

**UNITED NATIONS**



**OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE FOURTH SESSION  
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

**FIRST COMMITTEE**  
**POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS,  
INCLUDING REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS**

**SUMMARY RECORDS OF MEETINGS 1949**  
**20 SEPTEMBER — 6 DECEMBER**

**LAKE SUCCESS, NEW YORK**

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## **INTRODUCTORY NOTE**

These Official Records include the corrections to the provisional records which were requested by the delegations, and such drafting and editorial modifications as were considered necessary.

All United Nations documents are designated by symbols, i.e., capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

The Annex to the summary records of the First Committee contains a check list of all First Committee documents and accompanying indications of the inclusion of other documents pertaining to that Committee's agenda in the various volumes of Official Records of the fourth session.

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 H.E. Mr. H. Kauffmann  
 Mr. A. Andersen  
 Mr. H. L. W. Jensen  
 Mr. K. Amby  
 Mr. H. Lannong  
 Mr. N. Svenningsen  
 Mr. W. Borberg  
 Mrs. B. Begtrup  
 Mr. E. Nielsen  
 Mr. K. Johansen

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Dr. M. Henríquez-Ureña  
 Dr. E. de Marchena

ECUADOR

Dr. H. Viteri Lafronte  
 Dr. J. Vicente Trujillo  
 Dr. W. Córdova

EGYPT

H.E. Mohamed Kamel Abdul Rahim Bey  
 Mahmoud Fawzi Bey  
 Mohamed Abdel Monem Mostafa Bey  
 Brig-Gen. Mohamed Abdel Halim Khalifa Bey  
 Col. Abdel Hamid Ghaleb Bey  
 Mr. Mahmoud Salah el Dine Hassan  
 Mr. Ismail Fahmy

EL SALVADOR

H.E. Dr. Héctor David Castro  
 Dr. Jesús Alemán Penado  
 Dr. Alfredo Martínez Moreno

ETHIOPIA

H.E. Abte-Wold Aklilou  
 Ato Blatta Ephrem Twewlde Medhen

FRANCE

H.E. M. Robert Schuman  
 H.E. M. Jean Chauvel  
 M. Maurice Couve de Murville  
 M. Guy de la Tournelle  
 M. E. Burin des Rozières  
 M. A. Naudy  
 M. Y. Delahaye

GREECE

H.E. Mr. C. Tsaldaris  
 H.E. Mr. S. Venizelos  
 H.E. Mr. P. Pipinelis  
 H.E. Mr. V. Dendramis  
 Mr. C. Tranos  
 Mr. B. Theodoropoulos

GUATEMALA

Dr. C. García Bauer  
 Dr. F. Rolz Bennett  
 Sr. J. L. Mendoza

HAITI

H.E. M. J. D. Charles  
 H.E. le Dr. Price Mars

HONDURAS

H.E. Dr. Tiburcio Carías

ICELAND

Mr. Thor Thors  
 Mr. Hans G. Andersen

INDIA

Benegal N. Rau  
 The Rev. J. D'Souza  
 Professor M. Mujeeb  
 Mr. M. Gopala Menon

IRAN

H.E. Mr. Nasrollah Entezam  
 Dr. Ghassem Ghassemzadeh  
 Mr. Nasrollah Ghassemy

IRAQ

Dr. F. Al-Jamali  
 Mr. Ahmed Al-Rawi  
 Mr. Hashim Hilli

ISRAEL

Mr. A. S. Eban  
 Mr. G. Rafael  
 Miss E. Herlitz  
 Mr. S. Ocksman

LEBANON

Dr. Charles Malik

LIBERIA

Mr. H. F. Cooper

LUXEMBOURG

H.E. M. J. Bech  
 M. P. Majerus  
 M. Pierre Pescatore

MEXICO

H.E. Dr. L. Padilla Nervo  
 H.E. Sr. José Gorostiza  
 Sr. C. Peón del Valle

NETHERLANDS

Baron F. C. A. van Pallandt  
 Dr. M. A. M. Klompe  
 Mr. R. Fack

NEW ZEALAND

Sir Carl Berendsen  
 Mr. F. Shanahan  
 Mr. G. R. Laking  
 Mr. F. H. Corner  
 Mr. C. Craw

NICARAGUA

H.E. Dr. Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa  
 Dr. Juan José Morales Marengo

NORWAY

Mr. H. M. Lange  
 Mr. A. Sunde  
 Mr. T. Wold  
 Mr. C. J. Hambro  
 Mr. J. Worm-Muller  
 Mr. H. Berg  
 Mr. F. Moe  
 Mr. I. Lunde  
 Mr. B. Stabell  
 Mr. H. Engen  
 Mr. J. Boyesen  
 Mr. E. Ansteensen

PAKISTAN

H.E. Mohammad Zafrulla Khan  
 Mr. Sarwar Hasan

PANAMA

H.E. Sr. Mario de Diego

PARAGUAY

H.E. Dr. Luis Oscar Boettner  
 Dr. Luis Ramiez Boettner  
 Dr. Juan de la Cruz



PERU

H.E. Dr. V. A. Belaúnde  
Sr. J. B. de Lavallo  
Sr. L. F. Cisneros  
Sr. C. Holguín de Lavallo

PHILIPPINES

Mr. S. P. López  
Lt. Col. A. P. Chanco  
Mr. M. P. Aquino

POLAND

H.E. Mr. Stefan Wierblowski  
H.E. Mr. Marian Nazkowski  
Mr. J. Winiewicz  
Mr. J. Katz-Suchy  
Mr. J. Drohowski  
Mr. T. Zebrowski  
Mr. A. Krajowski  
Mr. A. Tarn  
Mr. S. Boratynski

SAUDI ARABIA

H.E. Sheikh Asad Al-Faqih  
Sheikh Ahmed Jabbar  
Mr. Aounay W. Dejany

SWEDEN

H.E. Mr. Osten Unden  
Mr. R. Sandler  
Mr. E. Boheman  
Mr. R. Sohlman  
Mr. S. Grafström

SYRIA

Fayez El-Khoury Bey

THAILAND

Mr. Phairote Jayanama  
Mr. Prasong Bunchoem

TURKEY

H.E. Mr. Selim Sarper  
Mr. Adnan Kural  
Mr. Ilhan Savut

UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

H.E. Mr. Dmitri Z. Manuilsky  
Mr. A. I. Galagan  
Mr. P. Kovalenko  
Mr. P. P. Udovichenko  
Mr. G. L. Nicolnikov

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

H.E. Mr. G. P. Jooste  
Mr. T. H. Eustace  
Dr. A. H. Mertsch  
Mr. J. R. Jordaan  
Mr. B. G. Fouri  
Mr. C. Norton  
Mr. N. Best

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

H.E. Mr. Andrei Y. Vyshinsky  
Mr. S. K. Tsarapkin  
Mr. B. F. Podtserob  
Mr. N. I. Klimov

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN  
AND NORTHERN IRELAND

H.E. the Right Hon. Hector McNeil  
H.E. the Right Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan  
Sir Terence Shone  
Mr. R. Allen  
Mr. G. L. Clutton  
Mr. D. S. Laskey  
Mr. F. E. Stafford  
Mr. C. A. G. Meade  
Mr. E. H. Peck  
Mr. G. W. Wall  
Mr. C. C. Parrott  
Mr. D. H. T. Hildyard  
Mr. D. L. Cole  
Mr. G. T. C. Campbell

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

H.E. The Hon. Dean Acheson  
H.E. The Hon. Warren R. Austin  
H.E. The Hon. Philip C. Jessup  
The Hon. Benjamin V. Cohen  
Mr. D. M. Wainhouse  
Mr. J. C. Ross  
Mr. J. B. Tate  
Mr. L. Clark  
Mr. J. C. Dreier  
Mr. C. Drew  
Mr. E. Freers  
Mr. H. N. Howard  
Mr. S. K. C. Kopper  
Mr. C. P. Noyes  
Mr. H. Raynor  
Mr. W. B. Sale  
Mr. J. E. Utter

URUGUAY

H.E. Dr. Alberto Domínguez Cámpora  
Dr. R. E. MacEachen  
Professor E. Rodríguez Fabregat

VENEZUELA

Dr. Carlos Eduardo Stolk  
Dr. Melchor Monteverde  
Dr. V. M. Pérez Perozo

YEMEN

No list submitted

YUGOSLAVIA

H.E. Mr. Edward Kardelj  
H.E. Mr. Milovan Djilas  
H.E. Mr. Sava Kosanovic  
H.E. Mr. Josip Djerdja  
Mr. Anton Vratusa  
Mr. Petar Guberina  
Mr. Petar Popovic

# FIRST COMMITTEE

## AGENDA

The General Assembly at its 224th, 229th and 230th plenary meetings held respectively on 17, 26 and 29 September 1949 decided to allocate the following items of the agenda of the fourth session to the First Committee for consideration and report.<sup>1</sup>

1. Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans [*item 21*].
2. Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies [*item 19*].
3. Condemnation of the preparations for a new war, and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace [*item 67*].
4. Palestine:
  - (a) Proposals for a permanent international régime for the Jerusalem area: report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine.
  - (b) Protection of the Holy Places: report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine.
  - (c) Assistance to Palestine refugees: report of the Secretary-General [*item 18*].<sup>2</sup>
5. Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945, and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations [*item 68*].
6. Question of Indonesia [*item 21*].<sup>2</sup>
7. Report of the Security Council [*item 10*].<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The letters by which the President of the General Assembly transmitted these items to the Chairman of the First Committee were circulated as documents A/C.1/477, A/C.1/480 and A/C.1/486. The First Committee subsequently altered the order of consideration of the items referred to it (A/C.1/482 and A/C.1/482/Add.1) and finally adopted the above order.

<sup>2</sup> Allocated to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee by the General Assembly at its 238th plenary meeting.

# FIRST COMMITTEE

## Political and Security Questions (includes Regulation of Armaments)

### TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-THIRD MEETING

*Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Tuesday, 20 September, 1949, at 12.10 p.m.*

#### Election of Chairman

1. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) nominated Mr. Lester Pearson (Canada).

2. Mr. VAN ZEELAND (Belgium) seconded that nomination.

3. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) nominated Mr. Hoffmeister (Czechoslovakia).

*A vote was taken by secret ballot as follows:*

*Number of votes cast, 59;*

*Abstentions, 3;*

*Invalid votes, 0;*

*Valid votes, 56;*

*Simple majority, 29.*

*Number of votes obtained:*

Mr. Pearson (Canada), 49;

Mr. Hoffmeister (Czechoslovakia), 5;

Mr. Bech (Luxembourg), 1.

*Mr. Pearson, having obtained the required simple majority of the members present and voting, was elected Chairman of the First Committee.*

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

*Acting Chairman: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).*

### TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FOURTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 27 September 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### Election of the Vice-Chairman

1. The CHAIRMAN thanked the members of the Committee for the honour they had done him in electing him Chairman of the First Committee. He introduced Mr. Zinchenko, Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Department of Security Council Affairs, and the Secretary of the Committee, Dr. Protitch, Principal Director of the Security Council Affairs Department.

2. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) nominated Mr. Sarper (Turkey) as Vice-Chairman.

3. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) and Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) supported the nomination of Mr. Sarper.

*Mr. Sarper (Turkey) was elected Vice-Chairman by acclamation.*

#### Election of the Rapporteur

4. Mr. KAUFFMANN (Denmark) nominated Mr. de Diego (Panama) as Rapporteur.

5. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) supported the nomination.

*Mr. de Diego (Panama) was elected Rapporteur by acclamation.*

#### Discussion of the agenda (A/C.1/477 and A/C.1/480)

6. Mr. VAN ZEELAND (Belgium) suggested that the Committee first take up the fifth item mentioned in the letter dated 23 September 1949 from the President of the General Assembly to the Chairman of the First Committee (A/C.1/477): "Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: report of the United

Nations Special Committee on the Balkans". The documentation on that question was at hand. In addition, if a new conciliation effort proved possible, it should be undertaken as expeditiously as circumstances would permit. The Committee might then take up the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies, a question which should have been solved at the previous session. The Committee could then take up the Palestine question and the fourth item on the agenda might be the one communicated by the letter dated 26 September 1949 from the President of the General Assembly to the chairman of the First Committee (A/C.1/480), namely: "Condemnation of the preparations for a new war, and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace". The Committee could then take up the question of Indonesia as its fifth item. It was probable that new elements would have entered into the picture by that time, making it possible for the Committee to deal with the item with a greater chance of reaching favourable results. The sixth and last item would then be the report of the Security Council.

7. Mr. VYSHINSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation, while essentially in agreement with the Belgian proposal, considered the item submitted by the USSR, on the "condemnation of the preparations for a new war, and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace", to be such an important issue that it should be taken up as early as possible. While taking into account the fact that the item had been submitted later than some of the other items, he suggested that it be placed second or third on the agenda, instead of fourth as proposed by the Belgian representative.

8. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) would not object to the order suggested by the Belgian representative but thought that in order to maintain as much harmony as possible in the committee's work it would be best to consider the item submitted by the USSR last. While that item was of great importance, it might give rise to a debate that would disturb the atmosphere of the Committee's discussions.

9. Mr. KAN (China) suggested that the Greek question be discussed first and that the order of discussion of the other items be decided upon only when that discussion had been completed. There appeared to be some disagreement regarding the order in which items should be taken up, and therefore it seemed difficult to take a decision at that time. He further understood that a few countries would submit draft resolutions within a few days, resolutions which might be of an important nature. It was only fair to such countries to wait until all such draft resolutions had been submitted, after which the Committee could decide the order of items on the agenda according to the nature and importance of the proposals which would have been made.

10. Mr. DE FREITAS-VALLE (Brazil) felt it would be dangerous to follow the course suggested by the representative of China, as it would entail reopening of the question of the agenda every time the discussion of an item had been completed. He proposed that the order envisaged by the Belgian delegation be adopted.

11. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the proposal made by the Chinese delegation might involve certain practical difficulties with regard to the organization of the Committee's work. Moreover, the Committee could decide to discuss any new items in any order it deemed fit.

12. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) understood the sentimental links joining the representatives of China and Greece, but could not agree that the Greek question should be discussed first on that account, as suggested by the representative of China. The item proposed by the delegation of the Soviet Union was a general one. The solution of that problem would considerably facilitate the Committee's task with regard to the other items on the agenda. He therefore supported the USSR proposal that that question be placed at the beginning of the agenda as one of the first items.

13. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) considered the concern of the Chinese representative for only one item of the agenda, the Greek question, rather natural. That representative was interested in what was happening in Greece because the events in China seemed to strike a familiar note. Mr. Kiselev noted that the representative of Peru considered that the proposal of the Soviet Union was a contentious one and therefore wished it to be shifted to the tail-end of the agenda. The argument that the establishment of peace all over the world and of the security of peoples was a contentious issue was interesting, but he believed that most of the members of the Committee did not subscribe to that view. The proposal of the Soviet Union that that item be placed second or third on the agenda was quite in accordance with the opinion of the peoples of the world, and his delegation fully supported that proposal.

14. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) said that there seemed to be general agreement about the order in which the Committee ought to consider the items of the agenda. He thought that the arguments put forward in favour of deferring discussion of the Indonesian question would also apply to the Palestine question. While there were a number of reports from the Conciliation Commission, it was also true that the Commission was awaiting the report of its Economic Survey Mission. He thought it would be possible, therefore, to take up the USSR proposal as the third item and the Palestine question as the fourth and on the other points follow the Belgian suggestion.

15. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was at a loss to understand the reasoning of some of the members of the Committee. While the representative of Peru had recognized that the proposals submitted by the USSR were important, he had suggested that the question be shifted to the tail-end of the agenda because discussion of it might be rather lively, perhaps with a calculation that the Committee might never succeed in discussing it at all during the last days of the session. If it was sincerely recognized that the USSR proposals were important, it would be illogical to place them at the end of the agenda. That item was of course important, in fact it was the most important one on the Committee's agenda, and if the First Committee was indeed a political committee which proposed to deal with and solve serious political questions, it should not accede to the quasi-logic of the representative of Peru. The Chinese representative's suggestion that the Committee should take up the Greek question, postponing a decision regarding all other items, had already been sufficiently commented upon. The logical course, as had been hinted by the representatives of Poland and of the Byelorussian SSR, would be to take up the USSR proposal first, since it was a question of such all-embracing significance, the favourable solution of which would facilitate the solution of other problems. However, in view of the fact that it had been submitted rather later than some of the other items, he would not press for having it considered first.

16. Fayez EL-KHOURI Bey (Syria) thought that the discussion on the agenda might prove to be very long. Would it not be in the interest of the work of the Committee if the suggestion of the Belgian representative were put to a vote? Such a course would permit reaching an early decision.

17. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTE (Ecuador) thought that it would be difficult to find a satisfactory conclusion if the discussion on the order of the six items before the Committee was continued; and he suggested that for the time being the Committee should select only two items. That would be taking a similar course to that followed by the First Committee in Paris during the first part of the previous session.<sup>1</sup> The Committee might first decide whether or not to discuss the Greek question first. A decision could then be made as to what the second item should be. When the first two items had been disposed of, the Committee could consider which should be the third and fourth items, and so on.

18. Mr. CASTRO (El Salvador) considered that the order of the entire agenda should be agreed

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, First Committee, 143rd meeting, page 12.*

upon at that meeting. The general view seemed to be that the Greek question should be placed first. He agreed with the suggestion that the second item should be the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies. He also supported the compromise solution suggested by the representative of Lebanon, to the effect that the USSR proposal be taken up third, followed by the Palestine question. The fifth item would be the question of Indonesia. Mr. Castro agreed with the arguments that had been put forward in favour of placing that question towards the end of the Committee's agenda. While the procedure followed at previous sessions had never involved more than taking note of the report of the Security Council by the General Assembly, he felt that the Assembly had the right to qualify the report, either favourably or unfavourably. It would therefore be logical to provide sufficient time for the study of that document.

19. Mr. CLEMENTIS (Czechoslovakia) agreed that there was no obstacle in the way of reaching a decision on the order of items of the agenda at that meeting. The question of the order was not merely procedural but was an important substantive one. There seemed to be only one point at issue, namely, whether the USSR proposal should be taken up as a second or a third item. He suggested that the Belgian representative might accept a compromise whereby he would include in his proposal Mr. Vyshinsky's suggestion that the item submitted by the USSR, embodying the most serious problem on the agenda, should be placed second.

20. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) said that without in any way prejudging the attitude of his delegation toward the item submitted by the USSR or the spirit in which that text had been presented, he thought that the proposal dealing with the condemnation of the preparations for a new war should not be placed too far down on the agenda. In fact, the issue of war or peace had general significance, and the Committee ought not to tie it to the text that had been proposed. As far as Yugoslavia was concerned, it did not have to search too far to find out how important the question of war or peace was.

21. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) said that the proposal of the Belgian delegation was a reasonable and sensible one. By voting on that proposal in its proper order, the Committee might conclude the discussion, and he therefore supported it.

22. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) stated that

the item submitted by the USSR could not be debated as an item apart from other subjects which concerned the First Committee and the General Assembly. For example, on the direction of the previous session of the General Assembly,<sup>1</sup> six Powers were at present discussing the question of atomic energy, and they must report on that subject. The second USSR proposal dealt with the same subject, and he suggested that the Committee would be wise to have the report of the six Powers, or an interim report, before it prior to taking up the USSR proposals. He therefore thought that the Belgian proposal was a reasonable one. In view of the importance which the USSR delegation attached to its proposal, should there be any disposition among the members of the Committee to delay a decision in order to see later whether it could be placed third, he would not contend against it and would accept the Ecuadorian proposal.

23. Mr. KAN (China) withdrew his delegation's proposal and supported the proposal made by the delegation of Ecuador.

24. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) pointed out that his proposal was an amendment to that of the Belgian representative.

25. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) supported the Lebanese proposal. If that proposal were voted as an amendment to the Belgian proposal, his delegation would vote in favour of the latter.

26. The CHAIRMAN explained that the Lebanese amendment would alter the Belgian proposal as follows: the first question would be the Greek question; the second, the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies; the third, the USSR proposals; and the fourth, the question of Palestine. He therefore put the Lebanese amendment to the vote.

*The Lebanese amendment was adopted by 40 votes to 12, with 5 abstentions.*

27. The CHAIRMAN stated that the Belgian proposal as amended was that the Committee should discuss the items on its agenda in the following order: first, the Greek question; second, the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies; third, the USSR proposals; fourth, the Palestine question; fifth, the Indonesian question; and sixth the report of the Security Council.

*The Belgian proposal as amended was adopted by 52 votes to 1, with 3 abstentions.*

The meeting rose at 12 noon.

## TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIFTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 28 September 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

### Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (A/935 and A/981)

1. Mr. MAKIN (Australia) said his delegation welcomed the improvement in the Balkan situa-

tion in the course of the past year and considered it a very encouraging development. It now seemed appropriate to seek an over-all settlement of the question. Attention should be given to the statement of the Chairman of the Conciliation Committee for the Balkans made on 19 May 1949, to be found in annex 5 A of document A/935,<sup>2</sup> which noted the progress which had been made

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, Resolutions*, No. 191(III) page 17.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 8*.

and suggested that an attempt to complete the work of the Conciliation Committee might well be made with chances of success. There was further material in that connexion in the report of the Conciliation Committee (A/AC.16/800). No doubt the representatives had seen the supplementary report of UNSCOB (A/981), which recommended unanimously that an effort be made during the fourth session of the General Assembly to reach a pacific settlement of existing differences between Greece, on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, on the other. The Australian delegation accordingly wished to make a proposal for a conciliation committee and urged that debate upon the substance of the Balkan question be deferred until a report on the progress of conciliation had been received. Such a proposal had been unanimously accepted by the Committee at the previous session<sup>1</sup> and it was to be hoped that a similar decision could be reached immediately. The Australian delegation therefore submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/481). Mr. Makin wished to amend that draft resolution in respect of the date by which the Conciliation Committee should report, changing the date to 17 October.

2. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) said his delegation wished to be associated with the Australian proposal and second it. A new effort should be made to settle the existing differences in the Balkans. It was to be hoped that such an endeavour would be made before the report of UNSCOB was discussed. He further hoped that the chances of success would not be prejudiced by any substantive discussion. Both the present report (A/935) and that submitted to the previous session (A/574) made the issue clear. Some States were continuing to ignore the Charter and resolutions of the General Assembly, but because of Greece's courage and the support given to that country the danger to peace in the Balkans had been very substantially reduced, and it was becoming apparent that Assembly resolutions could not be treated as scraps of paper. The President of the previous session of the Assembly had suggested the possibilities of success through conciliation. UNSCOB had also recommended such a course. The United States delegation therefore felt it was the duty of the Committee to make an effort towards conciliation. He hoped that the Committee would endorse the Australian proposal unanimously and that the officers appointed would be successful in establishing terms of settlement which would ensure their observation.

3. If there was a sincere desire for a settlement, such a settlement could be reached without delay. There was no need to reiterate that Greece's neighbours had no right to interfere in that country's internal affairs and foment civil war. External threats should be eliminated. The boundaries of Greece and its northern neighbours were regulated by international treaties and they were not subject to change by threat of force. Conciliation could not be advanced by the introduction of extraneous territorial issues. The terms of the Australian draft resolution were sufficiently flexible to lead to success if there were a genuine desire for a settlement. The only interest of the United States in Greece was that of peace and it would do everything in its power to aid the con-

ciliation committee, if such a committee was established. If no settlement were reached, the United States delegation felt that the First Committee should discuss the report of UNSCOB and seek effective measures to end the fomenting of guerilla warfare, which was taking place in violation of the Charter.

4. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the representatives should confine their remarks to the Australian draft resolution until a decision was reached upon it, in order to avoid what might prove to be unnecessary discussion.

5. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) recalled that frequently both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, when the Greek question had been debated, the Polish delegation had urged a solution through conciliation rather than through warfare or accusations against Greece's northern neighbours. In the Security Council Poland had supported and assisted in fixing the terms of reference of a commission of investigation, hoping to find a solution through conciliation.<sup>2</sup> When, later, the matter had come up before the General Assembly, Poland had frequently expressed the view that means for conciliation should be sought, particularly conciliation of an internal character in Greece. The Polish delegation therefore felt that the Australian draft resolution deserved careful study. It was unfortunate, however, that it had only just been submitted, for delegations had had neither time nor opportunity to study the proposal and consult their Governments. In the interest of reaching a unanimous decision and of establishing the conciliation committee best able to fulfil its task, Mr. Katz-Suchy proposed that the Committee should adjourn debate on the draft resolution in order to afford an opportunity for study.

6. Since the question of conciliation had been brought to the foreground, it should be remembered that, if it was to be successful and if a stable peace was to be established, certain preliminary moves were required on the part of the Greek Government. The First Committee should appeal to the Greek authorities in the interest of a solution through conciliation to suspend political terrorism, executions and courts martial immediately. The Press daily gave news of persons sentenced for their political beliefs. There was the particular instance of the condemnation to death of Catherine Zevgos by a military tribunal at Piraeus. If the Greek Government genuinely desired peace, and that the conciliation committee should succeed in its task, its first step should be the good-will gesture of suspending such activities. Mr. Katz-Suchy therefore submitted a draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/483.

7. The CHAIRMAN, in connexion with the proposal to defer discussion of the Australian draft resolution, said it was quite reasonable to postpone a final decision until the following day. He suggested, however, that some representatives might be prepared to make preliminary observations and that the debates might continue on that basis.

8. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said he endorsed the Polish motion to postpone a decision upon the Australian draft

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, First Committee, 193rd meeting.*

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, Second Series, No. 28.*

resolution by at least twenty-four hours. It merited careful study and the fact that it had only just been submitted caused some delegations certain difficulties. With regard to the information concerning the condemnation of Catherine Zevgos, he pointed out that she had been sentenced solely for her progressive opinions and her refusal to subscribe to the actions of the Greek Government. That act was typical of the terrorism pursued by the Athens régime and would not foster the results which the Committee was seeking. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR therefore believed that the Committee should approve the draft resolution appealing against the death sentence and thus produce evidence of a desire on the part of the Greek Government to co-operate and to end its terrorism.

9. Mr. KING (Liberia) said his delegation endorsed the Australian draft resolution since it appeared to offer the best means of reaching a solution in the Balkans. However, he could not support the Polish draft resolution. The Committee was not investigating the internal affairs of Greece, for that was contrary to the Charter. The Polish draft resolution was inappropriate and the Liberian delegation would vote against it.

10. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTE (Ecuador) said his delegation was prepared to support the Australian proposal. The establishment of the Conciliation Committee at the previous session had resulted from proposals advanced by Australia and Ecuador, although the formula which had been followed was that put forward by Australia. The present proposal followed from the previous one. Indeed it might be said that the conciliation was to be continued. The new draft resolution differed from the previous one only with respect to the composition of the committee. At the previous session, the President of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General, the Chairman and the Rapporteur of the First Committee had been appointed. The Assembly now had a new President and the Committee a new Chairman, but the Secretary-General and the Vice-Chairman of the First Committee had participated in the previous discussion, the latter having been the Rapporteur of the Committee. There were good prospects of reaching some of their objectives by 17 October and the Ecuadorian delegation would support the Australian draft resolution.

11. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) said his delegation welcomed and would support the initiative of the Australian delegation regarding the continuance of the talks which had previously come close to success. The draft resolution was particularly appropriate since UNSCOB had recommended an effort in the direction of a settlement during the present session. It was fortunate that the Committee was dealing with that recommendation before entering into the substance of the UNSCOB report, which doubtless would raise contentious issues. The fact that agreement had almost been achieved in May 1949 offered the hope that, if there existed on the part of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia the good-will to co-operate which Greece had shown, the talks might make considerable headway. Though it might be asserted that the Greek-Albanian territorial problem was an insurmountable difficulty, the United Kingdom delegation did not think so. By its consent to the proposals made by Dr. Evatt in May 1949 and by its public declarations, the Greek

Government had shown that it did not wish the territorial problem to prevent a settlement with Albania. The fact that Greece would set aside that question, which was of great importance to all political parties there, indicated that the territorial issue was not an insurmountable problem. Indeed the talks could proceed without touching upon it. The United Kingdom delegation wished the conciliation committee success in its efforts for peace. Such success would be a great tribute to the United Nations and would represent a great advance for the four countries concerned and for Europe as a whole.

12. While the United Kingdom delegation had no thought of suggesting the procedure to be followed in the talks, it might make one observation. The Soviet Union representative in the General Committee had stressed the importance of Article 2 paragraph 7 of the Charter.<sup>1</sup> Mr. McNeil reserved the right to discuss further the interpretation of that clause, but, together with the instructions to the conciliation committee, it clearly showed that there was no question of interfering during these talks in the domestic affairs of Greece. Such matters were beyond the scope of the talks and the competence of the General Assembly, and any move to introduce them would only prejudice success.

13. It was very difficult for any United Nations organ to reject, or assume a neutral attitude towards any humanitarian approach such as the representative of Poland had made. However, the Committee had previous experience along the same lines. Mr. McNeil recalled the discussions which had taken place in Paris. He did not suggest that the Committee should hurry a decision on the Australian draft resolution, but he submitted that if it was concerned over the problem of the relations between Greece and its three neighbours, and if it wished for the success of those talks, it would not introduce matters which were precluded by the Charter and might prejudice the larger question.

14. Noting that the Australian draft resolution set the date of 17 October for a report on the conciliation, Mr. McNeil expressed hope that that would afford reasonable time to ascertain whether there was in fact a basis for conciliation. He did not believe that there were representatives of either Albania or Bulgaria in New York. In order to save time, the Committee might agree that the Secretary-General should communicate forthwith with those Governments and ask them to make representatives available as soon as possible.

15. The CHAIRMAN, referring to the comments of the last speaker, said that he had received information to the effect that the Albanian and Bulgarian representatives were on their way to New York.

16. Mr. DJILAS (Yugoslavia) said that his delegation would welcome any measures aimed at normalizing relations between Greece and its northern neighbours. The Yugoslav delegation therefore took a favourable view of the Australian draft resolution and was not opposed to the establishment of a conciliation committee. However, since certain delegations had expressed a desire that the vote on the draft resolution should be postponed, Mr. Djilas saw no reason why the Committee

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, General Committee*, 65th meeting.

should not delay its final decision until the following day.

17. With regard to the Polish draft resolution, Mr. Djilas said that the conditions of terrorism which were prevailing in Greece were directed not only against those who supported the democratic movement but also against the Macedonian minority. It so happened that the territory inhabited by the Macedonian people had been the scene of fighting between governmental and democratic forces and was now under occupation by the former, which were employing harsh measures of repression. The Yugoslav delegation had extensive information at its disposal but did not wish to bring up that information at the present time. It was sufficient that the Yugoslav delegation supported in principle the Polish proposal designed to bring about the interruption of such repression. Mr. Djilas added that since the civil war in Greece was drawing to a close there no longer existed any military justification for the Greek Government to continue such harsh measures. The question was now purely a humanitarian one.

18. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation would support the Australian draft resolution as it had supported other analogous proposals made at previous sessions of the Assembly. However, he felt that the Committee would be acting correctly if it conceded to the request of Poland and the Byelorussian SSR for postponement of the final vote. In so doing the Committee would be acting in accordance with rule 109 of the rules of procedure. Furthermore the matter was of such importance that a serious effort should be made to remove any possibility of disagreement in connexion with the work of the conciliation committee. In order to achieve that end, it was most desirable that all delegations should have an opportunity to study the question in all its aspects before taking a final decision.

19. With regard to the Polish draft resolution concerning the repressive measures being taken by the Greek Government, in particular the sentencing to death of individuals solely because of their democratic convictions—as in the case of Catherine Zevgos—the USSR delegation regarded the proposal as essentially humanitarian and intended to support it. Mr. Vyshinsky criticized the legalistic attitude of the United Kingdom representative in the matter. It was true that the delegation of the Soviet Union had in the past opposed interference in the internal affairs of States on the basis of Article 2 paragraph 7 of the Charter. It had opposed such interference with regard to the charge of violation of human rights in Bulgaria and Hungary<sup>1</sup> and it would certainly maintain the same attitude in connexion with such cases in the future. But the situation was different. The appeal was directed to humanitarian feelings, which were stronger than legal considerations. In the case of Catherine Zevgos there was no reason to inflict such a harsh punishment. She was a victim of injustice.

20. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled moreover that the proposed appeal was not without precedent. During the third session of the General Assembly, the First Committee had issued a similar appeal on

behalf of certain Greek trade union leaders,<sup>2</sup> which had resulted in postponement of their execution. At that time Mr. McNeil had likewise opposed any action but nevertheless the Chairman of the First Committee had contacted the Greek delegation. At that time, Article 2 paragraph 7 of the Charter had not been applied and the appeal had been based only on humanitarian considerations. The present Polish proposal was similar and was likewise an appeal to the conscience of mankind. The proposal was simply a request that the Chairman of the First Committee contact the Greek delegation with a view to setting aside the death sentence passed upon a woman who had been unjustly convicted. Mr. Vyshinsky was convinced that all delegations imbued with humanitarian ideals would vote in favour of its adoption.

21. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) had wished to confine himself to a brief general statement on the Australian draft resolution. However, in view of remarks made by some preceding speakers he felt compelled to broaden the scope of his statement.

22. The Greek delegation of course supported the Australian draft resolution. Despite its desire for prompt action on the recommendations submitted by UNSCOB and in spite of its anxiety to see the actions of its northern neighbours brought into line with the rules of international law, the Greek delegation would readily support any measure designed to promote conciliation. Indeed, the Greek delegation had consistently aided all conciliation efforts in the past and it was noteworthy that the Conciliation Committee established during the third session of the General Assembly had reported that the Greek delegation had acceded to all its proposals and that the failure to find a satisfactory solution was due only to the fact that the Albanian Government had failed to reply to the proposals of Dr. Evatt. Ever since the third session of the Assembly, the Greek delegation had continued to do everything possible to bring about a *rapprochement*, and that in spite of their early failure. The experience with Yugoslavia had shown how little was needed to resolve the differences between the disputants. In the case of Yugoslavia it had sufficed for the Yugoslav authorities to close the border for a new era of peaceful relations to develop between that country and Greece. Of course political views in both countries had not changed but the improvement in relations showed that normal diplomatic relations could exist between States whose internal régimes were different. The Greek Government had always maintained that belief not through any sense of weakness but because of the traditional inclination of the Greek spirit toward moderation and tolerance. Mr. Pipinelis assured the Committee that Greece had no intention of departing from that worthy tradition; however, that was not the only reason for the moderate attitude of the Greek Government. As was well known Greece had to endure the misery and sacrifices of war for four years after the fighting had ceased in most other countries. Consequently if there was any one Government in the world which was sincerely anxious to see peace prevail it was the Greek Government.

23. Before entering upon conciliation, however, it was necessary to make clear certain funda-

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part II*, 201st plenary meeting.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, First Committee*, 186th meeting.



mental ideas which the comments of some of the preceding speakers had not served to clarify. When a task as delicate and as difficult as was proposed by the Australian representative was undertaken it was essential not to work *in vacuo*, but on the basis of certain principles accepted by the international community. Mr. Pipinelis cited two such principles. The first was an assurance of good faith on the part of each of the participating Governments. He believed that the only convincing evidence that such good faith existed could be found in a statement made without any reservations that the Government concerned was prepared to welcome on its territory the international body which had been vested with the duty of verifying facts. Lacking that assurance Mr. Pipinelis believed that any conciliation efforts would be vitiated from the outset.

24. While he did not wish to make any statements which might lead to a deterioration of goodwill he felt bound to draw the Committee's attention to a statement contained in paragraph 45 of the report of UNSCOB (A/935) in which it was stated that if Albania continued to aid the Greek guerrillas and to refuse co-operation with UNSCOB, the latter had little hope of assisting in the establishment of normal diplomatic and good neighbourly relations between the Governments of Albania and Greece. The truth of the statement was evident. It would be useless to expect any results of the proposed conciliation committee if that untenable and scandalous situation continued. It was a situation which had already been condemned by the representatives of the United Nations on the spot.

25. The second fundamental principle, acceptance of which was indispensable to the success of the conciliation work, was that international law and the main juridical premises of the Charter must be accepted as the basis of the discussions; otherwise, the consultations would run the risk of ending in confusion and oratorical diatribes. As the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom had observed, there were differences of opinion even as regards the very meaning of words.<sup>1</sup> What some called aggression others regarded as a liberation movement of oppressed classes. What some called order and stability others branded as terrorism. It was essential to know what was legally permitted and what was not and the only source of guidance in that direction was the Charter of the United Nations. In that respect Mr. Pipinelis supported what had been said by the United Kingdom representative; like him, Mr. Pipinelis believed that the text of the Charter was clear and unambiguous.

26. The representative of the USSR, in speaking of the Polish draft resolution, had argued against a purely legalistic interpretation of Article 2 paragraph 7 of the Charter, insisting that nothing in the Charter could be construed as forbidding an appeal to humanitarian feelings. But to accept such an appeal presupposed a conviction of truth. Supposing that the individuals had been rightly convicted, as indeed the Greek delegation could prove, then there could be no appeal to humanitarian consideration. Mr. Pipinelis assured the Committee that his delegation was prepared to co-operate in a genuine and sincere effort of con-

ciliation with its neighbours. However, the Greek Government was not prepared to lend itself to manoeuvres which, under false pretenses, were designed to perpetuate an international plot against Greece and thus to perpetuate the events which had ravaged his country for so many years.

27. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) also expressed support for the Australian draft resolution; nevertheless he deemed it necessary to comment upon certain statements made by preceding speakers on the matter.

28. In the first place the representative of the United Kingdom, speaking on the Polish proposal, had adverted to Article 2 paragraph 7, in order to prove that the United Nations was not permitted to interfere in the internal affairs of a State. But if that were true, then on what grounds did the United Kingdom delegation justify the attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in connexion with the alleged violation of human rights in those States. It was noteworthy that the United Kingdom delegation had espoused a completely different position in connexion with that question from the position which it now maintained towards the Polish appeal. Mr. Manuisky believed that the difference in the attitude of the United Kingdom delegation in respect to both questions showed a discriminatory attitude dictated by considerations that had nothing in common with the Charter.

29. The representative of the Ukrainian SSR also questioned the reference by the United Kingdom representative to certain territorial claims on the part of Greece which he had described as meritorious. Why, Mr. Manuisky asked, was it necessary to introduce the question of territorial claims in connexion with a proposal to establish a conciliation committee? The insertion of that issue certainly aroused doubts in the minds of several delegations which were prepared to support the Australian draft resolution.

30. A third statement which Mr. Manuisky found surprising was the insistence of the Greek representative that his Government must be permitted to continue its military campaign. What campaign did he refer to? In paragraph (a) of the introduction to the supplementary report of UNSCOB (A/981) it was stated that the Greek armed forces had eliminated organized guerrilla resistance along the northern borders of Greece and had resumed effective control of those areas. If that report was true then what war could the representative of Greece be referring to, if not perhaps to some plans directly related to Greece's territorial claims?

31. Finally, Mr. Manuisky drew attention to the statement in paragraph 3 of the supplementary report of UNSCOB which contained a recommendation that the General Assembly find that the Government of Albania was primarily responsible for the threat to peace in the Balkans. He believed that the paragraph referred to acquired a rather threatening significance in the light of the statement made by the United Kingdom representative.

32. In view of the foregoing considerations Mr. Manuisky requested that a decision on the Australian draft resolution be postponed in order to enable delegations to examine it in the light of the various statements which had been made.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 229th plenary meeting.

33. As to the Polish draft resolution, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR strongly favoured an appeal for suspension of executions in Greece while the conciliation committee was functioning. In that connexion it fully supported the arguments adduced by the representative of the USSR.

34. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) apologized to the preceding speaker for any adverse impression which he might have created. He explained that he had expressed no opinion as to the validity of the Greek territorial claims. It was the opinion of the United Kingdom delegation that the discussions in the conciliation committee could very well take place without any reference to those claims.

35. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) reiterated that he did not intend to discuss the substance of the Australian draft resolution at the present time. The proposal was of considerable importance and the Polish delegation would have to consult with its Government before taking a final position.

36. However, he regretted that certain of the statements which had been made appeared to deny the possibility of conciliation. In that connexion he referred to the statement of the Greek representative, who, while favouring the idea of conciliation, nevertheless spoke in a manner which was hardly conducive to conciliation. Mr. Katz-Suchy welcomed the fact that delegations were conscious of the existence of Article 2 paragraph 7 of the Charter, for indeed many seemed to forget it when questions arose which clearly involved an interference in domestic jurisdiction. Indeed, several delegations, in particular those of the United Kingdom and Greece, had not thought of it when a number of questions clearly contrary to the spirit and letter of the Charter had been introduced. However, now that an appeal for clemency was being made, that article was suddenly brought to the fore.

37. It was not the fault of Poland that the situation in Greece had become of international concern and had been brought to the attention first of the Security Council and then of the Assembly. The Polish draft resolution had been introduced in the interest of the possibility of conciliation. All that was being asked of the Greek Government was that it be more just, something which the Greek representative had claimed to be a special virtue of his people. Mr. Katz-Suchy stressed that the Polish draft resolution was a simple appeal which he was sure corresponded to the wishes of every delegation. He pointed out that the draft resolution did not even refer to the General Assembly; it left the question entirely to the First Committee because he believed that the latter was fully competent to deal with a question of purely humanitarian nature. Moreover, he felt sure that whatever position the United Kingdom delegation might take in the matter, the draft resolution was fully in the spirit expressed by British trade unions in their many appeals against the sentences of death issued in Greece. Acceptance of the proposal would constitute a conciliatory gesture which would go far to show how great the chances of political conciliation were and how great or small the desire of the Greek Government for such a solution was.

38. Mr. LONDOÑO Y LONDOÑO (Colombia), recalling that there had been no capital punishment

in his country for the past fifty years, did not think it was possible for States which had abandoned capital punishment for political crimes to reject the Polish appeal for clemency. While he was fully aware of the legal difficulties involved, he pointed out that any work of conciliation such as proposed by the Australian delegation must necessarily consider questions overlapping domestic jurisdiction of countries. The Colombian delegation hoped that the spirit of clemency which would be shown by the First Committee in adopting the proposal would extend to the discussions in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee relating to the violation of fundamental and religious rights of individuals in certain European countries.

39. Mr. ALVAREZ (Cuba) considered that the Polish draft resolution, as submitted, was much more a political proposal than a humanitarian one and therefore might be construed as intervention in the domestic jurisdiction in a State. His delegation might vote in favour of a specific appeal for clemency in the case of Catherine Zevgos and therefore be proposed as an amendment (A/C.1/484) to the Polish draft resolution replacing its second paragraph by the following:

*"The First Committee*

*"Resolves that the Chairman of the First Committee address to the Greek authorities a humanitarian appeal for the suspension of the death sentence on Catherine Zevgos without involving any intervention in the internal affairs of Greece."*

40. The CHAIRMAN, noting that a request had been made to postpone the vote upon the Australian draft resolution, asked the Committee how it wished to proceed with respect to the Polish draft resolution.

41. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) observed that his proposal was of an urgent nature and therefore urged that it be voted upon without delay.

42. The CHAIRMAN stated that rule 120 of the rules of procedure required that proposals relating to the same question be voted upon in the order in which they had been submitted. If the Committee wished to deviate from that rule and vote on the Polish draft resolution at the present time then a decision would have to be taken to that effect.

43. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) agreed that rule 120 applied but believed that priority should be given to the Polish draft resolution since it pertained to an urgent matter and delay might cost the life of the individual concerned. He added that the proposal was extremely simple and merely required that the Chairman contact the Greek delegation and request that the sentence be suspended or postponed. If that appeal were successful it would be a great achievement which would pave the way towards future co-operation.

44. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said it was true that the Polish draft resolution had been introduced after the Australian proposal, but, so far, no delegation had asked that the decision upon it be postponed, whereas several representatives had made such a request with regard to the Australian proposal. He wondered whether any delegation was prepared to take the responsibility for the execution of Catherine Zevgos by asking for postponement.

45. In the interest of unanimous decision Mr. Katz-Suchy said that if a vote were taken immediately, he would be prepared to limit the draft resolution, as suggested by the Cuban amendment, to a specific appeal to set aside the death sentence passed on Catherine Zevgos.

46. Mr. CASTRO (El Salvador) supported the Australian draft resolution. As to the Polish proposal, however, he urged that the matter be considered from a realistic point of view. For a Committee of the General Assembly to appeal for commutation of a sentence passed by a tribunal of one of the Member States obviously meant that pressure was being exercised on an essentially domestic question and it was therefore a violation of Article 2 paragraph 7 of the Charter. Nevertheless, there was clearly something which the Committee could do in the matter. Mr. Castro recalled that in a similar situation the French delegation had presented a successful proposal which had merely expressed the opinion of the First Committee and had left it to the Greek delegation to present that opinion to its Government.<sup>1</sup> Thus, in accordance with that precedent, Mr. Castro submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/485) as follows:

*"The First Committee*

*"Resolves to authorize the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Committee to approach the representatives of Greece in order to make clear to them the satisfaction with which the First Committee would view the Greek Government's efforts to exercise all possible moderation, as far as is consistent with justice, in the punishment of acts prejudicial to the internal peace of Greece."*

If the Committee were to adopt that draft resolution, then it would not be interfering with the domestic jurisdiction of Greece.

47. Mr. COUVE DE MURVILLE (France) speaking on the question of procedure raised by the Chairman expressed his opinion that the Committee should adhere to rule 120 of the rules of procedure and that the decision on the Polish draft resolution should be postponed until a vote had been taken on the Australian proposal. He added that such a procedure seemed appropriate since discussion on the Polish draft resolution was

apparently far from being completed. The Committee had just received a draft resolution submitted by El Salvador and it was possible that further proposals might be submitted.

48. A second argument in favour of postponement was that the discussion had shown that although the Polish proposal might be inspired by humanitarian sentiments, it was nevertheless likely to have a political interpretation since it was directly related to the whole of the question under discussion and in particular to the Australian draft resolution.

49. Another reason was that the Polish draft resolution raised important questions of principle with regard to interference in the internal affairs of Member States. Furthermore, it cited as facts certain matters on which, no doubt, the Polish delegation was well informed but on which other delegations, particularly the French, desired further information.

50. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) supported the representative of France. While he fully appreciated the sentiments of the Polish representative, he pointed out that under rule 109 of the rules of procedure, no proposals could be discussed or put to the vote unless circulated in writing to all delegations not later than the day preceding the meeting. Therefore it could not be said that the Committee had failed to act properly by not seeking to ask for an adjournment but rather that the Polish delegation had failed to follow the usual procedure. Moreover, as the French representative had pointed out, the matter was very involved and in view of the United Kingdom delegation, the discussion ought to be adjourned to enable Members to study both the Polish and El Salvadorian draft resolutions.

51. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the French proposal that the Committee follow its normal procedure and deal with the draft resolutions submitted by Poland and El Salvador after it had voted on the Australian draft resolution.

*The proposal was adopted by 44 votes to 8 with 4 abstentions.*

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SIXTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 29 September 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

### **Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, (continued) (A/935, A/978, A/981, A/C.1/481, A/C.1/483, A/C.1/484 and A/C.1/485).**

1. The CHAIRMAN recalled the decision, adopted by the First Committee at its previous meeting, to

deal first of all with the Australian draft resolution (A/C.1/481).

2. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) associated himself with the delegations which had spoken in favour of the Australian draft resolution.

3. Hostilities had practically come to an end in Greece; that fact, together with the improvement in Greek-Yugoslav relations and the progress previously made by the Conciliation Committee created at the third regular session of the General Assembly,<sup>2</sup> made it possible to view with optimism

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, First Committee, 186th meeting.*

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, First Committee, 193rd meeting.*

the proposed new conciliation committee's chances of success.

4. As regards the Polish proposal (A/C.1/483) and the Cuban amendment thereto (A/C.1/484), the delegation of the Philippines favoured in principle all appeals of a humanitarian character on behalf of political offenders. In the case in point, the Philippine delegation supported the Cuban delegation's amendment to address an appeal to the Greek authorities for the suspension of the death sentence on Mrs. Zevgos. It also supported the draft resolution of El Salvador (A/C.1/485) calling for an appeal to the Greek Government.
5. The CHAIRMAN reminded members of the First Committee that discussion at that stage should be restricted to the Australian draft resolution.
6. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) stated that his delegation, inspired by a desire to ensure the integrity and independence of Greece and the maintenance of peace in the Balkans, favoured the Australian draft resolution.
7. The delegation of Iraq had heard with satisfaction the representative of Greece speak of the resumption of normal relations between Greece and Yugoslavia. It could therefore be hoped that a similar improvement would take place with regard to Albania and Bulgaria.
8. It was essential, however, to observe two principles. In the first place, only the lawful Government of any country could take action when subversive elements attempted to destroy its authority. Any assistance to such rebels would constitute an act of intervention in the internal affairs of that State. Secondly, a foreign Government had no right to comment on internal measures taken by the legally constituted authorities of a State for the purpose of preserving peace within the country. Unless those two basic rules were observed, there could be no peace among the nations.
9. The delegation of Iraq, while expressing its intention to vote in favour of the creation of a conciliation committee, felt sure that the work of that committee would be greatly facilitated if Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter were better understood in the Organization.
10. Mr. CLEMENTIS (Czechoslovakia) said that his delegation welcomed any step which might lead to a solution of the Greek question, it was therefore prepared to support the initiative of the Australian delegation in so far as it could lead to the restoration of peace in Greece and the re-establishment of normal relations between Greece and its northern neighbours.
11. The Czechoslovak delegation had originally intended to submit an amendment to the Australian text on the subject of the powers of the proposed conciliation committee. Since, however, it seemed that the First Committee approved the new committee's mission of conciliation, the delegation of Czechoslovakia would vote in favour of the draft resolution.
12. Mr. EBAN (Israel) stressed the importance of the Australian delegation's contribution. The revival of the idea of an organ of conciliation, which had carried the General Assembly to the very threshold of success in the previous year, was most opportune.
13. The Israeli delegation supported the Australian draft resolution, which should make it possible to achieve the re-establishment of peace in the Balkans—the common objective of all Members of the United Nations.
14. Mr. COUVE DE MURVILLE (France) associated himself with those delegations which had supported the draft resolution of Australia. He pointed out that the problem before the United Nations was not the Greek question, but the relations of that country with its northern neighbours.
15. Confidence might be felt in the success of an attempt at conciliation sponsored by the highest authorities of the United Nations and unanimously supported by the delegations.
16. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) reminded the meeting that his delegation had invariably advocated methods of conciliation before every organ of the United Nations.
17. The delegation of Poland, which had been unable the previous day to express an informed opinion on the Australian proposal, considered that the draft resolution was far from satisfactory, since it dealt with only one minor aspect of the problem—that of the relations between Greece and its northern neighbours, which simply reflected the discord prevailing in Greece.
18. If peace were to be restored, conciliation should begin at home. In that way the relations between Greece and its neighbours would no longer cause any difficulty. That was the attitude of the Security Council's Commission of Investigation, regarding Greek frontier incidents, which had sought to be an effective instrument of peace among the various opposing groups in Greece and had tried to deal with the evil at its root. Unfortunately, at the very moment that that Commission was about to obtain satisfactory results, a new doctrine had made its appearance and plans of strategy had been worked out. The existing situation was simply the outcome of the struggle between the Greek people and the Government imposed upon them, in the first instance by the British forces and, afterwards, by British and American forces jointly. The Polish delegation had opposed the inclusion of the Greek question in the agenda of the General Assembly in the form proposed, since it was convinced that the problems would not be solved by laying the blame on Greece's neighbours.
19. In view of the spirit of conciliation shown in the First Committee, however, the delegation of Poland was prepared to support an attempt at conciliation, which erred only in seeking the solution of a minor aspect of a problem, whereas it should strive to settle at the same time both the internal problem and the relations of Greece with its neighbours. To lay the blame for the situation on the intervention of neighbouring countries and to hold Albania responsible, as did the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (A/935) was to lose all sense of proportion.
20. For three years the Greek people had withstood the British Army and the military power of the United States employed in the service of Greek governmental terrorism. It was therefore desirable that the committee to be set up under the terms of the Australian draft resolution should

take into consideration the various points of view put forward in the First Committee and should work for conciliation in every possible sphere.

*The draft resolution of Australia (A/C.1/481) was adopted unanimously.*

21. The CHAIRMAN said that the vote just taken was a happy augury for the work of the Conciliation Committee. Speaking for the Vice-Chairman and in his own name, he said that the members of the Conciliation Committee would draw inspiration for their work from the example given by the Committee presided over by Mr. Evatt, which had so nearly been crowned with success. He then called upon the Committee to examine the Polish draft resolution (A/C.1/483), the amendment proposed by the Cuban delegation (A/C.1/484); and the draft resolution of the delegation of El Salvador (A/C.1/485).

22. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) said that the Polish draft resolution was the latest in a series of similar attacks on the good name and dignity of Greece.

23. His delegation had wished to contribute to the harmony which had seemed to prevail in the First Committee by refraining from replying at once to slanderous charges.

24. Since, however, the question was important both to Greece and to the United Nations, and since it also appeared that the good faith of various delegations had been abused, it was essential to bring out the facts once more.

25. It had been alleged that the carrying out of the death sentence to which Poland had referred was imminent. Upon enquiry, however, it appeared that Catherine Zevgos had been condemned to death on 17 September by the military tribunal of Piraeus by a vote of three to two. As always in such cases, the matter had been brought before the Court of Appeal on the following day, and a definite stay of execution of the sentence had thus resulted. Since that decision was taken on 18 September, it was difficult to believe that it had escaped the notice of the delegation of Poland; hence, in claiming that the matter was urgent, it was taking advantage of the good faith of the Committee.

26. In any case, the important thing was to expose the systematic campaign of defamation directed against the Greek Government. As the representative of France had pointed out, the very act of making an appeal to a Government was tantamount to casting suspicion upon it. Before taking such action, at least a summary examination should be made of the facts of the case. It was a fact that the rebels had executed without trial tens of thousands of innocent people, had deported women and children and had crucified priests. If the Committee were to deal with all those cases, it would cost a great deal to do.

27. Even more basic was the issue of the very competence of organs of the United Nations to deal with the matter. Furthermore it was a case of political action which assumed the form of a humanitarian appeal. However, the Greek delegation did not wish to confine itself to procedural considerations. It preferred to enter into the substance of the matter and to take account of the whole context in which the problem arose. A civil

war had been in progress in Greece, aided as it was by foreign intervention, and the Greek Government had had to suppress it by force as any other State would have had to do in similar circumstances. There was no country whose penal code did not punish sabotage and murder, whether it was in Czechoslovakia, whose Foreign Minister had openly stated in plenary meeting<sup>1</sup> that the suppression of crimes of high treason could not be considered a violation of human rights, or in the legislation of another country enjoying the benefits of popular democracy, such as Poland.

28. Justice demanded that consideration should be given to all the details of the plot against Greece and that the figures should be carefully examined. In four years, the Greek communists had been responsible for the murder of 50,749 persons and destruction of 11,750 villages, without counting the losses incurred by the regular army. The report of UNESCO on the condition of 338,000 homeless children, living in the most abject misery was particularly significant. In the face of so much suffering, it was surprising, as the chief of the United States Mission in Greece had said, that the repression had not been more severe. Actually, in 1948, 11,759 persons had been brought before military tribunals; 6,314 had been acquitted and 1,698 sentenced to death, of whom 695 had been executed. During the four-year period ending on 30 April 1949, 2,314 persons had been executed.

29. On the other hand, the long series of measures for granting amnesties taken during the years 1945 to 1948 should be kept in mind. These measures were carried still further by a new decision submitted to the Greek Parliament on 29 September 1949 in an effort to put an end to the horrible tragedy. Under the new bill, most of the guilty persons who had been sentenced to various punishments short of the death penalty would be interned in re-education camps, where the most satisfactory results had already been obtained. Seventy per cent of the persons detained in those camps were already considered likely to be set free. In addition, the Greek Government had decided to refer all cases of capital punishment to the Court of Appeals in accordance with the principle by which it had always been guided, namely, that punishment should be meted out only to the extent to which it was absolutely necessary. He hoped that this brief statement would put an end to the slanderous and malicious accusations brought against Greece.

30. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) noted that at its preceding meeting the Committee had responded with sympathy to the Polish proposal that preliminary steps of clemency should be taken to ensure the success of the Conciliation Committee's work for peace. The statement by the representative of Greece at the present meeting could not change the situation; the Committee's sympathy went out to those who were most in need of it, to those who had been sentenced. Mr. Katz-Suchy wondered how the Greek representative, who at the preceding meeting had opposed any intervention by the Committee in the case of Catherine Zevgos, a case which had long attracted the attention of public opinion in the United States and elsewhere, could have suddenly heard that her exe-

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 228th plenary meeting.

cution had been suspended several days previously. That could only be an attempt to create a diversion.

31. The representative of Poland remarked that it was strange that Mr. Pipinelis should have spoken in such unctuous terms of the measures taken by his Government when, only the day before, the Greek delegation had brutally refused an American women's organization the right of intervening in favour of Catherine Zevgos and when, quite recently, captured partisans had been decapitated and their heads exposed to public view by soldiers of the Greek Army. The words of the Greek representative were also inconsistent with reports in the Greek Press, which boasted of the use of dive-bombers against the civilian population and of tanks against the guerrillas. The Greek Army had even been accused of having used gas and of having shot and tortured prisoners of war in violation of the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war. The figures quoted by Mr. Pipinelis did not correspond with those which Mr. Canellopoulos, the Minister of War in the Athens Government, had recently made public. According to those figures, 1,209 guerrillas had been condemned to death in the first seven months of the current year, and 708 of them had already been executed. Moreover, the 50,000 victims mentioned by the Greek representative undoubtedly included many thousands of guerrillas whom the Greek Army, day by day, boasted of having wiped out.

32. Mr. Katz-Suchy added that it was obvious that the Greek Government was responsible for a reign of terror affecting all the social classes of the Greek population as shown by press dispatches. Under those conditions, the United Nations had to act and could not allow itself to be impressed by the promises of re-education referred to by the representative of Greece. If the Conciliation Committee was to be able to act effectively, the atmosphere of terror prevailing in Greece must above all be dispelled. Accordingly the Polish delegation called for unanimous adoption of its proposal, which was in harmony with the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

33. The CHAIRMAN requested the members of the Committee to refrain from saying anything which might make more difficult the work of the Conciliation Committee, the creation of which had just been decided.

34. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), speaking on a point of order, protested against the statement of the Chairman and said that the representative of Greece had been the first to make passions flare up again by dealing with the substance of the question.

35. The CHAIRMAN indicated that a protest against a statement by the Chairman did not in itself constitute a point of order. He added that he had not referred to any particular statement and that he had merely expressed the hope that nothing would be said to make the work of the Conciliation Committee more difficult.

36. Mr. MARTÍNEZ MORENO (El Salvador) stated that the proposal which his delegation had presented the preceding day (A/C.1/485) had been based on humanitarian principles as well as on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a State. Nevertheless, in the light of the

statement of the representative of Greece informing the members of the Committee that sentences against political prisoners had been commuted, the delegation of El Salvador would withdraw its draft resolution and would vote against the Polish proposal, which seemed to be based on political rather than humanitarian considerations.

37. Mr. KAN (China) said that there was no political or juridical reason for adopting the Polish proposal. First of all, it was the responsibility of the Conciliation Committee to achieve conciliation and, if the First Committee thought it essential, it could at best invite the Conciliation Committee to give consideration to the problem mentioned in the Polish proposal. Nevertheless, it was obvious that that proposal was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations in that it constituted interference in the internal affairs of a State. In addition, that proposal was a political manoeuvre in humanitarian disguise to condemn the Greek Government even before the Conciliation Committee had been seized on the matter. Therefore the Polish proposal was unacceptable.

38. Mr. ALVAREZ (Cuba) recalled that his delegation had been sympathetic to the humanitarian character of the Polish proposal. He pointed out, however, that according to information published in the Press that morning the Greek Government had decided to suspend the execution of death sentences pending the promulgation of an amnesty law. That information had been confirmed by the Greek representative. Therefore the Polish proposal must henceforth be regarded as pointless. Accordingly the Cuban delegation withdrew the amendment (A/C.1/484) which it had proposed to that draft resolution.

39. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) supported the opinion of the representative of El Salvador and Cuba. He hoped that the representative of Poland would follow their example and withdraw his proposal since the purpose it sought had already been achieved without action on the part of the Committee.

40. Mr. DÓMINGUEZ CÁMPORA (Uruguay) expressed the view that in humanitarian guise, the Polish proposal tended to shed unfavourable light on Greece at the very time a question involving the territorial integrity of that country was being discussed. The Uruguayan delegation would have voted in favour of a proposal calling for clemency on the part of the Greek Government if a death sentence had been passed, but it was opposed to the Polish proposal, which under the pretext of putting an end to the alleged violations of human rights was political in character.

41. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stressed the fact that his country, together with the fifteen other Soviet Socialist Republics, was part of the only State which, after the war, had abolished the death penalty. It therefore had a moral right to intervene in the substance of the question raised by the Polish draft resolution.

42. Mr. Manuisky first of all questioned the statements of the representative of Greece and recalled those made in 1946 by three representatives of the British Labour Party and also by Mr. Jouhaux, which proved that a reign of terror prevailed in Greece. He added that the number of refugees mentioned by Mr. Pipinelis did not correspond to the figure of 250,000 quoted by Mr.



Tsaldaris during the second session of the General Assembly.<sup>1</sup> Why did the Greek representative blame Albania and Bulgaria for the misfortunes of Greece when commanders of the Greek Army had stated that their arms had been brought on Italian and Turkish ships? Was there any intention to hold the Turkish and Italian Governments responsible for the misfortune of Greece? Mr. Pipinelis had said that priests had been crucified, but he had not given any names. The Conciliation Committee would have to verify those allegations and not merely listen to one of the parties involved.

43. The representative of the Ukrainian SSR expressed surprise that, after the unfounded statement of Mr. Pipinelis, the representatives of Cuba and El Salvador had withdrawn their proposals and that the representative of Uruguay had stated that he was opposed to the Polish proposal because it constituted interference in the internal affairs of a State. He recalled that in 1946, impelled by humanitarian motives, Uruguay had requested (A/Bur/22) that the death sentence should not be carried out against the hitlerite war criminals judged by the International Tribunal of Nürnberg.

44. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR supported the Polish proposal, which, by its humanitarian nature, would enable the Conciliation Committee to achieve success in its work.

45. Mr. DÓMINGUEZ CÁMPORA (Uruguay), in reply to the representative of the Ukrainian SSR, pointed out that he had not opposed the Polish draft resolution on the ground of the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, but because of the political character of that proposal. It was true that at the time of the Nürnberg trials his country had asked that the death sentences passed by that Tribunal should not be carried out, and that Uruguay had acted in accordance with its usual line of conduct, which was to oppose the death penalty on all occasions.

46. He pointed out that certain representatives who appealed to the humanitarian feelings of members of the Committee were showing great cynicism, since they had remained unmoved at the death of tens of thousands of persons who had committed no other crime than that of belonging to a certain social class.

47. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTE (Ecuador) recalled that the death penalty had been abolished in his country fifty years previously and stated that his delegation approved in principle any appeal to suspend the execution of a death sentence. Nevertheless, it was for the Conciliation Committee to create a favourable atmosphere for conciliation among the four Governments, and any recommendation it might make would necessarily apply to those four States. Hence, it would be desirable for the representative of Poland to find a more general formula applicable to the four States concerned, or, better still, to withdraw his proposal in order to give the Conciliation Committee full scope for action.

48. Mr. KURAL (Turkey), in reply to a remark made by the representative of the Ukrainian SSR, pointed out that arms had, in fact, been sent to

Greece in Turkish vessels; but that had happened during the war and the arms had been sent to the Greek resistance movement against the Germans; however, to his knowledge, no illicit traffic of arms existed at the present time between Turkey and Greece.

49. The Turkish delegation would vote against the Polish proposal, which would involve interference in the internal affairs of a State, and which was also useless, since, according to the Greek representative's observations, Greek legislation afforded every guarantee of justice.

50. EL-KHOURI Bey (Syria) drew the attention of the representatives of small States to the importance of their vote. Instead of taking one side or the other, it would be better for them to abstain and to let the parties concerned discuss the matter. Furthermore, since the death sentence against Mrs. Zevgos had been suspended, there was no need to adopt the Polish proposal.

51. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) regretted that the representative of El Salvador had expressed doubts as to the sincerity of his proposal. He pointed out that Poland's history in the past two centuries afforded sufficient proof that no human issue could be a matter of indifference to Poland.

52. With regard to the statement of the Chinese representative, he considered that the sentiments expressed by the Committee on the previous day were the best reply to the charge of absurdity levelled by that representative against the Polish proposal.

53. He regretted that the representative of Cuba had withdrawn his proposal, for Mrs. Zevgos was still in danger.

54. He could not agree with the Lebanese representative's request that he should withdraw his proposal, since his conscience would not allow him to assume a responsibility which might cost the life of a human being.

55. In reply to the representative of Ecuador, he stressed that his delegation's proposal had been submitted with a view to creating a favourable atmosphere for conciliation. British trade unions and the International Red Cross had frequently taken action against the terror in Greece. Why should the Committee not follow the example of those organizations?

56. It seemed to him that the attitude of certain delegations had changed during the night. The attitude of the Polish delegation, however, remained unchanged and he asked for a vote by roll-call.

57. Mr. PANYUSHKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stressed that the Committee's decisions influenced world public opinion and said that all right-minded people would welcome with a feeling of relief the adoption of the Polish proposal. The statements that had been made regarding the political character of that proposal were designed to evade the protection that the United Nations was bound to give to human rights.

58. The USSR delegation would vote in favour of the just and humane Polish proposal, which was likely to enhance the prestige of the United Nations.

59. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) wished first of all to disassociate himself from any re-

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the second session of the General Assembly, First Committee, 63rd meeting.*

marks which cast doubt on the sincerity of the statement by the representative of Greece. Greece was a sovereign State, a Member of the United Nations; it was only normal that its representative should explain his point of view. Moreover, since there was opposition in the Athens Parliament and since the free transmission of news from Athens to other countries was permitted, those were additional reasons for believing the statements made by the representative of Greece.

60. Mr. McNeil also pointed out that in November 1948 the First Committee had rejected,<sup>1</sup> by 43 votes to 6, with 2 abstentions, a proposal (A/C.1/371) similar to the Polish resolution, because it would have constituted interference in the domestic affairs of Greece.

61. Finally Mr. McNeil made it clear that the change in the views of the representatives of Cuba and El Salvador was not due to pressure exerted on them during the night, but simply to the fact that the statement of the representative of Greece had offered ample proof that the life of Mrs. Zevgos was no longer in danger and that there was no longer any need for the Committee to act.

62. Mr. COUVE DE MURVILLE (France) felt that the Polish proposal raised two contradictory problems: on the one hand it appealed to humanitarian feelings; while on the other it touched upon the competence of the United Nations, which, as was known, could not interfere in the domestic affairs of a State. To avoid that situation, he had intended, before the statement by the representative of Greece, to propose that the question should be referred to the Chairman of the Committee so that he could take the necessary measures consistent with the ideas expressed by the Committee. However Mr. Pipinelis' statement, which had pointed out, in the first place, that the death penalty against Mrs. Zevgos had been suspended and, secondly, that the Greek Government intended to adopt a policy of appeasement with regard to convictions for political offences, had changed the facts of the problem and had made the Polish proposal unnecessary, as well as the proposal which the French delegation had intended to submit.

63. In those circumstances, the representative of Lebanon had pointed out the wisest course when he had asked Mr. Katz-Suchy to withdraw his proposal. If that proposal were not withdrawn, however, the French delegation would oppose it in order to facilitate the work of the Conciliation Committee.

64. Mr. LONDOÑO Y LONDOÑO (Colombia) thought that the persistence with which the representative of Poland pressed his proposal gave the impression that it concealed some political motive.

65. Of course the Colombian delegation would never refuse to participate in an appeal for clemency in connexion with the execution of a death sentence. The statement of the representative of Greece, which should be accepted unquestioned, showed, however, that the execution of the death penalty had been suspended. That being so, the Polish proposal was exclusively political in nature. It was important to note that, in spite of the war, Greece had been able to maintain intact a juridical system which did it honour.

66. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) regretted that the Colombian representative had withdrawn his support of the Polish resolution and that the United Kingdom representative had made reservations. He added that the reasons for which the Polish draft resolution had been submitted were still valid since the statements by Mr. Pipinelis on the death sentence of Mrs. Zevgos and on the suspension of her execution ought to be regarded with caution. He pointed out that during the third session of the Assembly he had submitted a similar resolution (A/C.1/353) which had been rejected<sup>2</sup> because the fate threatening the accused had been claimed to be non-existent; yet the execution of two of them had been announced the following morning. To prevent a similar case the Polish delegation wished to maintain its proposal.

67. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) did not feel reassured by the statements of the Greek representative regarding the case of Mrs. Zevgos, since Mr. Pipinelis had failed to say what action the court of appeal would take. Nor did he indicate the intentions of the Greek Government with regard to similar cases in the future. Would it be fair to victimize Mrs. Zevgos because in the view of some representatives, the Polish draft resolution was made for propaganda purposes?

68. The Yugoslav delegation had already drawn the attention of the Committee to the terror prevailing in Greece, especially in regard to the Macedonian minority, which had for a long time lived under the authority of the democratic government on territory at the moment occupied by Greek governmental troops. That was why he appealed to the Committee to forget the speeches, which had naturally failed to please everybody, and to confine themselves to the substance of the question.

69. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India), while agreeing with the humanitarian appeal of the proposal, felt that the efforts at conciliation would have a better chance if the Polish draft resolution were not adopted.

70. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece), replying to the new accusations levelled against Greece by Mr. Bebler, observed that more numerous accusations had recently been made against Yugoslavia by States holding the same social ideals. A Bulgarian newspaper, for example, had recently accused Minister Rankovic of having sentenced hundreds of Macedonian communists from Skoplje, and the USSR had accused Yugoslavia of having instituted a reign of terror. Thus, if Yugoslavia continued its propaganda about terrorism in Greece, it would have to be recognized that terrorism also existed in Yugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

71. He did not wish to reply to the rather un-called-for allegations of the Polish representative he did, however, wish to state that his Government was giving every proof of its sincerity and good faith by facilitating the investigations of all the United Nations organs and particularly of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans.

72. *A vote was taken by roll-call on the Polish proposal (A/C.1/483) as follows:*

73. *In favour:* Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, First Committee, 186th meeting.*

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, First Committee, 173rd meeting.*



Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia.

74. *Against*: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Turkey, Union of

South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.

75. *Abstentions*: Afghanistan, Chile, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Yemen.

76. *The proposal was rejected by 41 votes to 6, with 9 abstentions.*

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SEVENTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 30 September, 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman*: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

### Order of an additional agenda item

1. The CHAIRMAN said that, before proceeding to the next item on the agenda, he would draw attention to document A/C.1/486 containing a letter from the President of the General Assembly with regard to the decision of the General Assembly<sup>1</sup> to refer to the First Committee the additional item entitled "Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945, and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations". The Chairman invited the representatives to express their views on the order in which that item should be discussed.

2. Mr. TSIANG (China) recalled that the Committee had previously adopted a decision (274th meeting) regarding the order of discussion of the six items which had been referred to it so far. His delegation had then suggested that the Committee should only decide which should be the first item to be discussed, leaving a decision on the order of the other items for later consideration. Moreover, the Chairman had stated that, should a new item be referred to the First Committee, the order of debate might be reconsidered. In view of that declaration, and since the First Committee would be soon discussing the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies, he moved that the new item should be placed third on the Committee's agenda.

3. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that there were considerations of a formal character militating against the motion of the representative of China. The First Committee had already discussed at length the order of its agenda and had adopted a decision regarding that order. Any change in the present order of items, therefore, would introduce some perturbation; furthermore it was impossible to discuss the new item, since no documentation had been submitted.

4. Moreover, that question had been dealt with in a number of documents which cast unfavourable light on the case of the representative of the Kuomintang Government, namely, the State Department White Paper, and General Stilwell's

papers. It would be unfortunate, and against the interests of the General Assembly to create, at the very outset, an unhealthy atmosphere by dragging the Committee into such a controversial issue. The representative of the United States, the President of the United States and the President of the General Assembly had endeavoured to christen the present General Assembly "the Assembly of peace". If the General Assembly was to deserve such a name, discussions should be held in an atmosphere of serenity.

5. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) agreed with the first part of the remarks made by the representative of the Ukrainian SSR to the effect that the Committee was only concerned with the formal question of the order of the items on the agenda. No debate on the substance of the items involved had yet taken place. With regard to the objection raised as to the absence of material on the proposed item, that objection applied equally to the proposal of the Soviet Union. He recalled that Mr. Austin had already proposed that all items suggested for inclusion on the agenda should be supported by preliminary evidence; that proposal had not been adopted and the representative of the USSR had opposed it. Therefore, the Committee was in the position of having to deal with the placing of an item on its agenda without having any previous documentation pertaining to the case. His delegation believed that Member States were entitled to raise international questions for discussion by the General Assembly.

6. As to the order on the agenda of the Chinese motion, the representative of the Ukrainian SSR had alleged that such a motion might envenom the discussion. In that connexion it should be recalled that the first paragraph of the Soviet Union proposal (A/996) might also be described as somewhat provocative and not conducive to an atmosphere of peaceful discussions. Finally, it should be noted that the item proposed by the USSR referred to a peace pact to be concluded between the five permanent members of the Security Council and that the relations between two of those Powers were pertinent to the discussion of that item. In view of the above considerations, his delegation favoured the motion presented by the representative of China.

7. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) noted that the First Committee had already considered seriously and in detail the order

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 230th plenary meeting.

of the items on its agenda. Since a question had been adopted with regard to the six items, it would logically follow, therefore, that the proposal of the Kuomintang representative should be placed last on the agenda. The representative of the Kuomintang Government, however, deemed it essential that the item be placed third on the agenda. That move had been correctly interpreted by the representative of the Ukrainian SSR as calculated to poison the atmosphere and increase the tension in the First Committee. If that was the intention of the First Committee, it should follow the lead of the Chinese representative of the Kuomintang régime and it would then be clear that the current session would not be an "Assembly of peace" but an Assembly of war or preparation of war. If the representative of the United States was adopting such a position, his reasoning was a very bad omen for the work of the Committee. Moreover, should the majority of the First Committee comply with the request of the Chinese representative, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR would interpret the intent of the vote as a preparation for war, and not for peace.

8. The First Committee was not short of items for discussion and there were very important items on the agenda. Such items as the disposal of the former Italian colonies, the conclusion of the five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace and the Palestine question were very important items indeed and those had to be solved before the Chinese question was taken up. The representative of the Kuomintang Government found it appropriate to make his suggestion, for purposes of provocation. The Soviet Union was not to blame for the fact that a civil war was raging in China as the natural consequence of the mismanagement of the Kuomintang Government. The First Committee should approach the question with calm and impartiality. For those reasons, his delegation favoured placing the item seventh rather than third on the Committee's agenda.

9. The CHAIRMAN noted that there were two proposals before the Committee. The first was that the item should be placed in the third position; the other that it be included at the end of the agenda.

10. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) declared that he had been at a loss to understand the position taken by the representative of the United States, since the official documents of the State Department propounded a different position. He reminded the Committee that the Secretary of State of the United States had stated in his White Paper that the events in China were the result of internal forces. It was clear therefore that the Chinese situation had not been brought about by outside influences. He could not understand how the representative of the United States could support the proposal of that régime since the White Paper had taken a dim view of the corruption, bribery and interaction of cliques prevailing in it. It would have been more logical for Dr. Jessup to have adopted a policy of calmness than to have supported the Chinese proposal.

11. With regard to Dr. Jessup's contention that the Soviet Union had not submitted any documents in support of its proposal, Mr. Manuilsky recalled that the representative of the USSR had already submitted a draft resolution (A/996) call-

ing for a five-Power pact. That proposal should meet the aspirations of all the Members of the United Nations and of millions of people all over the world who had been watching with concern the events of the last few months. Dr. Jessup's contention that the Soviet Union delegation had submitted no documents was, therefore, incorrect. Besides, the representative of the Kuomintang Government had neither submitted documents nor suggested any course of action. It was obvious that the proposal and the support given to it by the United States representative were dictated only by bias. His delegation felt that it would be in the interest of the progress of the work of the First Committee and of the prestige of the United Nations to reject the Chinese proposal and to place the item as the last one on the agenda or the next to the last.

12. Mr. VAN PALLANDT (Netherlands) said that the discussion of the Soviet Union proposal should be held in an atmosphere of serenity. He believed therefore that such a controversial item as the Chinese proposal should be disposed of before starting to discuss the USSR proposal. He supported the proposal of the Chinese representative.

13. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) noted that the representative of China had been justified in previously proposing to place the Greek question as the first item on the agenda, leaving the discussion on the order of the other items for later consideration. There were some urgent items before the Committee which should be dealt with immediately. To this end, he proposed that the Committee should reconsider the agenda and rearrange the items in the light of the addition of the Chinese proposal.

14. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said that the representative of the Kuomintang Government wanted the Committee to consider his provocative complaint and deal with it hurriedly since time was working against his Government. The First Committee had already debated at length the order of its items and taken a decision. The Chinese proposal could not be considered seriously since the Committee would be acting against logic if it decided to reopen the debate. He added that the support given to the Chinese proposal by the representative of the United States was designed to shift serious items into the background, to hold up the peaceful initiative of the Soviet Union, and to undermine the possibilities of peaceful and constructive decisions by the General Assembly. His delegation was opposed to the Chinese proposal.

15. Mr. ZARUBIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that the head of the Soviet Union delegation had proved with great clarity the absurdity of the Kuomintang accusations against the USSR.<sup>1</sup> His delegation therefore deemed the item submitted by the Chinese representative unworthy of any serious attention. The Committee had already adopted a course of action and his delegation would object to the reconsideration of that course. It was difficult to imagine that the Committee, instead of considering the proposal of the Soviet Union which was designed to establish peace all over the world, should consider the provocative accusations of the bankrupt Kuomintang Government against the USSR. Accord-

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, 226th plenary meeting.*

ingly, his delegation fully endorsed the suggestion of the Byelorussian SSR, Polish and Ukrainian SSR delegations to the effect that the items submitted by the Chinese delegation should be considered as the last item on the agenda.

16. ABDUL RAHIM Bey (Egypt) believed that, although in the opinion of his delegation, the Chinese item should be considered with a high priority on the agenda, there were other items equally urgent and important, such as the Palestine question. The Committee had already decided to consider that question as its fourth item. However it was being proposed to shift it to the fifth place. His delegation had already opposed any delay in the discussion of that item, since millions of refugees were scattered all over the Middle East, contributing a great danger to the security of that area. The question of Jerusalem also needed an urgent solution. For those reasons, his delegation favoured the reconsideration of the order of items on the agenda.

17. FAYEZ EL-KHOURI Bey (Syria) supported the views expressed by the Egyptian representative and remarked that the Chinese problem had been submitted only a few days ago, whereas the Palestine question had been under consideration for a number of years.

18. Mr. CLEMENTIS (Czechoslovakia) remarked that the interventions of the representatives of Egypt and Syria showed clearly the danger of reconsidering the agenda. The so-called urgency of the item introduced by the representative of the Kuomintang Government was probably dictated by the rumours that in the very near future a Government representing the real people of China would be established. Taking into account that the reconsideration of the agenda would stress the provocative side of the item in question, his delegation, therefore, supported the proposal that the item should be placed last on the agenda.

19. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland), speaking on a point of order, questioned the validity of the debate by referring to rule 112 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. According to that rule, any proposal that had been adopted or rejected by the Committee, could not be reconsidered at the same session, unless the Committee, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, so decided. It was logical therefore that a modification of the order of the agenda should accordingly be adopted by a two-thirds majority.

20. The CHAIRMAN contested the interpretation given by the representative of Poland. He explained that the Committee was not reconsidering a resolution previously adopted, but was considering a new item to be included in the agenda. He reminded the Committee that the representative of the Byelorussian SSR had stated earlier that it was up to the First Committee to decide on the order of the items. The First Committee was making that decision now, and the discussion on that matter was therefore quite in order.

21. Mr. EBAN (Israel) believed that the considerations put forward by the representative of Egypt deserved the sympathetic attention of the Committee. His delegation deemed it necessary that some items of importance to the people of the Middle East should not be encroached upon in favour of an item submitted at a later stage.

22. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) could not acquiesce with the interpretation given to rule 112 by the Chairman. He insisted that any change in the order of the items on the agenda must be adopted by a two-thirds majority.

23. The CHAIRMAN recalled that there had been no objections to his earlier statement, during the previous discussion of the order of items on the agenda, to the effect that should new items be submitted to the Committee by the General Assembly, their order on the agenda would be decided upon subsequently. It was on that understanding that the Committee had taken its decision. It would follow logically, therefore, that rule 112 was not applicable in that case. Should, however, the representative of Poland challenge his ruling, he would immediately put it to the vote.

24. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) regretted that the Chinese proposal was wasting the time of the Committee. The point of view of the representative of Poland was quite correct, and the Chairman's interpretation of rule 112 was incorrect. Regardless of the fact that the Chairman had foreseen or had not foreseen that there would be reconsideration of the order of the agenda, rule 112 was perfectly clear on that particular case. Mr. Manuilsky, invoking rule 102 of the rules of procedure, appealed against the ruling of the Chairman.

*The Chairman's ruling was upheld by 47 votes in favour, 5 against, with 3 abstentions.*

25. FAYEZ EL-KHOURI Bey (Syria) explained that in his previous intervention when he pointed to the urgency of the Palestine problem, it was not that he did not believe in the urgency of the Chinese complaint. He assured the Chinese delegation of his delegation's sympathy. However, that did not prevent him from stressing again the urgency of the Palestine problem.

26. Mr. ALVAREZ (Cuba) stated that his delegation considered the item brought before the Committee by the representative of China to be one of the most urgent items with which the Committee had to deal. The essential objective of the General Assembly was to maintain peace, and there could be no doubt as to the situation of war extant in China. He did not understand how the Committee could discuss the peace pact proposed by the USSR without first considering the Chinese problem, as the latter was the one that at present gave rise to the greatest anxiety and fear in the world. For that reason and because of the sympathy which his delegation gave to the consideration of China's independence, he was in favour of placing the Chinese question among the first items to be discussed. However, he thought the Committee should consider the question of the Arab refugees before the Chinese proposal. He thus suggested replacing the present item 3 by the Palestine question and putting the Chinese question in fourth place. The fifth item would then be the USSR proposal.

27. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) withdrew his suggestion in favour of the proposal of the representative of Cuba.

28. Mr. LONDOÑO y LONDOÑO (Colombia) reminded the members of the Committee how hard they had worked to establish the order of the

items on their agenda at the 274th meeting. He drew the attention of the Committee to the possibility, already mentioned by the representative of Czechoslovakia, of a reopening of the general debate. While he did not share the views of the representative of the Ukrainian SSR regarding the immutability of the present order of the agenda, and had therefore voted in favour of the Chairman's ruling on the point, he feared that a reopening of a general debate on the matter might lead to the habit of presenting procedural questions at each meeting. Pointing out that the order decided upon represented a compromise solution, and that the case of China was already known to the Committee at the time of that decision, he regretted that he was unable to support the proposal of the representative of China. He preferred that the agenda should be maintained in the order originally decided by the Committee.

29. On the suggestion of FAYEZ EL-KHOURI Bey (Syria), Mr. ALVAREZ (Cuba) submitted his proposal as an amendment to the Chinese proposal.

30. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) stated that his delegation would vote in favour of the Chinese proposal. In doing so it did not wish to minimize the urgency of some of the other items, in particular that of Palestine. However, that urgency applied equally to all the items on the agenda, and the order of their consideration could be decided upon only on the basis of logic. He felt that items concerned with threats to the political and territorial integrity of any country deserved some priority and that such items should be granted precedence when examined by the First Committee.

31. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) considered that the Cuban proposal was not an amendment and regretted the suggestion made by the Syrian representative. The Committee had decided by an overwhelming majority on the order in which the items on the agenda should be taken up, and from the logical, legal and juridical points of view the Chinese proposal, which had been submitted last, should be the seventh item on the agenda. The proposal of the Cuban representative was incorrect and irresponsible, as it would amount to reconsidering the decision of the First Committee, a decision reached after some difficulty, and as a result of a compromise. Although his delegation did not agree with the Chinese proposal, at least that proposal could be defended, and he requested the Chairman to put it to a vote.

32. The CHAIRMAN stated that he intended to put to the Committee the proposals in respect of the inclusion of the Chinese item in the order in which they had been submitted. If any proposals were made dealing with matters other than the mere inclusion of the Chinese item, the Committee would discuss them after deciding where the Chinese item should be placed.

33. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that it was obvious that the proposal of the USSR, according to the Cuban representative's proposal, was now to be relegated to a spot where it could easily be sabotaged. The majority had of course the power to adopt such a decision, but he must remind the Committee, with a full consciousness of the responsibility implicit in every word that he was saying, that if such an operation was carried out against the background of a series of arbitrary acts, such as

the elections to leading organs, and the attitude of the First Committee to various important political questions, if an atmosphere was being created in which a bankrupt group was being opposed to the USSR, although no one had ever spoken of USSR assistance to any group in that State, it showed where the Committee was being led. Mr. MANUILSKY warned that such manoeuvres and methods had a cumulative effect. The quantity acquired a qualitative character which was fraught with dire consequences.

34. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTE (Ecuador), recalling his suggestion at a previous (274th) meeting to the effect that the Committee should decide upon two items to be discussed first, and agree later on the order in which the other items should be discussed, stated that his delegation would have to abstain in the voting on any proposal which led to the amendment of the agenda already adopted.

35. Mr. THORS (Iceland) considered that the matter of the order in which the items on the agenda were taken up was of great importance, as it could to a great extent influence the atmosphere in which the Committee worked. Pointing out that the decision previously reached by the Committee on that order, and particularly the agreement to place the USSR proposal in the third position on the agenda, had been reached in a spirit of conciliation, he thought that the Committee should be most careful before endeavouring to change that token of conciliation. The proposal of the Soviet Union was certainly an important matter, and he was sure that all members, and not least the representatives of the smaller countries, were most anxious to see what was behind that proposal. The question of China was also important, but if the discussion of the USSR proposal was to lead to anything, it was evident that the question of China would be considered by the Committee in a different atmosphere than if it was considered before the proposal of the Soviet Union. Mr. Thors thought that the Committee should not change the agenda as agreed upon a few days previously; however, in view of the fact that the consideration of the report of the Security Council had previously been largely formal, he suggested that the Chinese question should be placed in the sixth place on the agenda.

36. Mr. EBAN (Israel) stated that while his delegation saw no particular reason for further deferment of consideration of the Palestine item, there were strong reasons against advancing that item as proposed by the representative of Cuba. For one thing, adoption of the Cuban proposal would involve a procedural irregularity. In the second place, the factors alluded to previously by the Lebanese representative remained valid. The final consideration had been stated by the representative of Iceland. The sooner it became clear whether or not there was a prospect of improvement in the great Power relationships, the better it would be for the remaining work of the Committee and for the future of the United Nations. Those considerations led him to question the value of the Cuban proposal, which would disrupt decisions already reached.

37. Mr. CASTRO (El Salvador) considered the question of the order of a particular item to be almost immaterial if the Committee really entertained the purpose of dealing seriously with all the items on the agenda. He felt that the questions

concerning Greece, the disposal of the former Italian colonies, and Palestine, which were urgent and had already been subject to study and consideration by the Committee, should not be shifted further down on the agenda. The item submitted by the Soviet Union was interconnected with the Chinese problem, and a preliminary consideration of the latter might come as a result of the USSR proposal, which he felt should be maintained in the third place on the agenda. In view of the negotiations being conducted between the Netherlands Government and the representatives of the Indonesian Republic, he thought that the Indonesian question might wait a little, and proposed that the Chinese question be placed before it. The Chinese proposal would then be fifth on the agenda, the question of Indonesia sixth, the seventh item being the report of the Security Council.

38. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) stated that he had abstained on the point raised by the Polish delegation because, while opposed to the addition of the item proposed by China, he considered that it was difficult to hold that the mere addition of a new item amounted to the reconsideration of a previous decision. However, he considered that rule 112 should be applied as soon as the Committee was concerned with anything more than the mere addition of a new item.

39. He thought that the Committee would be acting against the decision taken a few days previously if it inserted the Chinese item before the USSR proposal. Moreover, the point raised by the representative of China would lead into the realm of ideological dispute, which would not augur well for solution of the third item, relating to the prevention of a new war. He therefore favoured any proposal which would insert the Chinese item in the agenda as late as possible.

40. Mr. HOOD (Australia) stated that his delegation would support the insertion of the Chinese item in the place of the present third item, but saw no reason why the remainder of the order should be disturbed at that point. However, if the insertion of the Chinese item resulted in any undue detriment to the Palestine question, then he thought there would be no objection to examining items 4 and 5, namely the USSR proposal and the Palestine question, concurrently. He pointed out that there had been at least one precedent for such simultaneous discussion of two items by the Committee.

41. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said that the question was not merely of the order of consideration of items on the agenda, but was much more far-reaching. That had been understood by one of the representatives, who had said that war was raging in China and that therefore the Committee had to hasten to the crystallization of the

United Nations point of view on the issue. In addition, there were political events occurring in China. The Kuomintang Government was being liquidated, although it was still represented in the United Nations. What was at stake, therefore, was the adoption, in time, of decisions that would hamper the constructive work of peace until the Kuomintang Government finally crashed and absconded to Formosa, or somewhere else. Mr. Wierblowski praised the sense of responsibility shown by the representative of Iceland and considered that the latter's proposal should be viewed as a compromise. There was no sense in the Australian proposal, which was likely to lead only to disorder and chaos in the Committee's debate. On the other hand, the proposal of Iceland would contribute to a calm and serene atmosphere, and he therefore supported it.

42. The CHAIRMAN, referring to a point of procedure raised by several representatives, and in particular by the representative of Yugoslavia, reiterated that in his view the Committee was competent to decide the position to be given to the Chinese item on the agenda, but that if any other matter was raised which affected the order of the other items on the agenda, not consequential upon the Chinese item, rule 112 did apply.

43. Mr. ALVAREZ (Cuba) said that in view of the Chairman's interpretation, he would withdraw his proposed amendment.

44. The CHAIRMAN stated that a vote would be taken on the Chinese proposal to the effect that the item should become item three on the Committee's agenda.

*The proposal was not adopted, there being 22 votes in favour, 22 against and 9 abstentions.*

45. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) withdrew his delegation's proposal in favour of that put forward by the representative of Iceland.

46. The CHAIRMAN stated that a vote would be taken on the proposal submitted by the representative of Iceland to the effect that the Chinese item be included in the agenda in the sixth position, immediately after the question of Indonesia.

*The proposal was rejected by 30 votes to 14, with 12 abstentions.*

47. The CHAIRMAN said that he would put the proposal of El Salvador to the vote. That proposal, which had also been put forward by other delegations, including Egypt, was that the Chinese question be placed fifth on the agenda, immediately after the question of Palestine but before that of Indonesia.

*The proposal was adopted by 41 votes to 3, with 13 abstentions.*

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-EIGHTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 30 September 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman:* Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

### Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies: general discussion

1. The CHAIRMAN read a letter (A/C.1/478/Rev.1) from the Italian observer with the United

Nations, dated 14 September 1949, asking the First Committee to allow representatives of Italy to take part in the discussion on the disposal of the former Italian colonies. He proposed that the request should be granted.

2. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) thought that if representatives of the Italian Government were invited to take part in the discussions, the same should be done with regard to all other parties concerned.

3. The CHAIRMAN said that the question he had raised related solely to the admission of Italian representatives and that the admission of other interested parties should be considered separately. He recalled that a similar procedure had been adopted during the second part of the third session of the General Assembly.

*At the Chairman's invitation, the representative of Italy took a seat at the Committee table.*

4. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) expressed his Government's regret that it had not been found possible to reach a solution during the second part of the third session and pointed out that the Assembly was responsible for the future welfare of more than three million men. The Committee should strive to find a solution which, in accordance with the Treaty of Peace with Italy, would be in harmony with the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants and the interests of peace and security, taking also into consideration the views of other interested Governments.

5. During the second part of the third session of the Assembly the United Kingdom delegation had voted for a draft resolution (A/873) to grant Libya independence at the end of a period of ten years, during which period its constituent territories would be placed under the system of international trusteeship. The proposal had been lost by a narrow majority.<sup>1</sup> His Majesty's Government believed that in existing circumstances the trusteeship system no longer seemed practicable for those territories. In particular, it could not continue to refuse the people of Cyrenaica its indisputable right to the greatest possible measure of self-government consistent with the international obligations of the United Kingdom Government and with the rights of the General Assembly, under the Treaty of Peace with Italy, to make recommendations on the future of those territories. At the beginning of September the United Kingdom Government had therefore given the Emir of Cyrenaica absolute powers in the internal affairs of that territory within the limits just mentioned and without prejudice to the question of Libyan unity. With the entire approval of the United Kingdom Government and after having consulted his people, the Emir had proclaimed a constitution under which a Government of Cyrenaica would shortly be set up. Faced with a demand from representatives of the people of Cyrenaica for independence — a demand which it could not grant because of its international obligations — the United Kingdom Government, after careful deliberation, had decided that in accordance with the Treaty of Peace with Italy and the terms of the Charter from which its powers derived, it could not do less than grant Cyrenaica that full measure of self-government. Such measures would be not merely inevitable, but entirely justified in the case of the neighbouring territory of Tripolitania, should the Assembly again fail to reach agreement.

6. Although Libya was a backward territory, the United Kingdom Government thought that a system of international trusteeship was neither

advisable nor easy to apply so far as Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were concerned and that, after such long delay, those territories should be granted independence as soon as possible. With the best intentions, delegations might perhaps maintain that that evolution should take place under the trusteeship system. The United Kingdom Government, however, could not share that opinion, for it believed that the territories in question might achieve independence within a period of three to five years, whereas at least two years would be needed for the setting up and organization of a trusteeship system. The United Nations would thus spend twenty-four months in preparing for twelve months of action. If the Assembly adopted a proposal for the earlier granting of independence to those territories, the United Kingdom Government would immediately take the necessary steps in accordance with the provisions of Annex XI and article 23, paragraph 3, of the Treaty of Peace with Italy to give effect to such recommendations. Great efforts would be needed on the part of all concerned. However, the British administration had already called on Libyans to co-operate to a considerable extent in the task, and had thus initiated, so to speak, the "libyanization" of the country. For instance, in Cyrenaica, all the Ministers taking up their duties under the provisions of the agreement mentioned above would be Libyans. The police force had already been "libyanized", and the district officials in various districts of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania were Libyans. The creation of a modern society was a highly complex undertaking. The Assembly should therefore decide whether a time-limit should be fixed for the Administering Power to complete its task and, if so, what that time-limit should be. The time allotted for the transfer of powers neither could nor should be long. Nevertheless, the question required careful study, and the United Kingdom delegation would welcome frank and open discussion both within and without the Committee.

7. The question of Libyan unity had often been discussed. Since its liberation, Libya had been administered in three distinct territories, and that division was not entirely artificial in view of the large tracts of desert which separated them. The United Kingdom delegation thought that the union of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica appeared inevitable. It was, however, essential to know what form such a union should take. The physical and practical difficulties were so great that any hasty decision would be unwise, since it might impose on the inhabitants of the two territories a political structure which would be neither adapted to their needs nor in accordance with their desires. The best plan would be to let the inhabitants of Libya themselves decide the question once the respective territories had achieved the necessary development.

8. The United Kingdom Government was meanwhile co-ordinating the respective administrations through its control organs in London and it proposed, in accordance with the decisions accepted by the people of Cyrenaica, to provide the inhabitants of those territories with consultative facilities which would begin to function the following year.

9. As is known, Tripolitania had been closely associated with Italy in the past. The United Kingdom Government was fully aware of the special position of the Italian community in Tripolitania and of the close economic and geo-

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part II*, 218th plenary meeting.



graphical links between the territory and Italy. Modern democratic Italy was well placed to supply those territories with the economic and, perhaps, the technical aid they might need. Those facts should be taken into consideration in any resolution the Assembly might adopt on the disposal of the territories. It would be to the economic and social interest of any future government of Tripolitania or Libya to conclude an agreement with Italy. Those questions would obviously have to be settled by negotiations between Italy and the future government of Tripolitania or Libya.

10. With regard to the Fezzan, the United Kingdom Government recognized the special interests of the French Government in the territory and would be glad to hear the views of that Government before expressing an opinion.

11. Turning to the question of Italian Somaliland, Mr. McNeil stated that the United Kingdom delegation supported the proposal submitted during the previous session of the General Assembly (A/873) for placing that territory under a system of international trusteeship with Italy as the Administering Power.

12. The situation with regard to Eritrea was more complicated. The United Kingdom delegation maintained its views that the central and eastern provinces, namely Massawa, Hamasien, Akkele-Guzai and Séraé, should be ceded to Ethiopia, subject to guarantees given to the Italian and other minorities and to municipal charters for the city of Asmara and the port of Massawa. At the previous session of the General Assembly, the United Kingdom delegation had supported<sup>1</sup> the proposal to incorporate the Western Province into the adjacent Sudan. It was again prepared to support such a proposal, for ethnic, geographical and religious reasons. If, however, the majority of the Assembly should consider such a solution inappropriate, or if a better solution were put forward, the United Kingdom delegation would raise no objection.

13. In some quarters, Mr. McNeil recalled, the proposals for the future of Eritrea had been described as dismemberment, and in the past months, there had been considerable propaganda for immediate independence. He considered such criticisms quite unjustified and urged the Committee to study very carefully the report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation on the territory. Like most colonial territories in Africa, Eritrea was not the product of any organic political growth, but the legacy of old merchant companies, of the colonial expansion of the nineteenth century, and of other fortuitous circumstances. Eritrea was a conglomeration of widely disparate races and religions.

14. Geographically speaking, the central provinces were part of the Ethiopian plateau, whereas the Danakil Coast and the port of Assab were connected geographically with the hinterland and had no lateral communication with Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, except by sea. The Western Province had geographical affinities with the Sudan. Eritrea was not homogenous, from either the religious or the racial point of view. The largest racial community was that of the Coptic Christians of Tigrean, or Ethiopian, race, who inhabited Asmara and the three neighbouring cen-

tral provinces. According to the most accurate estimates, they numbered 470,000 out of a total population of a little over a million, and they comprised 63 per cent of the population of the region which in accordance with United Kingdom proposals should be ceded to Ethiopia. Members of the Commission could have verified from the report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation that those Coptic Christians of Ethiopian race wished to be reunited with the Coptic Christians on the other side of the existing frontier.

15. The other racial groups in Eritrea which should be incorporated in Ethiopia were, first, the Danakils, a Moslem tribe of Arab-Afar origin, of whom approximately 80,000 inhabited the coastal strip south of Massawa. Most of the other members of that tribe were already included within the existing frontiers of Ethiopia. Then there were approximately 80,000 Saho-speaking Moslems who inhabited the eastern part of Akkéle-Guzai. Under the United Kingdom proposals, they could be incorporated in Ethiopia. Finally, there were 30,000 Moslems resident in Asmara, along with 60,000 Coptic Christians.

16. The Western Province was almost exclusively Moslem. Except for some semi-negroid tribes, the inhabitants were Beja Arabs. The largest of the Beja Arab tribes, the Beni Amar, was split between the Sudan and Eritrea. The Beja Arabs numbered some 300,000, out of a total population of 350,000. The United Kingdom Government therefore proposed that those peoples should not be incorporated in Ethiopia.

17. There was no common language in that territory. The Coptic Christians spoke Tigrinya, the same language as that spoken in the Tigré Province of Ethiopia. The Danakils spoke Afar. The Saho Moslems also spoke their own language. In the Western Province, however, the predominant languages were Tigrai and Beja Arabic. Bilen, Arabic, Baria and Baza were also spoken in the Western Province.

18. He thought those details were necessary in order to show how ill-founded was the propaganda campaign for retaining those territories as a unit under one form of administration or another. The territories had none of the racial, linguistic and geographic similarities which were the essential prerequisites of any independent State.

19. The United Kingdom proposals were not intended to dismember a living organism, but to separate into its component parts a completely artificial unit that it would be impossible to set up as a State, since it would be a prey to every form of internal conflict. Moreover, any other solution would deprive the 450,000 Coptic Christians of their undoubted right to unite with their fellow Copts. It was true that the report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation had stressed an almost unanimous desire that the country should be disposed of as a whole. The fact was, however, that the Coptic Christians who had expressed that view had done so because they wanted to see not only their own territory but also the Western Province incorporated into Ethiopia. The Moslem tribes had also expressed the opinion that the territory should be treated as a whole, but their reason for doing so was their hope that, as the representatives of a small majority, their views on the disposal of

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part II*, 218th plenary meeting.

the territory would prevail if it were treated as a whole. Those Moslems really did not wish to be incorporated in Ethiopia. The current United Kingdom proposals went very far towards meeting that point of view, by reducing to the minimum the number of Moslems whose homes would in future be under Ethiopian sovereignty. Furthermore, the majority of the inhabitants of Ethiopia were Moslems and enjoyed equal rights in that country. The United Kingdom Government had also reason to believe that the Moslems of the plateau provinces, while not welcoming incorporation in Ethiopia, would accept it. That was the information conveyed during the latest conversations the British experts had had with the representatives of those areas.

