the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency and the proposal by the Soviet

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

Union to establish a world space organization deserve in-depth discussion so as finally to obtain an overall structure. The same holds true of the proposals put forward by socialist and non-aligned countries concerning agreements on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and other space weapons. My country has repeatedly taken initiatives in this field and will continue to develop them further in Geneva.

The German Democratic Republic expects the resolution on the overall issue of outer space to be adopted by the General Assembly at this session, calling resolutely for the taking of practical measures.

Mr. RANA (Nepal): It is a great privilege to extend to you, Sir, an eminent representative of a great and friendly country, Venezuela, our warm felicitations on your unanimous election as Chairman of this important Committee. You bring to the Committee a rich combination of knowledge and experience relating to disarmament and security issues. We therefore have full confidence in your ability to guide our deliberations to a successful conclusion.

I wish also to congratulate Mr. Mohamed Nabil Fahmy of Egypt, Mr. Hassan Mashhadi of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Mr. Dimitrios Platis of Greece on their election as Vice-Chairmen and Rapporteur respectively.

As other speakers have pointed out, nuclear disarmament continues to command the highest priority on the disarmament agenda. Nuclear weapons represent the ultimate threat so long as they exist in the arsenals of nations. While progress in arms control and disarmament is a shared responsibility, it is natural for us to expect greater efforts and inputs from major Powers in the areas of nuclear disarmament. We therefore welcomed the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - the INF Treaty, as it represents an

(Mr. Rana, Nepal)

important step, albeit small, in new developments towards a more secure and stable world, one ultimately free of nuclear weapons.

An early agreement on 50 per cent reductions in the strategic arsenals of the two super-Powers would constitute an important intermediate landmark towards the final goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. We are heartened by the continuing high-level dialogue between them, for they strengthen our belief that the differences between them continue to narrow. This unprecedented bilateral endeavour has inaugurated a new era of flexibility in East-West relations and holds out a great prospect of concrete progress in disarmament.

My delegation believes that the prevailing positive trends must be utilized to strengthen the inherent complementarity between bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations. The awesome military power of the two super-Powers makes continuing dialogue and understanding between them an imperative. But disarmament is an area in which each one of us - big or small, weak or strong - has a vital stake. This is therefore a joint venture of all nations and peoples. If peace and security are to benefit all, the end result of arms control and disarmament needs to be the product of a global co-operative effort. The present propitious climate of international relations offers an unprecedented opportunity to end the crisis of confidence in the ability of multilateral forums in realizing the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

It is with these considerations in mind that my delegation has studied the report of the Conference on Disarmament (A/44/27). Unfortunately, we have not found much ground for optimism in the work of the Conference on Disarmament thus far. Assessments of that body by previous speakers have only served to reconfirm our feelings. Of course, we fully realize that arms control and disarmament are immensely complicated matters - the more so because of the inherent linkage with one of the fundamental duties of a State, the safeguarding of its security. We do

(Mr. Rana, Nepal)

not expect overnight miracles. What we do expect is a sustained and meaningful emphasis with signs of forward movement on all elements across the range of weapons - nuclear, chemical and conventional. There is yet another area of priority concern - prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Except in regard to chemical weapons, the Conference on Disarmament seems to have achieved very little on all those fronts. Global problems of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons are amenable to nothing short of global solutions. Reversal of the present trend alone would help in maintaining the trust of the international community in the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum.

Results achieved thus far in the Conference on Disarmament on the first item on its agenda - a comprehensive test-ban - are a case in point, despite the fact that all five nuclear-weapon States and practically all threshold States are members. The Conference on Disarmament has been unable to move forward on this agenda item, notwithstanding the overwhelming international consensus that a comprehensive test-ban treaty would greatly enhance the non-proliferation régime.

(Mr. Rana, Nepal)

The continued viability of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons beyond 1995 depends to a great extent on the adherence by the nuclear-weapon States to their commitments under Article VI of that Treaty. A comprehensive test-ban treaty would be the most visible demonstration of such an intention.

In view of the lack of progress in this high-priority area in the Conference on Disarmament, Nepal has co-sponsored a move to convene a conference of States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty with a view to amending it into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The success of that move will have a very positive impact on the Review Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty to be held in 1990. We therefore support the idea of holding the amendment conference prior to the 1990 Review Conference.

A verifiable convention banning chemical weapons has been the most urgent item on the disarmament agenda. The Paris Conference on the 1925 Geneva Protocol has given a renewed sense of urgency to the early conclusion of such a convention. The declaration by the President of the United States in his address to the General Assembly and the positive response of the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union to his proposals, together with the joint United States-USSR declaration on chemical weapons, have provided an added incentive. Chemical weapons seem to be an area where the Conference on Disarmament is making steady progress. We welcome the Chairman's proposal to hold an informal session of an informational nature on the status of negotiations in Geneva, and we look forward to benefiting from it.

My delegation has over the past several years urged that conventional disarmament be accorded the high priority it deserves in disarmament negotiations. The accumulation of conventional armaments is no longer a phenomenon unique to the major Powers and their military alliances. Together with an increasingly heavy

(Mr. Rana, Nepal)

international arms transfer, sophisticated weapons technology is proliferating at an alarming rate. The Secretary-General in his annual report has rightly noted that the spread of knowledge, not only of nuclear weapons, but of chemical weapons and missile technology, introduces another potentially destabilizing factor. My delegation welcomes the move towards substantial reductions of conventional forces and armaments in Europe and reiterates its belief that the goals of conventional disarmament should be pursued resolutely at regional and subregional levels in other parts of the world as well. Even the lack of quick progress in the conventional arms talks in Europe does not absolve the developing countries from responsibility to divert precious resources from military expenditure to the socio-economic development of their peoples.

The fact that all States bear a direct responsibility in the field of conventional disarmament gives the United Nations a unique opportunity and role in generating awareness of the urgency of this issue and possibly even in devising a comprehensive programme for the achievement of the goal. The subject of international arms transfers has started to receive the attention it deserves, and we look forward to the report of the group of experts commissioned in General Assembly resolution 43/75 I in this regard.

While our immediate focus should be and is on curtailing and controlling weapons of mass destruction, the international community must also continue to promote measures that serve to relax tensions, limit conflicts and promote confidence. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones greatly encourages and supplements disarmament efforts. We therefore view the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rorotonga as not only vital for the peace and stability of the Latin American and South Pacific regions but as contributions of immense importance to the disarmament process in general. We unequivocally support the move for the

(Mr. Rana, Nepal)

establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, the Middle East and in our own region of South Asia.

Likewise, the establishment of zones of peace can contribute to the security, stability and development of the State or States concerned. The solemn decision of the States of the South Atlantic to give practical shape to the concept of peace and co-operation deserves the full support of the international community. Nepal also whole-heartedly supports the proposal of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia. We can see no justification for any further delay in convening the proposed Colombo conference to give practical implementation to the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

In that context I wish to draw the attention of the Committee to the proposal of His Majesty King Birendra to declare Nepal a zone of peace. We believe that the concept of a single-nation zone of peace can be a useful addition to various confidence-building measures now under consideration. We hope that Nepal's proposal will be recognized by the international community as an example of how a small country may safeguard its independence and security while engaged whole-heartedly in the task of national development.

At the outset I tried to emphasize the importance of the multilateral approach to finding answers to the challenges of arms control and disarmament. The United Nations has a central role to play in this process, as envisaged in the Charter. The growing threat of nuclear-weapons proliferation, the steady increase in the number of countries with chemical-weapons capability, the massive transfer and accumulation of sophisticated conventional weapons and the disturbing proliferation of the sophisticated technology of mass destruction - all make the United Nations the only forum capable of addressing those challenges.



(Mr. Rana, Nepal)

Indeed, the improvement in the global political climate can prove precarious if those issues remain unattended. The encouraging movement in the negotiations between the two major Powers and their military alliances make it all the more necessary for developing countries to co-ordinate their efforts to accelerate the process. This calls not only for concrete and constructive proposals but also for hard evidence that we are putting into practice what we preach.

My delegation believes that, with the arms-control and disarmament process gathering a momentum of its own in the developed regions of the world, the time to bring other regions within its fold has come. Well-informed public opinion would be an indispensable ally in fostering that process by creating an atmosphere of trust and confidence. The United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean can play a crucial role in such efforts. In this context I am happy to inform the Committee that the Asian Regional Centre was inaugurated in Katmandu in January this year. The potential of the Centre for confidence-building and tension-relaxing measures cannot be overemphasized. However, as the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs pointed out in his statement in this Committee, the Centres need adequate human and material resources if they are to foster regional dialogue effectively.