20. In fact, the policy now recommended by the United Kingdom Government gave the fullest effect possible to the wishes of the various communities composing the territory and was a real contribution to the establishment of peaceful conditions in that part of the African continent. The United Kingdom proposals could not be considered incompatible with economic and political realities. It was to be hoped above all that no attempt would be made to exploit the situation for political propaganda purposes and that the three million human beings whose fate was at stake would not be used as instruments of some less worthy purpose than that of carrying out the task entrusted to the Committee.

21. Mr. ZARUBIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) thanked the Chairman for having had the text of the USSR draft resolution on the disposal of the former Italian colonies (A/C.1/487) distributed. The USSR delegation would explain its reasons for submitting that draft resolution during the consideration of the question at future meetings of the Committee.

22. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) recalled that at its third session the General Assembly had devoted nearly six weeks to consideration of the problem of the disposal of the former Italian colonies without being able to reach a decision. A solution would have to be found which would above all be in conformity with the three principles laid down in article 11 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, namely, the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants, the interests of peace and security, and the views of the interested Governments. But the principles relating to Non-Self-Governing Territories laid down in Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter would also have to be taken into account. The task was urgent, since, as Mr. McNeil had just pointed out, the destinies of some three million people were at stake. The United States Government had given intensive study to the problem in the light of opinions expressed during the previous session in the First Committee, and had sought to formulate its position by a balanced consideration of all the factors and principles involved.

23. With regard to Libya, the United States delegation was in favour of the establishment of an independent united Libya at a definite date in the near future. During the previous session of the General Assembly it had been recognized unanimously that Libya, of all the former Italian colonies, was furthest along the road to self-government. An overwhelming majority had been in favour of giving independence to that territory.

The people of Cyrenaica had already set up an internal administration under the Emir Sayid Idris el Senussi. The inhabitants of Tripolitania had expressed their hope of participating more completely in the government of their territory. A definite date acceptable to the General Assembly should be set for the granting of independence to that region. A reasonable period might be provided for the achievement of self-government.

24. On 21 September last the Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, had stated<sup>1</sup> that the General Assembly ought to prepare a plan for the establishment of a united and independent Libya, during the current session. It should be possible to carry out that plan in three to four years. The type of government to be established should be specified by the inhabitants of Libya themselves, and should not be imposed by a foreign Power or even by the United Nations.

25. The form of the new State might be federal, unitary or of whatever form would be most acceptable to the population. The General Assembly might wish to recommend that the representatives of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan be consulted at least one year in advance in order to determine the type of association that would be most suitable. The existing Administrations of the United Kingdom and France should be charged with the responsibility of co-operating in the establishment of governmental institutions and of preparing Libya for its independence by taking whatever steps the General Assembly might deem necessary. They should submit annual reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, so as to inform the Members of the Organization of the measures in the interim period.

26. It might be appropriate for an administrative council, acting on behalf of the General Assembly, to consult with the British and French Administrations and give them its views on the establishment of a government for a unified Libya and such related problems as common services, a common currency and frontier rectifications. It is obvious that such a council should in no way interfere in the administration of the territories.

27. With regard to Eritrea, the United States delegation maintained the views it had expressed during the previous session of the General Assembly, namely, that, with the exception of the Western Province, those territories should all be incorporated into Ethiopia. That incorporation should be subject to appropriate guarantees for the protection of minorities and to special municipal charters for the towns of Asmara and Massawa. The Western Province could be incorporated in the Sudan. The territory had been created artificially and its inhabitants were almost half and half Moslems and Coptic Christians.

The provinces of the Eritrean plateau were a continuation of the Ethiopian plateau. Although the population of the port of Massawa and of the province of that name was predominantly Moslem, it could not be separated from the Eritrean plateau without economic disruption. Assab and the Danakil coast had no lateral communication with the central provinces nor with the capital, Asmara. That area was geographically part of Ethiopia. Most of the members of the tribe to which the Danakils belonged lived within the

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 222nd plenary meeting.



frontiers of Ethiopia. It seemed that the majority of the inhabitants of Eritrea, with the exception of those of the Western Province, were in favour of union with Ethiopia. The Western Province of Eritrea should be annexed to the Sudan for the following reasons: (a) the majority of the inhabitants were Moslems, as were the populations across the border in the Sudan; (b) three-fourths of the population of the Western Province were nomadic or semi-nomadic and led an entirely different life from that of the farmers of the central plateau of Eritrea; (c) the climatic conditions of the greater part of the hot and dry western and coastal plain comprising that area were similar to those of the Sudan; (d) the inhabitants of the region had religious ties with the Sudan, through the adherence of certain tribes such as the Beni Amer of the Western Province to the teachings of the Maghani Tariga or confraternity, which was closely related to some 30,000 of its members in Sudanese territory; (e) the basis of social organizations for both nomad and sedentary populations in Eritrea was the same as in the Sudan, namely the kinship idea; (f) the economic resources of the Western Province were limited; it could not survive as an independent modern State.

29. The General Assembly had the chance of making a long-term settlement for Eritrea. He was gratified that a majority in the last Assembly had supported the return of the eastern part of those territories to Ethiopia. It was to be hoped that further consideration of the problem would convince delegations that the Western Province should be incorporated into the Sudan.

30. The peoples of Italian Somaliland aspired to independence, which would enable them to develop their country and enable it to become a full member of the community of nations, enjoying all its rights. They should, therefore, be assisted towards that goal through the Trusteeship System of the United Nations. Political institutions in that country, in which the population was largely tribal and pastoral, were, as yet, underdeveloped. Were that population's need for a trusteeship system recognized, the type of trusteeship best suited to the circumstances should then be decided upon.

31. During the third session, the First Committee had discarded as unsuitable in the existing circumstances, both a direct United Nations trusteeship and a trusteeship with a multiple or joint administration. The problem at present reduced itself to a choice of the Power best qualified to administer that territory. The United States Government had consistently maintained that the Italian Government was best suited to assume that responsibility. At the preceding session of the General Assembly, that view had been shared by thirty-five Member nations.<sup>1</sup> The Italian Government, which had indicated its willingness to assume that responsibility, had formally declared that it would discharge such a task in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and, in particular, with the provisions which dealt with the International Trusteeship System (250th meeting). Having carefully considered the objections to such a solution of the problem, the United States Government had

come to the conclusion that the Italian Government, under a trusteeship agreement approved by the General Assembly, could and should provide an administration which would assist the peoples of Italian Somaliland in their economic, social and political development and in their progress towards independence and self-government. His Government had full confidence in the determination and ability of the democratic Italian Government and people to discharge faithfully such obligation toward the General Assembly of the United Nations and the people of Italian Somaliland.

32. His Government regarded the settlement of that complex problem as the best way for the United Nations General Assembly to face its grave responsibilities towards the peoples of those areas. That problem also afforded the General Assembly its first opportunity to demonstrate that it could discharge the solemn duty of making a great political decision which the four great Powers signatory of the Peace Treaty with Italy had agreed in advance to accept. His Government also shared the obligation to accept as binding the decision which the General Assembly might take.

33. The United States Government realized that the peoples of the areas concerned were in various stages of development. In regard to all those populations, however, primary concern should be for their interests, welfare and development until such time as they would become full-fledged members of the community of nations.

34. Ato AKLILOU (Ethiopia) recalled that his delegation had already provided a considerable amount of documentation on the importance that Ethiopia attached to the problem and on its claims. Ethiopia was bounded on the north and south by two former Italian colonies, with which its history had been closely connected and which, since their occupation by Italy, had served as bases for three aggressions against the country.

35. The Ethiopians, like their brothers in Eritrea, originally came from Arabia and had emigrated to Ethiopia through the former territory of Tigré. That country, which was now Eritrea, had formerly been the centre of the Ethiopian Empire and, in spite of the Italian occupation, age-old ties had remained unbroken between the two countries, where Christians and Moslems lived side by side under the same conditions. Hundreds of thousands of Eritreans spent several months of each year on the high Ethiopian plateau, and 200,000 Eritreans had settled in Ethiopia. Ten per cent of the officials in Ethiopia were pure Eritreans. They held important posts, especially in diplomacy, although the population of Eritrea was only one-fifteenth that of Ethiopia. Thus, there were fundamental arguments in favour of the reintegration of Eritrea with Ethiopia.

36. The Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris in 1946, and then the Paris Conference, had studied the problem, on which an investigation and a hearing of the parties concerned had been held the following year. Finally, during its third session, a four-fifths majority of the General Assembly had decided in favour of the Ethiopian claims.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part II*, 218th plenary meeting.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

37. The Ethiopian delegation, which had always manifested the greatest possible objectivity and had taken care to refrain from carrying on any propaganda, wished to recall certain concrete and essential facts. In the first place, Eritrea had constituted an integral part of Ethiopia for thousands of years, and the whole population of the Eastern Eritrea of the high plateau was closely linked to Ethiopia by its language, religion, customs and political structure. Furthermore, 96 per cent of the population of the Asmara region on the high plateau wanted union with Ethiopia. The Danakil coast was inhabited by tribes whose chiefs lived in Ethiopia, and whose members lived in predominant numbers in that country. The plateau and the coast contained nearly 70 per cent of the whole population of Eritrea. Finally, hundreds of Eritreans had settled in Ethiopia or resided there periodically.

38. In the second place, Eritrea had never been an independent State. During the third session of the General Assembly, the representatives of Chile had stated (270th meeting) that, although the United Nations was under the obligation to help nations to become independent, it should not sponsor the creation of artificial States. Mr. Santa Cruz had also pointed out that only the colonial power had united the various parts of Eritrea. Thus, Eritrea had always been an integral part of Ethiopia, and the re-establishment of that situation would represent not an annexation, but rather the attainment of the aspirations of the Eritrean people. As the Australian representative had pointed out in his note of 6 August 1948 to the Deputy Foreign Ministers, Eritrea was an artificial administrative unit and the possibility therefore arose of either parts or the whole of Eritrea being combined with neighbouring countries.

39. In the third place, Eritrea would never, not even in the distant future, constitute an independent economic entity. The report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation gave adequate proof of the fact that, since Eritrea had been separated from Ethiopia, its imports, 50 per cent of which consisted of food products from Ethiopia, had always exceeded its exports by 200 per cent. It was stated in the report that Eritrea was not able to provide for its population and that its industry was in its initial stages of development. It was further stated that its national wealth and revenue could not provide for the development of the country.

40. Furthermore in 1935 only 5,000 Europeans were settled in that deserts territory called Eritrea. Since the end of the war, thousands of Italian unemployed had lived in camps maintained by the British Military Administration. Although Libya, with a population which did not exceed that of Eritrea, had absorbed 78,721 Italians in twenty-five years, Italy had been able to install only 4,100 of its nationals in Eritrea, and its long-term investments in that country over twice as long a period had amounted to only one million pounds sterling. It was also important to remember that the port of Massawa was dependent on trade with Ethiopia and that transit dues were an important element of the Eritrean budget. Massawa could not be cut off from its Ethiopian hinterland.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 225th plenary meeting.

41. The report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation indicated that a maximum of 10 per cent of the population was politically conscious. The representative of Pakistan had recalled that statement by the Commission of Investigation during the third session of the General Assembly and the representative of India had concluded that the inhabitants were not yet capable of self-administration (244th meeting). Finally, the Italian representative himself had stated before the Deputy Foreign Ministers, on 30 July 1948, that the former Italian colonies would need assistance for varying periods.

42. The representative of Ethiopia referred to the conclusion reached by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, who had said<sup>1</sup> that if the General Assembly had rejected the solution of unconditional independence by an overwhelming majority it was due to the fact that those territories were insufficiently developed politically and economically.

43. In May 1949 a number of political groups had demanded the creation of an independent Eritrea. Unable to achieve a settlement of their individual claims, those groups had united in a concerted demand for immediate independence, without reference to the inhabitants. The General Assembly, however, had upheld the Ethiopian claims by a four-fifths majority. It was possible that those same groups would put forward identical claims on the pretext that the situation had changed in three months. The fact remained, however, that a desert country such as Eritrea could not enjoy an independent economic existence and that the Christian population of the high plateau, under the ecclesiastical leadership of the Coptic Patriarch of Ethiopia, had chosen in favour of that country. The fate of at least 70 per cent of the population was closely bound with the destiny of Ethiopia and, in the region of Asmara, 96 per cent of the votes had been in favour of a union with Ethiopia. The leaders of the so-called political parties involved were thinking only of their personal interest and, given the utter impossibility of complete independence at however distant a period, their claims, in the same way as the establishment of further commissions of inquiry, would end only in delaying a solution.

44. Any attempt to establish an independent government would result in placing 70 per cent of the population under the subjection of a minority of 30 per cent localized in the Western Province. That would result both in domestic troubles and foreign intervention, in contempt of the provision of the Treaty of Peace with Italy relating to the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants and the interests of peace and security. The situation would grow even more acute if Somaliland were put under the trusteeship of Italy.

45. The representative of Ethiopia went on to quote Mr. Schuman, Foreign Minister of France, who had warned the General Assembly of the danger of poverty and disorder and had stated that liberty should not take the form of a snare or an adventure for the territories in question.<sup>2</sup>

46. The problem was in urgent need of solution. Extreme poverty reigned in Eritrea and its trade deficit was greater than that of the other territories under discussion. The return of Eastern Eritrea to Ethiopia would no more be an an-

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

nexation than had been the reunion of Piedmont with the other Italian states. So far as the Western Province was concerned the settlement approved by a four-fifths majority of the Assembly in the previous May left the door open to any kind of solution.

47. To Eritrea, independence meant the right to settle its own affairs and freedom from a foreign yoke. The report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation brought out the fact that the Unionist Party drew no distinction between independence and union with Ethiopia.

48. If Italy would admit that Eritrea could not be separated from Ethiopia, a wholehearted and fruitful co-operation between former enemies could ensue. Italians were already working peacefully in Ethiopia. If Italy would have confidence in the firm intention of the Ethiopian Government to protect Italian interests in Eritrea there would be nothing to prevent immigration which could be of considerable advantage to Italy. As the representative of Argentina had pointed out in May 1949, thousands of Italians were living at perfect peace with the local Eritrean population.

49. All that Ethiopia asked was that the United Nations should recognize the reality of the situa-

tion in East Africa. Ethiopia had nothing but praise for the just and liberal policy of the United Kingdom, the United States and France. France, in particular, had declared that, although voting against the United Kingdom resolution, it was not taking sides against the Ethiopian claim.<sup>1</sup>

50. It was thus the responsibility of the smaller nations to put an end to fifty years of imperialism in East Africa. Moreover, it was they who would first feel the effects if the General Assembly failed in its responsibilities under the Treaty of Peace with Italy and did not reach a solution. Was it not in the Charter, the pledge of justice and collective security, that the little nations put their trust? Ethiopia, confident because of the vote cast in its favour at previous sessions, hoped for the satisfaction for which it had waited so long.

51. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) said it would be expedient that the representative of Italy should take part in the discussion at the earliest opportunity.

52. Mr. TARCHIANI (Italy) stated that the Italian Foreign Minister would be in a position to make a statement at the following day's meeting.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-NINTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Saturday, 1 October 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman:* Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

### Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies: general discussion (continued)

1. Mr. COUVE DE MURVILLE (France) said that his delegation had deeply regretted the failure of the United Nations Assembly to solve the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies during the previous session, on account of the serious disadvantages inherent in the prolongation of a system of temporary administration. It was obvious that the question needed an urgent settlement. As at the previous session the French delegation would be guided by the principle of the welfare of the indigenous inhabitants and the special considerations which should be duly given to the interests and views of the States concerned with those territories, namely Ethiopia and democratic Italy. The task of the Committee, therefore, was to discover to what point the previous discussions of the General Assembly had led and what the possible solutions were.

2. With regard to Libya earlier discussions had shown that the essential problems were the independence of that territory, its unity and the choice of the authority responsible for its emancipation. All delegations had agreed that Libya was ready for independence, and that fact was borne out by the almost unanimous approval by the previous Assembly of a clause providing for the independence of Libya within a period of ten years.<sup>2</sup> However, most delegations felt that in view of the political immaturity of the local

population, the granting of independence should be subject to a transitional period. The Committee (272nd meeting) and the General Assembly had voted in favour of granting Libya independence after a transitional period under trusteeship. Unfortunately, that arrangement had been rejected because some delegations were opposed to Italian trusteeship over a part of Libya. Moreover, as the United Kingdom representative had remarked (278th meeting), a new fact had arisen, namely the establishment in Cyrenaica of a Government under the authority of the Emir of the Senussi, an important event which to some extent anticipated the decisions of the United Nations. That had led to the conclusion that the trusteeship method was outmoded and that new methods should be explored with a view to sparing the people concerned the risks of disorder, anarchy and poverty.

3. Although many representatives had stressed the importance of the unity of Libya and although the three territories constituting Libya obviously had affinities, the resemblances should not be exaggerated and the features distinguishing and even sometimes dividing Libya should not be overlooked. It was an error to attribute a common history to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica since the term "Libya" had been introduced only in 1934 when the Italian Government had decided to merge both territories into a single colony. It was equally erroneous to believe in the common economic bonds and the political similarities of those territories. Undoubtedly, delegations had

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part II, 218th plenary meeting.*

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part II, 218th plenary meeting.*

been led to believe in May 1949, as the Italian Government had previously, that independence would be more readily obtained for a larger and stronger territory. However, the third session of the Assembly had been careful not to commit itself to such a course of action and the draft resolution (A/C.1/476) adopted by the First Committee had endeavoured to invite the Administering Authorities in the component parts of Libya to enter into mutual consultations with a view to strengthening the economic and other bonds linking those territories. Such a course was wholly reasonable since it showed a desire to respect the aspirations of the indigenous inhabitants.

4. Moreover, a major difficulty had arisen during the previous session in connexion with the choice of the guiding authority during the transitional period. Agreement had been reached regarding Cyrenaica and the Fezzan, whereas some hesitation had been shown with regard to Tripolitania. In the absence of further information, the uncertainty still remained. Accordingly, the ultimate disposal of Tripolitania would require a special and careful study.

5. The settlement of the whole question, based on the principle of Libyan independence, would, therefore, require the creation in the respective territories of separate Governments, which should be granted independence as soon as possible, although it might well be impossible to define the period during which the independence would materialize. As soon as those Governments functioned normally, it would be their responsibility to establish the system of association under which they wished to dwell. During the interim period, the occupation authorities would assume responsibility for the administration, and, obviously, the United Nations would reserve the right to supervise the political evolution conducive to the implementation of its recommendations. The French delegation associated itself with the views expressed by the United Kingdom representative regarding the special position of Tripolitania, *vis à-vis* Italy, a position resulting partly from the large number of Italians who had settled there and from the economic bonds which naturally linked the two countries.

6. With regard to Eritrea, the demographic structure of that country and the unbalanced state of its economy raised a complex problem. The fact that agreement seemed possible during the previous session gave ground for optimism. It should therefore be possible to find a solution taking into account the territorial satisfactions of Ethiopia and the desire to conform with the wishes of the indigenous inhabitants, including the Italian minority. Accordingly, any constructive decision should receive the agreement of both the Ethiopian and the Italian Governments so as to prepare for their future collaboration.

7. As for Somaliland, the French delegation believed that the counter-proposal to the scheme placing that territory under Italian trusteeship would not secure the support of any substantial section of the Committee. Besides, the report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation showed that independence for that backward territory was a distant prospect. It was obvious, therefore, that the only form of administration satisfying both the spirit of the Charter and the interests of the inhabitants was trusteeship. The

French delegation still believed that Italy was best qualified to assume such a trusteeship.

8. Count SFORZA (Italy) thanked the Committee for again extending to him the courtesy of expressing the views of his Government. He regretted that the Government of the Soviet Union had once more opposed the admission of Italy to the United Nations.<sup>1</sup> In April 1949, when Italy had asked for trusteeship over the territories in question, it had been because, at that time, trusteeship appeared to be the most appropriate solution through which Italy would have paved the way for the earliest possible independence of those territories. The proof of the sincerity of that intention was borne out by the prompt decision which had been adopted by his Government two months later, when it had declared itself in favour of the immediate independence of the two most progressive territories, namely Eritrea and Libya, as soon as the debates of the previous session had evidenced such a trend of opinion. Italy had therefore immediately withdrawn its request for trusteeship over Tripolitania and Eritrea and favoured their independence. Moreover, it was evident that military administrations were detrimental to the populations, hampering the life of the countries, curbing initiative and spreading suspicion.

9. The Italian Government was convinced that the best guarantee for its national interests was to conceive those interests in function of those of the populations of its former colonies.

10. With regard to Libya, a unitary state, able to preserve the common historical heritage of its component territories, should be established. Obviously, account should be taken of the different characteristics of those parts and the varying levels of their political maturity. An appropriate federal council should be created to protect their common interests. The Italian Government was well aware of the fact that the events of the second World War had bound two of the three sections of the Libyan territory to the United Kingdom and France. Italy, therefore, acknowledged the necessity for those Powers to assume the transitional task of guiding them towards independence, on the understanding that any action to that end should come within the structure of a future federal unity of Libya, and that Tripolitania should be granted full freedom to dispose of its future. Accordingly, free elections for a constituent assembly should be held in Tripolitania within six months. That assembly should immediately proceed to the appointment of a government, whereupon British Administration should cease. The transitional stage should be supervised by a control commission in which Italy would be one of its members. Following the establishment of such a government, Italy, on equal footing, would negotiate with it an appropriate agreement to safeguard the interests of the Italian minority. Should, however, the transitional period be extended, the powers of the suggested control commission should not be limited to supervising the elections; it should assume the character of an over-all collaboration.

11. As regards Eritrea, Count Sforza proposed its independence. He recalled that when the Bevin-Sforza Agreement, which had been a compromise rather unsatisfactory to both parties, had

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council*, Fourth Year, No. 41.

been rejected, Italy had been prompt in asserting the necessity of granting independence to Eritrea. The Eritreans had proved conscious of their maturity and determined to assert it. The economic well-being of that territory was proved by the existence of a flourishing industry and a well-developed trade. As to the suggested partition, the fact of peaceful co-existence in Eritrea of various religions provided one more argument in favour of the unity and independence of that country. Such an independence was also in the interest of Ethiopia.

12. Finally, with regard to Somaliland, Italy should be entrusted with that territory with a view to continuing its proper development and preparing the way for its independence.

13. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA Khan (Pakistan) said that his delegation did not regret that a decision on that question had not been taken during the previous session. The views then expressed and the period of time that had since elapsed had brought a greater sense of reality towards the solution of the problem. The present approach was more practical, as shown by the speech just delivered by the representative of Italy, with whom he agreed to a great extent. With regard to the views expressed by the representative of France, he drew attention to the fact that the latter appeared to wish to create the impression that while the General Assembly had been prepared to accept the proposals for trusteeship with regard to Cyrenaica and the Fezzan, during the last session of the Assembly, the final decision had fallen through because of opposition to Italian trusteeship over Tripolitania and Somaliland. That was an erroneous allegation on the part of the French representative, since there had been almost as much opposition to the proposed United Kingdom and French trusteeship over Cyrenaica and the Fezzan, respectively, as there had been to proposed Italian trusteeship over Tripolitania. The main argument against the then proposed trusteeship over Libya had been that Libya was ready for independence as a single unit. He was gratified to note that that argument was being supported at the current session by a substantial number of delegations.

14. The general principles upon which an ultimate settlement of the problem should be based were laid down both in the United Nations Charter and in annex XI to the Treaty of Peace with Italy. Those principles were the wishes and welfare of the populations concerned, the interests of peace and security and the views of the interested Governments. The first two principles could be merged into one since any decision which was opposed by the indigenous inhabitants of those territories would ensure neither peace nor security. He therefore endorsed the observation made by the representative of France to the effect that any solution should take into account the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants of those territories.

15. With regard to Libya, his delegation was prepared to lend its support to the principle that Libya should be granted independence as soon as possible. Agreement could be worked out later, as to details. With regard to the transitional period, two facts should be borne in mind: there had to be sufficient time to set up the machinery through which the independence of Libya would

be assured, and the proposed period must not be so long as to create doubts and suspicion in the minds of the Libyan people.

16. The question of Eritrea presented a much more complex problem. First of all there were the Ethiopian claims, based upon affinity of race and culture, upon historical associations and upon the economic needs not only of Ethiopia itself but also of Eritrea, which had been very forcibly adduced by the United Kingdom representative at the previous meeting. While Sir Mohammad felt bound to recognize the merits of those considerations, yet he observed that the United Kingdom representative had stressed the factors which would stand in the way of an independent Eritrea to such an extent that one wondered whether union of the two territories would not jeopardize the independence of Ethiopia. Indeed, it would seem from the description made that Eritrea was almost a hopeless derelict. But, in that case, would it not be an injustice to Ethiopia to place such a weighty burden on its shoulders?

17. The delegation of Pakistan felt that the economic considerations had been rather overstressed. Similar deficiencies certainly existed in the case of many sovereign States and surely it would not be suggested that the solution in each case must be union with the neighbouring country. It could be doubted whether the economic deficiencies and economic needs of Eritrea were more serious than the deficiencies and needs of Ethiopia itself. Certainly, it was a small country, but, as Count Sforza had aptly pointed out, it was a dangerous doctrine to adopt that a small country must necessarily be absorbed by a neighbour.

18. Furthermore, there were political considerations that must be taken into account. It was still a matter of doubt whether Ethiopia or Eritrea had progressed further as regards political development. While the representative of Pakistan confessed to inadequate detailed knowledge with regard to Ethiopian political institutions, it was an evident fact that the dominant group in that country was the Amharic-Coptic one. It had been asserted that there was full equality between the various groups but in actual practice one could not discern any signs of that equality. The position of minorities in Ethiopia was an important factor to which attention must be paid, especially if large numbers of non-Amharic, non-Coptic peoples were to be placed under Ethiopian domination.

19. The over-ruling consideration must be the wishes of the populations concerned. If they desired to be annexed to Ethiopia then all the other considerations lost their force. It had been claimed that the investigation of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation had indicated that at least a substantial part of the populations desired such a transfer. In fact, however, the report of that Commission showed that opinion was very divided between several possible solutions and it might be doubted whether, at the time, the Eritreans had fully realized that the ultimate choice would be between accession to Ethiopia or independence. That issue was now clearly posed and it would be an easy matter to ascertain within the course of a few months which of the two solutions was desired. The delegation of Pakistan keenly sympathized with the recent sufferings of Ethiopia but could see no justice in trying to compensate the sufferings of one country by inflicting a greater wrong upon another people that was in no way

guilty. There was no reason why the economic deficiencies of both countries could not be remedied by mutual economic arrangements to the advantage of both.

20. With regard to the future of former Italian Somaliland, it would be recalled that Pakistan had been opposed to single-nation trusteeship as a matter of general principle because the arrangement savoured too much of the old colonial and mandate systems. In the case of former Italian Somaliland there was moreover a further argument mitigating against such a solution. Italian Somaliland was only a segment of the whole of Somalia, and such political consciousness as existed in Italian Somaliland was directed towards the eventual union of all the Somali people as an independent political entity. Nothing should be done that would stand in the way of achieving that objective. Consequently, the best solution would be one involving co-operation between the Powers which were vitally concerned: France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Ethiopia, as well as the indigenous population. That in itself would indicate the final aim. Here again, however, the decision must be dependent upon the wishes of the Somali. The Foreign Minister of Italy had declared that the bulk of the populations in the former colonies was not opposed to Italian trusteeship. If, upon investigation, it were found that the bulk or even a majority of the people of Italian Somaliland would welcome or at least not object to Italian trusteeship, the Pakistan Government had instructed its delegation to give sympathetic consideration to Italian claims in that connexion. However, such meagre information as had been received regarding the desires of the population indicated only opposition to Italian rule, and so long as that situation prevailed the Pakistan delegation could not reconcile itself to a single nation trusteeship by Italy. The attitude of the Pakistan delegation was not inspired by any feeling of hostility, with whom it maintained the most cordial relations.

21. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) would have preferred to delay his statement until he had had an opportunity to study the preceding speeches. For the time being he was only prepared to outline the attitude of his delegation without in any way taking a final position.

22. In the first place the Belgian delegation deplored the circumstances which had led to Italy's continued exclusion from membership in the United Nations and believed that no effort should be spared to put an end to that abnormal situation as early as possible.

23. Turning to the question under discussion, Mr. van Langenhove noted that the delay in finding a solution for the disposal of the former Italian colonies was not due to any unyielding attitude on the part of the principal negotiators. The proposals offered by the parties concerned had undergone several modifications since the question had first been referred to the United Nations. Originally the four Powers had unanimously believed that trusteeship of longer or shorter duration was necessary for all the colonies. Gradually the duration of the proposed trusteeship had been reduced and at the present time the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR are proposing that Libya should not be placed under trusteeship and that it be given its independence either within three to five years or

even immediately. Apparently the ability of the Libyan peoples to administer themselves had achieved surprising progress within a few months. If that progress was genuine, the Belgian delegation could only rejoice. For its part, however, it was unable to assess the situation by itself and must therefore trust that the opinions of the Administering Authorities and of others who had been able to examine the state of things on the spot. Though trusteeship henceforth concerned only Somaliland, the attitude of the Belgian delegation would continue to be dictated by the principles set forth in Chapter XII of the Charter, according to which the primary consideration must be the interest of the populations concerned as well as the interest of peace and security. Furthermore, the Belgian delegation realized that only a compromise solution could obtain the necessary majority in the General Assembly and that such a solution would necessitate concessions on the part of all. It was in that spirit of compromise that the Belgian delegation would examine the new formula suggested for Libya. But whatever solution was adopted in respect of Libya, it would still require outside assistance. The people of Libya ought to benefit from the assistance of Italy, whose link with Tripolitania hardly needed to be stressed.

24. As regards Somaliland, the Belgian delegation still favoured Italian administrative trusteeship, for which it had voted at the previous session of the General Assembly.

25. The Belgian delegation had voted previously in favour of annexing the central and coastal provinces of Eritrea to Ethiopia while allocating Western Eritrea to the Sudan. It intended to analyse carefully the comments which had just been made in that respect, together with any new element which might help in further assessing the situation.

26. It would be contrary to the interests of the populations concerned to keep them any longer in a state of uncertainty regarding their future.

27. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the debate be speeded by creating a special sub-committee to examine the applications for a hearing which had been received from political parties or organizations of the areas concerned. He suggested that the Committee follow the same procedure as had been adopted previously and establish a sub-committee of eleven, identical in membership with Sub-Committee 14, the only difference being that the terms of reference in the present instance need extend only to requests from political organizations or parties which had not previously applied or to such previous applicants as had new material to submit.

28. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) and Mr. COOPER (Liberia) supported the Chairman's proposal and suggested that it be adopted immediately.

29. The CHAIRMAN proposed a draft resolution (A/C.1/488) establishing the sub-committee and reading as follows:

*"The First Committee*

*"Resolves that the requests of representatives of political parties or organizations in the territories concerned, presented not later than 10 October 1949, shall be referred to a sub-committee composed of Brazil, Egypt, France, Haiti, India, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and the United*



States, who shall report to the Committee on the extent to which these parties or organizations represent substantial sections of opinion in the territory in question. For such purpose the Sub-Committee shall study and take into account the statements in the reports of the Committee of Enquiry on the organizations seeking to be heard and on similar local organizations. It shall make recommendations on whether, and if so how, they should be heard by the Committee.

"The Sub-Committee should consider :

"1. Requests emanating from political organizations or parties on which a report to the Committee was not made by Sub-Committee 14 during the second part of the third regular session; and

"2. Requests on which the above Sub-Committee has already reported, if new material has been submitted by the organizations or parties in question."

*The draft resolution was adopted unanimously.*

30. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) submitted two general suggestions for the Committee's consideration. First, he believed that representatives of the indigenous populations should be invited to present their views. Second, he urged the Committee to decide the fate of each of the former Italian colonies separately on its own merits. He was opposed to making the fate of one colony dependent upon the fate of another; for example, if Libya's future could be determined right away, it would not need to wait for a decision in respect of Eritrea or Somaliland.

31. Mr. al-Jamali then proceeded to explain the position of his delegation with regard to Libya, reserving his right to speak later in connexion with Somaliland and Eritrea. The delegation of Iraq maintained as strongly as ever the position which it had espoused at the previous session of the Assembly and was hopeful that the Committee by recognizing the right of the Libyans to independence and unity would act in accordance with the proposal submitted by Iraq at the previous session (A/C.1/455).

32. Libyan rights to independence were based upon historical legal and political foundations. As a part of the Ottoman Empire, Libya had long enjoyed an independent life with considerable privileges of self-government. When Italy had invaded the country in 1911 the Libyans had commenced a heroic resistance which had lasted

for over twenty years. During the Italian rule, which had been established by force, the population of Libya had dropped by 75 per cent. But the will of the Libyans had never been broken and during the Second World War they had taken an active part in the liberation of their country. Mr. al-Jamali cited a statement by Field Marshal Wilson commending the contribution of the Western Arabs to the Allied cause. Moreover, during the war, the Libyans had pinned their fate on the Atlantic Charter and upon the promise given in 1942 by Mr. Anthony Eden to the Senussis. Rightly or wrongly that promise had been interpreted to mean that the whole of liberated Libya would enjoy an independent existence. Finally, the Italian Peace Treaty stipulated that the wishes of the inhabitants should be the prime consideration in the disposal of the former Italian colonies. The testimony received by the Four-Power Commission of Investigation proved unequivocally that the principal Arab political parties agreed upon complete independence for a unified Libya with membership in the Arab League. Thus, the wishes of the inhabitants were well known and it only remained for the Committee to give its approval. It was wrong to argue that the economic underdevelopment of Libya warranted postponing independence. The country was no more underdeveloped than some of the Member States of the United Nations.

33. The three regions of Libya were linked by close historic, geographic and cultural bonds. As an instance of the economic interdependence of the three regions, Mr. al-Jamali cited an article in the *Manchester Guardian* of 6 October 1947 which had recorded that a drought had had disastrous consequences as the result of partition because the Arabs of Tripolitania had been unable to preserve their livestock by driving them into Cyrenaica or to supplement their food reserves with the agricultural produce of the Fezzan. Likewise the *Fortnightly Review* of November 1947 had recorded the express desire of the Libyans for unified independence.

34. The delegation of Iraq believed that immediate recognition should be given to that claim; the form of unity being left for the decision of the peoples themselves, as also the future relations of Libya with other countries. The duration of the transfer of authority to its inhabitants should be as short as possible.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND EIGHTIETH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 3 October 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman:* Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

### **Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies: general discussion (continued)**

1. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India) wished to emphasize the two following points: first, that the General Assembly would be acting for the first time like a world parliament, the recommendations of which would be accepted and carried out by the parties concerned; and second, that

the solutions proposed by the Assembly would therefore have to commend themselves to world opinion.

2. His delegation was very pleased that many delegations had changed their attitude and were now in favour of granting independence to Libya. The best way of safeguarding that independence would be to allow the populations concerned to draw up their own constitution through their

chosen representatives, as had been done recently in India and Burma.

3. Citing as an example the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig, which had been prepared under the auspices of the League of Nations, he suggested that the Libyan constitution should be drawn up by a constituent assembly, acting under the authority of the United Nations, so as to make sure that the constitution would reflect the genuine will of the people.

4. In order to achieve that end, the General Assembly could appoint a commission for the purpose of setting up the constituent assembly. The commission would have the necessary authority to adjust any differences that might arise out of the fact that Libya was administered by two different Powers. Those Powers, namely the United Kingdom and France, could submit to the United Nations a panel of three candidates for each of the territories concerned: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan. The Assembly could then choose one member from each panel and the three members elected would form the United Nations commission.

5. The commission would then examine the local conditions and lay down a suitable basis for either a unitary or a federal constituent assembly.

6. His delegation favoured the creation of a single constituent assembly in order to promote the unity of Libya. Nevertheless, the representatives at the assembly would have the right to decide whether they wished to have a unitary constitution, a federal constitution or a federation of three separate States with certain services in common. Should the assembly decide in favour of a federal State, the members would divide into three committees, each would draft a constitution for the state it represented, and finally all three committees would sit together in order to combine the constitutions into one harmonious whole with that of the federal State.

7. It would not be advisable for the constituent assembly to exercise authority over administrative matters until it had adopted a constitution. Nevertheless, in order to expedite the preparation of the constitution, the United Nations commission should remain on the spot and its main function would be to make sure that human rights and fundamental freedoms were properly safeguarded in the constitution. When the draft constitution had been approved, the commission would submit its report to the United Nations.

8. Since the preparation of a constitution had taken two years in so far as the Free City of Danzig was concerned, three years for India and only eight months for Burma, it would not be possible to fix a definite time limit at that stage, but, in any event, it should be possible to prepare the proposed constitution within three years.

9. Turning to the question of Italian Somaliland, Sir Benegal noted that the Four-Power Commission of Investigation had decided that the country was not yet sufficiently developed economically or politically for self-government. Only five months previously, however, the majority of Member States had considered that Libya was not ready for self-government and they had since changed their opinion. It was therefore possible that a United Nations commission of inquiry, if sent to Somaliland, might come to the conclusion

that the country was just as ready for self-government as Libya.

10. A United Nations commission (preferably the same as he had suggested setting up for Libya) should therefore be sent to Somaliland. If the commission decided that Somaliland was not ready for self-government, it would have to consider placing the country under the Trusteeship System with the three following guiding principles: (a) the preparation of a constitution appropriate to the present stage of development of the territory; (b) the inclusion in the constitution of a provision for its periodical amendment by the appropriate organs of the United Nations, with a view to ensuring the full independence of the country within ten years; (c) the administration of the territory by the Administering Authority strictly in accordance with the constitution. The Administering Authority could be chosen after the preparation of the constitution.

11. With regard to Eritrea, the representative of India considered that it would be useful if the United Nations commission for Libya could also visit Eritrea and collect information concerning the partition of the territory. If the majority of the population favoured partition, the commission should make recommendations concerning the exact position of the boundary line, the allocation of each part of the territory and the safeguards to be given to minorities.

12. If the commission found that the population did not wish for partition, it should state whether, in its opinion, Eritrea was ready for self-government or whether a system of trusteeship, similar to that envisaged for Somaliland, should be applied.

13. The Indian delegation was of the opinion that the United Nations could not decide anything with regard to Somaliland or Eritrea until a commission had been sent to investigate on the spot. The fact that independence was to be granted to Libya was very important, for it might have repercussions in Somaliland and Eritrea if those countries were not granted their independence at the same time.

14. Mr. VAN PALLANDT (Netherlands) supported the suggestion previously made by the representative of Iraq (279th meeting) that the Committee should deal separately with the three territories — Libya, Eritrea and Somaliland — and take a separate vote on each one of them.

15. The Netherlands believed that Libya should be granted independence as soon as feasible. The form the future State would take would have to be established by the Administering Authorities in consultation with the local authorities. A period of three to four years seemed reasonable for that purpose.

16. While agreeing that the will of the populations should be the main factor to be considered, and also that the incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopia would create important minorities, a fact which might give rise to new difficulties, he did not think any other solution could be found. The report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation showed that the territory was not an economic unit. The interests of the population would be best safeguarded if the eastern provinces were incorporated into Ethiopia and the Western Province into the Sudan. The United Nations,



however, should assume responsibility for the welfare and the economic development of the populations concerned.

17. Lastly, since Somaliland was a backward country politically and economically, its administration should be entrusted to Italy for a definite period, under United Nations trusteeship. Whatever its decision, the General Assembly should take into account the experience acquired by Italy in all its former colonies.

18. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) was surprised that the Indian and Netherlands representatives should try to put off a decision on the question. Indeed, although two years had elapsed since the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Italy, the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies had not yet been settled. The cause of the delay was that some States were guided not by principles likely to promote peace and security but rather by their own selfish interests.

19. Analysing the plan put forward by the United Kingdom representative, he expressed the opinion that the granting of independence to Cyrenaica was but a theatrical gesture comparable to the granting of independence to Transjordan (Jordan), which had in fact reduced that country to the status of a British colony. Although the United Kingdom representative had referred to the forthcoming promulgation of a constitution for Libya, it seemed that the new government would concern itself only with internal affairs, while foreign affairs and the army would be under British control and a United Kingdom Governor would have the right to veto the decisions of that government.

20. Quoting the report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation, Mr. Manuilsky refuted the assertions of the United Kingdom representative concerning the favourable economic situation of the former Italian colonies, and pointed out that since those territories had been placed under British Military Administration, Libya had experienced a drought, in 1947, the consequences of which had been disastrous because the British authorities had taken no preventive or remedial measures. Furthermore, tens of thousands of agricultural workers were unemployed, the development of water supplies had practically ceased, working conditions for women and children were still regulated by fascist decrees promulgated in 1937, discriminatory measures were still in force. In Somaliland, unemployment had been caused by the removal of Italian undertakings, the cost of living had increased far more than wages, there was no labour legislation and nothing was being done to combat racial discrimination. In Eritrea there had been a considerable increase in prostitution. All those facts showed the contradiction existing between the words of the United Kingdom representative and the deeds of his Government.

21. Refuting the view of the United Kingdom Government that Eritrea should be partitioned between Ethiopia and the Sudan for ethnical reasons, he observed that such a view was inconsistent with the national aspirations of Eritrea and, citing the Soviet Union as an example, showed that peoples of different races and creeds could live together within the framework of a single State. The United Kingdom proposal to

join the 300,000 Arabs of Eritrea to the Sudan, because there were 30,000 Arabs there, would defeat its own purpose, for if the premise was correct would it not be more logical to unite the 30,000 Sudanese Arabs with the 300,000 Eritrean Arabs?

22. There was hardly any difference between the United States plan and that of the United Kingdom except that the United States arguments were even weaker.

23. The United Kingdom and the United States delegations were not inspired by any desire to promote peace and security as prescribed by the Four-Power Declaration of 10 February 1947. The two States wished to maintain their controlling position in that area so as to set up strategic bases there; that was against the interest of the populations concerned. Quoting Italian Press comments on the fact that the United Kingdom had granted numerous air bases in Libya to the Americans, he pointed out that aggressive and expansionist imperialism was not dead despite the Chairman's statements to the contrary in the General Assembly.<sup>1</sup>

24. Turning to the proposal submitted by the USSR (A/C.1/487), he observed that it was consistent with the right of the people to self-determination, that it followed directly from the principles of the Charter and from the Four-Power Declaration and that it would strengthen peace and security throughout the world. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR supported that proposal and appealed to all other delegations to adopt it unanimously.

25. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) thought that the Committee should, first of all, take into consideration the legal background to the question: Article 13 of the Charter, article 25 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, and annex XI of that Treaty. Secondly, the Committee should base its judgment on verified and verifiable facts, such as the report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation. Thirdly, the Committee should base its considerations on the principle of the right of the peoples concerned to independence. Lastly, it should be guided by common sense. Those principles should be applied broadly and logically, and the approach to the various territories should be the same.

26. With regard to Libya, the Committee seemed to be almost unanimously agreed that the independence of that region should be taken as the basis for discussion. Some representatives had thought that a transitional period was necessary, and others had deemed that during that period the United Nations should participate in the administration of the territories. Such reservations could not, however, be regarded as contesting the very principle of independence, for it must not be forgotten that the emancipation of nations, in Europe and elsewhere, had been effected only gradually, after a period of transition. Moreover, investigations on the spot had shown that politically and nationally most of the peoples concerned had not yet reached such a degree of maturity that transitional periods could be entirely dispensed with. Furthermore, was it not true that even countries enjoying full independence had freely assumed international obligations which limited their independence to a certain extent? The

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, 228th plenary meeting.*

states in question could not justly take offence at a certain limitation of the independence of those territories by an international agreement.

27. Special mention must be made of the special interest which Italy might claim to have in the preparation of a transitional system and in the settlement of the whole question of Libya. Both in the case of Libya and the other former Italian colonies, the Committee should as far as possible take those interests into account. Greece's experiences in its relations with the new Italy during the past few years encouraged it to trust that country. At the time of the signing of the important substantial agreement which the Greek Government had just concluded with the Italian Government, the latter had shown a sincere good-will and deep understanding in its efforts to promote a satisfactory settlement of the problems which had separated the two nations during the last war. The Greek Government would take that opportunity to state that it was entirely in favour of the participation of Italy in the work of the United Nations, and thought that the Organization could not be complete without the participation of that country.

28. In the case of Eritrea, the problem of independence was a different one, for that country had been separated from Ethiopia in 1885. Eritrea should therefore be reintegrated into the framework of Ethiopia, rather than set up as a new independent State, the more so as the desire of the inhabitants of Eritrea for independence had not yet been clearly and finally expressed. The General Assembly had approved the union of Eastern Eritrea with Ethiopia, and the Greek delegation would vote in the same way at the current session. It would do so not only because Ethiopia had been the victim of unjust aggression, but also because that country had tried valiantly to defend its independence in a grave crisis of its history. It seemed to Greece that that was a factor to be borne in mind, for in defending its own independence a nation defended not only its own dignity, but also the cause of world peace.

29. Mr. MARTÍNEZ MORENO (El Salvador) thought that the destiny of the populations concerned should be determined as quickly as possible. In fact, in the political field, the United Nations was far from having attained its main objective. The antagonistic interests of the great Powers had limited the scope of the San Francisco Charter. In such circumstances, a solution of the problem of the former Italian colonies would be an undeniable proof that the United Nations was ready to guide the world towards justice and progress.

30. Recalling his country's struggles which, a hundred years ago, had enabled it to attain independence, the representative of El Salvador proclaimed his belief in the right of peoples to self-determination when they had attained a degree of political maturity which enabled them to act as sovereign States in co-operation with other countries and in favour of peace.

31. The majority of the Committee had recognized that Libya was able to settle its destiny without the intervention of foreign Powers. Italy, itself, had expressed its sympathy toward an independent Libya. The views expressed by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, France and the Soviet Union showed that

those countries unanimously wished to see the former Italian colonies take the place which rightfully belonged to them in the community of nations. An interval was necessary for the transition of those territories from a colonial status to future independence. It was important that the length of that period, which should be as short as possible, should be determined immediately. The form of government to be adopted should be patterned according to the wishes of the peoples concerned. El Salvador thought that the sovereignty of those new States should be such that they could be admitted to the United Nations as soon as they had been organized. Their admission to the Organization should not be blocked by political reasons, as had recently been the case when Italy had applied for membership.

32. In regard to Italian Somaliland, the unanimous opinion of the Committee seemed to be that that territory had not yet reached the degree of maturity necessary for it to be granted independence. That had been proved by the report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation. Secondly, the progress achieved in that territory by the Italian colonists ought not to be interrupted. In the opinion of the delegation of El Salvador, Somaliland should be placed under trusteeship with Italy being entrusted with the administration until it was in a position to follow Libya and Eritrea to independence. Italy was most qualified for that task under the control of the United Nations. Only recently liberated from a hateful régime, Italy could feel but the greatest sympathy for nations aspiring to liberty and independence. Moreover, the Italian colonists in those territories had close ties with the indigenous populations.

33. The delegation of El Salvador considered that the United Nations would heed the requests of Ethiopia, while taking into account the aspirations of the populations of Eritrea who had put forward their claim to immediate independence. It hoped, in this regard, that Ethiopia would be granted a permanent outlet to the Red Sea. Under the Franco-British agreement of May 1949 the port of Zeila had, to a certain extent, given Ethiopia satisfaction, but final and satisfactory arrangements must be made. If later proposals give cause to it, El Salvador would change its position.

34. Mr. Tsune-chi Yu (China) considered that the essential principles on which the Commission should base its recommendations were those stipulated in Article 76 of the Charter. The Assembly should adopt a far-sighted view since whatever decision it might take would be regarded as a precedent which would have far-reaching results. Happily, it was in a position to propose a reasonable and common-sense decision, for its hands were not tied by the rule of unanimity which, as the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had pointed out, had kept that country out of the United Nations. The United Nations must therefore face its responsibility and uphold its high ideals or run the danger of a policy of expediency. History would judge.

35. In the course of the previous session, there had been different opinions towards Italy. Some representatives had sung the praises of that country, while others had condemned the actions of fascist Italy. The delegation of China considered that a conciliatory attitude should be adopted and that the Assembly should not allow itself to be

too much influenced by passion and the spirit of revenge. It was the business of the Assembly to settle the question in accordance with the Charter, not to punish Italy, which had already paid the price of its errors at the Peace Conference of 1946. In the same way, it was not for the Assembly to adjudicate rewards to certain nations. All the efforts of the United States, of the United Kingdom and of China had contributed to the common victory, but that was not a sufficient reason for granting territories to one particular nation. China would not consider it for a moment. The majority of the members of the Committee were certainly in favour of justice and the Chinese delegation believed that there were no differences of opinion so great that they could not be reconciled. It recommended that the problem should be studied and a solution proposed in accordance with the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, having regard to the aspirations and welfare of the inhabitants of the territories concerned and to a spirit of conciliation founded on international justice and the maintenance of peace and security. The four Powers, before referring the matter to the United Nations, had agreed to grant Italy the administration of Somaliland under the Trusteeship System and three among them had been in favour of a similar solution in the case of all the former Italian colonies. That being so, the Chinese delegation thought that it should support a solution which would place Somaliland under a system of trusteeship with Italy as the Power responsible for its administration.

36. On the question of Eritrea, the delegation of China thought that the Commission should satisfy the demand of Ethiopia for free access to the sea. Just as China had been the first victim of Japanese aggression, Ethiopia had been the first victim of Italian fascist aggression. Any decision as regards the territory which was to form an outlet to the sea should be in accordance with the will and aspiration of the inhabitants. If need arose, a special commission should delimit its boundaries after studying the region. The rest of Eritrea should be placed under a system of international trusteeship leading to that territory's early independence. China shared France's belief that any settlement of the Eritrean question should be worked out in a spirit of conciliation between the two Powers concerned, Ethiopia and Italy.

37. Regarding Libya the Chinese delegation pointed out that as early as the Peace Conference in Paris, China favoured its immediate independence. The Chinese representative believed that a united Libya instead of a divided Libya should be made independent as soon as possible. A certain period of time might be necessary in order to prepare for the final transfer of powers from the military authorities to those which would be set up in the country, but the duration of that period might be determined by the Assembly and might be very short.

38. The representative of China expressed his sympathy with the statement made by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs (279th meeting). If the spirit of conciliation which characterized that declaration continued to make itself felt, it would certainly be possible to reach a final and just solution of that complex problem. The Chinese delegation hoped, moreover, that the United Nations would soon admit Italy into the

Organization. The participation of a democratic Italy in the work of the Organization would greatly advance the cause of peace and the security of peoples.

39. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq), referring to the statements made by the representative of the Ukrainian SSR with regard to the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan, declared that that country was a peace-loving and independent State steadily moving toward social, political and economic goals. That country maintained close diplomatic relations with numerous countries represented in the Assembly. If the criteria of independence required by the representative of the Ukrainian SSR were to be applied, not many independent States would be found in the world today.

### Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece

#### POINT RAISED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF POLAND

40. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) asked the Chairman if it were correct that three days earlier (276th meeting) when the Greek question had been discussed by the Committee and the examination of the problem adjourned until 17 October, the representative of Greece had promised that all death sentences and all court martial proceedings would be suspended. The Polish representative requested the Chairman of the Committee, who was also a member of the Conciliation Committee, and through him the President of the General Assembly, who presided over the Conciliation Committee, to make enquiries as to why the trade union leader, Georgi Demosthenes, had been shot by a firing squad on a Saturday morning, 1 October.

41. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that after the unanimous vote in the First Committee establishing a Conciliation Committee with regard to the Greek question, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR, on 23 September, had received news that a military tribunal in Athens had condemned Georgi Demosthenes, one of the trade union leaders to death, for the sole reason that he had expressed liberal and progressive opinions. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR had called upon the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General to intervene so that that death sentence would not be carried out. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR had had all the more reason for making that request since the representative of Greece had assured the Committee that all death sentences had been suspended and that a court of appeal was considering the case of those who had been sentenced, but yet dozens of persons were being sentenced to death and executed each night in Greece. That was of course not reported in the Press. The Greek representative had spoken of an island where a re-education camp had been established. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR had received precise documentation concerning that island: those who were transported there were tortured until they renounced their political convictions in writing.

42. The resolution adopted by the Committee the other day constituted a promise which could not be trampled underfoot. The delegation of

the Ukrainian SSR had now learned that Georgi Demosthenes had been summarily shot with scarcely any trial. The Greek Government had knowingly misled the First Committee. It was important to know what the Conciliation Committee proposed to do in that respect. If summary executions continued to be carried out, the Committee, instead of being a conciliation committee, would in fact be supporting the so-called Greek Government in its terroristic activity.

43. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the Committee was discussing at that time the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies and that it could not enter a discussion on another subject. He would, however, study the question

asked by the representative of Poland and would reply in due time.

44. Mr. KYROU (Greece) stated, with regard to the question raised concerning Georgi Demosthenes, that when information reached the Committee, it would prove to be as reliable as that given by the representative of Poland.

45. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) asked the Chairman to indicate, if not at once, at least within a short time, what the Conciliation Committee had already accomplished.

46. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the Conciliation Committee would send a report to the First Committee as soon as possible.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIRST MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 3 October 1949, at 3.30 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

### **Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies: general discussion (continued)**

1. Mr. KURAL (Turkey) said that his delegation had been disappointed by the fact that no decision had been reached by the General Assembly at its previous session with regard to the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies. The lack of a decision had led to the continuation of the military occupation of those territories, an admittedly undesirable situation. Mr. Kural noted, from the views expressed so far, that considerable evolution had taken place in the views of most representatives, so that whereas previously the tendency had been towards trusteeship with independence as a more or less distant objective, the present tendency stressed early independence. He considered the latter to be a good omen. The question under consideration was important to his country as a Member of the world community and of the United Nations. Moreover, the political evolution of that part of the world was of close concern to Turkey, as a Mediterranean State, from the points of view of both direct relations and of peace and security in the entire region. The Turkish representative recalled that a portion of the territories concerned had been part of the Ottoman Empire until comparatively recently. The public opinion of his country watched with interest the evolution of each of its former members and rejoiced every time one of them crowned its national aspirations with success. Libya had been an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, represented in the Ottoman Parliament and in the capital by its own representatives. It had participated in the administration of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and had also been called upon to play its role in the empire of which it had been a part, as had been attested by numerous delegations as well as by the representatives of the Libyan people. After those events, it would be paradoxical to maintain that Libya was not prepared for independence, a view confirmed by the statement made recently by the United Kingdom representative (278th meeting) to the effect that during the last few months Cyrenaica had made

great strides towards self-government. His delegation would therefore support proposals for the granting of independence to Libya. If a transition period proved necessary, his delegation would favour it, provided that were as brief as possible.

2. Mr. Kural considered the form of government and the union of those territories to be questions that should be left to the determination of the local inhabitants. The General Assembly might entertain its own opinions on that subject, as well as on the economic arrangements to be made between those territories and other States, and it might, if necessary, express those opinions as a wish, but the General Assembly should not make decisions without taking those opinions into account.

3. Recalling the difficulties to which the Eritrean problem had given rise at the previous session, Mr. Kural said that his delegation was guided by what seemed to it to be the best interests of the population of the region. The Turkish delegation believed that the solution of that problem should also take into account satisfaction of the claims of Ethiopia.

4. As for Somaliland, Mr. Kural said that his delegation remained in favour of placing the territory under trusteeship with Italy as administering authority to lead it to independence. He agreed with the representative of Iraq's request (279th meeting) that the Committee deal separately with the various parts of the former colonial empire, without subordinating the solution of one problem to the solution for another.

5. Mr. ICHASO (Cuba) said that his country, while geographically distant from the territories under discussion, was closely concerned by the moral and human questions at issue. Stressing the fact that what was at stake were the lives of human beings, Mr. Ichaso said that what interested Cuba most was the question of principle involved. He thought that a lot could be gained if the Committee were to lay down as a basic rule the rights of Libya, Eritrea, and even Somaliland to become sovereign and free States in accordance with the wishes of the populations of

those countries. The way in which that ideal was to be achieved and the time to be taken for its achievement were in the view of his delegation procedural questions. What the General Assembly had to do was to establish a permanent government and prevent chaos being let loose in those territories. For those reasons his delegation would not give serious consideration to draft resolutions of an extremist character that turned aside from the true problem and wished only to create difficulties for the countries concerned.

6. Emphasizing his country's sympathy for the Italian people and the present democratic Italian Government, Mr. Ichaso said that his delegation would support any measure that would guarantee the rights of the Italian minorities and that would at the same time respect the legitimate public and private interests of Italy in its former colonies. Another matter of concern to his delegation was that freedom of religion must be safeguarded in whatever decision was taken.

7. Mr. Ichaso opposed any artificial division of territories which might renew anachronistic colonial annexations. Praising the substitution of the Trusteeship System for colonialism, he said that the former was more logical, more human and always temporary.

8. In conclusion, the Cuban representative said that his delegation would support any resolution maintaining the rights of the former colonies to their unity and freedom and guaranteeing the rights of minorities and all other political, legal and economic principles that were legitimate. The transitionary period before those countries became completely independent should be as short as prudence allowed, but had to be determined by the local conditions in each case.

9. Mr. HENRÍQUEZ UREÑA (Dominican Republic) was pleased to see that the majority of the delegations were in agreement on certain basic principles and that the greatest division occurred with regard to the application of possible solutions. There was a general tendency to favour the future independence of the territories under discussion. Thus it was generally agreed that Libya should be granted independence. The difference began with the consideration of the method and details of the plan that would be applied to the achievement of that independence. Those differences were manifold; they concerned the period of transition, the way in which that transition period was to be developed and the role to be played by the United Nations in it, whether a special commission of the United Nations was to be established and, if so, what its terms of reference and composition would be. Other points of difference regarded the representation to be given to the local and indigenous population in such a commission, and the terms of reference to be given to the Administering Authorities in those territories.

10. Somaliland would probably require a longer period of transition before gaining its independence. That period must extend over several years at the end of which the General Assembly would decide whether or not a final plan could be put into effect to enable Somaliland to become self-governing. A similar formula might then be acceptable. He noted that there was considerable support for the proposal that Italy, together

with a special committee of the United Nations, should become the Administering Authority.

11. The problem of Eritrea was more complex, so much so that the possibility of an agreement that would receive a two-thirds majority could not be anticipated. It was clear therefore that the problem was not yet ripe for an immediate solution, and that further and more up-to-date information was needed regarding the true desires of the population and the development and standards of living in that country. Under the circumstances, he thought that the most practical formula would be to establish a special committee of the United Nations, similar to those sent to Palestine and Korea, to visit Eritrea and prepare a report for the next session of the General Assembly. Such a procedure, though longer, would obviously lead to a more practical result.

12. Summing up, Mr. Henríquez Ureña said that his delegation would do everything possible to harmonize its ideas with those that might obtain sufficient votes in the Committee, as long as the principles of the self-determination of peoples and the independence of countries were assured.

13. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), referring to the statement made to the Committee on 1 October by the Italian Foreign Minister (279th meeting), noted that the representative of the Ukrainian SSR had already given an appraisal of that speech (280th meeting). Count Sforza had alleged that it was the fault of the USSR that Italy had not become a Member of the United Nations. That allegation was incorrect and tendentious, for as Count Sforza was well aware it was not the policy of the USSR which had thwarted the admission of Italy to the United Nations, but rather that of the United States and the United Kingdom, who had engaged in discrimination against a number of countries in connexion with their admission to the United Nations. Mr. Arutiunian pointed out that Peace Treaties had been concluded with Romania, Hungary and other States in addition to Italy and that those other treaties also involved certain obligations.

14. The USSR deemed it essential to settle the question of the admission of new Members to the United Nations without delay, and insisted upon the simultaneous admission of all thirteen States whose applications for admission were pending. Those included Italy as well as a number of other States. His delegation had serious reasons for objecting to the admission of a number of the countries that had applied for membership, but was prepared to waive those objections in order to facilitate the admission of all thirteen countries provided there was no discrimination.

15. Turning to the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies, he stated that in the interests of the local inhabitants of those territories and of a general peaceful settlement, it was inadmissible that solution of the question should be delayed any further. It was not the fault of the USSR that the question had not been solved. The members of the Committee were well aware that for almost four years the USSR had made every effort to achieve a just solution fully taking into account the desires of the inhabitants of those territories and the interests of peace and security. On the other hand, the United Kingdom

and the United States, in pursuit of their selfish and aggressive purposes, had sabotaged the USSR proposals, and had made a solution impossible. The United States, the United Kingdom and France had done everything in their power to remove the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies from the agenda of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which had been found inconvenient, in order to utilize their majority in the General Assembly to ensure the adoption of a solution to their liking.

16. Stating that during the previous session the USSR representatives had clearly exposed the tendency of those three countries to take over the former Italian colonies in order to set up military and strategic bases in connexion with their aggressive plans directed against the Soviet Union and the countries of the peoples' democracies, Mr. Arutiunian said that the problem before the Committee had not been solved because the leading circles of the United Kingdom, the United States and France were not interested in the progress of the colonial peoples or in preparing the latter for independence as stipulated by the United Nations Charter.

17. At the previous session, the representatives of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR and other States had submitted data describing the catastrophic economic and political situation under which the peoples of the former Italian colonies were pining away as a result of the actions of the British Military Administration. The United Kingdom delegation had not been able to refute those facts, which were contained in the report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation. Describing the situation obtaining on those territories, he noted that various leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom and France had indicated, and continued to indicate, that it was necessary to take into account the desires of the inhabitants of the former colonies in determining the disposal of those territories. However, such statements had nothing in common with the actual truth. It was well known that the United Kingdom, with the approval of the United States, had taken the path of circumventing the United Nations in reaching a separate understanding with Italy on the partition of the former Italian colonies. That plan, agreed upon behind the back of the United Nations, while the question was being discussed during the third session of the General Assembly, had subsequently been submitted to the consideration of the First Committee as a joint Anglo-American proposal dated 12 May 1949. It maintained basically the same policy as the previous Anglo-American proposals of 3 May 1949, designed to maintain Anglo-American mastery over those territories, together with unconcealed increasing of British colonial possessions.

18. The Bevin-Sforza understanding had aroused an indignant reaction among the peoples of the former colonies, the representatives of which had categorically objected to it, having correctly assessed it as a plan for arbitrary partition which would benefit nothing but the colonial policy of the United Kingdom. Those representatives had noted that the Bevin-Sforza Agreement was incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and had realized that it would create a threat to the peace and security of the Mediterranean region. They had also understood the dangers which it presented to their aspirations for a just

solution of the question. During the discussion in the First Committee at the previous session, numerous parties and political organizations in Eritrea had joined in a bloc favouring an independent Eritrea calling for the unity of that territory. The representatives of various Somali and Libyan parties and organizations had also categorically objected to that Agreement and had proclaimed their determination to prevent the continuation of an occupation régime in their countries. The statements of those representatives had been supported by mass protest demonstrations of the local populations of the territories, so that the British authorities had in some cases been compelled to proclaim a state of siege. The indignant reaction of the peoples of the former colonies to the Bevin-Sforza Agreement could not be concealed from world public opinion, though the British Military Administration had endeavoured to do so. The representatives of the peoples of those territories had submitted to the United Nations a memorandum describing the reaction against the attempt to partition their lands, which had been circulated at the third session of the General Assembly (A/884), and that memorandum had not lost its validity. The Anglo-American proposal had thus been decisively rejected by the inhabitants of the territories under consideration, and it was well known that the Bevin-Sforza Agreement had been disavowed and rejected by the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations.<sup>1</sup>

19. Referring to the statement of Mr. McNeil (278th meeting), to the effect that the United Kingdom Government had handed over to the Emir of the Senussi full power over the internal affairs of Cyrenaica, that the latter had introduced a Constitution and that a Cyrenaican government was going to be set up in the immediate future pursuant to the provisions of that Constitution, Mr. Arutiunian commented that the practice of unilateral and illegal United Kingdom actions with respect to the former Italian colonies was not new, and had indeed been practised as early as 1948. At the beginning of January 1948, in violation of the Peace Treaty with Italy, the Mellaha air base had been placed at the disposal of the United States, and in February 1949 the United Kingdom Government had reorganized the administration of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, thus providing clear evidence of its intention to remain in those territories. After suffering defeat at the third session of the General Assembly in the realization of its plan for the former Italian colonies, the United Kingdom, ignoring obligations set forth in the Peace Treaty with Italy, had hastened to secure its interests in Libya unilaterally and illegally. To that end it had proclaimed on 1 June 1949 that it intended to set up a so-called Government of Cyrenaica and to recognize the Emir of the Senussi as the head of that Government. The Emir had subsequently been summoned to London to make sure that the United Kingdom would secure what it wished in Cyrenaica. That had not been a difficult task for the Foreign Office, since the material collected by the Four-Power Commission of Investigation showed that the Emir and other members of the Senussi family had been on the pay-roll of the British authorities for a considerable time. Mr.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part II*, 218th plenary meeting.



Arutiunian quoted official British data regarding subsidies and benefits provided for the Emir and his family by the British Military Administration. What was concealed by the proclamation that made the Emir head of the Government of Cyrenaica could be judged from a report in the Cairo newspaper *Al Hadis* dated 15 June 1949. That report stated that the British authorities had already drawn up a draft agreement for Cyrenaica, to be subsequently signed by the United Kingdom Government and by the Emir, according to which British advisers were to help in bringing about the "independence" of Cyrenaica; the armed forces would be led by a British general; the Government of Cyrenaica would send diplomatic representatives to other countries only with the approval of the United Kingdom Government; and the United Kingdom would have very extensive military and strategic prerogatives.

20. It was well known that the United Kingdom — and with the United States lurking in the background — were expediting military constructions in Libya, apparently thinking that they could deal with that territory as they had dealt with their own colonies. Mr. Arutiunian quoted a dispatch in the newspaper *Al Zaman* dated 28 June 1949 regarding the details of those constructions which were being carried out secretly in the Kos region which controlled the Sirte bay.

21. The British trick of granting self-government to Cyrenaica had aroused indignation in Libya and a negative reaction in all Arab countries, as it had nothing in common with the true independence of Libya. Demonstrations in protest against it had taken place in Benghazi on 2 June 1949. He quoted statements made by the Secretary-General of the Arab League and the Chairman of the Libyan Liberation Committee on June 2 and 3 respectively to the effect that the independence supposedly given to Cyrenaica was nothing but a lie which would be resisted and which was an attempt by the United Kingdom to implement the Bevin-Sforza Agreement unilaterally. As was well known from Press reports, the Arab countries had refused to recognize the Emir's Government. Though the British Government had alleged, in its statement of 1 July, that its actions were in accordance with the aspirations of the people of Cyrenaica, the fact that its measures had not been carried out democratically but had been imposed by the British Military Authorities showed that those actions had nothing in common with the aspirations of the Libyan people, which stood squarely behind full independence for Libya and was opposed to the dismemberment of their country.

22. As long as the General Assembly, in whose hands the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies was vested, pursuant to the Peace Treaty with Italy, had not adopted any decisions, the unilateral actions of the United Kingdom Government designed to modify the status of Libya were in direct contradiction with that Peace Treaty and could have no legal force or international authority. At the same time, he made it clear that his delegation's position with regard to the illegal actions of the United Kingdom in Cyrenaica did not mean that it viewed unfavourably the aspirations of colonial peoples to achieve self-government or independence expeditiously. On the contrary, the USSR based itself upon the consideration that those actions were directed

against the granting of genuine independence to those peoples. The Soviet Union continued to support the aspirations of the peoples of the former Italian colonies for independence but did not feel that the régime set up undemocratically and illegally in Cyrenaica by the United Kingdom was likely to achieve that aim, as it was merely a cover for the British colonial yoke which amounted to the undermining of the authority of the United Nations. The General Assembly could not and must not ignore that illegal step taken behind the back of the United Nations by one of its Members, the United Kingdom, with the overt blessing of another, the United States, but must determinedly disavow such machinations, which undermined its prestige and were designed to conceal from world public opinion the aggressive deals being made for the partition of the former Italian colonies. As at the previous session, the United Kingdom and the United States were attempting to confront the United Nations with a *fait accompli* achieved behind the back of the Organization and to push the General Assembly toward adoption of the Anglo-American plan, or they were trying to delay the solution of the question *sine die* so as to remain in fact masters in those territories.

23. The 3 million inhabitants of those former colonies expected an equitable solution. The representative of the Soviet Union said that the question could be solved in two possible ways, namely, that proposed by the United States and United Kingdom delegations or that proposed by the USSR delegation. To follow the first method would be tantamount to sanctioning illegal deals made by the United States and the United Kingdom with certain countries in their own aggressive and egotistic interests and would be tantamount to disavowing the stipulations of the Peace Treaty with Italy, which provided that the desires and the welfare of the inhabitants of the territories, as well as the interests of the maintenance of international peace and security, should be paramount in the solution of the issue. That course would amount to approving a policy designed to undermine the authority of the United Nations and to abandoning the principles and purposes of the Charter. The other course was outlined by the USSR proposal (A/C.1/487) based on the interests of the people of the former colonies as well as on the general interests of the United Nations. Demands for the immediate independence of Libya were being broadly supported in all regions of Libya and among all sections of the population. Mr. Arutiunian quoted from the Four-Power Commission of Investigation's report, third volume, section 5, entitled "Conclusions for the Whole of Libya", to the effect that, at present, as well as before the Second World War, Libya had been and was a single unit from all points of view. Stressing that unity, the report stated that local differences, accentuated in the post-war period owing to the artificial political division of that integral territory, were connected mainly with foreign interests and were largely counterbalanced by the integrating factors connected with the national interests of the Libyans themselves. That had been confirmed, *unter alia*, by the fact that the majority of the Libyans interviewed by the Commission had expressed themselves decidedly in favour of the unity of Libya. Similar thoughts had been expressed in the

memorandum of the National Libyan Liberation Council submitted to the Four-Power Commission.

24. Mr. Arutiunian said that the First Committee should also take into account the demands of the Eritrean population, which also wanted to maintain the unity of the country. It was well known that the views submitted to the Four-Power Commission of Investigation by all of the political parties and by the representatives who had addressed the Commission had been unanimous as to the necessity of maintaining the territorial integrity of Eritrea. He also referred to the unanimous declaration of the political organizations of Eritrea of 25 July 1949 protesting against any dismemberment of that country.

25. The USSR delegation, on the basis of those facts and in pursuance of its policy which took

into account the interests of the colonial peoples and those of the United Nations as a whole, had submitted a proposal (A/C.1/487) to the First Committee. That proposal was fully in accordance with the principles of the Charter pertaining to Trust Territories and with the principles set forth in the Four-Power Declaration on Italian territorial possessions in Africa. The solution proposed by his delegation would secure for the people of the former colonies the possibilities of economic, political and cultural advancement. It was inadmissible that those territories should remain colonial possessions any longer. It was essential to secure the development of the former Italian colonies and to secure as well the advancement of their peoples.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SECOND MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 4 October 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman:* Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

### Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece

POINT RAISED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

1. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) recalled the question concerning the execution of the Greek trade union leader, Georgi Demosthenes, raised by the Polish representative, at the 280th meeting. That news had been confirmed by a French press agency, and it appeared from information from Greece that summary executions were taking place every night. The Greek representative had stated, however, that his Government had requested judicial bodies to suspend all executions (276th meeting). In actual fact, the Committee had been deceived. The Chairman should examine the question without delay, and report to the Committee, after consultation with the Greek delegation, why action had not been taken in accordance with Mr. Pipinelis' statement, and why that statement had been made.

2. The CHAIRMAN said that following the statements made by the representatives of Poland and the Ukrainian SSR the previous day, he had discussed the matter with the President of the General Assembly, to whose attention it had already been brought directly by the representative of the Ukrainian SSR on the morning of 1 October. An urgent inquiry was being made, and he hoped to be able to inform the Committee of the result of it at the beginning of the afternoon meeting.

3. Mr. DENDRAMIS (Greece) said that Georgi Demosthenes had been condemned to death by a court, set up in accordance with existing laws. Owing to the principle of the separation of powers, his Government could not instruct the judicial arm to suspend or repeal a sentence pronounced in accordance with the law, without first changing that law. That was why his Government had tabled a bill modifying the existing procedure. The prisoner, however, had been executed before the decision on the revision of that procedure had been published.

### Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies; general discussion (continued)

4. Mr. JOOSTE (Union of South Africa) said that his Government was prompted by the following general considerations: (a) The future of the territories concerned was indissolubly bound up with the security of the African continent as a whole. The stability and progress of their administration were necessary and essential to the peaceful evolution of the continent. (b) The inhabitants' material and moral welfare and progress were factors which should never be lost sight of when solving that problem. (c) The inhabitants' aspirations in regard to their future government should be meticulously considered.

5. He recalled that at the second part of the third session, for the sake of compromise, his delegation had been prepared to accept certain proposals made by other delegations, although they did not conform in every respect to the solution the Union of South Africa thought best. No solution had been found, however, and the delay had led to a feeling of uncertainty and confusion among many of the inhabitants of those territories. In order to enable the Committee to reach a final settlement, the delegation of the Union of South Africa would study, in a spirit of compromise, any proposal worthy of interest and nearest to his Government's policy. In particular, it would examine very carefully the views of the United States and the United Kingdom, which had a great many points in common.

6. The delegation of the Union of South Africa recognized that the unification of Libya was the normal outcome of a natural evolution which should be based on the interests and wishes of the inhabitants of the territory. As to its independence, it could be regarded as a realizable and possible aim. The Committee should not, however, for the moment fix a definite time-limit for the interim administration under the Trusteeship System. Determination of that period should rather be left to the judgment of the Administering Au-



thority, in consultation with the inhabitants of the territory. The Union of South Africa appreciated the justice of the United Kingdom representative's statement (278th meeting) that an international trusteeship system in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica might lead to complications when independence was to be given to a United Libya. Like the United Kingdom Government, the delegation of the Union appreciated the special position of the Italian community in Tripolitania. It was in favour of a solution which would take that element into account, and particularly the fact that Italy was able to give those territories technical and economic assistance. In regard to the disposal of the Fezzan during the interim period which would culminate in Libya's independence, his delegation would like to follow the course of events before stating its views.

7. Former Italian Somaliland should be placed under Italian trusteeship. That territory was not economically viable and it was doubtful whether it ever would be. In any case a definite decision on its administration and development could not be taken for some years. The Union of South Africa believed that democratic Italy would be able to ensure the most enlightened administration and that Italian trusteeship would promote the interests and the material and moral welfare of the peoples concerned.

8. The Union of South Africa had, in the past, advocated an Italian trusteeship for Eritrea as it doubted whether Ethiopia would be able to develop the territory which it was proposed to cede to it. It was, however, convinced that steps should be taken to give Ethiopia direct access to the sea. His delegation had noted the wishes of certain representatives of the Eritrean population who were opposed to the annexation of part of that territory to Ethiopia. Such objections could not be passed over in silence or rejected without consideration. On the other hand, Eritrea was not economically viable. There could, therefore, be no question of granting that territory its immediate independence as a separate political entity. Moreover, it must be realized that the population was heterogeneous and divergent in its aspirations regarding the country's disposal. That was why the Government of the Union of South Africa felt that a final decision should not be taken at that time. On the contrary, it favoured a provisional administration for an indefinite period. Such an administration would help to crystalize the factors likely to decide the future destiny of the territory. The Union of South Africa was, therefore, in favour of a trusteeship system for Eritrea, as that system of government would make for stability and continuity of administration and would not interfere with the establishment of whatever governmental structure might later be decided upon in the light of experience.

9. The Committee had two proposals before it, one to incorporate the greater part of Eritrea into Ethiopia—a proposal which many seemed to favour—and the other to grant Eritrea immediate independence. In making the latter proposal the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs had used arguments (279th meeting) which were worthy of careful consideration. The delegation of the Union of South Africa, however, found it difficult, at least for the time being, to agree that the territory could become a separate autonomous State before its economic viability had been clearly proved. Whatever solution was adopted, his dele-

gation would support any proposal prompted by a desire to safeguard the interests of the Italian communities in Eritrea.

10. In conclusion he hoped that the Committee would come to an agreement during the current session, so as to put an end to the feeling of insecurity in the minds of the populations whose fate must be decided by the General Assembly.

11. Mr. CLEMENTIS (Czechoslovakia) said that the reason for the disagreement in the Council of Foreign Ministers and for the referral of the question to the United Nations had been the attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom, which had tried to obtain approval of their *de facto* domination of the territories. Apart from the usual motives of expansionist policy, the acquisition of military bases and strategic considerations had influenced the attitude of those two great Powers. The establishment of military and naval bases was certainly not the most appropriate method of achieving the aims of the Trusteeship System as described in Article 76 (b) of the Charter. The facts as they appeared in the report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation, which showed that the occupying Powers had used the decrees of the fascist régime and the services of representatives of that régime, proved that those Powers had no wish to help those populations to decide their fate for themselves. The attitude of the United Kingdom and the United States had not changed substantially since the question had been referred to the United Nations. During the second part of the third session of the General Assembly, the Commission had seen the so-called "Bevin-Sforza compromise", a compromise between the old methods of the United Kingdom and those of Italy that was more liable to harm the interests of the Libyan population than to serve them. Popular manifestations against that compromise had turned into demonstrations of satisfaction when it had become known that the compromise had been rejected by the United Nations. It was regrettable that Count Sforza had been given an opportunity to distract the attention of the populations of the former Italian colonies from the lamentable history of the fascist régime and from the attempt to re-establish Italian domination over those populations by slanderous attacks against the Soviet Union.

12. Disregarding the clear manifestations of the Libyan population in favour of a solution leading to the autonomy and independence of the territory within the shortest possible time, the United Kingdom and the United States were again inviting the Committee to sanction their selfish plans, already once rejected. The General Assembly should adopt a definitive solution that could give full satisfaction to the populations concerned and strengthen peace and the authority of the United Nations. Any other solution would involve the prolongation of the *status quo* and would give another opportunity for the arranging of a *fait accompli* such as that fabricated in the case of "independent" Cyrenaica.

13. The USSR proposal (A/C.1/487) represented a just, workable and definite solution that would not only be the expression of a logical policy, but would implement in concrete manner the ideas expressed by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report.<sup>1</sup> The Arab States

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 1.

were especially anxious that those problems should be solved in the spirit of the Charter and would doubtless favour such a solution. The problem seemed complicated, but could be solved quite easily, as was proved by the draft resolution of the Soviet Union. It was useless to discuss all the various possibilities and alternatives for the immediate granting of independence to Libya or the granting of such independence to Eritrea or Italian Somaliland after a period of trusteeship by the United Nations, since there was no end to the possible alternatives. Such a procedure might impede the adoption of any solution. During the second part of the third session of the General Assembly, the attempts to camouflage the aims and methods of contemporary imperialist policy under the purposes and principles of the Charter had been rejected. It was now the Assembly's duty to go further and implement the principles of the Charter by adopting the Soviet Union draft resolution.

14. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) recalled that during the second part of the third session a group of South American nations which favoured the independence of the former Italian colonies had drawn up a compromise solution for final settlement of the problem (A/C.1/449). That attempt had failed. A further failure would be regrettable. Furthermore, it would be strange if agreement were reached to grant Libya, Eritrea and Somaliland independence, and yet did not prove possible to reach agreement on the procedures for achieving that independence. The Argentine delegation wished to give its views on the broad outlines of the problem. Argentina was in favour of independence for all the territories concerned.

15. Since the former Italian Somaliland had not yet reached the stage of development necessary for self-government, it should be placed under the Trusteeship System with the proviso that its right to independence would be declared immediately. The Argentine Republic was favourably disposed to the legitimate claims of the Italian population which had co-operated in the economic development and cultural and political progress of the former Italian colonies. Italian emigration would help to speed up the economic and social progress of the African territories, whose evolution was still backward. Italy's efforts were worthy of admiration, and Argentina was prepared to do everything in its power to see that that country took part in the work of the United Nations as soon as possible.

16. The independence of Eritrea and Libya should be proclaimed forthwith. Immediately after that declaration of independence, United Nations commissions appointed by the General Assembly should elaborate the appropriate measures to give the three territories of Libya a provisional Government. No definite government should be imposed upon them in advance, nor should elections take place in accordance with a predetermined procedure. The inhabitants of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan should decide the nature of their future government for themselves, as the conditions of social evolution were very different in the three territories. The territories should freely elect the forms of government most suitable to them, without prejudice to the subsequent unification of Libya. Two commissions might be established, one to deal with Cyrenaica and the Fezzan and another to deal with Tripolitania, which had

reached greater social and political maturity than the other two territories.

17. The commissions should include an Italian representative since Italy was well acquainted with the history of the territories and had contributed to their progress. The commissions should not be concerned with the actual membership of the provisional Governments of those territories, but should guide them on the path to independence. The commissions should not interfere in the exercise of civil functions by the Administering Authorities. Once the provisional Governments had been established, the Administering Authorities would transfer their powers to them. The three autonomous territories would then begin negotiations to ensure the unity of Libya within the framework of a federal structure or some other similar system.

18. The independence of Eritrea should also be proclaimed at once. That declaration would not be harmful to the real interests of Ethiopia. A United Nations control commission, of which Ethiopia would be a member, would take the necessary measures for the election of a provisional Government to undertake the administration. The first act of that provisional Government should be to negotiate a treaty of friendship with Ethiopia, guaranteeing the latter free access to the Red Sea via the port of Massawa and the existing railway. Ethiopia would thus have an outlet to the sea, and the transit of goods to or from Addis Ababa would be advantageous to Eritrean economy. If the two Governments could not reach agreement, the United Nations commission would have to report to the Organization and the General Assembly might, at its following session, require Eritrea to cede the territory essential to give Ethiopia an outlet to the sea.

19. The Argentine delegation also wanted Somaliland to become independent. It might be placed under provisional United Nations trusteeship, and Italy might be entrusted with its administration. If any difficulties were to arise, they could certainly be overcome in the spirit of the United Nations Charter, without losing the benefit of the co-operation of democratic and republican Italy.

20. After the general debate, a sub-committee should be established consisting of the authors of all the drafts and suggestions submitted during the debate. The sub-committee's terms of reference would be to consider the various suggestions and proposals, in order to draw up one or more final proposals to be submitted to the Committee for study and voting. If the Committee thought it necessary, the delegation of Argentina would submit a written proposal to that effect.

21. Fayez Bey EL-KHOURI (Syria) said that the very wording of the question under discussion recalled the era of conquest and slavery which it would have been good to believe past. In fact, to use the word "colony" in an age when the countries of the Near East were about to be combined in the vast unity of the Arab world—which was on the march and which no power could stop—was to inflict an unjustified humiliation upon peoples.

22. In Libya, the colonial Powers had divided in order to rule. Thus, for example, France had seized the Fezzan during the last war. The fact

remained, however, that the unity of Libya was more than thirteen centuries old and constituted an undeniable historical fact. In the Ottoman Empire, the Arabs, including those of the Fezzan, of Tripolitania and of Cyrenaica had been able to hold the highest offices, on a footing of absolute equality. Unfortunately, things had changed from the day the French and Italian invaders had penetrated the Arab world. After the First World War, an arbitrary decision had established the Mandate System in the Near East, introducing a fundamental factor of discord, and delaying the political development of the peoples concerned. Although faced with that crime and its disastrous consequences, the Arabs had not despaired.

23. In fact, through Count Sforza, the new democratic Italy had admitted that if the existing situation were prolonged, the populations concerned would be led to think that no one was sincerely interested in their destiny. The new Italian Government had admitted that Libya had a right to independence and unity, the magic formula of national development, as the Italians knew better than any other people.

24. The unity of Libya was very real, whatever the representative of France might have said about it. His attitude was in unfortunate contrast with that of Count Sforza, since he had stressed the distinctions to be made between the three parts of Libya, and even the points of opposition. Whatever might have been said on the matter by the representative of France, who had neglected to mention the Fezzan, the different parts of Libya had been united for at least thirteen centuries. Revolutionary France had introduced the idea of liberty into the world, but the foreign policy of that country presented a characteristic example of stubborn and reactionary imperialism, especially in regard to its relations with its colonies. France did not believe in the unity of Libya. What mattered more were its ties with the Fezzan which it no longer considered to form part of Libya, since it was under French occupation. If that were the position of France with regard to the Fezzan, which had been conquered barely eight years previously, what would France say when the time came to speak about Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco? Moreover, France was more royalist than the king when it was a question of defending a certain conception of Italian interests; the attitude of Italy was neither so uncompromising nor so equivocal as that of France.

25. When would the few survivors of the era of imperialism understand that colonialism had ended, and that it was wiser to follow the example of the United States in the Philippines and of the United Kingdom in India and Pakistan? The United States and the United Kingdom showed an obvious liberalism towards the question on the agenda, and in that field they were even excelled by the Soviet Union. It was therefore to be hoped that all the great Powers would one day recognize the rights of the small nations.

26. The Syrian delegation had expressed its views during the previous session of the General Assembly, but since then a liberal evolution had taken place. The idea of placing Libya under the Trusteeship System had been set aside, and the present tendency was in terms of unity and independence.

27. So far as the Syrian delegation was concerned, it could but express satisfaction at that

new spirit for mandates or trusteeship implied experts, preferably from colonial Powers. But to know the other point of view, it was only necessary to ask the opinion of peoples like the Syrians, who had some experience in the matter.

28. The history of the Mandate System imposed upon Syria, Iraq, Transjordan, Palestine and Lebanon was very revealing. During the First World War, the Emir Hussein had fought with the Allies, who had promised him the independence of the Arab countries. But once victory had been won, there had been division and subjugation instead of unity and independence. The Mandatory Powers had misgoverned the territories entrusted to them. Following a quarter of a century of destruction and bloody repression, the Near East had found itself divided into smaller States, envious of each other and in no way prepared for independence, while intruders and invaders had been brought into the Arab countries by the Mandatory Powers themselves. The legitimate owners of Arab lands had been reduced to the condition of destitute refugees. The Arabs had lost the unity which they had had before the First World War and, thanks to the Mandate, they had been driven from part of their land, while the former Turkish provinces of the Ottoman Empire, which were generally less advanced but which had escaped the mandate system, were currently entirely independent. Lastly, the most extraordinary thing was that the Mandatory Powers had not feared to cast the blame on the Arabs whom they had left without any preparation of any kind, at the mercy of an enemy whom they themselves had trained. Such was the evidence which former mandated countries could bring to the United Nations.

29. In so far as each individual territory was concerned, it was the duty of every Arab to welcome the equitable and liberal draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/SR.487). The Syrian delegation considered it to be its national and humanitarian duty to support it, at least at that stage of the debate, while reserving its right to give more detailed explanations when the text was discussed together with the other draft resolutions.

30. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) paid tribute to the Syrian representative's moving picture of the fate of the peoples of the Near East.

31. During the long history of the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies studied successively by the Council of Foreign Ministers, their Deputies, and the United Nations, a series of unilateral acts, intended to solve the problem without resorting to the competent bodies, and certain transactions, had blurred the concept of the predominant consideration, namely the "... wishes and welfare of the inhabitants and the interests of peace and security . . .", according to the wording of annex XI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Peace with Italy.

32. The most important questions were, therefore, the following: were the inhabitants of the former Italian colonies sufficiently developed for self-government? Were they prepared for independence? And if not, what was the best way of hastening that development as much as possible?

33. Truly the manoeuvres of certain great Powers merely represented a new manifestation of their traditional policy of defending their established

interests and extending their sphere of influence. Now, five years after the end of hostilities in those territories, military bases were still being developed in Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Somaliland, not only under the control of the authorities at present in charge of the administration of those territories, but especially under that of the United States, which had apparently become a Mediterranean Power. It was not surprising, therefore, that the United States wished to participate in the control of those territories within the framework of United Kingdom proposals, nor that attempts were being made to alienate another great Power which was obviously considered to be too close a neighbour of the Mediterranean basin.

34. In those circumstances, what would become of the interests of the inhabitants and of international peace and security? Attempts were being made to fortify the positions acquired by the Anglo-Americans and to strengthen their control of the sea routes between Gibraltar and Aden. The interest shown by certain great Powers in the welfare of the peoples of the former Italian colonies should be viewed in the light of those political considerations. Those great Powers thought that they alone were qualified to preside over the development of colonial peoples, outside the framework of the Trusteeship System established by the United Nations. But were not investigations of the colonial system, past and present, sufficiently eloquent?

35. The United Kingdom representative had gone so far as to say (278th meeting) that trusteeship would not be the best method of guiding those populations towards independence, and the representative of France had stated (279th meeting) that that system was old-fashioned. On the other hand, those delegations were attempting to withhold independence as far as possible from peoples which, on their own admission, were capable of governing themselves. Thus, the Bevin-Sforza plan, the purpose of which was to confront the United Nations with a *fait accompli*, had been drawn up in the interests of the two Governments and, as Count Sforza himself had stated, in order to re-establish friendly relations between the two countries—at the expense of the populations concerned.

36. The Polish Government, on the contrary, wished to promote the interests of the populations, provided that international peace and security were safeguarded. Generally speaking, the Polish Government considered that all colonial peoples should be given their independence, either immediately, or as soon as possible if they were not sufficiently developed, and that they should first be helped to reach the stage where they could administer themselves.

37. The Polish Government considered that Libya as a whole should become independent; that the whole of Eritrea should be placed under international trusteeship for five years, though giving satisfaction to Ethiopia's legitimate wishes for free access to the sea through the port of Assab and that a régime similar to that of Eritrea should be set up in Somaliland. Those two territories should be administered by the Trusteeship Council, which would appoint an Administrator. An advisory committee would include the representatives of the five great Powers, Italy, Ethiopia, and the local populations, represented by two Natives and one European.

38. If one Power were to administer those territories, the interests of the populations would not be safeguarded. On the other hand, owing to the proximity of important maritime routes, the participation of all the great Powers without exception in the administration would constitute an essential guarantee of international peace and security.

39. The Polish delegation therefore called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops and the liquidation of military establishments and bases in Libya.

40. It was necessary to put an end to the expansionist and oppressive policy of the colonial Powers which hampered the free development of peoples. The voice of those peoples should be heard by all the United Nations. Poland would support them.

41. ABDUL RAHIM Bey (Egypt) referred to the principles and purposes of the Charter relating to equal rights and the self-determination of peoples and the provisions of the Peace Treaty with Italy relating to the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants and the interests of peace and security.

42. Most, if not all, of the delegations had recognized that a just solution must be found to the Libyan problem. The general if not unanimous tendency was to grant full independence to that country within the framework of its unity. For example, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, had stated<sup>1</sup> that plans for a united and independent Libya should be carried to completion in not more than four years. The United States representative on the First Committee had also spoken eloquently to that effect (278th meeting).

43. At the same meeting the United Kingdom representative had stated that his delegation had finally recognized that circumstances required that those territories should receive their independence at the earliest practicable date.

44. The Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/487) also provided in terms as eloquent as they were clear for the immediate independence and unity of Libya.

45. Thus justice and the Charter were triumphant.

46. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated at a meeting of the First Committee on 1 October (279th meeting) that his country was fully in favour of the immediate independence of the two most advanced territories, Eritrea and Libya.

47. With regard to the unity of Libya, Count Sforza had also stated that a unitary structure should preserve the common historical heritage of the different parts of Libya. Count Sforza, however, had then indicated in detail how the independence of Tripolitania was to be achieved and had spoken of the commission which would supervise the first general elections in Tripolitania without, however, saying anything about Cyrenaica and the Fezzan. He called for immediate independence for Tripolitania within the framework of the future unity—which the United Nations should recommend immediately—and which would then be realised by a free decision taken by the various

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 222nd plenary meeting.

regions as soon as they had attained independence. Did that mean that the independence of the Fezzan and Cyrenaica would be delayed? The Arab world hoped that the Italian Government, which seemed to favour immediate independence for a unified Libya, would dispel any doubts as to its intentions.

48. The statement made on 1 October by the representative of France (279th meeting), that country which had taught the world the ideals of liberty and fraternity did not augur well for the people of Libya or for the other dependent peoples who look to the United Nations for their deliverance. There could be no doubt that the Libyans were entitled to unity and independence, but Egypt, a sister Arab nation, felt it necessary to refer to certain questions which had been raised by the representative of France.

49. Libya was an indivisible unit. The existing division into three provinces was neither practical nor just. Moreover, since Libya had been united for centuries, such a division ran contrary to the whole trend of history which tended to group nations and peoples together.

50. An overwhelming majority of the population of Libya adhered to the Moslem religion. The inhabitants of the three provinces were Arabs. They had spoken one language for centuries and had had a single culture. All the successive régimes, including the Italian régime, had always respected the unity of Libya.

51. Furthermore, economic factors which nothing could destroy united all the Libyans. To disturb that unity would be to condemn the country to misery and ruin.

52. Certain delegations had stated that the desert extending between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania might form an obstacle to their unity, but deserts had not prevented national unity from being achieved in the United States or in Libya itself at a time when the means of communication had been rudimentary. The physical geography of a country could not prevail over ties of blood, race and religion as strong as those which united the inhabitants of Libya.

53. The unity of Libya corresponded to the aspirations of the majority of the Libyan people; that was clear from the report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation. Furthermore, the representative organizations from Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, which represented the overwhelming majority of the Libyan people had testified to that effect at the previous session and had stressed the unity as well as the independence of their country.

54. Thus the resolution to be adopted by the General Assembly should definitely establish the unity of Libya and put an end to foreign domination.

55. Libya's resistance to the foreigner had not faltered since 1911, as had been shown by the events which had taken place in Tripoli during the previous session of the General Assembly. During the war Libyans had struggled against the fascist régime and had organized a contingent of 14,000 men who had fought for a unified Libya, believing that liberty and justice were on the side of the Allies and that they were fighting for their own freedom. They expected, therefore, the right of self-determination. Had they not shown that they were politically mature? Until 1911, Libya

had nearly always been independent, hence its hatred of Italian domination. The Porte had hardly interfered in the administration of the various Arab States: it had respected and encouraged their national institutions. There had been national councils in Libya, the tribes had elected their own chiefs and the Libyans held important posts. At the beginning of the century Libyans had been represented in the Ottoman Parliament. Self-government would not, therefore, be a new experience for them. In all countries where aggressors had usurped national sovereignty the political *élite* had undoubtedly left the country. But hundreds of highly qualified Libyans were ready to return to their post as soon as their country had regained its independence.

56. The Egyptian delegation asked that Libya should be given its immediate independence within the framework of its unity, an essential condition for the maintenance of peace and security in the Mediterranean area. Any resolution concerning Libya should provide for the following: (a) The granting of immediate independence to a unified Libya, with the shortest possible transitional period during which time free elections for a constituent assembly of a free Libya would be held. (b) During the transitional period the two Administering Authorities should transfer their authority in such a way as to cause no prejudice to the unity of Libya with its three component provinces. The unity of the country, at the end of the transitory period should remain the ultimate objective in matters of customs, communications and education. (c) A special committee of five members representing the two Administering Authorities and three other States, one of which should be an Arab State, with a thorough knowledge of Libya and its people should be appointed by the General Assembly and be responsible to it. That committee would supervise first of all free general elections to the constituent assembly, and secondly the smooth and gradual transfer of authority from the present Administering Powers to the Libyans, that transfer being carried out in such a way as not to prejudice the principle of unity. That committee should report on the progress of its work.

57. As was well-known, Egypt had asked on many occasions for a readjustment of its western frontier with Libya, in several notes and at meetings of the Peace Conference in Paris and the Council of Deputy Foreign Ministers in London, as well as at the third session of the General Assembly (245th meeting). The Egyptian request had specifically mentioned: the Sollum plateau, the oasis of Jaghoub, the two oases of Arknoh and Owenat, and the Sarra wells, areas which, as historical documents proved, had always belonged to Egypt, and some of which had been detached after the First World War and annexed to Libya.

58. It was not a question of greed for territory on the part of Egypt, since the region concerned was a small desert area of no economic importance and of no value to Libya. It was a question of a vital adjustment which should have been made a long time ago, since it was indispensable to the national security of Egypt and its legality was based on the history of that country.

59. Egypt, which had made its request when three separate trusteeships had been suggested for Libya, felt it was in a position to negotiate similar

frontier adjustments in a spirit of friendship and mutual co-operation with a sister nation, the independent Libya of the future.

60. In so far as the former Italian possessions in East Africa were concerned, Egypt proposed to follow the Charter, to respect the rights of peoples to self-determination, to take into consideration the wishes and the welfare of the inhabitants, and to take cognizance of the economic interests and racial and religious affinities of those territories.

61. As regards Somaliland, the Egyptian delegation considered that it should ultimately be granted self-government and the maximum degree of independence as soon as possible. If, however, it was considered that a transitional period was necessary, the wishes and welfare of the Somali people should be constantly borne in mind.

62. In the case of Eritrea, Egypt would favour a solution which took into most serious consideration the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants of that country and of their racial and religious affinities, as well as the just claims of Ethiopia.

63. Finally, the General Assembly should settle the boundaries of those three territories. It was in fact laid down in annex XI, paragraph 2, of the Peace Treaty with Italy that ". . . the final disposal of the territories concerned and the appropriate adjustment of their boundaries shall be made by the Four Powers . . ." Since the Four Powers had not solved that problem, the General Assembly must do so.

64. The Egyptian delegation therefore proposed that boundary commissions should be formed, each composed of three members, representing the present Administrative Authority of the colony in question, the adjacent country, and a neutral chairman chosen by agreement between the two parties involved. The boundary commission should be directed to report on its decisions to the fifth session of the General Assembly.

65. The fate of millions of people, as well as the reputation of the United Nations, would depend on the decision that was taken on that long-standing problem.

66. Mr. GARCÍA BAUER (Guatemala) expressed the hope that the current session would succeed in solving the problem of the disposal of the former Italian colonies, in accordance with the Peace Treaty with Italy, in the joint interest of the welfare of the peoples of those colonies and the prestige of the United Nations.

67. Most delegations were in agreement that Libya should become independent immediately. Whereas, at the previous session, a trusteeship system had been contemplated for the three territories constituting Libya, the countries most directly concerned were now at present in favour of immediate Libyan independence, with a more or less brief transitional period, during which new agencies would be set up in accordance with the wishes of the populations.

68. Similarly, there was a strong current of opinion in favour of Libyan unity, which had already been stressed by the Guatemalan delegation at the previous session. In point of fact, the ethnic, historic and religious bonds justified the establishment of political unity. On the basis of those two principles of unity and independence of Libya a sub-committee should prepare a plan which would be acceptable to the required majority, and which would enable the Libyan population to assume the full responsibility of self-government.

69. With regard to Eritrea, the Guatemalan delegation believed that the most prudent course would be to appoint a commission of investigation which would prepare a report submitting a plan for the future of that territory. The General Assembly would thus be in a better position to take a decision. The General Assembly should receive information from the commission regarding the possibility of Eritrea's being able to develop as an independent political and economic entity.

70. The situation with regard to Somaliland was completely different. According to the information supplied by the Four Power Commission of Investigation, the degree of development of that territory was lower than that of Libya and it needed, therefore, assistance to achieve political maturity. Consequently the Guatemalan delegation reaffirmed its opinion that the best solution would be to place Somaliland under a trusteeship system, with Italy as the Administering Authority. With regard to its independence, a limit of not more than ten years should be fixed, at the end of which time the Trusteeship Agreement would be revised. It would then be possible to examine the progress achieved and take a decision as to the future. If the First Committee so agreed, the Guatemalan delegation would recommend to the Fourth Committee to prepare a trusteeship agreement for submission to the General Assembly, if possible during the current session.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THIRD MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 4 October 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

### **Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies: general discussion (continued)**

1. Mr. CARIAS (Honduras) said that the experience gained from the debates of the previous session which had ended with the failure of a compromise solution might serve to increase the efforts of the Committee. In fulfilling the authority vested in it, the General Assembly must apply

methods gained from previous experience. The representatives of Italy and the United Kingdom, as well as the representatives of a number of groups representing the population of the countries concerned, had proven that the general trend of opinion favoured the independence of those territories within a certain period of time.

2. Moreover, his delegation was glad to observe an almost unanimous desire to grant Libya immediate independence. He deemed it necessary for



the First Committee to decide on the methods whereby the independence of Libya would be established. The various characteristics of that area would seem to indicate that a federation was necessary. The United Nations should try to fulfil the desires of those peoples for independence and self-government. During the transitional period, the respect for human rights and privileges should be ensured, while flexible legislation must be adopted with a view to meeting arising circumstances. The Indian suggestion seemed to him to be most acceptable since it would guide those territories towards future independence. Establishment of a surveying committee to consider financial implications and territorial changes might become necessary. The creation of a federal system would also be part of the task of that committee working together with the representatives of the indigenous inhabitants.

3. With regard to Somaliland, the views expressed during the previous Assembly as well as during the present debate showed a tendency towards granting Italy trusteeship over that territory under the auspices of the United Nations for a period of time to be determined later. Under the circumstances, his delegation felt that such arrangement would be the most adequate and appropriate solution.