(Mr. Rana, Nepal)

The appointment of a director to head each of the three Regional Centres has become essential in order to ensure the organizational identity and effective functioning of the Centres. With this in mind, we intend to submit a draft resolution in due course and we look forward to the full support of the members of the First Committee.

Before concluding, I wish to express the appreciation of my delegation to you, Mr. Chairman, for your intention to carry on the task of rationalizing the work of the First Committee. The results achieved last year under the able guidance of Ambassador Douglas Roche of Canada have earned him the admiration of all of us. I would also like to place on record the deep appreciation of my delegation to the Department for Disarmament Affairs. Under the dedicated leadership of its Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Akashi, the Department has been playing a very important role in meeting the growing and multifaceted demands on the United Nations in the field of disarmament, notwithstanding severe resource constraints.

Mr. AL-KAWARI (Qatar) (interpretation from Arabic): I have the pleasure, at the outset, Sir, to convey to you our congratulations on your election to the chairmanship of this important Committee. To you, as well as to the Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur, go our wishes for every success in your task. I am certain that your wisdom, experience and skill will guarantee the success of our work.

We are meeting today in a climate of détente in international relations, which is a source of satisfaction for us. We note that relations are improving and developing further between countries that only a short time ago regarded one another with suspicion and doubt. We are all the more satisfied at the fact that détente is not confined to matters of disarmament and security, which are undoubtedly important. Détente also extends to such matters as trade and economic relations. We are witnessing indeed momentous historical events which, we hope, will warrant our optimism and will not prove to be mere illusions.

(Mr. Al-Kawari, Qatar)

My country wishes to express the hope that détente will continue and that peace in the world will be strengthened, so that all peoples may live in security and peace.

Nevertheless, together with the developments that are leading to optimism in international relations, the reduction of tensions and the improvement of crisis situations, we are also noting an acceleration in the stockpiling of both nuclear and conventional weapons, which is difficult to justify in the new climate of détente.

International détente loses much of its significance and of the benefits it can produce if there is a deterioration in the international economy. The majority of the countries in the world are still suffering from problems of poverty, indebtedness, undernourishment and other economic problems with which those countries are unable to cope. Security cannot be complete unless it also covers economic and social as well as military fields. The Ninth Meeting of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, meeting in Belgrade in September last, was well aware of those facts. It underscored this in its Declaration:

"The building of international peace and security can only rest on sound and equitable foundations."

That was the conclusion reached by the countries that participated in the summit conference. They noted that the international economic situation continued to suffer from flagrant disparities and discrepancies between developing and developed countries.

Returning to the question of disarmament, I would like to affirm that my country continues to stress the need to pursue efforts to bring the attainment of that goal closer - the goal of saving the world from the terror induced by the stupendous accumulation of nuclear weapons. This brings me to the problem of the proliferation in nuclear weapons. Next year, the Fourth Review Conference of the

(Mr. Al-Kawari, Qatar)

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be held - a Treaty to which my country adhered earlier this year. It is true that the number of States parties to that Treaty has now increased to 141; however, numbers do not mean much if they do not lead to the desired result, in this case: non-proliferation.

I wish to emphasize my country's commitment to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; we attach especial importance to the establishment of a denuclearized zone in the Middle East. Year after year, the General Assembly has adopted resolutions calling for the establishment of such a zone. Among the most important provisions in this regard is the appeal to countries of the region to adhere to the NPT. There is no need to recall that Israel continues to refuse to accede to that Treaty and persists, alone, in remaining in such an obdurate position. As if in a race with time, Israel continues to try to impose nuclear domination by developing further the weapons it already has and by manufacturing long-range delivery systems for these weapons. Israel has developed new missiles, with a range of more than 1,000 kilometres for the delivery of nuclear weapons. It has in fact launched missiles that have reached the Libyan coast, in flagrant disregard of what this means in terms of the threat it poses to peace in the region and to world peace. This constitutes an act of defiance that leads to an arms race, a danger that prompts the other countries to adopt the necessary measures for self-protection. We find ourselves in a position where we reiterate what the international community has unanimously urged - the need for nuclear disarmament, non-use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons, establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones - while Israel takes an adverse position to this. We wonder how long the international community represented in this Organization will continue to ignore this whole state of affairs.