4. With regard to the opinions previously expressed by those who supported a partition of Eritrea, there was a weakness in the preparation of such a solution. Some representatives had even admitted the possibility of a solution being reached which would be more in accord with the desires of the population. In view of the difficulties arising out of the various geographical, religious and ethnical complications, a commission should be established for the purpose of ascertaining the wishes of the population and report to the following session of the General Assembly.

5. In conclusion, Mr. Carias requested the United Nations to assume the responsibility of administering those territories which had not as yet reached the necessary political maturity. The Administering Authorities should recognize that the welfare of the indigenous inhabitants should be their guiding principle.

6. Mr. MARS (Haiti) recalled that his delegation had abstained in the votes taken at the previous session, since it had considered that the proposed solution did not attempt to solve the problem in conformity with democratic ideals. The present debate, however, evidenced a development towards implementation of the principle of self-government. With that principle in mind, his delegation would support any resolution aiming at the immediate independence of Libya, leaving it to the Libyan people to choose freely their own form of government.

7. With regard to Eritrea, the Committee should carefully consider the geographic, historical and ethnical factors involved. The Haitian delegation believed it necessary to give the Eritreans an opportunity to adjust their relations with Ethiopia, thus making it possible for the two countries to live together in peace.

8. Finally, with regard to Somaliland, Italy should be entrusted, under United Nations supervision, with the task of preparing that territory for independence within a reasonable period of time.

Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) said that his delegation, in general, believed that the evolution towards the independence of peoples and the achievement of equality of rights corresponded to the development of international relations. Thus all the United Nations efforts should be directed towards that end. That principle also served the interests of peoples that had already achieved independence, since the entire international community could but benefit from the contributions to justice and culture that any people could offer and could only offer if they could develop their internal affairs freely and without constraint. The less one nation was subordinated to another, the less interference there was in the domestic affairs of others, the greater were the chances of peace and the smaller were the dangers of war. In the light of those views, the Yugoslav delegation was glad to take note of the more and more vigorous tendencies manifested in the former Italian colonies towards the creation of two new independent nations: a unified Libyan State and an independent Somaliland. The General Assembly would be well advised to take decisions towards those ends.

10. With regard to Eritrea, the right of self-determination did not seem to his delegation to militate in favour of an independent Eritrean State. The central part of that territory had been artificially severed from neighbouring Ethiopia. It was obvious therefore that the just application of the rights of people to self-determination could not here be expressed in any way other than the incorporation of that territory into Ethiopia. National minorities, including those of cities and ports, would naturally have to share the destinies of the majority of the population in the territories concerned. As to the Western Province, neither the findings of the Four Power Commission of Investigation nor the views expressed during the present debate proved that that province was capable of constituting a new Arab nation. It had not been proved that it could become part of the Sudanese nation. In that particular case, collective trusteeship was fully justified. Collective trusteeship rather than trusteeship by one single nation could equally apply to Somaliland, should the First Committee favour such a solution. Accordingly, his delegation would vote in favour of any resolutions or parts of resolutions which were close to those points of view.

11. Mr. EBAN (Israel) said that the problem of the former Italian colonies had arisen in the First Committee as a result of the deadlock reached by the General Assembly at its previous session. His delegation had then felt unable to give any support to the majority plan worked out in that Committee, and had, along with others, criticized that plan on the ground of its excessive attention to the aspirations of the interested Powers and its disregard for the cause of national independence in the territories concerned. However, the Israel delegation was gratified to notice that in the course of the existing debate, the centre of gravity had visibly moved away from the concern with strategic relationships towards a general consensus in favour of strict independence. At the same time, those who attached primary importance to the principle of independence, had moved from the beginning toward the support of swifter and simpler procedures for its attainment. Israel's main desire was to see Libya, Eritrea and Somaliland pass as soon as possible under the rule of their own independent governments, drawing their au-

thority from their own peoples and not from outside.

12. The territories in question differed widely in their degrees of maturity and development. Accordingly, the rate of advance towards independence could not be uniform in each case. It was the duty of the First Committee, therefore, to study the problems of each territory on its merits and not to obstruct any solution for one territory on the grounds of being unable to reach agreement on another. Should, however, parliamentary complications appear likely to produce such a deadlock, it would be advisable for the Committee to make its proposal in the form of three separate resolutions, thus enabling the General Assembly to take decisive action, since the recurrence of a deadlock would be interpreted as a sign of the General Assembly's impotence to solve international problems even when its jurisdiction had been accepted in advance. Should the United Nations fail to adopt an equitable solution, the peoples of the territories concerned would be left alone with the Administering Powers and the provisions of the Charter in favour of an orderly independence under international auspices might cease to operate.

13. Mr. Eban was glad to note a growing movement in favour of Libyan independence. In the recent history of the Eastern Mediterranean area the dominant process had been one of swift emancipation. Whereas a few decades ago there existed a vast expanse of subject territories, there were now eight independent States. It was not enough for the General Assembly to adhere to the principles of self-government; its influence must extend to the supervision of the process whereby independence would be achieved.

14. In the inevitable transitional period, it was necessary that an organ of the General Assembly should represent the United Nations. Failing that, one could not ignore the danger that the forms of independence might be gained at the expense of its substance, and the General Assembly would be shifting its responsibilities to the Administering Powers, leaving it entirely to them to interpret its policies. Any such commission should be established on the principle of wide geographical distribution, offering special and adequate representation to important Italian interests.

15. The Israeli delegation supported the principle outlined by the Indian representative (280th meeting) to the effect that the populations of the three Libyan territories should themselves be completely free to secure their own unification in the exact form and manner they wished. The General Assembly should require and facilitate an identical and simultaneous process of elections throughout the entire territory and must not content itself with existing units of authority which had not yet submitted themselves to an electoral test. Moreover the existence of important minority groups in the Tripolitania area of Libya required close consideration.

16. The General Assembly could not ignore the interests and achievements of the Italian citizens of Tripolitania as well as the large Jewish community which had already been subjected to the fearful ordeal of attack and spoliation. The latter should receive special considerations and safeguards in the light of its future status as a minority in an Arab State. Such assurances should be re-

quested from the Libyan national representatives so as to include the maintenance of cultural and religious autonomy, the recognition by the State of the right of those who wished to depart with their families and property for settlement elsewhere to exercise that facility. By giving such undertaking, the Libyan representatives would be able to secure a unanimous support for independence by all the important elements of the population.

17. In supporting Libyan independence, his Government expressed its steadfast desire to see all its neighbours attain their genuine emancipation as soon as possible, as well as their collective harmony, based on regional co-operation and not on exclusive racial or cultural solidarities which had been so heavily stressed in the course of the debate. He supported the views expressed by the representative of Egypt (282nd meeting) to the effect that the transitional period should be as brief as possible. That transitional period should be timed to precise mathematical terms.

18. With regard to Eritrea, the delegation of Israel had not been convinced by the argument in favour of dismemberment and annexation. If it were true that the two areas of Eritrea desired to seek their future along separate channels and in association with neighbouring States or colonies, it would be for them to express their aspirations in those terms. In advance of any such expression of will, it was not for the United Nations to decide against the possibility of Eritrean independence. The representative of Italy, speaking from long experience, had not confirmed the view that Eritrea could not have any healthy independent existence of its own. If the immediate or early independence of Eritrea, as advocated by Italy, was not possible, then a solution should be sought along the lines of the draft resolution of the Soviet Union (A/C.1/487), which called for a brief period of United Nations trusteeship with representation for the Government of Italy in the Advisory Council.

19. As regards Somaliland, it was obvious that the progress of that territory towards independence should be controlled by the Trusteeship Council, whose wide international composition and specialized experience rendered it an adequate instrument for that task.

20. The present debate had revealed wide support for the granting to Ethiopia of an access to the sea. The question arose whether that access should be sought by territorial changes or by agreements on the use of ports and communications. Mr. Eban was of the opinion that the aspirations of Ethiopia for changes in existing territorial dispositions should be the subject of negotiations between Ethiopia and the future government or administration of Eritrea, the outcome of which should not be prejudiced by prior recommendations by the General Assembly. The views of the populations directly concerned, he concluded, were such a paramount consideration in those questions that his delegation would await their statements and the further development of the debate before discussing the details of the draft resolutions before the Committee.

21. Mr. DEJANY (Saudi Arabia) said that an almost unanimous agreement seemed to prevail in the First Committee with regard to one of the three territories under consideration, namely Libya.



He recalled that at the previous session, his delegation had consistently adhered to the view that Libya's unity should be preserved and that it was already ready for independence. Detailed arguments were advanced to substantiate that view. Moreover, most representatives who had spoken so far had accepted those principles.

22. However, despite the spirit of optimism already displayed, his delegation entertained some doubts as to the effectiveness of the measures proposed to secure the implementation of those principles. He was afraid that while the aspect of independence had been emphasized, that of unity had been relegated to the background; an over-emphasis on independence might prejudice the drawing up of the appropriate necessary means for the attainment of the unity of the country. Much of what had been said as to the ways of obtaining the unity of Libya convinced him that were those views followed, it would not be at all unlikely that the result would be a masterly operation of partition, thus placing the different parts of the countries under different types of administration and subjecting them to the influence of different types of cultures, languages and systems. That, however, should not be misconstrued to mean that any particular form of government should be imposed upon the country from without. The behaviour of the Administering Authorities during the transitional period would greatly determine the attainment of independence. Besides, in view of the fact that Libya was being administered by two different authorities, the services of a co-ordinating body would become indispensable. To that end, a United Nations advisory commission would be the most practical organ to be charged, *inter alia*, with the co-ordination of the different administrative services, as well as with the task of reporting to the General Assembly on the progress being made by the Administering Authorities towards implementing the independence and unity of Libya.

23. With regard to Eritrea, he felt that an acceptable solution should be based on the principle of self-determination. Most of the arguments already advanced for the partition of that territory seemed untenable. On the contrary, a strong case could be made for preserving the unity of the country with a view to granting it full independence.

24. As regards Somaliland, his delegation also wished its independence. However, should the Committee be convinced that Somaliland was not yet ready for independence, he would favour placing that territory under the International Trusteeship System, provided that the selection of the trustee or trustees would take into account the wishes of the indigenous inhabitants.

25. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) said that his delegation felt profoundly grateful to those representatives who, during the previous session, had supported the Ethiopian claim over Eritrea, as well as the support given during the present session. However, he regretted to find himself obliged to reply to certain remarks and suggestions made by the representatives of Pakistan (279th meeting). The attacks levelled by the latter came as a rude surprise to a people who had maintained the closest bonds of friendship with the people of Pakistan. The representative of Pakistan even went so far as to suggest grave doubts as to the economic capacity and democratic traditions of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian representative then re-

ferred to various statements made by the representative of Pakistan pointing to the incapacity of Eritrea as well as of Ethiopia to pursue an independent economic and political existence. Those remarks were unwarranted and, indeed, could not be described as friendly. Moreover, the representative of Pakistan had wondered whether the union of Eritrea with Ethiopia might not jeopardize the independence of Ethiopia itself.

26. With regard to the economic capacity of his country, Ato Medhen asserted that Ethiopia had always had a favourable balance of trade, and had not received any outside aid. As to the political structure of his country, he pointed out that, although the matter was a domestic one, Ethiopia had always had democratic institutions and had practiced racial and religious tolerance and equality. He gave a number of instances in support of those claims.

27. As regards the plateau and its inhabitants, the representative of Pakistan favoured the holding of a plebiscite. The Ethiopian representative was at a loss to understand such a suggestion since the Pakistan representative himself had complained of long delays in administering a plebiscite in the Kashmir, without hesitating to assert that it would be simpler to ascertain the facts in Eritrea within the course of a few months. Referring to the suggestion of a unitary solution for Eritrea on the basis of the eventual constitution of an independent State, the representative of Ethiopia contended that Eritrea had never existed as an independent territory. Besides, the overwhelming desire of the population of Eastern Eritrea to join with Ethiopia seemed to be of no significance to the Pakistan representative, since it did not correspond with his concept of the unity of the territory. In conclusion, with regard to Sir Mohammad's ironic remarks as to whether the union of Eritrea with Ethiopia might not jeopardize Ethiopia's independence, Ato Medhen stated that the absence of that union would most definitely constitute a direct threat to the security of Ethiopia.

28. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA Khan (Pakistan) regretted that the representative of Ethiopia had mostly quoted that part of his speech which related to the description which the representative of the United Kingdom had given of Eritrea. It was not he who had described Eritrea as a hopeless derelict; nor had he asserted that it was a garland of razor blades; nor had he suggested that its union with Ethiopia would jeopardize the latter's economic stability and independence.

29. Turning to the question of the wishes of the indigenous inhabitants, he said that the Ethiopian representative had appeared to contend that the majority of the population of Eritrea desired union with Ethiopia; but he had confined that aspect to the Central-Eastern Provinces. The representative of Pakistan pointed out that his only wish was to secure the utmost compliance with the desires of the population concerned, be it the union of the whole of Eritrea with Ethiopia or the union of only a portion. Sir Mohammad further pointed out that the Ethiopian representative had stated that the inhabitants of a plateau were overwhelmingly in support of such a union. If that was the case, would Ethiopia be content to have the plateau alone? But on what grounds was Ethiopia claiming other areas which were overwhelmingly Moslem where the majority of

the population was opposed to union with Ethiopia? Should all the inhabitants, Christians as well as Moslems, favour a union with Ethiopia, his delegation would support that principle. On the other hand, should that principle be supported only by a section of the population, the wishes of the remainder should also be ascertained and taken into account.

30. Sir Mohammad emphasized that what he had said and was saying was that if an area as complex as Mr. McNeil had estimated it to be were joined with Ethiopia, the economic life of the latter country might itself be jeopardized.

31. He thought that there need be no bitterness on the subject and submitted that the points of view of both Ethiopia and Pakistan were understandable. He could not see why the rest of Eritrea should be treated as one unit if the Western Province were left aside. It was known that there were racial and religious differences between the central plateau and the eastern provinces, and he suggested that those areas be taken by sections so as to determine which parts wished to be united with Ethiopia. The parts that did not wish for such a union should be permitted to say so, and some other solution would have to be found for them. While that view might not prove acceptable, it was as easily understandable, under the principles of the Charter, as the point of view put forward by Ethiopia. Sir Mohammad said that in his opening speech he had merely put forward some general principles and that if in doing so he had fallen into any error, he readily accepted the corrections advanced by the representative of Ethiopia. He assured the latter that he had no hostility towards his country or any country.

32. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic), pointing out that four months had elapsed since discussion of the question under consideration had been suspended at the previous session of the General Assembly, said that the question arose as to what new proposals had been brought to the present session by the delegations of the United Kingdom, the United States and France. Referring to the United Kingdom representative's statement to the Committee on 30 September (278th meeting), he summarized the present and previous proposals put forward by the United Kingdom delegation with regard to the former colonies, and concluded that the basis of those proposals was the principle of colonial partition of the former Italian possessions in Africa. The proposals were not based upon the interests of the populations of those territories or upon the interests of international peace and security; on the contrary, they were based on the interests of the Anglo-American monopolies and on the schemes of the American and British General Staffs, all of which wanted to transform those territories into military springboards for carrying out criminal aggressive plans.

33. The British authorities did not display any inclination to relinquish those areas, occupied during the war. While they were inclined to make some kind of deal with their American, French and Italian partners, contradictions that remained had prevented, until recently, any agreement on the conditions of the bargain. Some difficulty had also been found in obtaining United Nations sanction for such an illegal deal.

34. Mr. Kiselev emphasized the necessity of taking into account the desires of the population of the territories under discussion and observed that, having suffered defeat at the previous sessions, the United Kingdom had decided to confront the fourth session of the General Assembly with an accomplished fact. The United Kingdom Government, with the connivance or approval of the United States, had taken the path of unilateral solution of the question of the former colonies in general and of Libya in particular, ignoring the United Nations in the process. On 1 June 1949 the Chief Administrator of Cyrenaica had made a declaration to the National Congress of Cyrenaica in Benghazi according to which the British Government agreed to declare Cyrenaica a so-called "independent" State and agreed to the establishment of a Government in Cyrenaica headed by the Emir el-Senussi for administering internal affairs. On the same day the Italian Government had declared its agreement to the establishment of a similar "independent" Government in Tripolitania, in other words a Government with which Italy might establish close relations for fruitful co-operation. That new British policy had found approval and support on the part of the United States Government, which sought to accomplish its own purposes in the former colonies. Arab public opinion had assessed the proclamation of Cyrenaica's "independence" for what it was, namely a manoeuvre of British colonizers, and would never acquiesce in such deceit. Cairo newspapers had later reported demonstrations in Benghazi on June 2 directed against new British manoeuvres in Cyrenaica. Still earlier, on 11 1949, large protest demonstrations had taken place against the British proposal for placing Tripolitania under Italian trusteeship, during which the flag had been torn down from the United States Consulate, and the Italian club had been burned down. That had been the Arab reply to the partition plan for the former colonies. Mr. Kiselev quoted a dispatch published in the newspaper *Al Hawadis* on the contents of the treaty to be signed in London between the Emir of the Senussi and the Government of the United Kingdom. Under that treaty, which might already have been concluded and signed, the United Kingdom would endeavour to transform the area into its base in North Africa and would try to take over control of Cyrenaica for its own colonial purposes.

35. The support given by the United States representative on 24 September to the partition plan for the former colonies was far from coincidental, and it was well known that the United States and United Kingdom had set up substantial military, naval and air bases on Libyan territory. Reports in the London *Daily Express* of 15 February 1949 and in the Egyptian newspaper *Al Misri* of 28 March 1949 had described those activities as well as the advantages deriving from control of military bases in Libya. Nor should the interests of the oil monopolies in the United States and the United Kingdom be forgotten. Control over Libya would make it possible for those two countries to secure complete control over oil sources in the Near East.

36. According to an *Associated Press* dispatch published in Italian newspapers on 26 August 1949, as a result of secret conversations between the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and France, an agreement had been

reached on a new partition plan for the former Italian colonies. Through that agreement, those Governments had again attempted to confront the United Nations with an accomplished fact. The plan was to give the United Kingdom trusteeship over Cyrenaica; Tripolitania would not be placed under Italian trusteeship as previously supposed; Eritrea would be partitioned between Ethiopia and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, while only Somaliland was to be placed under Italian Administration. All those territorial aggrandizements would of course be accompanied by promises about the granting of independence to those territories at some future date. As had been reported, Mr. Bevin had summoned the Italian Ambassador to London and had officially informed him of the agreement reached. The new scheme for partition would lead to the legalization of the so-called independent Government of Cyrenaica under British control and protection, as well as to the maintenance of the existing British Administration in Tripolitania, with the Americans remaining in their bases throughout that region. France had agreed to British control over almost all of Libya only after the United States and the United Kingdom had agreed to the maintenance of the French Administration in the Fezzan. As had been seen, those reports had been fully confirmed by the statements of the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France in the First Committee.

37. Mr. Kiselev stated that the USSR proposals (A/C.1/487) would make it possible to reach an equitable solution of the problem under discussion. Those proposals, based on the principles of the Charter, took into account the desires of the population of the former colonies by proposing to shorten still further the time limit of United Nations trusteeship over those territories. The struggle of the USSR delegation in the United Nations for peace and security, for the interests of oppressed colonial people, and for an equitable solution of the question of the former Italian colonies was supported by the peoples of those colonies as well as by world democratic public opinion, which decisively condemned those who disregarded and hampered the freedom of colonial peoples, and who jeopardized the cause of peace and security of nations. Stating that solution of the question at issue had been delayed by the tactics used by the representatives of the colonial Powers, Mr. Kiselev said that the Committee must support the aspirations of the peoples of the former colonies and put an end to the occupation regime of British colonial administration, whose burden was becoming more heinous. In conclusion, he stated his delegation's support for the USSR proposals.

### **Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece (continued)**

POINT RAISED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE  
BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

38. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic), pointing out that the Chairman had made no report regarding steps being taken to obtain a suspension of executions in Greece, said that he wished to make some comments on the speech made by the Greek representative at the previous (282nd meeting) meeting. That representative had stated that the execution of Georgi

Demosthenes, one of Greece's outstanding trade union leaders, had already taken place. Such a statement was strange after all that had been heard to the effect that Greek executions had just about ended, that a court of appeals was taking over jurisdiction over such cases and that decrees were being issued about suspension, cessation or commutation of such sentences. In spite of such assurances it had been learned that executions were being continued apace. He asked how credence could be given to the words of the representative of Greece (276th meeting) in view of such evidence. The Greek Government had liquidated Demosthenes within three hours after learning that the matter had been raised in the First Committee. Such a situation reminded Mr. Kiselev of the time of the Hitlerite occupation of Byelorussia, of which, as Chairman of a commission that had investigated the worst excesses of that occupation, he had some knowledge. World public opinion was indignant at the excesses of the Greek Government which were unworthy of a Member of the United Nations.

39. The CHAIRMAN said that he had thought that the representative of the Byelorussian SSR had intended to ask whether he had anything to report with regard to the matter brought up by Mr. Kiselev at the previous meeting. Instead, Mr. Kiselev had added to his question a statement which he might or might not find justified by the report which would be presented to the Committee by the Chair. No such report had been received by any officer of the United Nations, though urgent inquiries were being made. As he had explained at the previous meeting, he had hoped to be able to convey to the Committee the result of those inquiries at the beginning of the present meeting. He was informed that the report would be in his hands not later than the following morning, and he would make the statement in question at that time. He hoped that no further statements on that question would be made until that time.

40. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece), referring to the statement of the representative of the Byelorussian SSR, considered that it was contrary to the rules of procedure to utilize a point of order to unleash a political discussion on an important item with respect to which on the basis of its Polish draft resolution (A/C.1/483), the Committee had decided (276th meeting) that it was incompetent. His delegation took exception to that kind of procedure. He thought that the Chairman ought to protect the representatives in the Committee from such abuses as the rude comments just heard from one of the members of the Committee.

41. While he considered that the discussion taking place was in its present form incompatible with the rules of procedure, he wished to state that the comments that had been heard amounted to the same deliberate lying used by certain delegations in a previous discussion. He reiterated that the sentence in question had been executed before the promulgation of the recent measure of the Greek Government which he had mentioned during the previous meeting. Since that measure had been promulgated no death sentence had been carried out in Greece, and he was sure that that would continue to be the case.

42. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, in the light of the communications constantly being received with regard to

the continuing terror of the monarcho-fascist Government in Greece against democratic forces and executions of members of the democratic movement, the USSR delegation insistently requested that the reply promised by the Chairman should be forthcoming the following morning.

43. In reply to a question put by Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), regarding what was being done by the Conciliation Committee, the CHAIRMAN replied that that Committee had met as a committee of four on the previous day and on 1 October. The Committee had met

with the delegation of Greece that morning and he believed that the members of the Conciliation Committee not attending the present meeting of the First Committee were discussing the matter with the delegation of the USSR.

44. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America), invoking rule 107 of the rules of procedure, moved the adjournment of the meeting.

*The motion was adopted by 43 votes to 6, with 1 abstention.*

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FOURTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 5 October 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

### Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece

#### STATEMENT BY THE CHAIR

1. The CHAIRMAN said that he was now in a position to make the statement which he had promised at the previous meeting of the First Committee. He wished to point out first, however, that according to rule 112 of the rules of procedure, a Committee, as well as the General Assembly itself, could reopen the discussion of a question which it had closed. To do so, however, a delegation had to present a motion to that effect; two speakers only could speak against the motion, which was then immediately put to the vote. Therefore, unless a motion in favour of further consideration of the Greek question was made and adopted, the First Committee would continue its study of the question of the former Italian colonies.

2. The Chairman stated that progress had been made by the Greek Conciliation Committee, which had been set up by a unanimous and very encouraging vote of the First Committee (193rd meeting). In addition to meetings in which its four members had participated, the Committee had held consultations with the representative of Greece and certain other delegations. The representative of Albania was expected to arrive in New York at any moment. During the meeting which the representative of Greece had attended, not only had certain possibilities of action been considered, but the members of the Committee had expressed to the representative of Greece, and to the representatives of the other countries concerned, the hope that nothing would be done which might further complicate the task of the Conciliation Committee.

3. The Chairman recalled that when the case of Georgi Demosthenes had been mentioned by the President of the General Assembly to the Greek delegation, the latter had assured the President that it would adhere strictly to the statement previously made. It would be recalled that according to that statement, which had been made at the 276th meeting of the First Committee, the cases of persons who had been sent to camps would be submitted to a special council and all death sentences would be reviewed by the court of appeal.

4. During the meeting which the representative of Greece had attended, the President of the General Assembly had requested the latter, as he would request representatives of other countries concerned, to submit a written statement. The President of the General Assembly had just received that communication and had transmitted it, that very morning, to the First Committee. It stated that the Greek citizen in question had been found guilty of treason and seditious activities by the unanimous decision of a court martial in Athens on 23 September, and that the sentence had been carried out before the law introducing measures of clemency — to which the Greek representative had referred on 29 September — before the First Committee (276th meeting) — had been promulgated.

5. The Chairman of the First Committee expressed the hope that the Committee would proceed with the discussion of the other items on the agenda until the Conciliation Committee's report was submitted to it.

6. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) asked if it was necessary to apply rule 112 of the rules of procedure, since the discussion of the case raised by the representative of Poland had already been re-opened by the statement which the Chairman had just made. If, however, the majority of the members of the First Committee wished to have that discussion re-opened, the delegation of Poland was prepared to make a motion to that effect. It was aware, however, that the Conciliation Committee was at work, and that it was not desirable to re-open the discussion of the Greek question in all its aspects. With regard to the draft resolution submitted on 28 September by the Polish delegation (A/C.1/483), however, an appeal to the Greek Government to suspend the execution of all death sentences and to postpone all courts martial would constitute a first step towards a conciliatory solution.

7. During the 275th and 276th meetings of the First Committee, a number of representatives had expressed their sympathy for the spirit of the Polish draft resolution, and some amendments had been submitted, while some members had considered that the expression of opinion which had taken place was sufficient.

8. But at the very time the First Committee had expressed its sympathy for the persons condemned

to death and for the prisoners whose only crime had been their political convictions, Mr. Pipinelis had made a sensational statement: he had declared (276th meeting) that all death sentences had already been stayed and that there was no need to protect the life of Catherine Zevgos, because she had automatically come under the provisions of the new law, which, he had stated, was already in force. Many members of the First Committee had accepted the word of the Greek representative and had changed their attitude in regard to the Polish draft resolution. While expressing their sympathy for the spirit of that draft resolution, they had declared that it was no longer necessary.

9. From Greece, however, the news had come concerning executions, and in particular, of that of Georgi Demosthenes, Secretary of the Electric Workers Union, who had been condemned to death on 23 September by a court martial at Athens.

10. The explanation given to the Conciliation Commission by the Greek delegation was that the execution had taken place before the promulgation of the law.

11. The First Committee, on hearing Mr. Pipinelis, had understood, however, that the law had already been passed and that the executions had already been stayed; in voting the First Committee had been guided by that interpretation of the statement of Mr. Pipinelis. In reality, the execution of Georgi Demosthenes had taken place on the morning of 30 September, that is, at least twelve hours after the statement of Mr. Pipinelis.

12. That statement which had been quoted by the Chairman differed appreciably from that of the Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Diomedes. According to *The Times* of 1 October, and to a *Reuter's* despatch of 30 September from Athens, the Prime Minister had stated that it had not been possible to wave off the execution of Mr. Demosthenes because the draft law postponing the execution until the various cases had been examined had not yet been in force.

13. Thus the members of the First Committee had believed that the lives of those under death sentence were not in immediate danger, but, not only had Georgi Demosthenes been executed after the statement of Mr. Pipinelis but also four members of the Greek Communist Party had been shot in Athens by firing squads. Among those were S. Anastasiades and Panayotis Gogos, Secretary of the Communist Party for the Islands of the Aegean Sea. Thus the promise given to the members of the First Committee, who had believed it, had been broken.

14. Mr. Pipinelis, in reply to the representative of the Byelorussian SSR on the previous day (283rd meeting) had used such insulting language that many indignant representatives had wished to re-open the discussion.

15. Thus, while the First Committee had endeavoured to save the lives of political prisoners who had fought valiantly to liberate Greece from occupation by various Powers, Mr. Dendramis and Mr. Pipinelis had called those men bandits, anarchists and criminals. That was an insult to the First Committee and to the feelings of millions of human beings.

16. The CHAIRMAN invited the Polish representative to make the motion provided for in rule

112 of the rules of procedure if he so desired, but to refrain from dealing with the substance of the matter.

17. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) stated that he was endeavouring to convince the Committee of the need for re-opening the discussion on the question which his delegation had raised.

18. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom), on a point of order, stated that the Committee was only seized at the present time with the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies. As for rule 112 of the rules of procedure, it did not seem that it provided for a speech on the urgency of the question to be re-opened for discussion.

19. The CHAIRMAN called upon the representative of Poland to conclude his statement, in accordance with rule 112.

20. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) stated that the case of Georgi Demosthenes, that of the other four persons who had been executed and all the other cases of which the Committee had not been informed made it incumbent upon the Committee to take action in order to put an end to the terror that was reigning in Greece, especially since Georgi Demosthenes had sent an appeal to the United Nations which had been intercepted by the prison authorities where he had been incarcerated.

21. Many lives were at stake, apart from that of Catherine Zevgos, who was the widow of the EAM delegate to the Security Council Commission of Investigation, who had been assassinated on his way to a meeting.

22. The Polish delegation called upon the First Committee to re-open the discussion on the terror in Greece, the death sentences and the courts martial. Indeed, the Committee had issued an appeal in the past which had not been sufficient, for of the ten men who had been saved provisionally two had subsequently been shot. That should serve as a lesson to those who confined themselves to vague oral appeals.

23. The Polish delegation requested the First Committee to allow the submission of proposals recommending clemency and destined to put an end to the terror in Greece.

24. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the proposal submitted by the representative of Poland in accordance with rule 112 of the rules of procedure, to the effect that the discussion on the aspect of the Greek question with which that delegation was concerned should be re-opened.

*The Polish proposal was rejected by 34 votes to 6 with 14 abstentions.*

25. Mr. PIPENELIS (Greece) stated that the Polish representative's statement contained certain inaccuracies and that his own delegation reserved the right to draw the First Committee's attention to them at a later date.

26. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) considered that the statement just made by the representative of Greece was intended to distract the attention of the world from the terror that the monarcho-fascist Government was promoting in Greece. The delegation of the Soviet Union reserved the right to return to that question when the First Committee resumed the consideration of the Greek problem as a whole.

27. With regard to his delegation's vote, he recalled that democrats had been executed in Greece

in spite of the assurance given by the representative of the Greek Government that the execution of death sentences had been suspended. Since the representative of Poland had asked the Chairman of the First Committee a question and since he had given his reply, if the procedure were to remain democratic, it was inadmissible to prevent various delegations from making comments on the Chairman's statement.

28. Indeed, the explanation given by the Chairman had come too late, since the Greek representative had admitted the previous day that Georgi Demosthenes, the leader of a Greek democratic trade union, had been shot. That unmasked the lie by which the representative of Greece had distracted public opinion from the terror in Greece.

29. In those circumstances, while terror and the persecution of democratic elements continued to reign in Greece, the possibility of settling the Greek problem and of a return to normal life was excluded.

30. The delegation of the Soviet Union considered that the time was ripe for members of the First Committee to give their views on the mendacious subterfuge to which the representative of the monarcho-fascist Government in Greece had resorted in order to mislead world public opinion and to conceal the terror that was raging in his country. It was in that spirit that the USSR had voted in favour of the Polish motion.

31. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) asked that it should be noted in the summary record that the explanation given by the Greek delegation to the Conciliation Committee had been far from satisfactory. The Polish delegation had therefore called for the re-opening of the debate, since it considered that the First Committee should take action to save the condemned persons.

32. The thirty-four delegations which had voted against the Polish motion would bear the responsibility for any death sentences that might subsequently be passed.

### **Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies: general discussion (continued)**

33. Mr. TARCHIANI (Italy) recalled that the representative of Egypt had requested the Italian delegation (282nd meeting) to give certain explanations in order to reassure the Arab world with regard to Italy's intentions in connexion with the independence of the three territories of a unified Libya.

34. Although Count Sforza had expressed his views clearly to the First Committee on 1 October (279th meeting), the Italian delegation was pre-

pared to confirm that statement, according to which Italy recognized the necessity of establishing independent States corresponding to the various parts of the Libyan territories, bound together by special federative ties, in conformity with the historical and spiritual unity of the country.

35. Italy realized, of course, that two of the three sectors of Libyan territory had been joined to the United Kingdom and to France during the war and that it was therefore essential to entrust to those two Powers the task of guiding the peoples towards independence.

36. The Italian delegation was therefore prepared to give favourable consideration to any proposals that those two Powers might make in that connexion, although it considered that that region should be given institutions in harmony with the general structure of the future united and federative Libya, and that Tripolitania should be given full freedom to decide upon its own future.

37. Mr. JAMALI (Iraq) stated that in speaking of the unity of Libya the fact that the Libyan people themselves had no difference of opinion on the unity of their country was often forgotten.

38. To place Libya under two different administrations must not entail submitting that country to the fate of Korea, Germany or other territories occupied by two or more Powers and thus divided.

39. It was for the Libyans themselves to decide upon their form of government, whether federal or united. Nevertheless, Libya was an entity.

40. Mr. HOOD (Australia) asked, in connexion with the statement made by the Iraqi representative, whether the work of Sub-Committee 16 had reached a stage where it was possible to hear representatives of the local population.

41. The CHAIRMAN stated that Sub-Committee 16 had already met and would meet again after the meeting of the First Committee. Nevertheless, the First Committee could not hear the organizations recommended by the Sub-Committee until it had before it the report of that Sub-Committee, which might be submitted within twenty-four hours.

42. Mr. CLUTTON (United Kingdom) pointed out that, if the Sub-Committee's report were submitted on the following day, it would be desirable for the various delegations of political parties to be prepared for a hearing.

43. The CHAIRMAN stated that that suggestion would be taken into consideration.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

## **TWO HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIFTH MEETING**

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 6 October 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

### **Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies: general discussion (continued)**

1. Mr. ENGEN (Rapporteur of Sub-Committee 16) submitting the report of Sub-Committee 16,

pointed out that the working group set up by the Sub-Committee had drawn for its documentation on the reports published by Sub-Committee 14 at the third session of the General Assembly. He then read out the Sub-Committee's report (A/C.1/494).



2. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the spokesmen of the five organizations mentioned in the report should be heard at the afternoon meeting. He hoped that in the meanwhile he would be able to close the list of speakers in the general discussion.

3. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) stated that his delegation unlike some others had not been disappointed when the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies had not been settled at the third session. It was better not to take a decision than to reach a bad one which would be carried by a small majority only.

4. He was pleased to note the change in attitude of several representatives which pointed to a better understanding of the problem. In particular he had admired the speech of the Italian representative (279th meeting) who had shown a great sense of realism inasmuch as he had taken into account the national liberation and independence movements which were manifest almost everywhere in the world. In that connexion it was important that the United Nations should assist in the transition of the relationship between States in order to do away with the concept of master and servant and to promote new concepts of legal and moral equality among peoples everywhere. It was incumbent on economically and politically strong States to exercise that power within the frame work of a community of nations enjoying equal rights, while the weaker States instead of being arbitrarily tied to specific great Powers should be free to choose those from whom they sought guidance or advice. Quoting as an instance the change in relationship between France and Lebanon, he remarked that these two nations had profited by that evolution and he felt sure that the same would be true in the case of Italy and its former colonies once the spectre of bondage had been replaced by an atmosphere of equality and brotherhood.

5. He pointed out that three factors had to be taken into account in drafting a statute for the former Italian colonies: first and above all were the interests and aspirations of the populations in accordance with their natural right, with the United Nations Charter and with the Peace Treaty with Italy; secondly, full co-operation between the populations and the existing Administering Powers must be ensured; and lastly, there was the responsibility of the United Nations to find a just and workable solution to the problem.

6. Mr. Malik felt that Libya should become independent and united as soon as possible. Reserving the right to make a statement after hearing what the representatives of the populations concerned had to say, he pointed out that any solution to the problem should be based on the following principles: (a) the transitory régime which would culminate in the transfer of power from the present Administering Authorities to the local populations must not prejudice the unity of the country in any way; (b) the transitory régime must allow the populations full liberty to decide for themselves the form of their government, whether it should be federal, unitary, centralized, de-centralized, monarchist or republican. He added that disinterested economic assistance should be provided for Libya during the transitory period and the first years of its independence. Finally, he stressed that each of the three component parts of Libya (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan)

should attain their independence simultaneously so that the whole country might become independent at once.

7. The Lebanese delegation was gratified to note the change that had taken place in favour of granting Eritrea its independence while letting Ethiopia have an outlet to the Red Sea. While it reserved its attitude until the representative of the local population had been heard, the Lebanese delegation nevertheless felt that a régime similar to that it had outlined for Libya, should be applied in Eritrea.

8. With regard to Somaliland, he felt that the Trusteeship System based on the interests and wishes of the Somalis and on common sense would prove to be the solution most satisfactory to all. Even if the General Assembly were unable to find an acceptable solution for that territory at the current session, that should not prevent a decision as regards the two other territories.

9. At all events, it was essential that the Assembly should succeed in harmonizing the two prominent principles which would afford moral satisfaction for Italy and adequate guarantees for the local populations.

10. Mr. STOLK (Venezuela) pointed out that the difficulties of the problem were fading, leaving a glimpse of the possibility of compromise which, having regard to the will of the inhabitants and the provisions of the Charter, would make possible a two-thirds majority in the Assembly.

Although there was a general tendency in favour of the independence of some of the former Italian colonies, opinions differed as regards the transition period. Some believed that a territory's independence could be proclaimed immediately, and measures taken for the progressive transfer of power. Other representatives, on the other hand, were in favour of immediate independence without any transitional measure. In that connexion, the opinion put forward by the representative of Italy was very interesting, since it showed the wish of the Italian Government to respect the local populations' desire for independence. That proved that Italy's demands had softened. With respect to the other colony, the position was different because there existed two completely opposing views. If the matter could not be settled, each case should be treated separately; the General Assembly should then reach a settlement for some of the colonies, without prejudice to the establishment of principles by which a decision on the territories, the case of which would be postponed, might be resolved later.

12. Since the majority agreed that Libya should be granted independence and unity, it followed that the transition period in that case should be as short as possible. Unless the Administration took the form of trusteeship, it would not be covered by the Charter. Objections has been raised to a system of trusteeship during that period. The existing project for the establishment of a system of self-government in Cyrenaica with the co-operation of the United Kingdom had been considered. In the case of the Fezzan, the co-operation of France could be counted upon. If France and the United Kingdom were to be entrusted with the administration of those territories during the transition period, they would have to report upon it to the United Nations. It would then

be indispensable to have the assistance of a United Nations commission as an organ for consultation and liaison between the Administrations, in order to foster the unification of the country as well as to organize and supervise the free elections that would take place.

13. The representative of Venezuela considered that a temporary trusteeship should be established in Somaliland as a preliminary step to the granting of independence to that country once it had attained the necessary political maturity. Differences of opinion had arisen as to the duration of that trusteeship. The General Assembly should reserve the right to review the country's position periodically in order to grant it independence as soon as its preparedness and progress made that requisite. The trusteeship of the territory might be confided to Italy since it now provided guarantees through its genuinely democratic institutions and had demonstrated its capacity for the administration of under-developed territories. There was not the slightest doubt that, if Italy were granted the administration of the territory, the Native population would be progressively called upon to take part in the government of the country.

14. Mr. Stolk noted that two opposing points of view had emerged on the question of Eritrea. Some, basing themselves on ethnic, geographical and economic reasons, considered that Eritrea should not constitute an independent entity, and advocated its partition between the Sudan and Ethiopia. Others on the contrary were in favour of the country's independence and were encouraged in that view by the movement to that end initiated by an important political organization. Other organizations had advocated independence in April and May.

15. Count Sforza had stated that there was a general movement in that direction in Eritrea and that the inhabitants were conscious of their maturity. He had maintained that the latter's tolerance and co-operation proved that, in spite of their religious and racial differences, they could form a sovereign State.

16. The Venezuelan delegation did not overlook the information given in the report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation, but felt that, since it was a question of the final disposal of the population of those territories, the position should be clarified in consultation with them before a double incorporation was decided upon. A United Nations commission might study the matter and ensure that such consultation was carried out. At all events, the delegation of Venezuela would prefer that independence should be granted to Eritrea very shortly, and that, in the meantime, a provisional system of trusteeship should be established. It also maintained its former opinion that Ethiopia should be granted an outlet to the sea, taking into account the ethnic, geographical and economic factors involved, as well as Italian interests. The latter should be considered also in settling the fate of the other territories.

17. Finally, the fate of the former Italian colonies could only be decided by granting their inhabitants the right of self-determination and giving them the possibility of forming sovereign and independent States.

18. The CHAIRMAN noted that there were no other speakers.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SIXTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 6 October 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Selim SARPEN (Turkey).*

### **Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies: general discussion (continued)**

1. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) considered that one fact had clearly emerged from the debate and not been contradicted, namely, the overwhelming desire of the population of the central plateau of Eritrea to return to Ethiopia immediately. Another central factor emerging from the discussion was that, although Ethiopia had long felt quite justified in calling for the return of the entire territory known as Eritrea, it had withdrawn its insistence upon an immediate decision regarding nearly two-thirds of the territory, the western province, where it was claimed that a clear Moslem majority would not desire union with Ethiopia.

2. The one remaining problem was that of the coastal area east of the central plateau. That coastal area, known as the province of Massawa, constituted one of the most forbidding and inhospitable areas in the world. According to the report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation, the area was inhabited almost exclusively, although not entirely, by Mohammedans. The population

was not dense, and exclusive of the port of Massawa it totalled less than 80,000. The inhabitants were nomads who were obliged during considerable portions of the year to seek pastureland partly on the Eritrean plateau and to a greater extent in the highlands of the Tigre Province of Ethiopia. Those nomadic tribes were most intimately attached to the neighbouring population of Ethiopia, and, in fact, the greater portion of them, as well as their chiefs, dwelt in Ethiopia. In view of those considerations, and of the fact, already pointed out by other delegations, that the population of the Massawa province had no commercial or other economic connexions with the rest of Eritrea, the Ethiopian request for joining the coastal desert area could not be considered exaggerated or unwarranted. The port of Massawa itself depended upon trade with Ethiopia and could not be severed from its economic hinterland. Naturally, apart from the needs of the port itself, Ethiopia desperately needed Massawa, the only port on the Red Sea. According to the report of the Four-Power Commission, the population of Massawa numbered 25,000, including 22,000 Moslems and 3,000 Christians. It was obvious that with the cession of the port those Moslems



would be placed under the Government of Ethiopia. However, Ato Medhen thought that it was not out of place to point out that according to its present formula Ethiopia was renouncing Christian communities in the Western Province which far out-numbered the Moslem population of Massawa and who would presumably be subjected to Moslem rule against their will.

3. He did not see how the imperative reality of the union of those portions of Eritrea with Ethiopia could be contested. If that fact were admitted, what purpose would be served by organizing a plebiscite or establishing a new commission of investigation? His delegation had already pointed out that a plebiscite could only render a disservice in view of the urgency of the problem and the delays that would be involved. There was no census of the territory where a plebiscite might take place. Moreover, experience of international plebiscites was not encouraging, and in that connexion he cited the example of the Tacna-Arica plebiscite which, incidentally, had never been completed.

4. To propose a commission of investigation implied that the long years of work which had preceded the study of the Four-Power Commission and the time given to subsequent studies, had not proved sufficient to provide an adequate answer regarding a territory which in so far as Ethiopia's claim was concerned was smaller than the smallest Member of the United Nations. Such a proposal would amount to re-investigating the work of the Four-Power Commission, which in the case of the plateau area had been clearly recognized by every Member of the United Nations. If it was proposed to establish a new commission of investigation for Eritrea, why then should a similar commission not be sent to Somaliland, where the evidence clearly showed an overwhelming opposition to the return of Italian rule? The same considerations and conclusions applied to the proposal for plebiscites. If a plebiscite were proposed for Eritrea, how in all good conscience could the necessity of a similar procedure be denied in the case of Somaliland?

5. Turning to the basic concepts of unity and independence as applied to the territory known as Eritrea the representative of Pakistan as well as others had pointed out that they were closely bound. The representative of Ethiopia questioned whether the Committee was in fact dealing with a case of unity in so far as Eritrea was concerned. Ethiopia had long felt justified in claiming the whole of that territory, since it could claim 68 per cent of the population. However, since it was held that the inhabitants were far from unanimous in their desires as to their future and that widely divergent ethnical and political groups were involved, it had to be assumed that there was no unity in Eritrea, all the more so that, politically speaking, Eritrea never had existed as an independent unit. Ethiopia, which had fought so long and bitterly for the maintenance of its own independence, would be the last State in the United Nations to oppose the principle of independence for any peoples who wanted it. However, the peoples of Eastern Eritrea were seeking their freedom only to join Ethiopia. The question therefore was whether that portion of Eritrea which was seeking union with Ethiopia should be compelled to become an independent State or at least share in the independence of a State to be created in the wider framework of Eritrea.

Asking whether a single instance could be cited in which any State Member of the United Nations had come into being by way of an act of aggression followed by ratification of that aggression by the establishment of an independent State, he pointed out that the portions of Eritrea which Ethiopia was claiming immediately had been seized by Italy in 1885 and that at no time prior to that period had the territory or its population ever been independent. If the present northern boundary of Ethiopia were ratified and a new independent State set up, the situation would be similar to the case of China when Japan had invaded Manchuria and declared it to be an independent State. However, no State Member of the League of Nations or of the United Nations had ratified those boundaries or that situation created by an act of force. What reason could there be, therefore, to ratify another act of aggression against a territory used as a base for invasions against a peaceful State not once, as in the case of China, but three times?

6. Delegations from all parts of the world had clearly taken a position on the fundamental issues involved long before the announcement of the Bevin-Sforza formula. Thus the States which were speaking in terms of the necessity for Eritrea to become independent had been equally emphatic four months previously in declaring that Eritrea could not become independent. He recalled that Italy had declared that independence could not be achieved in Eritrea within any appreciable time. That position had been affirmed by 36 votes to 6 (272nd meeting). It could not be claimed that the situation had changed to such an extent within four months. The Committee's decision at the previous session had not been implemented because numerous States had insisted upon the necessity of a global solution of the problem of the former Italian colonies. However, since the recognition of Ethiopia's claim to Eritrea had fallen through for reasons unrelated to Ethiopia's case, the significance of that vote must necessarily retain its full force. For the same reason the United Kingdom had been fully justified in recognizing self-government in Cyrenaica in view of the decision by a two-thirds majority reached at the previous session regarding that territory. It was now being claimed that a separate solution must be found for each of the territories, in which case the separate solution previously adopted with regard to Eritrea assumed even greater significance and moral stature. Yet Italy, which had insisted that Eritrea was not ripe for independence and needed Italy's guidance to that end, now declared that such guidance could best be obtained through immediate independence.

7. It was now being proposed to refuse to Ethiopia its widely recognized claims to a portion of Eritrea and so essential and so minimum a protection for its national security. It was now being suggested that Eritrea be given a so-called immediate but unobtainable independence or be placed under United Nations trusteeship, a solution which had been rejected so indignantly four months previously when it had been proposed by the USSR, (A/C.1/433/Rev.1). Another course proposed was the denial of any decision through the pretext of constituting a new commission of investigation or of a plebiscite. Such proposals added insult to injury because, in denying such a basic claim to justice, at the same time it was intended to return Italy to Somaliland to the

southern border of his country, from which at Wall Wall in 1934 the former had invaded Ethiopia. Ato Medhen said that such results could equally well be reached in any *ad hoc* meeting of States without necessarily convening behind the façade of the United Nations Charter.

8. He solemnly declared that the proposal to return Italy to Somaliland and the refusal to satisfy Ethiopia's claim to Eritrea took into account neither the desires and interests of the populations nor the interest of peace and security and constituted a direct threat to the independence of Ethiopia. If that attempt were to succeed, the United Nations would have lent itself and become accomplice to a greater injustice than that suffered by Ethiopia at the hands of the League of Nations. After all its sufferings Ethiopia would not allow itself to be sacrificed on the altar of the United Nations in the interests of satisfying or pleasing Italy as had been done at the League of Nations, but would abandon all hope in justice from the United Nations and would take all measures of legitimate self-defence as provided for in the Charter.

9. Mr. COOPER (Liberia), referring to a letter addressed to the Chairman of the First Committee by the representative of the Somali Youth League to the effect that the British Military Administration had banned the organization in Somaliland, stated that he had also heard that there had been several riots in that territory. He wondered whether the United Kingdom delegation could supply information on that question.

10. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) read the text of the letter referred to by the Liberian representative. The letter, dated 6 October 1949, stated that neither the reasons nor the details of the action of the British Military Administration had been contained in the telegram from which the news had been learned. It was not known whether the banning concerned merely the headquarters of the League or all the League branches. While the Military Administration had obviously not taken that drastic action without serious reasons, unfortunately there was not a single foreign diplomatic representative or correspondent in Mogadiscio to report to the world what was happening. The letter therefore requested that the representative of the United Kingdom be asked for reasons and details of the action and did not exclude the possibility that serious disturbances had taken or were taking place in Somaliland. Sir Mohammad submitted that the request contained in the letter was reasonable and trusted that the representative of the United Kingdom would enlighten the Committee at an early opportunity as to what had happened.

11. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), noting that according to the report of the Sub-Committee the Somali Youth League had 93,000 members and 300,000 supporters or adherents, thought the document to be of considerable importance.

12. At Mr. Manuilsky's request the CHAIRMAN read the text of the letter from the representatives of the Somali Youth League which stated that those representatives had received a telegram informing them that the League had been banned by the British Military Administration, that no reason had been given for such action and requesting that the representative of the United Kingdom be asked for the reasons and details of that action.

13. Mr. CLUTTON (United Kingdom) said that he informed the Committee with regret that on 5 October information had come to the knowledge of the British Administration in Mogadiscio that demonstrations were being carefully planned against the proposals made in the Committee for the disposal of Italian Somaliland. Due precautions had been taken, but later during that same morning, crowds had assembled and had refused to disperse. In the subsequent action by the authorities to preserve law and order, four people had been killed and thirteen injured. The situation had been tense and, in consequence, a curfew had been imposed and all political clubs, regardless of party, had been closed. While he would make inquiries on that point, the information received by his delegation did not seem to indicate any basis for the statement that the Somali Youth League had been dissolved or banned, and the only action as regards political parties was the natural and wholly justified precaution of closing the building of the clubs.

14. Mr. Clutton emphasized that under the Treaty of Peace with Italy, the United Kingdom Government was charged with the administration of the former Italian colonies and hence had the duty, even during the present tension while the disposal of the territories was being debated, to maintain law and order so as to ensure that the decisions of the General Assembly would be respected and executed. He was sure that the Committee would realize that the matter now under discussion was controversial and that what was said must therefore be weighed carefully. In conclusion, he hoped that the Committee would give the British Administration full support while the latter was carrying out its duty of maintaining law and order.

15. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA Khan (Pakistan) agreed that it was the duty of the Military Administration to maintain law and order at all times. However, the maintenance of law and order was one thing and the suppression of political activities was quite another. While the full details of the facts had not been submitted to the Committee, it had been asserted that demonstrations had taken place though it had not been said that there had been disorder or rioting. If such had been involved, of course, the use of police or military action would have become necessary. Demonstrations alone, however, no matter how serious from the point of view of the numbers involved, were legitimate political activity; it would be ironical if, while the fate of the people of that country was under discussion, the latter were not enabled to say anything with regard to the proposals under discussion in the Committee. It was not as if demonstrations had been organized in order to bring about conditions which would make it difficult or even impossible to give effect to a decision of the General Assembly, though even in that case certain considerations might apply but he did not wish to go into that at that time. It was strange that on the one hand it had been contended that the territories in question were not imbued with sufficient political consciousness to provide an indication of what the population really desired, and that on the other hand, when the people proceeded to give some indication of what they desired, that indication was suppressed. Expressing satisfaction at the statement that the League had not been banned or dissolved, Sir Mohammad

pointed out that if the buildings used by the political associations in Somaliland were no longer available to them for carrying on their legitimate activities, the associations would either have to stop such activities or have recourse to illegitimate ones. However, he appreciated the difficulty and delicacy of the situation and trusted that the Committee would be informed of the facts in greater detail at an early date so that it might make some estimate of what was happening in that area and of whether the indication of the people's approval or disapproval of any proposal before the Committee was being suppressed by use of force.

16. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the statement of the United Kingdom representative made it clear that all existing organizations, including the Somali Youth League, were being suppressed. Another indication of the seriousness of the situation was that demonstrations expressing opposition to Italian Administration over Somaliland were being dealt with by shooting, causing death and injury. With the addition of the fact that a curfew had been established, it became clear that Somaliland was, in fact, in a state of siege or the equivalent thereof. When the Committee was confronted by such facts, it was obvious that attempts to postpone the question of the disposal of Somaliland and other territories were harmful because they only led to an aggravation of the situation.

17. Such demonstrations, petitions and expressions of the people's will were among the various factors called self-determination of peoples, and the Committee was entitled to demand that the measures that had been taken be stopped, as they involved a violation of the elementary right of the population to express its will when its destiny was hanging in the balance in the General Assembly and in the Committee. While he understood the point of view of the representative of Pakistan, the Committee was confronted with a factual situation requiring urgent action and was entitled to ask that the situation prevailing in Somaliland be ended.

18. Fayez Bey EL KHOURI (Syria) said that having had long experience of such measures, he supported the statement of the representative of Pakistan with great sympathy for the dead and their people.

19. Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) supported the request of the representative of the Ukrainian SSR to the effect that the United Kingdom Administering Authorities should put an end to the practice that had been exposed. He also supported the proposal of the representative of Pakistan that the United Kingdom delegation should supply full information on the events in Somaliland. Grandiloquent phrases such as "the maintenance of law and order" often covered the suppression of fundamental rights and freedoms. The measures being undertaken in Somaliland were a flagrant violation of the principles which ought to guide the General Assembly.

#### PRESENTATION OF VIEWS BY REPRESENTATIVE ORGANIZATIONS

20. The CHAIRMAN brought to the attention of the Committee the first interim report of Subcommittee 16 (A/C.1/494), recommending that a hearing be given to spokesmen of five indigenous organizations.

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representatives of the Somalia Conference took seats at the Committee table.*

21. ISLAO MAHADALLE MOHAMED (Somalia Conference) said that the support of the programme of the Somalia Conference in Somaliland and the recent statements in the Committee in favour of the right of self-determination encouraged his delegation to renew its appeal for a prompt and just decision concerning the future of his country, still under military occupation. The Somalia Conference, realizing that the future of Somalia depended on the resolutions of the United Nations, which it would accept and abide by whatever those resolutions might be, asked for the independence of Somalia within the time-limit strictly necessary to enable achievement of the progress which would provide assurance for a wise administration and stable democratic liberties. That time-limit would be defined by the United Nations. The Somalia Conference did not take a position with regard to a union of all Somaliland, since such a union would include territories at present governed by other sovereign States. The Conference would oppose collective administrations or alternate administrations by several nations under the control of the United Nations and deemed it indispensable that the administration of the territory and the responsibility of leading it to independence be entrusted to one nation. It reaffirmed its stand in favour of trusteeship by Italy, in view of the achievements of that country in Somaliland, or at least in favour of the inclusion of Italy among the Administering Powers, should a collective administration be decided upon. The Conference further recommended gradual but rapid Somalization of the administration, on an equal basis for all Somalis, and asked for the absolute protection of the Islamic religion. He further said that while Italy had made errors during the fascist regime, the Somalia Conference felt confident that such errors would not recur because Italy would now be bound by the rules and directives of the United Nations. In that connexion he emphasized the desire of the Conference to be consulted when the terms of Italian trusteeship were set forth and defined by the United Nations.

22. He was confident that the threats of the Somali Youth League, which found their origin in a small group of subversive agitators, already banned in the neighbouring territories under British Administration, would not influence the decisions of the Assembly. Evidence of the measures taken against the Somali Youth League by the Government of Kenya was in the possession of the Conference and could be introduced immediately. The claim of the Somali Youth League to have increased the number of its members could not be relied upon, and he pointed out that that League had to recruit even the representatives it sent to the United Nations from outside their country. That small minority, lacking the support of the population, was trying to make use of its only available weapon, the threat of violence.

23. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) asked the representative of the Somalia Conference how the Somali Youth League, which supposedly did not represent anybody, had been able to arouse mass demonstrations for the suppression of which the United Kingdom authorities had had to take extreme measures.

24. ISLAO MAHADALLE MOHAMED (Somalia Conference) replied that the Somali Youth League was an extremist and terrorist organization. The action taken had been necessary in order to forestall conflict between the military authorities and the people.
25. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) asked what was the total population of Somaliland.
26. Mr. GASSIM (Somalia Conference) replied that precise statistics were lacking, but the Somali people considered it to be about 2 million.
27. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) wondered if there were no official figures in existence as to the total population, for the Somalia Conference claimed to represent 95 per cent of that population.
28. Mr. CASSIM (Somalia Conference) said that the figures were based not on official data but upon the personal knowledge which the Somali had of their own country.
29. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) remarked that the total population according to estimates at his disposal, amounted to only 870,000. He noted that the representative had spoken of the educational benefits which the Somali had derived from the Italian Administration and asked how many had learnt to read during the Italian rule.
30. Mr. GASSIM (Somalia Conference) replied that after thirty years of Italian Administration it could be claimed, generally speaking, that all the people of Italian Somaliland spoke Italian. Similarly, in other parts of Somalia administered by other Powers, the people spoke the language of the administrators.
31. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) congratulated the Somali delegation on its well-prepared and eloquent statement which evidenced considerable political ability. He asked what positions the delegates held in private life.
32. Mr. GASSIM (Somalia Conference) replied that two of the representatives including himself were employed by the British Administering Authorities. The remainder were business men and chiefs of tribe. As regards the two employed by the British Administration, Isiao Mahadalle Mohammad was a legal adviser in the Department of Justice while he himself was a collector of revenue in the service of the Municipality of Mogadiscio.
33. Replying to a further question from the representative of Pakistan Mr. Gassim said that about 30 per cent of the population were of similar educational and social standing.
34. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) observing that the previous replies showed that Somaliland had reached a higher level of literacy than India and Pakistan had at the time they had obtained independence, asked what further requirement was lacking for self-rule.
35. Mr. GASSIM (Somalia Conference) replied that the principal reason for which the Somalia Conference did not consider the country to be ready for self-rule was an economic one. However, there were also educational and social obstacles. The representative of the Somalia Conference believed that a number of stages would have to be passed before the country would be ready for independence which could only be achieved when certain racial and group prejudices had been overcome.
36. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) believed that the preceding statement clearly showed what was the true state of affairs regarding the stage of development reached in Somaliland.
37. Turning to another question he noted that in his prepared statement, the representative of the Somalia Conference had said that the aim of his organization was gradual and yet rapid transfer of administrative functions to the Somali people. Sir Mohammad asked why the change-over should be gradual.
38. Mr. GASSIM (Somalia Conference) replied that if his country was placed under the trusteeship administration of a friendly Power his organization would seek an immediate transfer of administrative functions into the hands of the Somali because it would desire to achieve progress in co-operation with the Administering Power.
39. In reply to a further question from the Pakistan representative he added that the necessary personnel required for such an administration did exist in Somaliland. However that was not a reason for demanding immediate independence since the Somali people wished to be fully ripe for freedom when it came.
40. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) asked why, if administration were given to Italy, the transfer of administrative functions to the Somali people must be gradual while if it were granted to another friendly Power the transfer must be immediate.
41. Mr. GASSIM (Somalia Conference) believed that the question was based upon a misunderstanding of his statement. If Italy assumed trusteeship, the Somalia Conference would want the transfer of administrative functions to be hastened.
42. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) noted that in the written statement the representative had recalled that Somaliland had "gone through very hard trials during the long years of military administration." He asked whether the military administration had been better or worse than the period of fascist rule before the war.
43. Mr. GASSIM (Somalia Conference) was unwilling to reply to that question.
44. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the representative of the Somalia Conference was under no obligation to answer the questions put to him by members of the Committee.
45. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) drew attention to a paragraph in the written statement where it was recorded that, in 1939, the number of Somalis attending elementary and craft schools totalled about 3,000. He asked whether that figure represented the total attendance during that year out of the school-age population and for the number of adults or adolescents attending schools and colleges in Somaliland.
46. Mr. GASSIM (Somalia Conference) replied that attendance varied. While he did not know the total figures he recalled that in the state-maintained school which he had attended as a child there had been 200 pupils. Of course, there were other schools.

47. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) noted the reply which the Somali representative had given to the question asked by the representative of the Ukrainian SSR as to the reasons for which the Military Administration had been compelled to take action against Somali Youth League. He noted also that a claim was made in the written statement that the League did not have the support of the population. If that was the case then how was it that there had been demonstrations in its favour which had to be suppressed?

48. Mr. GASSIM (Somalia Conference) replied that if the representative of Pakistan consulted the written statement, he would find that the Somali Youth League was an inflammatory organization which had been responsible for numerous outbreaks of terrorism even before the one which had led to the military measures referred to.

49. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) commented that the terroristic nature of the League was not evidence that popular support was lacking.

50. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) asked what time-limit would be set for the independence of Somaliland if the trusteeship were granted to Italy. He observed that at the previous session of the General Assembly the representative of the Somalia Conference had placed a thirty year time-limit upon Italian administration<sup>1</sup> and he wondered whether the attitude of the Organization, in that respect, had changed during the intervening period. Mr. Kiselev also asked what were the material means supporting the Somalia Conference and who had defrayed the delegation's expenses in coming to Lake Success.

51. Mr. GASSIM (Somalia Conference) was well aware that his delegation had asked for a thirty year time limit at the previous session of the General Assembly. He believed that the period of Italian trusteeship should be as brief as possible.

52. As for the second question, the funds which had permitted the delegation to be present at the General Assembly had been gathered by the branches and affiliates of the organization itself.

53. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) asked for an explanation of the membership of the delegation of the Somalia Conference. If 30 per cent of the population was politically and culturally developed then why was it that the delegation comprised mainly persons employed by the British Administration and not other representatives of the cultured section of the population such as teachers and agricultural experts, as could be expected of a democratically representative group?

54. Mr. GASSIM (Somalia Conference) replied that his organization was established on a democratic basis. It so happened that the leader of the delegation was Vice-President of the Hisbia Dighil Mirifle Union of Africans of Somalia.

55. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) failed to comprehend why the head of the delegation of the Somalia Conference had asserted that the Somali Youth League, which was demanding independence, was actuated by unworthy motives. It was well-known that Articles

73 and 76 of the United Nations Charter provided that the aim of trusteeship was to promote the progressive development towards self-government and independence of the peoples administered. Therefore, the statement of the representative of the Somalia Conference was at variance with the Charter. Mr. Manuilsky asked whether the representative of the Somalia Conference realized that his statement and, in general, the character of his organization was at variance with the requirements of the Charter.

56. Mr. GASSIM (Somalia Conference) replied that it was precisely because he was acquainted with Articles 73 and 76 of the Charter and because he knew the rights given to the Somali people by those articles, that he considered the behaviour of the Somali Youth League had as its aim to jeopardize the independence of the country. The Somalia Conference, on the other hand, sought to arrive at independence by means of evolution along reasonable lines, in accordance with the traditions and the historical development of Somaliland.

57. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) asked how many persons in Somaliland had a higher education in law, medicine, agriculture and so on.

58. He also desired to know the ratio of Moslems to the population of the territory as a whole and whether the Koran was being taught in the schools.

59. Mr. GASSIM (Somalia Conference), replying to the first question, said that in the interior of the country all the doctors and heads of infirmaries were Somalis and possessed appropriate university qualifications. The same applied to the other branches of the liberal professions.

60. As regards the second question, the entire population was Moslem. Not only was the Koran taught in the schools in the interior of the land but the highest legal functionaries in the country were Moslems.

61. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) asked whether the representative of the Somalia Conference understood the difference between trusteeship and colonialism.

62. Mr. GASSIM (Somalia Conference) gave an affirmative reply.

63. Mr. CLUTTON (United Kingdom) told the Committee that none of the members of the delegation of the Somalia Conference was employed by the British Administration. He believed that one had been temporarily employed during the preceding eight years. Two were employees of the Municipality of Mogadiscio, whether or not as tax collectors he could not say. The head of the delegation was not an employee of the Department of Justice of the British Administration. As recorded in the Report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation, he was employed as a clerk in the Court of one of the Italian judges. Mr. Clutton reminded the Committee that there were three separate kinds of courts in Somaliland: the Koranic courts, the Italian courts and finally the courts of the British Administration which administered British law and British proclamations.

64. SAYED Al Cadi MOHAMMED AL-AMRI (Yemen) asked whether the Somalia Conference would consider accepting independence should the Committee decide in that sense.

65. Mr. GASSIM (Somalia Conference) replied that, if the Somali people were to act in accordance

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part II, First Committee, 270th meeting, page 346.*

with their conscience and in the knowledge of a stage of progress reached, they would refuse it because they were not ready for absolute independence. Nevertheless, they regarded liberty and freedom as very highly desirable.

*The representatives of the Somalia Conference withdrew.*

*At the invitation of the Chairman the representatives of the National Congress of Tripolitania took seats at the Committee table.*

66. BASHIR SADAWI Bey (National Congress of Tripolitania) spoke in support of his organization's claim for an independent and united Libya and stressed that if that were achieved, Libya would become a strong factor in the consolidation of peace and stability in the Middle East. Moreover, its national government would be a free and democratic one ensuring personal liberty and legitimate rights for every inhabitant of the country. In urging the proclamation of immediate independence and unity, the National Congress of Tripolitania expressed the unanimous wishes of the Libyan people.

67. In conclusion, Bashir Sadawi Bey asked that his delegation be permitted to reserve its right to make a detailed statement at a later stage.

68. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) asked the delegation what period of time was considered necessary for the establishment of an independent Libya.

69. BASHIR SADAWI Bey (National Congress of Tripolitania) replied that he sought an immediate declaration of independence.

*The representatives of the National Congress of Tripolitania withdrew.*

*At the invitation of the Chairman the representatives of the National Congress of Cyrenaica took seats at the Committee table.*

70. Mr. SHENEIB (National Congress of Cyrenaica) stressed the grave responsibilities incumbent upon the General Assembly in deciding the fate of millions of people in the former Italian colonies. The Assembly's decision would either lead to enduring happiness and well-being for those peoples or, if it deviated from the path of justice, would condemn them to long misery.

71. The delegation of the National Congress of Cyrenaica shared the deep regret expressed by many delegations that it had been necessary to re-open the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies at the current session of the General Assembly. It had hoped that the Assembly, during its previous session, would have solved the problem in an equitable and just manner, thereby putting an end to the painful suspense which had almost exhausted the patience of the populations themselves. However, he hoped that the delay would result in a more equitable and wise decision than might have been possible five months earlier. As the representative of the United States had declared (278th meeting), the intervening period had provided delegations with an opportunity of acquainting themselves with the details of the problem. It was apparent that there had been a change in the attitude of several delegations towards the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies in general and towards the fate of Libya in particular. Mr. Sheneib welcomed the fact that most delegations believed Libya to be worthy of independence. The only point of dispute at the

present time concerned, apparently, the period of transition necessary to attain that independence. One might ask, how, in such a short period of a few months, Libya had been able to evolve from a dependent country over which United Nations Trusteeship was deemed necessary, to a country worthy of independence? How was it that the United Kingdom had been willing to accede to the declaration of a Cyrenaican Government under the Emir el-Senussi? Undoubtedly, the answer was that the States Members of the United Nations had come to realize the facts of the situation in Libya and had re-considered the case in a spirit of justice.

72. Now that it was recognized that Libya was ripe for the independence which it deserved, surely, all that remained to be done was to grant it that independence in accordance with the basic principle of the Charter, namely, the rights of all peoples to determine their own fate. Loyalty to the Charter made such a step imperative.

73. Turning to the question of Cyrenaica, Mr. Sheneib observed that self-government had already been granted under the leadership of the Emir el-Senussi. That present status, however, was merely the first fruit of the efforts of the Cyrenaican people who, under the leadership of their Emir, had struggled for over thirty years to throw off the yoke of slavery and colonization. It was needless to elaborate on the great sacrifices made by the Cyrenaican people in their fight against Italian domination. Their contribution in the Second World War had resulted in a promise given by Mr. Anthony Eden, the former British Foreign Secretary that their country would never again be placed under Italian rule. Clearly, both from the ethical and logical points of view, that promise could never have been interpreted as meaning a change-over from Italian occupation to occupation by another Power. In fact, the people of Cyrenaica had waited for over six years for the British Government to honour its pledge. As was known, Cyrenaica had recently been granted self-government. That fact, in itself, was a frank recognition of the necessity of the completion of that independence whereby Cyrenaica would attain full sovereignty on an equal footing with other States Members of the United Nations. Mr. Sheneib asked whether it was just that the Cyrenaican people, who had contributed much to the struggle of the United Nations, should still be aspiring for membership in the community of nations? What prevented the granting of full, immediate independence to Cyrenaica? Had not the Cyrenaican people proved the sincerity of their will and determination? It could not be argued with justice that independence must be delayed because the country was still dependent upon assistance in the economic and technical fields. Such aid was required by many countries which were independent and sovereign States and, if economic self-sufficiency was to be a criterion, then what explanation could there be for the Marshall Plan and the various economic and social organizations which formed integral parts of the United Nations? Mr. Sheneib believed that the essential criterion for complete independence was not economic, financial or technical developments; the essential condition was the existence of political consciousness among the people and their adherence to discipline both in their internal and external relations. Mr. Sheneib believed that both attributes were evident in the Cyrenaican people.



74. The United Kingdom, which was a good friend of the Cyrenaican people, had responded magnanimously and clear-sightedly in response to the wishes of the people by handing over the internal government of Cyrenaica to the Emir el-Senussi. The United Kingdom, however, was in a position to prove the fullness of its good intentions by removing such unjustifiable obstacles to the obtainment of independence as the stipulation of a lengthy period of transition stretching from three to four years. Mr. Sheneib felt sure that the United Kingdom Government was well aware that the Cyrenaican people had no patience left to undergo such a transition period. While he did not deny the good-will and sympathetic guidance which characterized the attitude of the United Kingdom, it must be evident to everyone that the best qualified administrator of any particular country was ultimately the owner of that country. No guardian or trustee should hope to continue in his duties once the protégé had attained maturity. Cyrenaica already enjoyed self-government, the people's claim to independence was based solidly on the United Nations Charter and was in complete harmony with the requirements of peace, both local and international. All that remained to be done was for the Assembly to endorse that claim and for the United Kingdom to execute a rapid withdrawal.

75. The people of Tripolitania had likewise expressed a clear desire for independence. Moreover, Italy itself, according to the terms of the Peace Treaty had relinquished all claim to its former colonies and the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Sforza, had asked that the First Committee grant Tripolitania immediate independence (279th meeting). In view of that request by the former enemy of the Tripolitanian people it was clearly the duty of the United Nations to recognize that independence. Mr. Sheneib added that, in his opinion, when Count Sforza had spoken of Tripolitania he had, by implication, recognized that Cyrenaica was independent and that the Fezzan was part of Tripolitania.

76. Mr. Sheneib also stated his delegation's desire that Libya be unified under the Government of the Emir el-Senussi. If the representatives of the Tripolitanian people still sought that solution then it would contribute to the welfare of the Libyan people as a whole. But if they sought to change their attitude and withdrew their acceptance of the Senussi Government then the delegation of the National Congress of Cyrenaica would have no choice but to regretfully confine its demands to Cyrenaica alone. In the latter eventuality its demands could be summarized as follows: (a) recognition by the General Assembly of a full and immediate independence of Cyrenaica as a sovereign State under the Government of the Emir el-Senussi; (b) full and immediate independence for Tripolitania and the Fezzan; (c) recognition of the right of Cyrenaica to demand reparations due to a country which had actively contributed to the allied victory in the last war on account of its losses in property.

77. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) asked whether the representative considered that the action of the United Kingdom Government in granting self-rule to Cyrenaica would hinder the establishment of an independent and unified Libya.

78. Secondly, would the people of Cyrenaica be content if a united Libya were formed without the

Fezzan? Finally, would the fact that much of the terrain of Libya comprised desert and wasteland be a hindrance to a united Libya?

79. Mr. GALAL (National Congress of Cyrenaica), replying to the first question, believed that the establishment of Cyrenaican self-rule under the Emir el-Senussi would actually hasten the independence of Libya.

80. As to the second question, the people of Cyrenaica insisted upon maintaining the unity of all parts of Libya. They desired that all three territories be given independence.

81. With regard to the final question, he did not think that the terrain of Libya constituted an obstacle to unity if the people of Libya were agreed that unity must be sought.

82. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) asked for the family names of the President and Vice-President of the National Congress of Cyrenaica.

83. Mr. GALAL (National Congress of Cyrenaica) replied that the President of the delegation was Mr. Sheneib, while he himself was Vice-President. A further member of the delegation was Mr. Shaglouf.

84. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) asked whether it was correct as reported by the Four Power Commission of Investigation (A/C.1/442) that the President and Vice-President of the National Congress of Cyrenaica were close relatives of the Emir el-Senussi?

85. Mr. GALAL (National Congress of Cyrenaica) replied that that was true but that they had been elected to those posts in a free election.

86. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) asked whether it was true as reported by Cairo newspapers that a treaty had been concluded—or at least was being contemplated—between the Emir el-Senussi and the United Kingdom Government which would in effect preclude any possibility of Cyrenaican independence?

87. Mr. GALAL (National Congress of Cyrenaica) denied the existence of any such treaty either open or secret. At present, all the efforts of the Cyrenaican people were directed towards securing independence.

88. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that according to the report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation, the Congress of Cyrenaica consisted of 71 persons all appointed by the Emir el-Senussi. He asked where and when did the elections to that Congress take place.

89. Mr. GALAL (National Congress of Cyrenaica) pointed out that in fact the Congress consisted of 67 persons. The President and Vice-President had been elected by the members of the Congress who, in turn, had been elected by the people and approved by the Emir.

90. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) remarked that the reply was unsatisfactory and was at variance with the data contained in the report of the Four-Power Commission. He also desired to know why the National Congress of Cyrenaica had refused to submit the records of their meetings to the Commission of Investigation on the grounds that those records



were secret. Furthermore, what was the attitude of the National Congress to the proposal of the USSR (A/C.1/487) for withdrawal of foreign troops as a whole and for the liquidation of military bases in Libya, so that that country should not be dragged into any future war?

91. Mr. GALAL (National Congress of Cyrenaica) did not wish to reply to the first question which he believed was only the concern of the Commission of Investigation.

92. Replying to the second question, he said that the withdrawal of troops and the return of the country to its own people was one of the requisites of independence. When independence was declared, all military forces would be required to withdraw from the country and all military bases and equipment should be liquidated.

93. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) asked whether the representative of the National Congress of Cyrenaica had read the draft resolutions submitted to the First Committee concerning the disposal of the former Italian colonies. And, if so, which of those draft resolutions did he support.

94. Fayez Bey EL-KHOURI (Syria) on a point of order believed that it was not for the delegation

of the National Congress of Cyrenaica to state which of the draft resolutions it supported since that was a matter for the Committee alone.

95. The CHAIRMAN ruled that such a point of order should not be dealt with until after a reply had been given since it might influence the attitude of the Cyrenaican delegation toward the question. Furthermore there was no limitation upon the kind of questions which might be asked and the representatives of organizations giving evidence before the Committee were perfectly free to reply or to refuse to reply to any questions.

96. Mr. GALAL (National Congress of Cyrenaica) said that he had read the resolutions and believed that the proposal of Iraq (A/C.1/489) was the most practical and could be accepted provided the United Kingdom gave an assurance of its good-will during the period of transition and that, if such good-will was not forthcoming, or if difficulty was experienced in applying the resolutions then the populations concerned would have the right to petition the Committee.

*The representatives of the National Congress of Cyrenaica withdrew.*

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SEVENTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 7 October 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

### **Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies: general discussion (continued)**

1. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) recalled that the United Kingdom representative had promised (286th meeting) to give more complete information about the demonstrations that the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies had caused in the town of Mogadiscio in Italian Somaliland. He asked the Chairman to invite the United Kingdom representative to give further details of the events in Italian Somaliland, and especially at Mogadiscio.

2. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) stated that he did not yet have precise information on the subject; he would supply details as soon as he received them. So far as he knew, the demonstrations had taken place only in the town of Mogadiscio, and only two thousand people had taken part in them. A telegram received that morning indicated that the situation was again quiet.

#### PRESENTATION OF VIEWS BY REPRESENTATIVE ORGANIZATIONS (continued)

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representatives of the Eritrean Bloc for Independence took seats at the Committee table.*

3. The CHAIRMAN said that, after hearing the statement to be made on behalf of the Eritrean Union for Independence, members of the Committee would be able to put questions to the representatives of that organization.

4. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) said that his group was composed of eight political parties and associations which had spontaneously united to express the will of the absolute majority of the Eritrean people to achieve their immediate liberty and independence. Those views had already been made known at the second part of the General Assembly's third session, as a reaction against the Sforza-Bevin compromise. It had since been strengthened and had resulted in the establishment of the Eritrean Union for Independence in a matter of a few weeks.

5. Accordingly, it was in the name of the whole Eritrean people that he (Ibrahim Sultan Ali) spoke, in asking for immediate independence for the whole of his country. The Eritrean Bloc for Independence considered that making that request was not infringing on the rights of any other people. Its sole desire was to establish the sovereignty of the Eritrean people over its own territory and to base that sovereignty on the principles of international law.

6. A millenary history testified to the unity of Eritrea. In fact, the Eritrean people were only asking for the acknowledgment *de jure* of a very old *de facto* situation; it concerned a people who had lived together on a territory bounded by natural and historical frontiers.

7. The contention that partition of Eritrean territory would be justified because of racial and religious incompatibilities among the population, was completely devoid of foundation. Tension had not even arisen during the most troubled periods.

Maintenance of public order had given the British Administration little difficulty, and the few disorders which might have occurred had been fomented by elements from outside. As within living memory there had been no racial or religious incompatibility in Eritrea between Christians and Moslems, for example, that argument was devoid of any basis for discussion.

8. It had also been said, in support of the annexation of Eritrea to Ethiopia, that the two countries were bound by a common language, tradition and culture. But history showed that Eritrea had never been under Ethiopian sovereignty. In Abassid times, Eritrea had formed part of the Caliphate of Baghdad. After the dismemberment of the Caliphate, local autonomous States under the dynasty of Moslem emirs had been formed on part of the Eritrean territory. A chief of Eritrean descent had consolidated his authority in another part of the territory. After Portuguese emigration and Turkish domination, the country had been governed by the Egyptian Khedives until the Italian Government had supplanted that authority. With regard to the statements to the effect that Eritrea had been rescued from Ethiopia by the Italians, it would suffice to recall that when the Italians had landed at Massawa in 1882, they had to fight Egyptian and not Ethiopian troops before they could take possession of the territory. To sum up, the historic evolution of Eritrean territory had been as follows: (a) with regard to the country as a whole, with the exception of the plateau comprising a part of Hamasien, Serae and a part of Akkele Guzai, the Turks and later the Egyptians had succeeded to the Caliphate of Baghdad; (b) the remainder of the territory had been under the domination of the chief Bahar Negash, who had submitted to the Turks and the Egyptians, except for brief periods when he had succeeded in imposing his own authority. Eritrea had thus always been a separate territorial entity on which Ethiopia never had a hold, although other countries at different times had imposed their sovereignty on it.

9. With regard to the so-called identity of custom, language and general interests between Eritrea and Ethiopia, it should be stated that there had never been the slightest community of interests nor of social life between the Ethiopians and the Christian population of the high plateau of Eritrea. Furthermore, Ethiopia itself was a mosaic of peoples of different languages and races, so much so that those factors had prevented the unity of the Ethiopian Empire and had led to the supremacy of one race over another.

10. It was equally erroneous to claim that there were ties of blood between the population of Northern Ethiopia and that of Eritrea. For centuries the Eritrean people had suffered from the violence which marked the Ethiopian nature and which was still evident by the bloody incursions against the Eritrean populations of the Danakil Coast and the Western Plateau.

11. It was not true to say, as the representative of Ethiopia had stated (278th meeting) that Christians and Moslems lived side by side on good terms in his country. Racial and religious discrimination was most rigorous in Ethiopia, as shown by the fact that no Moslem was allowed to take part in the governmental administration of the country. That was not a negligible aspect of the question in view of the size of the Moslem popu-

lation of Eritrea: 80,000 Danakil Moslems lived in the southwestern part of Massawa, 80,000 Moslems were residing in Arkele-Guzai, 30,000 Moslems were living in Asmara; those figures, taken from the report of the representative of a great Power, were in fact below the actual numbers. In addition, Moslems formed an absolute majority of the population of the town and territory of Massawa, and were very numerous in Serae and Hamasien. If the annexation contemplated by the Ethiopian Government took place, those Moslems would be under Ethiopian domination.

12. The so-called identity of language between the Ethiopians and the Eritrean inhabitants of the high plateau did not exist; the official language of Ethiopia was Amharic, which differed considerably from the language spoken in Eritrea. The fact that the Ethiopians of Tigray spoke the same language as the Eritreans of the high plateau merely proved that the union of the Province of Tigray with Ethiopia had been the outcome of the militaristic expansion pursued by the Ethiopian emperors. That fact was an argument for the annexation of Tigray by Eritrea, rather than the reverse. The periodical rebellions in Tigray were sufficient proof of the opposition of the population to Ethiopian domination. Moreover, the Eritrean Moslems who would come under Ethiopian domination, if the proposed annexation to Ethiopia were approved, did not speak the Tigray language, but a number of dialects.

13. The argument that there was a racial difference between the Christians of the high plateau and the Moslems of the western lowlands was equally groundless. From time to time, groups of Moslems had adopted the Christian religion without thereby losing the same ethnical characteristics as those who had remained faithful to the Moslem creed.

14. In any case, Ethiopia had not reached the necessary level of development to assume the administration of a country such as Eritrea whose civilization was without a question superior to that of Ethiopia. That country was governed by an absolute monarchy, surrounded by feudal lords who completely controlled the country. The Constitution of the country did not limit the executive power or determine the rights of the citizen in relation to the State.

15. The obvious gaps in Ethiopian administration were in large part due to lack of financial resources. In those circumstances, it might reasonably be asked how Ethiopia could effectively administer a country which the representative of Ethiopia had himself admitted to be unproductive and sterile. Even the annexation of part of Eritrea by Ethiopia would be harmful to Eritrea without bringing a corresponding benefit to Ethiopia. The majority of the Eritrean people would suffer the same fate as the Ethiopian people itself and would have no opportunity to improve its living conditions.

16. As for the political maturity of the people of Eritrea, it should be recalled that the representative of Ethiopia himself had said that a great many Ethiopian officials and diplomats were of Eritrean origin. If Eritreans were capable of working for a foreign State, why could they not work for their own country? The Eritrean people had in fact always shown a great interest in anything which

concerned their country, contrary to the statement of the Chief Administrator of Eritrea, mentioned in the report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation, that only 19 per cent of the population was politically and intellectually mature enough to be able freely to express a reasoned opinion on the future of the country.

17. It had also been said that Eritrea's economic immaturity would be an obstacle to its independence. That was proved, it was said, by the fact that the total imports from Ethiopia was twice that of Eritrean exports to Ethiopia. But everything exported from Eritrea to Ethiopia was consumed in the latter country, while most of the goods coming from Ethiopia only passed through Eritrea in transit to European countries. Moreover, if Eritrea had been so weak economically, it would not have been able to stand the test of the Second World War. That test, on the contrary, had led to the development of the resources and economic potential of the country. Eritrean industry currently comprised 1,600 enterprises, employing more than 34,000 persons. There was every reason to believe that, when the difficulties and restrictions imposed by the temporary administration had disappeared, economic development could make great strides.

18. The people of Eritrea rejected any attempt by any foreign country to subjugate their territory either wholly or partially. They fulfilled all the prerequisites for the granting of political independence and in particular, requested that no colonial régime, European or Ethiopian, be imposed upon them.

19. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) said that he wished to have more detailed information on the economic situation of Eritrea. Could Eritrea constitute an independent and viable economic entity in the near future? It would also be interesting to know whether Eritrea could be economically developed to the point where it could supply the needs of its population. Lastly, the Chilean delegation wished to know what repercussions the adoption of any one of the three solutions contemplated would have on the economic life, development and social progress of Eritrea, namely: (a) immediate independence; (b) a provisional trusteeship; (c) annexation of a part of the territory to Ethiopia and the other part to the Sudan.

20. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) requested the representative of Chile to be so good as to refer to the memorandum prepared by the Eritrean Chamber of Commerce, which explained in detail the problem of the economic development of Eritrea and all related problems.

21. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) asked how the representative of the Eritrean Bloc for Independence could reconcile his statement that on the one hand no Moslem was an official of the Ethiopian Government with his statement that on the other hand many Eritreans were officials of that same Government.

22. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) replied that the Eritrean officials in the service of the Ethiopian Government were all Eritreans of Christian origin.

23. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) asked if the representatives of the Eritrean Union for Independence who were present at the Committee's table were

there as representatives of a common group or as representatives of separate parties.

24. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) replied that the representatives who were sitting with him were representatives of the seven groups in the name of which he had spoken.

25. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) emphasized that he had asked that question because those representatives had appeared separately at the previous session and had expressed divergent opinions.

26. He wished to know whether the Eritrean Bloc for Independence was in favour of the principle of self-determination of peoples.

27. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) admitted that those groups had held divergent opinions at the time of the previous session, but that, when they had learned of the Ethiopian Government's intention to make Eritrea an Ethiopian colony, the whole population of Eritrea had united to struggle, not only against European colonization, but also against colonization of the country by an African Power. The General Assembly would certainly not lend its support to an attempt at colonization by an African Power, even though that same Power was struggling against European colonialism.

28. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) said that his question about the right of self-determination of peoples had not been answered.

29. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) stated that his group believed in the principle, which was included in the Charter, and cherished the hope that Ethiopia itself would respect it and would not try to increase its territory in violation of the principles of the Charter.

30. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) asked for an explanation of the fact that one of the parties currently incorporated in the Eritrean Bloc for Independence had asked at the previous session for the return of Italy, which had kept Eritrea a colony for fifty years.

31. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) replied that that attitude had been abandoned, and that all the groups of the Union were in favour of the country's independence. It was to be hoped that the party advocating Ethiopian domination would also rally to the cause of supporting independence.

32. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) asked whether the representative of that party had changed his opinion as a result of the interview he had had in Rome with Mr. de Gasperi.

33. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) replied that his group was inspired only by the sentiments of the Eritrean people, who thought only of the liberty and independence of the country. Moreover, it was in New York that the unity of the various groups had been achieved.

34. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) stated that, at the time of the third session of the General Assembly, each of the various parties since united in the Eritrean Bloc for Independence had had its own well-defined programme. On 12 May 1949, there had been a conference at the end of which a joint statement in favour of independence had been issued. But had the local population been consulted on that change of attitude?

35. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) stated that the Union had informed its constituents by cablegram, and that the newspapers had published the news of the agreement in the three languages of Eritrea. On the return of the representatives, a conference had been held and the population, which was politically mature enough to recognize its true interests, had ratified the decision taken.
36. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) stated that the representatives of the Union seemed to have a great deal of influence on the population since they had come to New York with definite instructions and yet had been able to declare themselves in favour of independence, without consulting those whom they represented.
37. Ato Medhen recalled that the representative of the Eritrean Bloc for Independence had said that he was in favour of the right of self-determination of peoples. He asked what was the total population of Eritrea?
38. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) replied that it was for the Administering Authority to supply statistics on the total population of Eritrea, if such statistics existed.
39. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) asked what percentage of the population the Bloc represented, in both the towns and the country.
40. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) replied that the Union comprised the following parties:
- Moslem League of Eritrea, 786,000 members; Liberal-Progressive Party, 113,500; Association of Eritrean Ex-Servicemen, 36,200; New Eritrea Party, 215,600; *Husbad Watani* Party, 56,500; Eritrean *Husbad Mustakula* Party, 129,400.
41. In addition, the following details could be furnished. In the Hamasien District, the Moslem League of Eritrea had 67,370 members. There were 5,000 Liberals, 60,800 Independents, 75,200 members of the New Eritrea Party, and 5,600 members of the Association of Eritrean Ex-Servicemen. In the district of Akkele-Guzai, the figures were as follows: Moslem League of Eritrea, 168,400; Liberals, 45,500; Independents, 25,800; New Eritrea Party, 36,000; and the Association of Eritrean Ex-Servicemen, 8,300.
42. In the Serae district, the Moslem League of Eritrea had 44,370 members, the Liberal Party, 63,000, the Independents 14,900, the New Eritrea Party, 32,100 and the Association of Eritrean Ex-Servicemen 7,500.
43. In the lowlands, the Moslem League of Eritrea had 368,660 members, the Independents, 24,800, the New Eritrea Party, 50,000 and the Association of Eritrean Ex-Servicemen 10,000.
44. In the district of Massawa and the Northern Danakil Coast, the Moslem League of Eritrea had 110,000 members, the Independent Party, 3,100, the New Eritrea Party 12,100, the Association of Eritrean Ex-Servicemen, 4,400 and the *Husbad Watani* 56,500.
45. In the districts of Assab and the Southern Danakil Coast there were 28,000 members of the Moslem League of Eritrea and 10,000 of the New Eritrea Party.
46. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) asked what was the total membership of the Union.
47. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) said that the total was 1,338,000.
48. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) said that that figure was greater than the entire population of Eritrea. He asked whether the Union kept lists of members.
49. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) said that each of the parties kept statistics of its membership.
50. Heads of families were given identity cards which showed the number of persons composing the family.
51. He added that the British Authorities had never compiled statistics of the population and that it was therefore impossible to state, as the representative of Ethiopia had done, that the membership of the Eritrean Union for Independence exceeded the figures for the total population.
52. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) noted that Ibrahim Sultan Ali had given the figure of 796,000 members with regard to the Moslem League of Eritrea, whereas, at the previous session, he had spoken of 975,000. He asked whether the League had lost part of its membership.
53. The representative of the Union had also said that the membership of his group on the high plateau was 600,000. That figure was larger than the total Christian population, not only on the high plateau, but in the whole of Eritrea.
54. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) said that the figures he had given did not conflict with those given in the summary record of the 247th meeting of the First Committee. The figures given for the Moslem League of Eritrea were also accurate and had not changed since before the visit of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation. The Eritrean Union for Independence included almost all the Christians of Eritrea, save for a small minority of about 9 or 10 per cent of the population which was bound by personal interests, as the representative of the Government of Ethiopia doubtless knew.
55. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) asked how many members of the Union had received a higher education.
56. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) recalled that the representative of Ethiopia had admitted that there were many Eritrean officials in his country. That proved their capacity to administer their country.
57. Moreover many administrative posts in Eritrea were held by Eritreans. That again showed the capacity of the Eritrean people.
58. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) asked whether, if the members of the Union did not include persons with college degrees, there were some who had received a secondary education and had passed an examination at the end of their studies.
59. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) replied that there were hundreds of schools in Eritrea. He had no statistics on the point, but the fact remained that a people capable of assuming government positions in Ethiopia and Eritrea could administer its own country.
60. Furthermore, groups of Eritreans were frequenting schools abroad, in particular in Egypt.

61. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) said that the representative had not been able to instance a single Eritrean who had even a certificate of secondary education.

62. As regards Eritrean graduates who held posts in Ethiopia, the representative of Ethiopia asked at whose expense they had studied, at Ethiopia's or at Italy's? If Eritrea became independent, would the Eritrean Bloc for Independence want to bring those Eritreans to administer the country?

63. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) suggested that at that stage of the Committee's work, the various delegations should simply put questions to the representatives of the various organizations, without engaging in polemics.

64. The CHAIRMAN said that the questions and answers should be as brief as possible.

65. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) said that Ethiopia itself had not yet been able to build many colleges and universities. How then could Eritrea, a victim of imperialism, have its own schools and colleges? As for those who had studied abroad, they had done so at their own expense.

66. Furthermore, the people of Eritrea expected all their fellow countrymen who were abroad to return as soon as the country gained its independence, in so far as they were capable of contributing towards the national advancement.

67. He asked the representative of Ethiopia where his two assistants had studied and who had borne the cost of their education.

68. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) said that according to the information available Eritrea could not be economically self-sufficient. If the country was granted independence, and found it had to ask for aid from one or more foreign countries, to which one would it turn?

69. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) said that it was the Ethiopian Government which contended that Eritrea could not become economically independent. The Eritrean Union, on the other hand, thought that the country was capable of achieving independence. Moreover, it would be for the Eritrean people to decide which country should be asked to furnish technical assistance, should the need arise. The representative of Ethiopia would find some interesting information in the memorandum prepared by the Eritrean Chamber of Commerce.

70. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) recalled that the representative of the Eritrean Union had stated

that Eritrea had always existed as a separate entity. He asked where the frontier had been between Ethiopia and the territory corresponding to Eritrea — the word had not existed in those days — before the arrival of the Italians.

71. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) said that the problem of the frontier between Eritrea and Ethiopia was discussed in the memorandum submitted by the Union he represented.

72. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) asked what need there had been for the representative of the Eritrean Union to pass through Rome on his way to New York.

73. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) said that on their way to New York the other groups had also stopped in Italy, as well as in Cairo, London and various other places.

74. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) said that the replies given by the representative of the Eritrean Union seemed to indicate that the population of Tigrai language and Coptic religion, which was now partitioned between Ethiopia and Eritrea, did not desire unity. How had the Eritrean Union learned that the population had adopted such a surprising attitude? Had there been a plebiscite or had petitions been signed?

75. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) said that even though they might adopt different methods, all the Eritrean parties wanted their country to become independent.

76. Referring to the agreement reached by the various parties and the change which had taken place in their attitude, he said that as a result of meetings held in all the towns of Eritrea, they had decided to co-ordinate their efforts.

77. All the Eritrean people wanted independence, and had there been any differences of opinion on that score protests would have reached the United Nations.

*The representatives of the Eritrean Bloc for Independence withdrew.*

78. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee had heard all the groups which the first interim report of Sub-Committee 16 (A/C.1/494) had recommended should be given a hearing.

79. He would ask all the organizations mentioned in the second interim Report of the Sub-Committee (A/C.1/495) to be ready for the afternoon meeting of the First Committee.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-EIGHTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 7 October 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

### **Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies: general discussion (continued)**

PRESENTATION OF VIEWS BY REPRESENTATIVE ORGANIZATIONS (continued)

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representatives of the Somali Youth League and Haman Youth Club took seats at the Committee table.*

1. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) read the text of a letter dated 7 October 1949 from the delegation of the Somali Youth League to the Chairman of the First Committee stating that a telegram had been received from Mogadiscio containing information regarding the recent anti-Italian demonstration in Somaliland. British troops had opened fire upon the demonstrators with the result that seven persons had been killed and many injured. It also stated that hundreds of persons had been

imprisoned including many tribal chiefs and leaders of the Somali Youth League had been deported. The number imprisoned was steadily increasing and the situation was tense. The letter urged that the First Committee recognize the serious nature of the situation and intervene without delay.

2. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the United Kingdom representative had already promised to investigate the situation (287th meeting) and make a statement when he had further information at his disposal. He assured the representative of Liberia that the letter referred to would be brought to the attention of the United Kingdom delegation.

3. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) observed that the serious nature of the situation had not been fully appreciated at first. He wondered whether the Committee was right in leaving the matter in abeyance or whether it ought not to act immediately regarding the banning of the Somali Youth League which had been recognized as a *bona fide* organization representing opinion in Somaliland.

4. The CHAIRMAN reiterated that the United Kingdom representative had promised to submit a report as soon as possible. He hoped that postponement of discussion until the report had been received would not lead to delay.

5. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) asked whether the British Administration in Somaliland considered any expression by the people of their views regarding the political future of the country to be illegal. Was it a crime to demonstrate against assumption of trusteeship by Italy or any other European Power?

6. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) replied that it was not a crime for the Somali people to express their political views. However, it was the duty of the Administration to maintain law and order. The recent disorders, the extent of which he believed had been exaggerated, had not resulted from a simple expression of opinions but from an attempt by a certain group to enforce its political views upon the rest of the community. Mr. McNeil recalled that Somaliland had been the scene of serious disorders in the past and the British Administration did not intend to permit a repetition of such events through dereliction of its duty.

7. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) noted that, whenever the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies had been discussed in the United Nations, attacks had occurred upon Italian citizens in Somaliland or upon those who supported the Italian cause. While he felt reassured by the statement of the United Kingdom representative, he deemed it necessary to state that the Argentine delegation would not countenance any repeated attacks on Italian sympathizers. It was the height of injustice that lives should be sacrificed in order to exercise pressure upon the United Nations.

8. Mr. Arce added the hope that the General Assembly would judge the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies solely on the basis of merit and in accordance with the principles enunciated in the Peace Treaty with Italy.

9. Mr. ISSA (Somali Youth League) appealed for a just and fair decision for his country based upon the principle of self-determination for the

Somalis. At the opening of the previous session of the General Assembly when the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies had come before the General Assembly for the first time, the Somali people had been imbued with great confidence and faith in the United Nations. However, that confidence and faith had been considerably reduced in the light of subsequent discussions which had resulted in the so-called Bevin-Sforza Agreement. Indeed, the Somali people would have been completely disillusioned had it not been for the action of some disinterested and non-colonial Powers in bringing about rejection of the Bevin-Sforza plan. The fact that such a plan had been put forward, which would have resulted in the survival of colonialism in Somaliland, showed that even in the General Assembly, the colonial Powers were able to gain strong support for their evil schemes to exploit and subjugate oppressed countries like Somaliland.

10. At the previous session of the General Assembly certain traitors claiming to represent sections of the Somali people had expressed support for the Bevin-Sforza Agreement which would have condemned the Somalis to perpetual slavery and servitude. In fact, those traitors were far more interested in the Italian promise to grant eight years of back pay to all ex-servicemen if Italian rule was re-established than they were in the welfare of the Somali people. That the Somali Youth League alone possessed the right to speak on behalf of the overwhelming majority of the population had been fully established by the report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation which had recognized the League as the only real and active political organization in the country and that its programme was supported by the greater part of the population. Mr. Issa quoted from the general conclusions of the report, in which it was stated that the Somali Youth League constituted the major force in Somali politics and might be expected to retain that majority for some time to come. That the traitors who had supported Italian claims had come before the General Assembly for the purpose of selling the freedom of the Somali people was evidenced by the fact that they had admitted, when questioned, that they had not even read any of the various draft resolutions submitted concerning the future of their country. Furthermore, they had made ridiculous assertions such as that, under Italian rule, universities and colleges had been established for the benefit of the Somalis and that more than 500 Somalis had obtained degrees. Mr. Issa urged the Committee to discredit the views expressed by all other organizations since, as could be ascertained from the report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation, their influence in Somaliland was slight.

11. Having established the right of the Somali Youth League to represent the legitimate aspirations of the Somali people, Mr. Issa drew the Committee's attention to the memorandum which he had submitted containing his organization's programme for the future of his country. That programme, which had received the unanimous support of the chiefs and elders of all the Somali tribes, called for a proclamation of immediate independence of Somaliland. That was the greatest desire of the people. If, nevertheless, the General Assembly considered it best to place Somaliland temporarily under the international trusteeship system, the delegation of the Somali Youth League



would raise no objection provided that Italian Administration in any form or guise was completely excluded. The Somalis were irrevocably opposed to ever again living under that hated and oppressive domination. The reasons for their opposition had been set forth in several memoranda submitted to the Committee.

12. In case the General Assembly decided to place Somaliland under the international trusteeship system, the Somali Youth League would prefer a direct United Nations trusteeship for an interim period of very short duration. The League was convinced that only under direct United Nations trusteeship could the letter and spirit of Article 73 of the Charter be successfully implemented.

13. Several members of the Committee had urged that the solution be sought in "a spirit of compromise". Needless to say, what they had in mind was a compromise between the supporters of Italy's unjust claims on the one hand and a bloc of colonial Powers on the other. Mr. Issa considered that such a compromise would be totally unjust and illegal. A true compromise must be between the inhabitants of the territory concerned and the General Assembly. The Somali Youth League, as representative of the overwhelming majority of the population, had clearly demonstrated in the memorandum which had been circulated, that they were willing to compromise within reason.

14. Mr. Issa was gratified to note that, since the previous session of the General Assembly, several delegations had modified their position with regard to the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies. Notably, a considerable number of delegations had recognized that Libya, and to some extent Eritrea, were ready for immediate independence. It was disappointing that they had not likewise reconsidered their position with regard to the future of Somaliland.