(Mr. Al-Kawari, Qatar)

We hope that détente will eliminate the obstacles to the holding of the Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo, pursuant to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1971, which declared the Indian Ocean a zone of peace in order to contribute to strengthening the security and stability in the region and to implement the principles enunciated in that resolution, including the non-use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and freedom of navigation for peaceful purposes. We cannot but express concern over the continued naval arms race, in the Indian Ocean, between States members of military blocs. We wish to reaffirm our support for the efforts made to eliminate the obstacles to the convening of that Conference in the hope that the General Assembly, at the current session, will set the date for the Colombo Conference in 1990.

(Mr. Al-Kawari, Qatar)

Disarmament is a long and strenuous process. Like all the other members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, we ask that priority be given to nuclear disarmament. We hope that the next decade will be crowned with fruitful results, with regard to the elimination of the terrible nuclear weapon, which threatens mankind with annihilation.

We hope that efforts will also be made to reduce conventional weapons, while at the same time taking into account safeguards to preserve the security, sovereignty and independence of the countries concerned.

With regard to the non-proliferation Treaty, we hope that the nuclear Powers which are parties to the Treaty will renounce the production, the transportation and the propagation of such weapons and related materials, in compliance with their commitments under the Treaty, especially since the other non-nuclear parties to the Treaty, which are steadily increasing in number, are complying with their obligations, in order that the Treaty may be meaningful and have the desired results.

The issue of banning nuclear tests is still precarious. It still meets with major obstacles. We support the efforts being made by countries interested in amending the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty to make it a comprehensive test-ban treaty, an amendment that was supported by the summit meeting of the non-aligned countries held in Belgrade.

In our view, the role of the United Nations in disarmament must receive the support of all countries, so that all may participate in realizing the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and in a manner that will guarantee the right of all countries to peace and security.

We commend the information activities of the Under-Secretary-General and the Department for Disarmament Affairs. They are disseminating information on diverse matters pertaining to disarmament, and clarifying them both here in New York and

(Mr. Al-Kawari, Qatar)

through the information centres or regional offices which have been created for the purpose of disarmament studies and research in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria): This session of the First Committee is taking place in a favourable international climate, resulting from the increasing understanding and co-operation in the relationship between the two super-Powers and their allies over the past few years. This evolution, whose absence hitherto had provided a ready excuse for lack of progress in the disarmament process, has since resulted in the successful Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - INF Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and has facilitated the resolution of some international problems that not too long ago appeared intractable. Nigeria supports this trend.

We believe, however, that this increasing manifestation of co-operation and the attendant relaxation of international tension should be reflected positively in the multilateral disarmament efforts. At the same time, we must remind ourselves, with all due emphasis, that there should be no room for complacency, because the atmosphere for an objective realization of a new era in which the peace and security of States may be truly regarded as safeguarded has yet to emerge.

It is regrettable that, in spite of the conclusion and entry into force of the INF Treaty, as well as the intensification of ongoing negotiations on the reduction of strategic arsenals, global peace and security are still gravely endangered by the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. What we are witnessing is the qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons to an unprecedented degree of precision and lethality to compensate for quantitative reductions, which has the effect of rendering the INF Treaty largely unhelpful.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

The task before the First Committee, in my delegation's view, should therefore be to get our priorities right. We must be determined to avoid taking one step forward and two steps backwards: one step forward in having the right political atmosphere, but two steps backwards by stifling multilateral efforts and denying ourselves what should have been the positive inputs of bilateral efforts.

It is against this background that the Nigerian delegation calls on the Committee to take such measures as will lead to the immediate commencement of multilateral negotiation on a nuclear-test ban as a matter of first priority. It bears repeating that a nuclear-test ban would provide effective means to prevent the qualitative arms race and support efforts for real nuclear disarmament.

As members of the Committee are aware, efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban have a long history, and rapid progress in modern technology now makes compliance with a test ban verifiable. Those States opposed to a comprehensive test-ban treaty therefore have no justifiable reason for continuing their opposition to the demand for such a treaty, other than to sustain their military doctrine of nuclear deterrence, in which case, the future of mankind is being made hostage to the perceived security of a few nuclear-weapon States.

That is why we see a strong link between the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests, on the one hand, which the comprehensive test ban seeks to achieve, and the success of the non-proliferation régime, on the other, as symbolized by the non-proliferation Treaty. We can only hope that the process of convening the amendment conference to convert the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty will be finalized soon during informal consultations, so that the amendment conference may be held as early as 1990, as endorsed by the recent Belgrade summit of the non-aligned countries. Thus, we support the proposal made by Mexico in its statement on 16 October that the amendment conference should be held in July 1990.



(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

Secondly, we must strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) itself and other related measures in the non-proliferation régime if nuclear-weapons acquisition is not to continue attracting those who accord it undeserved legitimacy as a currency of power. The forthcoming Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, to be held in August 1990, should be an opportunity to demonstrate to the international community that the non-proliferation Treaty, far from being an end in itself, is an important disarmament measure for all States, aimed at the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

We believe that the effective prohibition of nuclear-weapons explosions remains the acid test of the willingness of the super-Powers to reverse the nuclear-arms race and justifies the linkage between the comprehensive test-ban Treaty and the fate of the non-proliferation Treaty itself. The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, the giving of negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, and the conclusion of regional non-proliferation pacts, while useful in themselves, can only serve as reinforcing mechanisms, not as substitutes for effective global non-proliferation.

(Mr Azikiwe, Nigeria)

In this connection, I wish to inform you that the Government of Nigeria has submitted a proposal to the Depositary Governments of the NPT for an agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. The proposed agreement, if adopted, would create further incentive to States not party to the NPT to join it, thus strengthening the non-proliferation régime.

For the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, it would renew their faith in the Treaty by making it more relevant to their security concerns in this nuclear era. It is our hope that all parties to the Treaty will consider the proposal when it is circulated, with a view to adopting it at the Conference of the Parties to the NPT to be held for that purpose.

Thirdly, there is the need to revitalize the current disarmament machinery, particularly the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament, to make them more responsive in concrete disarmament efforts. The 1989 session of the Disarmament Commission in particular should alert us to the need to improve the effectiveness and maximum productivity of that important deliberative forum, which is open to all States. In this regard, we would like to be associated with the calls to rotate the post of chairman for important agenda items during each session, to allow for different approaches, and the staggering of agenda items over a number of sessions. Other methods could also include concentrating on a few manageable agenda items at any given session, in order to achieve maximum results, and reviewing in a positive way the provision concerning consensus on all substantive issues, to which, on some occasions, a few countries have deliberately resorted in order to frustrate agreement by an overwhelming majority of Member States on a number of items deserving of multilateral negotiation in the

(Mr Azikiwe, Nigeria)

appropriate forum. All these factors indicate that we should give our unwavering support for the continued relevance of the Disarmament Commission.

Fourthly, we believe that outer space should continue to be the common heritage of mankind, and should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes in the interest of humanity. The arms race must be prevented from reaching our last frontier, and activities regarding the exploration and use of outer space must also be carried out under effective international law. The existing legal régime is inadequate. There is, therefore, an urgent need to consolidate and reinforce the legal régime in order to prevent the extension of the arms race to outer space.

Let me now address myself to the issue of radiological weapons. May I use this opportunity to commend the Committee for the support given to the initiative of the Nigerian delegation on the resolution adopted in 1988 on the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes for hostile purposes. We are happy to note that since the adoption of the enabling resolution on the item, the Conference on Disarmament has commenced effective consideration of the matter under its Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. Given the lethal effects of radiation, Nigeria believes that the dumping of radioactive wastes for hostile purposes or in armed conflict with the deliberate intention to cause damage, destruction and injury constitutes one of the most effective means of conducting radiological warfare. Nigeria's desire here is to exclude this possibility completely, thereby protecting mankind from the horror and devastation that would result from such means of warfare. We hope that the Committee will continue to support the Nigerian initiative on this item.

(Mr Azikiwe, Nigeria)

We would also like to express appreciation to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for its efforts to bring the management of radioactive wastes under effective control in order to remove the threat to human survival and the environment that would result if such wastes were not managed under an effective code of conduct.

Permit me also to underline the importance Nigeria attaches to regional approaches to disarmament, peace and security. In this regard, the United Nations disarmament machinery should be strengthened in the regional disarmament sphere. As a firm commitment to this approach, Nigeria co-hosted, with the United Nations, the first-ever regional disarmament workshop for Africa under the expanded United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Training and Advisory Services Programme in Lagos from 3 to 7 April this year. The workshop, which examined African security perceptions and requirements including related regional issues, was attended by over 20 African experts, senior diplomats and high-ranking government officials. The high level of participation, discussion and results attained shows the importance of encouraging regional understanding and co-operation in facilitating the goals of disarmament. In this regard, we look forward to the report of the Secretary-General on the workshop, as well as to the organization of similar workshops for other regions next year under the programme.