15. Mr. Issa observed that from the outset of the debate it had been apparent that the authors of the Bevin-Storza Agreement intended to reintroduce that part of the plan which concerned Somaliland. That might well have been anticipated but it was surprising that most of the members of the Committee who had previously supported the plan were prepared to renew their support at the present time. They had already made statements to that effect in the First Committee even without waiting to hear the views of the representatives of the Somali people. Mr. Issa reminded all the delegations of the heavy responsibility which they bore towards the people of Somaliland and he urged them to consider all the relevant facts before casting their final vote. It was for them to decide whether there should be an end to colonialism in Somaliland or whether the people was to be condemned to perpetual slavery and servitude. He appealed to the Committee to respect the principle that the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants were paramount as well as all the other fundamental principles upon which the United Nations Charter was based. By reaching a just decision they would honour the war-time pledges given to all peace-loving nations and would strengthen the confidence and faith that the populations in dependent territories placed in the United Nations. An attempt to reimpose Italian rule against the wishes and interests of the Somalis would constitute an open violation of the United Nations Charter.

16. Mr. Issa had stated at the previous session of the General Assembly that the Somalis would offer physical resistance rather than live again under Italian rule (270th meeting). If any doubt of that statement still existed, then the just course would be to send a new commission of investigation to Somaliland to ascertain the people's wishes. That would mean postponement for at least another year. But it was better to delay than to reach an unjust decision. If Italian rule was reimposed then the Somalis would offer armed resistance notwithstanding the fact that the British would doubtless employ their military force to subdue the country. In the event that a decision was taken to send a new commission of investigation to Somaliland, Mr. Issa urged that its members be selected from among the strictly neutral States Members of the United Nations.

17. In conclusion, the representative of the Somali Youth League asked permission to make a further statement regarding the recent British action in Somaliland at a later time. He explained that the telegram to which the Liberian representative had drawn attention had been received too late for him to prepare any comment for delivery at that time.

18. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) noted the statement of the representative of the Somali Youth League that the people he represented would fight against any return of Italian rule. He asked whether they were equally opposed to rule by any other Power in Somaliland.

19. Mr. ISSA (Somali Youth League) replied that his organization opposed any form of foreign rule but was particularly unfavourable to Italy on account of the long and unhappy experience of Italian Administration.

20. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) asked whether the delegation was aware of a proposal to place Somaliland under a temporary trusteeship administered by the United Nations. He asked what the reaction of the Somali people would be to such a proposal.

21. Mr. ISSA (Somali Youth League) replied that the Somalis desired immediate independence. However, as representatives of the people, his delegation was obliged to take a realistic view and was ready to reach a compromise. If the General Assembly decided to place Somaliland under the International Trusteeship System that would not be opposed provided Italy were completely excluded. He added that, in the case of trusteeship, his delegation would prefer that the country be administered directly by the United Nations for a very short period of transition.

22. Mr. COOPER (Liberia), referring to the statement that the return of Italy would be opposed by force, asked whether the representative of the Somali Youth League believed that Italian rule could be established by any means other than forcible pacification.

23. Mr. ISSA (Somali Youth League) replied that Italy would be obliged to use physical force.

24. Mr. MARTIN (Canada) asked what steps had been taken to ascertain that the Somali Youth League and the Hamar Youth Club represented the majority of the population.

25. Mr. ISSA (Somali Youth League) replied that the report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation contained a statement that the



overwhelming majority of the people had supported the two organizations concerned at the time when investigation had been carried out. If the General Assembly still entertained the slightest doubt of their representative character or of the truth of his assertion that the Somali people preferred death to Italian rule then a new commission of investigation should be sent to ascertain the situation on the spot.

26. In reply to a further question from Mr. MARTIN (Canada) Mr. ISSA (Somali Youth League) stated his delegation's preference for an international trusteeship of a duration of only three to five years.

27. Mr. HOOD (Australia) presumed that the representative of the Somali Youth League was aware that any decision which the General Assembly might take in the matter would be binding and final. He asked whether the statement that, in certain circumstances, the settlement might meet with forcible resistance, did not imply that the resistance would in fact be directed against the decision of the United Nations.

28. Mr. ISSA (Somali Youth League) said that the people of Somaliland would resist any decision to return their country to Italy.

29. Mr. JENSEN (Denmark) asked what was the total population of Somaliland.

30. Mr. ISSA (Somali Youth League) replied that there were no precise official statistics. The British Administration had estimated the population to total one million while the Italian figures had varied. The Somali people, in the light of their knowledge of the country, considered that the population totalled two million.

31. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) noted that one of the preceding speakers had referred to post-war democratic Italy and had stated that as such, it would be a better Administrative Power than it had been before the war. He asked whether there had been any difference in the Italian Administration before and after the fascist régime.

32. Mr. ISSA (Somali Youth League) replied that, so far as the Somali were concerned, there had been no difference.

33. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) referred to the statement that Italian rule would be opposed under any conditions even if decided upon by the United Nations and asked whether it was not the opinion of the representative of the Somali Youth League that, if his people's wishes were ignored, they would feel justified in opposing the decision of the United Nations on the grounds that it violated the terms of the Italian Peace Treaty.

34. Mr. ISSA (Somali Youth League) replied that his people would take the view that the United Nations had ignored the statement he had made that they would rather die than accept Italian rule. Consequently, they would feel justified in offering armed resistance.

35. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) interpreted the viewpoint of the Somali delegation in the sense that if a certain contingency arose they would resist unto death. The argument that their action would mean resisting a decision of the United Nations was merely a legalistic quibble. A wrong was a wrong no matter who the perpetrator was. He thought that the Aus-

tralian representative would be able to understand the viewpoint of the Somali delegation if he were to envisage his own country in a similar situation.

36. The CHAIRMAN said he would take note of representatives' request to make a further statement at a later time concerning the recent British action in Somaliland.

*The representatives of the Somali Youth League and Hamar Youth Club withdrew.*

37. Mr. TARCHIANI (Italy) remarked that in the course of his speech and in answer to a query by the representative of Canada the representative of the Somali Youth League had referred to the report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation in order to prove the indisputable right of his organization to speak for and on behalf of the overwhelming majority of inhabitants of Somaliland. It should be mentioned, in that respect, that the report stated that the Somali Youth League was a progressive and active organization; that was the judgment of the Anglo-American delegations. However, the report had added the views of the USSR, and French delegations had expressed the view that some members of the Somali Youth League were occupying administrative posts, thus enabling the League to apply pressure upon the indigenous inhabitants and hamper the activities of the other parties. That was worth mentioning. The Italian representative concluded by saying that after the events of October 1947 and of January 1948, the only political leaders who had been arrested were those who were opposed to the League.

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representative of the Jewish Community of Tripolitania took a seat at the Committee table.*

38. Mr. PERLZWEIG (Jewish Community of Tripolitania) after thanking members of the First Committee for granting a hearing to the community he represented, said that that community was gratified that by virtue of the Peace Treaty with Italy the United Nations had been given the authority to make decisions which the great Powers had agreed in advance to accept and honour. Thus, the United Nations were bound, under the Charter, to place the welfare of the indigenous inhabitants above all strategic and diplomatic considerations.

39. Turning to the conditions under which the Jewish community lived in Tripoli, Mr. Perlzweig said that its economic position had steadily deteriorated as a result of the uncertainty of the situation and the failure of the United Nations and of the great Powers to agree on a solution. During the past year, a very grave and tense situation had existed. However, due to the foresight and precautions taken by the Administering Authorities, bloodshed had been avoided. Moreover, due to the apprehension and uncertainty, almost the whole community had moved to the City of Tripoli, with a desire to emigrate to Israel. He said that the Administering Authorities were providing all possible facilities to speed up that emigration. However, those facilities were limited and each family was allowed to take only the maximum of the equivalent of 250 pounds.

40. He recalled that the Committee had discussed at length the question of the protection of minorities in Eritrea, while no such subject had been

mentioned when discussing Libya. The First Committee should be aware of the fact that, if that economically powerful minority were to emigrate, the whole economy of Libya would be severely impaired.

41. He stated that the wishes of the Jewish community of Tripolitania could be summarized as follows: Firstly, any commission entrusted with the supervision of the transitional period to independence, should be as broadly representative as possible and include some neutral Power and, among those representing the population, at least one representative of the minorities. He hoped the commission would operate in the name of and with the authority of the United Nations. Secondly, any decision adopted by the First Committee, should explicitly state that a Government would be established on democratic principles and elected on the basis of proportional representation. Human rights and the maintenance of the existing status of minorities should be safeguarded. Thirdly, the right to emigrate should be guaranteed; each emigrant should have the right to take his property with him. Finally, he hoped that the United Nations would render justice to those minorities by drafting a resolution which would embody those reasonable requests.

42. MR. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) asked the representative of the Jewish Community of Tripolitania whether he was born in Libya and what was his nationality.

43. MR. PERLZWEIG (Jewish Community of Tripolitania) replied that he was not born in Libya and was a British subject.

44. MR. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) asked what the relationship of the Arabs and the Jews had been before the war and before the advent of Zionism.

45. MR. PERLZWEIG (Jewish Community of Tripolitania) replied that, on the whole, before the advent of the fascist Government and under the previous Arab Government, the Jews had enjoyed a period of tranquility and prosperity.

46. MR. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) further asked when terrorism had started and what had been the causes of it.

47. MR. PERLZWEIG (Jewish Community of Tripolitania) stated that terrorist acts and assaults on the Jewish community had been stimulated from outside Tripoli.

48. MR. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) thereupon concluded that the outside influences had been Zionism that had spread poison in the Arab world.

49. MR. PERLZWEIG (Jewish Community of Tripolitania) dissented from that statement.

50. MR. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) further asked the representative of the Jewish Community of Tripolitania whether the Jews who did not wish to immigrate to Israel would remain loyal to Libya or whether they would show a divided loyalty between Libya and Israel.

51. MR. PERLZWEIG (Jewish Community of Tripolitania) replied that there were no Jews in Tripoli or indeed anywhere in the world who had a divided loyalty.

52. MAHMOUD FAWZI Bey (Egypt), commenting on the speech delivered by the representative of the Jewish Community of Tripolitania, said that the First Committee should hear some commen-

on that speech from both the Administering Authority in Libya and from the representatives of the majority of Libyan people. Moreover, he questioned the veracity of Mr. Perlzweig's statement with regard to the question of divided loyalty.

*The representative of the Jewish Community of Tripolitania withdrew.*

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representative of the Representative Committee of the Italians in Eritrea took a seat at the Committee table.*

53. MR. DI MAGLIO (Representative Committee of the Italians in Eritrea) after thanking the Committee for granting him a hearing, declared that the organization of which he was President, had been organized in March 1947 with a view to defending and protecting the interests of all the Italians in Eritrea, regardless of their social or economic conditions. He remarked that when the Committee had been formed, the number of Italians in Eritrea totalled about 30,000 whereas there had been 80,000 in 1940-1941. Those Italians, although small in numbers constituted a very important group which should be regarded as an indispensable element for the realization of the new Eritrean State, which his Committee ardently hoped for.

54. As to the Independence coalition, the attitude of the Committee he represented had been, for particular reasons, one of neutrality. The exceptional importance of the present time for the very life of the territory and the ever-growing participation of the Eritrean political organizations in the activities aimed at the consolidation of their wishes and aspirations, had induced his Committee to refrain from openly expressing any specific preference, and to leave it to the free development of political forces to spontaneously determine the natural orientation of the majority towards the best solution. That course of action had been adopted also because of the advisability of avoiding Italian participation in the local political activities, for that might create such tension in respect to any other political organization of contrasting views as might bear actual consequences on personal protection and security. The wisdom of their policy was borne out by the fact that, while in general the political parties seeking independence had followed a line of moderation, certain other political organizations opposing them had not concealed in their unrestrained propaganda, that they were ready to use violence and intimidation against their political opponents. That had also been proved by the fact that, in connexion with such warnings, every time the problem of the political settlement of Eritrea had been brought before the United Nations, there had been an increased activity of terror and lawlessness.

55. Confronted with the impressive mass of convergent opinions and unanimous statements of the Eritrean Independence coalition, it would have been unnatural for the Committee representing the Italians in Eritrea to refrain from expressing their stand on a question so vitally affecting the supreme interests of a territory for whose general welfare and social and economic advancement, Italians had contributed and were contributing to such a great extent. In the light of those circumstances, Mr. di Maglio ventured to declare that an independent and sovereign State of Eritrea established on a free and democratic basis, would

be the best solution of the problem. The sixty years during which Italians and Natives had lived together had laid the essential foundation for the independence and self-government of the Eritrean territory, thus, enabling the Eritreans to discharge properly the new tasks that the achievement of independence would necessarily require. What he had said illustrated the value of two facts, namely, that the fusion of the Italians with the Eritrean population was an accomplished fact and the natural consequence of their common life and work had been strengthened by the mutual awareness of serving one and the same purpose. The second fact was that the considerable contribution of the Italians gave assurance for the existence of the economic self-sufficiency, which would necessarily form the basis of the future Eritrean State.

56. With regard to the latter point, Mr. di Maglio gave a detailed description of the agricultural, industrial and commercial achievements of the Italians in Eritrea.

57. On the basis of that detailed description, he asserted that an annexation of Eritrea to Ethiopia would represent an irreparable loss for the former territory. Aside from any other consideration, it was doubtful whether—if independence were not granted—the Italian population would remain to face the prospect of an uncertain situation. On the contrary, in such circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect that the exodus of the Italians would unfavourably affect the general economy of the territory, with inevitable negative repercussions on its inhabitants.

58. In conclusion, he declared that any postponement of a decision concerning Eritrea would severely damage the economic and social structure of the territory in question.

*The representative of the Representative Committee of the Italians in Eritrea withdrew.*

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representative of the Independence Party of Tripolitania took a seat at the Committee table.*

59. Abdalla SHERIF Bey (Independence Party of Tripolitania) stated that no one could ever fail to recognize that a great and radical change had taken place since the end of the previous session of the General Assembly. The United Nations was persuaded that no better solution for the Libyan problem could be reached except by recognizing the right of the Libyan people to secure their immediate, integral and complete independence. That independence should not be conditional on the fulfilment of *a priori* conditions and commitments. That solution therefore was the only one that could secure for the Libyan people an opportunity to contribute to the cause of peace and stability in that vital part of the world, and to become a useful member of the community of free and independent nations.

60. He felt it unnecessary to dwell in detail on the Libyan people's support of the cause of democracy during the Second World War. Furthermore, there existed many factors militating for the unity and independence of Libya. That unity had always been in existence, both during the Turkish and the Italian régimes, and continued to be the case until the Allied Powers had liberated Libya in 1943. It was at that juncture only and because of considerations arising from the military occupation of the country, that Libya had been

divided. That state of affairs had remained in existence ever since although it should have been terminated immediately upon the end of military operations.

61. All the Libyan people were in favour of independence and unity and the affiliation of their State to the Arab League. To that end, a democratic and constitutional Government, guaranteeing all human rights, without any racial or religious discrimination, should be established. An independent and united Libya should become a true friend of all the Powers upholding the cause of peace and liberty.

62. During the transitional period, Abdalla Sherif Bey said that a commission of the United Nations should be formed and charged with the task of supervising the implementation of the decision of the United Nations. By so doing, the United Nations would have proved its existence, strengthened its principles, and would also have rendered a great service to the cause of world peace and stability. In conclusion, he stated that his delegation would reserve the right to submit to the First Committee a detailed statement at a later stage.

*The representative of the Independence Party of Tripolitania withdrew.*

63. The CHAIRMAN said that all the organizations which Sub-Committee 16 had approved, had been heard. The First Committee had set the date of 10 October as the deadline for the submission of requests for a hearing. However, two additional requests had been received and the Sub-Committee was scheduled to meet the following day expressly for that purpose. The First Committee, therefore, would be unable to hear the organizations concerned before Monday. He inquired whether any delegation wished to continue the general discussion so as to fix a meeting for the following day. In the absence of any comments, the Chairman assumed that the general debate had ended and that after hearing the representatives of the two organizations, the Committee would proceed to the discussion of the Argentine draft resolution (A/C.1/492) dealing with the procedural aspect of the problem under consideration.

64. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) recalled that he had previously asked the representative of the United Kingdom as well as the spokesmen of the majority of the population of Libya to clarify certain important points arising out of the speech delivered by the representative of the Jewish Community of Tripolitania.

65. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that statements had already been made by representatives of the National Congress of Tripolitania and the Independence Party of Tripolitania who, he assumed, represented the majority in that area.

66. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) remarked that the Libyan representatives had spoken before Mr. Perlzweig had made his statement.

67. The CHAIRMAN said that if the representatives of the other Tripolitanian organizations wished to make any further statement, they could make a request to that effect, and the Committee would then decide on the issue.

68. Mr. CLUTTON (United Kingdom) said that during the previous as well as during the current

sessions, his delegation had carefully avoided expressing any opinion on the statements of the various indigenous organizations, deeming such a course advisable, since any comment on the part of the Administering Authorities might be misinterpreted either in those territories or in the First Committee. He concluded that his delegation would be ready to answer any question of fact and not of opinion.

69. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) explained that his request concerned information and not opinions.

70. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that the issue was whether or not the Committee should meet the following day.

71. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) pointed out that, to his understanding, at least one party representing the majority of the people of Tripoli might be ready to answer his questions the following day. The United Kingdom representative might also be able to provide some information at that time.

72. The CHAIRMAN said that the principle of granting a second hearing should either be discussed by the Sub-Committee which would then

report to the First Committee or the matter could be settled immediately by the First Committee itself. He did not, however, advise such a course since all the remaining organizations would be expected to ask for a second hearing.

73. Mr. CLUTTON (United Kingdom) said that his delegation would be glad to answer a list of questions, if the representative of Egypt were to submit such a list.

74. The CHAIRMAN, following some discussion, put to the vote a proposal that the Committee should meet the following day to give a second hearing to representatives of the majority organizations in Tripolitania.

*The proposal was rejected by 19 votes to 11, with 13 abstentions.*

75. Following an inquiry by Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq), the CHAIRMAN called for a vote on the principle of granting representatives of those organizations a second hearing, should they so request.

*The proposal was adopted by 37 votes, with 3 abstentions.*

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-NINTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 10 October 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

### Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies: general discussion (continued)

1. Mr. ENGEN (Rapporteur of Sub-Committee 16) presented the third interim report of Sub-Committee 16 (A/C.1/496).

PRESENTATION OF VIEWS BY REPRESENTATIVE ORGANIZATIONS (continued)

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representatives of the Unionist Party of Eritrea took seats at the Committee table.*

2. Mr. BAIRU (Unionist Party of Eritrea) after thanking the Committee for granting him a hearing said that much as his party appreciated the overwhelming vote, cast at the previous session,<sup>1</sup> which would have permitted the reunion of the eastern portion of Eritrea with Ethiopia, a deep sense of frustration had been caused by the postponement of the much awaited solution. The continued delay in the solution of the problem was necessarily causing deterioration in the political and economic life of the area, and uncertainty among the people in general and the new generation in particular with regard to their future. Having been forcefully torn away from Ethiopia for a number of years, on 5 May 1941 the Eritreans — Christians as well as Moslems — formed their first official political organization known as the Unionist Party.

3. They were again appearing before the Committee, knowing that they represented the majority

of the people of the whole area known as Eritrea and what was more important, that they represented beyond any doubt, the overwhelming opinion of the population of the Central Plateau, which according to the Four-Power Commission of Investigation, constituted 56 per cent of the entire Eritrean population. The inhabitants of the Central Plateau had voted in favour of union with Ethiopia. That decision had been reached by an impressive percentage of the population, amounting to 96 per cent in the Asmara region, the Unionist Party also had significant support in the Western Province as well as the Province of Massawa and on the Danakil coast. His party, therefore, felt qualified to state that the claim made by the recently formed Independence Bloc to the effect that Eritrea had never had any connexion with Ethiopia, was totally unfounded and constituted a deliberate and malicious misinterpretation of facts. Mr. Bairu asserted that Eritrea had always formed part of Ethiopia and gave numerous historical examples to sustain that view.

4. With regard to the Independence Bloc, Mr. Bairu said that that party had sprung into being overnight in May 1949 when Italy had realized the placing Eritrea under trusteeship would nauseate world conscience. The First Committee, after hearing that so-called "bloc", did not hesitate to reject their claims by recognizing those of the Ethiopians. Italy had, therefore, turned away from trusteeship to the formula of independence, in the hope of utilizing the 20,000 Italians living in Eritrea as an entering wedge for an Italian régime. Italy had supported the movement for independence with funds and advice, hoping that educated Italians, living in Eritrea, would assume the con-

<sup>1</sup>See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part II, 218th plenary meeting.*

trol and administration of the so-called independent State, thereby allowing large-scale Italian immigration. It was worth mentioning in that respect that the leader of the so-called Independence Bloc, on returning from Lake Success last spring, passed through Rome for consultations with Signor de Gasperi. It was not a matter of pure chance that they had done likewise on their way to the current session. Detailed information in that connexion was in the possession of several Governments of the Member States.

5. As far as the organization of the Independence Bloc was concerned, Mr. Bairu noted that it claimed to represent no less than eight parties. One of those, the Independent Eritrean Party had been informed at the same time as the Bloc itself with a view to increasing the list of parties, since document A/AC.1/SC.16/L.4 showed that that party had only been formed on 5 May 1949.

6. As for the so-called Association of Eritrean Intellectuals, none of whose members possessed any diplomas, its membership amounted to 145 persons only. That was self-explanatory. Moreover, the *Nuova Eritrea Pro-Italia* Party, the Association of Eritrean Ex-Servicemen and the Italo-Eritrean Association, at the previous session, had claimed to represent 100 per cent of the population! As regards the Nationalist Party of Massawa, it was obvious that their claims could not go unchallenged for the simple reason that the Independent Moslem Party of Massawa was at present at Lake Success to submit its own views. The Liberal Progressive Party did, at one time, represent a group of some relatively minor importance on the Central Plateau. However, following the events of May 1949, that party had almost entirely disintegrated, being left with a small nucleus of only 20,000 members. Finally, with regard to the Moslem League of Eritrea, according to the Report of the Commission of Investigation, its membership amounted to 40 per cent of the population. However, a number of important and influential chiefs with their followers had recently left that party.

7. The Unionist Party, supported by the overwhelming majority of the population of the Central Plateau, and at least by half the population of Eritrea, requested only that due recognition be given to the desires of those seeking union with Ethiopia. It had no intention whatsoever to impose that solution on others. On the other hand, those who did not share that view, should not impose their solution upon those seeking union. Moreover, should the Independence Bloc establish an independent Eritrea, it would logically be expected that the population of the Central Plateau would be subjected to their régime under the fiction of independence. Such a situation would not be conducive to peace and security. Having solved the problem of Eastern Eritrea, the First Committee should endeavour to find a just and equitable solution for the Western Province, at which time the claims of the Unionist Party along with those of other parties, should be duly considered.

8. In conclusion, Mr. Bairu hoped that a just solution would be reached, since any delay on the part of the United Nations would be interpreted as an attempt to hamper any settlement of the problem.

9. In answer to a question by Mr. COOPER (Liberia) as to whether members of the Unionist

Party had deserted and joined the Independence Bloc after its formation, Mr. BAIRU (Unionist Party of Eritrea) answered in the affirmative.

10. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan), in view of the conflicting claims made by the Independence Bloc and the Unionist Party which claimed to report the majority of the whole population of Eritrea, inquired how, in view of the representatives of the Unionist Party, the First Committee could determine to its own satisfaction which of the two delegations was in fact supported by the majority of the population.

11. Mr. BAIRU (Unionist Party of Eritrea) said, in reply, that it was only logical to suppose that those who were asking for such a vital solution, namely union with Ethiopia, really represented the true and natural aspirations of the people concerned.

12. In the light of the above and as an answer to a further query by Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan), Mr. BAIRU (Unionist Party of Eritrea) said that he thought his party was extremely anxious that a solution be reached at once, it was prepared that a plebiscite should take place with a view to putting to a test the true and real aspirations of the people of Eritrea.

13. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) asked whether the Unionist Party would leave the inhabitants of the Province of Massawa free to decide their future apart from that of the people of the Central Plateau, should the former choose not to unite with Ethiopia.

14. Mr. BAIRU (Unionist Party of Eritrea) answered that a delegation representing the people of the coastal plain was at present at Lake Success and would certainly also ask for union with Ethiopia.

15. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) asked in connexion with the reply given to the question put by the representative of Liberia, whether any members who had deserted their parties had joined the Unionist Party?

16. Mr. BAIRU (Unionist Party of Eritrea) answered in the affirmative.

*The representatives of the Unionist Party of Eritrea withdrew.*

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representatives of the Independent Moslem League took seats at the Committee table.*

17. Mr. HAMMODI (Independent Moslem League) after thanking the First Committee for granting his party a hearing, said that the political circumstances and the economic conditions resulting from the recent war and from the occupation of Eritrea by the British military forces after the Italian aggression against Ethiopia and the fascist defeat had prompted the Eritreans to form, on 5 May 1941, a political and social party aiming at the unity of the country with greater Ethiopia. That party had immediately been recognized by the British Military Authorities as a result of which it proceeded to co-operate with the British Administration for the general welfare of the country. At the end of the war, and in view of the United Nations Declaration at San Francisco, the leaders and chiefs of Eritrea had met at Asmara and had drafted a detailed memorandum, petitioning His Majesty, the Emperor of

Ethiopia to defend the national aspirations of Eritrea by incorporating that country into a greater Ethiopia. Moreover, when on 15 February 1946 the Eritreans had learned of Italy's consent to relinquish its rights in the former Italian colonies, it became clear to the Eritrean people that they would be completely freed from foreign control. Thus, they decided to present their national aspirations in a memorandum to the British Military Authorities requesting them to support their unity with Ethiopia, and to facilitate economic intercourse between the two countries. To that end, beginning on 30 March 1946, a series of conferences had been held by the leaders and chiefs of the country in co-operation with the representatives of the provinces. During those conferences, the problems of the country had been fully discussed and a request had been made to the Government of Ethiopia to support their claims for union with that country and to protect the human rights and the Islamic traditions of the people of Eritrea.

18. The Christian section of the Eritrean people, however, had not agreed to those conditions and had insisted on an unconditional unity with Ethiopia. That was the major reason for which a unanimous agreement had not been reached as to future action. Meanwhile, the Islamic section had decided to form an Islamic front to achieve the national aspirations of their people. That Islamic organization was headed by Sheikh Ibrahim Sultan Ali who was at present the head of the Independent Bloc. On 21 January 1947, a general Islamic Conference had convened and decided to form the Moslem League of Eritrea with a view to expressing the wishes of the Islamic inhabitants to the Four-Power Commission of Investigation.

19. Mr. HAMMODI recalled that during the previous session a delegation representing the Moslem League of Eritrea had appeared before the First Committee (247th meeting) and that following the failure of the United Nations to adopt a resolution on the problem, the representatives of the Moslem League had met at Lake Success with the other Eritrean delegations, which had previously requested Italian trusteeship, and had agreed on a programme of independence and unity for Eritrea. Those views had been presented at that time to the First Committee (269th meeting), following the sudden renunciation of Italy of its claims for trusteeship over Eritrea as formulated in the Bevin-Sforza Agreement. It had become obvious therefore that Italy would support the independent movement in return of Eritrean citizenship to Italian immigrants. Subsequently, a new organization had been formed under the title of the Independent Moslem League as distinct from the parent body, the Moslem League, which had incorporated itself with the pro-Italian parties. Thus it was natural to conclude that any independent State of Eritrea would be subjected to Italian influence and domination.

20. Mr. Hammodi concluded that the aims of his party were as follows: Union with Ethiopia on terms of equality of rights and duties, the recognition of the Arabic language, and of the personal rights of Moslems with appropriate guarantees for their protection. Such a solution would be in conformity with the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights, to which principles Ethiopia had subscribed.

21. In reply to questions put by Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan), Mr. QADI (Inde-

pendent Moslem League) stated that his party had been established at Massawa in September 1949. However, it was not new as most of its members had belonged to the Moslem League which had been established at Danakil on 21 January 1947. He stated that his delegation had actually left Eritrea on 30 September 1949.

22. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) asked whether the view of the representative of the Independent Moslem League was that Eritrea should not be partitioned and that the whole of that country should be united with Ethiopia.

23. Mr. QADI (Independent Moslem League) replied in the affirmative.

24. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) asked whether the Independent Moslem League would insist upon the union of Eritrea with Ethiopia if it should be satisfactorily established that the majority of the people of Eritrea were opposed to union with Ethiopia.

25. Mr. QADI (Independent Moslem League) believed that the majority of the Eritrean people did want union with Ethiopia.

26. In reply to further questions put by Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan), Mr. QADI (Independent Moslem League) stated that the organization that he represented had taken steps to ascertain whether various guarantees of Moslem rights would be forthcoming on the part of the Government of Ethiopia. Such assurances had been received through the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, since Ethiopia was a Member of the United Nations, it was obliged to guarantee those rights.

27. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) asked whether the feeling expressed by the delegation of the Independent Moslem League was more typical of the western provinces or perhaps of the Massawa or the Arab provinces.

28. Mr. QADI (Independent Moslem League) replied that while his party had been established at Massawa, it had adherents in the provinces of Asmara and of Akele-Guzai and in the district of Danakil. He considered that the views expressed by his delegation were shared by the majority of Moslems in those areas.

29. Mr. MAÚRTUA (Peru) asked whether, according to the views of the Independent Moslem League, the Italian citizens living in Massawa and Asmara would be subject to a minority system or be given equal treatment with the nationals of Eritrea as far as rights were concerned.

30. Mr. QADI (Independent Moslem League) said that his party alone was not in a position to decide such a question.

*The representatives of the Independent Moslem League withdrew.*

31. Mr. CLUTTON (United Kingdom) said that he was at present in a position to give further information regarding the regrettable disturbances that had taken place at Mogadiscio on 5 October. On the morning of that day, a crowd of about 2,000 Somalis had gathered on the outskirts of the city. That demonstration had assembled without having obtained the prior permission of the local authorities as required by the local regulations, and permission had in fact only been requested after the crowd had already assembled. Permission had not been granted as it was the declared intention of the crowd, which was carry-



ing provocative banners and was armed with stones and knives, to march into the centre of the city where the foreign, and particularly the Italian community resided. The police had given the crowd 15 minutes to disperse, at the end of that time they had endeavoured to disperse it by normal police methods. The police, however, had been met by a hail of stones and knives and had retired. The crowd, however, had pursued them and the police had been obliged to open fire, with one fatal casualty and some injured. The crowd had re-assembled in a more aggressive mood a few hours later and had again refused to disperse. Military units had then been called in and had been compelled to open fire, with a further fatal casualty. The total casualties from that most regrettable incident were two killed outright and three who subsequently died from wounds. In addition, there had been some 12 injured, excluding one British officer and some Native constables.

32. In consequence of that riot, the British Administration had felt compelled to take certain precautionary security measures, of which one had been the closing of all political club buildings. However, there was no question whatsoever of the Somali Youth League being disbanded or dissolved. Certain political leaders, considered by the Administration as having incited their followers to further acts of violence, had been required to take up residence in the country outside Mogadiscio.

33. Mr. Clutton emphasized that those measures were purely temporary and that it was hoped that the situation would return to normal as soon as possible, so that normal political life could be resumed in the territory. A number of lawful, peaceful demonstrations had taken place elsewhere in the country, and he did not doubt that they would continue because freedom of demonstration within the permitted legal bounds was part of the United Kingdom system of administration in the territory. However, there had been a few minor incidents, notably at Dolo where there had been two fatal casualties as a result of resistance to the closing of the Somali Youth League Club. Another incident had taken place at Bardera where the main casualties had been the British Provincial Commissioner and some of his officers, who had been wounded by stones. The situation in Somaliland was returning to normal and it was hoped that it would shortly be completely normal once again.

34. Referring to questions put to him by the Egyptian representative at the previous meeting, regarding the position of the Jews in Tripolitania, Mr. Clutton said that by the end of 1948, the number of Jews in the territory was over 28,000, of whom 23,000 had been living in Tripoli and its suburbs. Since the number of Jews in Tripolitania had been 16,000 in 1932, there had been a considerable increase in the Jewish community in the last decade. The present number of Jews in Tripolitania was approximately 22,000, as a result of considerable emigration, the rate of which was now at about 3,000 Jews per month. Since April, 1949, 6,700 Jews had emigrated from Tripolitania, mainly to the State of Israel. Those movements were all being organized by local Jewish organizations and the Administration was placing no obstacles in the way of such emigration. However, in certain cases it was not possible to give all the facilities desired by the Jewish community. Thus Jewish families wishing to emigrate were allowed

to take out up to 250 pounds sterling in personal belongings per family. They were being allowed to transfer up to 250 pounds through the normal exchange control channels, and the rest of their liquid assets was being placed in blocked accounts. While he fully sympathized with requests for the transfer, or eventual transfer of such blocked accounts, he pointed out that the British Administration could not agree to some set plan for such transfer, as it was in no position to say whether it would be still in the seat of government in Tripolitania in six months time to execute such an agreement. He expressed confidence that that was one of the problems which would be successfully settled by the future Tripolitanian or Libyan Government by arrangement with the competent Israeli authorities.

35. There was no persecution of any minority or community in Tripolitania, and would be none so long as the United Kingdom was in charge of the administration. However, it was true that some sections of the Jewish community had experienced economic difficulties. The causes of those difficulties were many. The disappearance of a large standing army and the uncertainty of all the inhabitants of Tripolitania regarding the economic and political future of the territory had undoubtedly caused suffering to the Jewish community as well as to others. Nor could the tension that had existed in Tripolitania, as in other territories, as a result of the events accompanying the settlement of the Palestine problem, be ignored. Mr. Clutton stated that the cause of the emigration of peoples was obscure. However, it would be realized that there was economic pressure to stimulate it. There was also the ideological appeal of the creation of the State of Israel and the immigration policy of that State on which he was not competent to speak. He emphasized, however, that that mass emigration could not be attributed to persecution.

36. In reply to a question put by Mr. COOPER (Liberia), Mr. CLUTTON (United Kingdom) said that the banners carried by the demonstrators in Somaliland had borne anti-Italian slogans.

37. Answering a request made by Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq), Mr. CLUTTON (United Kingdom) said that his delegation would keep the Committee informed of any substantial changes or incidents in those territories.

38. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the Committee had decided at its previous meeting that an opportunity to make a second statement would be given to those representatives of organizations and parties who desired to make them. Five such requests had been received and he hoped that those statements would be brief and would deal only with points raised by other parties to which the spokesman wished to reply.

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representative of the Independence Party of Tripolitania and of the National Congress of Tripolitania took a seat at the Committee table.*

39. Mr. SHUKRY (Independence Party of Tripolitania and National Congress of Tripolitania) said that he was grateful for the opportunity to refute the unjustified and unwarranted accusations made by the representative of the Jewish Community of Tripolitania. In the first place it was a fundamental religious principle of Islam that all non-Moslem communities living among Moslems should be given protection, so that they



might live in peace and prosperity, acquit themselves freely of their religious tasks, develop their culture and pursue their commercial and economic activities without let or hindrance. That principle had always been adhered to, even with the aggressive attitude of Jewish communities attendant upon the advent of Zionism. It was particularly true as far as the Jewish community of Tripolitania was concerned. He pointed out that twice in recent history Tripolitania had gone through the experience of not having an established form of government: once when the Italians had invaded the country in 1912 and the second time after the withdrawal of the Italian forces during the recent World War. In both cases the Moslem population of Tripolitania had protected the lives and the property of every member of the Jewish community. When, at the outset of the recent war, the members of the Jewish community living in the cities and coastal towns of Tripolitania had abandoned their homes and had streamed into the interior of the country, they had not only been given homes and shelter, but many of them had been provided with free accommodation and sustenance in spite of the fact that the food situation had been extremely critical on account of the war. Such continued to be the case until the Italians had eventually withdrawn their forces from Tripolitania. Under the present British Administration in Tripolitania, the Jewish community still lived in peace and enjoyed friendly relations with the Moslems.

40. Mr. Shukry regretted the fact that the representative of the Jewish Community had cited the sad and chance occurrences which had taken place three or four years previously, the like of which had never happened before or since in Libyan history. The incidents of 1945 and 1947 had been due to Zionist activities and propaganda. Had the representative of the Jewish Community been a resident of Tripolitania, he would have known that in both cases the heads of the Jewish Community and the Moslem notables had issued a joint statement published by the local Press to the effect that the incidents had been perpetrated by irresponsible elements and should in no way affect the amicable relations which had existed from the earliest times between Jews and Moslems in Libya. In the circumstances, the charges made by the representative of the Jewish Community were quite unjustified.

41. Turning to the question of emigration Mr. Shukry pointed out that the influx of Jews into the City of Tripoli could not be on account of persecutions which had never taken place and which would never take place. He was confident that the real reason for that emigration was to be found in the instigation of Zionist agents and in Zionist propaganda. Desirable as it would be to have that useful community share the duties and rights of loyal citizens of the new independent State of Libya, which he hoped would be established immediately, it was a fundamental human right that every individual should act according to his own free will. He pointed out that great numbers of the Jewish community were still living peacefully in the interior and that none of those preparing to leave the country had destroyed or abandoned their property. Moreover, those who wanted to leave the country at all had come from the destitute sections of the Jewish population, and it had been easy to persuade them to emigrate as Israel paid their travelling expenses. The

pretence of persecution had not only been advanced as an argument in support of the emigration of the Jews from Tripolitania but also as a justification for raising the question of the safeguarding of the rights of minorities in the future independent State of Libya. Mr. Shukry noted that the representative of the Jewish Community had requested such guarantees at the previous session (253rd meeting), but had mentioned nothing about persecutions or forced emigration at that time. Such assurance had been provided by his delegation in its statement of 11 May 1949. Nothing had since occurred in Tripolitania or in any other part of Libya warranting the accusations made by the representative of the Jewish Community.

42. He stated that amicable relations between Jews and Moslem Arabs in Libya had never been perturbed during the Italian régime in spite of the attempts made by fascist Italy to introduce racial discrimination. He pointed out that the Moslem Arabs of Tripolitania had helped to avoid the enforcement of a regulation discriminating against the Jewish community with regard to property by intervening with the Italian Authorities. The Jewish community, which had always enjoyed autonomy, had its own religious tribunal and its own justice of the peace. In the civil courts recently established in Tripolitania, a Jewish member had been included among the judges whenever a member of the Jewish community had appeared as party to any law suit. Furthermore, the Jewish community had always pursued its cultural, social and sports activities. In addition, several important Jewish commercial concerns and trading houses were flourishing in Tripolitania. While those firms had always employed Jews only in their offices, almost all of the Moslem Arab firms had members of the Jewish community among their employees. In spite of allegations regarding emigration as a result of alleged persecution, many members of the Jewish community were still acting as members of the municipalities of Tripoli and other cities.

43. Mr. Shukry further pointed out that during the severe drought of 1947 food supplies sent by the Government of Egypt had been distributed equally among the whole population of Tripolitania. The President of the Jewish Community had been a member of the committee supervising that distribution, and every member of the Jewish community in need of help had had his full share of that relief food. However, although donations from abroad had always been received by the Jewish community, not a single instance could be found on record to show that any assistance had ever been given by that community to the Moslem poor of the country.

44. Emphasizing that a non-resident could not hope to gain a true picture of the situation from a short visit, Mr. Shukry stated that the present President of the Jewish Community of Tripolitania fully supported the national aspirations of the population, and fully co-operated with the Moslem Arabs. He recalled that at the time of the visit of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation, the President of the Jewish community had been a member of the Tripolitanian Party of the United National Front and had fully supported the demands for complete and unfettered independence.

*The representative of the Independence Party of Tripolitania and of the National Congress of Tripolitania withdrew.*

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND NINETIETH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 10 October 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

*Later: Mr. Selim SARPER (Turkey).*

### Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies: general discussion (continued)

#### PRESENTATION OF VIEWS BY REPRESENTATIVE ORGANIZATIONS (continued)

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representative of the Somalia Conference took a seat at the Committee table.*

1. ISLAO MAHADALLE MOHAMED (Somalia Conference) said that his views on immediate independence had not been correctly interpreted. According to the report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation, everybody was agreed that Somaliland was not ready for independence. Naturally, if the country were offered its independence the Somalia Conference would not refuse; but above all a realistic view should be taken and the military occupation should be ended. Likewise, a final decision should not be postponed because of the promise of so-called independence, which would be accompanied by the setting up of a new body of investigation.
2. An immediate decision to place the country under Italian trusteeship, under United Nations supervision, would be preferable to a continuation of the military administration.
3. Secondly, the incidents of 5 October 1949 had been started by the Somali Youth League, which hoped to bring pressure to bear on the General Assembly by using violence. Those incidents had been purely local and the peace had been disturbed in Mogadiscio only.
4. It could, moreover, be seen from the report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation that the Somali Youth League often resorted to threats and violence. Thus, in the course of hearings by the Commission of Investigation, certain witnesses had found it difficult to speak freely. The Commission of Investigation had stated that the Somali Youth League had organized violent demonstrations by bringing in persons from outside in lorries. The Commission of Investigation had realized that many witnesses had been terrorized by the Somali Youth League and had noted that organization's constant attempts to disturb established order.
5. The Somali Youth League should not, therefore, be allowed to intimidate by using violence and threats. The Somalia Conference, which could easily have organized demonstrations ten times more powerful, had thought that violence was a confession of weakness and that strictly democratic methods should be adhered to.
6. The Somali Youth League could not claim to represent any major fraction of the population.
7. He then referred to the letters sent by the Somali chiefs to the Commission of Investigation and to the manifesto in favour of Italian trusteeship.
8. The Sab population itself, which had been the first to fall victim to fascist oppression, was convinced that democratic Italy would not repeat the mistakes of the past. It could be seen from

the Four-Power Commission of Investigation that satisfactory relations had existed between the Italians and the indigenous population, and that some elements had shown a certain degree of hostility towards the Italians only as a result of recent events. After the defeat of Italy there had been no demonstrations and in the undertakings visited by the Commission the members of the indigenous population had been favourably disposed towards Italy. However, at the moment the Somali Youth League was stirring up racial prejudices and stressing racial distinctions.

9. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) referred to the statement of the representative of the Somalia Conference that his organization represented 95 per cent of the population. He wondered how that representative could reconcile that claim with the passage in the report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation in which it was stated that the Somali Youth League was well organized and that it might well be the major political force in time to come.

10. ISLAO MAHADELLE MOHAMED (Somalia Conference) replied that if the movement, to which the Liberian representative had referred, had been as popular as was claimed, the presence of the representative of the Somalia Conference would be inexplicable. Besides, with regard to the alleged organizational ability of the Somali Youth League, it was not the cowl that made the monk.

11. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLAH KHAN (Pakistan) noted that two organizations were each claiming to represent the majority of the population. Moreover, the Somalia Conference rejected the conclusions of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation on the question. Why, therefore, should a United Nations commission not be appointed to determine the true attitude of the population?

12. ISLAO MAHADELLE MOHAMED (Somalia Conference) said that he himself did not see any objection to such a commission visiting Somaliland. He would, however, like to have the assurance that the population would be given the opportunity to express its opinion and vote in complete freedom.

*The representative of the Somalia Conference withdrew.*

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representative of the Jewish Community of Tripolitania took a seat at the Committee table.*

13. Mr. PERLZWEIG (Jewish Community of Tripolitania) said that he had in no way stated that the Jews in Tripolitania were being persecuted. There was thus no need for the United Kingdom representative to have given the assurance that there would be no persecution.

14. The representative of the Jewish Community had, however, referred to the uncertainty which reigned and to the current tension, as well as to the fears engendered thereby, and had recalled that two violent and bloody attacks had been made on the Jewish population. While it was a fact

that 130 Jews had been killed and 190 wounded, and property valued at from two to three million dollars had been totally or partially destroyed, the speaker had nevertheless carefully refrained from seeking the causes of those facts. In the same way, he would abstain from replying to certain allegations.

15. He had come to testify to the impression of uncertainty and fear which those facts had created and if that constituted an accusation, it was not directed against any specific group.

16. What the Jewish Community of Tripolitania wanted above all was to participate in the reconstruction of the country. Furthermore, some of its members had played an active part in the movement for the independence of Tripolitania; their position had not changed. All they asked was that the interests, skills and talents of the minority should play their role in the reconstruction of the country and that their status as a minority group should be guaranteed.

17. Undoubtedly some members of the community would leave the country. But the necessary funds for that came from philanthropic efforts almost entirely of United States origin.

18. He warmly welcomed the statements which had been made in favour of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which to a very large extent fulfilled the expectations of the Jewish community. It had heard with satisfaction two organizations recognize that the right to emigrate was a human right.

19. However, it was also important that the communities which had a certain status should be guaranteed their cultural and religious autonomy.

20. He hoped that his intervention, far from increasing the tension in Tripolitania, would facilitate a conciliation under the auspices of the United Nations. The Jewish element had already made an important contribution to the country which had need of its experience and talents. He formally pledged his word that the group would conduct itself in a most loyal fashion and that it would give excellent citizens to the new country.

21. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) recalled that the representative of the Jewish Community had affirmed previously that the Jewish population was composed of indigenous inhabitants. The United Kingdom representative, however, had given the following figures for the Jewish population: 1932, 16,000; 1937, 28,000; 1949, 22,000. How could the considerable increase which had occurred between 1932 and 1937 be explained other than by heavy immigration?

22. Mr. PERLZWEIG (Jewish Community of Tripolitania) said that there had been some immigration, particularly from Italy, and a shifting of population from Cyrenaica. Some confusion had resulted, however, from the fact that the figures that had been quoted had referred sometimes to Libya and sometimes to Tripolitania. In any case, no one had questioned the indigenous nature of the Jewish population of Tripolitania.

23. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) recalled that the representative of the Jewish Community had declared that those Jews remaining in Tripolitania would feel that they belonged to only one State. How was it possible,

however, to determine who would leave and who would remain, when no limit to emigration had been fixed and no time limit had been set? It was feasible that the remainder of the population would come to think that the loyalty of those Jews was not of a permanent nature.

24. Mr. PERLZWEIG (Jewish Community of Tripolitania) said that there would of necessity be a brief period of transition during which some members of the Jewish community would probably leave the country. He recalled that the figure he had cited had been 2,000 emigrants a month, whereas the United Kingdom representative had spoken of 3,000 emigrants a month. The emigration problem would thus be solved in less than a year, so long as emigration was not hampered, and the Jews who would have chosen to remain would have thrown in their lot with the country.

25. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) said that he had not wished to speak of the magnitude of the problem, but had simply asked how and when it would be known that such and such a part of the Jewish population would no longer owe allegiance to more than one State?

26. Mr. PERLZWEIG (Jewish Community of Tripolitania) said that the right of emigration was a human right and that the problem was a simple one which would in any case be resolved within the next twelve months.

27. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) recalled that Mr. Perlzweig had previously stated that he was a British subject. Had he been speaking as a British subject or as a Jew? Had he, furthermore, received permission from the Government of the United Kingdom to appear before the First Committee?

28. Mr. PERLZWEIG (Jewish Community of Tripolitania) said that he had spoken as the representative of the Jewish population of Tripolitania, which had appointed him as such.

*The representative of the Jewish Community of Tripolitania withdrew.*

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representative of the Somali Youth League took a seat at the Committee table.*

29. Mr. ISSA (Somali Youth League) recalled that the League, knowing that the people of Somaliland would resist with force if the Assembly re-established Italian rule, had issued a desperate appeal on 7 October, and had announced that any such decision would bring about a violent reaction in spite of the presence of British troops.

30. But on 7 October, before the representative of the Somali Youth League had been heard in the First Committee, alarming news had been received concerning the massacres of Mogadiscio, which had been caused by an attempt to stop by force of arms demonstrations held to protest against the proposals concerning the return of the Italians. Perhaps other massacres would follow.

31. The Somali Youth League's letters to the Chairman of the First Committee, dated 6 and 7 October, had mentioned the alarming telegrams which had been received. Since that time, all that had been learned was that chiefs and sheiks had been arrested at Mogadiscio and that large anti-Italian demonstrations were taking place continuously in almost all the towns. However, the

news from Somaliland was less detailed and more delayed, for the British Military Administration had banned the Somali Youth League and had arrested its leaders. The Somali Youth League, therefore, renewed its appeal to the First Committee for immediate intervention.

32. Under the Treaty of Peace with Italy, the United Kingdom was responsible for the administration of Somaliland until a decision was taken by the General Assembly. But what he wished to know was whether the United Kingdom had the right to persecute the Somalis for their anti-Italian sentiments and to open fire on anti-Italian demonstrations because such demonstrations were not in harmony with that Government's current policy.

33. The League had sometimes been accused of acts of terrorism, but the methods to which the colonial Powers were resorting against nationalist movements, which they labelled as subversive and communist, in Malaya, Viet Nam and Indonesia were well known.

34. An attempt had already been made to blame the League for the riots which had occurred in Mogadiscio during the investigation of the Four-Power Commission. On 11 January 1948, Italian ex-servicemen and residents, armed with grenades and guns, had attacked the League headquarters. The findings of the court of inquiry set up by the British Government to investigate those events had never been made public. But perhaps the representative of the United Kingdom might supply some information on that subject.

35. The anti-Italian feelings of the Somalis did not date from the establishment of the League. *The First to be Freed*, an official British publication containing the records of the British Military Administration in Somaliland and Eritrea from 1941 to 1943, had stated that the Italians of Somaliland were more violently fascist than those of Eritrea, that they were completely corrupt, detested by the Somalis who were sufficiently well armed to give vent to their hatred against the Italians. It added that a number of those Italians had criminal records and that the Natives had a positive hatred for their former masters.

36. The Somali Youth League requested full independence for the country and was opposed to any foreign administration, particularly that of Italy. It had therefore very quickly obtained the almost unanimous support of the inhabitants.

37. The League had repeatedly requested the United Nations not to sacrifice a whole nation for purposes of political bargaining. On 7 October 1949, *The New York Times* had reported an account of a preliminary meeting of the Latin-American delegations, at which Mr. de Freitas Valle, leader of the Brazilian delegation, had submitted a plan under which the Latin-American delegations would not agree to independence for Libya unless the General Assembly also agreed to the Latin-American proposal concerning an Italian trusteeship over Somaliland. Thus, the supporters of the unjust imperialist claims of Italy were trying to force a group of delegations which were in favour of immediate independence for Libya to vote for Italian administration of Somaliland.

38. Most of the delegations, including many from Latin America, had recognized that Libya was ready for immediate independence. Italy, too, was now coming out in favour of immediate inde-

pendence for a united Libya. It would be unjust, therefore, or rather illegal, to link the recognition of independence for Libya to the question of Somaliland.

39. Doubtless some delegations had felt obliged to vote in favour of Italian administration of Somaliland so as not to lose the support of the votes of the most powerful bloc on items important to them. But the new bargaining which was being arranged surpassed anything that had occurred so far. It was a violation of the Charter and of the provisions of annex XI, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy concerning the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants which were being sacrificed to the intrigues of certain delegations.

40. The fate of Somaliland, its very existence, depended upon the vote of the First Committee which should be guided only by the peoples' right of self-determination and by the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants, who preferred death to subjugation and placed all their faith in the United Nations.

41. If the Committee was not yet entirely convinced of that truth, it would be preferable to send a mission of investigation to ascertain the true wishes of the inhabitants, for to re-establish Italian rule would be to condemn the entire population to death. In spite of the massacres in Mogadiscio, and perhaps in other centres, and in spite of the brutal action of the British Military Administration which had banned the League and arrested its leaders and adherents, the Somalis supported the League almost unanimously. The League appealed to the First Committee not to sacrifice the people of Somaliland to bargaining. The General Assembly must be guided, not only for the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants, but also, according to Peace Treaty by the "interests of peace and security". There could be no peace in a Somaliland ruled by Italian bayonets. There could be no peace or security in Africa if Italy which had practised racial discrimination, even before Hitler, were to return to that continent. There could be no peace or security in the world, as long as colonial exploitation lasted.

42. A vote which would result in the return of Italy to any share whatever in the administration of Somaliland would be a vote against peace and security, a vote in favour of war and anarchy, a violation of the fundamental principles of the United Nations, and a rejection of the appeal made by the President of the General Assembly to the "Peace Assembly".

*Mr. Sarper replaced Mr. Pearson in the chair.*

43. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) inquired whether the Somali Youth League had taken part in any violent action against the Italians.

44. Mr. ISSA (Somali Youth League) replied that not only the Somali Youth League but all the Somalis were opposed to Italian administration. The League had never organized anti-Italian demonstrations. The only incidents which had taken place were those of January 1948 mentioned in the report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation.

45. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) pointed out that the Committee had heard speakers ascribe statements on the political importance of the Somali Youth League to the Four-Power Commission of Investigation, although they had been made by only two of the Powers concerned. Those statements had

been disputed by the other two Powers. The members of the First Committee should not allow themselves to be led astray.

*The representative of the Somali Youth League withdrew.*

*At the invitation of the Chairman the representatives of the Eritrean Bloc for Independence took seats at the Committee table.*

46. Mr. ASMEROM WALDEGHEORGHIS (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) said that the case of those who opposed the independence of Eritrea was practically indefensible. Contrary to what the Ethiopian representative had said, there were no serious reasons why part of Eritrea should be annexed to Ethiopia, save for the fact that Ethiopia lacked outlets to the sea. If that criterion were to be followed, the frontiers of many a State might have to be modified. Similarly, it was incorrect to say that the population of the eastern lowlands was closely allied to Ethiopia or that Massawa had no commercial relations with the remainder of Eritrea. In reality, the port of Massawa had the closest relations with the whole of Eritrea because it was that country's only outlet to the sea. Nor was it Eritrea's fault as some had suggested that it had served as the springboard for the Italian attack on Ethiopia.

47. Most of the population of Eritrea were Moslems and, with the exception of a very small minority represented by the Independent Moslem League, all the Moslems opposed union of their country with Ethiopia. When the members of the other seven parties of the Eritrean Bloc for Independence were added to that Moslem majority, it could be said that the policy of the Bloc was that of the overwhelming majority of the population, especially since, after the Bloc had come into being in May 1949, many members of the Unionist Party had adhered to it. The Independent Moslem League had actually been created as recently as 24 September 1949 and did not represent the Moslem population of Eritrea but was defending the interests which were favourable to the Ethiopian Government.

48. He then recalled that before the Italian occupation, Eritrea had been independent and that part of its boundaries had been marked by the Mareb River. While it was true that there was affinity of language and custom between some of the inhabitants of Eritrea and those of the Tigrai, that did not in itself justify the annexation of that part of Eritrea by Ethiopia, as it might just as well justify the annexation of the Tigrai by Eritrea. While it was true that, in the past, union of part of Eritrea with Ethiopia had been regarded with favour by a part of the population, subsequent developments had led to the establishment of the Eritrean Bloc for Independence, which enjoyed the support of the great majority of the people. Union could now no longer be advocated except by those whom it would personally benefit. It paid no heed to the interests of the population. It was not true that the inhabitants of the Plateau were in favour of union with Ethiopia for the Progressive Liberal Party, composed of Christians from the high plateaux, was supporting the policy of independence advocated by the Bloc.

49. Eritrea was ready to assume the responsibilities of a free and sovereign State; it appealed to the United Nations to take a decision compatible with international justice and in conformity with the principles of the Charter.

50. Mr. JOOSTE (Union of South Africa) asked what the representative of the Eritrean Bloc for Independence meant by complete and immediate independence.

51. Mr. IBRAHIM Sultan Ali (Eritrean Bloc for Independence) replied that Eritrea wanted immediate independence without any trusteeship. The United Nations should make the transitional period as brief as possible. Already the police, the public services, the government offices and courts were in the hands of Eritreans. Foreigners were merely exercising supervision over those various departments. It should therefore not be difficult to make the transitional period short, especially as Eritrea would be able to rely on the assistance of many of its nationals who were currently studying abroad.

52. He then read out a letter to the Chief Administrator of Asmara from the chiefs and councillors of 47 tribes of the Northern Danakil, in which it was pointed out that only a small number of the former Danakil tribe chiefs had joined the Independent Moslem Party. The population of Danakil coast demanded independence, it wanted a democratic form of government and rejected the Bevin-Sforza plan for the partition of Eritrea.

*The representatives of the Eritrean Bloc for Independence withdrew.*

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representative of the Unionist Party of Eritrea took a seat at the Committee table.*

53. Mr. BAIRU (Unionist Party of Eritrea) said he reserved his delegation's right to reply in writing to the observations of the representative of the Eritrean Bloc for Independence.

*The representative of the Unionist Party of Eritrea withdrew.*

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representative of the National Congress of Cyrenaica took a seat at the Committee table.*

54. Mr. ABDEL RAZEGH SHAGLOUF (National Congress of Cyrenaica) read out a cable in which Emir Idris el-Senussi asked for the complete independence of his country without an interim period. If, nevertheless, such a period was unavoidable, the principle of complete independence should be affirmed first.

*The representative of the National Congress of Cyrenaica withdrew.*

#### CONSIDERATION OF THE ARGENTINE PROPOSAL RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUB-COMMITTEE

55. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) said that, as according to the Chairman's statement the general debate on the question was over, he felt the time had come to consider the various draft resolutions submitted. In that connexion, he supported the Argentine proposal to set up a sub-committee to consider the various draft resolutions submitted to the Committee or to be submitted to that sub-committee.

56. He added that his delegation had introduced a draft resolution (A/C.1/497) which carried out the principles it had set out on 30 September (278th meeting).

57. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) pointed out that while his delegation had not submitted a specific draft resolution, it had given a general outline of its views on the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies. Consequently, the sub-

committee contemplated by the Argentine proposal should consider not only the draft resolutions which had been submitted to the Committee or might be submitted to the sub-committee, but also the suggestions made in the course of the general debate.

58. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon), supported by Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt), pointed out that before a sub-committee was set up it would be advisable for the Committee to consider briefly the different proposals so as to be able to define the sub-committee's terms of reference clearly.

59. Mr. CLUTTON (United Kingdom) supported the Argentine proposal and considered that in choosing the members of the sub-committee account should be taken of their particular interest in the matter; the sub-committee should include representatives of Ethiopia and the Union of South Africa. He also suggested that a time-limit should be set by which the sub-committee should report to the Committee.

60. Mr. COUVE DE MURVILLE (France), while supporting the proposal for the establishment of a sub-committee, felt that the vote on the proposal should be deferred for one or two days in order to enable delegations to study the draft presented on that day by the United States delegation (A/C.1/497) and possibly to submit their own draft resolutions.

61. The CHAIRMAN said he would put the Argentine draft resolution to the vote, without first settling the membership of the sub-committee.

62. In the course of a discussion in which the representatives of the UNITED KINGDOM, PAKISTAN, BRAZIL, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, LEBANON, ARGENTINE, CHINA, COLOMBIA, CHILE, POLAND AND THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA took part, the following suggestions were made:

(a) The sub-committee should report to the Committee not later than 18 October;

(b) For reasons of equitable geographic distribution, Liberia and Guatemala should be included in the sub-committee;

(c) The question of the sub-committee's membership should not be settled until any other draft resolutions had been submitted;

(d) The proposal to establish a sub-committee should not be put to the vote until the composition of the sub-committee had been settled;

(e) The vote on the sub-committee's composition and terms of reference should be deferred for twenty-four hours;

(f) The sub-committee should not include *ipso facto* the members of Sub-Committee 15 as the latter had not succeeded in its task; hence the mem-

bers should not be chosen merely on the basis of their direct interest in the question, but on the contrary, the sub-committee should include members which were not directly concerned in the question and which would, therefore, enable them to show greater objectivity;

(g) The Argentine proposal should be put to the vote forthwith and the composition of the sub-committee determined;

(h) The authors of draft resolutions who would not be members of the sub-committee should be authorized to participate without vote in the sub-committee's proceedings;

(i) It was important to bear in mind that the interest of the Union of South Africa in the matter was linked to its national security;

(j) There should be greater regard for geographical distribution than there had been at the time of the establishment of Sub-Committee 15.

63. The CHAIRMAN stated that in line with the suggestions which had just been made, the following day would be set aside for statements by the delegations wishing to speak on the draft resolutions which had been tabled. He nevertheless felt that, before the Committee adjourned, a decision should be taken at once on the Argentine draft resolution (A/C.1/492) and that it should be stipulated that the sub-committee should report to the Committee not later than 18 October. The question of the membership of the sub-committee could be settled after that. The Chairman reminded the Committee for its information that Sub-Committee 15 had been composed of the following countries: Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, Iraq, India, Argentina, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, France, Ethiopia, Poland, Egypt, Denmark, Union of South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Australia; if the sub-committee consisted of the same members and Liberia and Guatemala took part as well, the number of members of the sub-committee would amount to 18.

64. Mr. Tsune-chi YU (China) said that his delegation would wish to take part in the sub-committee's proceedings, and suggested that before deciding on the sub-committee's membership, the Chairman should consider the question carefully in order to ensure equitable geographic representation.

65. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) supported the Chinese representative's proposal and pointed out that the text of the Argentine proposal contained certain ambiguities which should be eliminated before a vote was taken.

66. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) moved the adjournment.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIRST MEETING

Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 11 October 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Selim SARPER (Turkey).

### Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies (*continued*)

#### CONSIDERATION OF THE ARGENTINE PROPOSAL RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUB-COMMITTEE

1. The CHAIRMAN asked for suggestions regard-

ing the composition of the proposed sub-committee.

2. Mr. DE FREITAS VALLE (Brazil) explained that, up to the present, his delegation had refrained from making any statement of principle regarding the disposal of the former Italian colonies in view of the developments that had oc-



curred since the previous session of the General Assembly. The Brazilian delegation held it important that a broad solution be found which would promote the interests of the populations concerned. It was prepared to support the Argentine draft resolution and it also shared the view expressed by the representative of Lebanon (290th meeting) regarding the undesirability of entrusting the matter to a sub-committee without giving the latter some guidance as to its work. On the other hand it was likewise important that the members of the sub-committee should not be prejudiced by what had been done previously or by any promises that might have been given by Member States to the indigenous populations.

3. Mr. de Freitas Valle stressed that a successful solution of the problem was of great importance to the prestige of the United Nations as a whole.

4. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) believed that, in view of the difficult task with which the sub-committee would be entrusted, its composition should be as widely representative as possible. He therefore proposed an amendment to the Argentine draft resolution to the effect that the sub-committee be composed of 21 members. While that amendment did not specify what delegations should be included, Mr. Santa Cruz suggested the inclusion of those delegations which had participated in the work of the Sub-Committee created during the previous session of the General Assembly together with the delegations of Liberia, Guatemala, Pakistan and China as had been suggested at the previous meeting.

5. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) agreed that 21 members would be a reasonable figure since the sub-committee would have the task of finding a solution acceptable to the First Committee. However, he warned against expanding the sub-committee beyond that number for that would nullify any advantages to be gained by entrusting the question to a subsidiary body.

6. Mr. Jessup agreed with the membership suggested by the representative of Chile and proposed that the list be completed by adding Czechoslovakia.

7. He further recalled that there had been a general agreement at the previous meeting that 19 October be set as the time-limit for the sub-committee's report to the First Committee.

8. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) supported the suggested composition of the sub-committee. However, he did not think that it was necessary to set such an extended time-limit for the sub-committee's report since all delegations were quite familiar with the subject matter and the various proposals which had been suggested were all perfectly clear. The United Kingdom delegation was extremely anxious that a solution be reached with the least possible delay in order to minimize the possibility of any further unrest in the territories concerned and consequently Mr. McNeil urged that 15 October be determined as the time-limit for the sub-committee's report. He added the hope that, when the report had been received, the First Committee would agree to interrupt its debate immediately in order to dispose of the item without delay so that it might be submitted to a plenary meeting of the General Assembly.

9. The CHAIRMAN asked if there were any objections to the proposed composition of the sub-

committee. In the absence of objections, he declared that the sub-committee would include the following Member States: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Guatemala, India, Iraq, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America.

10. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) agreed to the time-limit suggested by the United Kingdom representative. His delegation was likewise conscious of the desirability of reaching a decision with the least possible delay. He assumed that it would be understood that if, owing to unforeseen difficulties, the sub-committee was unable to complete its work by 15 October, it might request a further delay.

11. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) thought that the United Kingdom and United States representatives were being rather optimistic. For his part, he did not believe that it was possible for a sub-committee comprising 21 members to complete its discussion within 3 days. However, if 15 October was decided upon, then he suggested that the sub-committee be authorized, if necessary, to consult with the Chairman of the First Committee and to delay the submission of its report by a further one or two days.

12. In reply to a question by the representative of IRAQ who observed that certain delegations were too small to provide simultaneous representation on the First Committee, the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and a sub-committee, the CHAIRMAN said that there could be no question of suspending the meetings of the First Committee. The two bodies would have to meet simultaneously.

13. In answer to a further question from the representative of CUBA who intimated that his delegation might wish to submit a draft resolution on the question of the former Italian colonies the CHAIRMAN stated that no decision had been reached as to a final date for submission.

14. Mr. de FREITAS Valle (Brazil) pointed out that according to the Argentine draft resolution the sub-committee would be empowered to receive any new draft resolution which might be submitted.

15. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote an amendment submitted by the delegation of Iraq setting 15 October as the time-limit for the submission of the sub-committee's report and determining that the First Committee would suspend its meetings in the meantime.

*The amendment was adopted by 40 votes with 11 abstentions.*

16. The CHAIRMAN stated that the foregoing decision would result in the loss of at least 7 meetings and would make it very difficult for the Committee to catch up with its work.

17. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) recalling his earlier criticisms of the form of the Argentine draft resolution, which he had stated at a previous (290th meeting), proposed the following alternative text to replace the first part:

*"The First Committee*

*"Decides to appoint a sub-committee of the designated twenty-one members, due account*



being taken of the geographical situation of the countries represented with respect to the territory of the former Italian colonies. This sub-committee will study all drafts and suggestions which have been submitted . . ."

18. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) and Mr. ARCE (Argentina) considered the amendment proposed by the representative of Greece to be unnecessary since the composition of the sub-committee had already been decided upon. The former proposed that the Argentine draft resolution be amended by replacing the segment of phrase "of 15 members" up to the words "geographical position", by a simple enumeration of the delegations which had been elected.

19. Mr. de FREITAS-VALLE (Brazil) thought that since the composition of the sub-committee had been decided upon it had in effect been established.

20. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) withdrew his amendment but believed that a formal decision should be taken to create the sub-committee.

21. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) proposed that the Argentine draft resolution be amended by enumerating the countries and then omitting the words "on which all the members of the Committee will be represented proportionally in accordance with their geographical position." The amended text would also contain an additional paragraph stating that the sub-committee would report to the First Committee by 15 October.

22. The CHAIRMAN asked Mr. Arce whether he accepted the amendment.

23. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) answered in the affirmative.

*The Argentine draft resolution as amended was adopted by 54 votes with one abstention.*

24. Mr. HOOD (Australia) assumed that it would be left to the discretion of the sub-committee to submit a single comprehensive draft resolution dealing with the whole question of the former Italian colonies or separate draft resolutions dealing individually with each of the territories concerned.

25. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) pointed out that the resolution adopted by the Committee expressly provided that the sub-committee might submit either one or more draft resolutions.

26. He said that his delegation was preparing to submit a draft resolution which had been withheld in order that study might be given to the proposals from other delegations. Since the text of the draft resolution was not yet available he

deemed it advisable to explain its substance at the present time.<sup>1</sup>

27. In general the preamble of the draft resolution followed the same lines as that of the United States delegation with the exception of certain changes, in particular the incorporation of the directions contained in annex XI, paragraph 3 of the Peace Treaty with Italy.

28. As regards Libya the proposals were also similar to those of the United States with the following exceptions:

(a) stress was laid on the ultimate objective of a unified as well as an independent Libya; (b) it was proposed to add Pakistan to the membership of the Advisory Council and also to include a representative of the local population of the Fezzan; (c) it was stated that the Council in addition to advising the Administering Authorities how they should assist the inhabitants to form a Government for an independent Libya, should also advise the Administering Authorities regarding the functions set out in the first two sub-paragraphs of paragraph A 1.; (d) it was left to the Advisory Council to determine the location of its headquarters after consultation with the Secretary-General.

29. As regards Eritrea and Somaliland the proposals were different from those of the United States. For the former the Pakistan draft resolution recommended independence after three years as in the case of Libya. The process leading up to that independence would be the same as in the case of Libya, that is to say, there would be similar provisions relating to the duties of the Administering Authorities and to the creation of an advisory council.

30. As regards Somaliland it was proposed to institute an international trusteeship for a period of ten years. The territory would be administered by an administrator appointed by and responsible to the Trusteeship Council.

31. Finally, it was proposed to establish a separate boundary commission for each territory. In the case of Libya the commission would consist of Egypt, the United Kingdom and a third Member State to be nominated by the President of the General Assembly. In the case of Eritrea and Somaliland it was proposed that the membership of the commission should consist of Ethiopia, the United Kingdom and a Member State to be nominated by the President of the General Assembly.

*It was decided that the sub-committee should meet to discuss the order of its work immediately after the end of the present meeting of the First Committee.*

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

<sup>1</sup> Later submitted as document A/C.1/499.

## TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY-SECOND MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Saturday, 15 October 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman:* Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

### Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies (*continued*)

1. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) requested the Chairman to read to the

Committee the letter addressed to him on 13 October 1949 by the representatives of the Somali Youth League. According to that letter, the inhabitants of Somaliland were demonstrating in protest against the proposed Italian trusteeship

over the territory, and the demonstrations were being suppressed by the British Authorities. Mr. Kiselev contended that the information supplied previously by the United Kingdom representative (289th meeting) was not in accordance with the truth, since subsequently tension and terror had increased in the territory. Moreover, the Somalis were being denied their freedom of expression and their elementary human rights. That was borne out by the fact that the headquarters of the Somali Youth League had been closed and their leaders had been either jailed or exiled. The First Committee should take action on the basis of that letter with a view to putting an end to British arbitrary actions in Somaliland. In conclusion, Mr. Kiselev asked the Chairman to have the letter read to the First Committee; to invite the representative of the United Kingdom to comment on the contents of the letter and to request the Administering Authority to put an end to the existing terror.

2. The CHAIRMAN said that, among the many letters he received daily, he might have received the one referred to but that it was not before him at that time. It was, however, obvious that any member of the Committee had the right to read such a communication. As to the second question, he inquired whether the United Kingdom representative wished to make any statement in that respect.

3. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) objected to Mr. Kiselev's contention that his delegation's earlier statement was not in accordance with the truth. As to the situation in Somaliland, he reaffirmed that, since his last statement on the matter, no further disorder or casualties had been reported. Moreover, the restrictions, imposed with regret by the Administering Authorities, had almost all been removed. The curfew had been modified; the political clubs, including those of the Somali Youth League except for those of Mogadiscio, had all been reopened; those of Mogadiscio had been partially reopened.

4. Finally, Mr. McNeil noted that the temporary restrictions had been imposed on all political organizations and not on the Somali Youth League exclusively.

5. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that in its earlier statement the United Kingdom delegation had tried to minimize the gravity of the situation existing in Somaliland. The First Committee could not overlook the fact that demonstrations had occurred in at least fifteen places and that in some of those places several persons had been killed or injured, and that several leaders of the Somali Youth League had been sentenced to terms of imprisonment, ranging from eight to twelve months. In view of those facts, he deemed it useless for the First Committee to discuss the problem of the Italian colonies, if in the meantime the basic human rights of the inhabitants could not be safeguarded. The First Committee should make a firm recommendation to the Administering Authority to remove the ban on all political organizations and to release the arrested leaders.

6. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) replied that the casualties referred to by the representative of Poland had already been mentioned in the earlier statement made by his delegation and that no further casualties had been reported subsequently. As to the sentences imposed on the ar-

rested leaders, those sentences had been suspended as a result of their appeal.

7. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) recalled that he had previously requested the Chairman to direct the Secretariat to read the letter received from the Somali Youth League.

8. The CHAIRMAN explained that it had not been the practice of the Chairman of the First Committee to have communications received from private individuals and non-governmental organizations read to the Committee. However, it was perfectly in order for the representative of the Byelorussian SSR to read the letter to the Committee himself if he so wished.

9. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) questioned the statement made by the Chairman, in view of the particular importance of the letter under discussion.

10. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) read the text of the letter dated 13 October 1949 sent by the Somali Youth League to the Chairman of the First Committee, in which it was alleged that the British Military Authorities were still continuing to massacre the Somalis, to arrest and deport their leaders and to ban the branches of the Somali Youth League situated in the interior of the country. The Somali Youth League had been unable to submit to the First Committee full information concerning the disturbances in Somaliland due to the arrest and deportation of their leaders. The latter, after stating that a number of high officials of the Somali Youth League had been sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, referred to excerpts from reports published in *The New York Times* to the effect that a British frigate had been dispatched to Mogadiscio and that R.A.F. aircraft had been reconnoitering. Finally, the letter quoted a telegram received from Mogadiscio requesting that the Chief Administrator and some of his subordinates be brought before the International Court of Justice on account of massacring the people of Somaliland and of violating human rights and freedom of expression in the territory, as well as imposing arbitrary and excessive penalties on the leaders of the Somali Youth League.

11. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) proposed that the Committee recommend to Sub-Committee 17 that a hearing be given to the representative of the Somali Youth League on the questions contained in the letter of the League, at the first meeting of the Sub-Committee or at its earliest possible opportunity, and that the Sub-Committee should recommend to the First Committee the steps which could be taken in connexion with the situation in Somaliland.

*The Polish proposal was rejected by 21 votes to 11, with 16 abstentions.*

12. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) said that he could understand the feeling of the officials of the Somali Youth League. The latter were passionately anti-Italian and had protested each time the United Nations had appeared to be associating Italy with the administration of the former Italian Somaliland. However, he assured Mr. Manuilsky and the Committee that the administration had taken no measures to act exclusively against the Somali Youth League. Following the action on which details had been given, it had

been considered necessary to impose some temporary restrictive measures not directed, as had been said, exclusively against the Somali Youth League, but intended to maintain order and not to prevent an expression of political opinion. There had been no ban of the Somali Youth League, and demonstrations had been taking place within the last forty-eight hours, and no doubt were still taking place in all parts of the territory except in Mogadiscio. Such demonstrations would continue to take place as long as they did not constitute a threat to the general population and were in conformity with the local laws on the subject. The curfew had been raised progressively, and he thought that at the present time it was only partially in existence at Mogadiscio. In all places except Mogadiscio, the clubs had been re-opened to all parties, and even at Mogadiscio the clubs of the Somali Youth League had again been made available to the officers of that organization.

13. Mr. McNeil pointed out that his delegation had already apologised for the most unfortunate deaths that had occurred. While seven deaths and twelve people wounded represented a very serious situation, the latter scarcely merited the description of a massacre. Six persons had been arrested, of which two had been found not guilty and had been acquitted. Four had been found guilty of inciting a mob to violence and had been sentenced, as the Committee had been informed by the Polish representative. He reiterated, however, that appeals had immediately been made against those sentences and that they had been suspended. The appeals would be heard by the Appeals Court very shortly.

14. Mr. McNeil hoped that the representative of the Ukrainian SSR would agree that the British Authorities had acted as promptly as they could to restore normal conditions, whether or not Mr. Manuilsky approved of the initial conduct of those authorities. In conclusion he said that one frigate and six fighter aircraft were normally stationed in the territory.

15. Mr. HOOD (Rapporteur of Sub-Committee 17) said that in spite of the fact that Sub-Committee 17 had been sitting almost constantly it had not yet entirely completed discussion of the first item which it had taken up, the question of Libya. The opinion of most of the members of the Sub-Committee and of its officers was that at least another five days and possibly six, would be necessary to complete the work properly.

16. The CHAIRMAN said that, assuming that prophecy to be correct and that the Sub-Committee's report would not be received for another five or six days, the Committee would have to decide what to do in the meantime. Pointing out that the Conciliation Committee dealing with the Greek problem hoped to report to the Committee on 17 or 18 October, he said that the Committee could, of course, begin discussion of that report and of the Greek question while the Sub-Committee was dealing still with the former Italian colonies. Another alternative would be for the Committee to discuss the next item of the agenda, the USSR proposal, throughout the following week while Sub-Committee 17 was at work. Still another course would be to have the full Committee meet in the mornings dealing with the next item on the agenda while the Sub-Committee met in the afternoons.

17. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) proposed that the Committee meet on Tuesday morning to consider

the report of the Conciliation Committee on the Greek question and then decide what to do next.

18. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, if the Committee did not meet while the Sub-Committee was meeting, the possibility of a complete consideration of all items on the agenda during the present session would be gravely jeopardized. He therefore favoured the proposal that the Committee should meet in the morning and the Sub-Committee in the afternoon, and supported the Chairman's suggestion that the morning meetings be devoted to the third item on the agenda, namely the USSR proposal.

19. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom), pointing out that alternation of the meetings of the Committee and of the Sub-Committee might well involve loss of time, especially if the two were discussing different items, supported the proposal of the Lebanese representatives.

20. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) considered the fears expressed by the United Kingdom representative to be unwarranted. It would be another matter if political interests were involved and it was desired to delay the discussion of some item. However, that question had not been raised. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR therefore supported the proposal made by the representative of the Soviet Union, which was most calculated to further the work of the Committee. Moreover, the other items on the agenda could be discussed with calm and serenity once a proper exchange of views had taken place on the third item.

21. The CHAIRMAN stated that he would submit to the Committee the two proposals, namely that of Lebanon and that of the Soviet Union, in the order in which they had been submitted. Therefore, a vote would be taken first on the Lebanese proposal that the Committee adjourn until Tuesday morning, when it would discuss the report of the Greek Conciliation Committee.

*The Lebanese proposal was adopted by 45 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions.*

22. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) stated that he had just submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/501) appealing to the Administering Authorities in Somaliland to permit free expression of opinion.

23. Mr. DE HOLTE CASTELLO (Colombia), pointing out that the Committee had had no time to consider the draft resolution submitted by the Polish representative, moved that the meeting be adjourned.

24. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) stated that in view of the importance of the question and of the fact that the matter had been discussed sufficiently to permit an immediate decision, he would vote against the motion for adjournment.

25. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic), supporting the views expressed by the Mexican representative, said that he would also vote against the motion.

*The motion to adjourn was rejected by 28 votes to 13, with 8 abstentions.*

26. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) thought that the subject of the Polish draft resolution ought to be disposed of immediately. He therefore moved the closure of the debate under rule 106 of the rules of procedure.

27. The CHAIRMAN noted that under that rule two speakers could oppose such a motion, after which the latter would immediately be put to the vote.

28. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the proposal for closure of the debate was not in accordance with the provisions of rule 106 since only the information contained in the letter from the representatives of the Somali Youth League addressed to the Chairman had been discussed. The draft resolution submitted by the Polish delegation had not been discussed at all, and it was not possible to close a debate that had not even started. The motion submitted by the United States representative was therefore not to close the debate but to prevent discussion of the draft resolution submitted by the Polish delegation. Such a proposal was illegal and incorrect.

29. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) agreed with the views expressed by the representative of the USSR. The question raised by the Polish delegation was not only urgent but was very important. Recalling that the representative of the United Kingdom, in reply to a question put by the representative of Liberia, had stated at a previous (289th) meeting that the slogans being carried by the Mogadiscio demonstrators had been anti-Italian. Pointing out that it had never been intimated that pro-Italian slogans were considered provocative, Mr. Bebler concluded that the United Kingdom Authorities in Somaliland took a specific position on the question of the disposal of that territory and that the administrative measures represented as being in the interests of law and order in the territory were in fact unilateral measures directed exclusively against the elements that did not want Italian trusteeship. That was just one piece of evidence militating against the motion for the closure of the debate, and it was indispensable that the Committee should allow at least a brief exchange of views, so that all the delegations might be permitted to adopt a clear position regarding the Polish proposal.

30. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) said that he had handed to the Secretariat an amendment (A/C.1/502) to the Polish proposal just as the United States representative was moving closure

of the debate. He asked the Chairman whether the motion for closure precluded submission of the amendment.

31. There was some discussion of the procedural question involved in which emphasis was placed on the importance of the possible precedent which might be created. The representatives of IRAQ, IRAN and MEXICO generally considered that amendments could be submitted after closure of the debate. It was stated that the word "debate" mentioned in rule 106 referred to the general debate and did not cover the matter of submission of amendments.

32. The representatives of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, POLAND, LEBANON, CHINA and the BYELORUSSIAN Soviet Socialist Republic generally considered that no amendments could be submitted after the closure of the debate had been decided upon.

33. The CHAIRMAN stated that, in conformity with rule 106 of the rules of procedure, his duty was to put to the vote immediately the motion for closure of the debate. As far as the amendment submitted by the representative of the United Kingdom was concerned, he stated that he had not received it before the motion for closure of the debate had been made. According to his interpretation of rule 106 of the rules of procedure, a vote must be taken on the "item under discussion" in the form in which the latter had been before the Committee at the time when closure of the debate had been moved. If, however, the motion for closure was not carried, no problem would arise. If the motion was carried, his interpretation of rule 106, which might be wrong, could be challenged, so that if a precedent was established, it would be based not on a ruling of the Chair but on the opinion of the majority of the Committee.

*The closure motion was defeated by 32 votes to 8, with 8 abstentions.*

34. Mr. ARCE (Argentina), invoking rule 107 of the rules of procedure, moved that the meeting adjourn.

*The proposal for adjournment was adopted by 32 votes to 13, with 1 abstention.*

The meeting rose at 1.50 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY-THIRD MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 18 October 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

### Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece (continued)

REPORT OF THE CONCILIATION COMMITTEE  
(A/C.1/503)

1. The CHAIRMAN read a letter dated 18 October (A/C.1/503) from the President of the General Assembly constituting a report on the activities of the Conciliation Committee, and notifying the First Committee that it had been unable to develop a basis of conciliation on which an agreement could be reached between the Governments

of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia and that it had to suspend further activities.

2. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) remarked that the report dealt only briefly with the negotiations that had taken place in the Conciliation Committee and neither outlined the discussions nor indicated the reasons for their failure. He enquired whether the Conciliation Committee would present to the First Committee a fuller report giving a more complete picture.

3. The CHAIRMAN replied that in due course the Conciliation Committee would report in greater detail. However, their last meeting had

taken place only that morning and they had been unable to give a full report at once. As soon as possible, they would present a factual report outlining all points of view.

4. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) recalled that, when the creation of the Conciliation Committee had been discussed, his delegation had requested that it should seek to achieve a suspension of terrorism in Greece. He asked whether the Chairman could inform the Committee of what had been done in that respect, especially as recent news despatches stated that, on 14 October, Catherine Zevgos had again been sentenced to death by the unanimous vote of a court martial. In her second trial, new facts had emerged concerning the torture of witnesses with a view to extracting information from them, which had resulted in the death of one witness and another being driven to commit suicide. When the Zevgos case had first been discussed, general sympathy had been expressed and a promise to suspend the sentence had been given. That indicated the value of the promises of the Greek delegation. As the Conciliation Committee had apparently failed, it was the duty of the First Committee to take action in that respect. Mr. Katz-Suchy appealed to the Chairman for intervention also on behalf of Mr. Spyros Kritsikis who had been sentenced to death on 31 August and on whose behalf intercessions had already been made by the International Red Cross and a number of political and other associations in France and the United Kingdom. Mr. Katz-Suchy asked for information as to the action taken by the Conciliation Committee on these matters.

5. The CHAIRMAN stated that the detailed report of the Conciliation Committee would cover all aspects of their discussions. With regard to the situation referred to by the Polish representative, he would speak to the President of the General Assembly who was also Chairman of the Conciliation Committee. Their report would be made available as soon as possible.

6. Mr. MAKIN (Australia) noted that the Conciliation Committee had reported that no progress had been made. The detailed report should be examined in order that the discussion might be informed. He therefore moved that consideration of the report of the Conciliation Committee should be deferred until the following meeting of the First Committee.

7. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said he appreciated the Chairman's reply to his question. He asked, however, what guarantee there was that Catherine Zevgos and Dr. Kritsikis would not both be executed in the meantime. There was too much experience of Greek promises in such matters and, in particular, there were the cases of the trade union leader, Georgi Demosthenes, and of four communist leaders who had been executed twelve hours after Mr. Pipinelis had given the promises of leniency.

8. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, before voting on the Australian motion, he wished to know how long the Conciliation Committee would need to prepare their report.

9. The CHAIRMAN observed that according to the Australian proposal the discussion would take place at their following meeting. That would possibly involve two difficulties. Firstly the de-

tailed report would take time to prepare since there were twenty-nine meetings to be covered; secondly, there was a possibility of confusion at the next meeting of the Committee since the report of Sub-Committee 17 might also be available. In reply to the question put by the Soviet Union representative, the Chairman stated that probably two or three days would be required to draft the report.

10. Mr. COUVE DE MURVILLE (France) said that the points raised by the representatives of Australia and the Soviet Union led to the question of the organization of the Committee's discussion. Apparently, neither the full report of the Conciliation Committee nor the report of Sub-Committee 17 could be expected for two or three days. There were therefore two alternatives: on the one hand the Committee could immediately proceed with the discussion of the Greek question; that would involve two disadvantages for the report of the Conciliation Committee was not yet available, and it would lead to the simultaneous discussion of two items; alternatively, the Committee could decide not to meet on the following day, but to convene on Friday to take up the report of Sub-Committee 17 which should then be ready; the Committee could then conclude its discussion on the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies; the following week, the Committee could revert to the Greek question, after having studied the full report of the Conciliation Committee. The drawback to that procedure was the loss of time involved. However, that loss might not be quite so real, since an immediate discussion of the Greek question would not be fully informed. Mr. Couve de Murville accordingly moved an amendment to the Australian proposal in the sense of the second alternative.

11. Mr. MCNEIL (United Kingdom) agreed with the representative of France. Moreover, according to the Journal, no meeting had been scheduled for the following day, so that their programmes would not be affected. For the current meeting, there was the question of the Polish draft resolution (A/C.1/501) concerning political activities in Somaliland, and the United Kingdom amendment thereto (A/C.1/502). He proposed that the Committee deal with those items and then proceed in accordance with the French proposal.

12. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that he appreciated the reasons for postponing the discussion of the Greek question since it would be difficult to discuss it in the absence of a full report. However, he was concerned over the possible loss of time which might result. The next item on the agenda was the Soviet Union proposal for a five Power pact. It had been evident from the beginning that some delegations wished to postpone the discussion of that item or even eliminate it from the agenda. Now there seemed to be an attempt to nullify the decision to place it third on the agenda. Mr. Katz-Suchy proposed that, if there were no meeting the following day either on the Greek question or on the question of the disposal of the Italian colonies, the First Committee should then begin discussion of the Soviet Union proposal. There had hardly been a time, at any session of the Assembly, when sub-committees had not been at work, and that was the first occasion when meetings of the First Committee had been cancelled because of those of a sub-committee. The target date for the end of the

Assembly was approaching and many items still remained unexamined. Indeed, the First Committee had not yet disposed of any. If the Committee decided not to deal with the Greek question the following day, Mr. Katz-Suchy wished to move that it proceed with the discussion of item 3 of the agenda and leave both the Greek question and the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies until the appropriate reports were received.

13. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) believed that the Polish proposal would keep the Committee from wasting time. Some twenty days had been lost during the second part of the third session on the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies, and it was to be feared that the Committee might repeat that performance. Since the reports of the Conciliation Committee and of Sub-Committee 17 were not expected for a few days, it would be reasonable to move on to item 3 of the agenda, either the following day or that afternoon. That procedure would lead to a more efficient use of the Committee's time.

14. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) asked for information upon the possibilities of meeting the following day, and whether one of the meetings of the Committees at present scheduled could be cancelled.

15. The CHAIRMAN stated that he had been informed by the Secretariat that a meeting could not be arranged for that afternoon, but that one could be arranged for the following day.

16. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) suggested that the Committee first decide whether they should meet the following day and then decide upon the subject for discussion. He thought it would be advantageous to separate the two questions.

17. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) said his delegation supported the French proposal, despite its desire to have the Greek question dealt with as soon as possible. However, it would accept the postponement in order to have the final report available. That report was essential to the Committee's discussion, and would show the opinion of eminent leaders in the United Nations, who would present facts. Those facts would be more pertinent and reliable than those given by some delegations. With regard to the remarks of the Polish representative, Mr. Pipinelis said that he would not deal at once with the substance of the insinuations, but would refer the matter at the proper time.

18. Mr. MAKIN (Australia) withdrew his motion in favour of the French proposal as amended by the United Kingdom representative.

19. After a procedural discussion upon the method of voting between the CHAIRMAN and Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland), the latter stated that he wished to re-submit his motion in the form of an amendment to the French proposal. Its purport would be that discussion of the Greek question should be deferred until the Conciliation Committee's report had been received, and that discussion of item 3 on the agenda be initiated the following day.

20. Mr. COUVE DE MURVILLE (France) could not accept the Polish amendment. He did not consider it advisable to discuss three items simultaneously. The Committee was already examining

two items and it was hard to avoid overlapping. The Committee was unlikely to gain time by holding one or two meetings on the Soviet proposal. If the United Kingdom proposal was intended as an amendment to the French motion, he would accept it, as it would not change the French proposal which dealt with the future organization of the Committee's work.

21. Summing up, the CHAIRMAN observed that the Committee had before it the French proposal as amended by the United Kingdom to the effect of postponing the discussion of the report of Sub-Committee 17 until the following Friday and, after its conclusion, to continue with the Greek question. At the current meeting, the Committee would deal with the Polish draft resolution with regard to political activities in Somaliland and the United Kingdom amendment thereto. Then there was also a Polish amendment to the French proposal that the discussion of the Soviet Union proposal be initiated on Wednesday, while reverting on Friday to the discussion of the report of Sub-Committee 17.

22. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) suggested that the French proposal might be construed as a motion for adjournment of the debate under rule 105. The Committee might take a decision on that before considering what it should discuss immediately or on the following day. Secondly, it might deal with the United Kingdom proposal and thirdly with the Polish proposal. The three ideas seemed to be quite distinct.

23. The CHAIRMAN stated that he did not feel that the suggested procedure would bring about any different result from the procedure he had proposed, namely to vote first on the Polish amendment, and then on the French proposal as amended by the United Kingdom.

24. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) expressed the hope that adoption of the French proposal would not prevent the representative of Greece from replying to the points he had raised.

25. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Polish amendment to the effect that discussion on item 3 of the agenda should be initiated on Wednesday and that the Committee would revert to the report of Sub-Committee 17 on Friday.

*The amendment was rejected by 32 votes to 6, with 8 abstentions.*

26. The CHAIRMAN then put to the vote the French proposal, as amended by the United Kingdom, to the effect that the Committee should discuss the Polish draft resolution (A/C.1/501) at the current meeting and then adjourn until Friday when the report of Sub-Committee 17 would be discussed, after which the Committee would pass on to the Greek question.

*The proposal was adopted by 42 votes to none, with 4 abstentions.*

### **Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies (continued)**

27. The CHAIRMAN declared that the Committee would proceed to discuss the Polish draft resolution (A/C.1/501), the text of which read as follows:

*"The First Committee,*

*"Taking into consideration the fact that the future of Somaliland is being discussed by the General Assembly,*



*"Appeals to the Administering Authorities of Somaliland to permit free expression of opinion and to prevent victimization of persons and political organizations."*

28. Two amendments had been submitted to the draft resolution, one by the representative of the United Kingdom and another by the representative of Yugoslavia. The United Kingdom amendment (A/C.1/502) read as follows:

*"The First Committee,*

*"Taking into consideration the fact that the future of Somaliland is being discussed by the General Assembly,*

*"Appeals to the Administering Authorities of Somaliland to maintain their present policy of permitting free expression of opinion and of preventing victimization of persons and political organizations."*

29. The Yugoslav amendment (A/C.1/504) consisted in replacing in the second paragraph the words 'to prevent victimization of persons and' by the words 'and the free activity of'. That paragraph would therefore read as follows:

*"Appeals to the Administering Authorities of Somaliland to permit free expression of opinion and the free activity of political organizations."*

30. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that the United Kingdom amendment was presented in an unusual form and amounted to a complete change of the substance of his draft resolution. The United Kingdom amendment, if adopted, would amount to an approval by the First Committee of the present policy pursued by the Administering Authorities in Somaliland. He said that his delegation had intended to submit its own amendment to the United Kingdom amendment but hesitated to do so in order not to engage the Committee in endless discussion. Moreover, should Mr. McNeil insist that a vote be taken on his amendment, the Polish representative suggested that the First Committee call upon the representative of the Somali Youth League to appear before the Committee with a view to ascertaining their opinion on the policy of the Administering Authorities. The United Kingdom representative had previously admitted the existence of disturbances in Somaliland. However, additional information had been received to the effect that various Somali leaders had been sentenced to periods of imprisonment ranging from 8 to 12 months. The United Kingdom representative was, therefore, asking the First Committee to approve of the actions of the Administering Authorities. In conclusion Mr. Katz-Suchy said that the United Kingdom amendment was irrelevant, since the Polish draft resolution requested the Administering Authorities to permit freedom of expression and to prevent victimization without reference to any political organization, whereas the United Kingdom amendment requested the maintenance of the present policy of the Administering Authority.

31. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) said that his delegation felt unable to support either the Polish draft resolution or the United Kingdom amendment to it. With regard to the Polish draft resolution, his delegation thought that the First Committee did not possess sufficient factual information to warrant a judgment of that kind, the nature of which would be prejudicial to the

matter under discussion. On the other hand, the United Kingdom Government did not require an appeal from the Committee to maintain the good policy which it claimed to be sustaining in Somaliland. His delegation was therefore ready to support any resolution which would neither prejudice the issue nor reduce it to an absurdity. Accordingly, he submitted the following amendment (A/C.1/505) to the second paragraph of the Polish draft resolution:

*"The First Committee,*

*"Taking into consideration the fact that the future of Somaliland is being discussed by the General Assembly,*

*"Requests the Administering Authorities of Somaliland to ensure free and peaceful expression of opinion among the inhabitants of the territory regarding its future."*

32. Mr. MARTÍNEZ MORENO (El Salvador) said that since the United Kingdom amendment constituted a negation of the Polish draft resolution, his delegation would formally move that the Committee consider them as separate proposals and vote on them separately. His delegation would vote against the Polish draft resolution since it implied a criticism of the policy of the Administering Authorities in Somaliland and since his delegation had no information leading to believe that the disorders in Somaliland were the result of the policy pursued by the Administering Authorities. He would equally vote against the United Kingdom proposal, since it implied an approval of the policy which it was following in Somaliland, in which case, he saw no reason for the First Committee to approve of that policy. As for the Philippine proposal, his delegation would also vote against it, since its adoption would amount to a partial decision on a matter which was still under consideration by Sub-Committee 17.

33. Mr. GONZÁLEZ ALLENDES (Chile) agreed with the views expressed by the representative of El Salvador.

34. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the United Kingdom amendment should be regarded as a separate draft resolution since it requested the First Committee to approve of the policy of the Administering Authorities in Somaliland. That policy consisted in the denial of freedom of expression and in the banning of demonstrations and political organizations, especially the Somali Youth League. Moreover, the United Kingdom proposal implied that the present policy of the Administering Authorities in Somaliland permitted the free expression of opinion and prevented victimization of persons and political organizations. If a change had occurred in that policy, the First Committee should have been informed to that effect and an opportunity should be given to the representative of the Somali Youth League to confirm that information.

35. With regard to the earlier suggestion to the effect that discussion be postponed until the consideration of the report of Sub-Committee 17, that suggestion was intended to hamper the progress of the work of the Committee since Sub-Committee 17 was dealing with another aspect of the problem. The Polish draft resolution was an objective and correct proposal and his delegation would, accordingly, vote in favour of it.



36. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) said that Mr. Katz-Suchy should not object to the application by the First Committee of correct parliamentary procedures in amending a resolution in conformity with the direction of the Chair. He could not understand the attitude of the representative of the Byelorussian SSR with regard to the Somali Youth League, since on page 21 of the Report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation the delegation of the Soviet Union accused the Somali Youth League of terrorism and other methods having nothing in common with democratic principles. The Committee would certainly be interested in ascertaining the reasons for that sudden change of mind. The representative of the Somali Youth League had submitted material alleging the mistreatment of their leaders, whereas other organizations had refuted those allegations; the United Kingdom delegation was not in a position to judge as to the veracity of either contention.

37. Various allegations had been made to the effect that the Administering Authorities were denying the Somalis their freedom of expression. Those allegations could be sustained if it were proven that the military authorities were permitting freedom of expression only to such political organizations holding views similar to those of the Administering Authorities. If the Administering Authorities were practising a terroristic policy in Somaliland, it should be assumed that they would endeavour to prevent any such information from reaching the First Committee, but that was not the case. Moreover, the Administering Authorities had always allowed peaceful demonstrations and had only attempted to prevent those intended against the Italian minority. The Administering Authorities had been forced to adopt their present policy as a result of similar unfortunate experience in January 1948. Moreover, the curfew had already been completely lifted and all political clubs, except those of Mogadiscio, had been reopened. In conclusion, the representative of the United Kingdom offered to withdraw his amendment with a view to facilitating the work of the First Committee and said he would do so if the representatives of El Salvador and the Philippines found it acceptable.

38. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that, in submitting its draft resolution, his delegation had

not intended to question the policy of the Administering Authorities in Somaliland. That draft resolution had been submitted as a result of recent events in that territory. His delegation would withdraw its draft resolution in favour of the Philippine proposal.

39. Mr. CASTRO (El Salvador) thanked the United Kingdom representative for withdrawing his amendment and hoped that the Philippine representative would do the same.

40. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that during the previous session, his delegation had condemned the terroristic activities by the Somali Youth League against the Italian minority but had found later that the charges made against the League had been exaggerated. His delegation considered terroristic actions on the part of any organization or any group of the population against any other group of the population to be reprehensible and that there was therefore no contradiction between his delegation's position then and the position it was adopting at present, believing that there could, should and must be no prohibition of the expression of the will of any group of the population of Somaliland.

41. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) also withdrew his amendment.

42. The CHAIRMAN put the Philippine draft resolution (A/C.1/505) to the vote.

*The draft resolution was rejected by 23 votes to 18 with 9 abstentions.*

43. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) and Mr. GONZÁLES (Chile) explained that they had voted against the Philippine draft resolution because of its implied criticism of the policy of the Administering Authorities in Somaliland.

44. The representatives of INDIA and of PAKISTAN remarked that their delegations had voted in favour of the Philippine draft resolution on the understanding that it did not imply any criticism of the Administering Authorities in Somaliland.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOURTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 24 October 1949, at 3.30 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Selim SARDER (Turkey).*

1. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that, as Subcommittee 17 had not yet concluded its work, it would not be possible to finish the consideration of the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies before returning to the Greek question, as had been decided previously. He proposed that, as the Conciliation Committee had submitted its report (A/C.1/506) to the First Committee, the Committee should resume the general debate on the Greek question.

*It was so decided.*

### Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece (continued)

#### DEATH SENTENCES PASSED BY GREEK MILITARY COURTS

2. Mr. VYSHINSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that the Polish representative had made a statement on 18 October (293rd meeting) concerning death sentences in Greece and that the Chairman of the First Committee

had stated that the question would be mentioned in the report of the Conciliation Committee. That question, however, was not dealt with in the report of the Conciliation Committee (A/C.1/506).

3. Meanwhile, the delegation of the Soviet Union had learned that the military tribunal in Athens was continuing to pass death sentences. On 13 October, the military tribunal in Athens had sentenced to death eight members of the liberation movement, who had fought heroically against the hitlerite invaders for the freedom and independence of their country. Those persons had been condemned to death two or three times without any proof, on the testimony of police informers, including, in particular, that of Aravanitis, an agent of the secret police of the Piraeus, who, according to the Greek Government, had subsequently committed suicide.

4. Those death sentences had followed revelations made by the condemned persons concerning an orgy of cruelty that had taken place at the headquarters of the Piraeus police. The Greek patriots were being tortured by fire, their hair was torn out, and they were driven to insanity and suicide. Aravanitis himself had written to his sister that he could no longer endure the shrieks of the tortured persons.

5. In order to extract confessions from the prisoners, they were loaded with sandbags and forced to remain standing for hours, or they were hurled from cliff tops into the sea. Taksis, an eminent patriot, had died as a result of those tortures, and Evangelia Saradzis, a young woman of twenty-five, one of the eight persons sentenced to death, had been subjected to the phalangist torture, which consisted in hanging up the victims by the arms which were previously forced between their bound legs. Evangelia Saradzis had also been tortured by fire.

6. The names of the torturers were known: They were Jattris, Kich, Moskios and Giorgios, whose real name was Joachim.

7. Those crimes by the monarcho-fascists had caused indignation among the people of the Soviet Union. Honest people throughout the world should raise their voices in protest. As the families of the eight condemned persons had appealed to the Government of the USSR to save those innocent people, the delegation of the Soviet Union was submitting a draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/507.

8. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) expressed his surprise that the representatives who once again invoked humanitarian considerations and resumed their accusations against the "monarcho-fascist" Government, did not realize that there were cases more worthy of consideration closer to their countries. In Hungary, eminent persons had been executed after their personalities had been sapped by the processes used in extracting confessions. In Czechoslovakia, a whole class of the population was gradually being wiped out. In the territory of the Soviet Union, 17,000 Greeks from the Caucasus had been deported elsewhere in conditions which were tantamount to a death sentence. At that time, however, the delegations who were invoking humanitarian considerations in the case of Greece had uttered no protest.

9. Recently, in the United Nations itself, the discussion had resulted in the moral condemna-

tion of three countries who were flagrantly violating certain clauses in their peace treaties which related to human rights.<sup>1</sup>

10. In such circumstances, it was easy to form an opinion on the real motives of those who were accusing the Greek Government.

11. In his speech on 29 September (276th meeting), the representative of the Greek Government had pointed out that, although acts of sedition and sabotage perpetrated in Greece had unfortunately involved stringent repressive measures, those measures were not directed against any political ideas whatsoever. The Greek representative had added that his Government had decided to refer all death sentences to a court of appeal. That statement had been absolutely clear. The French representative had summarized it as the postponement of the execution of Mrs. Zevgos and a sign of the Greek Government's desire for appeasement. The representative of Yugoslavia had even added that the Greek Government's statement concerning Mrs. Zevgos did not prejudice the decision to be taken by the court of appeal and that it gave no indication of the procedure that would be followed by the Greek Government in similar cases. In fact, the statement made by the Greek delegation meant that all cases would be considered by a court of appeal, but not that all the executions would be suspended. The representative of Poland had imputed to Mr. Pipinelis the statement that all executions would be postponed, that it would, therefore, be unnecessary to protect the life of Catherine Zevgos and that, generally speaking, no executions would take place once the law announced by the Greek representative had been passed.

12. The Polish representative's interpretation thus changed the meaning of Mr. Pipinelis' statement.

13. Another ruse had been to represent the condemned persons as innocent idealists, whose only crime had been to hold ideas different from those of the "monarcho-fascist" Government. To take a few examples, however, Catherine Zevgos, who was born in Eastern Thrace and came to Greece in 1928, had been employed by the Minister of the Soviet Union in Athens and had served as a liaison agent with Greek clandestine organizations. In 1929, she had been sent to Moscow. On her return to Athens in 1933, she had organized a reception centre for communist agents. In December 1944, she had settled in Peristeri, a suburb of Athens, and had been employed in sorting out hostages and deciding upon kidnappings and executions. It was for those activities that she had been condemned. Furthermore, at the beginning of 1949, she had organized, under an assumed name, a terrorist group that had attacked the electrical power station at the Piraeus.

14. With regard to Demosthenes Georgi, the telephone workers' trade unions had sent a message to the Greek delegation, recalling the activities of that communist, whom his party had forced on the workers in that industry as chairman of the trade union. Demosthenes had often denounced his fellow workers to the Germans, thus being responsible for many death sentences. In December 1944, he had been instrumental in the

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 235th plenary meeting.

execution of several members of the trade unions and had even been present at the executions. The message from the telephone workers' trade union provided the names of Georgi Demosthenes' victims.

15. The authenticity of that information could be checked, as all members of the Committee were free to go to Greece, to visit the prisons, to speak to the accused and to leave the country without hindrance; that was not the case in countries such as for instance, the USSR and Poland, which concluded such detailed frontier conventions that they even prohibited conversations across the frontier, except by specially authorized officials.

16. Doubtless it would not have been lost on most of the members of the First Committee that certain delegations had been guilty of intervention in the domestic affairs of Greece, but that country was ready to take up the discussion. The information given on 29 September had been more than confirmed by events; since the tabling of the bill on appeals before a court of appeals, no further executions had taken place. Consequently, the Soviet Union delegation had changed its tactics; it was no longer concerned with executions, but with convictions, just as if the functioning of the Greek courts could be stopped at the bidding of the representative of the USSR or of any other country.

17. With the return of peace and the end of foreign intervention, clemency would prevail to an even greater extent. Sabotage and acts of sedition only had necessitated vigorous repressive measures. There was ample proof of such acts of violence. For example, on 17 April 1948 a circular issued by the Greek *Politburo* had called upon the communists to take action in the towns without awaiting liberation by the so-called democratic army. The instructions given called for a mass exodus to the mountains, the formation of groups of five and the unleashing of riots and sabotage. A circular, dated 30 August 1948, dealt with the arrest and execution of hostages, deputies, policemen and officials by groups of eight to ten guerrillas, who were to penetrate into the urban areas disguised as civilians.

18. Mr. Evatt, who was absolutely objective, although he had sometimes failed to understand certain aspects of the Greek problem, had stated, with complete impartiality, in his book *The Task of Nations*, that in order to put down a rebellion very strict measures were necessary. History taught that Governments which felt themselves threatened resorted to measures which were sometimes more severe than they had intended. With the return of peace to the Balkans, however, the Greek people would return to their traditional clemency.

19. In addition to fanatics and foreign agents, a number of unfortunate people had also been led to commit crimes. Those who had led them astray now wanted to interfere, being moved not by a spirit of humanity but by the desire to retain intact a criminal system of foreign agents.

20. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that some individuals in Greece were behaving like wild beasts, and that men accused of progressive leanings were being treated in a manner incompatible with respect for human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms.

21. Messages, which had been received on the subject of the death sentences passed on 13 October, threw a new light on the inhuman cruelty of the monarchist-fascist Government in Athens. The anxiety felt by the delegations of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR was thus justified.

22. The Polish delegation had asked for a repeal of the death sentence on Catherine Zevgos. The question of commuting death sentences so as to promote pacification in Greece was relevant to the current discussion, but the empty rhetorics and hypocrisy of the Greek representative in regard to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria and even the frontier conventions entered into by the Soviet Union, were completely irrelevant.

23. At the 276th meeting of the First Committee, on 29 September 1949, the Greek representative had stated that his Government had decided to submit to Parliament a bill to end the current tragedy, and that it had been decided that the files of all those condemned to death would be transmitted to a court of appeals.

24. That had been a blatant lie, and the statements concerning the suspension of the execution of Georgi Demosthenes had been equally false. In connexion with that subject, the Greek representative had referred to the Act of 27 September 1949. Two or three days later, however, when President Rómulo and the Secretary-General had been asked for certain explanations and the Greek representative had said that sentence had already been carried out. In actual fact the execution had been advanced when the case had been raised in the General Assembly. That proved how reliable the Greek representative's statements were.

25. At the same meeting, of 29 September 1949 (276th meeting), Mr. Pipinelis had given the number of death sentences as 1,698; mass executions were still taking place for fear that, as a result of the work of the Conciliation Committee, the General Assembly might call on the Greek Government to put an end to the terror.

26. The truth was that the figure of 1,698 did not include those executed without trial, secretly, for allegedly attempting to escape, or in so-called re-education camps.

27. According to the Greek representative, excellent results were being obtained in those camps. From time to time the truth about the islands was learned through the Press: floggings, burning alive of prisoners, tarring and exposure to the sun. Such was the work of the Athenian disciples of Himmler. And their victims were those who had fought heroically against the hitlerite invaders for the freedom and independence of their country.

28. The Greek people certainly did not need Mr. Pipinelis' defence. Those who deserved to be condemned were the vicious clique who had seized power in Greece and were asking the United States for the wherewithal to continue the civil war.

29. Mr. Pipinelis had spoken of the charges made against Mrs. Zevgos. In reality, her great crime was that she had been employed by the Soviet Union Legation. But since when could nationals of one country not be employed by the

legation of another country maintaining diplomatic relations with their Government? It was a far cry from that accusation to the death penalties meted out right and left.

30. With regard to Georgi Demosthenes, who would believe that the delegation of the Soviet Union would raise its voice in defence of former collaborators? The protest it was making was directed against those collaborators who were now engaged in torturing former members of the resistance.

31. The accusations levelled against Mrs. Zevgos and Georgi Demosthenes were based on reports of instigators and on confessions extorted under torture. One unfortunate person had been warned that he would be tortured to death if he did not sign a prepared confession, which was to be inserted in the indictment against him in any case. Moreover, the authorities had threatened that he would be taken through the town and that arrests would be made in his presence so that his friends might think that he had turned traitor before dying. Such was the moral torture inflicted on those who were sympathetic to certain ideologies which Mr. Pipinelis invariably called communist, for to him all Greek patriots were communists.

32. Mr. Pipinelis had spoken of freedom of opinion. But Mr. Rendis, Minister of National Security, had said that communists should either lay down their arms, commit suicide or go into exile. That was how Mr. Pipinelis conceived freedom of opinion. That same Mr. Rendis, addressing the police in the Peloponnesus had stated that those who did not abandon communism would spend all the rest of their lives in concentration camps, or if they were in exile, would be deprived of Greek citizenship forever, and he indicated that he had prepared lists of leaders and members of the Communist Party with that end in view. Mr. Rendis had added that all the political parties in Greece as well as the United Nations approved of that method of procedure. But how could the United Nations, which had proclaimed human rights and fundamental freedoms, permit such horrors to exist? How could the Conciliation Committee, of which the Vice-Chairman of the First Committee was a member, ignore the events taking place in Greece, known as they were to all?

33. The Conciliation Committee had attempted to reduce the Greek question to a problem of relations between Greece and its northern neighbours. But the First Committee could not pass over in silence the ordeal of the leaders of the Greek patriots who had just been condemned to death.

34. The Ukrainian SSR delegation fully supported the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/507). Having declared on 29 September that a bill had been submitted to Parliament and that a court of appeals was reviewing death sentences, could Mr. Pipinelis reply to the following question: would the execution of those eight victims which might perhaps be hastened after the appeal made to the United Nations—would those executions be suspended or would the penalty be commuted? The Ukrainian SSR delegation asked the representative of Greece to give a clear and direct answer to that question.

35. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) thought that all the representatives wished to see

the end of military executions throughout the world. Everyone desired that the conditions rendering those sentences should be eliminated, but the First Committee should first of all adhere to an effective procedure. It had repeatedly decided in the past that it was not competent to deal with individual cases. Thus, for example, when the question of the violation of human rights in certain ex-enemy States had been discussed, no one had asked the First Committee to try to intervene in individual cases. Neither the General Assembly nor the First Committee could set itself up as a court of appeal.

36. An Associated Press dispatch in the evening papers reported that seven Romanians accused of subversive activities had been condemned to death by a military tribunal at Sibiu. The Committee, however, could not concern itself with those cases. If it wanted a normal situation to prevail in Greece, it should concentrate its efforts on the problem before it, namely the threats to the territorial integrity and political independence of Greece, which were the reason for the existence of martial law in Greece.

37. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) shared the United States representative's opinion that the Committee's first concern should be the conditions which were the cause of the terror reigning in Greece. The Polish delegation had mentioned individual cases on several occasions, because the executions were continuing even as the matter was being discussed in the First Committee.

38. He wondered whether conditions in Greece caused the United States representative as much anxiety as he showed concerning the conditions allegedly reigning in Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. The Committee's opinion could certainly not be influenced by references to the Romanian question, since it was not the Romanian question but the Greek question which was under discussion, and the main reason for the debate was United States intervention in Greece.

39. The so-called generosity and clemency of the Greek Government did not seem to be supported by the facts. In that connexion, he referred to a photograph published in the London *Daily Mirror* showing Greek soldiers exhibiting the heads of decapitated Greek partisans.

40. In the eyes of Mr. Pipinelis, the discussion on the terror in Greece was obviously only an attempt to distract the Committee's attention from the so-called threats to Greek territorial integrity. He was also opposed to the discussion because he thought it was an interference in Greek domestic affairs. The whole history of the previous three years in Greece was in fact only the history of foreign interference in that country. A king had been brought back against the will of the Greek people, and a Government had been set up which was also maintained against popular feeling. Hence the responsibility for the executions was shared by the Government of Mr. Tsaldaris and the Governments which had intervened in Greece.

41. Mr. Pipinelis had spoken of trials in Hungary, alleged persecutions in Czechoslovakia and the deportation of Greek nationals, but he had obstinately refused to deal with the matter of the death sentences, the recent trial of Catherine Zevgos, and conditions in the concentration camps.

42. The Polish delegation, the delegation of the USSR and the other delegations which appealed to humanitarian feelings knew that it was useless to address any such appeal to the Greek Government, since it was moved only by the thirst for power and the desire to maintain at any price the *status quo*, in other words, the foreign intervention which was the source of dollars enabling the members of the Greek Government to transfer their profits abroad. When, a few days beforehand, the United States had said that military assistance to Greece could be reduced, Mr. Tsaldaris had immediately declared that the situation was not as favourable as some people claimed and had requested that the assistance should be continued.

43. With regard to Catherine Zevgos, it should be remembered that she was the widow of Jean Zevgos, murdered by agents of the Greek Government while he was, so to speak, acting as an unofficial member of the United Nations Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents, since he had been accredited to it by the EAM. He had been assassinated while he was on his way to a meeting of that Commission at the Commission's request. His wife had simply continued her husband's work for the liberation of Greece.

44. When Mr. Pipinelis had been asked for information regarding the execution of Georgi Demosthenes, he had been unable to give any reply. He had merely promised to give explanations later, and was submitting to the Committee a slanderous communication concocted in some office of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Instead of replying to the accusations, Mr. Pipinelis had merely hurled back counter-accusations. *Inter alia*, he had read instructions from the *Politburo* of the Greek Communist Party referring to the Party's activities in Greece. Mr. Katz-Suchy was asked whether there was anything surprising in a party giving instructions to its members. No doubt the party represented by Mr. Pipinelis received its instructions only from abroad.

45. Some of the eight death sentences mentioned in the Soviet Union's draft resolution had already been brought to the Chairman's notice at a previous meeting. Mr. Pipinelis had given no explanation, in spite of his promise. He had restricted himself to statements regarding the persecutions and sufferings to which the Greek Government was subjected. He had also said, in a threatening manner, that the Committee could not prevent the executions taking place in Greece because the Greek courts could not tolerate foreign interference in their normal operations. The Greek representative's attitude did not comply with the rules of procedure, since the subject under discussion was the Greek problem and it was precisely because of the machinations of the Greek Government and its masters that Greece had become a subject of concern to the United Nations.

46. The time had come for the First Committee to take action, because the terror was increasing daily. It was impossible to compile a complete list of the executions but data published in a Swiss information bulletin revealed an unbroken series of death sentences and executions from the end of August to 15 September. Could the Committee allow that state of affairs to continue while the Greek question remained on its agenda?

47. Whereas Mr. Pipinelis had recently stated that there would be no further executions until the court of appeals had reconsidered the death sentences and that the Committee should therefore not adopt the Polish draft resolution (A/C.1/483), Mr. Kanellopoulos, War Minister in the Athens Government had told the Press that no such decision had been taken and that, in any case, he would have been the only person authorized to issue such a statement. Moreover, facts belied the statement of Mr. Pipinelis because the Greek trade union leader, Georgi Demosthenes, had been condemned to death some hours after that statement and four other communists had been executed at that time.

48. The Committee had been dealing with the Greek question for a very long time. Hundreds of facts had been brought to the attention of all delegations; they knew the differences of opinion which existed between the Greek people and their rulers; they knew that terror reigned in the country and that cross-examinations of prisoners were being accompanied by inhuman torture. All of those facts had been reported by the British and United States Press. The United Nations could not allow such a state of affairs to continue. The time had come to adopt the draft resolution of the Soviet Union. Such action would make it possible during subsequent discussions to reach a general solution of the Greek question more easily.

49. It would be appropriate to add one name to the list of eight names in the USSR draft resolution, that of a democratic leader, Dr. Spyros Kritsikis, who had been condemned to death in Greece for refusing to sign a condemnation of the people's liberation movement. His case had produced great international repercussions and had been discussed in articles in the French Press. The International Red Cross had requested its representative in Greece to contact the Greek Government to seek commutation of that sentence. The French Socialist Party, the International Congress of Democratic Lawyers and the British Socialist Medical Association had raised protests. As far as could be ascertained, the sentence which had been pronounced on 31 August was still pending before the court of appeals. The promises of the Athens Government were not enough because a majority of the members of the court of appeals were former collaborators or at least persons who had been lenient towards those who had collaborated with the Nazis.

50. There were many others in the same situation as Dr. Spyros Kritsikis for whose lives the Committee was responsible. As the British Corporal Starr had stated before a London audience — and those statements had been confirmed by twenty-five ex-servicemen including six captains who had all been stationed in Greece — nothing could be compared to what could be seen in Greece: the long queues of women and girls waiting outside prisons were, in his own words, a perpetual and shameful reminder to any Britisher who knew the true state of affairs in Greece.

51. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that world public opinion was outraged by the state of affairs prevailing in Greece. The telegrams sent to the Members of the General Assembly, to its President, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, amongst others, by the World Federation of Trade Unions,

the All Slav Trade Union Council, the Central Committee of the World Association of Women, the Anti-Fascist Women's Committee of the Soviet Union and by a number of other international democratic organizations provided adequate proof.

52. Mr. Pipinelis had not replied clearly to the accusations against the Athens Government made by the relatives of eight Greek patriots who had been sentenced to death. They wrote that, while the Greek question was being discussed in the United Nations, the Greek military tribunal had once again sentenced to death eight persons who had been guilty of no crime. The accusations against them were based only on the statements of a police agent named Aravanitis who apparently had since committed suicide. The only charge against those eight convicted persons was that they had exposed the criminal machinations of the Greek security police in Athens and Piraeus.

53. Recalling the figures given by Mr. Pipinelis at the meeting of 29 September (276th meeting) regarding the number of cases judged by the Greek military tribunal during the four years ending 30 April 1949, Mr. Kiselev stated that those figures were incomplete. During the three years following the Second World War, 400,000 arrests had taken place in Greece and 10,000 fighters for national liberation had been executed.

54. In addition, on 24 April 1949 an appeal to world public opinion had been launched by the relatives of persons imprisoned on the islands or in concentration or "re-education" camps. That appeal pointed out that the organization of the prisons by the Anglo-American authorities had made them real extermination camps. When a citizen was brought before a court, special laws were immediately applied whereby the prisoner could be sent, even before judgment was pronounced, to the island of Makronissos where he was subjected to torture. He appeared before a court martial in a pitiful state and if he refused to renounce his opinions and admit his errors, he was sentenced to be shot. The same appeal described the conditions of terror and torture prevailing on the islands of Corfu and Aegina and in the prisons.

55. An appeal from the provisional democratic Government of Greece, which had recently been sent to all delegations showed that, although that Government had agreed to halt military operations in order to spare the country, owing to the brutality of the monarcho-fascist government and its vindictive attitude, it would be forced to take up arms again if the Greek Government were to persist in that course.

56. The First Committee could not overlook those statements. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR strongly supported the proposal submitted by the USSR.

57. Mr. CLEMENTIS (Czechoslovakia) considered that the arguments presented by the delegations of the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR, the Soviet Union and Poland adequately demonstrated the appropriateness of the USSR proposal.

58. As Mr. Pipinelis had rightly said, the situation prevailing in his country was the result of an international plot. It was not only a plot; the situation had been brought about by the open intervention of two great Powers.

59. In connexion with the prevailing situation, the question arose how to reconcile the statements of the Athens Government that all partisan resistance had ceased with the daily news of death sentences imposed by military tribunals and renewed acts of terrorism. What was the purpose of those sentences, in view of the fact that the Athens Government itself had acknowledged that the fight was over? They could only mean a challenge to world opinion and to the United Nations itself and should evoke the response they warranted.

60. The United States representative had stated that the United Nations could not deal with individual cases. If that view were adopted, the second paragraph of the USSR proposal had only to be modified by the deletion of the names in it so that the appeal to the Greek Government became general. In the meantime, the Czechoslovakian delegation would support the proposal of the Soviet Union and the amendment submitted by the representative of Poland.

61. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) thought that the execution of dissidents in Greece could not be dealt with as a matter separate from the Greek question as a whole. If it were dealt with separately, as was done in the USSR draft resolution, it would only divert the attention of the Committee from the main problem created by the deadlock which negotiations had reached. An appeal to humanitarian feelings would have but little value so long as the Greek Government could maintain that it was forced to take repressive measures in order to safeguard its sovereignty and authority.

62. When Greece and its neighbours came near to a settlement, an appeal to clemency might be made for two reasons: firstly, because it might become an integral part of the general agreement; and secondly, because it would have the practical effect of creating a conciliatory atmosphere in Greece itself. In the circumstances, the Philippine delegation would abstain during the vote on the draft resolution of the Soviet Union.

63. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) emphasized that the Greek courts martial were still passing death sentences although the Government was announcing that the victory was won. Could it be because the Greek Government wished to take reprisals against its enemy? Apparently, that was the reason, for the statements of Mr. Pipinelis were permeated with spite. He was in effect saying to the Greek patriots: "you did such and such a thing during the war. Now that the war is over, we are going to do the same to you". It should be realized that as long as those death sentences continued to be passed in Greece, the Soviet Union would protest and would fight against them.

64. Regarding the accusations against Catherine Zevgos, the fact remained that two of the judges of the court martial, which was composed of five professional soldiers, had voted against the death sentence. Mr. Pipinelis had said so himself. That fact invalidated the accusations which he had against her.

65. Of the eight persons named in the USSR proposal, Mr. Pipinelis had mentioned only Catherine Zevgos and Georgi Demosthenes. He had not said a word about the other six, among them were even some non-communists. He had



not spoken of Artemios Yoannidis, a member of the right-wing who had made charges against other defendants and had then retracted his statement saying that he had been forced under torture to make the accusations. He had not spoken of Sotirios Barbounaris, publisher of the *Teacher's Tribune*, or of the democrat, Yakovos Thamelis.

66. Mr. Pipinelis had answered none of the charges that torture was being carried out in Greek prisons and camps. That could not but give rise to concern. The United States representative himself was worried; he thought that sentences should not be passed. But when he was faced with specific cases, he said that the Greek question should be settled as a whole. That view was not incompatible with the USSR proposal. The representative of the United States must answer whether or not he was in favour of the execution of the eight persons sentenced.

67. The Committee could not work calmly in the atmosphere created by those executions. That was why the delegation of the Soviet Union was pressing for its draft resolution to be put to the vote. It accepted the addition suggested by the representative of Poland.

68. According to Mr. Pipinelis, the executions could be stopped if all foreign intervention ceased in Greece and if the civil war was ended. In the view of the Soviet Union, the terms of that proposal should be reversed. The USSR delegation would explain how during the general debate. For the time being, it was appealing to the First Committee to have the moral courage to vote for the Soviet Union proposal.

69. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) drew the Committee's attention to the case of the Slavonic-speaking Macedonian population of northern Greece, which the Greek Government was subjecting to a reign of terror. In the Macedonian town of Lerina, 72 inhabitants of the Slav village of Sorovitch had been on trial from 8 to 22 August 1949. The defendants had been accused of having taken part in the partisan movement, and the chief witness had been the commander of the gendarmerie in Lerina. The local population believed that the trial had been staged by the gendarmerie itself; in fact, the charge was based on a document which the gendarmerie said was a list of subscribers to a collection for the democratic army, containing a figure against each signature. The whole village knew that the list referred to a collection for the construction of a water main. If there had really been a secret collection, obviously no signatures would have appeared.

70. On 22 August, sentence of death had been passed on 51 of the accused; 11 had been sentenced to forced labour and 8 to lesser penalties. Women and old men were among those sentenced. That verdict showed that the measures taken by the Greek Authorities were in the nature of reprisals, and that there was no military justification whatever for them. Mr. Pipinelis had tried to

convey the impression that all the persons now being sentenced in Greece were agents of a foreign Power; but such a charge would surely not be made against 72 inhabitants of a small village.

71. The Committee should express its opinion of the conduct of the Athens Government by adopting either the USSR proposal, with or without amendments, or any other proposal which other delegations might submit.

72. Sir Carl BERENDSEN (New Zealand) thought that the Greek Government should certainly give proof of the greatest possible clemency. He could not, however, support the Soviet Union draft resolution because the Committee was in total ignorance of the facts of the case. It was possible that the persons mentioned in the USSR resolution were innocent, but they might equally well be guilty. Moreover, even if the Committee was fully acquainted with the facts, it could not make demands of a Member State to suspend measures it intended to take.

73. The CHAIRMAN proposed that the meeting should be adjourned unless the Committee wished to go on to vote immediately on the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/507).

74. Mr. MARTIN (Canada) thought that the Committee should vote on that proposal at once.

75. Mr. SANTA-CRUZ (Chile) said that he could not vote in favour of a resolution which took only one aspect of the problem into account. He thought it premature to vote on an incidental question. He supported the Chairman's suggestion and asked that the meeting be adjourned.

76. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) thought that the Canadian proposal would deprive those delegations, which did not feel in a position to speak that evening, of the opportunity to state their views on the Soviet Union proposal.

77. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the question whether the Committee wished to vote on the USSR draft resolution at once.

*It was so decided by 18 votes to 14, with 21 abstentions.*

78. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) thought it would be unfair to put his draft resolution to the vote at once. The vote just taken did not indicate that a clear majority in the Committee favoured an immediate decision on the Soviet Union proposal. Moreover, if the vote were postponed, another proposal than that of the USSR might be submitted in the meantime which would be of assistance to the eight persons condemned to death.

79. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) formally moved the adjournment.

*The motion for adjournment was adopted by 33, with 7 abstentions.*

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.



## TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIFTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 25 October 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Selim SARPER (Turkey).*

### Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece (continued)

#### DEATH SENTENCES PASSED BY GREEK MILITARY COURTS (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the discussion on the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/507) and on the Polish amendment (A/C.1/508) was open.
2. Mr. JAYANAMA (Thailand) reminded the meeting of the principles of Buddhist ethics which were followed in his country and said that it would be very difficult to vote against a proposal intended to save the lives of nine persons accused of political crimes. In view of the difficulty of obtaining accurate information on the question, however, the delegation of Thailand would abstain during the vote on the proposal.
3. Mr. DE ALBA (Mexico) considered that, if only by reason of the sufferings of the Greek people in recent years, the United Nations had no course open to it but to insist on the observance of the principles of human dignity and of the right to live whenever it was in a position to do so. He pointed out that, earlier in the year, the International Diplomatic Conference at Geneva had adopted conventions on the protection of war victims and said that, for the first time, those conventions were applied alike to civil wars, wars of liberation and wars of independence. Recommendations had been made against reprisals, the use of torture, mass deportations and the execution of persons without trial. The principles of those Geneva conventions should be linked with those for the maintenance of peace and international security, since, in the present age, there was invariably a relation between international conflicts and civil wars. No conflicts were purely internal in character; there was always some relationship between them, and conflicts described as civil wars might set the spark to a world conflagration.
4. Hence, from a strictly humanitarian point of view, the delegation of Mexico could not be indifferent to a problem involving human lives and human dignity. Without wishing to accuse the Greek Government, he would recall the statement made by the representative of Yugoslavia (294th meeting) to the effect that 68 inhabitants of a Macedonian village had been executed on the mere suspicion of helping partisans.
5. Though the First Committee had no right to ask the Greek Government to show mercy to the eight persons who had been condemned to death, mentioned in the USSR draft resolution, it could send the official records of the meeting relating to the examination of the question to the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, asking them to use their good offices to induce the Greek Government to show clemency. In Greece such a step, while not infringing national sovereignty, would restore an atmosphere favourable to the settlement of those differences which had brought the country to its present pass.
6. Mr. DE LA TOURNELLE (France), while pointing out that the aftermath of civil war was as bad as, if not worse than, civil war itself, said that he could not vote for the USSR draft resolution. The representative of Greece had stated (294th meeting) that, since 29 September, no execution had taken place in Greece, that a Court of Appeals had been set up and that lenient measures had been contemplated by the Greek Government. There was no reason for mistrusting that Government; the United Nations had always met with complete understanding on the part of Greece, whereas the same could not be said of some other Members. Moreover, the USSR draft resolution was incomplete, since it made no mention of veterans of the Resistance who, at the present moment, were being killed and wounded by the bullets of certain satellite Governments. Finally, the USSR draft resolution also failed to mention the particularly odious crime of sending Greek children under 15 years of age back to Greece in the ranks of the partisans, only to find their death on the field of battle.
7. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) recalled that on 28 September the representative of Poland had submitted (275th meeting) to the Committee the question of a reprieve for Catherine Zevgos. Many representatives and in particular the representatives of El Salvador and Cuba had supported that humanitarian appeal. At a subsequent meeting (276th meeting), the representative of Greece had stated that a law for extending the principle of amnesty had been passed and that all death sentences would be referred to a Court of Appeals. According to the Greek representative, those sentences were to be suspended and camps organized for the re-education of captured partisans. As a result of that statement, the representatives of El Salvador and Cuba had withdrawn their proposals for the suspension of the death sentence. Nevertheless, it was discovered the following day that Georgi Demosthenes had been shot and Catherine Zevgos condemned a second time. The Greek delegation had thus wittingly deceived the First Committee. Moreover, the representative of Greece had not yet answered the Ukrainian SSR delegation's question as to whether the sentence on the eight persons to which the USSR proposal referred had been suspended.
8. It was difficult to see how the representative of Mexico could put forward such a vague draft resolution at a time when political prisoners in Greece were being subjected to tortures reminiscent of the darkest days of the Middle Ages. Mr. Manuilsky could not understand how the representative of France could oppose the USSR draft resolution, since political prisoners in Greece were the victims of extreme torture, not merely physical but psychological, as when a prisoner was threatened with being marched through the streets of a town under escort while other arrests were being made, in order to suggest that he had betrayed his comrades.
9. After the war his country, in common with all the other Soviet Socialist Republics, had abolished the death penalty. As a representative of one of those republics, he thus had the right to speak in the name of human conscience and he

would therefore support the USSR draft resolution. He was astonished that followers of Christ, Buddha and Mahomet could oppose it.

10. Sir Terence SHONE (United Kingdom) suggested that the Committee had spent too much time on that problem and pointed out that, when a similar case had arisen during the third session of the General Assembly, the Committee had decided by 43 votes to 6 that the matter did not lie within its province (186th meeting). The representative of Greece had assured the Committee that his Government would not carry out further executions. The Committee could not prevent the Greek Government from administering justice in its own territories or from passing sentences. The First Committee was not a court of appeal and should proceed without further delay to deal with the matters within its competence.

11. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) noted that the discussion showed that the USSR delegation and those delegations which faithfully reflected its views had no confidence in the Court of Appeals set up by the Greek Government. The Belgian delegation could not express an opinion on the question for lack of the necessary information regarding that Court.

12. The USSR proposal was nevertheless unacceptable, since it sought to substitute the First Committee for the Court of Appeals. It was expedient that the Committee should pass on as soon as possible to the real question on which it had to take a decision, namely: the threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece.

13. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that he was in agreement with the representative of the Philippines in being prepared to support any measures for leniency, on condition that they were accepted by all the parties concerned and formed only a part of the general settlement of the Greek question. Nevertheless, the measures under discussion were particularly urgent, since the executions might take place at any minute. There must be no repetition of the misunderstanding which had occurred during the third session of the General Assembly, when the Chairman of the First Committee had ruled out of order a request for the suspension of a death sentence and when, on the following day, the Committee had learned that the prisoners sentenced for political crimes, on whose behalf a request had been formulated, had already been executed.

14. Despite all that had been said, the proposal was strictly humanitarian and had no political character. It made no reference to the political situation in Greece or to the methods of Greek courts of justice. It should not be forgotten that although Mr. Pipenelis had spoken in soft terms, behind him stood the Greek Government, which passed sentence on political grounds. Since Mr. Pipenelis had last made his statements, at least five persons had been executed—Georgi Demosthenes and four communists. According to reliable sources, Greek courts had rejected the appeal of two trade union leaders. In those circumstances, how could the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a State be invoked?

15. It would be interesting to know to what countries the representatives of France was referring when he spoke of "satellite" States. Was he

thinking of the countries participating in the Marshall Plan or of those which had signed the North Atlantic Treaty? Why should he criticize the countries which gave refuge to Greek children who had previously been used by the Greek Army as cover against the guerillas? Since the aftermath of civil war was more odious than civil war itself, as the French representative had pointed out, he failed to see how a draft resolution appealing for mercy could be rejected.

16. The appeal made on the previous day by the representative of New Zealand (294th meeting) was timely. Vague and individual appeals, however, were not enough, since experience showed that the Greek Government completely disregarded the requests of the United Nations. For that reason, it was desirable that Sir Carl Berendsen should submit his appeal to the Committee in order that it might reach a decision upon it.

17. Mr. GONZÁLEZ ALLENDES (Chile) pointed out that the USSR draft and similar drafts submitted the previous year were proof of the fact that no country in the world could remain indifferent to the execution of persons accused of political crimes. Still, it would be logical when such draft resolutions were submitted, to look at the problem as a whole. It could not be forgotten, in that connexion, that reports were daily appearing in the Press concerning the execution of prominent public figures not in Greece, where there was a civil war, but in Czechoslovakia, Romania and elsewhere.

18. His delegation would be prepared to support a resolution dealing with the question as a whole, but it would be unable to vote in favour of the Soviet Union proposal, first, because the proposal was incomplete, secondly, because it was not in line with the question before the First Committee, and thirdly, because the Chilean delegation reserved the right to submit an amendment to the general resolution to be adopted in the course of the consideration of the Greek question; that amendment would request the Greek Government to apply a policy of leniency likely to contribute to the restoration of peace in the Balkans.

19. Mr. MARTÍNEZ MORENO (El Salvador) said that his Government's policy was based on humanitarian reasons and also on the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a State.

20. Since Mr. Pipenelis had assured the Committee that the Greek Government would apply a policy of leniency and as there were no grounds to doubt that statement, the USSR draft resolution assumed a political nature and was therefore unacceptable. Moreover, as the Chilean representative had pointed out, any resolution which was based on a humanitarian point of view would have to deal with the problem as a whole.

21. Mr. VENIZELOS (Greece) deplored the fact that the spirit of conciliation and tolerance shown by the Chairman had given certain delegations an opportunity to make slanderous attacks on Greece.

22. In point of fact, it was the First Committee's duty to counteract the threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece, and to put an end to attacks instigated by its northern neighbours, and not to interfere in the country's domestic affairs. It was true that foreigners came and went freely in Greece; even prison-camps, and in particular Makronisos, were open to all comers. But the propaganda campaign that so-

called defenders of democracy were waging against Greece must continue to be refuted.

23. Following a statement by the Greek delegation, announcing that the question of the execution of all capital sentences had been referred to the Court of Appeals, two heavy votes had been cast by the First Committee on 29 September (276th meeting) and 5 October (284th meeting). Now, however, the countries of the Soviet bloc wanted the course of justice to be suspended and, apparently, that armed revolt or the organization of disturbances and acts of terrorism should no longer be referred to the tribunals. It was no longer therefore a matter of preventing executions, since they had been suspended some weeks previously, but an attempt to rekindle the zeal of the defeated partisans and encourage new acts of violence and sabotage under humanitarian pretexts.

24. The Soviet bloc, of course, spoke of "the terror which the monarcho-fascist Government exercised in Greece", but what weight would that slander carry when one bore in mind that raids by armed bands became liberating operations by the "democratic army" and that the kidnapping of 28,000 children was considered as a humanitarian action.

25. For nine years the Greek people had been defending its right to remain Greek, and for three years the political parties had presented a common front to the aggressor: that defence of the home, that sacred union, were now being called monarcho-fascist activities.

26. The most violent attacks, as under Nazi occupation, were currently being directed against the liberals, among them the speaker himself; in one case, it was Colonel Psaros who was killed by individuals pretending to be members of the Resistance; in another case, after the liberation in 1944 and 1945, it was the liberals of the Peloponnesus who were massacred by the communists, and Mr. Ladas, Minister of Justice, executed in the open street. The chief target were the liberal ideas and the democratic principles which, after the war, Greece and the Liberal Party had undertaken to apply faithfully. But armed foreign agents had attempted to sow destruction and poverty. Now, those mercenaries of the *Cominform* had been driven back, but Greece had 338,000 orphans, 700,000 refugees, starvation wages and countless ruins.

27. But love of liberty still survived in Greece and if a stop was put to attempts to incite and arm Greeks against their own country, bloodshed would cease forthwith. Why, therefore, did those who were so inspired by "humanitarian" motives not cease to stir up discord and rebellion?

28. As for the interest shown by certain delegations in a certain "terrorism", the result of those so-called humanitarian scruples was to encourage the guerrillas to carry on with their sabotage and destruction.

29. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said it was the habit of some delegations, whenever they were embarrassed by a particular question, to wrap up their real motives in lofty words of "human rights" and "democracy". In that particular case, those delegations were once more seeking to avoid discussion. Thus the Greek representative had maintained, in the face of the most soundly established facts, that

the delegation of the Soviet Union was opposed to justice being done in Greece. Nothing in the documents submitted or in the statements made by the Soviet Union justified such an allegation.

30. Moreover, the Greek representative had stated with a certain amount of frankness that too large a measure of indulgence towards the partisans would be to the detriment of the Greek people. That statement was difficult to reconcile with the Greek Government's promise of 29 September to suspend the execution of death sentences. Did not the new statement mean that the Athens Government had dropped the idea of a definitive commutation of the penalty in the case of death sentences? The Greek representative had thus admitted that those sentences had been and would continue to be executed in the future.

31. It was in the light of that latest declaration that one should study the statements made by the French representative, who had discoursed on the admirable Greek democracy, and by the representatives of Chile, El Salvador, the United States and the United Kingdom. In opposing the Soviet Union draft resolution, those delegations had maintained that since 29 September the question of the execution of the death sentences no longer arose. The French representative had asserted that no executions had taken place since 29 September. Yet, since that date Georgi Demosthenes had been executed. One might wonder what were the French representative's motives.

32. What Mr. Pipenelis had really said on 29 September was that most of the offenders, except those condemned to death, would be re-educated. The death sentences themselves would be referred to a Court of Appeals, since the Greek Government considered that the punishment should not be more severe than was absolutely necessary. That formula had charmed the representatives of France, the United States, the United Kingdom and Chile, but it did not mean at all that the death sentences would be commuted. The Greek Government, as a matter of fact, thought it was necessary to kill and torture. Even on a military court whose members carried out the orders of a Government that oppressed the people, there had been a minority to dissent from the capital sentence in the case of Mrs. Zevgos. For the Government, however, death was the only punishment suitable for patriots who had risen against it. The representative of the Athens Government had stated that the civil war was ended: that made such cruelty still more absurd.

33. In the language of Mr. Pipenelis, death was the minimum penalty, and only hypocrites hostile to the draft resolution of the Soviet Union could claim that the statement made by Greece meant the end of the executions. The France of human rights, or rather the France of Jules Moch, stated in consequence that it would vote against the USSR draft resolution, or rather in favour of the executions.

34. The Polish representative had previously replied to the French representative's claim that the draft resolution of the Soviet Union was incomplete. It should also be added that, as the Mexican representative had said, some domestic matters were very close to external matters, and were of such a nature that they could not be withdrawn from consideration on the grounds of intervention in domestic affairs. Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter mentioned "matters which

are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State." But some matters were not so far within the domestic jurisdiction of a State that they could not be considered by the Committee. Thus, the question of Franco Spain had been a borderline case to a certain extent affecting international relations, and on that subject the General Assembly had thought itself in a position to make a decision. Thus there was no Chinese Wall between domestic and external matters.

35. Another essential aspect of the question was the humanitarian aspect. The First Committee was not being asked to take the place of the Court of Appeals. The problem of guilt did not arise, although the delegation of the Soviet Union, for its own part, considered that the charges were false. The issue concerned simply people who had been condemned to death, and the Buddhists, for their part, would do better to obey the voice of their conscience than, by their abstention, to allow the shooting of innocents in a spirit of bestial revenge. As for the representative of France, he could vote only for a draft which was absolutely perfect, and by a somewhat strange logic would reject a text which he claimed to be only half satisfactory.

36. As Mr. Manuilsky had said, it was not a matter of deciding on the guilt of the accused, but of making the voice of the international conscience heard on behalf of some human beings. The Greek Government stated that its political adversaries were henceforth not dangerous, but it nevertheless wanted to shoot them on the grounds that clemency would not be in the interests of the Greek people. It was true that the representative of France had thought it his duty to approve that attempt to obscure the issue.

37. The representative of Chile had addressed a question to the Soviet Union delegation. The every-day life, the principles and the conduct of the peoples of the Soviet Union would furnish the answer to the representative of Chile and refute his insults. The representative of Chile would do better to answer frankly the following question: was he or was he not in favour of the execution of the eight condemned persons? If he was really opposed to those executions, let him submit a resolution of some kind or other to save their lives. In reality, however, the representative of Chile, like the representative of Greece, did not see why mercy should be extended to political convicts. The execution of those human beings would harm the whole of humanity and would compromise the reputation of the Greek people. The representative of El Salvador had spoken of intervention in matters falling within the domestic jurisdiction of Greece. It was, however, an imposture to claim that the Soviet Union wished to interfere in the administration of justice in Greece, or to allege, like the representative of Belgium, that the First Committee was to be called upon to replace the Court of Appeals.

38. That same majority, which never failed in pursuance of its own interests to interfere in the domestic affairs of a State, now displayed scruples that were quite unexpected if one thought of what had taken place in the question of the so-called violation of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.

39. Probably most delegations would, of course, vote against the Soviet Union draft resolution.

Failing the adoption of some text condemning the death sentences or lodging in diplomatic language some kind of appeal or request that the sentences should not be executed, the brand which would mark the opponents of the USSR draft resolution would do equal harm to the reputation of the First Committee as a whole.

40. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTE (Ecuador) said the civil war in Greece affected international relations; all the events that were taking place in that country, although they might appear to be within the jurisdiction of that State, had international repercussions and aspects. Accordingly, repeated appeals were initiated in the First Committee in connexion with acts committed by the Greek Authorities in the exercise of their powers. So long as the civil war lasted it might happen that the Greek Authorities would be induced to pronounce death sentences and to execute them, and consequently new cases would be submitted to the First Committee. What then should be the attitude of the Committee? Should it adopt a resolution of a general nature, or study on each occasion the particular case submitted to it, since, in spite of the very precise statement made by the representative of Greece, similar appeals would inevitably recur?

41. The First Committee was not qualified, as suggested in the Soviet Union draft resolution, to ask the Greek Government to suspend execution of the death sentences passed by the military courts. Hence, indirect methods had to be resorted to and action taken in the spirit that had animated the Conciliation Committee in order to find a more or less durable solution such as would relieve the First Committee of the need to constantly return to the same problem.

42. The First Committee had submitted that question to the Conciliation Committee, whose report was negative. Nevertheless, since Greece, whose efforts had been so remarkable, should be enabled to find ways and means of returning to normal development, it would be desirable that the Conciliation Committee should continue its work, which had already produced valuable results. In international disputes, the greatest patience was necessary, as had been shown by the precedent of the war between Bolivia and Paraguay, which had in the end been settled by a new formula, the sixty-sixth.

43. Thus, the First Committee, as such, would not take any direct action towards the Greek Government, but would recommend the Conciliation Committee to appeal to the Government of Greece in the most suitable manner in order to establish an atmosphere of conciliation. By such a procedure, the Greek Government might perhaps be induced to suspend the executions.

44. If the Conciliation Committee were not to continue its work, the Chairman of the First Committee might perhaps, as he had done during the third session, open negotiations and come to an agreement with the Greek delegation concerning suspension of the executions.

45. Some delegations were in favour of a wider formula. Yet a decision on urgent cases could not be delayed. Perhaps the suspension of all executions in every State where death sentences had been passed might be requested. Ecuador, a country in which the death penalty had been abolished, would undoubtedly look favourably on any pro-

posal to abolish it throughout the world. Nevertheless, the legal system of one country could not always be applied in another. From a humanitarian and philosophical point of view, his delegation disapproved of the death penalty. But Governments in whose countries the death penalty existed, could not be asked to apply it.

46. If the Soviet Union delegation would agree that the First Committee, instead of addressing itself directly to the Greek Government, should recommend the Conciliation Committee to come to an understanding with the Greek Government, that would perhaps be the best solution. Moreover, it would be preferable not to mention names, but to draft a general resolution that would cover any similar cases likely to arise in the future.

47. His delegation thought that the First Committee was not competent to approach the Greek Government directly. Hence, it could not vote for the Soviet Union draft resolution. Still, if it was decided that the Conciliation Committee should continue its efforts, his delegation would be willing to propose that the Committee should enter into negotiations as previously defined by Ecuador.

48. Mr. LONDOÑO Y LONDOÑO (Colombia) recalled that when he had supported the Polish representative's appeal in the case of Mrs. Zevgos (275th meeting), he had stressed the objections to considering specific cases. If the First Committee were to replace the Greek tribunals and function as a court of appeal, it would be going beyond its competence. His delegation had, however, said before that it would never turn a deaf ear to appeals for leniency.

49. As the representatives of Ecuador and Uruguay had said, in the Americas there had always been a superior authority to intervene and prevent wars from involving unduly severe punishments. Colombia, in particular, felt that it had complied with the precepts of justice and equity without resorting to capital punishment. Accordingly, his delegation would support any appeal to conciliation and justice in the national, as in the international, sphere. It was in that spirit that his delegation had submitted its draft resolution (A/C.1/510). If the First Committee were to make the appeal suggested by Colombia, an atmosphere of mercy might prevail in all the countries that were trying to regain peace on the morrow of wars and internal crisis, and international peace could only benefit by it.

50. The Soviet Union representative had said that there was no need to carry out executions once a rebellion was over. But it was after peace had been re-established that the Nürnberg trials had been held, and that exceptional courts had

functioned both in Central and in Western Europe. In France, in particular, punishment for acts of collaboration had continued for two or three years, and no one had thought of protesting.

51. As for Greece, that country had been involved in a conflict that had not been its will and in which other States had taken part. His delegation was nevertheless convinced that the hour of mercy had come and that out of liberty, moral progress and international co-operation would be born.

52. The peoples of the Americas had not known the horrors of war, and Colombia, in submitting its draft resolution, was sending a peace message to all the peoples of the world.

53. The First Committee could not continually revert to the case of persons whom Mr. Vyshinsky described as idealists and Mr. Pipinelis as criminals; that would imply that legal procedure was being applied to reach a conclusion as to the validity of sentences passed by military tribunals.

54. Mr. Vyshinsky had referred to the famous metal box in which was found the Government list which Cardinal Mindszenty was planning to bring into power. But similar problems would naturally have to be examined in the case of Greece, and neither the First Committee nor any United Nations organ could substitute itself for the various States which alone were qualified to apply laws and execute sentences.

55. What the First Committee could do would be to ask all the Governments in the world to do everything in their power, without prejudice to internal order and international security, to suspend death sentences; that would contribute to the re-establishment of peace throughout the world. So long as blood was flowing, so long as Catholics in Central Europe were dying for their faith, conciliation would be nothing but an empty word.

56. His delegation therefore requested all Governments to adopt a more conciliatory attitude and to stay the hand of the executioner who was preparing to carry out the death sentence on political prisoners. That was the spirit in which his delegation had submitted the draft resolution (A/C.1/510).

57. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said it would be desirable that the various delegations should be able to study the Paraguayan proposal as soon as possible. Likewise, the representative of Ecuador might perhaps submit his suggestions in writing.

58. The CHAIRMAN said that the Paraguayan proposal was in process of reproduction.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY-SIXTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 26 October 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Selim SARPEN (Turkey).*

### Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece (continued)

DEATH SENTENCES PASSED BY GREEK MILITARY COURTS (continued)

1. Mr. GONZÁLEZ ALLENDES (Chile) recalled

that he had already stated that the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/507) could not receive general support in the Committee. He had pointed out (295th meeting) that the representative of the Soviet Union might perhaps submit a general formula to include all possible cases of political executions taking place in countries where a state

of war existed. Though the USSR representative had stated that he was willing to reply to any questions put to him, Mr. Vyshinsky had answered the Chilean invitation by saying that the reply would be found in the newspapers. The fact was that the representative of the Soviet Union had not accepted that invitation. With reference to the USSR representative's comments, the representative of Chile said that he did not think it necessary to explain the democratic position of his Government; if any country had concerned itself in the United Nations with the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, that country was Chile. It had been concerned over the right of Soviet women married to foreigners to follow their husbands to the latter's country. The same was true of his country's attitude towards the violations of human rights that had been committed in Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. On the other hand, when the observance of human rights had been mentioned the representative of the USSR had erected a barrier consisting of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter. When Chile defended the rights of man, Mr. Vyshinsky's position had always been to accuse and never to defend. Thus in the Congress for Peace and Democracy in Montevideo in 1937, the activities of the USSR delegation had been very different from their present activities. Mr. Vyshinsky did not want the sentences imposed on the eight Greek guerrillas to be carried out. But it was because of the accusations that Mr. Vyshinsky had made that so many Marxists had been executed in the USSR in 1937.

2. The Chilean representative said that the formula he had suggested had not been intended as an escape clause. It was a broader and more generous formula than the one proposed by the USSR delegation. If it were true, as the representative of the Soviet Union had stated, that the capitalistic economy was subject to cycles, it was likewise unquestionable that the right to life in the USSR and its satellites was subject to cycles. He said that several years previously there had been a kind of illness in the Soviet bloc. In fact, if at that time blood had been drawn from the Soviet bloc the result of the analysis would have been "window reaction, positive". At that time it was dangerous for certain people to approach a window. He recalled the fate of the leaders of the Czechoslovak Republic, of Mrs. Kosenkina and other persons. At present a new cyclic period afflicted the Soviet bloc. A new blood test of the Soviet organism should give the results "cancellor reaction, positive two plus". He mentioned the names of Mr. Dmitrov and Mr. Laszlo Rajk, well-known Marxists who had been branded as traitors. Others had been sent to Siberia and the representative of Chile wondered what would be the destiny of certain of his colleagues belonging to other delegations.

3. His delegation did not wish to enter a debate regarding what representatives had done at different times in their lives, but would do so if compelled to. However, he did not wish to go further into the matter. He could not vote in favour of the USSR draft resolution as the latter was in fact contrary to the interests of those whom it was supposed to protect. Moreover, the matter was not within the competence of the Committee. He could support any general formula which would not lead the Committee into the absurd position of transforming an inquiry undertaken

on behalf of Greece, which had been invaded from several sides, into an accusation against that same country.

4. The CHAIRMAN, pointing out that the item under discussion was the Greek question, requested the members of the Committee to remain strictly within the limits of the subject, in the interests of the normal conduct of the work of the Committee.

5. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that, while keeping in mind the Chairman's appeal, he could not ignore what had been said by the representative of Chile, who had repeated all the slanders and libels always used by Chile against the Soviet Union. The things referred to by the Chilean representative had one common feature, namely, that they were not relevant to the question under discussion. The Chairman was quite right; the Committee was discussing certain death sentences. The representative of Chile had endeavoured to divert attention from that subject.

6. Mr. Kiselev said that the statement made by the representative of Greece at the previous meeting to the effect that the eight Greek partisans could not be pardoned since such an act would not benefit the Greek people had produced a grievous impression. It could be seen how the Greek monarcho-fascist Government was squirming before its own people and was endeavouring to suppress the will of that people by terror and by the killing and extermination of free-thinking persons who happened to disagree with the view of the Government. Waves of executions of patriots and of persons who had formerly resisted the German occupiers, had been begun by the monarcho-fascist Government three years previously and were still continuing.

7. Turning to the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Colombia (A/C.1/510), Mr. Kiselev said that that proposal was not relevant since it did not relate to the item under discussion. His delegation would therefore vote against it. On the other hand, the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Paraguay (A/C.1/509) was relevant to the item under discussion. However, it proposed calling upon the Greek nation rather than upon the Government of Greece. It was the latter alone which could put an end to the execution of death sentences. The proposal was therefore unrealistic and devoid of any object.

8. The only correct, equitable and just proposal was that of the USSR as amended by Poland. Mr. Kiselev read the text of that draft resolution (A/C.1/508) and stated that it expressed the profound feelings of world public opinion aroused by the executions of Greek patriots. That draft resolution, the only one dealing with the substance of the question under discussion, would be likely to save the lives of the nine patriots who had been sentenced to death, and he appealed to the members of the Committee to support it.

9. Mr. DE ALBA (Mexico) said that his delegation was in favour of conciliation and good offices because it was certain that violence and hatred led to more violence and more hatred. In that connexion he recalled the condemnation of violence by one of the founders of the Indian nation, Mahatma Gandhi. It was necessary and urgent that the United Nations should find a solution to the impasse brought about by the problem of



Greece and of the Balkans. It was well known that the region of the Balkans had always been a danger spot with regard to the maintenance of world peace. The General Assembly was therefore fully justified in seeking all means to end the differences and disputes that had arisen in that part of the world. As had been stated by the representatives of the Philippines and of Ecuador, the matter under discussion should come within the framework of the functions carried out by the Conciliation Committee. Support had already been expressed for the idea that the work of the Conciliation Committee should be continued, and that Committee would then be the appropriate body to make an appeal to the Greek Government on behalf of those who had been sentenced to death, since it was the same Committee which would have to take steps to solve the problem as a whole. He regretted that the representatives of Ecuador and the Philippines had not put forward their view-points in concrete and specific form, so that the matter might be referred to the Conciliation Committee, which was the appropriate body to deal with the matter. It was for that reason that his delegation had suggested that the whole question, along with the records of the First Committee, be referred to the President of the General Assembly, who was the Chairman of the Conciliation Committee.

10. While he sympathized with the Colombian proposal, he feared that it did not really focus attention on the specific problem before the Committee. While the proposal submitted by the representative of Paraguay was a humanitarian and opportune one, the First Committee could not appeal directly to the Greek Government because the responsibilities of the United Nations in the matter had been assigned to the Conciliation Committee. Mr. de Alba thought that it might be desirable to suggest that the Chairman of the Conciliation Committee, having been provided with reports submitted by the Chairman of the First Committee, should make an appeal to the Government of Greece so as to avoid being faced by a consummated fact when a resolution was eventually adopted. If a formal and categorical promise were given by the representative of Greece, including guarantees concerning the persons named in various proposals and a denial of the facts which had been brought forward in the Committee, it would be possible to leave the present preoccupation aside. Since that was not yet the case, from the humanitarian point of view, and in accordance with certain of the ideals of the United Nations, the responsibility concerning the lives of those eight persons could not be evaded.

11. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) considered that it would be beneath the dignity of the Committee to make any reply to the slanderous insinuations of the representative of Chile. Nor was it necessary to dwell on the methods of political diversion resorted to by a number of delegations in order to evade the issue raised in the USSR draft resolution, of which the Chairman had reminded the Committee. In that connexion, Mr. Manuilsky said that he was referring particularly to the delegations of Colombia, Chile, El Salvador and France. Since there was no such thing as a constituted Government in France at the present time, the French representative might be considered as having expressed his own point of view or perhaps that prevalent in the country in which the Committee was work-

ing. However, he would rather hear the views of the United States representative.

12. Mr. Manuilsky said that the draft resolution submitted by Paraguay could not be put to the vote, since it was incorrectly addressed. At no point in the discussion of the Greek question had the whole Greek nation been accused of the acts intimated by the proposal submitted by Paraguay. The Greek nation was the object of such acts and was suffering from them. Such an innovation bore witness to the manoeuvres resorted to to whitewash the monarcho-fascist Government of Greece and to justify it in spite of the documented and authenticated accusations against it. The corrupt group of persons, imposed upon the Greek nation as a result of foreign intervention, which had turned the civil war into a profitable undertaking with the profits being derived from the pockets of the American taxpayers, was the question being discussed by the Committee. The so-called Athens Government was accused of carrying out mass executions of innocent persons on the basis of secret black-lists compiled by police *agents provocateurs*. It was accused of subjecting witnesses and defendants to horrible tortures which human conscience could not ignore. In spite of its assertions that the civil war in Greece was over, the Greek Government, actuated by the desire for vengeance, had still further increased the terror waged against democratic elements. Mr. Manuilsky stated that his delegation further accused the Athens monarcho-fascist Government of having systematically led the First Committee into error and confusion, through its representatives in the United Nations, by hypocritical promises concerning the possibility of extending mercy to accused Greek democrats and patriots. In fact, instead of reviewing those sentences, Greek military tribunals were meting out new ones, as was proved by the recent execution of the well-known trade union leader, Georgi Demosthenes as well as the death sentences pronounced on 13 October against eight democratic leaders of the resistance against the hitlerite occupiers. Mr. Manuilsky repeated the names of those leaders, which would remain engraved in the history of the Greek people and could not be expunged, while those now condemning them would be thrown into the refuse heap of history.

13. Responsibility for the policy of torture and killings was borne not only by the monarcho-fascist Government of Athens, but also by that Government's foreign supporters. Rejection of the USSR draft resolution would be tantamount to sanctioning and endorsing further exacerbation of feelings and further aggravation of the internal situation in Greece. Such action would be fraught with dire consequences which might engender a threat to the peace in the Balkans. Stating that he hoped that the First Committee would be guided by political reasonableness and logic in adopting a correct decision, Mr. Manuilsky said that part of such a decision ought to be a move which would save the lives of the eight condemned Greek leaders and patriots.

14. Mr. MARTIN (Canada) said that for two days the Committee had been listening to statements on a subject not relevant to the item referred to it by the General Assembly, namely threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece. That item referred specifically to the external relations between Greece on the one hand and its three northern neighbours on the



other. The Committee should be considering the report of the Conciliation Committee that had been established to seek a pacific settlement of the existing differences between those four parties, but Mr. Vyshinsky had endeavoured to divert attention from that report by raising a matter which was entirely outside the scope of the Committee to decide. It was natural to feel a sense of distress in regard to any person sentenced to death, but that was not the question before the Committee. The USSR proposal could not be accepted, because it raised a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Greek Government. Even if that matter were not wholly within the jurisdiction of the Greek Government, the Committee was not a court of appeal to examine the guilt or innocence of the eight persons mentioned. The Committee was a political body, and he therefore hoped that the USSR proposal would not be accepted and that the Committee would then continue with its examination of the proper subject with which it was concerned.

15. Contrasting the position adopted by the USSR and Ukrainian SSR representatives in the present matter with that which they had taken in the discussion in the *Ad Hoc* Committee regarding the violation of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Mr. Martin quoted from the summary record of the statement made in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on 10 October, by the representative of the Ukrainian SSR.<sup>1</sup> That statement had been to the effect that the United States and United Kingdom delegations were inducing the General Assembly to consider the question of alleged violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in those countries in gross violation of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter. The statement continued to the effect that the Governments of Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania had not given their consent and would never do so since the matter lay within their domestic jurisdiction. On the following day, 11 October, Mr. Vyshinsky had taken a similar position in the same Committee, and Mr. Martin quoted paragraph 7 of the summary record of that meeting.<sup>2</sup> He called the Committee's attention to a passage from Mr. Vyshinsky's statement to the effect that charges of violations of international obligations and peace treaties were being used as a convenient pretext for interference in the domestic affairs of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. Those arguments had been continued at length and had been repeated by the representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Having argued that the accusations against those three countries constituted an invasion of domestic jurisdiction, the representatives of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR were now seeking to tell the First Committee that the trial in Greece of the eight persons named was a matter of international concern in which the General Assembly and the First Committee must intervene.

16. It might be asked why Mr. Vyshinsky and Mr. Manuilsky had taken those diametrically opposite positions during the past ten days. Mr. Martin thought that it was not because those two representatives believed that there should be one law for religious leaders and another for revolutionaries, but because they wished to divert attention from the report of the Conciliation Committee. Whatever their motives, the Canadian dele-

gation would not support the USSR draft resolution, and he strongly urged that the Committee vote on the latter and proceed to the real question before it, namely the threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece.

17. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) noted that the representatives of Chile and Canada, among others, had described the USSR draft resolution as an attempt to divert the Committee's attention from the main issue under discussion. For his part, Mr. Katz-Suchy believed that the real attempt at diverting the Committee's attention was to be found in the irrelevant references by the Chilean representative to alleged violations of human rights by the people's democracies. The Canadian representative had compared the present situation with what he described as an almost identical situation during the discussion in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee regarding the alleged violations of human rights in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. If the situations were really similar, the question was not why the Soviet Union and other delegations were taking a different position at the present time but why the Canadian delegation, for instance, had reversed its position and was now citing Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter while in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee it had not considered the possibility of violating domestic jurisdiction. The Canadian representative knew well that the convicted persons in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary were not sentenced because they were priests but because they were criminals. They had been sentenced after fair and public trials, the verbatim records of which were available to all. Thus the situation was quite different from that prevailing in Greece where the executions were merely part of a civil war being waged by the Government against the Greek people.

18. Mr. Katz-Suchy believed that all the statements made by different Greek representatives, as well as all their manoeuvres and irrelevant arguments, would not destroy the sympathy which had been engendered in the Committee towards the proposal for clemency for the victims of Greek Government persecution. It was noteworthy that the Greek delegation had not denied one of the accusations levelled against its Government. It had not denied that death sentences were being passed or that prisoners were being maltreated. Instead, the Greek representatives had made irrelevant accusations against Greece's northern neighbours. Mr. Venizelos had told the Committee how he and his friends had suffered when the National Government of the EAM and the coalition of democratic parties had been in power. But he had not explained that the friends to which he referred had collaborated with the German invaders. Mr. Venizelos had said that he was a liberal and a humanitarian but no one could put forward such claims while at the same time defending or attempting to cover up the terror prevailing in Greece. It was a fact that blood was being shed in Greece at the present time and if Mr. Venizelos claimed that the prison camps were open to inspection, one could only ask whether that applied universally. For example, it must be remembered that when the correspondent of *The New York Times* had asked to visit a certain part of the Makronesos camp his request had been refused.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ad hoc Political Committee, 11th meeting.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 12th meeting.

19. Mr. Katz-Suchy believed that the Committee should not adopt a general resolution which would provide no guarantee of security to those persons about whose lives the Committee was concerned. He rejected the Paraguayan draft resolution because, as had been explained by previous speakers, it was not the Greek people that was responsible for events in Greece. If it were so they would doubtless have put an end to the terror long ago. In fact, United States and British intervention had prevented the Greek nation from setting up a Government which reflected the popular will. Consequently, it was useless to appeal to anyone but the Government of Athens.

20. The need for some concrete action on the part of the Committee must be apparent to anyone who listened carefully to the speeches of the Greek representative wherein there was clearly a threat that the executions would continue. The Committee must take due notice of that threat, for there could be no doubt that the outcome of the present discussion would have its effect on the situation in Greece. If the Committee wanted to find a solution to the whole Balkan problem it was the internal situation in Greece which must be its first concern. The primary task, therefore, was to adopt a proposal along the lines of the Soviet Union draft resolution which would lead to conciliation between the opposing parties within Greece.

21. The Canadian representative was not correct in saying that the Committee would have to review the sentences passed by the military tribunals. The Committee was not asked to examine the indictments themselves or the methods employed in conducting the trials. The Soviet Union's proposal was not an attempt to change the Committee from a political body into a court of justice. All that was being asked was that it should act to save the lives of the eight persons listed in the draft resolution all of whom had a better record as fighters for democracy than any member of the Greek Government. Anyone who calmly studied the statements of the Greek representatives must inevitably conclude that rejection of the Soviet Union proposal would be interpreted by the Greek Government as approval of its actions and as a sign that it could proceed immediately with the executions. That had already been the case. When the question had been raised in the First Committee, during the second part of the third session of the General Assembly, and had been ruled out of order by the Chairman (243rd and 250th meetings), the Greek Government had subsequently executed two persons. Today, the danger was the same. The threat had been repeated, and those who voted against the Soviet Union draft resolution in the roll-call vote which Mr. Katz-Suchy intended to request, would be responsible for the lives of the persons concerned.

22. The CHAIRMAN declared that the last part of the statement of the Polish representative was an attempt to influence the voting of the Committee. He therefore declared it to be out of order.

23. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) held that every statement was an attempt to influence the voting of the Committee and that as a representative of a sovereign State it was his right to interpret anything that happened in the Committee according to his opinion. He believed that if the Committee postponed action in the matter there would be a danger that the executions would be carried out

before anything could be done. He therefore appealed to the Committee to accept the Soviet Union draft resolution, which was purely humanitarian in purpose.

24. Mr. BOETTNER (Paraguay) explained the reasons which had led his delegation to submit its draft resolution (A/C.1/509). Whenever an item referring to the threats to the political independence and the territorial integrity of Greece had been discussed in the First Committee the debate had been characterized by vehement charges and counter-charges from both sides relating to terrorism and persecution. It was apparent that Greece was the scene of a direct clash between the two apparently irreconcilable political and social ideologies which divided the whole world and endangered international peace and harmony. Obviously the supporters of both sides feared that their opponents would, at some time or other, attempt to impose their views upon the rest of the world by force. However, there was ample evidence in history to show that one ideology could not impose itself and destroy another merely by force. For instance, Christianity had survived and grown in spite of the persecutions of earlier ages. The only permanent solution must therefore be sought through mutual respect for the rights and ideas of all. Those who championed individual freedom and democracy must respect and tolerate the ideology of those who disagreed with them and allow them full freedom of speech. On the other hand, it would not be right to accept clandestine activities aiming, by means of terrorism, sabotage, intimidation and other illicit means to undermine the very foundations of the legal and ideological institutions of the majority. Only by adopting a conciliatory attitude would it be possible to create an atmosphere of world harmony and peace.

25. Returning to the specific case of Greece, Mr. Boettner observed that the problem had two aspects, a legal and a humanitarian one. As regards the legal aspect, clearly the First Committee was not a court of appeal and did not have the necessary evidence to make a decision. Moreover, it might also be violating the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a State. As regards the humanitarian aspect however, certainly something ought to be done. The correct course for the First Committee to take would be to appeal for leniency for those condemned to death by military tribunals and for an end to acts of sabotage and terrorism which often resulted in the death of innocent victims.

26. Mr. Boettner explained that his delegation fully agreed with the substance of the draft resolution submitted by the Colombian representative and if this were adopted would have no objection to withdrawing his own proposal. However, if the Committee did not adopt the Colombian draft resolution the Paraguayan delegation would insist that a vote be taken upon its own proposal.

27. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) said that he had not previously invoked the rules of procedure during the discussion of the Soviet Union draft resolution because he had not wished to limit the debate or create the erroneous impression that his Government had anything to conceal. The Committee had heard repetitions of the insinuations and wild accusations which had been levelled frequently against Greece in the past. The delegations of the USSR, Poland and the Ukrainian SSR

among others, had indulged in lengthy oratorical speeches to which it was unnecessary to reply. There were, however, certain questions of fact regarding which Mr. Pipinelis felt that an explanation was needed.

28. In the first place, it had been alleged that the Greek representatives had misled the Committee on 29 September because he had announced (276th meeting) that no further death sentences would be executed when, in fact, an execution had taken place on the following day. Actually, as the record showed, Mr. Pipinelis had not stated there would be no further executions. He had merely explained the functions of the Court of Appeals which would be established. Furthermore, the execution referred to had taken place on 30 September, the morning of the day upon which the clemency bill was introduced in the Athenian Parliament. That bill did not become law until six days later. Mr. Pipinelis recalled that he had frequently repeated in the Committee that, after the enactment of the clemency bill, no death sentence had been executed in Greece for any act of sedition.

29. That, however, was merely one aspect of the question. The main point was that the First Committee could not take a decision regarding the sentences on the eight persons referred to in the Soviet Union draft resolution without undertaking a study of the history of each case. Otherwise, any conclusion would be arbitrary and, if the Committee recommended that the sentences be annulled, it would be guilty of accepting the slanderous accusations against Greece upon their own merits. On the other hand, if the Committee wanted to take a just decision it would have to become, in effect, a court of appeal and would have to examine the complete dockets relating to the cases of the condemned persons. Mr. Pipinelis recalled that, some days previously, he had stated (294th meeting) that everybody was perfectly free to verify the Soviet Union's accusations by investigating the facts on the spot. Surely that was evidence of the good faith of the Greek Government. It was especially noteworthy that the delegations from which the accusations emanated refused to proceed to any kind of verification. Indeed, the Soviet Union itself did not permit any investigations upon its own territories.

30. Turning to the main aspect of the question Mr. Pipinelis recalled that the original Security Council Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents had carried out an extensive investigation on the spot, as a result of which it had been clearly established that the root of the problem was the unfriendly attitude towards Greece adopted by its northern neighbours. In 1947 and 1948, the General Assembly had accepted the conclusions of that Commission and had proceeded with its work on the basis of those conclusions. The General Assembly had rejected the artificial thesis that the situation was a result of the internal conflict within Greece. Nevertheless, the delegation of the Soviet Union and others were stubbornly persisting in ascribing the troubles to Greece's internal situation. Only recently, during the work of the Conciliation Committee, the representative of the Soviet Union had presented a list of demands relating directly to the internal policies of the Greek Government. As was known, the Conciliation Committee had rejected those demands. A further attempt was now being

made to induce discussion of the internal affairs of Greece by introducing a humanitarian appeal. But what would be the effect of an attempt by the General Assembly to change the administration of Greek justice which, as in every civilized country, was not subject to interference from any quarter? Presumably the Greek Government would have to reply and were it only for reasons of courtesy, would have to explain its action. Thus, a series of accusations and counter-statements would arise which would, in fact, divert the attention of the First Committee from the principal question which it had to solve. The Committee would be induced into discussing the question of the threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece from the aspect of the internal situation of Greece and might ignore the other factors, of which above all was the relations between Greece and its northern neighbours. Consequently, the Committee's work would be distorted and an injustice would be perpetrated against the Greek Government.

31. Mr. Pipinelis also pointed out that, if the Committee wished to consider the humanitarian aspects of the problem, it should not ignore the fact that human lives were lost daily as a result of raids from across the frontiers into Greece; nor should it ignore the plight of the Greek children who had been abducted by force and were being detained in other countries.

32. Mr. Pipinelis reiterated that the policy of his Government was guided by the principles which he had outlined in his statement on 29 September. Acting on its own initiative, after the civil war had come to an end, Greece had immediately undertaken conciliatory measures of pacification, tolerance and mercy designed to put an end to internal discord. Those measures were but a beginning, and Greece as a sovereign and independent State would take further measures as its security became more firmly established. The Greek Government would persevere in that policy by sovereign and spontaneous acts and it would never have been induced into discussing it with anybody.

33. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) believed that the statement of the Greek representative itself exposed the falsity of the assurance which he had given on 29 September. At that time he had assured the Committee that there would be no further executions because a clemency bill had been submitted to the Greek Parliament and was in process of adoption. His assurance had proved to be worthless some twelve or fourteen hours later when Georgi Demosthenes had been executed upon sentence of a military tribunal. If it was true, as Mr. Pipinelis said, that the execution had simply been due to the fact that the legislation had not yet been enacted, then why was it that, as late as 13 October, eight more prominent public figures had been sentenced to death in Athens, and that similar sentences were still being passed by military tribunals throughout Greece? Was it the intention that the sentences should not be executed? If so, that situation was unheard of; it would mean that the tribunals had no authority. No court passed a sentence without intending that it should be executed. As to the statement that the military tribunals were equitable it was sufficient to note that, out of the eight innocent defendants named in the Soviet Union draft resolution, three had been condemned

to death by a mere majority verdict of the military judges of three to two. Everyone knew it was a universally accepted principle of jurisprudence that doubt should always be construed to the advantage of the defendant. Hence in those three cases the verdict of the military tribunals showed that their actions were incorrect and inequitable. What need was there for the First Committee to become an "appeals court" as some representatives had insisted that it would become if it was to take a just decision? The facts were perfectly clear and the character of the military tribunals was apparent. Mr. Vyshinsky believed that it was not a question of interfering in the internal affairs of a State. The Committee must act in accordance with the dictates of conscience and the Polish representative was correct in stating that, in the forthcoming vote, the representatives would bear responsibility for the life or death of the persons convicted. Mr. Vyshinsky could not understand why the Chairman had ruled the Polish representative out of order when he had made that statement.

34. The CHAIRMAN said that he had ruled the Polish representative out of order on the grounds that his statement was designed to influence the votes of representatives. Actually, a more accurate expression to have used would have been to describe the Polish representative's statement as an attempt to intimidate the members of the First Committee.

35. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) did not agree that there had been any attempt at intimidation.

36. But Mr. Vyshinsky wished to go back to the substance of the matter and he recalled that the Greek representative had not denied that there had been any executions since the adoption of the clemency bill but had said that there had been no executions of death sentences in cases of sedition. Obviously that was an ambiguous statement since it was a general practice of the Greek Government to accuse the democratic fighters and patriots not of sedition but of "banditry". Thus, the Greek representative had attempted to confuse the Committee as to the real situation. Mr. Vyshinsky challenged the representative of Greece to give a clear assurance that all death sentences had been suspended and that no one would be executed in the future. The fact was that none of the persons named in the Soviet Union draft resolution were represented in Greece as political criminals at all; they were described as common law criminals. Consequently, the draft resolutions submitted by the Paraguayan and Colombian representatives would not help them in any way and offered no solution.

37. The Greek representative had invited representatives of Member States or their agents to visit the Greek prison camps in order to see for themselves that there was no cruelty or persecution. The Polish representative had clearly shown the falsity of that offer when he had referred to the sections of the prison camp behind barbed wire into which no journalists were admitted. It was unnecessary to visit Greek prison camps and "re-education" institutions because everyone knew of the tortures and cruelty practised there. Mr. Vyshinsky described the brutal methods which, he said, were employed at Makronesos to induce prisoners to abandon their political views.

38. The Greek representative had asserted that the cause of the trouble in the Balkans was to be found not in the internal situation in Greece but in the policies of its northern neighbours. That allegation, was, of course, completely unfounded as would be shown when the First Committee came to discuss the report of the Conciliation Committee. Equally unfounded was the assertion that the Soviet Union delegation was trying to shift attention from one aspect of the question to another. The USSR delegation had no intention of obstructing discussion of the Conciliation Committee's report: on the contrary, it intended to take a very active part in that discussion. Of course, the Greek delegation did not wish to have the Committee discuss the question on the basis of the situation within Greece because then it would become quite obvious that there was no threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece from its northern neighbours. As the Soviet Union delegation had stated three years previously the complaint was a complete fabrication.

39. As evidence of the policy of the Greek Government with regard to its political prisoners Mr. Vyshinsky cited an article published in the newspaper *Vradini* in October. The article called for merciless treatment of "communists and bandits". It referred to the execution in the Peloponnesus of an eighty-year old liberal and urged that the same fate be meted out to all when opposed the Greek régime. It called for the abolition of re-education camps as an unnecessary expense and urged that all judicial procedure be abandoned in the suppression of guerrilla activities. Mr. Vyshinsky asserted that the article reflected the policy of the Greek Government.

40. Mr. Pipinelis, and later the representative of Canada, had endeavoured to convince the Committee that the action proposed in the Soviet Union draft resolution involved an interference in the domestic jurisdiction of Greece. The Canadian representative had referred to the discussion in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee regarding the alleged violations of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania and had endeavoured to show that the Soviet Union delegation was now reversing the position of principle which it had previously espoused. The Canadian representative had already received a reply to the argument but it must be pointed out that, in fact, it was the Canadian delegation which could be charged with changing its position. The latter had not objected to interfering in the internal affairs of Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania and only referred to Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter in connexion with Greece. Actually, Mr. Vyshinsky believed that Greece was no longer a truly sovereign State. Its domestic jurisdiction had already been violated and its internal affairs were being directed by other States. The true situation was described in an article by Paul Porter, the former head of the United States mission to Greece, in *Collier's* of 20 September 1947 wherein it was stated that the Greek Government was under the domination of the United States and the United Kingdom which were exploiting the country in exchange for economic aid. Since the Greek Government was not master in its own house it was difficult to base an argument on the preservation of Greece's domestic jurisdiction. However, the Soviet Union draft resolution was not aimed at violating that jurisdiction. It was merely proposed

to demand that certain unjust sentences be revoked.

41. There were several ways of conniving with the sentences that had been imposed by the Greek military tribunal. One position would be that those sentences were justified, but that position would be so indecent that not even the Greek delegation would wish to adopt it. Since the matter had to be twisted in some way or another and attention had to be diverted from the core of the question, another method was resorted to and all kinds of irrelevant problems were being brought up. The questions raised by the representative of Chile were a case in point. Thus, when the USSR had entertained diplomatic relations with Chile, its Embassy had been shot at with revolvers from a passing car; that was not supposed to be a violation of human rights or of international law! But the fact that a visa had been refused to the wife of a son of a Chilean diplomat in some country had been considered to be a world-shaking event. That scandalous question had been placed on the agenda of the General Assembly in spite of his delegation's objections, but nothing had come of it because the question was so ludicrous. That and other matters that had been raised were being exploited in order to exacerbate the anti-Soviet campaign being waged in certain countries.

42. Mr. Vyshinsky said that, when submitting his proposal, he had thought that one meeting would suffice to solve the matter because it was so simple, so humanitarian and so obvious. It would be a regrettable fact to be noted by a future historian that for three days the majority of the Committee had sought desperately for ways and means to reject that proposal. Thus the Chilean representative had not given facts but had spoken of other things, so much so that the Chairman, who usually used his gavel in one direction only, had been forced to call the Chilean representative to order.

43. In addition to the remarks made by other representatives who had criticized the Colombian proposal, Mr. Vyshinsky said that it was incorrect to say that there prevailed in the world a situation which was not conclusive to plans for readjustment of international peace and security as was intimated in the first paragraph of that proposal. There was no such threat to an atmosphere of conciliation and justice except in the case of certain countries, including Greece. He rejected with indignation such an accusation, directed against all countries of the world. The second paragraph of the Colombian proposal dismissed the concrete question of executions in Greece and replaced it with a request addressed to all Governments of the world. He stressed the fact that the USSR could not accept that because in the Soviet Union the death sentence had been abolished not only for political crimes but for all crimes. He believed the same to be true of certain Latin-American countries. That being so, the proposal made no sense, and was obviously intended to cover up the actions of the Tsaldaris Government in Greece with references to Governments in other countries. Moreover, as he had already pointed out, it was not political crimes of

which people were being accused in Greece. The Greek courts themselves covered the matter by references to banditry and common-law crimes. Therefore, if it was the desire of the Committee and of the General Assembly to put an end to the death sentences being meted out and put into effect in Greece, the Colombian proposal could not be adopted.

44. The Paraguayan proposal (A/C.1/509) was not far removed from the Colombian text, though it put the matter in different terms. It amounted to an accusation flung in the face of the Greek nation, accusing the latter of the crimes which were in fact being perpetrated by the Greek Government. It did not make sense to speak of an end being put to the executions by the Greek nation. Thus the draft resolution submitted by Paraguay was also unacceptable.

45. The proposal submitted by the delegation of Ecuador (A/C.1/512), calling upon the President of the General Assembly to enter into consultations with the Greek Government concerning death sentences passed by military courts for political reasons, was also inadequate and unacceptable, since the Greek Government, in order to cover up the unbridled terror in Greece, alleged that the reasons for the death sentences were crimes of common law supposedly committed by the defendants.

46. Turning to the Uruguayan draft resolution (A/C.1/511/Rev.1), Mr. Vyshinsky said that it was so utterly colourless that it could not be considered in any way adequate in that matter, which required decisive and determined steps and measures. The Uruguayan proposal would merely recommend the commutation of all death sentences passed in any country. The subject of the discussion, however, was Greece. Bringing in other countries could only be done by those who either failed to understand the political significance and import of their action, or understood that import and merely attempted to thwart the matter and to stymie it for political purposes.

47. As the representative of Mexico had said, it was impossible to tie the concrete question raised by the USSR delegation with the general aspects of the Greek question, because while the Committee deliberated, the eight persons sentenced might be shot. That was exactly what would happen, and it was his conviction that as soon as the Committee adopted a decision which did not state unequivocally that the Greek Government was called upon to revoke those sentences, those executions would be carried out immediately. Mr. Vyshinsky challenged the Greek representative to deny that such would prove to be the case. However, the USSR representative feared that the majority would not vote as it ought to. Under all sorts of pretexts, the Committee would fail to act to prevent that horrible crime, namely the execution of persons who had fought for the freedom of their country, for their own freedom of conscience and for the freedom of conscience of the whole people of Greece, as well as for the political liberation of Greece.

The meeting rose at 1.55 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVENTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 26 October 1949, at 3.30 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Selim SARPEN (Turkey).*

### Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece (continued)

#### DEATH SENTENCES PASSED BY GREEK MILITARY COURTS (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that he would put to the vote the five draft resolutions (A/C.1/508, A/C.1/509, A/C.1/510, A/C.1/511/Rev.1 and A/C.1/512) in their order of submission.
2. Mr. RODRÍGUEZ FABREGAT (Uruguay), in explaining his delegation's proposal (A/C.1/511/Rev.1), said that whatever views might be expressed on the Committee's competence to deal with that question, the fact remained that it had been discussed already at length by the Committee. The problem of criminal punishment had arisen out of the discussion on the question of threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece. In view of the paramount importance of the question as a general principle, his delegation's draft resolution suggested that the First Committee should recommend Governments to commute imminent death sentences, and should urge States to eliminate the death penalty from their legislation.
3. His country's proposal was inspired by the same spirit as the Colombian proposal, but it was more general as its purpose was to eliminate the death penalty from all legislations whether inflicted for political or other crimes.
4. Mr. DE ALBA (Mexico) said that his delegation agreed with the principles set forth in the Ecuadoran proposal (A/C.1/512); it should be possible to communicate the First Committee's wish to the Greek Government, through the United Nations Conciliation Committee, that the death sentences passed against the persons listed in the draft resolution of the Soviet Union be suspended. The proposal should go further and should request the commutation rather than the suspension of the sentence.
5. His delegation would vote for the Colombian (A/C.1/510), Uruguayan and Ecuadoran proposals, all of which were based on high moral principles; his delegation would abstain from voting on the USSR draft resolution as amended by Poland (A/C.1/508).
6. Mr. JAYANAMA (Thailand), referring to the Buddhist moral code prevailing in his country, said that he would vote for the Colombian draft resolution.
7. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTE (Ecuador) said that his delegation's draft resolution was a compromise between the various views expressed and that it in no way prejudged the right or wrong of the charges brought against the Greek Government.
8. His proposal was limited to the suspension of death sentences passed by military courts for political reasons; the word "reasons" had been used intentionally as some non-political offences were committed for political reasons. The proposal was limited to the period during which efforts at conciliation were being made, as there was no question of paralysing completely the administration of justice on Greek territory.
9. His delegation was, in principle, in favour of the abolition of the death penalty but wished to point out that its proposal was a realistic compromise, as it avoided any details which might hinder its adoption.
10. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) recalled that he had already spoken in support of the USSR draft resolution. He would abstain from voting on the other proposals instead of voting against them, as, in spite of certain negative features, they had some positive aspects especially in that they had been submitted in regard to and during the discussion of the Greek question.
11. Mr. MARTÍNEZ MORENO (El Salvador) recalled the Canadian representative's remarks (296th meeting), and said that he too had some misgivings in regard to the procedure followed to date. He wondered whether the item under discussion was on the agenda, and whether the discussion was not unduly delaying the solution of other questions submitted to the Committee.
12. The CHAIRMAN said that the views of the representative of El Salvador would appear in the record. He added that he had not stated his own views on the matter, and had accepted all the draft resolutions, in order not to limit freedom of speech.
13. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) said that he would abstain from voting on the various draft resolutions, except in respect of the Ecuadoran proposal which linked the matter of the death sentences to the more general item on the Committee's agenda.
14. Mr. LONDOÑO y LONDOÑO (Colombia) explained that, at the Chairman's request, he had added to his original draft resolution a paragraph specifically mentioning the Greek question in order to establish a link between that resolution and the question under discussion. Moreover, viewed from that point of view, the USSR and Polish proposals were only very remotely connected with the item on the agenda; the Conciliation Committee had already declared itself incompetent with regard to certain similar proposals which, in its view, concerned Greek domestic affairs. The First Committee should make a declaration along those lines.
15. The Colombian proposal was an appeal for clemency drafted in general terms; it gave satisfaction to all who wished to express a humanitarian point of view. It had the undeniable advantage of avoiding the establishment of a dangerous precedent. Care must be taken lest the First Committee should find itself continually engaged in discussions on individual cases.
16. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon), considering that the general debate was closed, invoked rule 110 of the rules of procedure and formally proposed that the Committee should vote on the question whether it was competent to decide on proposals regarding the death sentences pronounced in certain countries.
17. His proposal regarding the Committee's competence should be put to the vote first and should apply to all the proposals indiscriminately.



18. Mr. STOLK (Venezuela) supported the principle of the Lebanese representative's proposal and asked that the question of competence should be considered separately in respect of each of the proposals submitted.
19. From a humanitarian point of view, Venezuela had always been in agreement with negotiations tending to abolish the death penalty for political offences. Those negotiations must, however, be carried out in the United Nations in accordance with the Charter and the rules of procedure. In any case the Committee could not make direct recommendations to Members; only the General Assembly was entitled to do so. Moreover, if a vote on the question of competence were not taken, the delegations which considered that the Committee was incompetent, when voting against the proposals, would appear to be taking a stand against an appeal to humanitarian feelings. It would be more logical, therefore, to proceed to vote first on the question of competence; he also requested the Chairman to take a separate vote on each draft resolution and not on all the proposals as a whole. In point of fact, the Ecuadoran draft resolution was in conformity with the Charter and the rules of procedure. It might enable the Committee to achieve its purpose.
20. He asked Mr. Viteri Lafronte if he would agree to replace the word "authorizes" in the first line of his draft resolution by the word "requests".
21. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) agreed to the voting procedure suggested by the Venezuelan representative but thought that the Committee was incompetent with regard to the proposals as a whole.
22. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) thought that the remarks of the Lebanese and Venezuelan representatives could only concern the proposals dealing with the abolition of the death penalty in all countries, since that question was not the agenda item. On the other hand, the resolution regarding the suspension of the death penalty in Greece came within the general framework of the problem of establishing peace in the Balkans, a matter with which the Committee was certainly competent to deal.
23. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) thought that under rule 110 of the rules of procedure his proposal should be put to the vote immediately.
24. Mr. KAN (China) pointed out that the Committee's aim was the establishment of Greece's political independence by peaceful means. He thought that, if the execution of nine Greek political prisoners had been the chief obstacle to the attempt at conciliation, the draft resolutions would have been admissible. However, since that was not the case, the Chinese delegation supported the Lebanese proposal that the Committee should declare itself incompetent.
25. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) observed, with regard to rule 110 of the rules of procedure, that the word "immediately" was connected with the phrase following it which was worded "immediately before a vote is taken on the proposal in question" and which did not mean that the vote should take place immediately the question of competence had been raised, but immediately before a vote was taken on the proposal in question.
26. Moreover, it was possible to raise the question of competence with regard to general proposals for the suspension of the death penalty, in the past, present and future, in all countries without distinction. The USSR and Ecuadoran draft resolutions, on the other hand, dealt with a specific case which was directly related to the problem being examined by the Committee.
27. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the arguments presented by the representative of Poland concerning the interpretation of rule 110 of its rules of procedure were correct.
28. It was, to say the very least, strange that suddenly, after three days of discussion, it should be asserted that the Committee was not competent to deal with the question. The proposals concerning the suspension of the death penalty were closely linked to the question of "threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece." In that connexion Dr. Evatt, the President of the third session of the General Assembly, had indicated during that session that it was impossible to settle the international status of Greece without considering the matter of the internal régime in that country. Obviously, if the item "threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece" were removed from the agenda, the Committee would no longer be competent to deal with the proposals, but the question could not be arbitrarily subdivided; members could not claim that the Committee was competent to discuss one aspect of the Greek question while it was not competent to discuss another.
29. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) suggested that the Chairman, in accordance with rule 102 of the rules of procedure, should give a ruling under rule 110.
30. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) did not understand the United Kingdom representative's point of view, because a request for a ruling by the Chairman was not in order when there was no doubt regarding the procedure to follow.
31. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) said that the Polish and USSR representatives should be given the benefit of the doubt in their interpretation of rule 110. Referring to rule 106 of the rules of procedure, he moved the closure of the debate on the question of competence, after which the Lebanese proposal could be put to the vote.
32. The CHAIRMAN did not consider that a ruling by the Chair under rule 110 was necessary. Since the closure of the debate had been moved, he would give the floor to two speakers opposing that proposal.
33. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) was surprised that the representative of Lebanon should have raised the question of competence and should have moved the closure of the debate, the intention being to prevent the Committee from voting on the proposals appealing for clemency. During the preceding session, Mr. C. Malik had been among those who had voted for the proposal (A/C.1/372) to ask the President of the General Assembly to intervene with the Greek Government to obtain a suspension of the death sentence of ten Greek trade-unionists. That proposal had been adopted (186th meeting), and the ten trade-unionists had still not been executed. Why was he at the present time deliberately taking a different stand?
34. It was not possible to treat Greece's internal régime and its external relations as completely



separate issues. A régime of terror prevailed in Greece which should be taken into account. It was futile to split hairs in an attempt to brush aside that undeniable fact on the basis of arguments drawn from the rules of procedure. Either the Greek question should be withdrawn from the agenda, or it should be considered as a whole.

35. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that at the time when the request for the suspension of the sentences against the ten Greek trade-unionists had been made, Mr. C. Malik had not thought of raising the question of the Committee's competence. He added that on 29 September 1947 (276th meeting) the Committee had voted on the Polish proposal (A/C.1/483), the object of which was similar to that of the proposals currently before the Committee, without deciding in advance on the question of competence. If the Committee's competence on a question had been admitted twice, it could scarcely be contested later.

36. Moreover, the Committee's competence in the matter was defined by Articles 1 and 14 of the Charter. Article 14 provided that the General Assembly could recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations. Article 1 stated that one of the purposes of the United Nations was to maintain international peace and security; for three days there had been constant references to the question of threats to international peace and security.

37. Finally, at the third session of the General Assembly the Greek representative himself had stated that he would take note of the Committee's recommendations that the execution of the ten trade-unionists should not take place. All those facts proved the Committee's competence. The proposals should therefore be put to the vote in the order in which they had been submitted and the Lebanese proposal should be rejected.

38. Mr. MCNEIL (United Kingdom) pointed out that at the third session the Committee had declared, by 45 votes to 6, that it was not competent to deal with a similar question (186th meeting). An amendment presented later by Mr. Vyshinsky had been rejected by 37 votes to 6 on the same grounds, that the Committee was not competent. He added that at the current session the General Assembly had in fact not adopted the Polish draft resolution, but a Cuban amendment to that draft resolution.

39. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) replied that at the 276th meeting a vote, in which the United Kingdom delegation had participated, had been taken on the Polish draft resolution (A/C.1/483), thus confirming the Committee's competence in the matter.

40. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the motion for the closure of the debate on the question of competence.

*The proposal was adopted by 50 votes to 2, with 4 abstentions.*

41. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the question whether or not the Committee was incompetent to examine the draft resolution of the Soviet Union, as amended by the Polish representative (A/C.1/508).

*At the request of the representative of the USSR, the vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Haiti, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*Votes for the Committee's incompetence:* Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece.

*Votes against the Committee's incompetence:* Mexico, Norway, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Thailand, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Guatemala.

*Abstaining:* Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Costa Rica.

*The Committee decided, 31 votes to 16, with 12 abstentions, that it was not competent to adopt the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/508).*

42. The CHAIRMAN put the question of the Committee's competence to adopt the proposal of Paraguay (A/C.1/509) to the vote.

*The Committee decided by 40 votes to 7, with 10 abstentions, that it was not competent.*

43. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the question whether the Committee was competent to adopt the draft resolution of Colombia (A/C.1/510):

*The Committee decided by 39 votes to 8, with 8 abstentions, that it was not competent.*

44. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the question of competence with regard to the Uruguayan draft resolution (A/C.1/511/Rev.1):

*The Committee decided by 40 votes to 8, with 8 abstentions, that it was not competent.*

45. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) requested that the vote on the draft resolution submitted by Ecuador (A/C.1/512) should be taken by roll-call.

46. Mr. CLEMENTIS (Czechoslovakia) asked the representative of Ecuador to define the meaning of the expression "political reasons" which appeared in his draft resolution.

47. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTE (Ecuador) referred to the explanation he had given in the course of the preceding meeting.

48. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) suggested that the last phrase of the proposal of Ecuador, "while efforts are being continued to settle outstanding questions by conciliation", should be replaced by the words: "as long as the Conciliation Committee is in existence".

49. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTE (Ecuador) accepted that amendment.

50. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) doubted the advisability of appealing to the mercy of only one of the parties, in view of the fact that on the other side also conditions existed which affected human lives. He suggested that a phrase should be added to the proposal of Ecua-

dor requesting the President of the Assembly to negotiate with the representatives of other States concerned regarding the suspension of all aid to the Greek guerrillas.

51. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia), supported by Mr. DE LA TOURNELLE (France), considered that the Committee should first decide on the question of its competence with regard to the proposal of Ecuador, before beginning the study of amendments of substance.

52. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) stated that his proposal regarding the Committee's competence had referred to the original text of the Ecuadoran proposal. In view of the amendments which had been made to that text with the consent of its author, he had to withdraw his proposal.

53. Mr. STOLK (Venezuela) asked the Chairman to give a ruling on the question whether the United States amendment to the proposal of Ecuador was or was not in order.

54. The CHAIRMAN recalled that according to rule 110 of the rules of procedure any motion calling for a decision on the competence of the General Assembly to adopt a proposal submitted to it should be put to the vote immediately before a vote was taken on the proposal in question. That proposal could of course be amended before the vote was taken. He ruled that the amendments to the original draft resolution could be allowed, since the vote on the draft resolution itself had not begun.

55. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTE (Ecuador) thought that a vote should first be taken on the competence of the Committee to deal with his draft resolution; if the Committee was declared competent, the substance of his draft and the amendments to it could then be discussed. He had accepted the amendments suggested by the representatives of Venezuela and the USSR, because they were merely drafting amendments, but as that of the United States was of a substantive character, it should be voted upon separately, after the vote on the Ecuadoran draft resolution had taken place.

56. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) considered that the United States representative, under cover of a harmless amendment to a proposal, was trying to overcome one of the greatest difficulties his delegation would meet in the course of forthcoming discussions; it would not be easy for him to gain an admission that the alleged aid had actually been given to the Greek guerrillas by neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the amendment concerned the substance of the matter, which the Committee had not even started to discuss. He did not therefore consider that the United States amendment could be accepted as an amendment.

57. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) was of the opinion that the United States amendment, which dealt with the substance of the matter, should be voted upon first; the Ecuadoran draft resolution, whether amended or not, could then be put to the vote.

58. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) considered that the Committee should first of all vote on its competence in regard to the Ecuadoran draft resolution, including the drafting changes accepted by Mr. Viteri Lafronte. Amendments could be introduced subsequently

and voted upon in turn. If substantive amendments which had not been accepted by the author were included in the Ecuadoran draft at the present juncture, the Committee would be confronted by an entirely different proposal.

59. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the Lebanese representative had withdrawn his proposal challenging the competence of the Committee in regard to the Ecuadoran draft resolution.

60. Mr. STOLK (Venezuela) recalled that, in supporting the motion of the Lebanese representative concerning the Committee's competence, he had expressly asked that the question of competence should be decided separately for each draft resolution before the Committee. The Lebanese representative had admittedly withdrawn his motion concerning the Committee's competence but the Venezuelan delegation's motion concerning the competence of the Committee was to adopt the Ecuadoran proposal in its original form was still before the Committee and he wished it to be put to the vote.

61. The CHAIRMAN said a vote would be taken by roll-call on the question whether the First Committee was competent to take a vote on the Ecuadoran draft resolution (A/C.1/512), including the amendments accepted by the author of that draft.

*Mexico, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour of the Committee's competence:* Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Israel.

*Against the Committee's competence:* Peru, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Argentina, Belgium, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Lebanon, Luxembourg.

*Abstaining:* Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United States of America, Australia, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Haiti, Iraq and Liberia.

*The Committee decided, by 31 votes to 16, with 12 abstentions, that it was competent to take a vote on the Ecuadoran draft resolution.*

62. The CHAIRMAN stated that the draft resolution submitted by Ecuador and the United States amendment to it were before the Committee. The amendment would be voted upon first, unless the author of the proposal accepted it. A vote would then be taken on the draft resolution as a whole, amended or not, as the case might be.

63. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) stated that he would vote for the amendment submitted by the United States representative, for he thought that it made the Ecuadoran draft resolution more acceptable.

64. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) pointed out that the United States amendment related to the substance of the agenda item: "Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of

Greece". It had nothing whatever to do with the questions discussed in the First Committee during the previous few days and it should be considered when the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans was discussed. If the United States amendment was retained, it could be put to the vote only after the debate on the substance of the matter had taken place. The Polish delegation therefore asked that discussion should be opened on the substance of the question, since that had not yet been considered.

65. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) asked for the text of the United States amendment to be distributed so that members could study it. In actual fact, it was not a mere amendment, but a new proposal. It bore no relation whatsoever to the question before the Com-

mittee. If the United States representative wished to present a proposal of that kind, he should do so in the form of a separate draft resolution and the Committee should have twenty-four hours in which to consider it, as provided by the rules of procedure. If that were done, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR would ask for the debate to be opened on the substance of the question.

66. He proposed that the Committee should pass immediately to the vote on the draft resolution of Ecuador in its present form.

67. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) moved the adjournment of the meeting.

*The motion of adjournment was adopted by 37 votes to 15, with 1 abstention.*

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY-EIGHTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 27 October 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

### Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece (continued)

#### DEATH SENTENCES PASSED BY GREEK MILITARY COURTS (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee would continue the discussion of the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Ecuador (A/C.1/512), to which two amendments had been submitted, namely, the United States amendment (A/C.1/515) and the USSR amendment (A/C.1/516).

2. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTE (Ecuador) said that in submitting his draft resolution, his delegation had attempted to find a compromise formula with a view to enabling the First Committee to wind up the lengthy discussion in which it had been engaged. In view of the fact that various substantive amendments had been offered to the Ecuadoran draft resolution, and in order to eliminate the possibility of any further counter-amendments, his delegation had revised its draft resolution (A/C.1/512/Rev.1) and then changed it again in the hope that all the amendments so far submitted would be withdrawn, thus making it easier for the First Committee to proceed to the general discussion of the question. The final draft of the resolution reads as follows:

#### *"The First Committee*

*"Requests the President of the General Assembly to ascertain the views of the Government of Greece concerning the suspension of death sentences passed by military courts for political reasons, as long as the Conciliation Committee is in existence."*

3. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) said that his delegation still adhered to the view that it was not the proper procedure for the First Committee to single out the problem of the death sentences, while ignoring other factors which were, in many ways, more important. Nevertheless, in order to expedite the work of the First Committee, his

delegation would withdraw its amendment (A/C.1/515).

4. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) explained the amendments submitted by his delegation as contained in document A/C.1/516. As regards the first amendment, his delegation had suggested the insertion of the words "and cancellation" after the word "suspension" since it considered utterly inadequate to suspend the death sentences temporarily while they might be carried out at a later date. With regard to the second amendment, his delegation had suggested the deletion of the words "as long as the Conciliation Committee is in existence" since those words could be construed as meaning that the death sentences could be carried out as soon as the Conciliation Committee had ceased to exist. That interpretation could not be in accordance with the desire of the members of the First Committee or with the purpose of the author of the Ecuadoran draft resolution.

5. His delegation could not withdraw the amendments it had submitted since in case these amendments were not adopted the meaning of the Ecuadoran draft resolution would be distorted. Moreover, in view of the fact that the consensus of opinion in the Committee was in favour of taking measures with a view to having those death sentences revoked, his delegation found itself unable to withdraw its amendment.

6. Turning to the revised text of the Ecuadoran draft resolution, his delegation noted that the original text had deteriorated considerably. Whereas the original text (A/C.1/512) authorized "the President of the General Assembly to negotiate with the representatives of the Government of Greece", the revised text used the words to "ascertain the views of the Government of Greece". His delegation considered the revised Ecuadoran draft resolution entirely unsatisfactory, since the views of the Greek Government on the matter under discussion had been clearly expressed in the First Committee. Accordingly, his delegation would submit a third amendment to the revised Ecuadoran draft resolution to the

effect that the President of the General Assembly be requested to "negotiate" with the representatives of the Greek Government and not only "to ascertain the views" of the Greek Government.

7. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first amendment submitted by the representative of the USSR (document A/C.1/516).

*At the request of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics a vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*The Philippines, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

*Against:* Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama.

*Abstaining:* Philippines, Syria, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Israel, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan.

*The amendment was rejected by 25 votes to 6, with 21 abstentions.*

8. The CHAIRMAN put the second amendment of the USSR to the vote.

*At the request of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a vote on the second amendment was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Guatemala, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Haiti, Iceland, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, France.

*Against:* Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, El Salvador, Greece.

*Abstaining:* Guatemala, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Syria, Thailand, Union of South Africa, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia.

*The amendment was rejected by 16 votes to 15, with 22 abstentions.*

9. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the third USSR amendment substituting for the words "to ascertain the views of the Government of Greece" the words "to negotiate with the representatives of the Government of Greece".

*At the request of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics a vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Argentina, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, France, Guatemala, Iceland, India, Israel, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

*Against:* Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

*Abstaining:* Argentina, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Uruguay, Yemen, Afghanistan.