With regard to the functioning of the three Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, Latin America and Asia, my delegation would like to call for increased funding, as such Centres have truly proved to be instruments for accelerating regional co-operation, disarmament, peace and security. In our region, Nigeria has consistently supported the viable functioning of the Regional Centre in Africa - based in Lomé, Togo - which, since its inception, has undertaken numerous activities. Indeed, a sum of \$50,000 was donated by the Nigerian

(Mr Azikiwe, Nigeria)

Government towards the functioning of the African Regional Centre in Lomé last March. We are also doing what we can, despite our present economic problems, to render further assistance in the coming year. As part of what we believe the Centre can achieve, five West African States, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Togo and Nigeria, have jointly initiated the establishment of a commission on transboundary issues to be placed under the auspices of the Regional Centre. The purpose is to encourage scholarly research and to facilitate the formulation and implementation of appropriate policy measures on border issues in the sub-region. As certain favourable trends are emerging and gaining momentum in international relations, we believe that regional issues and initiatives should also complement global disarmament efforts and should command the attention they deserve.

In this connection, my delegation is deeply concerned about the information in paragraph 3 of the Secretary-General's report on the Regional Centre for Africa, as contained in document A/44/582 of 9 October 1989. According to paragraph 3, the incumbent Director of the Centre completed his assignment and the research assistant is serving as Officer-in-charge. Even as an interim arrangement, this is a situation which is bound to cause the donors concern. Effective direction of the Centre has been an important part of its strength in attracting contributions, which, we are told in the Secretary-General's report, amounted to \$699,000 in the last year. My delegation appeals to the Secretary-General to take urgent steps to enable the Centre to have a credible Director.

I should like to express the satisfaction of the Nigerian delegation at the amount of work done so far at the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating a convention on the complete elimination of chemical weapons. The current level of public awareness and understanding of the proposed convention is testimony to the fact that the international community is exerting a tremendous effort towards attaining this objective.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

At the Paris Conference held in January 1989, the participating countries reaffirmed their commitment to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which banned the use of chemical weapons, and there was a consensus that the Protocol should be strengthened in order to outlaw chemical warfare permanently. That demonstration of political will was aptly followed up by the September 1989 Canberra Conference, which aimed at introducing more practicality into the negotiations by involving, at this concluding stage, industries whose co-operation will be necessary for the implementation of the convention. Although neither initiative is within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, they have helped to gauge international opinion on the convention under negotiation. The positive responses given to both initiatives by the international community, and the achievements of both conferences, will give a much-needed impetus to the Conference on Disarmament negotiators.

Nigeria does not possess chemical weapons, and we do not intend to acquire them. For this reason we fully support the elimination of this category of weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of all States.

We note with satisfaction the new development at the Canberra Conference concerning the proposal to set up a group of technical experts to act as an advisory body to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We hope that this proposal will be referred to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where it would be properly discussed.

Finally, you will recall that, at the 1988 session of this Committee, Nigeria initiated a resolution on the declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade, which was adopted by consensus. It is regrettable that in 1989 the Disarmament Commission failed to agree on the elements of this Declaration. We hope it will be possible for this Committee to conclude action on it at the current session.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to remind delegations that the First Committee will hold a special meeting tomorrow morning in observance of the beginning of Disarmament Week. In addition to a brief statement which I shall make as Chairman of the First Committee, statements will be made by the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General.

I also wish to announce that the special meeting devoted to Disarmament Week will be immediately followed by the Seventh United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign. I trust that delegations will be present not only in person but also with pledges for the World Disarmament Campaign.

I also wish to recall that in accordance with the consultations held before we began the work of the First Committee, and as announced previously, the First Committee will hold an informal meeting tomorrow afternoon to provide countries that are not members of the Conference on Disarmament with information on the status of ongoing negotiations at the Conference with regard to the draft convention on chemical weapons. At that meeting, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, who is the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament, will provide delegations with information and will be available to delegations for any additional information that may be required. I should like to emphasize that the holding of this informal meeting of the First Committee should not be construed in any way as a precedent for the future.

I would like to announce that for this afternoon's meeting the speakers are as follows: Singapore, Tunisia, Viet Nam, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Niger, Democratic Kampuchea and Italy.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.