*The amendment was rejected by 23 votes to 14, with 17 abstentions.*

10. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) enquired from the Chair whether his delegation was right in assuming that the rejection of the three USSR amendments could not be interpreted as an approval of the execution of the death sentences or as a lack of concern on the part of the First Committee.

11. The CHAIRMAN said in reply that he did not deem it necessary to answer the question.

12. He then put to the vote the revised text of the Ecuadoran draft resolution, reading as follows:

*"The First Committee*

*"Requests the President of the General Assembly to ascertain the views of the Government of Greece concerning the suspension of death sentences passed by military courts for political reasons, as long as the Conciliation Committee is in existence."*

13. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, although the USSR amendments had been rejected, his delegation considered that the Ecuadoran draft resolution, even in the present form, was an expression of a modest and inadequate concern regarding the death sentences, since the adoption of that draft resolution could only be interpreted as being designed to influence the Greek Government with a view to suspending and eventually cancelling those sentences. Accordingly, despite the many drawbacks of the draft resolution outlined by his delegation, the delegation of the Soviet Union construed that draft resolution as expressing the desire of the First Committee that the Greek Government stay and commute the sentences under discussion and his delegation would therefore vote in favour of it.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*The draft resolution was adopted by 40 votes to 4, with 10 abstentions.*

14. Mr. D'SOUZA (India) explained that his delegation had voted in favour of the Ecuadoran draft resolution on the understanding that the words "for political reasons" pertained to political parties and expression of political opinions.

15. Mr. SUNDE (Norway) said that the negative vote cast by his delegation regarding the USSR amendments should not be construed as meaning a lack of concern for the death sentences. He expressed the hope that the Greek Government would take note of the deep concern manifested

in the First Committee and would show the utmost degree of mercy in dealing with its political adversaries.

16. Mr. EUSTACE (Union of South Africa) said that his delegation had voted against the draft resolution because it constituted an interference in the internal affairs of Greece.

17. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) said that the withdrawal of the United States amendment compelled his delegation to abstain from voting on the Ecuadoran draft resolution, which was incomplete in its present form. If it had been completed by inclusion of the United States amendment, the Greek delegation would have accepted it without reservation. Greece was in favour of the abolition of capital punishment but the assassins should take the initiative by stopping their crimes.

18. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he had previously explained the reasons why his delegation considered it possible to support the Ecuadoran draft resolution in spite of its inadequacy. The representative of Greece had made it clear that his Government still maintained its position of carrying out the death sentences although his last declaration had been made in the form of an explanation of vote. Mr. Vyshinsky declared that the delegation of the USSR would continue the fight to save Greek patriots and he expressed his confidence that the General Assembly would assist this fight.

19. Mr. LONDOÑO Y LONDOÑO (Colombia) said that since the Ecuadoran draft resolution was incomplete as a result of the withdrawal of the United States amendment, his delegation had felt it necessary to abstain from voting. He believed that the Committee had adopted a merely partial solution of the problem.

20. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that his delegation had supported the Ecuadoran draft resolution despite its inadequacy, because it felt that the consensus of the opinion of the majority of the First Committee constituted a moral condemnation of the policy of the Greek Government. Moreover, the correctness of the amendments submitted by the USSR delegation was confirmed by the fact that they were rejected by only small minorities and with many abstentions.

21. The CHAIRMAN stated that the main item on the agenda, namely "threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece" and the report of the Conciliation Committee, was now open for general discussion.

### General Discussion

#### REPORT OF THE CONCILIATION COMMITTEE (A/C.1/506)

22. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) said that the Committee had dealt at length with the sentences imposed upon the nine Greek citizens, but it should deal with a more important problem, namely the external threat to the independence of Greece which had cost the lives of over 50,000 human beings.

23. The United States delegation had been entertaining the hope that the Conciliation Committee might have been able to report, with some promise of success, the achievement of a *modus vivendi* whereby the ground work for the ultimate settle-

ment of the many problems along the northern frontier of Greece could be laid. The formula based on the previous work on the Committee under the Chairmanship of Dr. Evatt, on which the Committee had been working, seemed to have provided a simple and satisfactory starting point which might be conducive to a peaceful settlement, if there was the will to achieve it. The formula provided the framework for such a settlement, namely: the establishment of diplomatic relations, the renewal of efforts for the preparation of frontier conventions with a view to settling frontier incidents, and the establishment of a mixed frontier commission for the regulation of such incidents, if and when they did occur. Moreover, the Conciliation Committee had also suggested a most important formula which would oblige the signatories to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of a neighbouring State for the purpose of changing existing frontiers. The acceptance of that formula would remove the fears regarding the use of force to alter existing boundaries in the Balkans. Unfortunately, however, and despite the fact that the Greek delegation had accepted the suggestions of the Conciliation Committee, and that the Yugoslav delegation was also favourably disposed towards them, neither the Albanian nor the Bulgarian delegation was willing to accept them.

24. Mr. Cohen pointed out that the conciliators had asked the representatives of Albania and Bulgaria whether their Governments would agree that the United Nations verify the disarmament of Greek guerrillas in their respective territories. No Bulgarian reply had been given on that point. The Albanian representative had rejected the proposal on the ground that such verification would be useless because, he alleged, the guerrillas had been disarmed and interned. The Albanian and Bulgarian régimes, had, on several occasions announced the disarmament and internment of Greek guerrillas who had entered their territories, and each such announcement had been followed by renewed guerrilla incursions from those countries into Greece. If the recent Albanian and Bulgarian announcement in that regard were meant seriously, the Governments of those countries would have greatly benefited by inviting the United Nations with a view to having their alleged good conduct confirmed.

25. Moreover, the Albanian representative also had told the Conciliation Committee that his Government was not concerned with the implementation of the General Assembly's unanimous resolution 193 C (III) calling for the repatriation, under specific conditions, of the Greek children removed from Greece. The Albanian representative had contended that there were no longer any Greek children in Albania without, however, explaining what had become of the 3,000 or more Greek children which the Albanian Government had previously asserted it had harboured in its territory. Albania had also declined to accept the principle of the appointment of a neutral chairman or referee for the proposed mixed frontier commissions.

26. On the other hand, the Greek representative had accepted the Conciliation Committee's suggestion of a United Nations referee to assist the two-party commission to resolve their differences. The Greek representative had also accepted the Committee's proposal that Greece, on the one hand, and its northern neighbours, on the other

hand, agree to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other's territorial integrity and, in particular, to agree to refrain from the use or threat of force for the purpose of changing existing boundaries between them.

27. As to the Albanian representative, he had refused to accept such a pledge, unless existing boundaries were accepted as final. He was supported in that position by the representative of the Soviet Union. It was not clear to the United States delegation from the USSR representative's statements to what extent his conditional approval of the Conciliation Committee's proposals were further conditioned on agreement with regard to a general pacification of internal conditions in Greece.

28. Bulgaria had also clothed its rejection with an acceptance in principle conditioned on a general agreement among the Balkan countries and the arrival at a general pacification in Greece.

29. The representative of the United States recalled his previous remarks (275th meeting) to the effect that the cause of conciliation and peaceful settlement could not be advanced by introducing extraneous territorial issues. The prospect for the future would be dim indeed if the maintenance of diplomatic relations and adherence to minimum standards of international conduct were made conditional on the immediate settlement of all territorial issues and the recognition of all frontiers as eternally final. Nevertheless, the Charter did clearly outlaw any effort to change existing frontiers by force or threat of force. The Greek Government had offered to agree in specific terms not to use force or the threat of force with a view to altering existing frontiers. It was the view of the United States delegation that that offer should be sufficient and should provide a basis for agreement among the parties concerned.

30. The United States representative then outlined the history of the Greek question since its first consideration by the General Assembly in September 1947. In particular, he stressed the fact that the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans had been in the Balkans area for almost two years. Its reports required no detailed analysis for they were brief and precise. UNSCOB had had the benefit of direct observation undertaken by its subsidiary groups. Neither UNSCOB nor its subsidiary groups had been permitted to enter the territories of Albania, Bulgaria or Yugoslavia. Their reports were based on the observations of the UNSCOB members themselves as well as on the work of the observation groups and upon evidence obtained from the interrogation of more than 1,500 witnesses during the past year. In its reports, UNSCOB had noted that Albania was the principal source of material assistance to the Greek guerrillas, and that Bulgaria had continued to assist them. Moreover, it was interesting to observe that Yugoslav assistance, according to the reports, had recently ceased, whereas the important assistance of Romania was stressed. UNSCOB's reports also called attention to the fact that practically none of the approximately 25,000 Greek children who had been removed from Greece had been returned to Greece in accordance with the unanimous resolution 193 C (III) of the General Assembly of 27 November 1948. On the contrary, thousands of those children had been transferred from one Soviet Union satellite to another or sent back to

Greece to fight in the ranks of the guerrillas; some of those children had actually been interviewed by UNSCOB observers on Greek soil. After carefully studying the Greek problem, UNSCOB had reaffirmed the conclusions at which it had arrived during the course of 1948, particularly the conclusion that the continuation of the present situation constituted a threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece and to peace in the Balkans. It was specifically recommended that the General Assembly should continue to provide for appropriate United Nations machinery, with adequate powers of conciliation and observation, to further a settlement between Greece and its northern neighbours, to restore peaceful conditions in the Balkans, and to keep the United Nations informed of the situation.

31. Turning to the existing military situation in Greece, Mr. Cohen said that it had improved. Indeed, in its supplementary report (A/981), UNSCOB noted that the Greek armed forces had eliminated organized guerrilla resistance along the northern borders of Greece and had resumed effective control of those areas.

32. The members of the First Committee were no doubt aware of the statement of 16 October broadcast by the so-called free Greek radio in which the Greek guerrillas had acknowledged their defeat and had announced that fighting had ceased. That propaganda announcement should, however, be carefully read, since the guerrillas had very specifically stated that the democratic army had not laid down its weapons, but merely stood at ground arms.

33. In view of that statement, and of the public admission on the part of both Albania and Bulgaria that large numbers of Greek guerrillas had fled to those countries, as they had done on repeated occasions during the last two years, it was surely appropriate to inquire as to the precise location of those guerrillas and whether, as the Governments of Albania and Bulgaria had asserted, they had in fact been disarmed and interned in accordance with the principles normally governing the relations between peaceful States. According to the United States information, there were at least 8,500 Greek guerrillas in Albania and about 3,000 in Bulgaria.

34. The United States delegation believed that it would be prudent for the United Nations to be vigilant on the northern frontiers of Greece while seeking a peaceful settlement in the Balkans. The problem could not be considered solved. The United States believed that UNSCOB should be continued. In conjunction with Australia, China and the United Kingdom, they had submitted two draft resolutions. One of these (A/C.1/514) dealt with the repatriation of Greek children. The other draft resolution (A/C.1/513) was similar to the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in 1947 and 1948. It proposed the continuation of UNSCOB with its previous terms of reference and added further instructions. It noted the assistance given by Albania and Bulgaria to the guerrillas and called upon them and all other States to cease giving such support, whether of a direct or indirect character. It called upon the northern neighbours of Greece to co-operate in the settlement of differences by peaceful means and particularly to establish diplomatic relations and arrange for conventions concerned with the regulation of their common frontiers. UNSCOB



should aid the Governments concerned in attaining these ends by offering its good offices. UNSCOB or another international agency should verify the disarmament of Greek guerrillas in the neighbouring countries.

35. Mr. Cohen drew particular attention to the last two paragraphs of the draft resolution (A/C.1/513) which were related to the task of rehabilitation. They called upon all States harbouring Greek nationals to facilitate the repatriation of those wishing to return to Greece. The final paragraph authorized the Secretary-General to extend any feasible assistance through appropriate channels in the work of repatriation or resettlement. Finally, it envisaged aid. It was to be hoped that during the coming year the work of the United Nations on the Balkan problem would

attain final success. Mr. Cohen reserved his right to intervene again in the general debate.

36. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) remarked that the joint draft resolution proposed by Australia, China, United Kingdom and the United States had just been distributed that morning. It should be studied before it was debated if the discussion was to take place in an orderly manner. Now that the introductory statement had been heard, it might be best to adjourn until the afternoon.

37. As no representatives desired to speak either on the joint draft resolution or on the general subject on their agenda, the CHAIRMAN declared the meeting adjourned until the afternoon.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

## TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY-NINTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 27 October 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

### **Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans—general discussion (continued)**

#### REPORT OF THE CONCILIATION COMMITTEE (continued)

1. Mr. CASTRO (El Salvador) stressed that it was the Committee's task not to discuss the internal situation in Greece but to consider what action should be taken to maintain the national security of that country which was being threatened from outside. The Committee had to act to put an end to the interference in the internal affairs of Greece on the part of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to which, according to the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, must be added Romania on account of the action which that country had taken to perpetuate the Greek civil war. It was a source of gratification that the UNSCOB report contained two pieces of information regarding recent developments which gave some hope that a solution might be reached. On the one hand, the report noted that the Greek Government was steadily consolidating its position while the guerrillas, who were opposing it with the aid of foreign Powers, had apparently failed in their efforts. On the other hand, it was reported that the assistance formerly extended to the guerrillas by Yugoslavia had gradually diminished in the course of the preceding year. It was to be hoped that the change of attitude on the part of Yugoslavia was due to a desire to abide by the resolutions of the General Assembly concerning its relations with Greece and to respect the principle of the Charter according to which every Member State was required to abstain from interfering in the internal affairs of any other. The future would show whether that hope was justified and the delegation of El Salvador would await some assurance from the Yugoslav representative.

2. The Greek delegation had, among other things, accused the three northern States of giving

aid to the guerrillas. The truth of those accusations was borne out in the report of UNSCOB. Mr. Castro recalled the past history of the Greek question in the United Nations. In 1947 the General Assembly, upon the evidence of a previous report of the Security Council Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents had determined that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had aided the Greek guerrillas and had called upon them in its resolution 109 (II) to abstain from all further assistance. Nevertheless, the three Governments had continued their acts of intervention. In 1948, the General Assembly had received a further report from the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans which showed that the guerrillas had continued to receive aid from the northern States on a considerable scale, that they depended largely upon supplies from abroad and that they had frequently crossed the borders either for tactical reasons or whenever they had been heavily pressed by the Greek Army. On the basis of that report, the General Assembly had again called upon the three Governments in its resolution 193 (III) to abstain from giving further assistance and from permitting their territory to be used by guerrilla forces.

3. Mr. Castro drew the Committee's attention to various passages in the recent report of the Special Committee (A/935) in which the attitudes of the Governments concerned were summarized. In paragraphs 85, 102 and 115 it was clearly stated that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had continued to render assistance to the Greek guerrillas and permitted them to cross the borders. In the case of Yugoslavia, it must, however, be noted that in early July 1949, the border authorities had received the order to close the frontier to the Greek guerrillas. In paragraph 37, on the other hand, it was stated that the Government of Greece had expressed its willingness to resume normal diplomatic relations with the northern States and to settle its differences with them in a spirit of good-will. The attitude of Romania was set forth in paragraphs 118 and 119. According to the evidence received by the

Special Committee, Romania had supported the guerrillas in many ways, which included the provision of hospitality for them. Furthermore, there was considerable evidence that Greek children previously abducted by the guerrillas had been sent back to Greece from Romania as recruits for the guerrilla forces. In paragraph 120, the Special Committee reported that such Greek children were being compelled to fight in the ranks of the Greek guerrillas. Mr. Castro indignantly condemned such utilization of children in combat units, particularly on the part of Governments which were arbitrarily and insistently interfering in the internal affairs of Greece. As for the report of the Special Committee itself, he believed that it deserved the tribute and respect of the General Assembly. UNSCOB had worked well under trying circumstances and he was sure that its conclusions would be accepted as an authentic picture of the true situation in the Balkans.

4. Studying the picture as it was presented, it was important to assess the way in which States Members of the United Nations had co-operated in implementing the resolutions of the General Assembly. Yugoslavia was, of course, the only one of the accused States which was a Member of the United Nations. However, it must be noted that the irresponsible attitude of Greece's northern neighbours had been defended among others by the delegations of the Soviet Union and Poland. In Mr. Castro's view, the most disturbing aspect of the situation was that Member States which, at San Francisco, had solemnly undertaken to uphold the principles of the Charter were opposing the efforts of the United Nations to safeguard and succour one of its Members against the effects of unjustified aggression on the part of other States. It was strange that those delegations seemed more concerned to discredit the Government of Greece than to prove that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were innocent of the charges brought against them. To any true observer of the facts that position was, in itself, an admission that the charges were true. Moreover those same delegations were adopting in the different Committees of the General Assembly positions that were completely contradictory when it was their interest to do so at the time. On the one hand, they demanded revocation of the sentences pronounced by the Greek courts upon those who had threatened public safety on the grounds that those sentences were a violation of human rights; and at the same time, they took a completely incompatible position in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee in refusing to condemn real violations of fundamental human rights committed by Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania on the grounds that to do so would be to violate the domestic jurisdiction of the guilty States. Those contradictions showed the weakness of the arguments adduced against Greece and showed also that the delegations concerned not only did not co-operate in the implementation of the General Assembly recommendations but even encouraged non-member States to flout those recommendations. Mr. Castro urged all delegations to give support for the resolutions of the General Assembly and, in particular, to recognize the authority of the Commissions and Committees which the United Nations sent to those parts of the world where international peace was in danger. The delegation of El Salvador would support all proposals which reaffirmed the sovereignty of Greece and protected it from those who threatened its integrity.

5. Mr. MAKIN (Australia) said that, as a sponsor of the resolution which had established the Conciliation Committee (A/C.1/385), his delegation felt that it had a special interest in the Balkan question and a responsibility to see that everything possible was done to bring about a settlement. It was needless to remind the Committee that the Australian delegation had done its utmost to promote conciliation even to the extent of proposing earlier that the debate on the report of UNSCOB should be deferred until the conciliation efforts had been completed. It was, therefore, with genuine regret that the Australian delegation had noted the statement of the President of the General Assembly that the Conciliation Committee had been unsuccessful (A/C.1/503). At the same time there was no need for despair and Mr. Makin believed that previous speakers had been unduly pessimistic regarding the results of the Conciliation Committee's work. At least the latter had clarified certain issues, narrowed some of the points of disagreement and established a possible basis for a renewal of conciliatory efforts. Mr. Makin felt it necessary to remind the Conciliation Committee, that under its terms of reference, it was empowered to consult with any other State which might be able to render it assistance. He urged all delegations, should the Conciliation Committee decide to meet again, to make all possible constructive contributions to its work. For his part, he hoped that that work was not yet at an end.

6. For the present, however, Mr. Makin believed that the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/513) offered the best solution since it emphasized the aspects of conciliation. In paragraph 7, it again called upon the three northern neighbours of Greece to co-operate with the latter in the settlement of their differences by peaceful means through normal diplomatic channels. Already, there was some hope that Yugoslavia might respond to the appeal. Mr. Makin reminded delegations that, under the joint draft resolution, the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans would continue in being and would be able to offer his services as required. It was noted moreover in paragraph 11 that the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had publicly announced that Greek guerrillas who had entered their territories had been disarmed and interned. He urged the First Committee to adopt the joint draft resolution as it provided a means to find a way out of the impasse.

7. In conclusion the Australian representative reserved his right to speak again on the substance of the question at a later stage of the debate.

8. Mr. NIKOLNIKOV (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) believed that the first question to be asked was why the Conciliation Committee had failed to reach an agreed settlement. The United States representative had attempted (298th meeting) to shift the blame for that failure upon Albania and Bulgaria while whitewashing the monarcho-fascist Government of Greece which was supported by the United States and the United Kingdom. The data in the report of the Conciliation Committee (A/C.1/506) shed some significant light upon the reasons for continued disagreement. It was stated therein that the Albanian delegation had laid down the condition that any settlement must contain a statement to the effect that both the Greek and Albanian Gov-

ernments regarded the frontier between their territories as final. The monarcho-fascist Government of Greece had stubbornly refused to accept that condition. What was the reason for that attitude? Clearly, the present Greek Government was unwilling to waive its territorial claims upon Albania and was hatching aggressive plans to seize by force that part of southern Albania which the Greeks called Northern Epirus.

9. Mr. Nikolnikov, then, recalled the history of Greece's claim. It had first been advanced at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946 when Greece had demanded the cession of part of Albania and Bulgaria. At that time the claim had been rejected but the Greek Government had not given up hope. During the following three years it had launched a propaganda campaign in support of its demands and had repeatedly violated the territorial integrity of Albania and Bulgaria by organizing numerous border incidents. Repeatedly the Governments of Albania and Bulgaria had appealed to the United Nations. From November 1944 until September 1949 the armed forces of the Greek Government had perpetrated 1,565 armed provocations and incursions into Albania. In most cases those had not been mere border incidents but large-scale armed incursions by Greek Government troops. Mr. Nikolnikov recalled several of the incidents which had been reported and the numerous complaints which Albania and Bulgaria had submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

10. Yet in spite of all those complaints it was the territorial integrity of Greece with which the First Committee was requested to concern itself and not the threats to the territorial integrity of Albania and Bulgaria. In Mr. Nikolnikov's opinion it was, to say the least, strange that the Committee was being asked to brand little peace-loving Albania as an aggressor threatening peace in the Balkans. Every unbiased observer must realize that peace was threatened not by Albania but by the dark forces of imperialistic reaction which were stifling the independence and freedom of the Greek people. The intentions of the monarcho-fascist Greek Government were made clear by its categorical refusal to recognize as final the existing frontier with Albania. It was evident that the Greek Government wished to revise that frontier by force. In support of his assertion, Mr. Nikolnikov referred to an Athens Press report which quoted Mr. Venizelos as having stated to a BBC correspondent that the Government seriously considered invading Albania on the pretext of pursuing guerrilla detachments. Similar hints had been made by the Greek Minister for Internal Affairs in a statement published in an Athens newspaper and, even by the Greek representative in the First Committee. The Prime Minister himself was reported in the Athens Press to have stated on 6 October that his Government would not abandon its claim upon Albania. All the foregoing evidence clearly showed who was responsible for the threat to peace in the Balkans.

11. Mr. Nikolnikov disagreed with preceding speakers who had held the view that the question should not be discussed from the aspect of the internal situation in Greece. It was the terroristic policy of the Greek Government in its internal affairs that had engendered its aggressive foreign policy. Thus it was not surprising that the Greek representative had urged the Committee not to

discuss the internal situation lest it approach the question from the wrong angle. Of course, he had not wished the Committee to discover the true cause of the Balkan dispute which was the aggressive character of the Greek Government supported by the United States and the United Kingdom. The people of Greece had not wanted a civil war. They had been forced to take up arms by the terrorism indulged in by the small clique that had been foisted upon them by foreign interventionists.

12. Mr. Nikolnikov believed that, on account of its strategic position, Greece had been assigned an important role in the plans of the Anglo-American expansionists for aggression against the people's democracies. Greece, like Turkey, was a potential base for military operations in the Balkans. That fact had been clearly stated in the Turkish newspaper *Tasviar* in February 1949. Likewise, Walter Lippman, writing in the *New York Herald Tribune* in April 1947, had asserted that the United States had elected Turkey and Greece for economic aid, not because they needed assistance but because they were strategic gates to the heartlands of the Soviet Union. Having lost their previous position in the Balkans as a result of the Second World War, the imperialist circles in the United States and the United Kingdom were endeavouring to create a situation in the Balkans which would enable them to retain their favourable military positions. At the same time they wished to have an artificial pretext, such as the alleged threat to peace by Albania and Bulgaria, which would justify future provocations.

13. Returning to the report of the Conciliation Committee, Mr. Nikolnikov said that that Committee's failure was largely due to its refusal to deal with the internal situation in Greece. In his view, it was not possible to reach a solution along the lines proposed in the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/513). He drew the Committee's attention to the proposals contained in Annex 1 of the Conciliation Committee's report which had been submitted by the Soviet Union delegation and which the Conciliation Committee had rejected. He considered that those proposals outlined the only programme which could possibly bring peace to the Balkans. The delegation of Ukrainian SSR would vote for the adoption of those proposals.

14. In conclusion Mr. Nikolnikov reserved his right to speak in connexion with the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans at a later time.

15. Mr. KAN (China) said that, in subscribing to the joint draft resolution, his delegation had two objectives in view. First, it sought to put an end to disguised invasion by foreign countries which employed the victim's own nationals to fight against their government. Secondly, it sought to find a peaceful settlement of the Greek question which, if permitted to continue, might lead to open conflict. With regard to the first objective, the Chinese delegation had taken into consideration its own tragic experience at the hands of a new form of imperialism which masqueraded under democratic slogans. Greece and China were suffering from a similar new form of aggression. As to the second objective, Mr. Kan believed that the proposals embodied in the joint draft resolution represented the

minimum that should be done to safeguard the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece.

16. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the report of the Conciliation Committee was worthy of detailed consideration because it dealt with questions of considerable significance which were determinative for a solution of the whole Greek problem. The report of the so-called United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans also required serious attention and analysis, because purporting to be factual, it served as a basis for certain conclusions stated in the sequel to the report, namely the joint draft resolution of Australia, China, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. That draft resolution was the crowning point of the parade of artificial accusations whose true author was the United States. The USSR delegation considered its first task to be that of making a careful analysis of the work of the Conciliation Committee and of the Special Committee on the Balkans. The reports of those bodies would be examined to see whether the conclusions and recommendations submitted to the First Committee could indeed be said to derive from the data on which they were supposed to be based. He would therefore have to intervene in the debate again at later stages.

17. Mr. Vyshinsky said that he would not reply to the insinuation of the representative of China, who had not even talked about Greece and was merely taking advantage of the discussion on Greece to say what he wanted to say about China because he was afraid that, owing to the force of events in the world and particularly in China, he would no longer have an opportunity to do so when the Committee finally took up the item that the Chinese delegation had submitted.

18. The USSR representative said that two important issues had arisen during the work of the Conciliation Committee, namely the question of the borders between Greece and its neighbours and the question of the internal situation in Greece. Solution of those issues was so important that it might be said that in their solution resided the key to the whole Greek problem, or as it had been called, the Balkan problem.

19. The boundary problem, which had been one of the principal obstacles to the solution of the differences between Greece and its northern neighbours at the third session of the General Assembly, still obstructed an agreement, as was shown by the work of the Conciliation Committee. Asking why that question was so significant, Mr. Vyshinsky said that it was because of the charge made against Albania that it had to bear the responsibility for the existence of that obstacle. Such an accusation did not accord with the facts. Thus, at the Paris Peace Conference on 3 August 1946, Mr. Tsaldaris, then head of the Greek Government, had outlined a programme of territorial claims against Albania and Bulgaria. Already at that time, the Greek Government had attempted to press its claims on Northern Epirus. The Paris Peace Conference having prepared a peace treaty *inter alia* with Bulgaria, and not with Albania, the latter having been on the side of the anti-hitlerite coalition, the Greek Government could not talk openly about Albania at that time; it had therefore concentrated its efforts

on the Greek territorial claims against Bulgaria. Mr. Tsaldaris, however, had said in 1946 that a state of war existed between Albania and Greece. That thesis, designed to serve as the starting point for the unfolding of the Greek Government's aggressive attack based upon its coveting of foreign territory, had been rejected at that time. However, it has remained a favourite thesis, and it has been brought up whenever the question of the border between Albania and Greece had been considered.

20. The position of the Greek Government since 1946—namely that a supposed state of war must lead to a natural and equitable conclusion through the transfer to Greece of Northern Epirus—amounted to a direct demand for foreign territory. In other words, Greece was saying that there would be no peace unless and until Northern Epirus or Southern Albania was handed over to it. Mr. Tsaldaris had declared that Greece demanded the transfer of Northern Epirus to the motherland. The essence of that statement had been to give some cloak of legality to the aggressive intentions of the Greek Government which had not been abandoned although the latter had agreed to paragraph 1 of the draft agreement at Paris stating that Albania and Greece were not in a state of war. In effect, if the Greek Government had seemingly waived its previous attitude, it had accepted paragraph 1 only because paragraphs 2 and 3 indicated that the Greek Government did not abandon its claims to Northern Epirus, but merely abandoned solution of that question by force or threat of force. In the speech made at the time, Mr. Tsaldaris had even referred to the decision of the United States Senate, recommending that Northern Epirus be transferred to Greece. That reference had not been accidental, and it was clear that the United States supported those aggressive intentions, and in fact fostered and charted the whole line.

21. In Mr. Vyshinsky's view, it was no accident that those obstacles had constantly prevented a solution. Thus, as soon as the Conciliation Committee had completed its work, Premier Diomedes had stated, according to *The New York Times*, that Greece could not in any way abandon its claim to Northern Epirus, which was considered to belong ethnically to that country. That statement showed that the Greek Government still nurtured the hope that it would be able to snatch Northern Epirus from Albania. The clear, precise and peace-loving formula proposed by the USSR, contained in annex 2 of the report of the Conciliation Committee, to the effect that the Governments of Albania and Greece would recognize the present border between Albania and Greece to be final, had not been accepted. Instead, the Conciliation Committee had proposed two alternative drafts, both of which reserved the right of the Greek Government to its present territorial claims on Albania. Greece was prepared to admit a formula whereby it would refrain from threats and from the use of force against the territory of Albania. However, that formula was a mere repetition of an obligation set forth in the Charter, to which Greece was a signatory. That was not the issue either, no matter how often it was repeated. The issue was that the Greek Government should waive and abandon its covetous designs and aggressive plans. Actually, the formula agreed to by the Greek Government did not prevent its plans from being brought into effect by so-called

peaceful means, often worse than force, such as blockade, economic pressure, the fomenting of border incidents, internal disorder, and so forth. Thus, both alternatives set forth under paragraph 2 of annex 3 of the Conciliation Committee's report failed to provide a formula which would end mutual suspicions, tension and other disturbances. Both alternatives meant that the Greek Government was still going to make it a purpose of its national policy to change its boundary with Albania by snatching off a piece of foreign territory. To state that the boundary would not be changed by force or threat of force was irrelevant, since the victimized State did not wish any of its territory to be removed from it in any shape or form. In friendship there must be no such thing as suspicion or the proved fact of coveting somebody else's land or property.

22. According to Mr. Vyshinsky, the supposed concession made by the Greek Government, according to which that Government and the Government of Albania would agree to refrain from the threat of use of force either against each other's territorial integrity or for the purpose of changing the existing boundaries between them, amounted to a reiteration of the previous claims of the Greek Government and showed that that Government did not want to reach any agreement on the matter. The Greek Government wanted the kind of agreement which would not prejudice its claims that Northern Epirus should be transferred to it. Such an agreement was unacceptable to Albania or to anyone else in that position.

23. At the third session of the General Assembly in Paris, Mr. McNeil had not concealed the fact that the United Kingdom entertained some strategic interests with regard to Greece. There was no doubt that the reactionary circles of the United States and the United Kingdom, which stood behind the Greek Government circles and had proved their support for the expansionist aims of the Greek Government, were themselves interested in the implementation of those aims. The American bankers and capitalists who had poured in hundreds of millions of dollars and pounds sterling in favour of the Diomedes-Tsaldaris clique, were doing so only because they intended to extract substantial dividends from those enterprises.

24. At the Paris Conference in 1946, Mr. Tsaldaris had demanded that one-quarter of the territory of Albania be annexed to Greece. He had gone even further in a speech made at Salonika that same year, in which he had stated that the national claims of Greece were not confined to territories recognized as Greek in international acts, but included territories which were Greek from the historical point of view. Such arbitrary claims were characteristic of a régime that was designedly called monarchofascist. Citing a plan for a so-called "border adjustment" put forward in 1946 in the Greek Parliament, Mr. Vyshinsky said that a juxtaposition of all those facts, claims, concealed and unconcealed aspirations cast light not only upon the position of the Athens Government in the relationship between Greece on the one hand and its northern neighbours on the other, but also upon the reasons for which it had been impossible to reach an agreement between Greece and Albania regarding the border question. In the circumstances, it was ridiculous to allege that Albania had thwarted the work of the Conciliation

Committee. If the General Assembly's recommendation for the re-establishment of normal diplomatic relations had not been implemented as yet, the responsibility therefor rested squarely upon the Greek Government, which refused to abandon its territorial ambitions with respect to Albania, as well as toward some other neighbours. The negative attitude of Albania with regard to the re-establishment of normal diplomatic relations with Greece was clearly legitimate in the circumstances, and it was hardly surprising that the USSR supported Albania. The Soviet Union would continue to defend Albania whenever the latter was justified and whenever Albania was threatened by some neighbour taking advantage of the fact that it was championed and supported by some other States. In concluding his argumentation on the boundary question, Mr. Vyshinsky emphasized that the disagreement on that point could easily be removed by acceptance of the formula that the existing border should be the final one. Until that was done, the problem would not be solved.

25. The second question on which there had been serious divergencies of opinion in the Conciliation Committee concerned the internal situation in Greece. He believed that the USSR proposal, which the representative of the Ukrainian SSR had read and which were contained in annex 1 of the report of the Conciliation Committee, were adequate and perfectly suitable to regulate and normalize the internal situation in Greece. However, while it was admitted that the proposals would be adequate if the Conciliation Committee dealt with the internal situation in Greece, it was said that they were irrelevant because the Committee was supposed to deal only with the external situation. That position was incorrect because the question of the internal situation in Greece was inextricably linked with the question of the external relations of Greece. That had been pointed out by the Chairman of the Conciliation Committee, Mr. Evatt, Minister of External Affairs of Australia, at the previous session of the General Assembly. In a letter dated 21 May 1949, addressed to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, Mr. Evatt had made it clear that he construed the task of the Conciliation Committee set up by the General Assembly at its third session, to be that of solving the two related problems, as solution of them would mean solution of the problem as a whole. Quoting from the letter, Mr. Vyshinsky stated that Mr. Evatt had proposed that the whole situation in Greece, internal as well as external, should be considered as one which could and should be expeditiously settled on a basis of equity and justice for all concerned. That letter made it clear that both aspects of the problem had to be solved simultaneously.

26. The USSR had repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that the basic roots of the situation in Greece resided in the struggle between the democratic Greek people and the reactionary forces which had grouped themselves around the nucleus of a Government supported by the reactionary forces of the United States and the United Kingdom. Even the so-called United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans had looked into the matter, in paragraphs 43 and 48 of its report, which noted that operations by the

Greek Army against the guerrillas fighting on the frontier had occasioned frequent border incidents between Greece on the one hand and Albania and Bulgaria on the other. Under the circumstances it was not possible to deny the link between the internal situation in Greece—which caused the Greek Government to fight against its own people—and the external relations between Greece on the one hand and Bulgaria and Albania on the other. Another fact proved that the Greek problem was not only a question of border incidents: it was said that operations in the Grammos mountains were over, but in all sectors of Greece clashes between partisans and royalists were taking place all the time. That view was borne out by data supplied by the General Staff of the Greek Army itself. In that connexion Mr. Vyshinsky referred to a number of *communiqués* issued by the Greek General Staff, one of which, published in the French language newspaper *Le Messager d'Athènes* of 19 September, stated that resistance was being crushed all over the country. Those facts explained the situation as regards the internal affairs in Greece. That situation must be normalized, and such normalization could be effected through a number of measures mentioned in the USSR proposal annexed to the report of the Conciliation Committee.

27. Mr. Vyshinsky stated that the USSR would be the only non-interested State to assist in such normalization under the proposals. The United Kingdom and the United States would be fully interested since their capital was safeguarded by their troops in Greece. Moreover, those countries had loans and Marshall Plan material to safeguard as well. Reviewing the USSR proposal, Mr. Vyshinsky said that it was essential that elections should be organized with the participation of the Soviet Union and under the supervision of a control commission. There should also be a joint commission of the Powers, including the Soviet Union, to control and check the frontiers between Greece and its northern neighbours. He pointed out that the latter proposal did not exclude the establishment of bilateral border commissions such as had been agreed to by Albania and Bulgaria during the previous session of the General Assembly in Paris. Stating that the USSR proposal to the Conciliation Committee was being resubmitted to the First Committee for consideration, Mr. Vyshinsky said that he would deal with other aspects of the question, and notably the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans as a whole, at a later stage.

28. Mr. KAN (China) said that while he had spoken of disguised aggression and of a new type of horrible imperialism, he had not said one word about the USSR. He could only assume from the reaction of Mr. Vyshinsky that the latter had been upset by his conscience.

29. Answering Mr. Vyshinsky's question about the length of time that he would remain the representative of his country, Mr. Kan said that would depend upon the USSR. The latter had equipped the Chinese Communists with Japanese arms for the conquest of Manchuria, and if the USSR were to give the Chinese Communists all they wanted, then, of course, his country could not fight the world conqueror single-handed. Even then, however, it would re-

main to be seen what the world thought about the matter. The representative of Greece would probably not have been present if the disguised aggression against Greece, backed by the USSR had not been checked and if Greece had not received the support of world public opinion.

30. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) noted that the USSR representative had said that, at the previous session of the General Assembly, he had acknowledged the strategic interests of the British Government in Greece. What he had in fact said was that the obligation of his country and his Government was first to see that the people of Greece had a freely elected and representative Government, though it was hoped that the United Kingdom would be on good terms with that Government, as with all Governments (172nd meeting). That was still the position of his delegation, which wanted to see in Greece a Government acceptable to the Greek people, that the Government and the people should be protected from the assaults which had continually been visited upon them.

31. While he could understand that the USSR representative thought himself entitled to make sallies about the sovereignty of Greece, he felt that it was another matter for the leader of the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR to do so. While Greece had most of the symbols distinguishing a sovereign Government, the same was not true of some of the delegations which took it upon themselves to question that sovereignty. On the same theme, Mr. Vyshinsky had repeatedly talked of the Government which had been "foisted upon" Greece. It was proper that the Committee should remember that the present Government of Greece was a Government elected by its people and elected under international supervision in accordance with an offer made by the Greek Government of that time. That invitation had been extended to the USSR which at that time had not been anxious to share in the privilege of supervising those elections.

32. The United Kingdom representative said that the Committee would not be deceived by the argument that the strife in Greece could be ended if the Greek Government finally and completely abandoned its claims to frontier rectification. The report of UNSCOB offered precise evidence as to the quarters from which the guerrillas received assistance, and it could not be doubted that those were quarters over which Mr. Vyshinsky had considerable influence. While he did not wish to offer the point as evidence, he quoted a statement made by Mr. Porphyrogenis, the self-styled Minister of Justice in the so-called democratic Government of Greece, in the *Cominform Journal* of 15 November 1948, in which it was claimed that the Soviet Union supported the Greek Guerrillas. Recalling that remarks he had made at a previous session about General Markos, then leader of the Greek guerrillas, had been fiercely disputed by the representative of the Byelorussian SSR, Mr. McNeil said that the name of General Markos was not heard quite so commonly at present. He thought that the representative of the Byelorussian SSR would now be a little closer to his point of view because he still tolerated the opinion of General Markos that he had tolerated at that time. Therefore, he did not wish to offer what Mr. Porphyrogenis had said as very hard evidence.



33. The representative of the USSR and of the Ukrainian SSR had spoken as though Mr. Tsalدارis and his associates were the only Greeks harbouring those claims to Northern Epirus. While he did not wish to comment on the validity of the claims, it was, however, a fact that those claims were almost a nationalist aspiration in Greece. It would obviously be very awkward for Mr. Vyshinsky to have to tell the communists in Greece that they must desert these claims to Northern Epirus if every other party in Greece did not do so. Such a situation was not without comparison, and Mr. Vyshinsky's political associates had found themselves in the same dilemma in several countries. If there was to be a change in USSR tactics and if an attempt was to be made to restore a legalized communist opposition, because another type of opposition had failed, it was quite plain that the *Politburo* would have to deal with the matter. Mr. McNeil then quoted a statement made on 3 August 1946 by the EAM representative to the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris to the effect that not only Northern Epirus but Eastern Thrace should be adjudged to Greece. Moreover, that statement continued to the effect that it was also imperative that the security of the Greek frontier with Bulgaria be safeguarded.

34. It had also been suggested that the Greeks were alone in pursuing territorial claims in the Balkans. He pointed out, however, that other countries in the area had stated territorial claims in the strongest language. Thus the Bulgarian representative had informed the Council of Foreign Ministers that the Bulgarian territorial claims could never be deserted.

35. While Mr. Vyshinsky had said that the offer of the Greek delegation, not to seek any method conflicting with their obligations as a Member of the United Nations to settle the question, was not enough, it was evident that if the other parties to the dispute were willing to accept an equal obligation, an important step forward would have been made. It would mean that all parties to the dispute would have agreed that they would not resort to war upon the issue. If Mr. Vyshinsky was in earnest in saying that his only desire was to secure peace, he must use his influence with the Albanian delegation and say that they were being unreasonable. He must say that to accept that obligation would be a decisive step forward in the normalization of relationships between those Powers, and he certainly must not contend to the Committee that one party in Greece was alone responsible for the situation.

36. Pointing out that the latest pronouncement of the "democratic" army was that there was no longer any conflict, Mr. McNeil said that the appeal to the "belligerent parties" to cease hostilities contained in the USSR proposal apparently did not apply at the present stage. As for a declaration of general amnesty, evidence had been given showing that relaxation had already taken place in that respect. That was a tendency which he was sure all hoped would be continued, as far as the conditions of security permitted. Referring to the third USSR proposal, dealing with free parliamentary elections, Mr. McNeil said that he was a little perplexed by the fact that the Government of the Soviet Union should now find international supervision to be a good thing, while it had found it completely unacceptable

in 1946. As for the proposal for the establishment of a joint commission to control the frontiers between Greece and its northern neighbours, while the objective was excellent and the great majority of the Committee had associated itself with it, there was no need to set up new machinery for the purpose. The Government of the Soviet Union could take part in that task as soon as it decided to take the place reserved for it by resolution of the General Assembly on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans.

37. Referring to the cessation of military aid to the Greek Government, proposed by the USSR, Mr. McNeil said that the aid of various kinds requested from certain Powers by the Greek Government was legal by any kind of international standard. The illegal kind of aid with which the Special Committee's report was concerned, was the one which was smuggled and driven across the border, not only without the invitation, but in opposition to the wishes, of the legally established Government of Greece.

38. Moreover, the USSR proposal as a whole would represent a gross interference in the internal affairs of Greece. Mr. Vyshinsky's views on the subject were known, but it was difficult to understand how the representative of the Soviet Union could contend in one case that action by the United Nations would be unjustified interference in the internal affairs of some countries, although such action was taken on the basis of the apparent violation of certain precise points contained in international peace treaties, and yet could offer a proposal like that of the USSR to an international organization when there was no treaty, and when there was a duly established and functioning legal Government in Greece.

39. The representative of the Soviet Union had drawn the Committee's attention to paragraphs 43 and 48 of the report of the Special Committee as evidence that the Greek Army had occasioned frequent border violations of Albanian territory. It was unfortunate that he had not also cited the passage in paragraph 43 in which the Special Committee reported that, in the absence of co-operation from Albania, it had been unable itself or through its observation groups to investigate the frontier incidents alleged by Albania on Albanian territory. If Mr. Vyshinsky was really concerned about those incidents, then he would do right to advise the Albanian Authorities to take advantage of United Nations machinery so that the incidents could be properly investigated. Indeed, in order to present a true picture of the situation, he should, at the same time, have cited paragraph 85 of the report in which the Special Committee stated its conclusion that Albania had furnished active assistance to the guerrillas and permitted them to utilize its territory for tactical purposes. Not all the eloquence and ingenuity of the representative of the Soviet Union would persuade the Committee that responsibility for the situation lay with the Greeks. It might be that Mr. Vyshinsky would be able to point to a few minor contradictions in the Special Committee's report, but its findings together with the proceedings in the Conciliation Committee left no doubt that there existed a systematic and designed threat to the territorial integrity of Greece. It was also apparent that those who had created the threat had been unwilling to offer any proof of their desire to remedy

the situation. In the light of those considerations the Committee would doubtless take a decision along the lines suggested in the joint draft resolution of which his delegation was a sponsor.

40. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia), while reserving his right to speak later upon the substance of the question, replied to two accusations which the representative of the Soviet Union had implicitly levelled against his Government in asserting that "claims have been presented upon Albania by some other neighbours who are also protected by some great Powers . . ." That was aimed at Yugoslavia since the latter was the only other country adjacent to Albania. The accusation that Yugoslavia had powerful protectors had been adduced for the first time in the resolution adopted by the *Cominform* in June 1948. That accusation

had been repeated many times thereafter but it had not succeeded in convincing anyone in Yugoslavia, nor had many been convinced abroad. Consequently, Mr. Bebler felt it unnecessary to deal with the criticism at any length.

41. The second accusation was contained in a hint that Yugoslavia had made territorial claims upon Albania. Mr. Bebler denied that any such claim had been advanced in any form by any public figure in Yugoslavia and he challenged Mr. Vyshinsky to show otherwise. The Yugoslav Government had no territorial claims upon Albania. On the contrary, its policy was aimed only towards maintaining the independence and honour of its country.

The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m.

### THREE HUNDREDTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 28 October 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### **Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans<sup>1</sup>—general discussion (continued)**

##### REPORT OF THE CONCILIATION COMMITTEE (continued)

1. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) said that his delegation considered the events set forth in the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans to be established facts. That Committee was composed of representatives from various parts of the world. Their impartiality and objectivity could not be questioned seriously. For the most part, their findings corroborated the conclusions of the previous year: that moral and material support had been given to the Greek partisans; that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had persistently refused to recognize the Special Committee and that those countries had completely disregarded the resolutions of the General Assembly. Lastly, the Special Committee reaffirmed the conclusions of its previous reports according to which continuation of the present situation "constitutes a threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece and to peace in the Balkans." Though the facts constituting the threat remained fundamentally the same, the Special Committee nevertheless pointed out that the situation had developed somewhat. "Albania is the principle source of material assistance but the Special Committee has taken note of certain activities in countries other than the northern neighbours of Greece, particularly Romania, in support of the Greek guerrilla movement."

2. There was another finding of the Special Committee which deserved particular attention: "The Governments which received Greek children removed from Greece have not complied with the General Assembly resolution 193 C (III) of

27 November 1948 calling on them to co-operate in the return of the children to their families. In violation of fundamental humanitarian principles, some of these children, both boys and girls, of adolescent age, have been sent back to Greece to fight in the ranks of the guerrillas. Those children, numbering several thousands, had been urgently asked back by their parents. In spite of the persistent efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League Red Cross Societies, the children had not been returned to them. Such a situation could not but profoundly shock the conscience of the world.

3. Turning to the report of the Conciliation Committee set up during the current session, Mr. van Langenhove said it was unusual to make the conclusion of an agreement, the sole purpose of which was to re-establish normal relations, dependent on the recognition as final of the existing Greek-Albanian frontier. There were many countries in the world between which there were or had been territorial disputes but which had yet maintained normal and even friendly relations. The essential thing was for them to show a determination as Greece had done, not to resort to threats of or the use of force, as prescribed by the Charter. In applying the Charter, Greece had been bringing the events of which it was complaining to the attention of the United Nations for the last three years. On several occasions the great majority of the General Assembly had recognized that those events constituted a threat to Greece's political independence and territorial integrity, as well as to peace in the Balkans, and that they were incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter. Greece had followed, and had agreed to follow, all the procedures of inquiry or of settlement adopted by the General Assembly. On the other hand, the countries accused had constantly refused to comply with the terms of the Assembly's resolution and had not even recognized the body set up by the United Nations in the Balkans. Those who had defended those States during the current session had tried to divert attention from the actions of those States by accusing the State which was

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly* Supplement No. 8.

the victim of aggression. If such attempts were to succeed, the guarantees for security which all States, and particularly the small ones, had the right to expect from the application of the Charter would be in danger. The Belgian delegation would vote in favour of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/513) which would confirm the previous resolutions of the General Assembly.

4. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), referring to the statement made by the Yugoslav representative at the previous meeting of the Committee, said that he had never stated anything like what had been imputed to him by that representative. He had said that if the decision of the General Assembly with regard to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Albania and Greece had not been complied with, the responsibility lay with the Greek Government, which had been unwilling to abandon its aggressive appetites with respect to Albania and certain other neighbours. Mr. Vyshinsky said that any other passage of his statement had been to the effect that the USSR would always defend Albania or any other small State that was in the right, and whose neighbours wished to take advantage of it, whenever States would use other States, like Greece, in order to serve their own interests.

5. Mr. Vyshinsky noted that the Belgian representative had praised the objectivity, work and conclusions of the Special Committee. The USSR delegation had a completely different point of view and considered that the present report (A/935) was marked by the same flagrant drawbacks as had marked previous reports of the Special Committee. For example, the anecdotal data previously used as evidence against the northern neighbours of Greece had placed defenders of the Special Committees in a ludicrous situation. Anecdotal conclusions and testimonies were no longer common, however. While previously the observation groups had been happy to obtain stupid but sincere witnesses, a premium had now been placed on the cleverness and willingness of the witness to testify. However, all persons with any legal or judicial experience realized how carefully such over-zealous witnesses had to be dealt with.

6. He noted that the United Kingdom representative had said at the previous meeting that attention would be drawn to some minor inconsistencies in the report and that those would perhaps be utilized in an attempt to compromise and jeopardize the value of the report and of the testimony. The United Kingdom representative had been right in assuming that course of action would be followed but wrong in believing that the inconsistencies or falsifications in the report were only minor. The Special Committee had endeavoured to attach to its work a certain aura of decency. It had tried to cover up its true purposes and objectives under the guise of objectivity and impartiality and had therefore created a new special procedure for the questioning of witnesses. That procedure was not in itself particularly exceptionable. However, it was merely a design to mask the perpetuation of the tendency of the Special Committee to select only such material as provided accusing data. All materials that would have served to deny such data had been rejected. That was a most arbitrary procedure and proved a bias most intolerable in a tribunal. In demonstrating such

bias, the Special Committee had shown that its activity was harmful and evil, and was likely to lead to those international complications that the Committee supposedly was expected to avert. That fact could be demonstrated by an examination of the work of the observation groups of the Special Committee on the Balkans, the cornerstone of which was the testimony of witnesses. In that connexion, Mr. Vyshinsky said that the brief categorical formulae used to characterize and describe the witnesses were completely insignificant. That fact would not fail to find its reflection in the value of the kind of evidence given by the witnesses. In view of the numbers interrogated, it could not be expected that all the testimony given would be included in the final report. As was stated in paragraph 61 of the report, some kind of selection had therefore been essential. According to the second sentence of that paragraph, reference had been made "only to representative or especially significant witnesses." However, no mention had been made of the fact that the testimony had been hand-picked. The witnesses had not been placed at the disposal of the Committee on the basis of principles set forth in the rules of procedure. According to the report, ordinarily witnesses had been brought up by the Greek police and by the Greek liaison officers after having been questioned by the police. Mr. Vyshinsky said that the overwhelming majority of witnesses heard by the Special Committee and by the observer groups of that Committee had been supplied by the Greek police from concentration camps and gaols. Those witnesses had been persons whose cases had been *sub judice*, and had known that anything they said would be used against them. While all the formal specifications appeared to have been complied with, such testimony could not be considered. Even if all the testimony had been correctly recorded, witnesses brought in by the police from such places as Makronesos Island, with the threat of punishment hanging over their heads, were not free, and an indictment or verdict could never be based on the testimony of that type of witness.

7. A witness must be truly free and independent for his testimony to be credible. Referring to paragraph 62 of the Special Committee's report, which stated that a number of the witnesses had been under detention pending further investigation by Greek Authorities, Mr. Vyshinsky said that the nature and location of those investigations was well known and had been described during the discussion regarding the death sentences passed on nine outstanding Greek social, political and trade-union leaders. He quoted a recent article written by the Secretary-General of the Greek Socialist Party and published in the Greek newspaper *Make*, which analysed a recently adopted law that had been represented as a progressive piece of legislation on the part of the Greek Government. That law had established so-called measures of national re-education and was said by the author of the article to permit Greek reaction to use its provisions as a tool in the struggle with its political enemies. Moreover, according to the author of the article, who had quoted the statement of a Minister to the effect that the Makronesos schools were being set up for many years and would continue to function even after the revocation of the third decree, that law, dealing with the reorganization of the concentration camps on the Makronesos Island

was not a temporary or extraordinary measure. Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out that the third decree dealt with extraordinary measures whereby the Government could have anyone it wished shot summarily. The author of the article had listed the categories of persons to be relegated to those concentration camps and had described the methods used by the "re-educators". Mr. Vyshinsky described an incident in which 600 prisoners had been transferred from one camp to another on 14 October 1949. The prisoners had been beaten for a number of hours by soldiers armed with clubs, and, as a result of those atrocious floggings, five of the prisoners had died and thirty had become insane. Two hundred other political prisoners considered as unfit for re-education had also been subjected to floggings and tortures and had been faced with the alternatives of abandonment of their views or death. Mr. Vyshinsky said that according to press reports, one of the prisoners faced with that cruel alternative had already committed suicide.

8. That was the kind of "previous interrogation" to which the witnesses heard by the Special Committee or by its observation groups had been subjected. It was on the testimony of such witnesses that the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee had been based. It was clear that that testimony, and therefore the conclusions and recommendations, were vitiated and untrustworthy.

9. Mr. Vyshinsky said that he would take a number of representative facts and would analyse them, since it was impossible to analyse everything contained in the report. The scandalous foundation of those supposed facts was invariably to be found at the basis of the other facts in the Special Committee's report. One example was furnished by two witnesses who figured in the reports of the observation groups. Those two witnesses had been numbered 4/W/212 and 3/W/160 and had given very similar testimony. The reports of the observer groups stated that the two witnesses were one and the same person. Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out, however, that according to one observation group the age of the witness was 41, whereas according to the other it was 57. Moreover, the background of the witness was completely different in the two reports. While such differences might be dismissed easily by Mr. McNeil, it was clear that there was either a flagrant error or a falsification. That was something quite inadmissible in the case of serious documents on which serious charges against Governments were based.

10. Another indication of the kind of discrepancy to be found in the report was contained in the chapter alleging that Albanian Authorities actively co-operated in the recruitment of partisans. It was stated that an order had been published in Albanian newspapers to the effect that all Greek refugees were to enroll and fight with the guerrillas. The footnote to the paragraph in which that allegation was made referred to the records of some observation groups which included testimony by a number of witnesses on which those charges were based. Mr. Vyshinsky said that he had read the testimony of the four witnesses who were cited in the footnote. One of them, No. 1/W/377, had left Albania because he had been afraid of persecution owing to the fact that he was not a member of the Communist Party. That indicated that the witness had not been unbiased.

Moreover, it was hardly possible to say somebody had fled because he had not been a member of the Communist Party, since under those conditions a large section of the population of some countries would have to flee. In any case that witness had merely stated that the order in question had appeared in Albanian newspapers on 12 and 13 March. Another witness, No. 1/W/383, had not stated that the order had appeared in a newspaper, but had been made by Greek officers who were partisans. While that might be an accidental contradiction, the next witness, No. 1/W/385, had stated that he had received an order from some Greek organ to appear in Delvine to be recruited into partisan ranks. One of the witnesses had said that out of three hundred persons at a meeting, forty-five had actually been conscripted. Such a statement was obviously completely inconsistent, as those persons must have volunteered. Those statements of the three witnesses were obviously contradictory. The first witness had not said what he had seen or read but what he had been ordered to say. Thus when the Special Committee had started to investigate the facts it had found a statement of the Greek liaison officer, contained in an official document, to the effect that the Albanian Government had published a certain order. On 5 May 1949, the Special Committee had sent a letter to that liaison officer, requesting him to submit a copy, together with a translation, of that alleged Albanian order to the Chams to enter Greek partisan detachments. The Greek liaison officer had also been told that it might be desirable to have additional data regarding the training of those refugees and their conscription into partisan detachments. In its reply to that letter, on 5 June 1949, the Greek Liaison Service had merely sent a verbatim copy of the testimony of the witnesses which Mr. Vyshinsky had just referred to, though the numbers of those witnesses have not been given. The Special Committee had noted that no newspaper confirmation, no textual confirmation and no documents to authenticate the information had been submitted by the Greek Liaison Service. Thus a most heinous accusation to the effect that the Albanian Government had taken measures to mobilize Greek refugees in Albanian territory into the partisan army had been based on the testimony of one witness who had alleged that he had read the story in some newspapers. Moreover, no authentic copy of an order or newspaper had been furnished to back up that accusation.

11. Mr. Vyshinsky concluded that the work of the Special Committee on the Balkans with respect to Albania did not look very trustworthy. Exactly the same was true of the accusations against Bulgaria. All the accusations in the report were based on the same kind of testimony. Thus according to the testimony of witness No. 4/W/271, leaders of the guerrillas had negotiated with Bulgarian privates about the supplying of arms on the Bulgarian border. However, that could hardly be taken as an official action of the Bulgarian Government, even if the testimony were taken as correct. It was well known that smugglers contacted certain border guards in order to smuggle through illegally what they could not get through legally. That happened not only in Bulgaria but elsewhere, and could hardly be represented as having anything to do with the Bulgarian Government. Mr. Vyshinsky said that the testimony of that same witness was completely

contradictory with regard to how such weapons or supplies were actually transported over the border. There was a great deal of inference and of unauthenticated information in the report. Furthermore, the type of question called for by the rules of procedure had never been asked, according to the records of the testimony. Those questions had not been asked because they would only have indicated how untrustworthy the witnesses were.

12. Mr. Vyshinsky declared that there was no piece of testimony showing any relation of the Bulgarian or Albanian Governments to any such supplying of weapons. There were other interesting documents, however. He quoted a statement of a Greek Army commander, in secret army document No. 40186 to the effect that ten sailing vessels going to the Dodecanese and other Greek islands from the port of Bari were used for smuggling arms and supplies to the partisans. Other confidential documents issued by the Greek General Staff had also described such smuggling from French or Italian ports, as well as from regions of North Africa. Those documents showed how weapons had been supplied to the partisans.

13. The accusation made by the Special Committee was that Bulgaria and Albania had been supplying the Greek guerrillas with weapons and ammunition. Nothing was said of the French, American and Italian equipment found in their possession. The Special Committee adduced as evidence a certain number of such weapons which had been found on territory evacuated by the guerrillas. In actual fact all that the Greek Army had discovered was a small quantity of arms and ammunition bearing Bulgarian markings some of which had been manufactured as long ago as 1924. Even if the Greek Army had discovered large quantities of such equipment, that would not have proved the accusation in any way since, as was well known, the Bulgarian troops which had occupied Greece during the war had left considerable supplies behind during their hasty withdrawal and it was only natural that the Greek people should have employed them in the struggle against the monarcho-fascist régime.

14. A further piece of evidence adduced by the Special Committee was the report by the Fourth Observation Group that it had observed a convoy of trucks crossing the frontier from Bulgarian territory into Greece. If one consulted the map appended to the report of the Fourth Observation Group it would be seen that the headquarters of the group was situated 8 kilometres from the border and the convoy of trucks was said to have been observed from a distance of 10 kilometres, at night, by its lights. The map showed that there were two roads at the spot indicated, running parallel, one of which crossed the border while the other continued on Bulgarian territory. Mr. Vyshinsky saw no reason to suppose that the observation group had not been mistaken and that the convoy had actually been travelling on the second road. Likewise, it was reported that trenches had been dug by the guerrillas on the Bulgarian side of the frontier. Here again the evidence was not conclusive. There was no reason to suppose that the trenches had not been constructed by the Bulgarian border guards. Actually, there were Bulgarian fortifications at the place referred to. On the other hand, there was much evidence that the Greek guerrillas who crossed into Bulgaria were disarmed and

interned. Mr. Vyshinsky cited the evidence of two witnesses who had given testimony before the Special Committee to that effect. It was significant that all that evidence which favoured Albania and Bulgaria was ignored in the Special Committee's report.

15. The foregoing clearly led to the conclusion, despite the contrary assertions by preceding speakers, that the Special Committee's report was biased and unjudicial. It artificially ignored the evidence which did not advance the objectives of the Special Committee and it was replete with contradictions and inconsistencies. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that, in 1946, when the Security Council Commission of Investigation had first been created he had pointed out the complexity of such an investigation which required that it be entrusted not to a political body but to a group of trained expert investigators. It might well be that the members of the Special Committee were very honest persons but they lacked the requisite experience. Furthermore, the work of the Special Committee was tendentious and showed a definite political bias. That was why the Soviet Union delegation could not accept its conclusions and recommendations.

16. Moreover, Mr. Vyshinsky considered that the conclusion drawn in the joint draft resolution from the findings of the Special Committee did not accord either with those findings or with the evidence upon which those recommendations were based. The Soviet Union delegation would therefore oppose the joint draft resolution. It held the view that the only correct solution would be one based upon the proposals which it had submitted (A/C.1/518) and upon which Mr. Vyshinsky would speak at a later time when the Committee commenced discussion of the various draft resolutions.

17. The representative of the Soviet Union replied to a number of points contained in the statement of the United Kingdom representative (299th meeting). Mr. McNeil had asserted that the Greek claim to Northern Epirus was based upon certain national interests, widely supported by the Greek people, and he had referred to a communist, an EAM leader, who had said something in that spirit. That was not the question. What was important was that the Greek Government coveted the territory of Albania whereas the latter had presented no territorial claims upon Greece. Moreover, the Greek Government had refused to accept the existing frontier as final and was only willing to agree that it would not use force or the threat of force for territorial aggrandizement. That clearly meant that the Greek Government still coveted Albanian territory and in such a situation it was hardly possible to expect any agreement. Of course, Mr. Vyshinsky recognized that national frontiers were not immutable. But they could be modified only on the basis of mutual understanding and respect for the equality of States and the self-determination of peoples. It was in accordance with those principles that the Carpathian Ukraine had been transferred from the Czechoslovak Republic to the Ukrainian SSR. In the same way, the frontier between Poland and the USSR had been modified in accordance with the Curzon Line by a mutual exchange of territory. That was a very different thing from attempting to seize territory against the will of its owners. The United Kingdom Government today supported Greek claims but,

in a book published in 1923, Mr. Churchill had described Greece's annexation of Bulgarian territory after the First World War as an untactful act and had favoured Bulgarian demands for its return.

18. The United Kingdom representative had also said that the Greek Government had been freely elected by its people. But, had not the preceding Premier, Mr. Sophoulis, said on the eve of the elections that none but the Monarchists enjoyed freedom to express their opinion and had not two Ministers resigned because they could not agree to those elections? Mr. Vyshinsky cited several reports of American journalists who had watched the elections being carried out to show that the plebiscite had been controlled by the rightist parties by intimidation and falsification of ballots. It was especially noteworthy that one of the international observers had been dismissed because he had stated that, out of 38 registration cards which he had examined, 30 had been false. There was also a news agency report from Athens to the effect that 16 electoral lists had contained the names of dead persons. Out of 2 million persons about half had abstained from participating in the elections on the grounds that they were not free.

19. The United Kingdom representative had resented the assertion that his Government had strategic interests in Greece. He had said that his Government did not conceal the fact that it desired to have a friendly Greek Government. But, on 26 October 1948 (172nd meeting), Mr. McNeil had himself stated that the United Kingdom did have certain strategic interests in Greece. In Mr. Vyshinsky's view, there was ample evidence to show that the source of the threat to peace in the Balkans did not only lie in the aggressive intentions of the Greek Government but in the influence exerted by certain ruling circles in the United States and the United Kingdom which desired to transform the Balkans into a springboard for economic and strategic action. That was why the Soviet Union delegation insisted on the withdrawal of foreign troops as the prerequisite for normalizing the situation in Greece. It likewise insisted that the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans be abolished because it served no useful purpose and because the material which it submitted to the General Assembly misled the latter into taking action which further complicated the relations between Greece and its northern neighbours, and did not help the internal situation in Greece.

20. Mr. DE ALBA (Mexico) believed that a solution to the Greek question could be found only if all Members of the United Nations, in a spirit of good will, employed all their efforts towards conciliation. It was especially important to act with the utmost care in order not to further exacerbate the hatreds and passions that had been aroused as a result of the sufferings on the part of all the inhabitants of the area. It must be recognized that the situation was rendered extremely complex as a result of the many issues involved. The United Nations should act in a spirit of humanity and sympathy towards the people concerned. That fact was dramatically emphasized by the information that had been received concerning Greek children. The situation

had been properly stated in a speech by a Greek representative at a recent international conference. He had pointed out that in Greece there was no division between vanquished and victors: everywhere there was bitterness and unhappiness and endless suffering extended throughout the land. The proper role of the General Assembly, which accorded with the ideal of international harmony and co-operation upon which the United Nations was based had been shown in the efforts at conciliation undertaken during the third session of the Assembly in Paris under the leadership of Dr. Evatt. The present situation was characterized by accusations and counter-accusations which merely hardened the political division between opposing ideologies and offered no hope of a solution. Mr. de Alba therefore appealed for a return to the ideals of co-operation and harmony among the great Powers which had been expressed at San Francisco, Teheran and Yalta. The United Nations was based on the belief that differing ideologies could exist together in a world at peace. It was therefore of vital importance both for a solution in the Balkans and for the future of the United Nations that the great Powers should utilize their influence to bring about an understanding. The United Kingdom representative had said that the Soviet Union could do much to influence events. Perhaps the representative of the Soviet Union could say something to the same effect regarding the United Kingdom. It was therefore the duty of the great Powers, as also of the other Members of the United Nations, to make every effort to preserve the spirit which imbued the Charter.

21. Mr. de Alba believed that a means should be sought to enable the Conciliation Committee to continue its work. He noted that the joint draft resolution did not close the door to that possibility. On the question of repatriation the Greek children the representative of Mexico believed that the proposal contained in the joint draft resolution should be adopted unanimously. The remainder of the proposal should be subjected to careful consideration. Clearly there should be an attempt to seek a settlement by diplomatic negotiations. Such negotiations presupposed, on the part of both sides, a flexible attitude of give and take. The proposal of the Soviet Union might well have been appropriate when the Second World War had just ended and reconstruction only just begun. However, it could not be accepted at the present time. Mr. de Alba believed that the representative of the Soviet Union knew very well that his proposal would not receive general support. He had put it forward as a measure of a political nature because it would give him a basis for all kinds of new arguments.

22. In conclusion, Mr. de Alba recalled the draft resolution (A/662/Rev.1) of the Mexican delegation which the General Assembly had unanimously adopted at its third session in Paris and which had resulted in the establishment of the first Conciliation Committee. He hoped that that resolution would receive some encouragement and reaffirmation so that it could once more become operative.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.



### THREE HUNDRED AND FIRST MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 28 October 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### **Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans—general discussion (continued)**

##### REPORT OF THE CONCILIATION COMMITTEE (continued)

1. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) wished to answer the accusations made, during the previous meeting, by Mr. Vyshinsky since the latter had alleged that Mr. Bebler had deliberately misquoted him at the 299th meeting. The representative of Yugoslavia then read in Russian the words spoken by Mr. Vyshinsky according to the sound record. The literal translation of those words in English read as follows:

“The Soviet Union will continue to defend Albania, when Albania is in the right, whenever any small State which its neighbours want to offend is in the right, neighbours who take advantage of circumstances and of the protection of stronger States in respect of which the States playing the role of an offender act like servants in order to serve their masters.”

2. The above text, therefore, was somewhat different from what Mr. Bebler had stated at the 299th meeting, subject to reservation since, at that time, he had not been in possession of the verbatim record. The text of the sound record thus differed from the quotation he had read at the 299th meeting on two scores: first the text of the sound record was less clear, since instead of “Albania” in the middle of a sentence it mentioned a small, symbolic State which had more than a hostile neighbour coveting its territory with the protection of great Powers. In that case, the accusation against Yugoslavia was less clear than he had thought it to be; secondly, on the other hand, the accusation went further since, as he had understood, Yugoslavia was accused of coveting not a part of the Albanian territory, but the whole of Albania. Having clarified the matter, he left it to the Committee to judge the correctness of the intervention he had made on the previous day (299th meeting).

3. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he had previously thought that Mr. Bebler had been the victim of his own lack of attention and lack of knowledge of the Russian language. He now understood him to be a slanderer since he had distorted in an evil manner the statement made in the Committee by the Soviet Union delegation. He had said, and the sound track said literally that

“The Soviet Union will continue to defend Albania, whenever Albania is in the right, whenever any small State which its neighbours want to offend is in the right, neighbours who take advantage of the circumstances and of the protection of stronger States in respect of which these States playing the role of an offender act like servants in order to serve their masters.”

4. That statement was confirmed in the sound records as well as in the verbatim record. On

the other hand, Mr. Bebler had quoted him as saying (299th meeting) “claims have been presented upon Albania by some other neighbours who are also protected by some great Powers . . .” It was perfectly obvious that the words used by the representative of the Soviet Union, as shown by the sound record and the official verbatim records did not, as Mr. Bebler contended, refer to the claims upon Albania on the part of other States or other neighbours. On the contrary, they made it clear that the Soviet Union would defend, not only Albania, but any other small State that was being victimized or threatened as well. Mr. Bebler had made a slight but deliberate omission. He had said that although the word “Albania” had not been repeated, the symbolic State referred to could only be construed as being Albania. But in addition to Albania, there existed a number of other small States in the world and the Soviet Union would always come out in defense of any small country that would be victimized or subjected to any menace on the part of any State.

5. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) said that it had become clear to the Committee that Albania had been referred to up to the middle of the sentence by the USSR representative but that, after the comma, it had no longer been Albania which had been mentioned but reference had been made to an imaginary State, to its neighbours and their very powerful protectors. Moreover, in his second intervention, Mr. Vyshinsky had denied the fact that his statement had referred to Yugoslavia or that he had wished to imply that he was referring to Yugoslav territorial claims against Albania. That explanation proved to be more satisfactory to his delegation than the earlier one given in the course of the morning (300th meeting).

6. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) protested against the distortion of his statement by the Yugoslav representative. He reiterated his previous statement to the effect that Albania was being threatened by Greece and that the Soviet Union would always defend the justified claims and demands of Albania or of any other small State whose territory was coveted by its neighbours. If Mr. Bebler considered that there was only one State in the entire world which was prepared to attack its smaller neighbours, he would then merely be confirming what the USSR representative had not said.

7. Mr. CASTRO (El Salvador) said that Mr. Vyshinsky had contended that the Greek situation was due to the irreconcilable position of Greece with regard to Northern Epirus, a claim which had caused the failure of the negotiations carried out by the Conciliation Committee. Mr. Vyshinsky had added that the situation would be completely settled if Greece were to give up its claims to that territory and were to sign a pledge to that effect. But what situation would then be settled? If Greece were to sign such a pledge, would that terminate the civil war? If the civil war in Greece were to come to an end as a result of the signing of such a pledge, then it would become perfectly obvious that Greece's northern

neighbours were responsible for the situation in Greece, since there would be a solution of the internal Greek problem as a result of the settlement of differences between Albania and Greece. But his delegation could not subscribe to those over-simplified views since, in its opinion, the civil war in Greece was not due to the fact that the guerrillas did not share the views of the Greek Government with regard to Northern Epirus.

8. Mr. Vyshinsky had also stated that the internal situation in Greece, as well as the international situation in relation to its northern neighbours, were two interdependent matters. Did that imply that the civil war in Greece would come to an end, once the differences between Greece and its northern neighbour had been settled? If that were the case, it would be tantamount to admitting that the civil war in Greece was a mere product of foreign intervention and that, therefore, that civil war would end as soon as that intervention had ceased. Furthermore, Mr. Vyshinsky had stated that the rejection of the proposals submitted to the Conciliation Committee by the USSR delegation was due to the fact that those proposals allegedly dealt with matters falling within the internal jurisdiction of Greece. If the proposals in question were identical to those circulated in the First Committee by the USSR (A/C.1/518), the reasons for such a rejection would appear to be understandable, since that draft resolution requested that the present Greek Government should give way to a Government formed by the guerrillas. It would be logical to expect that the reorganization of the Greek Government should be an internal matter to be solved by the Greeks themselves. The United Nations could only be concerned with the international aspect of the question, which was clearly expressed in the terms of the item under discussion, namely, "threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece." The First Committee therefore should carefully consider the report submitted by United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans and should concentrate its efforts on the discussion of that item only. As to the principle of conciliation, Mr. Castro wished to reiterate the importance of the results that would be gained, should the Soviet Union, with the powerful influence it had over its neighbours, decide to exercise that influence with a view to bringing about peace in the Balkans.

9. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) wished to comment on the views expressed by both the representatives of El Salvador and of the United Kingdom. His delegation understood the difficulties of the Chairman in his endeavour to restrict discussion of the item under debate. He had, however, to reply to the representative of China who had related a Chinese story at a previous meeting. He had told an old Chinese story about a man who had stolen 300 dollars from a neighbour and had put up a sign above the spot where the money was buried reading "The three hundred dollars are not under here". The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR could reply with the authentic fact that the group to which the Chinese delegation belonged had stolen 3 billion dollars in hard cash from the United States taxpayers without benefiting anybody.

10. Turning to the remarks made by the representative of the United Kingdom, about the sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR, Mr. Manuilsky questioned the relevancy of Mr. McNeil's argumentation about postage stamps as they certainly did not constitute *indicia* of sovereignty. Mr. McNeil had further inquired why the Ukrainian SSR so far entertained no diplomatic relations with other countries. If the United Kingdom Government really desired the establishment of such relations, the Ukrainian SSR considered it fitting and essential that a great number of questions should be settled beforehand with the United Kingdom, namely the questions of the implementation of the Potsdam Agreement with regard to reparations from the Western Zone of Germany; the extradition of the group of traitors who under the guise of displaced persons were being trained for eventual military action against his country; and the question of numerous war criminals such as Stephan Boudera who were being given asylum on territory controlled by the United States and United Kingdom and who were guilty of the most heinous crimes against the Ukrainian civilian population. When those questions were settled, the Ukrainian SSR would be prepared to recognize the United Kingdom Government and would establish normal diplomatic relations with it.

11. With regard to the remarks made by the representative of El Salvador, Mr. Manuilsky noted that Mr. Castro had supported the position of the Greek Government in its refusal to recognize the borders between Greece and Albania as final. Mr. Manuilsky asserted that the Greek representatives were not expressing, in the First Committee, the same views as those being expressed at home. He quoted the newspaper *Akropolis*, which stated "Our gallant army is in readiness and at the first order it will march upon Tirana". He wondered whether those views were compatible with the peace-loving statements expressed by the representative of Greece in the First Committee. Mr. Manuilsky further quoted another newspaper to the effect that Greek soldiers were ready to attack Northern Epirus.

12. As regards the question of Greek children, Mr. Manuilsky remarked that it was natural to expect, when Greek armies invaded the Albanian frontier with the use of United States airplanes and machine guns, that the people living in the border zone should seek refuge in neighbouring countries. His delegation, together with those of Albania, Bulgaria, Poland and Czechoslovakia, was in favour of General Assembly resolution 193 C (III) of 27 November 1948 calling for the repatriation of Greek children. In support of that view, he read a number of letters exchanged between the International Red Cross and the Governments of Czechoslovakia and Romania, in which the representatives of the International Red Cross had expressed their satisfaction as to the way the Greek children were being treated in Bulgaria. Moreover, the Committee would probably be interested to know some of the facts submitted by the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece: although the resolution calling for the repatriation of Greek children had been adopted on 27 November 1948, it had only been one year later that the Greek Government had submitted a list of 5,000 Greek children through the International Red Cross, despite the fact that the resolution clearly stated that the relatives

must demand the immediate repatriation of their children. The delay of the Greek Government was caused by the fact that those lists had been compiled through the use of force: the Greek gendarmerie had invaded villages in search of distant relatives whose signatures had been acquired forcibly. Moreover, such requests had been made by persons totally unrelated to the children in question. Those methods, resorted to by the Greek Government, were intolerable and inadmissible. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR had intervened at that stage of the discussion with a view to shielding the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia against unfounded accusations which were being made with regard to those children.

13. Mr. KAN (China) said that the accusations levelled at his Government by the Ukrainian SSR delegation were ridiculous since China had obtained loans approved by Congress from the United States through normal diplomatic procedure. However, he wished to mention the fact that a well-known Power had taken away forcibly from Manchuria practically all existing machinery and equipment. That constituted a pure theft amounting to more than 3 billion dollars.

14. The CHAIRMAN requested the representatives to avoid irrelevant reflections on other countries, and confine their remarks to the item under discussion.

15. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that he had been approached by three American clergymen representing the Protestant, Catholic and Jewish faiths, who had informed him that they had submitted a memorandum to the Secretary-General expressing their views on the Greek question. Mr. Katz-Suchy requested the Chairman that the Secretariat should circulate that memorandum to the members of the Committee. The memorandum which Mr. Katz-Suchy read out stated that, contrary to various declarations, civil war was still continuing in Greece and would no doubt continue as long as no democratic and just solution was acceptable to the Athens Government. Moreover, the memorandum stated, that "the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece", which was leading the fight against the Athens Government, had on several occasions declared that a free general election was the only way to restore peace to Greece. If the Athens Government feared that such free elections would deprive it of state power, as the sponsors of the memorandum believed, the Athens Government was therefore conducting a fratricidal war, with American and British help, in order to protect the interests of a ruthless minority. It was the duty of the United Nations to point out to the Member nations the contentions of each of the warring factions in Greece and, to that end, should also bring to the attention of the representatives the existence of the memorandum of the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece which presented a realizable set of terms for the ending of the Greek civil war.

16. Mr. Katz-Suchy wished to appeal to the members of the Committee not to single out one aspect of the Greek problem with a view to distracting the attention of the First Committee from the main issue. At the present time, that aspect had been obscured by the problem of the Greek children. It was a matter of regret to note that the suffering of children had been used as an argument in a political struggle.

17. Furthermore, the representative of Poland reiterated the views expressed by the representative of the Ukrainian SSR to the effect that representatives of the International Red Cross had visited those children in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia and had added that those refugees were given a better treatment than that given to similar refugees by the Athens Government. As far as the allegation of adolescent children being sent to the front was concerned, he refuted it as lacking valid proof. Various members of the Committee had been aroused by that type of propaganda but they had shown a lack of concern about the various young persons sentenced to death by the Athens Government.

18. Mr. McNeil had endeavoured to prove that Greece was sovereign since it had its own stamps, its own Foreign Office and its ambassadors. Certainly, the fact that Greece possessed its own stamps could not be indicative of sovereignty, since many British colonies had their stamps too although those colonies were very far from being sovereign. Moreover, the representative of the United Kingdom had spoken of the freely elected Greek Government. Mr. Katz-Suchy quoted various British and American statesmen and even Mr. Sophoulis himself, who had strongly criticized the 1946 elections. A United States Congressman had gone so far as to assert that in any fair election, the Greek Government would be overwhelmingly defeated. Moreover, how could one speak seriously of Greek sovereignty when British and American troops were stationed in Greece.

19. In conclusion, Mr. Katz-Suchy stated that he reserved the right of his delegation to submit more detailed statements on the whole question at a later date.

20. The CHAIRMAN stated, in reply to the request of the Polish representative, that the statement of the three clergymen had become part of the verbatim record of the meeting. Being available in that form and as it was a non-governmental communication, no further official circulation would be made. With regard to the other memorandum, it also was a non-governmental communication and was no doubt referred to in the appropriate lists of communications received which were circulated to delegations at regular intervals. Any delegation wishing to consult any such document could do so. However, it was not the practice to circulate such documents.

21. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) agreed that non-governmental communications were not normally circulated when received. However, any delegation could request the publication of such a communication. Precedents for such a course had been established at the previous session of the General Assembly in connexion with the Greek question and there was no reason for not continuing that practice. If every delegation wishing to read that important communication had to go to the Secretary-General's office, matters would become unduly complicated. In the interests of orderly debate, the Chairman should accede to his request.

22. The CHAIRMAN said he would examine the precedents and might reconsider his ruling.

23. Mr. GONZÁLEZ ALLENDES (Chile) considered that it would establish a dangerous precedent if any communication were given official status

upon request. Such a course would confer novel rights on individuals and organizations. The absence of the proposed documents would be no bar to a clear and orderly debate. Mr. González Allendes asked the Chairman to bear that point of view in mind when reconsidering his answer to the Polish representative's request.

24. Mr. CASTRO (El Salvador) remarked that the Polish representative had seen it fit to be indignant that some delegations were concerned over the recruitment of children into the ranks of the guerrillas. The Polish representative had claimed that the introduction of that question was an attempt to draw a red herring across the path of the Committee's debate. Mr. Castro rejected the imputation. His delegation's object in supporting the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/514) was to prevent the recurrence of a situation in which the Greek children were sent to fight in the guerrilla ranks. That fact was not based on mere rumour, but on the report of UNSCOB which should be given due consideration. Indeed, if the United Nations showed contempt for the reports of its committees and commissions, all its work was doomed to failure. The report of UNSCOB dealt with the question of the Greek children in paragraphs 119 and 120. Paragraph 120 stated that there was overwhelming evidence that the Greek guerrilla movement was using children as young as 14 years of age, both boys and girls, in fighting groups. Mr. Castro could do no better than recall what he had said at the previous meeting when he had expressed his difficulty in finding terms strong enough to condemn such a use of children. His statements had been inspired by humanitarian motives and were supported by the evidence of UNSCOB.

25. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) stated that the question before the Committee was a complex one which had various aspects. It presented certain points similar to those raised at the previous session, while others were new. One significant factor, which had not changed, was that the neighbouring countries were not co-operating either with the United Nations or with Greece. The attitude of Greece on the one hand and of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other hand, were noted in paragraphs 20 and 22 of the report of UNSCOB which showed that Greece had co-operated, while the other three Governments had not. That lack of co-operation was also evinced in the statement made by Dr. Evatt on 19 May 1949 concerning the efforts of the Conciliation Committee. In assigning reasons for the failure of those efforts, Dr. Evatt had noted that the Greek Government had accepted the formula in substance, while Albania had given no reply. He had further given the opinion that the replies of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia would have been favourable if Albania had accepted the formula. The conciliation effort had been renewed at the current session. It had been recognized that if they were to be successful the negotiations should be circumscribed within certain limits. The debate in the First Committee had shown that the Conciliation Committee should not permit itself to be led astray by matters beyond its competence and should concentrate on the most urgent task, namely to try and settle the situation on Greece's northern borders. The First Committee had felt that if the threats to Greece were eliminated a great step forward would be made which might preclude the Conciliation Committee from dealing

with other questions. It had been agreed that the Conciliation Committee should not act, as it were, as a peace congress dealing with territorial matters and internal questions and the Conciliation Committee had also understood its terms of reference in the same way.

26. The Greek delegation had held that view in setting forth its attitude. It had asked for a commission to ascertain whether the guerrillas who retreated into Albania and Bulgaria were in fact being disarmed. With regard to the situation on the borders, they had requested that joint commissions with neutral chairman should have the right of access to the borders of the countries concerned, so as to be able to ascertain the existing state of affairs and to ward off incidents which might occur, and settle them. They had proposed neutral chairmen to avoid the possibility of the joint commissions otherwise being bogged down from the beginning. In addition they had asked for the repatriation of Greek children. All those requests seemed reasonable and gave evidence only of a desire to reach a solution.

27. With regard to the joint commissions' access to frontiers, Greece's neighbours had stipulated that any such movements would require the consent of their Governments. Greece had hopefully accepted that view in the belief that a more reasonable attitude would prevail at a later stage. Moreover, Greece had accepted all of the Conciliation Committee's suggestions of 14 October. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had accepted the suggestions in principle but had conditioned their acceptance upon the agreement of Albania. Albania had rejected them. The Albanian rejection was comprehensive and was not only related to the frontier question. That indicated a lack of any desire to co-operate.

28. On the matter of the Albanian-Greek frontier, attempts had been made to show that the Greek claims constituted a threat to Albania, although Greece had stated its intention of proceeding only through the appropriate international machinery. It should be noted that by the omission of that point from their suggestions dated 14 October the Conciliation Committee had implied, that the problem could be solved without imperilling the interests of any country, although the frontier matter remained open. Mr. Evatt had taken the same view and had expressed the belief that the question was not of first importance or likely to endanger peace. He had elaborated that view in his book<sup>1</sup> when dealing with his conciliation efforts and had stated that the frontier question was one which should be deferred. The Greek view was that the frontier questions should be settled by reference to an international court and that it need not be a bar to harmonious co-existence with Albania. Indeed the Greeks had lived at peace with Albania for many years, despite their differences over Epirus. Territorial questions need not disturb good relations between neighbours. Indeed the fact that the Soviet Union had absorbed a large part of Poland appeared to cast no shadow on the relations between the two countries.

29. It might be recalled that when Greece had been attacked by Italy in 1940, Greek territorial matters had been discussed by German and Soviet Union representatives in Berlin. During the conversations of 13 November 1940 between Messrs.

<sup>1</sup> *The Task of Nations.*

Molotov and von Ribbentrop the statement had been made that the Soviet Union would guarantee Bulgaria an outlet to the Aegean Sea through Greek Thrace. While that was going on, Greece had satisfactory diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Territorial claims need not mar peaceful relations, provided the intention was to place them before the appropriate international authority. However, it was a violation of international law and a threat to the peace to adopt a hostile attitude and demand the abandonment of any claim in order to bring about a settlement.

30. Mr. Pipinelis stated that the issue was not a minor matter such as a small question of demarcation of frontiers. It was a long-standing injustice which became greater with the passage of time. It concerned the future of 100,000 Greeks in an area which had not been included in Greece after their war of liberation. Greece had yielded to a decision imposed by threats of war made by Austria-Hungary and Italy. However, a compromise had been reached at Corfu in 1913 which had given the people of that area considerable autonomy as to creed and language. At the end of the First World War, that area had been given to Albania at the insistence of Berlin, Rome and Vienna. However, in signing the Protocol of 17 January 1925, the Greek Government made explicit reservations concerning its claims to that area. During the Second World War the question had arisen once again. The Western Powers considered it essential to take a stand on the future independence of Albania. A joint statement made in December 1942 by the United States and the United Kingdom recognized the principle of an independent Albania, but emphasized that the boundaries should be reviewed at the Peace Conference. In subsequent discussions towards the end of the war, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom had been careful to refer to that point. It had also been raised by the United States at the Council of Foreign Ministers in April and November 1947. Thus, it was clear that the Greek claims concerning the frontier were by no means new. The question was rather whether further postponement of that issue could make a gradual improvement in the general situation impossible.

31. On the question of the assistance given to the guerrillas by Greece's northern neighbours and particularly by Albania and Bulgaria, Mr. Pipinelis wished to refer briefly to the remarks made by the representative of the Soviet Union. The latter, according to his old tactics, had attempted to discredit the work of UNSCOB by questioning the credibility of a few witnesses. However, the report of UNSCOB showed in paragraphs 59 and 60 that the Special Committee had a variety of sources of information. Paragraph 64 noted that no single statement had been used as a conclusive basis for any finding and that evidence had been analysed and cross-checked.

32. As far as the question of the Greek children was concerned, the report of UNSCOB stated that not only they had not been repatriated but had been recruited into the ranks of the guerrillas. Mr. Pipinelis wished to add that up to the present date not a single child had been returned to Greece. That was confirmed by the report of the International Red Cross (A/1014).

33. Moreover, the problem of the Greek children presented a very sad feature which had not

yet been discussed, namely the moral pressure exerted on the children and the process of denationalization to which they were being subjected. Beyond doubt, in due course justice would prevail and the children would come home. However, they would be greatly changed and that was the reason behind the delay. No doubt their material conditions were satisfactory, but they were being subjected to sinister indoctrination. Mr. Pipinelis cited a circular addressed in March 1949 by a school inspector in Prague to the teachers responsible for the education of Greek children. That circular stated that their education should make them physically strong and partisans devoted to socialism. The syllabus for Greek children in Czechoslovakia contained no reference to God or to their own country. Marx and Lenin were set up as the great men of history. A sample extract from that syllabus read that Markos loved Greek children and wished to protect them against English and American threats. The concern which that state of affairs was causing in Greece was obvious. When Greek children were treated in that manner and Greece was threatened by troops recruited in Greece and armed by its northern neighbours, it was difficult to speak of conciliation and hope for the growth of good will. UNSCOB was unquestionably right in stating that there was little hope for peace and normal diplomatic relations between Greece and Albania if Albania continued to supply aid to the partisans and refused its co-operation to UNSCOB.

34. With regard to the aspects of the Greek question which were new at the current session, the Committee should note an important factor in the Balkan situation which was the position of Yugoslavia. On 11 July 1949 Marshal Tito had stated that the Greek-Yugoslav frontier would be closed and that guerrillas would not be permitted to cross it. That had brought about a more normal situation and Greece had no cause for complaint. The situation in fact had greatly improved. It was evident moreover that the difference in ideologies between the two Governments did not prevent normal relations.

35. Another new aspect was the victory of the Greek Army which had reduced the acts of the guerrilla bands to negligible proportions. The nature of the war had changed and was confined to mopping-up operations. That was the real situation, although the representative of the Soviet Union had tried to make out that war was continuing inside Greek territory. Danger remained, but it was across the frontier where some 10,000 guerrillas had been received in Albania and Bulgaria. Thus, a virtual menace existed at the border which, if it were to materialize in the future, would assume the very dangerous character of an invasion from foreign soil and would therefore be more serious. It had already been pointed out that the rebels had not abandoned the struggle and had made clear in their declaration of 17 October in Prague that they had lowered their arms only temporarily. Greek partisans who were in Yugoslavia had decided in August 1949 to leave for Czechoslovakia in order to assist the revolution in Greece from there. They too had stated that they would not sit with their hands folded. Despite these facts there were some who tried to claim that the external threats had been invented by the Greek Government and that the real evil in Greece was internal.

36. Since the representative of the Soviet Union and others had renewed the accusation that the Greek Government did not represent the people but had been imposed by British bayonets and American dollars, Mr. Pipinelis felt obliged to recall in that connexion the report made upon the international observation of the Greek elections in 1946. The Mission had stated that the proceedings on Election Day had been orderly and that there had been no significant amount of illegal voting, although there had been some irregularities in the registration lists. There had been intimidation by extremists on both sides, but not enough to affect the result of the election seriously. There had not been a great deal of deliberate abstentions. The Mission had concluded that the conditions were satisfactory, that on the whole the election had been free and fair and that the outcome represented a valid verdict of the Greek people. That was an objective report which noted both the defects and the positive factors.

37. A third new aspect of the Balkan situation was the enlargement of the geographical area of danger. Previously there had been only the threat to Greece, but now other Balkan countries, and particularly Yugoslavia, felt threatened. For over a year concern had been felt in the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party. In August 1948, the latter had expressed the view that the activities of the Intelligence Service of the Soviet Union in Yugoslavia reflected an inadmissible attitude towards another country which had a communist Government. The degree of tension had increased and references to the threat of Yugoslavia were being made both in the General Assembly and in the meetings of the Foreign Ministers. Thus the Balkan situation had been aggravated both with regard to intensity and in size.

38. The action of the *Cominform* in the Balkans always followed the same pattern: it was the exploitation of the existing difficulties and tensions. There was no doubt that serious difficulties had arisen in many a Balkan country as a result of the war and by making use of them by creating suspicions and by direct action, the *Cominform* was seeking domination. The first part of the attack consisted in a barrage of propaganda and such activities as breaking diplomatic relations. Any Government which failed to yield to the *Cominform* instructions was branded "fascist". If the country tried to defend itself, it was accused of terrorism. The next step was the formation of "resistance" groups. Czechoslovakia and Greece offered examples of the pattern. Mr. Pipinelis asked how peace could be achieved if that policy were to be successful everywhere.

39. Those who were now defending themselves and making sacrifices were in fact defending all the rest and defending peace. That was implied in what was called the Greek problem which really had a general character.

40. The Greek people would persevere and vigorously defend the principle of non-interference in their internal affairs because the whole new strategy directed against them consisted of trying to twist that principle in a certain direction.

41. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) drew the attention of the Committee to United Nations Press release BAL/600 dated 26 October which dealt with the experience of an UNSCOB ob-

serva-tion group at Kastoria on 25 October. Three observers and a Greek liaison officer who had proceeded to investigate two frontier incidents had been fired at from Albanian territory. The United Kingdom delegation believed that the United Nations should do all it could to sustain its observers. Any threat to the work of the United Nations should be opposed. The United Kingdom delegation had therefore introduced a draft resolution (A/C.1/519) which Mr. McNeil hoped would find support from the Committee. Although some delegations might not feel able to support it, he hoped that they would feel in a position to abstain. The draft resolution had been prepared with restraint and was not concerned with attacking anyone. Such incidents might well take place without the direction of the central Government. However, the Committee should be concerned to disapprove of such activities and was asked to instruct the Secretary-General to request Albania to ensure that attacks from their territory upon United Nations observers were immediately ended.

42. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that the United Kingdom draft resolution revealed the intentions of the accusers of Albania and Bulgaria. It was a manoeuvre to besmirch the Albanian Government and represented it as the main culprit perpetrating the crimes taking place in Greece although there was ample evidence of continual attacks from Greece onto Albanian territory. No such draft resolution could be adopted. Moreover, the alleged facts ought to be verified before any decision was taken. In addition, any draft resolution required a twenty-four hour interval before it was voted upon.

43. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) observed that the representative of Greece had tried to draw a parallel between Yugoslavia and Greece and had stressed the element of guerrilla warfare fomented and organized from abroad. That element rather showed differences between the two situations. The Greek civil war had begun in December 1944 when the Yugoslav and other neighbouring Governments were in no position to concern themselves with the internal situation in Greece. The Greek guerrilla movement had begun as a spontaneous internal reaction against British forces occupying Greece. The movement had persisted for years as an expression of the revolt of the people. It was a fact that no guerrilla movement was possible if the people themselves did not revolt. That was proved by the case of Yugoslavia where guerrillas existed only in the foreign Press. Mr. Bebler added that Yugoslavia would prefer to defend its own case in the Committee without the aid of the Greek representative.

44. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said his delegation would oppose the United Kingdom draft resolution. The United Kingdom delegation could not prepare some report and persuade the Committee to accuse the Albanian Government without any investigation of the facts. The Committee could not be stampeded into approving immediately such a draft resolution on the pretext that the situation was dangerous.

45. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) affirmed that the draft resolution concealed no sinister intentions and was not an attack upon the Albanian Government. He welcomed the fact that the Polish representative disapproved of the sud-



den introduction of draft resolutions and that the Ukrainian SSR representative desired corroboration of the facts. However, they could not lightly set aside information in an official United

Nations publication. However, the request for time was reasonable.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND SECOND MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Saturday, 29 October 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman:* Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

#### **Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans—general discussion (continued)**

##### REPORT OF THE CONCILIATION COMMITTEE (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the list of speakers in the general debate be closed at the end of the meeting. That would not prevent delegations from making clear their positions regarding the various draft resolutions at a later time when the specific proposal came up for discussion.
2. In reply to a question from Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom), the CHAIRMAN pointed out that it had been agreed previously to interrupt the general debate in order to discuss and vote upon the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/519). In his view that draft might be considered as just one of the proposals before the Committee.
3. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) thought that it was not possible to take a decision upon the United Kingdom draft resolution at the present time as twenty-four hours had not elapsed since its submission. Actually, he had only just received the Russian text.
4. Mr. GONZÁLEZ ALLENDES (Chile) pointed out that the only rule in the rules of procedure upon which the request of the delegation of Ukrainian SSR could be based was rule 109. In fact, that rule merely said that a draft resolution could not normally be discussed until the day following its submission in writing. Hence, he believed that the proposal could be discussed and a vote taken upon it.
5. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) supported the request of the representative of the Ukrainian SSR. Rule 109 stated that "as a general rule no proposal shall be discussed or put to the vote at any meeting of the Committee unless copies of it have been circulated in writing to all delegations no later than the day preceding the meeting". Hence, the time of submission was immaterial in view of the fact that the Russian text had only just been received. He believed that the request of the representative of the Ukrainian SSR was in accordance not only with the rules of procedure but with the established practice in the Committee. It was perfectly reasonable for delegations to request a delay in order that they might study the draft resolution, examine the relevant documents and consult with other delegations.
6. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) saw no reason why the matter should not be disposed of immediately. In submitting the draft resolu-

tion the United Kingdom representative had stressed that it was not controversial and was aimed merely at ensuring the safety of United Nations employees. The proposal was perfectly simple and, moreover, the representative of the Ukrainian SSR had discussed it at the previous meeting.

7. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) pointed out that there were two aspects to the problem. In the first place, delegations were perfectly justified in requesting that it be made available in advance in their official language. Secondly, and more important, it was necessary that the Committee should have all the available information at its disposal on which to base its discussion. The draft resolution spoke of a report from the United Nations observers. But he had seen no such report. All that had been cited was a Press release of the Department of Public Information which Mr. McNeil had read to the Committee (301st meeting).

8. The United Kingdom representative had said that his proposal was designed to avoid controversy. The representative of Poland believed that it was in fact controversial and was an attempt to incriminate Albania. Acceptance of the draft resolution would imply recognition of the truth of the accusations concerning aggressive acts allegedly committed by Albania. Mr. Katz-Suchy wondered whether the proposal was not designed to create the impression that Albania was guilty and thus to pave the way for a full-scale condemnation of Greece's northern neighbours. In his view, acceptance of the draft resolution would prejudice the whole Greek question and it would be needless to continue the debate on the report of the Special Committee.

9. The Polish representative held the view that the proper procedure would be to continue the general debate and to take up the United Kingdom draft resolution later in conjunction with the other proposals which had been submitted. He saw no reason for precipitate action by the Committee since the observer groups had been operating in the area for some time past and it had not previously been deemed necessary to provide them with special protection.

10. The CHAIRMAN observed that there were two proposals before the Committee. First, the representative of the Ukrainian SSR had requested that discussion of the draft resolution be delayed over the week-end so that delegations could better acquaint themselves with the problem: second, the Polish representative had requested that the matter be postponed until it was time to consider the other draft resolutions.

11. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the request had not been to postpone discussion over the week-end, since

that might be interpreted as delaying tactics. It had merely been asked that the Committee respect the terms of rule 109 of the rules of procedure which required that the text of a draft resolution must be circulated to all delegations not later than a day prior to the discussion. The Russian text of the document had only been circulated that day. Mr. Malik explained that it might be possible to discuss the draft resolution at an afternoon or evening meeting after the necessary time had elapsed for its study.

12. The CHAIRMAN said that the request of the representative of the Ukrainian SSR must therefore be interpreted in the sense that the Committee should not discuss the draft resolution at the present meeting.

13. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) noted that the Polish representative had said that it was a practice not to ask that proposals be discussed and voted upon with unreasonable haste. Actually, that practice had not been generally observed in the past. It was also untrue to say that the observers had not been appointed by the United Nations but only by certain Member Governments. They were employees of the United Nations and it was the latter's duty to protect them. Mr. McNeil did not agree with the Polish representative that the draft resolution was prejudicial to the interests of Albania. It had been very carefully drafted so as to make the least inference about the Albanian Government. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the draft resolution which the Polish representative had introduced earlier regarding the repeal of death sentences passed on Greek guerrillas had been prejudicial to the position of the Greek Government.

14. The Polish representative had also said that the Press release referred to was not an official document. On the contrary, it was an official United Nations publication and it was the normal procedure to publish such news in the form of a Press release. Releases by the Department of Public Information were received daily by all delegations. Mr. McNeil recalled that, in the past, the Committee had frequently been asked to take a decision solely on the basis of newspaper evidence.

15. Mr. McNeil considered that his proposal was perfectly simple and straightforward. However, he would rather bow to the wishes of the Committee and would not participate in a vote on the requests for postponement.

16. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) was at a loss to understand why the United Kingdom representative asked for a hasty decision. The draft resolution had only been received that very morning by the Russian-speaking delegations and it was only correct that they should be allowed a certain amount of time to study it carefully. Moreover, the report from the United Nations observers had not been distributed to the Committee and he considered that no decision could be taken until all delegations had had an opportunity to examine it. He supported the requests of both the delegations of the Ukrainian SSR and Poland.

17. Mr. GONZÁLEZ ALLENDES (Chile) asked the Committee to bear in mind that it had already adopted a humanitarian appeal on behalf of persons sentenced to death by Greek military tribunals in conformity with normal judicial pro-

ceedings. If the Committee had acted on that appeal, which had no doubt been connected with the substance of the Greek question, it should certainly give careful consideration to an appeal for protection on behalf of the United Nations own employees which was unrelated to the substance of the Greek question.

18. It was true that the rules of procedure required that a draft resolution should be circulated in writing on the day prior to consideration. There seemed to be no reason for the delay in preparing the Russian translation, and Mr. González Allendes hoped that an explanation would be given by the Secretariat. Even so, he thought that it would be possible to discuss the draft resolution at the present time since the proposal was very simple and the Russian speaking delegations had heard it interpreted. Moreover, the rules of procedure did not specify that the text should be distributed in Russian. Mr. González Allendes added that he had not yet received the Spanish translation but he did not regard that as an obstacle to discussion. However, if the majority of the Committee felt that the item should be postponed, he suggested that a meeting should be called in the afternoon.

19. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) expressed no surprise at the attitude of the Chilean representative since the latter delegation had often been wont to look at certain questions in a misleading light. It was not true that the resolution adopted by the First Committee (A/C.1/517) with regard to the eight persons condemned to death by the monarcho-fascist régime in Greece had been merely on newspaper reports (298th meeting). The original draft resolution of the Soviet Union had actually resulted from an appeal addressed to Premier Stalin by the relatives of the condemned persons. Furthermore, the resolution of the First Committee had been based, not on the basis of a Soviet Union text, as the Chilean representative had asserted, but upon a draft resolution submitted by the representative of Ecuador (A/C.1/512/Rev.1). Also, the Committee's resolution had not been a definite decision but merely a request for information from the Greek Government on the suspension of the sentences. It was misleading to say that the resolution had been adopted in "rapid-fire order" since it had actually been debated for almost three days.

20. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom had contended that the proposal was very simple and should be voted upon without delay. That was always said of proposals directed against Albania and Bulgaria. But the Soviet Union delegation could not agree to such a procedure. The draft resolution and the report on which it was based must be studied. Mr. Malik welcomed the United Kingdom representative's statement that he would accept the decision of the majority as to whether the item should be postponed, but Mr. McNeil's idea was probably that the majority would be on his side anyway.

21. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom), in the light of the statement by the Soviet Union representative, said that he would agree to postpone discussion until Monday morning. However, it should not be postponed until after the other draft resolutions had been examined since the United Kingdom delegation felt that the Committee must fulfil its obligation towards the em-

ployees of the United Nations. He pointed out that it was not the first instance of attacks upon members of UNSCOB.

22. Mr. McNeil agreed that the Committee should never allow itself to take "rapid-fire" decisions upon such matters. He likewise contended that decisions should not be based upon newspaper reports; however, the Press releases of the Department of Public Information of the United Nations were rather a different matter and if the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR had not received the document referred to, Mr. McNeil advised the latter to take the matter up with the Secretariat.

23. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) stressed that the report of the United Nations observers had not been made available to the Committee. It was true that the Press release of the Department of Public Information was being delivered to all delegation offices. But a Press release was not an official document. If the Special Committee, or the observer group concerned, had desired that specific action should be taken, Mr. Katz-Suchy was quite sure that they would have transmitted a formal request to the First Committee.

24. As to Mr. McNeil's statement regarding the haste with which certain delegations had introduced draft resolutions in the past, the Polish representative recalled that, in connexion with his appeal on behalf of Catherine Zevgos, it was the United Kingdom delegation itself which had asked for delay. However, at that time the situation had been different since the representative of Greece had been present at the meeting and could have answered any questions.

25. Mr. GONZÁLEZ ALLENDES (Chile), in spite of the statement by the United Kingdom representative, believed that the question should not be postponed over the week-end. There was nothing in rule 109 to prevent a vote being taken unless copies of a proposal had been previously distributed in all official languages. Moreover, the Committee had an obligation to ensure the safety of United Nations employees.

26. The CHAIRMAN also thought that rule 109 of the rules of procedure did not apply. In his opinion the Committee had merely to decide whether or not to grant the requests for postponement.

27. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) reiterated his reasons for urging delay. He could not agree to a hasty decision on a question which involved the honour and prestige of Albania. Had the members of the Special Committee been in danger they would surely have addressed an appeal to the Committee.

28. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that he had been informed that Press releases of the Department of Public Information were not official documents and were published solely for the benefit of the Press. They were published only in English. In many cases the Secretariat had denied responsibility for Press releases. Consequently, the report referred to could not be treated as official until a formal report was received from the Special Committee or the Observer Group. Mr. Katz-Suchy added that, if some delegation had had any doubt as to whether the United Kingdom draft resolution did relate to the substance of the Greek question, their doubts should be dispersed

by the statement of Mr. McNeil himself in which the latter had not denied that his proposal contained criticism of the Albanian Government. In view of that statement and of the fact that no report had been transmitted to the Committee the Polish representative considered that no action should be taken.

29. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) believed that the Committee should postpone its vote both out of respect for rule 109 of the rules of procedure and for the wishes of those delegations which had urged delay. If the United Kingdom delegation, for instance, had asked for time to study a proposal, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would certainly have acceded to its request.

30. The Chilean representative had spoken of the need to protect employees of the United Nations and members of the Special Committee. It was a pity that the Chilean representative had not expressed similar concern when the Soviet Union Embassy in Chile had been attacked. Since the United Kingdom representative was ready to postpone the discussion, Mr. Manuilsky urged that his request be accepted.

31. Mr. COLEMAN (Liberia) remarked that rule 109 of the rules of procedure did not require that a draft resolution should previously be distributed in all languages. However, since the United Kingdom representative had agreed to postponement he thought it reasonable to accede to the request of those delegations which required time for further study.

32. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the proposal that the United Kingdom draft resolution should not be discussed at the present meeting.

*The proposal was adopted by 26 votes to 4 with 19 abstentions.*

33. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that, although the General Assembly had for three years been discussing the Balkan question under the title of "threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece" the record had shown that there was no threat to Greece. On the contrary, the true situation was that the monarcho-fascist Greek Government was threatening the political independence and territorial integrity of Bulgaria and Albania. It was a matter of public knowledge that the Greek régime had been following an aggressive policy towards its neighbours which was a flagrant violation of the principles of the Charter and a threat to international peace and security. The Greek Government had artificially fomented political tension, provoked a series of border incidents and made repeated claims upon Albanian territory. Mr. Kiselev cited an article published in the Greek newspaper *Ethnikos Kourikos* of 6 April 1949 which urged immediate invasion of Albania. There was abundant evidence of border provocations deliberately carried out by the Greek Government. Between November 1944 and 1 October 1949 Albania had reported 1,565 such provocations by Greek troops. It was quite clear that the policy of the Greek Government, which had resulted in such military action, was a flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the Charter was designed to kindle a new war.

34. It was characteristic that the report of the Special Committee contained no reference to the

Greek Army's attacks on the Albanian border and merely endorsed the campaign of slander which the Greek Government had initiated in order to divert world public opinion from a true understanding of the situation. The report, which was tendentious and untrue, unjustly accused Albania and Bulgaria of having aided the Greek guerrillas. At the same time it white-washed the aggressive policy of the Greek Government.

35. Analysing the evidence adduced in the Special Committee's report, Mr. Kiselev said that it was a matter of public record that the Special Committee had co-operated with the Greek Government and police. Although pains were taken to avoid identifying witnesses, whose testimony was received in secret on the pretext of preserving them from danger, the Greek liaison officer was always permitted to be present. The latter, of course, saw to it that the witnesses' testimony was strictly in accordance with the instruction given them by the police. Events had shown that any deviation from those instructions was promptly punished. In several cases, where witnesses were suspected of insincerity towards the police authorities, they disappeared before the Special Committee was able to receive their testimony. It was also noteworthy that the testimony of witnesses was not recorded verbatim and doubtless such portions as did not favour the Greek régime had been carefully omitted. The fact that the Special Committee had questioned 1,105 persons did not prove the quality or the trustworthiness of the testimony.

36. Mr. Kiselev drew attention to the description of the interrogation procedure contained on page 23 of the Special Committee's report.<sup>1</sup> It was obvious that the questions addressed to witnesses laid stress on military information which was of value to the Greek Army intelligence branch. In support of his contention he cited the cases of three witnesses whose evidence dealt with the precise location, strength and tactical disposition of guerrilla units. Mr. Kiselev referred to the testimony of another witness, who had helped to transport arms and equipment for the partisans but had been unable to say from where the partisans had obtained their weapons. That matter was easy to explain, for, as was well known, the Greek partisans obtained their weapons in their struggle with the Greek monarcho-fascist Army. Most of those weapons, made in the United States, were supplied to the Greek Government for use against the Greek people. Mr. Kiselev observed that the same was true of the weapons used by the Chinese National Liberation Army which, as was well known, obtained its weapons, made in the United States, mainly from the Kuomintang Army. Those facts showed that the accusations set forth in the draft resolution submitted by Australia, China, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/513) regarding alleged moral and material support to the Greek partisan movement by Albania and Bulgaria were absurd and without foundation.

37. Mr. Kiselev said that his delegation objected to the draft resolution, submitted by the same four delegations, demanding the repatriation of Greek children (A/C.1/514). The Press had already published reports that children's concentration camps had been set up on Makronesos

Island for the so-called re-education of children of the age of ten and over. Those children whose parents were in gaol or had been executed for their struggle against the monarcho-fascist Government were the first to be sent to those camps and the kind of education lavished upon them there could be imagined. In view of the present conditions in Greece, where about one million peasants, including two hundred thousand children, had been displaced from their villages and lived in concentration camps under such extreme conditions that large numbers perished, repatriation of the children that had found shelter in the countries of the peoples' democracies would be tantamount to their perdition.

38. The Greek representative's statement at the previous meeting to the effect that the Committee should only be concerned with questions or events taking place outside Greece was easily understood. For zealous service to the United States and the United Kingdom, the Athens Government had received vast sums of money designed to support an army of 200,000 which had fought against the Greek people. In that connexion, Mr. Kiselev quoted data from a semi-official newspaper in Athens as well as data given by the President of the United States on 2 August 1949, as reported in *The New York Times*, concerning the quantity of military assistance furnished to the Greek Government by the United States. He drew attention to an article in *The New York Times* of 10 May 1949 in which harsh criticism of the policy of American assistance had been voiced. That data had been taken from unpublished materials in the hands of the Congress for International Co-operation and had been compiled by Louis Wyman, a member of the Republican Party. Mr. Kiselev summarized that report, which had been made after lengthy and personal study of the situation in Greece. The Greek Government was characterized as incapable, reactionary and obstructionist, and it was stated that the only reason for which it remained in power was the fact that it received American support. The article further described conditions in Greece and criticized the conduct of American officials in that country.

39. The representative of the Byelorussian SSR said that the only correct solution of the catastrophic situation in Greece would be provided by the draft resolution submitted by the USSR delegation (A/C.1/518). From the statements made in the Committee it was clear that certain delegations opposed the USSR draft resolution and supported the Athens Government, which wanted to exterminate the democratic elements in Greece and to set up a fascist dictatorship in order to provide a military springboard against the countries of the peoples' democracies for the United States and the United Kingdom. The monarcho-fascist Government of Greece was unwilling to waive its expansionist plans against Albania and Bulgaria. The only explanation of the attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom and of the intent of the draft resolution submitted by them as well as by others was that those countries, in pursuance of their aggressive purposes, were unwilling to see quiet and calm reign in the Balkans. His delegation opposed that joint draft resolution and would vote in favour of the USSR draft resolution.

40. Mr. GONZÁLEZ ALLENDES (Chile) said that in view of the repeated references that had been

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 8.

made to the matter, he wished to explain that after diplomatic relations had been severed between Chile and the USSR, a car had passed in front of the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Santiago, where the USSR Ambassador had taken refuge. That Ambassador had not wished to leave Chile. Shots had been fired at the Embassy, which as a result of thorough investigation were considered to have been a possible attempt by Soviet citizens. In any case, it had not been possible to determine who had fired the shots. However, there had been no damage at all and no one had been hurt in any way.

41. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the firing on the Embassy of the Soviet Union at Santiago had occurred prior to, not subsequent to, the severance of diplomatic relations. The version given by the Chilean representative, which was apparently that the Ambassador of the Soviet Union had refused to leave his Embassy and had therefore been fired at, was strange and incredible. Stating that he had dealt with the matter personally, Mr. Malik said that in order to wipe out all trace of that unprecedented incident which it had permitted, the Chilean Government had severed diplomatic relations, using pretexts and justifications without any relation to the USSR Government.

42. Mr. GONZÁLEZ ALLENDES (Chile) stated that the basic purpose of his previous intervention had not been concerned with the chronological order of the events: whether the attack on the USSR Embassy had taken place before or after the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the two countries. That question was of no importance and Mr. Malik might well be right in that connexion. The fundamental point, however, was that the incident had been of no consequence and that no one had been killed or injured in that anonymous attack.

43. Mr. FACK (Netherlands) reverting to the matter discussed earlier and pointing out that clarification would facilitate a decision on the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/519), suggested that the Secretary-General be requested to obtain official confirmation of the facts mentioned in Press release BAL/600 of 26 October 1949 from the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans.

44. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) pointing out that if the Special Committee considered that the situation was dangerous it would certainly submit a report directly, saw no reason to appeal to UNSCOB in the matter. The suggestion would mean applying pressure upon the Special Committee and could not be considered proper.

45. The CHAIRMAN did not think that the question of a report from UNSCOB was relevant. As he understood it, the representative of the Netherlands had asked the Chair to ask the Secretariat as to the status of the Press release referred to in the United Kingdom draft resolution.

46. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that from the outset it had been pointed out that the true sponsors of the item under consideration by the Committee, namely the United States and the United Kingdom, had endeavoured to mislead the Committee. There was no such thing as a "threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of

Greece" by its northern neighbours. While neither Albania nor Bulgaria entertained any territorial ambitions with regard to Greece, the monarcho-fascist Government of Athens coveted territory and was making attempts against the political independence of those two countries. It had been abundantly clear from the beginning that the Greek item had been placed on the agenda of the General Assembly in that form in order to cover up and justify the actions of the Greek monarcho-fascist Government as well as the way in which that Government invented provocative reports, in order to pave the way for the carrying out of its intentions in the Balkans. The so-called United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans had been established as a tool of the expansionist policies of the United Kingdom and the United States. For three years the entire activity of that Committee had not served to normalize the situation in Greece, to settle relations between Greece and its northern neighbours, but had aggravated the internal crisis in Greece and had incited the monarcho-fascist Government of that country in its designs against Albania and Bulgaria. Pursuant to instructions from the United States and United Kingdom, the Athens Government had followed a policy of thwarting any agreement with Albania and Bulgaria, both at the previous session and at the present session of the General Assembly.

47. While it would appear that the assertion that an end had been put to the national liberation movement in Greece would oblige the Athens Government to put an end to the system of terror and to declare a general amnesty, what was happening was quite different. Terror, death sentences and executions were continuing apace. The true masters of Greece, the United States and United Kingdom, were trying to aggravate the situation in that country in order to perpetuate the occupation of Greece and to turn Greece into a strategic and economic springboard for further expansion into the Balkans. In order to carry out those plans the United States and British occupation authorities had abetted the Greek monarcho-fascist Government in its territorial claims upon Albania. Those purposes, which underlay the submission of the item before the Committee, had been unwittingly exposed at the previous meeting by the Greek representative, who had declared that the Athens Government never had abandoned and never would abandon its claim to Northern Epirus. Equally convincing proof of the existence of such a plot had been furnished by the statement of the United Kingdom representative at the same meeting and the latter's proposal regarding alleged firing by Albanian border guards on observers of the Special Committee. That draft resolution became the more significant if account was taken of the chauvinistic hysteria which had beset the monarcho-fascist soldiery in Greece, an attitude which found its expression in the Athens Press, in the slogan "Forward March upon Tirana".

48. No less significant had been the establishment in Paris, on 25 August 1949, as a result of the efforts of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation and the British Intelligence Service, of a committee of Albanian war criminals and quislings under the name of "Free Albania". It was well known that Greek collaborators and quislings had welcomed that Committee and were hoping it would be successful. The Greek Prime

Minister had made a statement on 25 August to the effect that the Greek Government would welcome any movement directed against the Government currently in power in Albania. In that connexion, Mr. Manuilsky asked the representative of France what the reaction of his Government would be if any other country were to shelter an organization which purposed the overthrow of the Government in power in France. The cumulative impact of all those facts made it clear that the Committee was confronted with a sort of international plot against the small and peace-loving Albanian People's Republic.

49. Anxiety must also be expressed with regard to another statement of the Greek representative at the previous meeting, namely that the fact that about 10,000 Greek partisans had found shelter in Albania, Bulgaria and even Czechoslovakia might have the result that the internal war in Greece would inevitably grow into an external war. That statement made it clear that the Greek delegation denied the right of the supporters of democracy to find shelter and succour in another country, and considered that granting shelter to political *émigrés* was a convenient pretext for the unleashing of military conflicts. The possibility of such conflict was broadened so as to cover not only Albania and Bulgaria, but even Romania and Czechoslovakia, which did not have a common border with Greece.

50. The Greek representative, aware of the fact that the Greek children were living far more comfortably in the peoples' democracies than other children lived in Greece itself, had bewailed the fact that, under instruction of the Czechoslovak educational authorities, Greek children were being educated in the spirit of democratic Greece and were being taught to respect the ideals of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. Such a statement added reason to the anxiety expressed by the representative of the Byelorussian SSR as to whether those children, after return to Greece, would not be dispatched to Makronesos Island for "re-education". Those facts made it clear that the Greek representative and others supporting him had praised the work of the Special Committee because the report of that Committee was the principal barb in their slanderous campaign against Albania and Bulgaria. However, that report, concocted mainly on the basis of the testimony of witnesses purveyed by the Greek liaison service, had been subjected to destructive criticism by the USSR representative. The Greek representative's assertion that the leader of the USSR delegation had divided the witnesses into various categories of intelligence was complete nonsense, as it was the credibility of the testimony that had been questioned.

51. Mr. Manuilsky said that the testimony could hardly be considered trustworthy since, for example, one witness had been described as having given incoherent testimony. Another witness was said to have had difficulty in drawing the line between facts and invention. He noted that the same tendency had been displayed in the discussion of the question in the First Committee, notably by the Greek representative in his statement on 29 September (276th meeting) about amnesties and appeal procedures supposedly designed to soften the fate of the defendants. The same thing applied to the section of the report of the Special Committee relating to recruitment of children into partisan detachments. He referred

to the testimony of witnesses Nos. 4/W/371 and 1/W/348 to show the credibility of the materials used by the Special Committee. No credence was attached to the Special Committee not only because of such testimony but because its political assignment had been clear from the start. The pressure that would be exercised upon the Special Committee by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom had also been evident from the first. In that connexion he recalled that the French representative on the Special Committee on the Balkans had set down a minority opinion at variance with the views of the majority on a number of items in the 1948 report to the General Assembly.<sup>1</sup> The signature of that representative was conspicuously absent from the report at present before the Committee, and the present French representative agreed with the findings of the Special Committee. The fact could not be concealed that the political views of the members of the Committee were reflected in all their findings, conclusions and recommendations.

52. It was said that the First Committee could not halt the twentieth century tortures in Greece as such action would involve interference in the internal affairs of that country. When on the other hand it was said that those who had hatched plots for the destruction and overthrow of legitimate national régimes should be judged and punished, it was immediately demanded that such sentences or punishments should be halted and that the defendants should be set free on account of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans was illegal and was contrary to the letter and spirit of the Charter. As had been demonstrated by other speakers, the alleged conciliatory activity of the Special Committee had merely been designed to conceal the intrigues hatched by it against Greek democracy. That had been made clear particularly in the speech of the head of the Soviet Union delegation. The Special Committee had pursued its undermining and seditious activity mostly with the help of observation groups consisting of officers who, as the official reports showed, engaged in the collection of intelligence data. In that connexion Mr. Manuilsky quoted the testimony of a Greek soldier named Yanis Virgos, who had stated that along with a Lieutenant Yorgas, he had collected military and political data in Albania for the British and Americans in the Special Committee. The testimony further stated that the United Nations Special Committee had participated with the Greek General Staff in the direction of operations in the Grammos area. However, that authentic document had received no mention in the Special Committee's conclusions. Nor had the Special Committee questioned the witness further or endeavoured to ascertain the facts. The question could be put why the First Committee itself should not investigate the actions of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans with respect to their participation in military operations in the Grammos area and elsewhere. It was not surprising that his delegation considered the report of the Special Committee untrustworthy. That report was designed to besmirch Albania and Bulgaria in contradiction with the genuine facts and with common sense.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 8.



53. The report was used to justify the aggressive intentions and activities of the Greek monarcho-fascist Government, as the Greek representative had made clear during the previous meeting. That representative had stated that, with or without the support of the United Nations, the Athens Government would continue to do what it had been doing thus far. Such a statement was a direct challenge to the United Nations, and if it was intended that the First Committee should be warned that the Greek Government would not recognize the recommendation of the General Assembly if the latter disagreed with the plans of that Government, the question arose as to why the First Committee should waste its time in a fruitless quest for a solution of the Greek problem.

54. Noting that the United Kingdom representative had rejected the USSR proposals without having studied them, Mr. Manuilsky said that the argument of the representative to the effect that even the withdrawal of foreign troops from Greece would be an intervention in the internal affairs of that country was absurd. Only on the basis of the USSR draft resolution could the situation in Greece be normalized.

55. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) said that the statement of the representative of the Ukrainian SSR threw considerable light on the reasons for the failure of the efforts of the Conciliation Committee. Whatever its intent, the effect of that speech, as well as that of other similar speeches, was not to further peace in Greece and between Greece and its northern neighbours, but to incite efforts to overthrow the Government of Greece. The impression that such speeches left was that the co-operation of those Governments in establishing peace in the Balkans could not be obtained until Greece had a Government of the *Cominform's* choosing.

56. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the statement of the United States representative was not in accordance with the facts. Mr. Cohen knew that the USSR proposals were designed to solve in an immediate and peaceful way both problems which prevented a solution of the Greek question. Those problems were the internal one, the fight of the Greek monarcho-fascist Government against its own people all over Greek territory, and the foreign complications stemming from the internal problem because Greek partisans had fled into Albania. It could not be said, however, that because partisans had fled into Albania, Albania had any responsibility for the situation in Greece. The USSR delegation had therefore submitted its proposals in the First Committee and in the Conciliation Committee. Mr. Malik had received an official statement in the Conciliation Committee that the United States delegation and not only the Greek delegation, which was subject to the former, had not agreed to the USSR proposal. He had also received information to the effect that the Greek representative, aided and incited by the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom, had not agreed either to the USSR proposal or to the proposal of the Albanian delegation for a final solution of one question which was the main source of the

trouble in the external relations, namely the territorial claims and covetousness of the Greek Government. Mr. Malik said that the records of the work of the Conciliation Committee and the report of that Committee (A/C.1/506), as well as the record of the behaviour of the delegations of the United States and Greece, were eloquent evidence of the fact that the United States and the United Kingdom delegations did not want to solve the question peacefully and wished to keep the Greek door ajar in order to retain a foothold in the Balkans. Stating that the only possible way of solving the Greek problem peacefully was set out in the USSR draft resolution, Mr. Malik said that the problem could be solved if the United States delegation, which guided and protected the Greek delegation and Government, were to advise the latter to waive its territorial ambitions and claims on Albania and to stop nurturing designs upon Albania's territorial integrity and political independence.

57. Mr. COHEN (United States of America), pointing out that the First Committee had voted to create a Conciliation Committee consisting of officers of the First Committee and of the General Assembly, and that neither the United States nor the USSR had been appointed to act as the conciliator, stated that the Soviet Union and the *Cominform* countries had rejected the proposals of the duly constituted Conciliation Committee. Responsibility for the rejection of the proposals of that Committee could not be evaded by talking about the so-called rejection of the USSR proposal.

58. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the members of the Conciliation Committee had informed him that it was not they who had rejected the USSR proposals and who had endorsed the Greek alternative formula. The Greek delegation had done that, with the support of the United States and the United Kingdom. Mr. Malik observed that the Greek alternative proposals, in spite of the fact that the words and phrases used had been taken from the Charter and used out of context, had been designed to cover up Greece's expansionist designs upon Albania.

59. He did not think that the United States representative could have agreed so readily to the alternatives if the question had been one of a claim upon American territory.

#### **Point raised by the representative of Yugoslavia**

60. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) believed it to be his duty to draw the attention of the First Committee to a *communiqué* which had arrived from Belgrade half an hour previously, to the effect that the Ministry of the Interior had announced that Hungarian troops and frontier guards had laid down a night-long barrage of automatic weapon fire along the Yugoslav border on the night of 27 October but had not crossed the frontier. The announcement said that Yugoslav troops had been alerted and were waiting on their side of the border ready to beat off any invasion.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND THIRD MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 31 October 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman:* Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

#### **Tribute to the memory of Mr. Stettinius**

1. The CHAIRMAN paid a tribute to the memory of Mr. Stettinius, who had died suddenly on the morning of 31 October 1949, and stated that he would express the Committee's deep sympathy to Mrs. Stettinius and to the family of the deceased in their great loss.

#### **Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (*continued*)**

2. In reply to a question the Netherlands representative had raised at the 302nd meeting, concerning the rule under which a press release (BAL/600) had been published, the CHAIRMAN stated that the press releases prepared by the Department of Public Information were based on official press releases sent to Lake Success by United Nations press officers attached to the various Commissions. Those releases were sent to all delegations as semi-official documents.

3. Press releases from the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans were not published until they had been approved by the Chairman of that Committee, in accordance with the provisions of rule 15 of the Special Committee's rules of procedure.

4. He stated that, in accordance with the decision taken at the 302nd meeting, the list of speakers wishing to take part in the general discussion was closed.

5. He then read a letter (A/C.1/521) sent to him on 27 October 1949 by Mr. N. Mevorah, the Bulgarian observer attached to the United Nations, requesting permission to participate, without vote, in the discussion on the Greek question in the First Committee.

LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE FROM THE BULGARIAN OBSERVER ATTACHED TO THE UNITED NATIONS (A/C.1/521) REQUESTING PERMISSION TO PARTICIPATE WITHOUT VOTE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE

6. Mr. CLEMENTIS (Czechoslovakia) supported the request of the representative of the Bulgarian Government. He suggested that the Committee should also invite the representative of the Albanian Government to attend in the same capacity.

7. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) thought it quite proper that the representatives of the Bulgarian Government and the Albanian Government should have the right, as in the preceding year, to make statements in the First Committee and to be available to reply to any questions the Committee might ask them. He assumed that it was such limited participation that the Bulgarian Government was requesting, since its representative referred to the procedure followed during the preceding session of the General Assembly. He considered that the Committee should follow the established precedent.

8. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) considered that the Committee should comply with the request of the Bulgarian representative to participate without the right to vote in the discussion on the Greek question in the First Committee.

9. He also supported the proposal of the Czechoslovak delegation that the same rights should be granted to the representative of the Albanian Government.

10. Since there was an established procedure for invitations of that type, it was enough to follow that procedure and to give the representatives of the countries invited an opportunity of speaking, without necessarily limiting that right as the United States representative had proposed.

11. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) recalled that, according to the decision adopted by the First Committee the preceding year (170th meeting), the Albanian and Bulgarian representatives had been invited to make statements on the Greek question and then to remain at the Committee's disposal in order to reply to any questions that they might be asked. He proposed that that procedure should be followed during the current session.

12. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that, according to a well-established rule, the representatives of States non-members of the United Nations had the right to participate in the discussion of questions relating to their countries; they had the right to speak in order to express their views, but they could not participate in the voting. That rule should be applied without reservations in extending invitations to the representatives of Bulgaria and Albania, especially in view of the fact that the Committee was dealing with a question in which those countries were the victims of accusations that the USSR delegation considered to be unjustified. It seemed obvious that if new questions involving the original statements made by the representatives of Albania and Bulgaria were to arise during the discussion, those representatives should have an opportunity of speaking for the second time, in order to provide any additional explanations.

13. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) saw no reason why the precedent set in 1948 should be abandoned. As in 1948, Albania and Bulgaria had not co-operated with the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, and there seemed no reason to grant them rights equivalent to those of the members of the First Committee, the sole limitation being that they would not be permitted to take part in the voting.

14. He requested that the United States proposal should be regarded as an amendment to the Czechoslovak proposal.

15. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) did not consider that the existing situation was analogous to that of the previous year. When the question of the participation of the representatives of Bulgaria and Albania in the debates of the First Committee had been discussed in 1948, those representatives had not yet had

an opportunity of taking an active part in the work of the Conciliation Committee. In the existing circumstances, however, a new factor must be taken into account: those two Governments had taken an active part in the work of the Conciliation Committee both at Paris in 1948 and at Lake Success in 1949.

16. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) felt himself obliged to point out that the failure to co-operate involved the relations between the Governments of the two countries concerned and UNSCOB. The fact that those two countries had co-operated in the work of the Conciliation Committee did not eliminate the fact of their having failed to co-operate in the other case. There was therefore no reason to depart from the attitude adopted the previous year.

17. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) found it strange that certain representatives had bitterly reproached Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania for having been unwilling to give explanations to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee at the time of the discussion of the question of the violation of human rights in those countries, and yet, when the representatives of Bulgaria and Albania wished to take part in a discussion in the First Committee, the representative of the United States wanted their rights to be restricted. If Mr. Cohen wanted those representatives to be heard, he should not first try to limit their rights.

18. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) thought that the representative of the United States had clearly shown that his idea was to penalize Albania and Bulgaria for their refusal to co-operate in the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans. What, however, was the meaning of the right granted to a non-member State to take part in the discussion without the right to vote? It meant that the representative of that State would be authorized to make a statement to the Committee and to reply on all points arising out of it to which he might consider a reply necessary. According to Mr. Cohen's proposal, however, that right would be restricted in the current instance and would be granted non-reciprocally, for the members of the First Committee would be able to ask any question whatever, whereas the representatives of Albania and Bulgaria would not be able to ask any questions themselves and would have to confine themselves after their initial statement to replying to the questions put to them.

19. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) pointed out to the representative of the Ukrainian SSR that the invitation which he was proposing was identical with that extended to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee at the time of the examination of the questions relating to human rights.

20. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) saw no reason for departing from the precedent adopted in 1948, for any changes which had taken place in the interim had merely aggravated the situation of the countries concerned. Not only had those States refused to co-operate with the representatives of the United Nations, but they had paid no regard to the decisions of the General Assembly or to the responsibilities which devolved upon them under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Treaties of Peace signed by them. The arguments which the representatives of those two countries would be able to advance would merely

be a repetition of what had already been said in the Committee by the representatives of the Soviet Union and certain other countries.

21. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) thought, rather, that in taking part in the debates of the Committee the representatives of Albania and Bulgaria would be able to explain the attitude of their respective Governments. Mr. Pipinelis had no wish to hear once again an objective statement of the problem under discussion from the neighbours of Greece, for he was well aware that it was clear from the report of the Conciliation Committee that the party which was really to blame for the breakdown of the attempts at conciliation was not the Government of Albania or that of Bulgaria, but in fact the Government of Greece, which wished neither to co-operate peaceably with its neighbours nor to recognize the territorial frontiers between Greece and Albania.

22. Mr. Cohen was showing a complete lack of objectivity and impartiality, for, whereas in the case of the Palestine question he had no objection to the representative of the Arab League and those of various other organizations taking part at great length in the discussion, he was now, in a similar situation, attempting to put the Albanian and Bulgarian delegations in the dock.

23. Mr. DE ALBA (Mexico) expressed the wish that a rule of procedure which would provide a broad solution of the question of principle regarding the hearing of representatives of States not Members of the United Nations should be included in the rules of procedure.

24. The rules of procedure of international conferences usually included a clause providing that observers had the right to take their place at the table and speak in the debate at the request of the Chairman or whenever one of the representatives taking part in the conference asked them a question. They could not, however, speak on their own initiative.

25. Since the representatives of the Governments of Albania and Bulgaria were present as observers, it would seem appropriate that a rule of procedure of that kind should be adopted, not only in connexion with the case under discussion but once and for all. In any case, the members of the Committee who might wish to support those observers would have the right to put to them any question which might enable them to present their point of view.

26. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) thought that it was not a question of granting special privileges to the representatives of Albania and Bulgaria. It was rather a question of applying the general rule to them, without the restrictions proposed by the representative of the United States.

27. What, in fact, the representatives of Greece and the United States wanted was to curtail the right of the representatives of Albania and Bulgaria to participate in the discussion, simply because, in the Conciliation Committee, they had not agreed to the Greek proposals whose objective had been the annexation of part of the territory of Albania. Thus it was merely a matter of reprisal.

28. There were many precedents for the invitation of non-member States to participate in discussions. There was, for example, the occasion

when the representatives of the Arab League had participated in the discussion on the Palestine question. No restrictions had been imposed on that occasion. The rule concerning the participation of non-member States in the Committee's work was a general rule; if it were also borne in mind that the representatives of Albania and Bulgaria had taken an active part in the work of the Conciliation Committee, it would appear only reasonable to invite them to participate fully in the First Committee's work as well, except for the right to vote.

29. Mr. MAKIN (Australia) saw no reason to change the procedure that had been adopted by 39 votes to 6 during the previous session (170th meeting). He proposed that a similar text should be put to the vote immediately.

30. The CHAIRMAN put the United States amendment to the Czechoslovak proposal to the vote.

*The United States amendment was adopted by 46 votes to 6, with 3 abstentions.*

31. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, although he had voted against the United States amendment, he would support the Czechoslovak proposal as amended, because he thought that the representatives of Albania and Bulgaria should be allowed to decide for themselves whether they wished to submit to the restrictions which the Committee had decided to impose upon them.

*The Czechoslovak proposal, as amended by the United States, was adopted by 53 votes, with 1 abstention.*

32. The CHAIRMAN opened the discussion on the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom (A/C.1/519).

#### DISCUSSION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM DRAFT RESOLUTION (A/C.1/519)

33. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) pointed out that the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans had not made any formal request that steps should be taken by the General Assembly or the First Committee concerning the incident mentioned in the United Kingdom proposal. Consequently there was no reason whatever for the Committee to discuss the question. That was but another proof that the representatives of certain countries paid no attention whatever to legal or procedural considerations, but were guided solely by their desire to seize any pretext for submitting draft resolutions directed against countries where the system of government was not to their liking.

34. Mr. McNeil had attempted to make a press release pass as an official report from the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans and to convince the First Committee that his draft resolution on the subject should be adopted immediately. If Mr. McNeil was so assiduous a reader of press releases published by the Department of Public Information at Lake Success, he was doubtless also aware of press releases BAL/586, 579, 585, 590 and 593, all of which recorded violations of the Albanian frontier by Greek Government forces. Those press releases had made no impression on the United Kingdom representative but if a single press release stated that shots had been fired at United Nations ob-

servers, allegedly from Albanian territory, that was sufficient for the representative of the United Kingdom to make him submit a draft resolution asking for steps to be taken against the Albanian Government. It was, however, quite clear that the tension prevailing all along the frontier and the numerous skirmishes provoked by Greek forces might give rise to all sorts of statements and allegations. The Greek Government was responsible for all those incidents because the tension was increased and frontier incidents were caused by the flight of Greek guerrillas into Albanian territory in an attempt to escape from the monarcho-fascist terrorism. Moreover, when Greek troops invaded Albanian territory, that country had to take steps to expel them. In such circumstances, it was difficult to make sure that there were no United Nations observers among them. To adopt the United Kingdom proposal would amount to exploiting the currently difficult situation in order to envenom the relations between Greece and the countries concerned; it would make it possible to hold the neighbouring countries responsible whenever any attacks were made on United Nations observers. If the Greek Government considered it necessary to have foreign observers on its territory, it was for that Government to guarantee their safety.

35. The Soviet Union delegation considered, therefore, that there was no need to discuss the United Kingdom draft resolution in detail or to take any decision on the subject, since the question it dealt with was not on the Committee's agenda.

36. The CHAIRMAN read a telegram which the Secretary-General had just received from the Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, stating that press release BAL/600 had been based on a telegram from Observation Group 2 at Kastoria. The latter telegram stated that, at 2.35 p.m. on 25 October, shots had been fired from Albanian territory at UNSCOB observers who, accompanied by a Greek liaison officer, had been investigating the frontier incidents of 13 and 17 October. The Greek forces had not returned the fire and there had been no casualties.

37. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that the report of the Secretariat which had been read at the beginning of the meeting made two things clear: first, that the press release in question was based on the report of the United Nations press officer with UNSCOB, and secondly, that it was not really an official document.

38. It was an exaggeration, therefore, for the United Kingdom draft resolution to refer to "the report from observers of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans". No report from United Nations observers had been available when the draft resolution had been tabled on Friday 28 October; there had only been a press release based on the report of a press officer.

39. Furthermore, the very first words of the cable from the Chairman of UNSCOB, which had just been read, referred to the discussion in the First Committee on the United Kingdom draft resolution. Had there been no such discussion, UNSCOB would not have felt compelled to send any report to anyone on the alleged incident of 25 October.

40. The First Committee could not therefore adopt the United Kingdom draft resolution, which was not based on official documents. The author of the resolution, who was urging its immediate adoption, had admitted that it contained an inferential criticism of the Albanian Government. The aim was to hold that Government responsible for the alleged attack of 25 October.

41. If the United Kingdom delegation was really anxious to ascertain the true facts, it would request the Secretary-General to investigate the alleged incident of 25 October. Indeed, the shots might have been fired from Greek territory. The necessary geographical information was not available to the First Committee, which, on the sole basis of a United Kingdom statement submitted together with a communication from the Chairman of UNSCOB, was being asked to censure Albania. The aim of the manoeuvre was clear: under the pretext of taking a quick decision to protect human lives, it was intended to prejudice the issue raised by the draft resolution of the United States, which, with the eager support of the United Kingdom, China and Australia (A/C.1/513), was trying to deliver certain condemnations. The United Kingdom delegation was certainly displaying touching solicitude for its staff working with UNSCOB; the best way to ascertain the facts, however, would be to request the Secretary-General to obtain information from the Albanian Government and then to report to the First Committee.

42. In any case, the First Committee could not take a hasty decision on the basis of exceedingly flimsy information, the mysterious significance of which could hardly be explained by the United Kingdom delegation itself.

43. Mr. CLEMENTIS (Czechoslovakia) said that, even assuming for the sake of argument that the facts mentioned in the cable read to the First Committee were true, the United Kingdom had no right whatever to assert that the incident in question—the most recent of a long series of frontier incidents—was a deliberate attack on UNSCOB. The United Kingdom representative himself could not really prove that that was the case; yet he wanted the Secretary-General to request the Albanian Government to cease its attacks upon UNSCOB.

44. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) said that his delegation had never suggested that there had been a deliberate attack on the part of Albania; on the contrary, it had taken great care to indicate that conditions in the mountainous frontier region were such that an incident could easily occur without the knowledge of the central Government. It was, however, the duty of the First Committee to take all necessary steps to protect the lives of those who were working for it.

45. The Polish representative had obviously been labouring under some misapprehension when he had asserted that the United Kingdom representative had admitted his intention to criticize the Albanian Government. The United Kingdom delegation had, on the contrary, tried to word its draft resolution in such a way as to contain no criticism of anyone. If there was an inferential criticism of the Albanian Government in the resolution, it was unavoidable.

46. The representative of the Soviet Union had asked why the United Kingdom delegation paid so much attention to the press release in question

while totally ignoring the releases of the United Nations Department of Public Information quoting Albanian assertions regarding frontier incidents allegedly provoked by Greek units. There was, however, a considerable difference between the two kinds of releases. It was a question, on the one hand, of unverified allegations, and on the other, of a communication from UNSCOB made in accordance with the rules of procedure of that body; its rule 15 laid down that UNSCOB should publish official press *communiqués*, previously approved by its Chairman. It would be quite different if, for instance, Albania were taking part in the work of UNSCOB and if, in the course of an inquiry made on its territory, United Nations observers were fired upon. In such a case, the press release drawing attention to those facts would be of the same nature as that dealt with in the United Kingdom draft resolution. And were such a case to occur, the United Kingdom delegation would show the same concern for the security of United Nations observers.

47. The representative of Poland had stated that it was difficult for the observers to know whether the firing came from the other side of the frontier. For men who were literally on the frontier, it was not so difficult to identify the direction from which the firing came.

48. The United Kingdom delegation had not wished to criticize the Albanian Government or to introduce a controversial tone into the debate. Its sole aim in submitting its draft resolution (A/C.1/519) had been to show its concern for United Nations personnel.

49. The CHAIRMAN put the United Kingdom draft resolution to the vote.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 46 votes to 6, with 3 abstentions.*

#### GENERAL DISCUSSION (*continued*)

50. Mr. CLEMENTIS (Czechoslovakia) said that no one denied the importance and seriousness of the problem, even if there was some difference of opinion as to its origin, the means of solving it, and the nature of the threats to Greek independence.

51. The real movers of draft resolution A/C.1/513, the United States and the United Kingdom, were repeating their accusations, with due regard for the change in attitude of one of Greece's northern neighbours; they asserted that the threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece came fundamentally from Albania and Bulgaria. The UNSCOB report, however, brought in Romania as well, and during the discussion mention had been made of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In the absence of any real evidence and proof, an attempt was being made, by means of fantastic accusations, to distract attention from the events which had really brought about the existing situation in Greece.

52. The true aspirations of the Greek people were represented by those members of the resistance who had taken up arms against the nazi-fascist invaders. The armed intervention of the United Kingdom in December 1944 had, however, outlawed those representatives of the Greek people; according to Mr. McNeil's words in the First Committee on 26 October 1948 (172nd meeting) it was a question of establishing a Government friendly to the United Kingdom and of

meeting "imperative" strategic requirements; or, in the words used by Mr. Dulles regarding the United States intervention which had followed that of the United Kingdom, it was a question of launching a counter-attack in the struggle against world communism. In view of such a formulation of the Greek problem, it might be asked what had become of the interests, the aspirations and the sovereignty of the Greek people.

53. It had of course been said at the previous session of the General Assembly that United Kingdom and United States intervention had followed upon the request of the legal Government of Greece, and that consequently there was no "intervention" according to international law. But, first of all, how had that Government come to power? After armed British intervention in December 1944, followed by a short armistice, fascist bands, supported by the present régime and by the British Military Authorities, had attacked the democratic elements in the country and had unleashed a reign of terror; in the period from December 1944 to March 1946, the number of victims had risen to 1,500. Then came the elections and, in order to form an opinion on the nature of the present Greek Government, which at times had controlled no more than one-third of the territory, it was only necessary to consider the number of abstentions and the non-participation of certain parties in the elections of 31 March 1946.

54. In his book *Behind the Curtain*, John Gunther had been forced to admit that without military help from the United States the Greek Government and Army could not survive more than a few days. Mr. Gunther considered that Greece had become a "client" State which might well come under complete United States control. Mr. Gunther had used understatement, but he had admitted a little farther on that the Army, Government, finances and parliament of Greece, down to the smallest factory, were virtually under United States control. It should also be mentioned that all American personnel in Greece enjoyed extra-territorial privileges.

55. Greek sovereignty was admittedly demonstrated by the issue of postage stamps as Mr. McNeil would say (299th meeting), but that did not justify the accusations levelled against Albania and Bulgaria; it was ridiculous to allege that those States were threatening the political "independence" of Greece.

56. As to the territorial integrity of Greece, neither UNSCOB, whose task it was to collect proof in support of an untenable thesis, nor the authors of draft resolution A/C.1/513 had been able to quote a single fact relating to the so-called activities of Greece's neighbours against Greek territory. In reality it was the Greek Government which did not wish to admit that its frontier with Albania was final; hence the failure of the Conciliation Committee.

57. The title of the First Committee agenda item under consideration was therefore misleading. The Special Committee, a costly body, had been unable to prove that there was a single foreign soldier in the ranks of the Greek Democratic Army, or to deny that thousands of young Greeks had been sent to concentration camps for their refusal to take part in a fratricidal struggle on behalf of monarcho-fascists and foreigners.

58. Mr. Vyshinsky had irrefutably proved (300th meeting) how empty were the accusations in the UNSCOB report, which were being produced as evidence by the champions of the American war in Greece.

59. As regards chapters 3 and 4 of the report, on the subject of Greek refugees, and particularly of children who had fled from the hell of war and sought refuge in other countries, Czechoslovakia being one of them, the representatives of El Salvador, of the United Kingdom and some other countries had expressed their indignation at the alleged recruitment of children as combatants in the ranks of the guerrillas.

60. The United States and United Kingdom delegations wanted the General Assembly to condemn the countries which had received Greek children. According to paragraph 131 of the UNSCOB report (A/935), "some 25,000 Greek children have been removed from Greece and retained in the territories of the northern neighbours of Greece and other countries". Paragraphs 121 and 123 dealt with the so-called recruitment of Greek children. It was sufficient to read paragraph 120 to form an opinion on the biased and, it might be said, cynical attitude of the Special Committee; it was there stated that children "had been removed from their homes in Greece by the guerrillas . . . allegedly for humanitarian reasons". The children had really escaped from hell. Yet UNSCOB went so far as to insinuate that the Greek democratic forces had intended to force them to fight. True, UNSCOB gave only five examples in all. It was also stated in paragraph 121 that children "aged from five to seventeen" had been drafted into fighting units: yet no mention of a typographical error was to be found in the list of *errata*.

61. The real facts of the case were the following: the children had been removed from the fighting area at the express request of their parents. The transfer had never been made against the wishes of the parents, and, in many cases, the mother or another member of the family had accompanied the children. Not even the Special Committee had been able to produce more than one false witness to the contrary in its preceding report. The latest report no longer even contained a mention of "forcible" removal of Greek children.

62. Monarcho-fascist propaganda had tried to make world public opinion believe that the children were living in appalling conditions. However, UNSCOB had been forced to admit in paragraph 133 of its report (A/935) that the living conditions of the children abroad "have been found to be satisfactory". That was, of course, an understatement; the children were being cared for as never before. It was true that Mr. Pipinelis had lamented the fact that Greek children in Czechoslovakia were receiving a democratic education.

63. The joint draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/514 asked for a condemnation of Czechoslovakia which was alleged to have failed to comply with the unanimous General Assembly resolution 193 C (III) on the return of Greek children to their country. That accusation was entirely unfounded. According to document A/1014, the Czechoslovak Red Cross had identified 138 children on a list of 5,060 names sent by the International Red Cross. But the Czechoslovak Red Cross was somewhat reluctant to supply the



names of all the children on Czechoslovak territory, and the adoption of a new resolution by the usual majority in the General Assembly would not remove its scruples on that point. If it was certain that the children had been removed from Greece at the request of their parents, it was equally certain that that fact would be interpreted by the monarcho-fascists as a sign of collusion with the democratic army; and "banditism" was punishable by death. A dispatch from Athens in *The New York Times* of 29 October had announced that Greek Prime Minister Alexander Diomedes had stated that neither the United States nor the United Kingdom were in favour of an amnesty; that meant that the Athens Government was determined on vengeance. The Czechoslovak Red Cross did not want to be an accomplice in such crimes or to be responsible for the banishment of those children to the ill-famed isles of Greece.

64. Neither the Special Committee nor the International Red Cross had deemed it necessary to concern itself with the fate of the children remaining in Greece, either because they had not wished to intervene in the "domestic affairs of Greece" or because they had wanted to avoid mentioning the atrocities committed by the monarcho-fascist units against children in prisons and concentration camps. According to the *Salonika* newspaper *Nea Alitheia*, 512 children had frozen to death in one of the camps; according to the Government newspaper *To Vima*, of 1 January 1949, children were begging night and day in the streets of Athens, and little girls were wandering around the cafés and cabarets at all hours of the night. American journalists had reported that children were dying in Athens for lack of care; and a Government *communiqué* of 31 March 1949 had given the number of orphaned or abandoned children as 340,000. Furthermore, Greek children were being murdered in the fighting area by the arms imported under the well-known doctrine. But the United States and United Kingdom draft resolution wanted Czechoslovakia to be condemned for having failed to return to Greece children who were living in the best possible conditions, far from the civil war.

65. The Czechoslovak Red Cross had to exercise great caution in respect of the declarations about the return of their children made by parents remaining in Greece. On 13 December, in the region of Kastoria, the 73rd Brigade had forced mothers at the point of machine-guns to sign declarations that the guerrillas had taken their children away from them by force.

66. Only one thing was to be deplored—that no more than 25,000 children had been saved. But doubtless the representatives of El Salvador and the United Kingdom were ignorant of the fate of hundreds of thousands of Greek children, who, nevertheless, deserved some attention.

67. Mr. DE FREITAS VALLE (Brazil) recalled that he had said at the inaugural meeting of the Security Council<sup>1</sup> that the Council would be able to stop trouble-makers. It was rather unexpected that Greece should come to be seen as the defendant, when it was certainly not the maker of troubles occurring on its territory. The proof of that was that the Greek Government, unlike its

neighbours, had always complied with United Nations recommendations.

68. The UNSCOB report showed that the Greek irregulars had received, and were still receiving, considerable assistance from Albania and Bulgaria. Thus paragraph 64 of the report said: "From consideration of the cumulative evidence in the statements of witnesses, from direct observation which corroborates this evidence and from the other types of information . . . the Special Committee has been able to reach its conclusions."

69. The Special Committee was entitled to expect appreciation of its work. The difficulties it had encountered had been enormous. The Brazilian delegation thought that UNSCOB's mandate should be prolonged.

70. As the representative of the Soviet Union had said it was difficult to know which witness could be relied upon, but paragraph 64 of the UNSCOB report showed the sincerity of UNSCOB's efforts to overcome that difficulty.

71. The Special Committee needed assistance from all those who had the happiness of the Greek people sincerely at heart, and it was to be hoped that the First Committee would be given details on the atrocities alleged to have taken place in the "death islands", when men and animals had been tied together in sacks and thrown into the water. It was most regrettable that the Soviet Union had not thought fit to send a representative to Athens to take part in the work of the Special Committee. But the Soviet Union's interest in the Greek question, as shown by the submission of document A/C.1/518, was encouraging.

72. The Brazilian delegation could not approve the proposal to establish an international control commission to supervise elections in Greece. From the very first meetings of the Security Council, Brazil had considered that elections should not be held under foreign control, except in the case of victorious military authorities. Even in that case, the sole intention of control should be the re-establishment of normal political conditions.

73. The delegation of the Soviet Union had communicated interesting documents on the assistance the Greek guerrillas were allegedly receiving from French and Italian ports. The General Assembly might usefully request France and Italy to put an end to such shipments of arms, and forward to them the documents submitted by the Soviet Union. But UNSCOB's evidence on the assistance given to the guerrillas by Albania and Bulgaria and, to a certain extent, by Romania and Yugoslavia was still valid. The First Committee should therefore press Bulgaria and Albania to establish normal diplomatic relations with Greece and make every effort to settle existing difficulties. The Greek questions could be solved in that manner, and not by making speeches full of hatred.

74. In regard to the distinction drawn between the Greek people and the Greek Government, such insinuations had also been heard in the cases of Hitler and Mussolini, and even of certain Governments represented in the United Nations. But that method had always been useless. It would be better for the Governments of the Balkan countries to forget their ideological conflicts and their grievances, and to try to re-establish peace

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council*, First Year, Fifth Series, No. 1, page 10.

between themselves through diplomatic negotiations. There were undoubtedly serious territorial difficulties, but the leaders of those countries could surely follow the path of wisdom shown by the Republics of Latin America.

LETTER DATED 31 OCTOBER 1949 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FROM THE ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE UNITED KINGDOM DRAFT RESOLUTION. (A/C.1/519)

75. Mr. PROTITCH (Secretary of the First Committee) read a letter dated 31 October 1949 from the Albanian Government to the Secretary-General. Referring to the statement made on 28 October (301st meeting) by the United Kingdom delegation, which had been based on press *communiqués*, and to the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/519), the Albanian observer with the United Nations formally stated that the report of shots being fired from Albanian territory on UNSCOB observers was untrue, and wished to reject the accusations levelled against Albania.

76. The Albanian delegation further stated that at 3 a.m. on 25 October 1949, monarcho-fascist soldiers had advanced fifty metres inside Albanian territory in the vicinity of pyramid 39. An Albanian patrol had opened fire, and the provocateurs had been forced to return to Greek territory. That incident had taken place near the village of Bracan, mentioned in the UNSCOB *communiqué*.

77. At 5 p.m., on the same day, monarcho-fascist soldiers had fired five machine-gun salvos on the Albanian frontier post situated near pyramid 69-70.

78. Apart from those Greek provocations, according to the Albanian communication, there

had been no other incidents on the Greco-Albanian frontier on 25 October.

79. The communication from the Albanian Government concluded with a reference to the Albanian telegram of 28 October concerning recent provocations by the monarcho-fascist forces in regard to Albania.

80. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), referring to the communication that had just been read, said it was clear that the First Committee had acted in a partial manner and with excessive haste in voting the United Kingdom draft resolution.

81. The First Committee should in the future avoid repeating the error of adopting a resolution without giving a hearing to the party concerned.

82. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) said that his delegation had carefully considered the Albanian Government's communication and entirely understood why that Government had felt compelled to make such a statement.

83. It was very surprising that the Albanian Government had not taken advantage of the facilities made available to it by the First Committee for the investigation of just such incidents as that brought up by the United Kingdom. It was therefore quite out of place that the Soviet Union representative should suggest that any delegation had asked the First Committee to take a decision without affording the Albanian Government the opportunity of stating its position and without making suitable enquiries on the incident.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND FOURTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 31 October 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### **Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans—general discussion (continued)**

##### REPORT OF THE CONCILIATION COMMITTEE (continued)

1. FAYEZ EL-KHOURI Bey (Syria) emphasized the historical, cultural and geographical links between his people and the people of Greece. The concern of his delegation with the problem under discussion was equally justified by the fact that his country's fate could not be separated from the fate of its neighbours. The Syrian delegation felt that it was its duty to express its opinion on the matter before the Committee, as on other similar matters, and thus help in solving problems brought before the Organization by peaceful and just means. However, it was not easy for the delegation of a small country to express its opinion with sincerity and frankness, especially when the problem in question was the subject of a dispute between the great Powers. The Syrian representative referred to an incident which had taken place during the discussion in the Committee the pre-

vious week, when, after a certain speech, the Chairman had stated that it was the duty of the Chair to protect the representatives on the Committee from any kind of intimidation. That incident might be of no real significance, and any apprehension resulting from it might be unfounded and unjustified; in any case it might not apply to those delegations whose geographical situation placed them far from the area of dispute. Geographical situation could be a blessing or a curse. In spite of Syria's critical geographical situation, his delegation believed it to be its duty to take part in the discussion and express its views. It was also its duty to reiterate the attitude which Syria humbly advised the small nations to take in conflicts between the great Powers. The small nations had to avoid participation in those conflicts and should limit themselves to taking sides only in problems of direct interest to themselves or of interest to world peace and security. The problem before the Committee was in origin a quarrel between different political parties in Greece. Quarrels between Greece or between peoples in the Balkans were chronic and a normal thing in that part of the world. Even those complications which appeared at present were to some extent the result of the interference of foreign Powers in local quarrels; he added that

the Balkans in general and Greece in particular were in a very bad geographical situation from that political point of view.

2. He did not think that there was an easy or even a possible solution to be found at the present session. The United Nations should help alleviate the ordeal of the Greek people and protect its freedom, enabling them to deal with their internal affairs as they deemed appropriate and necessary for the recovery of their country. His delegation would therefore support any resolution which would guarantee freedom and security for Greece. In conclusion, the Syrian representative stated that no interference in Greece's own policies could be imposed unless requested and agreed upon by the legal and constitutional Government of that country, set up as the result of elections which had taken place under international supervision.

3. Mr. MAKIN (Australia) said that while thorough discussion of the report of the Special Committee was most valuable, it was the conviction of his delegation that the time had come for the Committee to turn its attention to more practical matters in a further effort to help resolve the Balkan dispute. Recalling that his delegation had urged that every possible contribution be made to help the work of the Conciliation Committee, he observed with regret that with the exception of some formulae offered to that Committee, no really practical steps had been taken and few concrete suggestions or ideas had since been put forward. Mr. Makin said that the Australian delegation had always taken a leading interest in the promotion of peace in the Balkans by means of conciliation. The possibility of establishing a basis for the renewal of conciliatory efforts had been indicated rather than denied in the report of the Conciliation Committee (A/C.1/506). It seemed likely that the joint draft resolution under review (A/C.1/513) would be accepted in one form or another, and for that reason, as well as in his delegation's conviction that some practical steps could and must be taken, he would suggest a sketch plan that could be implemented under paragraphs 12 and 13 of the joint draft resolution.

4. Pointing out that the plan was not a rigid one, Mr. Makin said that it was in the nature of a series of suggestions which could either be cleared through the Conciliation Committee or discussed in the First Committee. It was the belief of his delegation that whatever future relationships might exist between Greece and its northern neighbours, some plan of that nature would have to be considered eventually if there was to be any settlement in the Balkans. The Australian proposals related to the problem of those Greek nationals who had for various reasons left the country. The fact, officially acknowledged by Albania and Yugoslavia, that, as a result of recent military operations, the number of Greek guerrillas and other Greek nationals in Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had greatly increased presented a grave problem not only to Greece but also for the northern neighbours themselves. The United Nations must make every possible contribution to the solution of that problem as, apart from the individual privation and suffering involved, the presence of so many Greek citizens in the territories of the northern neighbours would be a constant source of irritation and would con-

stitute a grave threat to peace throughout the Balkans. His delegation believed that it was the duty of the United Nations to initiate action to secure the repatriation to Greece of as many of those persons as possible thus removing that threat to world peace. While achievement of that end would require the co-operation of the northern neighbours, there was reason to believe that the chances of obtaining that co-operation were now brighter than ever before. Since the guerrillas had been virtually driven out of Greece, the problem of their return would involve negotiations with the countries that had given them shelter but did not involve any negotiations with the guerrillas. Attention should also be drawn to the impressive evidence that many of the guerrillas had been conscripted and forced to fight for a cause to which they were opposed or at least indifferent. There was also some evidence that many had ceased to support the cause which had changed radically and which they no longer understood. In any case, ample evidence existed that those people would gladly return to Greece if given a suitable opportunity. The Australian proposal would also offer the northern neighbours a new opportunity of giving active support to a United Nations effort to end a situation that might easily endanger world peace. The Australian delegation therefore submitted for the consideration of the Committee a sketch project which Mr. Makin outlined, setting out a scheme for an appeal for the return to Greece of all Greek nationals who had sought refuge in or had been taken to the territories of the three northern neighbours and other countries. No Greek national would be forced to return against his or her will. It was envisaged that all persons would return under a United Nations guarantee of safe custody to a "protected" area, outside of Greek territory, which would be maintained and administered exclusively by the United Nations through the Secretary-General. Such persons would be assured protection as long as they remained in that area, and their departure from the area to destinations inside Greece would be subject to whatever conditions and guarantees the Greek Authorities might deem advisable. Departure to destinations elsewhere would be subject to whatever conditions the Secretary-General, or the country willing to accept that person, might deem advisable.

5. After arrival in the area, a period would follow during which persons acceptable to the Greek Authorities would gradually leave the area and be reabsorbed into civil life. A proportion of more difficult cases would of course remain, but would cease to be subject to propaganda against the Greek Government, and many of them, as the peaceful reconstruction of Greece proceeded, would acquire incentive to co-operate in their country's development. Eventually only a small hard core of irreconcilable elements would remain, which group might go to countries willing to accept them. Their maintenance would present a minor problem of which the Greek Government could be relieved. Stressing the advantages of the United Nations assuming responsibility for such a scheme, Mr. Makin said that if the appeal succeeded, the power and prestige of the United Nations would be increased all over the world. Moreover the scheme could not fail completely, since some guerrillas would have had the opportunity to return home and the General Assembly

would be in a position to gauge the situation from a new angle. The mere effort would be a moral victory, and he emphasized that any steps designed to put an end to the terrible and distressing problem before the Committee must be given very serious consideration.

6. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) said that he understood perfectly the earnest and disinterested character of the Syrian representative's submission. However, that representative's advice to small countries was open to a good deal of scrutiny. He recalled that sixteen years previously, the then Foreign Minister of the USSR, Mr. Litvinov, had reminded the small nations that there was no longer such a thing as neutrality. That statement did seem to be largely true in the modern age. The Committee was at present considering the indignities and difficulties foisted upon a small country by what was in the final analysis one great Power. Mr. McNeil wished to point out that small countries, if they did not heed the difficulties in which other small countries were placed, might later find themselves in the same position.

7. Mr. McNeil said that his delegation, like all others, was very interested in the ambitious and involved Australian proposal. While he did not wish to discourage such a commendable and studious submission, at first glance the matter seemed to be one to come at the end of a process. At any rate, paragraphs 12 and 13 of the joint draft resolution authorized such action. However, at the present moment the suggested scheme scarcely arose.

8. Referring to the statement of the representative of the Ukrainian SSR, at a previous meeting of the Committee (302nd meeting), who had complained of his dealing with the USSR proposals in an off-hand manner, Mr. McNeil emphasized that he had only given his initial reaction to the USSR proposals but would examine them in greater detail later. The proposed appeal to the conflicting parties to cease military operations, contained in the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/518), had been very interesting and it was now clear that the *communiqué* of the so-called Democratic Army, stating that it had ceased to fight, had not been unconnected with the renewal by Mr. Vyshinsky of those proposals which Mr. Gromyko had given publicity the previous spring. He wished to repeat, however, that there was no assurance that that army, which had retreated into Albania and Bulgaria, would not at some future date take up its arms once again as, in its own phrase, it had only been grounded temporarily, and again threaten or attempt to threaten the independence of Greece.

9. The first USSR proposal, that for a general amnesty, while desirable, was primarily a matter for the Greek Government to decide when the latter was in a position to grant such relaxations of security measures as were consistent with security. A number of relaxations had already been granted, and he had every hope that the Greek Government would extend those leniency measures. It was not, however, for the General Assembly to commend such a course to the Greek Government. He doubted whether Mr. Vyshinsky would appreciate a recommendation that the USSR Government should grant an amnesty to some of the political prisoners whom for doubtless the best of reasons Mr. Vyshinsky had been

instrumental in committing to prison at different times.

10. Turning to the second point of the USSR proposal, Mr. McNeil said that he was sure that the Greek Government would in due course announce its intention of holding free elections. It would be realized, however, that the conditions brought about in Greece by the foreign-aided rebellion had rendered it difficult for elections to be held. Thus quite recently nearly three-quarters of a million refugees had been driven from their homes by the rebels. In that connexion, Mr. McNeil regretted that the Czechoslovak representative in referring to the matter (303rd meeting) had not faced that question of responsibility. Referring to the provision in the USSR proposal to the effect that the body responsible for carrying out elections should include representatives of Greek democratic circles at the head of the National Freedom Movement in Greece, Mr. McNeil said that the USSR intention was clearly that the leaders who had been attempting to overthrow the legitimate Greek Government for three years should now, their military efforts having failed, be in a position to assume "legal" opposition to the Greek Government. The Greek Government and people could have no confidence in any opposition or Government in which those rebel leaders participated. In any case, those were matters for the Greek Government itself to decide.

11. As for the third point of the USSR proposal, suggesting that the elections be supervised by representatives of the great Powers, he recalled that an invitation had already been issued for the participation of the Government of the Soviet Union in the supervision of the elections of 1946 and that, on that occasion, the USSR Government had refused the invitation on the grounds that it was opposed in principle to the supervision of national elections by foreign States. He suspected that the Committee knew the reasons for that refusal at the time. Quite different kinds of elections had been about to take place in Bulgaria and Romania, and Mr. Vyshinsky did not want to create a precedent which would have permitted scrutiny by Allied observers. Now that those elections were a thing of the past, Mr. Vyshinsky had changed his position and wished his Government to assist in the supervision of the new Greek elections. However, the supervision of elections could only be undertaken at the invitation of the Government concerned and could not be imposed.

12. As for the establishment of a joint commission of Powers, which would include the Soviet Union, to control the frontiers between Greece and its northern neighbours, Mr. McNeil pointed out that such a commission had been in existence for the past two years and that the USSR and Poland were entitled to participate in its work. He recalled that on 25 November 1947 UNSCOB had requested the Secretary-General to inform Poland and the Soviet Union of the Special Committee's hope for their co-operation. The attitude of non-co-operation displayed by the USSR and Poland was reflected by the lack of co-operation shown by the three northern neighbours of Greece. Later, after the renewal of UNSCOB's mandate, invitations had again been addressed to those two countries in January 1949 and to the USSR in July 1949. The USSR had declined that new invitation and Poland had sent no reply. Moreover, copies of all Special Committee docu-

ments had been transmitted regularly to the Governments of Poland and the Soviet Union. It was clear that Mr. Vyshinsky could not blame anybody but himself and his Government if the Soviet Union was not represented on an organ carrying out the duties he now proposed.

13. With regard to the cessation of military assistance to the Greek Government, the United Kingdom representative said that he had made it clear that the Committee was concerned with the illegal aid to a faction conspiring to overthrow the legal Greek Government rather than with military assistance given with the consent of that Government. It was the former which must be stopped and which could be stopped if the USSR Government were to influence Bulgaria and Albania towards ceasing the supply of aid to the rebels.

14. Mr. McNeil said that it would perhaps be appropriate to inform the Committee of an official statement made that very day in the House of Commons, to the effect that in accordance with its intentions to withdraw British troops from Greece as soon as practicable, the United Kingdom Government had informed the Greek Government that the troops remaining in Greece would be withdrawn in the near future, in view of the altered situation resulting from the victories of the Greek armies. The statement emphasized, however, that the various British military missions to Greece would not be withdrawn at the same time, and that the withdrawal of troops did not mean any lessening of interest in the security and well-being of the Greek people. He hoped that it would be conceded by those familiar with the situation that British troops had behaved with dignity and propriety throughout those difficult years. His Government had been grateful for the opportunity of discharging an obligation to the people of Greece which he hoped would be remembered in that part of the world as a not insignificant piece of co-operation between those two peoples.

15. Any pressing of the points included in the USSR proposal would involve violation of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, which many delegations including that of the USSR had scrupulously desired to observe in the case of other countries featured in problems before the present session of the General Assembly. In that connexion he quoted a reply given by Mr. Bevin on behalf of the United Kingdom Government to the efforts at conciliation made by Dr. Evatt when he was President of the General Assembly. That reply had been to the effect that the policy of the United Kingdom Government was based on the fact that the Greek Government and parliament had been elected under international supervision and that rebellion against that Government must be dealt with by the Greek Government itself. The steps suggested by Dr. Evatt would involve interference in the internal affairs of Greece which would be regarded by the Greek Government as an affront to its independence. If other Governments, the reply continued, adhered to the same principle of non-interference in Greek domestic affairs, the rebellion would very soon come to an end. Mr. McNeil said that none of the points put forward in the USSR draft resolution was acceptable, least of all that the Special Committee should be dissolved. That Committee still had to ensure that the threat

to Greece, which had fortunately been reduced, did not spring again into being with further action by the guerrillas waiting in Albania and Bulgaria who were ready to take up the struggle at a given signal.

16. As he had predicted, Mr. Vyshinsky had endeavoured to discredit the testimony offered by the Special Committee. The USSR representative had drawn attention, as had another representative at the previous meeting, to the minor violations of the Albanian frontier by Greek forces. Those Albanian complaints had been investigated by the Special Committee (annexes (C) and (E) of document A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/39) in spite of the refusal of the Albanian Government to co-operate with it in any degree. The lack of completeness of those investigations had been due primarily to the fact that the observers had no access to Albanian territory. The burden of the USSR representative's speech had been, however, an attempt to discredit the testimony of witnesses before the Special Committee as well as that of the observers of UNSCOB, and therefore to invalidate the conclusions upon which the First Committee and the General Assembly must eventually base their action. In that connexion he wished to point out that it would be impossible for the United Nations or any part thereof, including the specialized agencies, to carry out its work efficiently or coherently unless it was assumed that the servants of the Organization, who were carefully selected, were impartial and meticulous in their observation and reporting.

17. Mr. McNeil said that he particularly wished to direct the attention of the USSR representative to paragraphs 62, 63 and 64 of the Special Committee's report, in which the members of that body had attempted to meet the difficulty posed by the credibility of witnesses. Moreover, paragraph 64 made clear the manner in which the Special Committee had been able to reach its conclusions. If the representative of the Soviet Union was really going to discredit the report and invalidate its conclusions, he must first destroy those three paragraphs rather than analyse the testimony of particular witnesses hand-picked for his own purposes. In fact, Mr. Vyshinsky had scarcely dealt with those three paragraphs.

18. Mr. Vyshinsky did not seem to be on very sure ground even in dealing with selected incidents. It was not true that the witnesses had given no accurate account of the arms given to the partisans from Bulgaria or that the witnesses had made only general statements. In that connexion Mr. McNeil referred to the testimony of witness No. 6/W/194, who had given very precise evidence on the matter. The quantities of arms mentioned by that witness could not have been handed over to the guerrillas without the knowledge of some servants holding a fair position in the Bulgarian Government.

19. UNSCOB had collected ample evidence from various sources of the moral and tactical assistance given to the Greek guerrillas by Bulgaria. There was ample testimony, which was not new, in the Special Committee's report regarding the moral support given to them by prominent Bulgarian leaders, as to the deliberate use of Bulgarian territory by Greek guerrillas and as to the highly organized system for the return to Greece of guerrillas trained and hospitalized in Bulgaria. The most important form of assistance furnished

by Bulgaria was the supply of arms, ammunition, food and material generally. The UNSCOB report stated that all the evidence indicated that large quantities of military stores had been supplied to the guerrillas by Bulgaria and that the forwarding of supplies had been highly organized. Supplies brought from Bulgaria were taken to the border, usually in charge of Bulgarian soldiers, and turned over to guerrillas. In that connexion, Mr. McNeil quoted the testimony of the guerrilla witness No. 4/W/269 and referred to the material found at Kraskhori. While Mr. Vyshinsky said that the quantities of arms and material was small and therefore could have been supplied without the knowledge of the Bulgarian Government, and hence did not deny the offence, that supply of material had appeared not only at isolated points along the Bulgarian frontier. Stating that supplies of food, arms and ammunition had been delivered to the guerrillas at any necessary point along that frontier, Mr. McNeil quoted the testimony of a witness who had been a former political commissar with the guerrillas regarding the support rendered the latter by Bulgaria in the course of the past three years.

20. Mr. Vyshinsky had endeavoured to convince the members of the Committee that the guerrillas generally captured their arms from the Greek Government forces. No one who had studied the information, however, could believe that those arms had only been found after the guerrillas had obtained successes against the Government forces. Thus, in a rebel headquarters in the north-western corner of Greece which had been seen by United Nations observers very shortly after its capture by Government forces, some Czechoslovak vehicles had been found, of which photographs were available. Mr. McNeil pointed out that if those vehicles had been captured from Government forces, they must have been supplied to those forces by Czechoslovakia, which hardly seemed plausible. The bulk of material in the possession of the guerrillas, however, came from countries other than Czechoslovakia, which, judging from the proclamations of the guerrillas, seemed to be the general headquarters and recruiting centre for the rebels. The participation of Romania also seemed to be somewhat limited, though there expert testing had located the radio transmitter which under *Cominform* direction served as a propaganda instrument for the guerrillas.

21. Albania, beyond doubt, had been the principal source of material assistance to the guerrillas. That conclusion was underlined by the report of the Special Committee and had been amply confirmed not only by the statements of hundreds of witnesses but also by the direct observation of the observers of the Special Committee. Albanian territory had provided the guerrillas with ample opportunity for the practical use of the frontier as a line behind which they could withdraw and impede the Greek Army in their operations, enabling the guerrillas to retire for a period of rest and refitting before their return to Greece. United Nations observers had repeatedly seen guerrillas cross the border with complete freedom and make use of Albanian territory for tactical purposes as well as anti-tank gun, mortar and machine-gun fire from Albania into Greece. The way in which Albania had furnished most assistance to the rebels had been by the consistent supply of food and war material, and Mr. McNeil

gave several instances in which United Nations observers had observed such assistance. He also cited the testimony of two guerrilla witnesses regarding such supplies. Another witness had spoken of fifteen large guns brought into Greece from Albania, existence of which had been proved by the fact that they had been used for the bombardment of the Greek town of Florina. Those guns had not been captured from the Greek Army and must have come from outside Greece since no large armament factory existed in the northwest corner of that country. That evidence had been strikingly confirmed when in August 1949 United Nations observers had been able to inspect the very large dump of war material left behind by the retreating guerrillas in the Vitsi-Prespa area. Mr. McNeil quoted the conclusion contained in the 39th report of Observer Group No. 2 to the effect that the materials used in those dumps proved that a large-scale supply organization had been in existence for some time. The elaborate headquarters built up in the north-western corner of Greece could not have been supplied and maintained except by external aid which could only have reached it through Albania.

22. Mr. McNeil observed that his reference to the claims made by the representatives of EAM for rectification of the Northern Epirus frontier in favour of Greece, as well as to the territorial claims unambiguously stated by Bulgaria, had not been and could not be denied. Those facts were important because the only sustained attempt made to discredit the part of the Greek Government in the efforts made by the Conciliation Committee had hung upon the accusation that the present governmental elements in Greece were the only people adhering to territorial claims. The representative of the Byelorussian SSR, in particular, had not disputed his statement, nor had that representative repeated the sincere attempts made the previous year to defend General Markos.

23. The Greek Government had repeatedly made it plain that it would not permit the existence of those claims to prevent its giving its full co-operation to the efforts of both Dr. Evatt and General Rómulo to achieve a basis for a normalization of relationships in the Balkans. Mr. McNeil cited statements made to that effect by the Greek Foreign Minister in December 1948 and on 14 May 1949. Mr. Pipinelis had been quite right to point out that the USSR had territorial claims and had not permitted the existence of such claims to destroy the normal relationships which it enjoyed with most countries. The important thing was that the Conciliation Committee should have satisfied itself that those countries in the Balkans would display the normal peaceful methods of conversation and decision. Greece had offered to do so, but Albania had twice prevented a fruitful conclusion to or progress in the work of the Conciliation Committee by demanding a price for its participation which it was not within the competence of the First Committee to give.

24. Turning to the matter of repatriation of Greek children, Mr. McNeil pointed out that despite the most courteous and painstaking efforts, the Red Cross had been impeded in its work by Albania, Hungary, Poland and Romania. On the other hand Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had co-operated, and with profit, with that organization. The children in Greece were not badly



reated or in poor condition, as the representative of the Byelorussian SSR had contended. As the Red Cross reported (A/1014), investigations on the spot in Greece had indicated not only that the conditions were satisfactory but that no differentiation was made between the children of supporters of the Government and those of its opponents. It should be noted that the delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross had felt bound to comment that, whatever the motives determining the evacuation of those children might have been and whatever their living conditions might be in the reception countries, it was nevertheless true that the children were separated from their families and homes, which nothing and no one could replace. The parents themselves suffered from the absence of the children.

25. It was legally, psychologically and morally indefensible that that separation should continue. He did not wish to speak at any length of the evidence available from UNSCOB about the satanic use in battle to which those children were in some cases being put. Children were protected by means of international organizations from harmful drugs, from indecent traffic, from pornography, from hunger and from disease. The Committee could not stand aside uncritical of men who twisted a child's mind to throw his body into a struggle of which he knew little, perhaps against kith and kin.

26. The Committee must satisfy itself first of all that all nations were co-operating to restore those children to their parents and must be prepared to criticize any Power evading its obligation in that respect. Secondly, the Committee must satisfy itself as to whether any Power had impeded the conciliation efforts. There was abundant evidence that Greece had made the effort to co-operate and that other Governments, in particular Albania, had impeded that work. Thirdly, the Committee must satisfy itself as to whether or not Albania and Bulgaria, with Czechoslovakia and Romania to a much lesser degree, had afforded aid to the threat systematically directed against the sovereignty and integrity of the Greek nation. In that connexion, Mr. McNeil had been impressed by the United States representative's point that the USSR delegation and its supporters had not in any way indicated their disapproval of arms being supplied to the rebels. It was to be expected that if Mr. Vyshinsky did not believe it to be the intention of the Albanian Government to furnish such aid and really disbelieved the evidence offered in that respect, a person as earnest for peace as he proclaimed himself to be would have used his undoubted influence with the Albanian Government to plead publicly with the latter to take all reasonable steps to remove such suspicion. Mr. Vyshinsky had not done so, and indeed the Government of the Soviet Union and the Governments which supported its policy had not once, during the deliberations on the subject, done anything by statement or action to discourage or to hint that they wished to discourage the Governments which had systematically and brutally harassed not only the Greek Government but the Greek people. Mr. McNeil stated that Greece had been a victim and a section of its population the tool of a Soviet foreign policy with a cynical and a moral disregard of the sufferings and aspirations of the Greek people. The USSR could quickly refute that most repug-

nant conclusion by stating that, by itself or through operations of those countries which depended upon Soviet encouragement, it gave no support of any kind to countries assisting in the threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece. Unless such a statement was made, he hoped that the Committee and the Assembly would overwhelmingly support the resolutions with which his delegation was associated.

27. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) recalled that when the Committee had first commenced consideration of the present item it had been unanimously agreed to postpone the substantive discussion in order to permit a further attempt at conciliation to be undertaken (276th meeting). The general feeling among most delegations had been one of hope because the earlier efforts at conciliation had shown that all the parties wanted a settlement and that the outstanding difficulties were not insurmountable. Unhappily, that hope had proved unfounded although that was not due to any lack of effort by the Conciliation Committee. In Mr. Malik's view the real cause for the continuation of the Balkan dispute was to be found in the clash of ideologies which was manifest throughout the world. That was evidenced by the preceding debate which had been characterized by ruthless attacks and abuse on the part of certain delegations against the Greek Government and the Greek delegation. The intransigent attitude shown by the critics of the Greek régime had certainly diminished the possibility of a negotiated settlement. For his part, Mr. Malik admired the courage and restraint with which the Greek representative had defended himself.

28. The representative of Lebanon believed that a solution of the Greek question could be found only if the Committee was able to solve the ideological conflict which divided the world into two opposing camps. The situation in Greece was simply a manifestation of that general conflict and was the outcome of Greece's geographical position at a meeting point of the two worlds. The first task, Mr. Malik believed, should be to endeavour to create a new atmosphere of world confidence as a prerequisite to any improvement in the Balkan situation. The Governments of the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies must be brought to realize that the western nations were not aiming at aggression. They must be induced to abandon the thesis of dialectical materialism that the world was divided between irreconcilable forces which could not co-exist in peace and harmony and that the final outcome must inevitably be world revolution and the shattering and smashing of existing governmental structures. That thesis had been recently restated by Mr. Vyshinsky himself, in his book *The Law of the Soviet State*. Once they had been induced to realize that differing ideologies could co-exist and that change should be brought about by peaceful means, by reason and agreement, and not by revolution then international confidence would grow and a solution of the Balkan problem would become possible. Mr. Malik stressed that the basic conflict concerned all peoples of the world and no one could stand aside as a disinterested observer.

29. Mr. EBAN (Israel) believed that the unanimous vote which had established the Conciliation Committee had testified to the general desire of the international community to find a solution

on the basis of mutual recognition and tolerance among all the Governments concerned. The Government of Israel shared that hope, not only because it sympathized with the sufferings of the Greek people but also because it had historic ties with Greece and was a near neighbour of the Balkan States with which it had full diplomatic and commercial relations. Hence, it had been with deep regret that the Israel delegation had received the report of the Conciliation Committee (A/C.1/506). Mr. Eban had hoped that the report would be closely studied by the First Committee in order to see whether the areas of agreement already reached could be recorded and consolidated, and an attempt made to bridge the remaining gap. Unhappily, the First Committee had apparently taken the view that a conciliatory settlement was not possible at the present time. It was for that reason that two conflicting draft resolutions had been presented, each of which was an expression of the viewpoint which the Conciliation Committee had failed to reconcile.

30. In Mr. Eban's opinion the effort at conciliation had not yet proved a complete failure and he considered that it would be premature to vote on the substance of the question without a further attempt at negotiation. As evidence that there was still some possibility of conciliation he cited the three following points of agreement in the Conciliation Committee's report. First, as was shown in annexes 3 to 6 of the report, all the parties had expressed their readiness to resume normal diplomatic relations and to take up their outstanding differences through diplomatic channels. Second, all had agreed under varying formulae not to resort to force or to the threat of force against each other's territorial integrity. In the sole case where there was a territorial claim, Greece had agreed not to advance that claim by force or the threat of force. Third, there was general agreement upon the proposal to establish a mixed frontier commission to mediate any frontier disputes. True, there had been disagreement regarding the membership of the commission, but that issue was not of such fundamental importance as to preclude any agreement. It was encouraging to notice that all four Governments held the view that the question of the frontier control should be settled primarily or conclusively among themselves.

31. In view of the above considerations Mr. Eban believed that the President of the General Assembly had been unduly modest in describing the Conciliation Committee's report as a negative one (A/C.1/503). In his opinion, the First Committee should take note of the agreement which had already been reached and the delegation of Israel would support a resolution endorsing the three points of agreement and calling for another effort at conciliation, if possible during the current session, either through the good offices of the United Nations or by direct diplomatic discussions. The delegation of Israel was not ready to support either of the two resolutions before the Committee at the present stage.

32. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) said that the representatives of the United Kingdom and Lebanon had already dealt with several of the points which he had intended to raise. Further attention, however, should be given to the statements of the USSR representative concerning the negative results of the Conciliation Committee's work. In view of the great moral force behind the reso-

lution establishing the Conciliation Committee which had been adopted unanimously it was clearly important to establish responsibility for that body's failure. The representative of the Soviet Union had asserted that the responsibility must be borne by Greece because the latter had refused to accept the existing frontier with Albania as final. Actually the responsibility did not lie with Greece and it was not for Albania or the USSR delegation to formulate authoritative proposals which called for a positive or negative reply from other delegations. The Conciliation Committee had followed the only procedure possible in any effort at mediation: it had studied the demands of all parties and had made recommendations regarding those demands. That the Greek delegation had not been intransigent was shown by the fact that it had accepted the Committee's recommendations which had rejected two of the principal Greek demands, one concerning verification on the spot of the disarmament and internment of guerrillas preceding any *rapprochement* and the other concerning instantaneous access by a mixed frontier commission to the scene of alleged incidents in Albania, Bulgaria and Greece. On the other hand, the Committee had accepted the proposals advanced by the Soviet Union delegation particularly with regard to Article 3 of the draft agreement, an article which Mr. Evatt had described as prime importance. The absence of any desire for reconciliation on the part of Greece's opponents had been clearly shown by the torrent of insults and accusations which had been directed against the Greek Government and people in the First Committee.

33. One of the main factors which had been cited during the debate as preventing any solution of the Balkan question had been the continued presence of United Kingdom troops on Greek soil. Due regard must therefore be made to the statement by the United Kingdom representative that his Government intended to withdraw its forces in the near future. Mr. Pipinelis welcomed that statement and said that his people would never forget its gratitude to the United Kingdom for diverting troops to Greece at a time when they were urgently needed elsewhere. Would it not be a good thing if the USSR Government were to respond to that gesture by withdrawing its own armed forces from Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria? By so doing it would contribute much to a solution of the Balkan question. In Mr. Pipinelis' view, failure by the USSR Government to make such a gesture would show who was responsible for the Balkan crisis.

34. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) referred to the problem of the return to Greece of approximately 25,000 children, who had been removed from Greece to the territories of various Eastern European countries, and stressed that their repatriation was not and should not be a matter of controversy. A resolution calling for their repatriation (193 C (II)) had been unanimously adopted at the previous session of the General Assembly as a purely humanitarian measure. During the recent conciliation talks all the parties had reiterated their intention to conform to that resolution and only a few days previously the representatives of Poland and the Ukrainian SSR had referred to it with approval and expressed their continued concurrence with the measure. When the resolution had been adopted the United

States delegation, like others, had hoped that it would be faithfully and promptly carried out by all delegations concerned. Unfortunately, there was no evidence to that effect. On the contrary, the report of the Special Committee showed that some of the children concerned had been recruited to fight with the Greek guerrillas while others, contrary to the spirit of the resolution, had been shifted from one Eastern European country to another. Mr. Cohen cited the report of the International Red Cross (A/1014) to show that Greece was able to provide adequate care for the children once they had been returned and he expressed the hope that the General Assembly would reaffirm its appeal on its behalf.

35. Turning to the political aspects of the problem, Mr. Cohen noted that the arguments adduced by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Poland, Byelorussian SSR and Ukrainian SSR forced him to conclude that their arguments were more calculated to stir up strife than to put an end to it. The effect of the speeches by representatives of the *Cominform* nations was not to further peace between Greece and its northern neighbours, whatever their intention might be, but rather to incite and revive efforts to overthrow the Greek Government. For example, Mr. Cohen cited the appeal on behalf of the persons condemned to death by the Greek military tribunal. At first it had been asserted that the appeal was based purely on humanitarian grounds but scarcely one of the speeches supporting the appeal had failed to contain a torrent of insults and abuse against the Greek Government. The impression which they had created was that the pleas were rather calculated to provoke the Greek Government to reprisals than to move it to mercy. A similar impression had been created by the arguments of the *Cominform* representatives regarding the proceedings of the Conciliation Committee. It was the task of conciliators to quieten passions and to help the parties to reach agreement. Thus, when Albania had asked that its existing frontier with Greece be accepted as final, the Conciliation Committee had found a formula which would have satisfied the essence of the Albanian demand without exacerbating Greek sensibilities. Mr. Cohen found it difficult to understand why the formula recommended by the Conciliation Committee had proved unacceptable to Albania and the Soviet Union. Their rejection of the formula raised a doubt as to whether they really wanted the conciliation effort to succeed. Its rejection did not make Albania more secure. On the contrary, it tended only to rekindle the passions provoked by the unnecessary agitation of historically conflicting claims. That doubt as to the motives of the *Cominform* was reinforced by the recollection that, at the end of the Second World War, nearly all the Communist Parties of Europe had been advancing the most extreme nationalist claims. The representative of the United Kingdom had shown that the territorial demands of the EAM submitted at the Paris Peace Conference and the Council of Foreign Ministers were more extreme than those of the Greek Government. The communist policy of exerting pressure in support of conflicting nationalist claims had not aided the efforts to establish peace but had resulted in stimulating confusion among neighbouring States. Whether the policy had that aim or not, it was clear that in the case of Yugoslavia the passions

which had been kindled could not be allayed later even by the demand of the USSR *Politburo*. Mr. Cohen assured the representative of the Soviet Union in reply to his question that the United States would be perfectly content to have its existing frontiers which were fixed, as in the case of Albania and Greece, by treaties which antedated the First World War secured by no further treaty obligations than were contained in the Charter.

36. In Mr. Cohen's opinion, the formula recommended by the Conciliation Committee, while not precluding a peaceful future revision of the frontiers, did protect them from change by force or threat of force. The representative of the United States felt sure that the Greek Government would be happy if the Bulgarian Government were prepared to accept the Conciliation Committee's formula in relation to the common frontier between Greece and Bulgaria. He also believed that the Government of Yugoslavia would be happy if its neighbours were to accept that formula as applicable to its own frontiers. In his opinion, the whole frontier issue was merely a pretext of the *Cominform* nations to avoid reaching any agreement at all with Greece. If that obstacle to a peaceful settlement had not existed they would certainly have invented another. Abandonment by Greece of its historical claim, which had not prevented normal diplomatic relations between the two countries in the past, would merely be the first instalment in a whole series of blackmail payments under the threat of renewed guerrilla activity. Such a development was already foreshadowed in the Soviet Union delegation's proposal for wholesale intervention in Greek internal affairs.

37. The *Cominform* delegations had joined in the unanimous decision to establish the Conciliation Committee. But the Soviet Union delegation was now stating that it did not regard the Greek Government as representative of the Greek people. That Government might not be perfect, but it had been established as a result of an internationally supervised election and in Mr. Cohen's view was infinitely more representative than any of the ones established by the *Cominform* in Eastern Europe. In fact, the antagonisms which the *Cominform* nations had aroused in Greece was an obstacle to the general pacification of the country which they professed to want to further. The aid which they had given to the Greek guerrillas made it harder for any Greek Government to undertake the internal measures of pacification which it might wish to undertake when those reforms were suggested by the *Cominform* States.

38. The *Cominform* delegations had even suggested that the Greek Government was the creature of the United States. Unfortunately, they seemed to assume that the relations of the United States Government with friendly States were of the same character as the relations of the Soviet Union Government with the *Cominform* States. Mr. Cohen emphatically denied any resemblance between United States assistance in Greece and Soviet Union imperialism in Eastern Europe. In fact, the representative of the USSR had quoted criticisms of the American Press in proof that opinion in the United States was at times critical of the Greek Government. Mr. Cohen was certain that criticisms of the United States Government could also be found in the Greek

Press. United States aid to Greece not only was conditioned on the continuing consent of the Greek Government but was subject to termination whenever the Security Council or the General Assembly found that aid furnished by the United Nations made the continuance of United States assistance unnecessary or undesirable. Furthermore, the United States had waived its right of veto were the matter to come before the Security Council. Mr. Cohen wondered whether the aid given by the USSR to the *Cominform* nations was subject to such conditions. Presumably the representative of the Soviet Union would not contend that the lend-lease aid amounting to over 10 billion dollars, which had been extended to the Soviet Union in the past had compromised the latter's sovereignty. The purpose of that aid was the same in both cases, namely to protect the common interest of both nations in the preservation of freedom throughout the world. When the threats to Greece were removed the Government of the United States would be happy to be relieved of its responsibilities.

39. The Government of the United States looked forward as much as any other Government to the time when the sovereign and independent State of Greece could, without danger, release those persons detained for reasons of national security. That day could be hastened, not by stirring up hate against the Government of Greece, but by putting an end to warmongering and securing compliance with the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly.

40. The statements of the representative of the Soviet Union had been characterized by the divergent nature of their compliance regarding the testimony obtained by the Special Committee. They had sought unsuccessfully to divert attention to the mountain of evidence concerning foreign aid to the Greek guerrillas by trying to

cite a few imperfections. However, when they questioned the character of the witnesses or the validity of the testimony, they should bear in mind that the Special Committee had reported that it had been seriously handicapped in obtaining information by the refusal of the Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav Authorities to permit it or its observers to enter their territories in order to investigate charges or to interrogate witnesses. Moreover, when the representatives of the Soviet Union criticized the Special Committee's work as inadequate or partial, it should be pointed out that he was impugning the good faith not of the United States but of representatives of nine States from different parts of the world aided by an internationally responsible Secretariat. The Soviet Union and Poland had repeatedly been invited to serve on the Special Committee but had abstained from taking part. Mr. Cohen believed that the detailed quotations which the representative of the Soviet Union had extracted from the documents of the Special Committee had as their purpose to detract the First Committee's attention from the essential facts of the Greek problem.

41. Mr. Cohen considered that none of the criticisms had in any way invalidated the unanimous conclusions reached by the Special Committee after careful study and observation. The basic issue was the accusation that aid had been given by Greece's northern neighbours to the Greek guerrillas in spite of the resolutions of the General Assembly. At no point during the debate had those representatives who supported the Soviet Union position ventured to deny that material aid had been given in substantial quantities. It was therefore the duty of the First Committee to act upon the unanimous conclusions contained in the Special Committee's report.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 1 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman:* Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

#### **Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans—general discussion (continued)**

##### REPORT OF THE CONCILIATION COMMITTEE (continued)

1. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said he would deal with the Greek question on the basis of the reports of UNSCOB and of the Conciliation Committee. He reserved the right to present his delegation's views on the various resolutions after the general discussion had been concluded. At that time he would also deal with the allegations concerning the treatment of Greek children.

2. The Greek question was before the General Assembly for a third time and again there was no evidence that the majority of the First Committee had made a serious effort to dissolve the real basis for Balkan unrest. That was confirmed by the reports of UNSCOB and of the Conciliation Committee. No welter of documents could

hide the fact that the United Nations had been duped into pursuing United States strategic policies and had failed to remedy the situation. That was true despite the statements of UNSCOB and despite the efforts of the Conciliation Committee to win approval for Greek aggression against Albania. It was evident that the present report of UNSCOB could have been drafted by anyone without having visited Greece. That was but another example of the United States policy of using United Nations not as an organ of international co-operation but as a pawn in the cold war.

3. It was time to make a full review of the Greek question. It had been raised originally in January 1946 when the Soviet Union had drawn the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the presence of British troops in Greece constituted a danger to international peace and security<sup>1</sup>. In August 1946 the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR had asked the Security Council to consider the Balkan situation as one which

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council*, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1, annex 3.

endangered international peace and security<sup>1</sup>. On neither occasion did the Security Council take action because it did not consider that the relations between Greece and its neighbours constituted a menace to peace and security. On neither occasion did the Greek Government lay charges against its northern neighbours, although guerrilla units had been operating in Greece. The charges of external aid had only been worked out in December 1946 by the Tsaldaris régime and its Anglo-American underwriters. The Security Council unanimously decided to establish the Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents<sup>2</sup>. This unanimity gave rise to the hope that the Greek question could be solved in a manner which would serve the interests of peace and democracy. However, in March 1947 before the Commission of Investigation had completed its work, the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed. That move prejudged the findings of the Commission and put pressure upon it. It clearly showed that the United States was trying to wreck the United Nations and that it was not concerned with the result of the investigation.

4. The obvious course for the United Nations at that time should have been to recall the Commission, to re-examine the situation in the light of the unilateral action of the United States. However, the United Nations, through its majority, bowed to the dictate of the United States. No attempt to pretend that the Truman Doctrine was altruistic could cloak its strategic aim. As Walter Lippman had stated at the time, Greece and Turkey had been chosen "because they are gateways to the Black Sea and to the heart of the USSR". The Truman Doctrine proved to be an instrument for enslaving Greece; and economic occupation followed military occupation. After two and half years, Greece found itself completely under United States control. Candidates for Cabinet posts had to be approved by the United States Mission. Military operations and the appointment of commanders were controlled by United States officials. The economic and political life was controlled, through various missions sitting in Greek Ministries, in the interests of American companies. The details of what that control meant in terms of cost of living, black marketeering, could be judged from the reports of the United States Government on its expenditures in Greece.

5. Mr. Katz-Suchy proceeded to name American corporations which controlled major industries in Greece, including roads and railroads, the Corinth Canal and ports, war industries, public utilities, water distribution, airlines, radio and telegraph communications and tobacco. The altruistic nature of American aid to Greece was typified in the contract of the American International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, which in June 1949 took over all communications in Greece through "an autonomous company free of all governmental or ministerial control" to purchase equipment from "recognized foreign industrial houses" rather than from Greece.

6. Millions of dollars had been taken from American taxpayers to maintain the Athens Government in power and the Greek people in poverty. Mr. Katz-Suchy quoted figures from an article in *The Chicago Daily Tribune* of

3 August 1949 which stated that Greece had received a total of 1,750,000,000 dollars of foreign aid which was equivalent to 171 dollars *per capita*. That compared with an average annual pre-war income of 80 dollars. The article pointed out that all that money had had no important effect other than to delay the establishment of orderly government. It also pointed out that out of 182 million dollars given under the Marshall Plan during the year preceding May 1949, only one and a half million had been for industrial machinery, and only one million for farm implements. The article concluded that the hundreds of millions poured into Greece had done the country no good, militarily or economically.

7. Mr. Katz-Suchy asked how any objective person in the light of the foregoing could believe that the Greek situation resulted from aid given to the guerrillas by the northern neighbours. The report of UNSCOB was manifestly one-sided and had clearly been drawn up in order to justify certain policies. Chapter 3, which dealt with alleged aid to the guerrillas and described the procedure of UNSCOB, showed plainly that their procedure was completely abnormal. Paragraph 62 stated that witnesses had usually been made available by the Greek Liaison Service and that many had previously been interrogated by Greek Authorities. Of the captured guerrillas examined, a number had been in detention pending further interrogation. In short, all the witnesses heard by UNSCOB had been previously interrogated by the Athens authorities and many were in prison. Clearly, unless the testimony was useful to the Athens Government, UNSCOB never heard the witness. Yet UNSCOB was prepared to state in paragraph 64 that it was firmly of the opinion that the statements recorded reproduced the facts as described by the witnesses.

8. In dealing with external aid to the guerrillas, the report divided the support into moral and material classifications. UNSCOB considered any opinions expressed in Albanian or Bulgarian newspapers which were not favourable to the Athens régime to constitute moral support. In connexion with material aid from Albania, UNSCOB alleged that since the spring of 1949 more than half of the guerrilla strength had been based on the Albanian border. On what part of the report was that assertion based? He challenged anyone to show him a basis for that assumption on the part of the Special Committee. UNSCOB had reached the interesting conclusion that the guerrillas were using a road going from south to north on the Albanian side of the frontier because there was no north-south road on the Greek side of the frontier. The conclusion, in short, was derived by abstract speculation and not on a basis of facts.

9. Elsewhere the report concluded that, because in May 1949 the guerrillas had used more and bigger guns than they had used previously, the guns had been supplied from Albania. Mr. Katz-Suchy pointed to the possibility that the guns had been captured and also to a report of the Greek gendarmerie concerning imports of arms from Italy. However, UNSCOB delighted in that sort of evidence and had given accounts of motor vehicles being observed by night moving along the Albanian road through Bilishte towards Greece. It concluded that the only purpose for

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council*, First Year, Second Series, Supplement No. 5, annex 8.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 28, 87th meeting.

such particular traffic must be to cross the border. Another sample of that kind of reasoning could be found in paragraph 74 which purported to establish beyond question that guerrillas in the Vitsi area were being maintained from Albania. As the observations had been made at night from an aircraft and over mountainous and wooded regions, it was not unreasonable to suppose that the movement might have been between two Albanian towns. As a whole, the evidence submitted by UNSCOB in connexion with Albania amounted to mere gossip and hearsay.

10. Bulgaria also was accused of giving moral support. That was partly based on a statement by Mr. Kolarov, Bulgarian Foreign Minister, quoted in paragraph 88, according to which the Bulgarian people were extending moral support to the Greek people in their struggle for freedom and independence. Mr. Katz-Suchy remarked that constituted material support, practically every State represented in the First Committee could be accused of giving material support to Indonesia and to colonial peoples in general. The accusations made against Albania were repeated in the case of Bulgaria with changes only in the names of localities. For instance in paragraph 93, the fact that guerrillas often spoke to Bulgarian frontier guards was mentioned as evidence of Bulgarian military intervention. Paragraphs 96 and 97 gave further examples of peculiar observations and abstract reasoning concerning supplies.

11. New charges directed against Romania had been added. The basis for the charges was the existence of the "National Committee to aid the Greek people". The activities of that organization were not described, for its very existence was deemed a sufficient basis for accusations. Mr. Katz-Suchy pointed out that various committees to aid the Greek people existed in the United States, the United Kingdom, France and many other European countries, but it was only the Romanian organization which was considered criminal. Another of UNSCOB's accusations was that the Free Greece radio station was located near Bukarest. That charge was based on the results of radio location tests which, everybody knew, could never be considered conclusive. These were the bases of the charge of interference in Greece's internal affairs.

12. Mr. Katz-Suchy said he had looked into the evidence quoted by Mr. McNeil on the previous day, which was attributed to witness No. 6/W/194, relating to the observation of five mules carrying 150 rifles and 10 machine guns. Apart from the fact that that was an improbable load for five mules, Mr. Katz-Suchy pointed out that no member of the observation group had asked the witness how he had been able to obtain such accurate figures. Mr. McNeil considered the capture of Bulgarian arms from the guerrillas to be satisfactory evidence. However, UNSCOB gave no indication of what proportion of the captured arms were Bulgarian, American, German or Greek.

13. The bias of UNSCOB was shown by its attitude towards border violations by the Athens Government, which were always minimized. On the other hand, Bulgarian representations were treated with contempt, as in paragraph 24, which referred to "... a typical series of Bulgarian allegations . . .". Frontier violations by the Athens

Government were actually justified, as in paragraph 43.

14. While ignoring violations of the Albanian and Bulgarian frontiers, UNSCOB also ignored the war-mongering of the Athens Press and the plans for the invasion of Albania. It had tried to make out a case against Albania, Bulgaria and Romania entirely on the basis of rumour.

15. With regard to the members of the observer groups, Mr. Katz-Suchy pointed out that no details were given in the report as to their names, nationalities, ranks, past occupations, etc., although it was common knowledge that about two-thirds had been furnished by the United States and the United Kingdom. It seemed reasonable to assume that those observers, nationals of countries which had "strategic" interests in Greece, had reached their conclusions before doing any observing.

16. Even if it were assumed that the evidence produced by the Greek Liaison Service was actually correct and that the report of UNSCOB was nothing but the truth, any objective person could see that the situation in the Balkans had no connexion with the reason submitted by UNSCOB. On the one hand there were a few thousand ill-armed and ill-equipped guerrillas. On the other hand, there was an army of 150,000 men, 60,000 military police, several thousand British troops and a few hundred officers of the United States Army. Funds and modern equipment were furnished by the United States and the United Kingdom, both in large quantities. Even if Albania and Bulgaria devoted their entire national military budget to supporting the guerrillas, it would only amount to a few per cent of the enormous sums contributed to the Athens Government.

17. Clearly the reasons for the prolonged war in Greece had to be sought elsewhere than in the alleged aid by the northern neighbours. The Conciliation Committee had failed because it had avoided the fact that the real cause of the situation was the actions of the Greek Government. That was in accordance with the policies of the United Kingdom and the United States. Mr. McNeil had announced the withdrawal of British troops from Greece and declared that their action would long be remembered as a contribution to peace. Mr. Katz-Suchy agreed that British action would long be remembered by the families of those who had fallen before British arms. However, Mr. McNeil, without saying it, had made clear that the naval and air units would remain in Greece. Nothing could hide the fact that the intervention of the United Kingdom and the United States had caused the Balkan trouble. No one could deny that the basis of the difficulty was the internal situation and that the accusations against the northern neighbours arose out of it. The Chairman of the first Conciliation Committee, Mr. Evatt, had reached the conclusion that the internal problem had to be solved if the Greek problem was to be solved at all and had so stated in a letter to the Four Foreign Ministers. The reply made by Mr. Bevin was not convincing.

18. With regard to the elections in Greece, the opinions of British observers and of a delegation of British members of Parliament were well known. The great sensitivity of the British Cabinet in regard to Greece's sovereign rights was



therefore surprising. However, it could be recalled that Mr. McNeil had gone to Greece in November 1945 to discuss the re-organization of the Greek Cabinet and had proposed the establishment of British or Allied advisory committees to advise in matters of economic administration and policy.

19. The current Conciliation Committee had chosen to ignore Dr. Evatt's letter. It had also ignored the need for safeguarding the territorial integrity of Albania by not demanding a declaration from the Greek Government that it had no territorial claims. Although it had been stated that Greece was prepared to accept an appropriate formula, the First Committee had not been informed that Greece had refused to guarantee the territorial integrity of Albania. Responsibility for that refusal rested mainly with the United States.

20. Clearly the threat to Albania had not diminished. The designs of the United States in the Balkans were evident from the denial of a territorial guarantee to Albania and from the fact that UNSCOB had concentrated its attack on Albania. The provocations against Greece's neighbours constituted the real danger to peace. Yet the only proposal made was that the Greek régime should be allowed to continue to threaten Albania with the endorsement of the United Nations. The new reason given by Mr. Pipinelis for refusing to guarantee Albania's integrity, namely the presence of troops of the Soviet Union in Bulgaria, Hungary and perhaps in Albania, was extremely naive.

21. Mr. Katz-Suchy cited various statements and articles published in the Greek Press and directed against Albania and proposing measures including armed invasion. He pointed out that foreign support had been given to these provocations in the form of legalistic reasoning. In addition to such verbal provocations it should be noted that, according to a broadcast by the Albanian radio, on 10 August 1949, Greek troops had invaded Albania for four days and fighting had taken place along a thirty-mile front. There had also been attacks made against the guerrillas through Albanian territory. Although the facts had been reported, UNSCOB had carried out no investigation.

22. Despite the increasingly blatant calls for attack upon Albania and inflammatory statements including a declaration by the Greek Prime Minister that Greece would not abandon its claims in Northern Epirus, the Conciliation Committee had accepted the Greek Government's statement that it had no designs on Albanian territory. However, on the following day, 19 October 1949, it had been reported that the Greek Prime Minister had reiterated his régime's territorial claim.

23. The plots against Albania were further confirmed in the despatch of 15 September 1949 by C. L. Sulzberger of *The New York Times*. That despatch noted that the United States and the United Kingdom had set up a Free Albanian Committee in Paris which they intended to recognize as the legal Government. Despite their concern about expressions of sympathy toward the Greek people, they apparently saw nothing wrong in setting up a rival to the legally constituted Government of Albania. The enlargement of the threat against Albania had been encouraged by the resolution 193 A (III) of the General Assembly which, while making groundless accusations against the northern neighbours, permitted

the Athens régime to continue its plot against the peace in the Balkans, in order to conceal its failure to deal with the real Greek problems.

24. The beneficiaries of the American aid programme had been indicated by Harold L. Ickes, former United States Secretary of the Interior in an article dated 29 August 1948. Mr. Ickes had pointed out that, since the Greek Royal Family, the royalist supporters and many United States officials found that they could live in luxury on the proceeds of the war, they would continue to make a living out of it. Mr. Ickes had also suggested that, by a carefully supervised and honestly conducted election, one should discover what kind of government the Greek people wanted. Similar suggestions had been made by Mr. Sofianopoulos, a former Greek Foreign Minister. The leader of the Greek Communist Party had declared at that time that his Party would accept United Nations supervision of such an election and would abide by any decision reached by the people. He had urged the institution of an interim neutral Government and had stated that the appointment of a United Nations mediator would be welcome. The only reply given to that offer had been a new wave of terror. Again, at the current session of the Assembly, an appeal had been made by the provisional democratic Government of Greece declaring its willingness to accept an honourable agreement in the interests of peace. No reply had been sent to that letter (A/C.1/520).

25. Mr. Katz-Suchy pointed out that the solution which the United Nations had tried in Greece for three and a half years had not improved the situation. The situation arose out of internal difficulties which had been created by the intervention of the United Kingdom and later by the United States in Greece's internal affairs. Conciliation was the requirement, but no serious effort had yet been made in that direction. However, the United States Government wished neither peace nor conciliation; it wanted to continue to use Greece in its strategic plan.

26. It might be easy to speak of the guerrillas as bandits, but the United Nations should not allow its name to be misused to justify terrorism. Mr. Katz-Suchy drew attention to the statement made on 9 July 1949 by Constantin Rendis, Greek Minister of the Interior, to the effect that those who persisted in their communistic tendencies would be imprisoned or expelled from Greece and that those measures had been agreed upon by all political parties and by the United Nations. While stressing that misuse of the name of the United Nations, Mr. Katz-Suchy suggested that the representative of Australia might wish to adjust his proposals for the repatriation of Greek children in the light of the programme which had been mapped out for those who did not disfavour communism.

27. When proclaiming the Truman Doctrine, the President of the United States had said that his Government had advised Greece to practice tolerance. The past two years had served to show what was tolerated: murder, suppression of human rights, strife, starvation, brutality, miscarriage of justice, lies and plans for war. The problem before the Committee was not only the tragedy of Greece but also the fact that the United Nations had allowed themselves to come under the control of one country and be an in-

strument of its policy. Although victory had been claimed by the American Commanding General in Greece, it was well-known that mere weapons and foreign military planning could not stop the fight for freedom. The democratic army had decided to cease major operations in Greece, not because they were weak but because a new peace was the only hope for the Greek people.

28. The choice before the First Committee was whether the United Nations would survive as a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations or become the tool of one Power. The Assembly had the power to institute new and conciliatory ways of resolving the Greek question. Such action would be of great value in diminishing international tension. It would constitute a return to the purposes of the United Nations and conform to the expectations of those who expected it to act in the interests of peace and not as the protector of foreign intervention. If it did nothing, or followed the line of least resistance, all would share the responsibility for the continuation of the sufferings of the Greek people and of the dangers to world peace and security.

29. Mr. EUSTACE (Union of South Africa) shared the general feeling of regret for the failure of the Conciliation Committee to bring about the solution of the Balkan problem. He had hoped that, since the work of the Committee had not been prejudiced by the ideological recriminatory clashes which had so badly poisoned the atmosphere at previous sessions, it had had a reasonable chance of bringing about a better understanding as well as a decision on the part of all those involved to terminate the conflict. However, in spite of the most strenuous efforts, the Conciliation Committee had failed to arrive at a solution. Such a failure, however, should not be construed to mean that it had achieved nothing, since a measure of agreement had, in fact, been achieved on certain points. Besides, it had enabled the representatives to scrutinize and evaluate the elements of the problem. Finally, it constituted another realistic effort to establish international peace and security. The position in the Balkans was, of course, only one component in the over-all problem of international conflict, which was still so seriously threatening peace. If the Balkan problem were removed, the world situation would become much less depressing. The continued efforts of the United Nations with a view to achieving success in the Balkans were therefore, essential. The Greek nation, as it had been stated so often, had surely suffered enough and must be afforded an opportunity to deal with its task of reconstruction.

30. Many of the statements already made, like that of the representative of Lebanon, had indicated the large measure of sympathy which the Greek delegation enjoyed in the First Committee. The trials of the Greek people were fully appreciated, and the courageous efforts of the representatives of Greece in the First Committee had not gone unnoticed. The delegation of the Union of South Africa had always endeavoured to give a clear indication of both its sympathy for the people of Greece as well as its admiration for the manner in which the Greek spokesmen had represented their problem at the United Nations.

31. Turning to the problem of Greek children. Mr. Eustace said that his delegation had noted

the relevant terms of the joint draft resolution submitted by Australia, China, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/513) and would support it.

32. As to the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, his delegation felt that the Committee had done good work under trying and often dangerous circumstances. It was for those reasons that his delegation had voted in favour of the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/519). Furthermore, the presence of the Special Committee in the Greek battle areas had played an important role, and its value in keeping the United Nations informed should not be underestimated, although, much to their regret, it had not succeeded in obtaining a full measure of co-operation from all parties concerned.

33. Mr. Eustace was at a loss to understand the contention of the opponents of the United Kingdom draft resolution that that resolution, in trying to protect the servants constitutionally appointed by the United Nations, constituted an intervention in the domestic affairs of Albania.

34. His delegation, always vigilant in the matter of domestic jurisdiction, had felt compelled to vote against (298th meeting) the Ecuadorean draft resolution because it did constitute an interference in the administration of justice in Greece, commendable though were its motives.

35. As regards the joint draft resolution submitted by the representatives of Australia, China, United Kingdom and United States (A/C.1/513), the delegation of the Union of South Africa considered it as a logical consequence of the report and recommendations received from the Special Committee. The draft resolution also recognized the work performed by the Special Committee and took note of the announcement by the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the question of disarmament of guerrillas. It finally called upon all States harbouring Greek nationals to facilitate the peaceful repatriation of all those nationals who desired to return and live in accordance with the law of the land. Since the South African delegation supported those aims, it would, therefore, gladly vote in favour of the joint draft resolution.

36. Abdur RAHIM Khan (Pakistan) doubted that it was possible to add anything new to the arguments which had already been advanced by the two schools of thought in connexion with the represent conflict in Greece. The Greek case had been before the United Nations for nearly three years and the salient features of the problem had remained the same throughout the discussions, namely, the armed conflict along the northern borders of Greece between Greek Government forces and the guerrillas. On the one hand, it had been claimed on behalf of the Greek Government that all the fighting taking place in those regions was primarily due to the assistance and shelter which the northern neighbours of Greece were affording to the guerrillas, while on the other hand, it had been alleged that the Athens Government was thoroughly distasteful to a large portion of the population of that country, and that its activities were so intolerable that some of its opponents had taken arms against it with a view to freeing their country from outside influences. The fact, however, remained that up to the present time fighting had continued

along the northern borders of Greece and a great deal of misery and terror reigned in those areas. Any listener to the speeches delivered in the First Committee during the current session must have felt that the situation in Greece was undoubtedly presenting a very serious threat to international peace and security and that the United Nations should do its utmost to prevent a worsening of the situation.

37. When the problem had first come before the United Nations, serious doubts had been raised regarding the accuracy of the allegations made by the Greek Government, and the United Nations quite properly decided to ascertain for itself the true state of affairs prevailing in Greece, by establishing a Commission. His delegation had maintained a representative on the Special Committee for the past two years because it felt confident of its ability to fulfil its obligations in an absolutely impartial manner. Whatever opinions some delegations might hold with regard to the Special Committee, Rahim Khan wished to assert that every representative of the nine nations composing the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans had worked with only one object in mind, namely, to comply to the fullest extent with the directives issued to the Committee by the United Nations, and to inform the United Nations of the true state of affairs prevailing in Greece. That bold assertion was based on the fact that he had served on the Special Committee for a considerable period himself. The reports and the records of the discussions of the Committee constituted a convincing proof of the unbiased and disinterested outlook of its members. Furthermore, and very fortunately, time had provided the best evidence regarding the correctness of the conclusions of the Special Committee. UNSCOB had found that fighting along the northern borders of Greece continued because the guerrillas were receiving aid and assistance from the neighbouring countries on the borders of Greece. Two outstanding events had occurred which lent the fullest corroboration to those conclusions, namely, the advance of the Greek Army up to the northern borders of the country, and the consequent disappearance of a great part of the guerrillas from Greek territory. UNSCOB had therefore had the fullest oppor-

tunity to determine whether or not their previous conclusions were based on a correct analysis of the situation. Those conclusions could only be challenged on the ground that the Special Committee was biased. His delegation sincerely hoped that no representative would level such accusations against the Special Committee.

38. Some representatives might disagree as to the causes of the Greek problem and the best methods which the United Nations could use in eliminating them. Yet, any challenge of the good faith of the members of the Special Committee should only be made if irrefutable evidence could be secured in its support. Furthermore, the conclusions of the Special Committee were supported by yet another fact, for when certain events in Yugoslavia had begun to influence the existing Government in that country, the activities of Greek rebels along the Yugoslav border had steadily declined.

39. Rahim Khan said there could not be two opinions as to who was extending help to the Greek guerrillas. His delegation was satisfied from the information at its disposal that Albania and Bulgaria were continuing to render aid and assistance to the Greek guerrillas. Once that fact was accepted, the necessity for further action by the United Nations became very obvious.

40. Since the joint draft resolutions A/C.1/513 and A/C.1/514 met the requirements of the situation and referred to the fate of Greek children, his delegation would support them.

41. Mr. MORALES (Nicaragua) said that in view of the death of Mr. Edward Stettinius Jr., who had contributed so much to the cause of the United Nations, he would request a moment of silence as a tribute to his memory.

42. The CHAIRMAN felt certain that the proposal of the representative of Nicaragua would meet with the unanimous approval of the Committee and asked the members of the Committee to bow in a moment's silence.

*The Committee observed a moment of silent tribute to the memory of Mr. Stettinius.*

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND SIXTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 1 November 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### **Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans—general discussion (continued)**

##### REPORT OF THE CONCILIATION COMMITTEE (continued)

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) replied to the statements of the United Kingdom and United States representatives and noted that, although contesting the position of the Soviet Union delegation, they had not denied the facts which he had adduced nor had they replied to his specific arguments and conclusions. On the contrary, they had followed the procedure

of ignoring the arguments of the Soviet Union and merely insisting upon acceptance of their own views. It was Mr. Vyshinsky's intention, however, to reply in detail to their statements in order to show that the position of the United Kingdom and the United States representative was completely unfounded.

2. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that he had submitted considerable data in support of his denial of the charges that the Albanian Government had helped to mobilize the Chams, having thus actively helped in the mobilization of Greek guerrilla forces. None of the representatives who supported those charges had made any attempt to destroy the evidence which Mr. Vyshinsky had advanced. He reiterated his assertion that the

Special Committee's accusation was unfounded and based upon a distortion of the fact. There had been no such mobilization of the Chams nor had the Albanian Government published the advertisements or made the announcements which it was alleged to have made on 12 and 13 March. Although the accusation was obviously wrong, the majority of the Special Committee, as also the majority of the First Committee, said that they believed the Albanian Government to be guilty of helping to recruit the Chams into the guerrilla forces. Yet they offered no supporting evidence and the matter was passed over in silence.

3. Secondly, Mr. Vyshinsky had drawn attention to several discrepancies in the documents of the Special Committee, as for instance the fact that one witness was referred to in two separate reports but in each the data as to his age and occupation were quite different. Mr. Vyshinsky was sure that if he had an opportunity to study carefully all the testimony received by the Special Committee he would find many other such falsifications of facts. Neither the United Kingdom and the United States representatives nor any other defenders of the Special Committee had attempted to explain the deficiencies of which he had spoken. Perhaps they considered it an unimportant matter, but duplication of testimony was certainly something that should be explained. It was a patent example of falsification. Likewise, he had shown the ludicrous character of the testimony of those witnesses upon which the Special Committee had based its conclusions that Albania and Bulgaria had supplied arms to the Greek guerrillas. He had cited a number of documents emanating from the General Staff of the Greek Army which made it clear that the principal sources of supply for the guerrillas were Italy, France and Turkey, various sea-routes of supply that were exploited by the Greek partisans and so on. He had given documentary proof that guerrillas had been warned not to stray into Bulgarian territory and, when they had entered Albania or Bulgaria, they had been disarmed and interned. Indeed the latter point had been reported to the Special Committee itself by the observation groups but had been ignored. In the same manner the majority of delegations in the First Committee was ignoring the evidence and the representative of the United Kingdom, who had acted as chief spokesman for the accusers of Albania and Bulgaria had made no attempt to disprove that evidence.

4. In fact, the United Kingdom representative had endeavoured to divert attention from the facts which Mr. Vyshinsky had adduced by citing some other data which supported the Special Committee's charges (304th meeting). His uncritical attitude towards that data had been shown by his citation of a perfectly irrelevant document. Instead of disproving Mr. Vyshinsky's evidence, he had talked about something completely different. For example, the United Kingdom representative had drawn attention to paragraphs 62, 63 and 64 of the report of the Special Committee wherein it was alleged that the testimony of witnesses had been submitted to careful analysis and that the conclusions of the Special Committee had been reached on the basis of corroborated evidence. If that claim were true, then the Special Committee would not have had to refer to testimony of such an obvious ludicrous character.

It would not have considered the evidence of witnesses brought forward by the Greek police. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that the Special Committee had accepted the testimony of witness No. 357 who had said that he knew that the guerrilla detachment of which he had been a member had entered Albanian territory because he had seen the lights from certain houses which, he said, were those of Albanian villages. Another witness, to whom the Polish representative had referred (305th meeting), had enumerated the precise number of weapons which, he had said, had been transported on mules across the Albanian frontier. Was it not surprising that the witness had known the exact number of weapons in the consignment? The record said that he had been a very willing witness. Surely, it was obvious that his replies had been dictated by his sponsors. Again, the United Kingdom representative had referred to another witness who had asserted that a certain consignment of arms had been transported by mule from Yugoslavia, although he had admitted that he had not observed the actual crossing of the border. Clearly there could be no ground for accepting a mere assertion. The United Kingdom representative had also spoken of a gun alleged to have been shooting into Greece from Albanian territory. Yet, the witness had alleged that he had seen it in operation after the action had ended. Here again the evidence was absurd. As a further basis for his conclusions the United Kingdom representative had referred to the testimony of witness No. 259, who had been a political commissar in the guerrilla forces. Here the first question to be asked was why he had become a turncoat. According to the witness it was because his position in the Greek partisan forces has enabled him to realize that the Bulgarians wanted to take over the greater part of Greece if the partisans gained victory. Obviously, such statements could only come from a provocateur to the Greek Government. Mr. Vyshinsky believed that his analysis of the evidence to which the United Kingdom representative had referred had shown that it was entirely false. It had not invalidated in any way the arguments of the Soviet Union delegation.

5. Mr. McNeil had also analysed the proposals contained in the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/518). He had described the provision for an appeal to the conflicting parties to cease operations as something very suspicious which required careful examination. He had said that there was no assurance that the National Liberation Army would not again resort to arms although the temporary democratic government had declared that operations had ceased. The Greek representative had said the same thing and had pointed out that there were some thousands of partisans in Greece who might again resume organized military action. However, the recommendation had been made for the precise reason that there was a danger of renewed hostilities and therefore it was essential to appeal to both parties not to resort to arms again. If there were no such danger, there would be no use in making that appeal. Clearly, the United Kingdom representative had not understood the logic of the Soviet Union proposal.

6. The draft resolution also provided for a general amnesty. Mr. McNeil had replied that that was primarily for the Greek Government to decide. Of course, it was the Greek Government

which had to declare such an amnesty, obviously, however, the present régime would not do so since it was incapable of extending any clemency to its enemies, a fact which had been demonstrated by the statements of the Greek War Minister. If it was desired to use the language of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, the Soviet Union delegation would not object to merely recommending a general amnesty. However, the United Kingdom representative's objections were not concerned only with language. He had argued that to declare a general amnesty would amount to relaxing security measures, a course which could be followed only if security was completely assured. In other words, there could be no amnesty so long as the Greek Government had not eliminated all its political adversaries. Thus, Mr. McNeil was the opponent of any amnesty as such. Mr. Vyshinsky wondered whether the relaxation of security measures referred to were the "re-education" laws and the institution of such camps as Makronesos where, as everyone knew, the most horrible cruelties were perpetrated. Apparently it was the view of the United Kingdom representative that such brutal treatment of surrendered guerrillas constituted a humanitarian relaxation of security measures which rendered an amnesty unnecessary.

7. Mr. McNeil had also disagreed with the proposal for holding general and free parliamentary elections in Greece. He had objected that the presence of some 750,000 refugees and the obsolescence of the electoral lists would make it difficult to hold a proper election without a great deal of preliminary work. It was quite true that the electoral lists needed to be revised, a fact which had been apparent at the time of the 1946 election when a member of the international supervisory Mission had been dismissed for objecting to the inclusion of the name of dead persons. The United Kingdom representative had also criticized the proposal to include representatives of the Greek democratic forces in the body which would conduct the elections. He had argued that the record of the guerrillas who had engaged in an armed struggle against the present régime would not permit their becoming a legal opposition. But history proved the absurdity of such a view. It was well known that, as recently as 1922, the Republican Party in Ireland had been an illegal body which had resorted to force of arms in defending its ideals and programme. Yet that had not prevented the Republican Party from subsequently being recognized and, after a period of parliamentary opposition, taking over the Government in 1927. All that had happened under the eyes of the United Kingdom Government and the latter had even engaged in negotiations with the Government of Mr. de Valera. Hence, the representative of the United Kingdom was ignoring and denying historical facts and precedents when he argued that a political party should be denied the privileges of a legal opposition simply because, in the past, it had to resort to arms in defense of its views.

8. The Soviet Union proposal also provided for the supervision of elections by representatives of foreign Powers including the USSR. Mr. McNeil had criticized that proposal and had pointed out that, when a similar proposal for international supervision had been adopted in 1946, the Soviet Union had refused an invitation to participate.

It was true that the position of the Soviet Union delegation had changed with regard to the question of international supervision, but that was because circumstances at the present time were very different from those prevailing in 1946. At the time the proposal had been advanced with a clear idea in mind that the Soviet Union Government would refuse. Now, when the Soviet Union proposed it, the other delegations refused. However, the fact of the matter was that the situation in Greece was now much more acute than it had ever been before and it was essential to take all possible measures to restore normal conditions.

9. Likewise the United Kingdom representative had criticized a proposal for a joint commission of foreign powers to control the frontiers between Greece and its northern neighbours. Mr. McNeil had confused resolution 109 (II) of the General Assembly establishing the Special Committee with the present proposal of the Soviet Union. The former had not dealt with the question of border control but had merely outlined the functions of the body which it had established. He had argued that those proposals would constitute an interference in the internal affairs of Greece. That was a convenient argument which was frequently used to cover up the shameful interference in the internal affairs of Greece on the part of certain other foreign Powers. It was noteworthy that the United Kingdom representative had made no reference to the proposal contained in sub-paragraph (e) of the Soviet Union draft resolution. Mr. McNeil had quoted the letter in which Mr. Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, had rejected the viewpoint of Mr. Evatt that the internal affairs of Greece and its external affairs were merely two aspects of the same question which should be settled simultaneously. It was a pity that the United Kingdom representative had not seen fit to analyse Mr. Evatt's idea and show where the error lay.

10. In concluding his statement the United Kingdom representative had asserted that the Special Committee served the cause of peace and should therefore be continued. In Mr. Vyshinsky's opinion the Special Committee should not be continued because its work had been characterized by a tendentious distortion of facts and by erroneous conclusions. That the Special Committee had been well aware of the nature of the testimony which it received was shown, for example, in an annotation to the testimony of witness No. 451 to the effect that the witness after careful and kind treatment gave all the information which was at her disposal. There could be no doubt as to what kind of inducement had been offered. Confronted by untrustworthy evidence, the Special Committee had had no moral right to make the accusations which it had advanced. Yet it had gone further and had even drawn false inferences from the data at its disposal.

11. Mr. Vyshinsky again returned to the allegation that Albania was the source of supplies for the Greek guerrillas. The United Kingdom representative had cited several witnesses in support of that accusation. But there were more authentic documents which contradicted it. Mr. Vyshinsky cited a report of the commandant of the Eighth Division of the Greek Army in which it was stated that Greek guerrillas far from the Albanian border were well fed on local supplies whereas the guerrillas in the Grammos region, just on the Albanian border, were starving and had not re-

ceived bread for a fortnight. The real source of the guerrillas' supplies was shown by a report of the Commanding General of the Third Army Corps of the Government forces relating to an attack on two army supply columns which had resulted in the capture of important supplies by the guerrillas. Of course it was true that there was sympathy among the Albanian and Bulgarian people for the Greek democratic forces. That sympathy was also world-wide. Sometimes a loaf of bread, sometimes even a sack of cornmeal were thrown across the frontier by those who sympathized with the guerrillas. It was also true that, in Rumania and elsewhere, funds had been collected to purchase toys for the children of the guerrillas. But those were normal humanitarian acts and certainly did not constitute interference by the Albanian and Bulgarian Governments. It was significant that the Greek representatives had made no attempt to explain or deny the official documents of the Greek Army which Mr. Vyshinsky had cited in connexion with the origin of the guerrillas' supplies.

12. Mr. McNeil had recalled a statement made by Mr. Litvinov when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union to the effect that there was no longer any such thing as neutrality in the world. What Mr. Litvinov, addressing himself to the small nations, had said was correct but it was wrong to interpret that statement as anticipating the moment when small nations would finally lose their sovereignty. That was the policy of the United States and the United Kingdom both of which had little regard for the sovereignty of small nations. The United Kingdom representative had also appealed to the Soviet Union Government to make a public appeal to Albania not to threaten Greece illegally and had promised that once such a public appeal was made his delegation would withdraw all its criticisms of the Soviet Union position and all its proposals. Of course, it was a common parliamentary procedure to make a promise which one knew it would never be necessary to carry out. But, the Soviet Union delegation was daily performing what Mr. McNeil had requested of it. Every day it asserted that the accusations against the Albanian and Bulgarian Governments of assisting the Greek guerrillas was a slanderous falsification of fact.

13. Turning to the statement of the United States representative (304th meeting), Mr. Vyshinsky dealt first with the question of the Greek-Albanian frontier. The United States representative had advocated adoption of the formula recommended by the Conciliation Committee which would require that Albania and Greece undertake not to attempt any frontier changes by the use of force or the threat of force. Presumably the term "force" was meant to include all forms of economic pressure. Mr. Vyshinsky considered that the United States Government had used such a threat in August 1946 when it had demanded that the Greek Government accept the conditions of United States aid under penalty of withdrawal of United States armed forces. Thus the threat was of a special kind, namely, the withdrawal of the Anglo-American military support without which the Greek régime could not continue to exist. Clearly there were various interpretations which could be given to the term "use or threat of force". It might be interpreted in a restrictive sense as relating only to armed force or, on the

other hand, it might apply to all forms of pressure. What use was there in adopting such a complicated formula when there was a simple proposal of the Soviet Union to determine that the frontier between Albania and Greece was final? Mr. Cohen had asserted that the whole frontier question had been used as a pretext to prevent any agreement with the Greek Government. Mr. Pipinelis had cited history (301st meeting) to show that, in the past, although there had been no agreement on the frontier question, the relations between Albania and Greece had been good. But in the present situation the frontier question was the corner-stone of the whole problem since the alternative formulae (A) and (B) which the Conciliation Committee had recommended<sup>1</sup> were designed to permit Greece to resurrect its claims on Northern Epirus after a certain time had elapsed. Albania and Bulgaria could not be expected to enter into any agreement while the threat of Greek territorial claims still persisted. The Soviet Union delegation had offered a simple and straightforward solution of the problem which alone provided a satisfactory basis of agreement.

14. The United States representative had asserted that the Greek Government was as popularly representative as any other Government in Eastern Europe. Of course, he was well aware whom the Government represented. It was well known that, in 1946, there had been widespread criticism in the Greek parliament of the United States Government's demand that 12,000 Greek civil servants be dismissed. At that time even the reactionary newspapers in Greece had said that the demand was an interference in the nation's internal affairs.

15. Mr. Cohen had concluded his statement with an appeal for a more peace-loving attitude on the part of all concerned. He had asserted that the internal struggle in Greece was over and that all the existing problems concerned its external relations. If that was so then why did the Greek Government not demonstrate its peace-loving attitude by releasing the thousands of innocent persons who were languishing in prisons. In Mr. Vyshinsky's opinion there could be no valid reason for rejecting the proposal for an amnesty.

16. Turning to the statement by the Greek representative, Mr. Vyshinsky criticized as incorrect the assertion that the proposals of the Conciliation Committee had been rejected outright by Albania. One had only to consult annex 4 of the Conciliation Committee's report to see that points 1, 2 and 5 of the draft agreement had been accepted by the Albanian Government without comment. Point 4, relating to the mixed border commission, had been opposed simply because the Albanian delegation favoured a rotating chairmanship and insisted that a transfer of territory should take place only by mutual agreement between both parties. Clearly, the Greek representative's assertion was a blatant untruth.

17. The Greek representative had insisted that there must be some verification on Albanian and Bulgarian territory to ensure that the fleeing guerrillas had been disarmed and interned. However, both Governments had declared unambiguously that such had been the case and it was an insult unheard of to refuse to accept the assurances of a sovereign Government. Moreover, even

<sup>1</sup> See document A/C.1/506, annex 3.



if it were proved that the guerrillas had been disarmed and interned, that would not provide a stronger guarantee against their return to Greece if it was assumed that the Albanian and Bulgarian Governments could not be trusted to respect their commitments. In Mr. Vyshinsky's opinion the demand for a commission of investigation on the spot was so ludicrous that it could only have been advanced in the hope that it would be rejected.

18. The representative of Greece had praised his own delegation for accepting all the proposals of the Conciliation Committee. It must be remembered, however, that the Conciliation Committee was composed of persons who supported the position of Greece and therefore anything which it had proposed had been agreed to in advance by the Greek delegation.

19. Mr. Vyshinsky said that he could not fail to take note of the Greek representative's comments with regard to Epirus, namely that that question was not of such importance as to prevent agreement. Actually, that was the only question outstanding. The Greek representative had endeavoured to prove that it was possible to entertain normal diplomatic relations even while territorial claims were maintained by one of the parties. The Greek representative had spoken so much in that connexion that he had ventured to repeat slanderous nonsense about alleged plans of the USSR Government in wartime with respect to Bulgaria. However, that matter had been exposed for what it was a year previously by the Soviet Information Bureau in connexion with falsifications of history attempted by the State Department in a compilation which it had issued in January 1948.

20. Mr. Vyshinsky said that it would be unnecessary to deal with the so-called free elections described by Mr. Pipinelis, in view of the remarks of some previous speakers. It was only after the mission—which had approved the elections—had "fired" an inconvenient member that it had found it possible to praise the elections conducted by the Tsaldaris Government. The Tsaldaris Government in return praised the mission.

21. Referring to another comment made by the Greek representative to the effect that the East had wanted to continue that situation through agreements with would-be conquerors, Mr. Vyshinsky said that the agreements signed by the USSR at the time in question had saved all Europe, including Greece, from the horrors of hitlerite domination.

22. Turning to the speech of the Lebanese representative (304th meeting), Mr. Vyshinsky noted that Mr. Malik, after stating that there were two worlds, had felt anxiety and concern in looking at the book *The Law of the Soviet State*. Mr. Vyshinsky observed that book had not been written by himself alone but by a group of authors. The anxiety which the first page of that book had caused to Mr. Malik would also have been caused by the "Communist Manifesto", which had stated precisely the same things about a hundred years previously. While the Lebanese representative had been incorrect in his comments regarding that work, he had been right in stating that there was a struggle between two worlds. That had already been made clear in 1946, however, when the USSR delegation had said that

there were two camps expressing the opposing tendencies in international relations. One of those tendencies, adhered to and pursued by that world in which the USSR and its friends played their part, was towards international co-operation, the strengthening of the United Nations, and strict compliance with and implementation of the Charter, the strengthening of relations on the basis of the principles set forth in the Charter. The other world or tendency, however, was towards world hegemony, dictation and subjection in the name of carrying out a plan of world mastery.

23. The USSR representative said that sides must be taken in that struggle. Pointing out that the United Nations ruled out the policy of would-be world hegemony, he said that the new claimants of world mastery would suffer the same fate as previous claimants. If the Greek question were viewed as part of the general struggle between two worlds, it could only be said that that was because that question was being exploited by the would-be world masters in order that Greece might be used as a door to get into those parts where they could implement their plans. That was the sense of the events at the basis of the difficulties in the Greek question. Mr. Vyshinsky concluded by saying that the problem could be solved on one basis alone, namely, respect for the principles expressed and proclaimed in the Charter, on the basis of co-operation. That was the policy championed by the USSR.

24. Mr. DE LA TOURNELLE (France) said that no task had brought greater honour to the United Nations than that of UNSCOB. All geographical regions were or should be represented on that Committee. There were only two delegations, whose comments on the work of the Special Committee had been bitter, which needed to participate in the work of that body, but it was clear unfortunately that it was not possible for them to participate, since if they were to participate, Albania and Bulgaria would have no further reason to refuse the Committee access to their territory or to prevent it from making any investigations on those territories. Those two countries clearly were afraid of such investigation. No function was more necessary than that of the Special Committee, whose task was to protect a small country by application of the principles of the Charter and to maintain the peace seriously threatened in that region of Europe.

25. Stating that his country was honoured to have participated in that work, having been represented both on the Commission of Investigation set up by the Security Council and later on the Special Committee set up by the General Assembly, Mr. de la Tournelle noted that some representatives had tried to differentiate between the French representatives on each of those bodies, because the first had not associated himself entirely with the conclusions arrived at by his colleagues, whereas the second representative had agreed with the unanimous decision of the Special Committee. He recalled that in 1947 his delegation, in associating itself with the position of its Government's representative on the Commission of Investigation, had requested (69th meeting) and obtained (72nd meeting) from the General Assembly a decision that no formal condemnation be pronounced against anyone, in view of the fact that the conclusions and findings of that Commission had not seemed sufficiently conclusive. As had been pointed out at that time, it had

seemed preferable to attempt to create an atmosphere of understanding and friendliness so as to facilitate the solution of difficulties which it was hoped would be temporary. The efforts of men of good will had been in vain, as the reports of the Special Committee had shown. The help to partisans had been increased and perfected and, on the orders of the *Cominform*, States which were not neighbours of Greece had also intervened. A new crime had been perpetrated against humanity, in which abducted children had been physically and morally prepared in order to be launched against their fatherland. The testimony in that respect furnished by the Special Committee was convincing. The French representative quoted an extract of an article published in *Le Monde* of 21 October 1949, which commented on and described the abduction and use of Greek children.

26. The French representative recalled that he had vainly endeavoured to have the resolution regarding the repatriation of Greek children adopted at the previous session of the Assembly by the First Committee worded in different terms and he hoped that the present proposal would prove more effective. In spite of the fact that the dangers to peace in the Balkans had clearly increased since the previous year for reasons not altogether connected with the agenda item under discussion, certain aspects of the Greek question were not altogether unfavourable. Thus the Greek-Yugoslav frontier had at last been closed. Moreover, though the Special Committee might not have removed all evils, without its presence and activities the actions of the aggressors would have been even more numerous and more violent.

27. In order not to affect the future negotiations of the Conciliation Committee and to avoid condemning in advance the absence of a spirit of conciliation among certain delegations, a spirit which, it was hoped, would appear at a later stage, his delegation fully associated itself with the conclusion of the letter dated 18 October 1949 to the Chairman of the First Committee from the President of the General Assembly to the effect that it was essential to reach such an agreement—whether by direct negotiations or by conciliation—if conditions of security and stability were to be restored in the areas concerned (A/C.1/503). His delegation had also been concerned by the violence of the interventions of certain representatives of *Cominform* countries to which the Lebanese representative had referred on the previous day (304th meeting), and he wondered whether that violence and those attacks did not hide a new threat to peace. The continuation of UNSCOB was therefore an absolute necessity. Paragraph 4 of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/513) seemed particularly appropriate in that it provided for the immediate convocation of a special session of the General Assembly, if the Special Committee deemed such a course necessary, for the purpose of considering new steps which might be required to thwart new threats to peace. He hoped that such measures would not be required and that the Special Committee would in the near future contribute to accelerating conciliation in Greece.

28. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTE (Ecuador) said that the problem before the Committee, which had been discussed by the United Nations since 1946, appeared to have become a permanent one. It must also be borne in mind that during that period

of time, the question had retained the same fundamental characteristics. Thus the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in 1947 and 1948 had been almost identical, and the present joint draft resolution was very similar to those previously adopted. There seemed to be reason to anticipate that a similar proposal would be adopted the following year. While he recognized that there were some important differences, the real facts of the situation continued to be that the internal situation in Greece was affected by external factors to the extent that it would be difficult to solve the former without first securing a solution of the second aspect of the problem. Greece was a victim of its geographical situation, since it held a very important strategic position in the Mediterranean.

29. Pointing out that the report under discussion had come from a serious and responsible Committee, Mr. Viteri Lafronte said that the analysis to which that report had been subjected did not warrant disagreement with its fundamental conclusions and findings. The concrete and specific fact that Albania, Bulgaria and Romania had continued to give moral and material support to the Greek guerrilla movement still remained. While the form, extent and significance of such assistance might be disputed, it could not be denied that that assistance had been extended and that it was incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter. Stating that the conclusion of the report to the effect that the assistance furnished to the guerrillas by Yugoslavia had been considerably reduced and might even have ceased was an important change in the situation, he reaffirmed his delegation's view that the Committee must above all request the Conciliation Committee to continue carrying out its activities, since it was always possible that some appropriate meeting ground might be found which would facilitate solution of the problem. His delegation, while aware of the difficulties under which the Special Committee had laboured and though aware that it might have encountered some deficiencies, recognized that much had been accomplished that had served and would serve to lessen the difficulties inherent in the question before the First Committee. Noting that the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 6 of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/513) involved a new step not inherent in the previous decisions of the General Assembly, Mr. Viteri Lafronte said that while he did not wish to enter into detailed discussions of the proposals before the Committee, he wanted to state that he was in agreement with the proposal that the Special Committee should continue its work. He suggested that it would be better to specify the "certain States" referred to in various parts of the joint draft resolution.

30. He pointed out that the provisions of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 7 of the joint draft might offer some difficulty to zealous defenders of the domestic jurisdiction of States, since it might also be said that that jurisdiction included the establishment and maintenance of diplomatic relations. The problem, however, did not arise as far as his country was concerned as it had stated that some limitations on sovereignty were an essential prerequisite for an efficient international organization.

31. Turning to the USSR representative's contention that it would be simple to accept a definite

frontier between Greece and Albania and thus make agreement possible, the Ecuadoran representative said that while it was easy to solve any problem by giving legal status to a *de facto* situation, such a solution might be completely unfair for one of the parties. Even from the most practical and realistic point of view such a problem had to be solved by legal means which were specified by the Charter.

32. Mr. Vyshinsky had also alluded to the existence of two groups of States and to the situation arising from that fact. Many small countries were aware of the problem and wished to see an end to that lack of understanding among the great Powers. Quoting a statement he had made the previous year while referring to the Greek problem (182nd meeting) Mr. Viteri Lafronte said that it was well known that the diametrical opposi-

tion of those two groups of States had created the main difficulty for the solution of the problem. It must be hoped that those two opposite worlds might find a road to conciliation, which was the only way in which the Greek problem could be solved and peace and security in the world could be ensured.

33. In reply to a question put by Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), the CHAIRMAN stated that he expected to be able to read a communication from the President of the General Assembly the following morning regarding the results of the latter's approach to the Greek representatives pursuant to the decision of the Committee of a few days previously (298th meeting).

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 2 November 1949 at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman:* Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

#### **Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans—general discussion (continued)**

1. The CHAIRMAN recalled the decision of the Committee to invite the representatives of Albania and Bulgaria to take seats at the Committee table in order to make statements on the Greek question and then to remain available to the Committee to reply to any questions that they might be asked (303rd meeting).

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representatives of Albania and Bulgaria took seats at the Committee table.*

2. Mr. PRIFTI (Albania) stated that his Government had welcomed the invitation to participate in the work of the Conciliation Committee, since it had considered the establishment of that Committee to be a proof of the First Committee's desire to find a solution to the Greek question. The Albanian delegation felt obliged unfortunately to state with sincere regret that the expected results had not been achieved.

3. Before broaching the substance of his statement, he wished to tender a formal protest against the First Committee's adoption, on 31 October (303rd meeting), of the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/519) concerning an alleged incident on the Greek-Albanian frontier which was claimed to have endangered observers of the Special Committee. That resolution, directed against Albania, was absolutely unfounded and had been adopted arbitrarily, in a manner unworthy of the First Committee. It represented a political manoeuvre, intended to influence the Committee in its debates on the Greek question.

4. He thought that the discussion of the report of the Conciliation Committee had proved once again that the only reason for the serious situation existing in Greece was the interference of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom and the maintenance of an oppressive régime by means of armed force. The causes of that situation were to be found in Greece

itself, and not in its relations with Albania and Bulgaria, which merely represented a reflection of the internal position of Greece. The Governments of Washington, London and Athens did not in fact wish either the democratic pacification of Greece or peace in the Balkans. Those Governments, by refusing to accept the just proposals of the Soviet Union, Albania and Bulgaria, had intended to bring about the failure of the Conciliation Committee, and to shift the responsibility for that failure to the other parties. They had endeavoured to use the Conciliation Committee as a miniature United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, with the intention of aggravating the already tense relations between Greece, Albania and Bulgaria and thus to provoke an aggressive war that had been engineered for a long time against the Soviet Union and the Popular Democracies. They were now attempting to use the failure of the Conciliation Committee in their slanderous attacks against Albania, because that country, which held an important strategic position in the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, constituted an obstacle to their aggressive plans. During the late war, the United States and the United Kingdom had tried to sabotage the struggle for the national liberation of the Albanian people. They had worked with quisling Governments, and members of their missions had had no hesitation to even collaborate with the German invaders. The charges they were now levelling against Albania, by quoting from the reports of the Special Committee and the Conciliation Committee, were a logical sequence of that policy. The resolutions directed against Albania for the past three years merely served to undermine the moral strength of the United Nations and also aggravate the situation in Greece.

5. The allegation that Albania had caused the failure of the efforts of the Conciliation Committee was absolutely false. How and why could Albania have brought about that failure? Was it because it had claimed the most legitimate and fundamental right of a sovereign State, namely the recognition of its frontiers? The delegation of the People's Republic of Albania felt compelled to inform the Committee of its negotiations with the Conciliation Committee.

6. Albania had held interviews with the Conciliation Committee on 8, 13, 14 and 17 October. The President of the General Assembly had submitted to the Albanian delegation, as "a basis of discussion", the draft agreement prepared by the Conciliation Committee in Paris in 1948, and also Mr. Evatt's statement of 19 May 1949<sup>1</sup>. He had also requested the Albanian delegation to transmit to its Government the following three questions:

(a) Would the Albanian Government be prepared to accept a neutral person designated by the United Nations as chairman of the mixed Albanian-Greek commission as stipulated in the draft agreement?

(b) Would the Albanian Government welcome the despatching into Albania of a neutral United Nations observer, who would verify on the spot the disarmament and internment of Greek partisans in Albania?

(c) What would be the attitude of the Albanian Government on the question of the repatriation of Greek children, if such repatriation were requested by their parents?

7. On 14 October, the Committee had submitted to the Albanian delegation the tentative suggestions for draft agreements between Greece and each of its northern neighbours, together with copies of the USSR proposals submitted on 13 October (A/C.1/506, annex 2) indicating that the first part of those proposals, namely, those dealing with the settlement of the situation in Greece, had not been adopted and had not been taken into consideration when the suggestions submitted by the Committee had been formulated.

8. He then read his delegation's reply to the Conciliation Committee (A/C.1/506/annex 4). With regard to the three questions asked by the President, the Albanian delegation stated that it considered the appointment of a neutral chairman or referee for the mixed commission to be useless, in view of the fact that the establishment of that commission presupposed general agreement between the two countries. With regard to the President's second question, it considered the appointment of a neutral observer to be equally useless and, furthermore, incompatible with the sovereignty of Albania. The question of the repatriation of Greek children no longer concerned Albania, since there had been no Greek children in that country since December 1948.

9. The Albanian delegation had expressed its full agreement with the proposals submitted to the Conciliation Committee by the delegation of the Soviet Union. Finally, it had stated that the Albanian Government was always prepared to assist the Conciliation Committee in its work.

10. It appeared, therefore, that the Albanian Government (a) had raised no objections against the majority of the proposals contained in the draft agreement submitted by the Conciliation Committee, (b) considered the formal recognition of its existing frontiers with Greece to be an indispensable condition for the establishment of normal relations with that country, (c) considered the democratic internal pacification of Greece to be an essential condition to peace in the Balkans and throughout the world.

11. The delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom and Greece had tried to create

the impression that the attitude taken by Albania was the main reason for the failure of the Conciliation Committee. Nevertheless, neither the letter of 18 October (A/C.1/503) nor the report of 28 October (A/C.1/506) transmitted to the First Committee by the President of the General Assembly contained a single word in support of such accusations. The documents and the statements of the Greek delegation in the First Committee proved that the responsibility for the failure of the Committee could be laid at the door of the Greek Government.

12. Many facts and innumerable official statements proved, moreover, that the Greek Government had decided and was prepared to use force in order to realize its territorial claims against Albania. He recalled that at the Paris Peace Conference Mr. Tsaldaris had insisted upon Greece's territorial claims against Albania and had alleged that a state of war existed between those two countries. When that manoeuvre had failed, Mr. Tsaldaris and his delegation had continued to state that only the ceding of Northern Epirus to Greece could put an end to that alleged state of war. He quoted statements made by Mr. Diomedes and Mr. Pipinelis, to the effect that Greece could not relinquish its claims to the territory concerned. History contradicted those expansionist claims of the Athens Government, and international juridical instruments proved irrefutably that the question of Northern Epirus did not exist and that Albania was one and indivisible, with frontiers which could not be disputed.

13. He stressed that his Government had sincerely wished to collaborate with the Conciliation Committee and had shown itself prepared to consider the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Greece. In that connexion, he recalled the letter sent on 2 May 1948 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Albanian Government, stating that, if the Greek Government wished to bring to an end the existing tension on the Albanian-Greek frontier, which was in fact a result of the aggressive policy of the Athens Government, Albania would be prepared to reconsider the question of re-establishing normal diplomatic relations with Greece. In spite of the short time available to the Conciliation Committee, it could certainly have contributed more effectively to the solution of that problem by deciding to eliminate the fundamental pretext of Greece's aggressive policy against Albania, namely, the Greek territorial claims.

14. Since its liberation from Nazi occupation, the Albanian Government had resolutely pursued a peaceful policy in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Nevertheless, it had been the victim of the attacks, pressure, threats, provocations and aggressive acts of the Athens Government and the American and British imperialists. That hostile attitude had been manifested not only by the previously-mentioned territorial claims and by the allegation that a state of war existed between Greece and Albania, but also by the persecution of the Albanian Cham minority in Greece, by military provocations that had latterly degenerated into open acts of aggression and by allegations that Albania was assisting the Greek Democratic Army and interfering in the internal affairs of Greece.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 8, annex 5A.

15. With regard to the alleged state of war that had existed since 1940, when Greece was attacked by fascist Italy, the actual facts were that Albania itself had already become a victim of Italian aggression on 7 April 1939 and that the Albanian people had struggled against that aggression by the side of the Greek people and of all the other Allied peoples. The real reason for the Greek accusation was, as Mr. Diomedes had said on 26 August 1949, when a committee of Albanian quislings had been set up abroad, that the Greek Government would welcome any movement directed against the existing régime in Albania: thus, the fascists of Athens were forming an alliance with Albanian fascists, under United States auspices. The Albanian people and the Government of the People's Republic of Albania categorically stated that they had never declared war on Greece, had never been and were not in a state of war with that country, and had no desire for war with that country at any time.

16. The Athens régime was responsible for the mass extermination of the Albanian Cham minority in Greece, perpetrated at the order of the fascist General Napoleon Zervas. Two thousand eight hundred and seventy-seven persons had been the victims of his persecutions, and the rest of that ethnic minority, comprising 23,000 persons, had been expelled into Albania. In spite of the Albanian Government's protest to the Council of Foreign Ministers in June 1946 and to the Security Council in 1947<sup>1</sup> and in spite of the findings of the Security Council Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents in 1947, those members of Albanian minorities in Greece had been unable to return to their homes, and their persecutors had remained unpunished.

17. Military forces of the Athens Government daily violated the territorial integrity of Albania with a view to maintaining the tension that existed on the frontiers and unleashing an aggressive war against that country at an opportune moment. From November 1944 to the end of September 1949, those forces had committed 1,565 armed provocations and incursions into Albania. In those numerous attacks and provocations, 18 Albanian soldiers and officers had been killed or wounded, 7 civilians had been killed, and many buildings had been totally destroyed. The Albanian frontier authorities had captured 75 soldiers and officers of the Athens Government Army in Albanian territory.

18. The Greek provocations had varied in intensity, in accordance with the internal and international position of Greece. They had been especially frequent during the summer of 1945; when the Athens Government had been preparing a real aggression against Albania, during the summer of 1946, when the Athens Government had been pressing its claims against Albania at the Paris Peace Conference, during the winter of 1946, when that Government had accused Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in the Security Council of giving assistance to Greek partisans, and during the summer of 1947, when the Security Council had considered the report of the Commission of Investigation. They had become more frequent and more violent after the arrival in Greece of the so-called United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans and by August 1949 had become

undeniable acts of aggression. Indeed, on 2 August 1949, troops of the Athens Government had invaded Albanian territory in the Bilishte district. Under the command of the American General Van Fleet, three Greek brigades had entered Albania, supported by 178 airplanes, which had bombed and machine-gunned villages and civilians. That aggression had been perpetrated on the eve of the session of the United Nations General Assembly, with the intention of confronting the Assembly with a *fait accompli*. As usual, the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans had hastened to legalize that aggression by setting upon it the seal of the United Nations. That plot had been prepared by a campaign of provocation, official statements and slanderous accusations against Albania, which had begun at the beginning of the year and had been intensified since July. In that connexion, he quoted various articles that had appeared in the newspapers *Eleftheria*, *The Manchester Guardian*, *Le Monde* and *The Glasgow Herald*, an appeal by Radio Athens and statements by the British MPs Raymond Blackburn and A. R. Low and by General Theodore Pangalos, to the effect that Albania should be liberated from its existing régime, if necessary, by means of invasion. At the same time, the United States FBI had set up in New York an "Albanian Anti-Communist Front", composed of traitors and war criminals and working in collaboration with the British Intelligence Service to unite all the war criminals who had fled abroad in an organization that claimed to represent "Free Albania". The purpose of those machinations was to impute to Albania the responsibility for the existing situation in Greece and to create, by means of Greek and Yugoslav provocations on the Albanian frontiers, a situation that would serve as a pretext to unleash aggressive war against Albania. The frontier forces of the Albanian National Army had, however, valiantly defended the integrity and independence of their country and had brought about the failure of all those attacks. The Albanian Government felt obliged solemnly to call upon the United Nations to take the necessary measures to put an end to the aggressive activities of the Greek Government.

19. After the failure of the aggression of August 1949, the United States Government had displayed uneasiness with regard to the turn that events on the Greek-Albanian frontier might take, and had informed the Greek Government that it would pass strict judgment on any Greek activities tending to violate Albanian territory. The openly hostile attitude of the United States and United Kingdom representative toward Albania during the debates that had taken place on the Greek question in the First Committee clearly proved that those remonstrances were only made in order to create confusion. That also proved, however, that the American and British imperialists realized that the Athens Government was the aggressor against Albania and that they were directing that aggression. Moreover, it proved that the aggressors and their American and British masters had been forced to retreat before the firm resistance of Albania.

20. Experience of the past year had already shown the biased, futile and provocative nature of the work of the so-called United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans. The report for the current year, however, showed that to satisfy United States interests, the Special Committee

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council*, Second Year, No. 58, 158th meeting.

had departed even further from the principles of the Charter.

21. The Special Committee had been set up illegally, under pressure from the United States, for the avowed purpose of formulating charges against Bulgaria and Albania and of interfering in the domestic affairs of independent sovereign States. After two years, the Special Committee was proving itself useless and even dangerous in regard to the internal situation in Greece, the relations between Balkan nations and world peace. The Special Committee's last report showed that it had acted as an emissary of the United States, whose activities were directed in particular against the People's Republic of Albania.
22. The charges made by the Special Committee were as serious as they were groundless. But one wondered what value could be given to its methods and statements. Paragraph 59 of its report<sup>1</sup> admitted that information available to the Special Committee had been circumscribed. Nevertheless, it had drawn conclusions from so-called direct observations, the testimonies of 1,105 witnesses, official statements and various documents. The main source of information had been that of the witnesses, most of whom were Greek nationals usually introduced by the Greek Authorities, who had interrogated large numbers of them and had often taken their statements while they were under arrest, as pointed out in paragraph 62 of the report. Standard questions had been prepared and witnesses had not given evidence on oath. Finally, they were identified only by algebraical symbols.
23. In the circumstances, the Special Committee's and its observation groups' working papers, which were difficult to read but essential, showed the futility of the report.
24. Most of the witnesses had been awaiting trial, and their conviction depended on the evidence they gave. Furthermore, the Special Committee's adoption of standard rules for interrogation made it possible for the Greek police to prepare the witnesses beforehand. Moreover, the police were often content to transmit evidence. In regard to the anonymity or real identity of witnesses, he wondered whether there was any need to call upon the Greek Liaison Service.
25. Paragraph 64 of the report stated that the Special Committee was "firmly of the opinion that the statements recorded in observation group reports . . . faithfully reproduced the facts as described by the witnesses." As to the truth of the facts themselves, the Special Committee would be hard put to produce any proof, as those facts had been invented in the torture chambers of the Greek secret service. The Special Committee had stated that it had not accepted any information unless it had been reported by more than one witness. When, however, it had had two false witnesses, it had indulged in cunning fabrication to compile a report which it would be tragic for the First Committee to take as a basis for its discussion.
26. The Special Committee had accused Albania of having refused to collaborate with it and of having given "essential" assistance to the partisans. The Albanian Government denied the
- whole and every part of the false accusations invented by the monarcho-fascist authorities with the aid of the observation groups and the Special Committee itself. The purpose of those allegations was to defame a peace-loving democratic State, to justify the military intervention in Greece of the United States and United Kingdom and the monarcho-fascist terror, and by accusing Albania of interfering in the domestic affairs of Greece and of disturbing the peace in the Balkans, to prepare against Albania the armed aggression premeditated by the United States, United Kingdom and monarcho-fascist Greece.
27. Albania had already said that it would consider the Special Committee as illegal and would never assist or recognize it. However, during the third session the Albanian Government had willingly co-operated in the work of the Conciliation Committee. Greece, however, had caused the work of that Committee to break down by refusing to accept Mr. Evatt's initial proposal on the final recognition of existing frontiers. The Albanian Government had also collaborated with the existing Conciliation Committee, and would do everything in its power to assist in the settlement of the Greek question in accordance with the Charter.
28. It was true that Albania had sheltered wounded Greek partisans for humanitarian reasons and in conformity with international law; but it also formally denied that, to the knowledge of the Albanian Authorities, any Greek partisans had returned to Greece after leaving hospital. It was also untrue that Albania had assisted or supplied the Greek Democratic Army, or had authorized it to use Albanian territory for tactical purposes. It was an insult to the sovereign State of Albania to accuse it of having helped the Democratic Greek Army to recruit partisans on its territory. Similarly insulting were the charges of the alleged recruiting of Greek children.
29. As the Head of the Albanian Government had stated on 15 September 1948, the Albanian Government had never interfered in the domestic affairs of Greece. Those accusations to the contrary were reminiscent of the fable of the wolf and the lamb. The monarcho-fascists and their masters alone were responsible for what was happening in Greece.
30. The Albanian Government had never given armed assistance to the democratic soldiers, nor had it allowed them to enter Albania and then return to Greece. The Albanian Government interned in concentration camps all democratic or monarcho-fascist soldiers who crossed the border. Albanian troops had orders to keep a strict watch on the border and not to advance an inch into Greek territory; they had observed those orders.
31. The Special Committee had based its arguments mainly on the evidence of witnesses and on the observations of its groups. With regard to the so-called assistance to partisans, document A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.1/26 stated that a certain group of partisans could only have been supplied by Albania, and that statement was supposed to have been based as much on the map as on the statements of witnesses. Yet monarcho-fascist documents proved that in fact those partisans had been supplied on the spot. And as for the witnesses, who were officers of the Greek Army, the observers had not been able to confirm the

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 8.



figures they had given as to the number of shells fired by the partisans. Moreover, were those shells not perhaps marked "made in USA"? Other examples of the so-called logistical assistance were given in document A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.5/8. But on reading it, it would be noted that witness No. 5/W/47 had seen only two trucks—not "many trucks"—that he could not have known that the trucks were loaded because they were covered, and finally, that "his stays" in the area had been limited to one day, 17 October 1948. Witness No. 1/W/319 (A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.1/26) claimed that Albania had supplied the partisans with cans of jam and chocolate, which it could certainly not have done.

32. Witness No. 1/W/323 had said that the munitions had been contained in "clean" cases. But why had he not given the maker's name? UNSCOB was very discreet on that point.

33. UNSCOB admitted, it was true, that the Albanian Government had informed the Secretary-General of the provocations and the acts of aggression periodically committed against Albania by the monarcho-fascists. Even paragraph 43 of the report stated that operations against the partisans had given rise to frequent incidents and lesser violations of Albanian territory. But on that point UNSCOB was manifestly attempting to minimize those incidents, while doing its utmost to give a semblance of truth to monarcho-fascist slanders. Document A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/31 reported that the observation group, which had gone to investigate alleged firing upon Greek troops from Albanian territory, had itself been under fire. The observation group had admitted not to be able to state positively that the shots had been fired from Albania, but had submitted a fantastic sketch suggesting that certain gun emplacements were on Albanian territory, although it must be repeated that the group which pretended to have witnessed the incident could not make any precise assertions.

34. According to document A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.1/32, Observation Group No. 1 had stated that "it was impossible for the Greek Army to have all-round defence without encroaching, for a few metres, into Albania". UNSCOB thus recognized the right of the Greek Army to violate the territorial integrity of Albania and implicitly justified its acts of aggression.

35. It was rather surprising that observation groups composed principally of officers did not seem to have examined the holes made by shells or the unexploded shells when they had reported on so-called Albanian provocations. They were satisfied with the testimony of the monarcho-fascists.

36. Moreover, on what facts did UNSCOB base its accusation that Albania had enlisted Greek children and sent them into combat? That charge was based on two letters from the Greek Liaison Officer, who had merely reported the testimony of witness No. 2/W/322 and others whose depositions had been taken by Greek officials. Some of those witnesses did not even remember in what year they had allegedly gone to Albania. One said he had seen a group of 16-year old boys arrive from a foreign country and the Special Committee had asserted that that foreign country was Albania (A/AC.16/W.98). But how could the witness know that those young

people had come from a foreign country, that they were organized in a company and that they were sixteen years old? That age seemed to be a favourite one for the clever sleuths of the Special Committee.

37. Albania refuted all those wholesale fabrications and all that slander. As the Secretary-General had been informed on 18 April 1949, the children who had been in Albania had been transferred by that date to other People's Republics willing to receive them.

38. Albania had been charged with having misunderstood resolution 193 C (III) of the General Assembly of 27 November 1948 on the repatriation of Greek children, but the Albanian Government considered that its behaviour had been in conformity with humanitarian principles and the Charter, since it had saved those children from the monarcho-fascist executioners.

39. Indeed, what was the fate of children in Greece? On 9 July 1948, the *Hellenikos Vorras* had reported that numerous children were begging in the streets of Athens and the *World Telegram* of 8 December 1948 had published an appeal by the "Foster-Parents Plan for War Children" which stated that the children of Athens were dying in hundreds.

40. Safe in the People's Democracies, those sufferings were unknown to the Greek children. The philanthropists of the Special Committee, who would never agree that the monarcho-fascist terror had claimed enough victims, would not admit that fact.

41. The Special Committee had further accused Albania of assisting the partisans in recruiting Greeks and Chams in Albania; that was yet another lie. On 31 May 1949, the Greek Liaison Officer had sent the Special Committee an extract from the evidence of two persons "of Albanian origin" concerning the so-called recruitment of Chams in Albania. The witness, Liokossis, had stated that on 23 March 1949, in the village of Sales, an Albanian partisan and an Albanian officer had called for volunteers, and that 35 of the 300 Chams who were present had volunteered. According to the evidence of Liokossis, provided by the liaison officer, who had naturally transmitted only what suited him, Cham political informers had stated that all Chams between the ages of 16 and 45 had to volunteer in order to avoid being recruited by force.

42. Surely that constituted a mockery of the General Assembly and of world public opinion. According to his name, Constantin Liokossis seemed to be a Christian, but he described himself as a Cham, whereas all Chams were Moslems.

43. The other witness, Babis Thomas, an Albanian deserter, had asserted that he had met a Cham who had told him that the Chams had been mobilized on 24 March 1949, a date which should be compared with that of 23 March previously quoted, and that 300 Chams had volunteered. The witness had added, it was true, that the Chams did not wish to volunteer, but that they would be recruited by force to occupy the area where they originated.

44. Thus, the evidence of one deserter had been sufficient proof for the Special Committee to assert that the Albanian Government was indeed guilty of that traitor's charges. In the sec-

ond place, the Albanians were accused of recruiting Chams to occupy Chamuria.

45. Thus, on the grounds of testimony extracted in torture chambers, Albania was accused of assisting the Greek Democratic Army as well as having expansionist tendencies.

46. Witness No. 1/W/377 had stated that on 12 March 1949 Albanian newspapers had published a *communiqué* urging all Greek refugees, including Chams, to join the ranks of the partisans. The date mentioned in that case was 12 March, whereas the Albanian Liaison Officer had referred to an appeal dated 20 March. In neither case had any supporting documents been produced, not even a single Albanian newspaper.

47. Witness No. 5/W/176 had alleged that the appeal had been issued in January 1949, and had stated that the Albanian police had distributed it to partisans. According to those witnesses, the newspaper and the police in Albania were subject to the orders of Greek partisans.

48. Thus, the Special Committee was accusing Albania, on the basis of false testimony of monarcho-fascist origin, of having assisted partisans in recruiting Greeks and Chams from Albania; but neither the date, nor the real origin of the appeal allegedly issued to the Chams, nor any supporting documents had been provided.

49. The report of the Special Committee was full of obvious absurdities, which deprived that document of any value. Many testimonies referred to the period of 1948, on which the Special Committee had already submitted a report. Furthermore, the Special Committee's teams had formed groups of spies and had entered Albanian territory by night (A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/31).

50. Albania stated that the tendentious accusations of the Special Committee were absolutely unfounded, and asked that the following offensive activities of that group and its hostility towards Albania should be condemned.

(a) The Special Committee continually tried to justify Greece and to accuse Albania;

(b) The Special Committee accused Albania of sympathizing with the Greek partisans, who were fighting for freedom, peace and democracy as if that sympathy constituted a crime;

(c) The Special Committee implicitly recognized the Greek territorial claims on Southern Albania and accused Albania of hostility towards Greece, whereas it kept silent in regard to the Greek Government's appeals for the dismemberment of Albania;

(d) When the Special Committee was informed by the Secretary-General of Albania's protests against Greek provocations, it had tried to justify them and to prove the existence of imaginary Albanian provocations. The Greek aggression of August 1949 against Albania had even been ignored by the Special Committee;

(e) The observers of the Special Committee had taken part, on 25 October 1949 in particular, in the provocations of the monarcho-fascists against Albania, and according to Greek agents who had been apprehended by the Albanian Authorities, the Special Committee had organized an espionage service against Albania;

(f) The Special Committee showed absolutely no interest in the internal situation in Greece (various American and British troops and mis-

sions, the terrorization and oppression of the people by the monarcho-fascists and civil war throughout continental and insular Greece passed unheeded). The Special Committee had concentrated all its activities in the North, especially on the Albanian frontier, and it gazed towards Romania and even beyond.

51. The Special Committee was as despicable as its report was flimsy, tendentious and mendacious. Such an organ could only be used by enemies of Albania and by those who wished to overthrow its popular régime from without. Certain delegations had therefore decided to congratulate the Special Committee on having provided such valuable assistance for the policy pursued by the United States, the United Kingdom and the monarcho-fascists, which was detrimental to peace and to the United Nations. The arbitrary and bellicose draft resolution directed against Bulgaria and Albania and submitted by the United States naturally showed a striking similarity to the recommendations of the Special Committee. The free peoples called for the abolition of that illegitimate body since such a move would mitigate the sufferings of the Greek people and would represent a first step in the path of the pacification of Greece and of the establishment of normal relations with Albania and Bulgaria.

52. Albania called upon the First Committee to reject the report and the recommendations of the Special Committee, as well as the joint draft resolution of the United States, Australia, China and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/513), which was based on that report, and to adopt the draft resolution of the USSR delegation (A/C.1/518), which provided the only equitable and rapid solution of the Greek problem.

53. The Albanian delegation submitted the following conclusions:

(a) The charges brought against Albania by the monarcho-fascists and the Anglo-Americans had the sole purpose of provocation and were intended to mask aggressive acts;

(b) Terror raged in Greece, and the people were struggling for their liberty;

(c) That situation had been created by the interference of the United States and the United Kingdom and had been aggravated by the Special Committee;

(d) The American and British imperialists wanted to turn Greece into a spearhead against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies;

(e) That situation and the Greek régime constituted a threat to peace in the Balkans and throughout the world.

54. The Albanian People's Republic, desirous of defending the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of Greece and international peace and security, proposed:

(a) To denounce the Government of Athens, which was guilty of aggression;

(b) To consider the report of the Special Committee as null and void and to dissolve that organ, which had been established in violation of the principles of the Charter;

(c) To condemn the interference of the United States and the United Kingdom and demand the immediate withdrawal of their forces and their military missions;

(d) To adopt the draft resolution of the Soviet Union.

DEATH SENTENCES PASSED BY GREEK MILITARY COURTS (*continued*)

55. The CHAIRMAN read a letter from the President of the General Assembly to the Chairman of the First Committee, in reply to Mr. Pearson's letter of 27 October 1949, concerning the death sentences passed by Greek military tribunals.

56. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that his delegation reserved the right to return to that subject, since the Greek Government's reply to the President of the Assembly was in no way satisfactory and gave the impression that the Athens Government really wished to carry out the death sentences.

57. The CHAIRMAN referred to the summary record of the 276th meeting of the First Committee on 29 September 1949, and recalled that Mr.

Tsaldaris had stated his Government's intention to refer all the death sentences to a court of appeals.

58. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that it was the wish of the First Committee, as proved both by the vote taken on the Ecuadoran proposal (298th meeting) and by the explanations of votes, that the death sentences should be suspended. It was therefore probable that a large majority would be in favour of stating the wish of the First Committee on this matter without discussion. The Greek representative should have the courage to inform the First Committee of his Government's intentions and the First Committee should, if necessary, force the Greek Government to respect its wishes.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 2 November 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman:* Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

**Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece: report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans—general discussion—(*continued*)**

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representatives of Albania and Bulgaria took seats at the Committee table.*

1. Mr. MEVORAH (Bulgaria) recalled that when Bulgaria had been accused of extending material help to the Greek liberation movement, Bulgaria had drawn the attention of the First Committee (175th meeting) to a serious drawback to the work of UNSCOB, namely, that all the witnesses were previously interrogated by the Greek Authorities. They had not been questioned before the Special Committee itself. Yet, the First Committee had proceeded to base its decision on the conclusions of that body. However, that fact had not been overlooked by Mr. Daux, the French representative on the Security Council Commission of Investigation, who had at that time expressed serious doubts as to the veracity of those testimonies. The French delegation had expressed similar views in the First Committee (172nd meeting) and in the General Assembly, and had pleaded that Albania and Bulgaria should not be condemned outright for violation of international law or their international obligations. Thus, judging from the way in which the resolution had been formulated, the General Assembly had not at that time assumed certain responsibilities. It had been recognized in a number of quarters that the allegations made had not been substantiated.

2. As to the sympathies Bulgaria had for the Greek liberation movement, the Bulgarian Government had never denied that it had the greatest sympathy and admiration for that movement. Any nation could clearly express its sympathy for any political group in such a divided world. It should be recalled in that connexion that some people had blamed the United Kingdom for having certain

sympathies for one of the parties involved in the Palestine struggle and that no one had ever denied that the United States had displayed similar sympathies for the other party. If that admiration for the Greek liberation movement constituted a crime, then the Bulgarian Government would plead guilty to the charges. However, when the report of the Special Committee alleged that Bulgaria had materially assisted the democratic movement in Greece, it was the duty of the Bulgarian Government to endeavour to prove the fallacy of those allegations. It was a true assertion that the independence of Greece was being jeopardized, but not by Bulgaria. If the national liberation movement were actually being helped by Bulgaria, obviously, some traces of that help, such as soldiers and war material, would have been left on Greek territory. Since nobody had been able to substantiate such an allegation, the accusations made by the Special Committee were therefore false. Moreover, even if those contentions were true, Mr. Mevorah was at a loss to understand why the United States was not accused of similar charges since that country had extended a much greater material help to the Athens Government. If it was a crime to supply a few rifles and bullets, the fact that the United States were supplying huge quantities of heavy war material and money should constitute a bigger and much more important crime. Naturally, it was contended that that help was extended to the Athens Government on the ground that the guerrillas were endeavouring to overthrow a duly established Government. Moreover, some speakers in the First Committee had expressed the opinion that the conclusions of the report should not even be questioned since the Committee should trust the judgment of the members it had appointed with a view to ascertaining the true state of affairs in Greece, and that it was beyond the ability of the representatives in the Committee to read all the documents related to the Greek question. Obviously, the First Committee was expected to take into account not only the conclusions of the report but also the facts which were of equal importance.

3. As to the evidence given by the various witnesses referred to in the report, Mr. Mevorah contended that their testimony was biased and therefore void, unless corroborated by material evidence. Paragraph 62 of the report admitted that those witnesses had usually been presented to the Special Committee by the Greek Liaison Service after having been interrogated and thoroughly screened. Obviously, only those expected to give information favourable to the Athens Government had been presented to the Special Committee. UNSCOB should have ruled out the testimony of those biased witnesses but, naturally, it could not have followed such a course, since it would then have possessed no evidence to enable it to formulate its alleged conclusions.

4. Moreover, having read the records of the interrogations of all those witnesses, Mr. Mevorah contended that the overwhelming majority of those witnesses had invariably declared that they had been forcibly recruited by the guerrillas. That statement could be easily understood since paragraph 62 admitted that a number of those witnesses had been under detention by the Greek Authorities pending further investigation. It was natural to expect those people to make such a statement, since any declaration to the contrary would have resulted in their imprisonment by the Athens Authorities.

5. Recalling the statement of Mr. McNeil (304th meeting) to the effect that if the veracity of paragraph 64 were disproved, then the position might change, the Bulgarian representative said that his delegation could easily submit evidence to prove the fallacy of that paragraph. Since that paragraph contended that the Special Committee had taken into account all the circumstances under which the testimony of witnesses had been obtained and that it was firmly of the opinion that the statements recorded in observation group reports, in accordance with the standardized procedure, faithfully reproduced the facts as described by the witnesses, the only inference that the Bulgarian delegation could draw from that contention was that the Special Committee had acted under bias, since it had taken for granted all the testimonies submitted to it. Furthermore, the paragraph in question explained that no single statement had been used by the Special Committee as a conclusive basis for any of its findings, and that the Special Committee had subjected the evidence of witnesses to close analysis and had carefully cross-checked statements made on the same subject by witnesses examined independently of each other. The paragraph also stated that it was from consideration of the cumulative evidence in the statements of witnesses, from direct observation which corroborated that evidence and from the other types of information referred to in paragraph 60, that the Special Committee had been able to reach its conclusions. The fallacy of that part of the paragraph was obvious, since the Special Committee had acknowledged, beyond any doubt, the veracity of a particular testimony as a result of the multiplicity of the same evidence. Accordingly, the conclusions of the Special Committee were wrong since they were based on a false premise.

6. Mr. Mevorah said that the report of the Special Committee should have been expected to have covered the period from 15 October 1948 to July 1949. Such delimitation had obviously been deemed necessary on the part of the Spe-

cial Committee in order not to merely repeat the accounts of events that had occurred before the Special Committee had received its new terms of reference from the third session of the General Assembly. Obviously, if the events of 1946, 1947 and early 1948 had been repeated in the present report, the Special Committee would then have acted against its terms of reference, and would have placed the accused in double jeopardy. The Bulgarian Government had been accused in chapter III of the report of materially assisting the guerrillas. But the Special Committee had condemned Bulgaria for facts that were alleged to have occurred before the period covered by the present report; thus the whole chapter dealing with material assistance was vitiated by the cardinal sin of double jeopardy. According to paragraph 94, all the evidence indicated that large quantities of military stores had been supplied to the guerrillas by Bulgaria and that the forwarding of supplies had been highly organized. That testimony had allegedly been given by witness No. 4/W/271. But the events described by that witness had occurred during the period of April to August 1948, namely, prior to the period covered by the report of the Special Committee. Moreover, according to the report, witness No. 4/W/204 had alleged that supplies had been taken from army depots to the border, usually under the supervision of Bulgarian soldiers, and that they had been turned over to the partisans, and that an effort had been made to check the stores in order to prevent those bearing Bulgarian markings from entering Greece. However, without questioning the truth of the testimony, the events described by that witness had occurred in June 1948. Besides, it was witness No. 4/W/271 who had given such testimony, and not witness No. 4/W/204. If a careful analysis were made, one would discover that more than half of the witnesses had given accounts of events that had occurred prior to the period covered by the report. If all the chapters of the report suffered from the same weakness, the report as a whole would be completely vitiated.

7. Moreover, if armed supplies had been furnished, as alleged, in great quantities, then obviously a great number of those arms, such as machine-guns, would have been left on Greek territory. However, after long and careful investigation, UNSCOB had only been able to find a small number of those arms, such as a box of hand grenades with Bulgarian tags, and another box bearing Bulgarian inscriptions containing fuses, as well as rifle bullets bearing similar inscriptions. The Special Committee had not taken into account the fact that it would be conceivable that such inscriptions could have been made by someone else. As to the contention that Bulgarian rifle bullets had been found on Greek territory, it was quite conceivable that those bullets and similar war material could easily have been left by the Bulgarian Army during its withdrawal from Greece under Nazi occupation.

8. Analysing the methods pursued by the Special Committee, Mr. Mevorah noted that the latter had drawn up a list of material found in a partisan headquarters in some part of Northern Greece after that headquarters had been captured by the Government forces. Citing the contents of that list, he concluded that the quantity and diversity of that material was not very great. To Observer Group 1, however, that materiel had

seemed large and varied, and the Special Committee had concluded that such large and diverse quantities of equipment could not have been produced or acquired in the area occupied by the guerrillas. As he had pointed out, however, the items referred to in that list might well have been acquired in the area. The Special Committee had then stated that those supplies must have largely or perhaps altogether come from areas outside Greece, probably from Bulgaria or at least through Bulgarian territory. Stating that there was no ground for such a conclusion, the Bulgarian representative pointed out that, according to the Special Committee, all the materiel found had been German with the exception of one Russian sub-machine-gun. That could hardly prove that the materiel must have come from Bulgaria. In fact, the conclusions of the Special Committee seemed to have been based on the discovery of a Bulgarian typewriter and uniform buttons, whose presence on Greek soil could only be explained by facts he had already alluded to. Citing other types of evidence used by the Special Committee, Mr. Mevorah quoted the text of a letter written by a Greek girl in a refugee camp in Bulgaria, which had been found on the body of a dead partisan. The Greek Liaison Officer had found the "real" father to whom the girl's letter had been addressed. After hearing the evidence of the "father", who had found that the letter contained certain strange expressions, the Special Committee had concluded that children in refugee camps in Bulgaria received instructions as to what to write in letters to relatives. However, that conclusion had been based only on that one letter. Pointing out that a separation of over a year in different surroundings might well be responsible for the use of new expressions, he wondered what expressions in such a simple letter could be found strange. The Special Committee's conclusion had clearly been without foundation.

9. Mr. Mevorah asked whether the evidence that had been submitted could convince the First Committee that Bulgaria had furnished the assistance that had been alleged and he pointed out that, as the USSR representative had stated, the Greek Government Authorities themselves had stated that the partisans obtained their weapons from such places as Italy and North Africa. Contraband was always an important factor in wartime and means were always found to transport arms to those who desired them. Viewing the matter in that light, it was clear that the Bulgarian Government, which had a 500 kilometre long frontier with Greece, could hardly be accused of having had anything to do with the minute quantities of Bulgarian weapons found on Greek soil.

10. Turning to another category of evidence, that of the testimony of observers, he recalled that Mr. Vyshinsky had dealt (300th meeting) with an incident in which observers of the Special Committee had seen a convoy which, as the USSR representative had demonstrated, could have been moving along a parallel road in Bulgarian territory. He informed the Committee that there was a large volume of traffic along that Bulgarian road on account of the construction of a near-by hydro-electric plant. Moreover, it would be seen from the map that the Greek troops, with the observer group, could easily have cut off the convoy on its return journey had the latter been travelling on Greek territory. In another in-

stance, partisans had been driven onto Bulgarian territory by a flanking movement of the Greek Army, which had been carried out on Bulgarian territory. The partisans had had to retire further or be captured. The observers accompanying the Greek troops, having seen certain defences on Bulgarian territory on the frontier, had concluded that the partisans had been permitted to build defences on Bulgarian territory. He wished to point out, however, that the main frontier defences in Bulgaria were situated some distance behind the frontier, and were connected with some ground-works and huts which were close to the frontier line. The latter were the fortifications which the partisans had occupied in order to defend themselves when attacked. The observers and the Greek Army had occupied those defences on the same day but had not found any Bulgarians in them. The Bulgarian forces had at that time been located at some distance behind the lines and had taken no part in the action. It might well be asked how Greek troops had come to be on Bulgarian territory, but such illegal incursions had been common and that particular occasion therefore had not been surprising. Such actions were characteristic of the Greek Government. However, it was quite another matter for an observer group, supposedly acting on behalf of the United Nations, to enter Bulgarian territory without having sought permission from the Bulgarian Government, and he had to protest against such acts, the serious nature of which could not be over-emphasized. The Bulgarian representative explained that while partisans had often entered Bulgarian territory, the Bulgarian Government had on such occasions done all that it should have done and had disarmed and interned all such persons. Mr. Mevorah contended therefore that the promise set forth in paragraph 64 of the Special Committee's report had not been kept and that it was clear that the report was not only full of contradictions but was quite without real foundation.

11. Describing the unhappy period in which Greek children had been forced to leave Greece, the Bulgarian representative said that his Government had found itself faced by the moral and humanitarian obligation to render assistance to those children. In that connexion, he outlined the measures taken and quoted paragraph 133 of the Special Committee's report to the effect that representatives of the International Red Cross had found the conditions in the camps for those children in Bulgaria to be satisfactory. He pointed out that those representatives had themselves chosen the camps they had subsequently visited and had found everything satisfactory. That fact had not received any attention during the First Committee's discussion. Mr. Mevorah added that the education received by those children was quite normal and was anything but the "warping" of children's minds described by the Greek representative in such a melodramatic way.

12. Recalling that in Paris during the previous session of the Assembly, the Bulgarian representative had agreed to the repatriation of Greek children through the intermediary of the Red Cross (195th meeting) and that similar assurances had been given to General Rómulo at the present session, Mr. Mevorah said that his Government had not impeded and would not impede that work. It was true that the Red Cross report had stated that it was awaiting the reply of the Bulgarian

Government regarding the lists of children that had been furnished. However, that could not be considered a criticism since the delay had been due partly to the late date at which the Red Cross had furnished those lists as well as to the technical delays inherent in that kind of work.

13. Mr. Mevorah denied that any children had been sent back to Greece into battle. It might well be that a few young partisans had been found on the battlefield, but the participation of such young people was a characteristic shared by all such historical movements. His Government had never either assented or favoured or given assistance to partisans to enable them to go back to the battlefield.

14. It was easy to make such accusations as were contained in the Special Committee's report, especially in view of the new methods of falsification that had been developed. However, it was always possible to distinguish between the true and the false by relying on common sense as well as on a sense of proportion. Thus, all the accusations contained in the new resolutions submitted by the Anglo-Americans and China amounted to nothing at all. Such proposals were typical of a policy of hatred. Were those delegations creating an atmosphere propitious to help the parties to reach an understanding? During the negotiations conducted by the Conciliation Committee, he had done his best to avoid creating undue and unnecessary difficulties. The only condition he had insisted upon had been that any agreement must include all the parties involved, a condition the more understandable in view of his country's friendly relations and ties with Albania. Agreement would easily have been reached had the Greek Government proved to be reasonable. With regard to the proposed commission to supervise implementation of the frontier convention, he had said that his Government would rather have a joint commission consisting only of the representatives of the parties without a neutral chairman; he had resorted to a rather flexible formula. He had said that his Government would prefer that the matter be subject to discussion and had been sure that agreement would have been reached rapidly because the other party would have understood his Government's position that it was preferable to have a commission consisting merely of representatives of the parties.

15. The Greek representative, in dealing with the frontier question, had spoken of Alsace and Lorraine. Mr. Mevorah found that example striking, since it could hardly be said that France and Germany had been on good terms after 1871. It could hardly be thought that peace would result from the establishment of a similar situation with regard to Albania and Greece. Since Mr. Pipinelis had defended and pressed his Government's claims, it was clear that those claims remained. In that connexion, the Bulgarian representative pointed out that it was always possible for a country to manufacture incidents and then go to war by saying that it had been attacked. He could not conceive of peace in the Balkans so long as relations between Albania and Greece remained a burning issue. The removal of the frontier question would settle the whole problem and permit his country to deal with the urgent task of reconstruction.

16. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) said that the Albanian representative's references to "collaborator

Tsaldaris" and to the "democratic pacification of Greece" had obviously been *lapsus linguae*. The same was obviously true of references to the "dishonest attitude" of the United States Government and to a "mechanical majority" in the Committee. The Greek representative recalled that the representative of Albania had been heard by the Security Council in December 1946 on the basis of a declaration that it accepted the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations<sup>1</sup> and accepted the decision of the Security Council on the matter under consideration, in the framework of the provisions of Article 25 of the Charter. Since that time there had been a series of official findings by organs of the Assembly, according to which the Government of Albania had failed to comply with the decisions of the General Assembly. He therefore wished to ask the representative of the Hoxa Government whether his Government was able to declare that it would unambiguously and without reticence accept the decisions taken by the Assembly.

17. The representative of the Hoxa Government had said that the charges of the Special Committee against Albania were false. The Special Committee had denied that. It would be logical and proof of good will to suppose therefore that the Hoxa Government was prepared and ready to declare that it would accept the findings on the situation by an international organ to be designated by the Assembly, which organ would be either the Special Committee or any other that might be appointed. That was the second question he wished to ask.

18. According to the Bulgarian representative, the conclusions of the Special Committee could not serve as a basis for a verdict by the Assembly. The Bulgarian Government had submitted a report which differed from the one submitted by the Special Committee. He therefore wished to ask the same questions of the Bulgarian representative, namely, whether the latter's Government was prepared to accept an international investigation on its territory designed to place those affirmations on an incontestable basis; and whether the Bulgarian Government was prepared to declare that having agreed to participate in the work of the Assembly under the conditions stated it would respect unequivocally the decisions adopted by the General Assembly.

19. Mr. PRIFTI (Albania), referring to the first question of the Greek representative, said that the Government of Albania had always agreed to comply and did comply with the general principles of the Charter, and therefore the allegation of Mr. Pipinelis were not in accordance with the facts. His personal opinion was that it was impossible to take a position on any decision to be adopted by the General Assembly when that decision was not even known and when his country was not given an opportunity to express its point of view on it. Recommendations of the General Assembly, which were not binding even on Members of the United Nations, might be at variance with the Charter. As to the second question, he believed that it was incompatible with the principles of sovereignty for anyone to interfere in the internal affairs of a State. Partisans crossing into Albanian territory had always been disarmed and placed in internment camps according to the principles of international law.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council*, First Year, Second Series, No. 26, page 609.



20. Mr. MEVORAH (Bulgaria), noting that the same questions had been put two years previously (69th meeting), said that the same answers must be given. He believed that the question had been put in the wrong way and that his Government should be asked whether it would accept a specific solution. If the question had been asked in that manner, his Government would have submitted its answer in due course. He pointed out that there was disagreement in the General Assembly itself regarding the matter raised in the second question of the Greek representative. Moreover, his country, though small, was proud of its sovereignty and could not accept an investigating committee designed to prove the allegations of Mr. Pipinelis.
21. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) noted that the Albanian representative had alleged that Yugoslavia was participating in aggressive plans aimed at Albania. The Yugoslav representative did not wish to dwell on the fact that that allegation formed part of a campaign which was not germane to the Greek question, however, to back up his allegation, the Albanian representative had not been able to do more than repeat slander published in a newspaper. Such slander was common in the Press of most of Eastern Europe. Yugoslavia had assisted Albania during the whole post-war period, and the present tension was due only to the participation of the Albanian Government in a campaign organized by certain States. The Albanian people had every reason to desire good relations with Yugoslavia, particularly in view of the threats of the Greek Government. By its accusations, however, the Albanian Government showed that it preferred to participate in the campaign to which he had already referred.
22. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) said that the countries not directly concerned must consider what right Albania and Bulgaria had not to co-operate in the fullest degree with organs appointed by the United Nations. Quoting the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 6 of the Charter, the Peruvian representative said that it was obvious that participation would have been more than useful to Bulgaria and Albania as well as to other countries. He therefore wished to ask why those two countries had adopted an attitude of non-co-operation.
23. Mr. MEVORAH (Bulgaria) said that that question had already been answered during previous sessions of the General Assembly as well as in the replies made by his Government to the communications received from the Secretary-General. In order to save the Committee's time, he would submit a written reply to the Chairman.
24. Mr. PRIFTI (Albania) said that the Peruvian representative's statement was incorrect, as his Government had assisted and co-operated with the Security Council Commission of Investigation. However, his Government had never recognized the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans and had never participated in that body's work.
25. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the questions of the Greek representative involved the honour of the United Nations. Being accustomed to complying with ultimatums without any qualms, the Greek representative proposed that a blank cheque ultimatum should be presented to sovereign States. Such a proposal was unprecedented and inadmissible.
26. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), quoting paragraph 121 of the Special Committee's report concerning distribution of children to combat units, asked the Albanian representative whether such cases as were mentioned in that paragraph had ever occurred.
27. Mr. PRIFTI (Albania) replied that he believed that the whole Committee agreed that the accusations contained in that paragraph were untrue.
28. Mr. MAKIN (Australia) asked the representatives of Albania and Bulgaria for the exact number of Greek guerrillas and refugees interned in their countries.
29. Mr. PRIFTI (Albania) and Mr. MEVORAH (Bulgaria) stated that they would submit their replies to the Chairman in writing.
30. Mr. DE LA TOURNELLE (France) said that while the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, referred to by the Bulgarian representative, had created lasting resentment against the Germans, the question of those two provinces had not been involved in the origins of the First World War. The Bulgarian representative had therefore misinterpreted that point of history.
31. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) asked the Albanian and Bulgarian representatives whether they did not believe that the question put by the representative of Australia was designed to complement the intelligence data of the Athens Government.
32. Mr. PRIFTI (Albania) agreed that that was the case. His delegation had already stated that such questions were designed to complement the Greek Government's information.
33. Mr. MEVORAH (Bulgaria) said that the answer was perfectly clear.
34. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), in respect of a point raised by the Greek representative, asked what portraits were displayed in schools for Greek children in Albania and Bulgaria.
35. Mr. PRIFTI (Albania) pointed out that there were no Greek children in Albania.
36. Mr. MEVORAH (Bulgaria) replied that numerous portraits of illustrious men were displayed in the corridors of such schools, including, among others, persons prominent in the history of the USSR as well as figures from the literature and history of other countries. There was no reason to forego admiration for such men as Marx and Engels, who would ultimately receive their due even in the United States.
37. In reply to a question put by Mr. HENRÍQUEZ UREÑA (Dominican Republic), who asked if those portraits included that of Ivan Vasov, the author of *Freedom of Bulgaria*, who had written so much about the independence of his country, Mr. MEVORAH (Bulgaria) stated that the portraits referred to did include Ivan Vasov, who was widely read in this country.
38. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) asked whether the representatives of Albania and Bulgaria considered that their Governments, in participating in the work of the Conciliation Committee, had displayed an ardent desire to co-operate with the United Nations in maintaining and strengthening peace.

39. Mr. PRIFTI (Albania) replied that whenever invited, his Government had participated in the work of all such international bodies whenever such participation could help to strengthen peace and security throughout the world. The Albanian Government had welcomed any initiative towards that goal.

40. Mr. MEVORAH (Bulgaria) said that he had worked in Geneva with the representative of Mexico at a Red Cross Conference and he could tell the Committee that Bulgaria had contributed to all initiatives taken under the aegis of the United Nations in a spirit of co-operation. The Bulgarian representative had received instructions from his Government to do everything in his power to further the work of the Conciliation Committee, and he had done so. The records and reports of that Committee, however, contained the implication that his Government had not extended sufficient support to that Committee's work and had given its reply too late. Explaining the reasons for delay in that reply, he stated that the implication was false, since it had not been the fault of his Government that there had been delay.

41. Sir Terence SHONE (United Kingdom), noting that the representatives of Albania and Bulgaria had advanced reasons for which their Governments were not disposed to permit international inspection of camps in which guerrillas were interned, wished to ask what those two Governments intended to do so with such persons taking into account the facts that there was a large number of guerrillas in Albania and some in Bulgaria, and the statement of the so-called "Democratic Army" that it had only grounded its arms temporarily.

42. Mr. PRIFTI (Albania) replied that the statement that there was a substantial number of Greek partisan soldiers in Albania was not in accordance with the facts. The numbers of partisan and monarcho-fascist soldiers who had crossed the border and been interned had been reported regularly to the Secretary-General. The soldiers at present in his country would be disposed of in accordance with international law.

43. Mr. MEVORAH (Bulgaria) replied that the persons in question were respected as refugees and were given the internationally accepted right of asylum. Those refugees would return to Greece when the conditions had gone back to normal and when they no longer ran the risk of being interned and when a different atmosphere prevailed in Greece. The United Kingdom representative might prefer that the Bulgarian Government should turn out those refugees, but such action would involve failure to respect the right of asylum.

44. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) asked the Albanian representative whether the Greek Government's covetous designs on Albanian territory and its refusal to recognize the Greek-Albanian border as final helped to foster friendly and normal relations between Greece and Albania.

45. Mr. PRIFTI (Albania) replied that his Government's views had already been made clear. The refusal to recognize the border between Greece and Albania as final was an indication of the Greek Government's future intentions. The behaviour of the Greek Government did not serve

the cause of peace and was not in accordance with the interests of the Greek people themselves.

46. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) asked how the Government of Albania viewed the so-called "Free Albania Committee" which was active on French territory and whose purpose it was to overthrow the present people's democratic régime in Albania.

47. Mr. PRIFTI (Albania) replied that the establishment of that so-called "Free Albania Committee" in France and the activities of those in sympathy with it in France, the United States and the United Kingdom were evidence of the negative and unfriendly attitude of those Governments towards his Government and people.

48. Mr. DE LA TOURNELLE (France) said that he had no official information whatsoever on the existence of such a committee. However, he supposed that there were in France a great number of Albanians enjoying the right of asylum referred to by the representative of Bulgaria. Since Albania and France entertained absolutely regular and correct diplomatic relations, it was through the intermediary of their representatives that the Albanian Government could address itself to the Government of France.

#### Point raised by the representative of Yugoslavia (*continued*)

49. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), referring to the statement made by the Yugoslav representative at the 302nd meeting of the First Committee regarding the alleged fact that Hungarian troops and border guards had opened fire along the Yugoslav border and had kept firing throughout the night of 28 October 1949, said that according to authoritative and authenticated information at the disposal of the USSR delegation, what had happened on the Hungarian-Yugoslav border had been quite at variance with what Mr. Bebler had alleged. The latter's statement had been nothing but a provocation, while Mr. Bebler himself in that question looked like a hired provocateur and warmonger.

50. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) said that apparently the Committee had no ways or means of investigating the incident brought to its attention by the Yugoslav delegation. The Hungarian version had come two days later and had been "doctored" in order that the wrong side of the picture might be given. The language used by the representative of a great Power in connexion with the statement made by the representative of a small State, was quite typical and was the language Yugoslavia had heard for the past eighteen months, it also resembled the language used by the Athens Press in speaking of Greek partisans. He did not consider that it redounded to the credit of the USSR representative to use such language.

51. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said that the representative of Yugoslavia who had raised such serious charges, which were not confirmed by any evidence, must be described as a provocateur. He endorsed, therefore, the statement made by the USSR representative.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND NINTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 3 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that general discussion on the question was closed, and said that the Committee had three draft resolutions (A/C.1/513, A/C.1/514/Rev.1 and A/C.1/518) before it for consideration.

2. He suggested that the joint draft resolution A/C.1/514/Rev.1, submitted by Australia, China, the United Kingdom and the United States which dealt with repatriation of children, should be considered first.

3. As there were no objections, he opened the debate on that draft resolution.

#### DISCUSSION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE REPATRIATION OF GREEK CHILDREN

4. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the first draft (A/C.1/514) had been somewhat toned down by its authors during revision. Nevertheless paragraph 2 did not correspond to fact. There was no need for concern as the repatriation of children was a difficult and complicated task which required time. Some delegations had further pointed out that the States which had sheltered those children were carrying out that task in accordance with General Assembly resolution 193 C (III).

5. Hostilities in Greece had not helped the repatriation of the children; obviously, conditions would be more favourable to their return, if hostilities ceased.

6. He pointed out that the parents of many of the children were in prison or concentration camps, and considered therefore that requests by parents for the repatriation of their children from camps could only have been obtained under pressure. He mentioned also an instance of children being claimed by a very distant relative. There were many similar examples, and he thought, therefore, that paragraph 2 should be deleted. His delegation could not vote for the proposal if paragraph 2 were retained.

7. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) though that paragraph 2 of the revised resolution contained a veiled charge against the States which had sheltered Greek children. The Red Cross Society's report had stated that the condition of the children who had received shelter in those States was satisfactory. Consequently, instead of feeling concern, it would be better to express gratitude for that humane action, and for the moral and material care given to the children by the States which had sheltered them.

8. The problem of repatriation was complex and its solution required time. The Governments concerned had already taken steps to implement General Assembly resolution 193 C (III) on the repatriation of children. Furthermore, hurried repatriation was undesirable as long as armed hostilities in Greece continued. He remarked upon the illogical attitude of certain delegations which had opposed the USSR draft resolution on the

cessation of hostilities (A/C.1/518), and which were now making veiled charges against the States which had sheltered the Greek children for not having as yet returned them to their homes.

9. He reminded the Committee that resolution 193 C (III) had been adopted unanimously during the General Assembly's previous session, and hoped that the same unanimity would be attained also during the current session. He, therefore, suggested that paragraph 2 of the draft resolution be deleted.

10. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) pointed out that any factors likely to lead to political controversy had been deleted from the revised draft resolution. He hoped, therefore, that it would meet with unanimous approval. Paragraph 2 of the draft resolution expressed a humanitarian concern that the Greek children had not been returned to their country. The authors had not intended any criticism of the States currently sheltering those children. There was therefore no need to delete that paragraph, but a separate vote should be taken so as to enable the Committee to make its views clear on that matter.

11. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) recalled that at the General Assembly's preceding session the question of the repatriation of children had been dealt with from a purely humanitarian point of view. He thought that, to maintain that attitude, paragraph 2 which was controversial and did not strengthen the remainder of the text should be deleted. Requests for repatriation had reached the Governments concerned only in August 1949. The examination and sorting of requests took a considerable time. There was, therefore, no need for concern.

12. The Committee should be grateful to the Governments which had undertaken to shelter the children, for they had enjoyed better conditions than those who had remained in Greece. He then read statements on that subject from newspaper correspondents, from which it could be seen that Greek children sheltered in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia enjoyed better conditions than most orphans.

13. His delegation appealed to the Committee to refrain from using the draft resolution for political ends, and asked for the deletion of paragraph 2.

14. Mr. DE ALBA (Mexico) appealed to the authors of the draft resolution to agree to delete paragraph 2, so as to make a unanimous vote possible. Such a vote would not only denote agreement, but would also strengthen the action which the International Red Cross would take to repatriate the Greek children. If that were done all the Governments concerned would be obliged to assist the Red Cross in its work.

15. The resolution was humanitarian in substance. It should not, therefore, contain accusations, but should, above all, aim at results. Furthermore, unanimity on that question might facilitate the solution of the remaining questions on the Committee's agenda.

16. Mr. MAKIN (Australia) said that some of the parents of Greek children had emigrated to Australia and elsewhere. The words "to their homes" in paragraph 2 should, therefore, be interpreted as meaning the children's parents wherever they were.

17. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) noted with satisfaction that Mr. Kiselev's proposal had been favourably received by certain delegations, in particular by that of Mexico. He wondered why, in the circumstances, the United States representative considered paragraph 2 indispensable. That paragraph expressed a certain concern; but in the course of debate, concern had been also shown in regard to the re-education of children in Greece. A proposal or an amendment might have been submitted on that subject. The reason why that had not been done, however, was a desire for unanimity.

18. Mr. Pipinelis had admitted that the Greek children abroad were in better condition than those who had remained in Greece. He could, therefore, see no reason to insert a paragraph blaming the States which had sheltered the Greek children.

19. The Australian representative's view was unfounded. The approach of winter would make the transportation and repatriation of children more difficult. He therefore supported the proposal made by the representative of the Byelorussian SSR and supported by the representative of Mexico.

20. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Australian representative's view that the word "home" might include a home in a foreign land, was not sufficient reason for retaining paragraph 2, as not a single request for repatriation had been received by the States sheltering the Greek children from any of the Greek parents in Australia or elsewhere.

21. The deletion of paragraph 2 would allow not only unanimous agreement on that humanitarian draft resolution, but would also make its application more effective.

22. ABDUR RAHIM Khan (Pakistan) had been impressed by the First Committee's desire to reach agreement in the interests of the children. He therefore hoped that the authors of the resolution would agree to revise their text and delete the words "with concern" from paragraph 2, so that the paragraph would not do more than state a fact. He appealed to all the representatives to consider that suggestion.

23. Mr. STOLK (Venezuela) recalled that, like the representative of Pakistan, he had already tried to obtain unanimity on that question. He had also intended to suggest the deletion of the words "with concern." The drafting of paragraph 2 was moreover too dogmatic. Indeed, it was not known whether some children had not already been repatriated; it would therefore be difficult to vote for paragraph 2 in its present form without first verifying the facts.

24. He therefore proposed that the Pakistan proposal be adopted, and that the rest of the paragraph be amended to state simply that some Greek children had not yet been returned to their homes.

25. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) saw no objection to accepting the Australian representative's in-

terpretation of the word "homes". He was, however, against the deletion of paragraph 2, since that paragraph merely stated facts, without passing judgment upon them. In that connexion, he assured members of the Committee, and especially the representative of Venezuela, that no repatriation had yet taken place and added that there was reason to believe that the delay might continue.

26. The Greek delegation considered that the responsibility for that delay should have been indicated, but as it was the injured party it had not proposed moral condemnation, in order to avoid that the eagerly awaited move should be further delayed. Nevertheless, opposition to the mention of such a lamentable fact would deprive the draft resolution of its fundamental meaning. Indeed, the Committee was considering the question anew because the Red Cross report had stated that Greek children had not been repatriated. That fact should, therefore, be mentioned in the draft resolution the Committee was to adopt. It was self-evident, however, that the Greek delegation would not oppose any possible drafting amendment of that paragraph.

27. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) stated that he would be prepared to vote in favour of the revised draft resolution in the form in which it had been submitted. He had, however, listened with interest to the remarks made by the delegations of the Byelorussian SSR and the Soviet Union and to the suggestions made by the Pakistan representative.

28. The first two paragraphs of the joint draft resolution were in fact a preamble, and could therefore be condensed into a single paragraph. With regard to the substance of the question, if the Greek representative and the authors of the resolution would accept the deletion of the words "with concern", he would also accept it. He considered that the idea expressed in paragraph 2 should be retained. Nevertheless, in the interests of a unanimous decision, he wished to suggest as a matter of form that the first two words of paragraph 1 should be replaced by the word "Notes", and that the following wording should be used in paragraph 2: "Recognizing the necessity of further efforts for the full implementation of the above resolution . . ." If the representative of the USSR and the authors of the joint proposal approved those modifications, he would be prepared to propose them formally.

29. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) regretted that the Greek representative had decided to speak on that question, for he had passed from the humanitarian to the political field. By stating that he was in agreement with the Australian representative's interpretation of the word "homes", the Greek representative had implied that Greek children might be sent anywhere, provided that they were not left in the country where they were at present.

30. He proposed formally that paragraph 2 of the revised resolution should be omitted.

31. Mr. PACHECO (Bolivia) considered that paragraph 2 merely stated the undeniable fact that no Greek children had been returned to their homes. The Bolivian delegation could not draw that conclusion without concern, and would vote in favour of paragraph 2 in its existing

form. It could not accept a text such as that submitted by the Lebanese representative, for it considered that that text served to conceal a reality which should be clearly stated in the resolution.

32. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTE (Ecuador) thought that the present wording of paragraph 2 might prevent the adoption of the draft resolution as a whole. The assertion that no Greek children had been returned to their homes was too categorical for his delegation's approval. He would abstain from voting if the existing text were retained. He was in favour of a text similar to that proposed by the Venezuelan representative and suggested the insertion of a phrase such as "a large majority of Greek children have not yet been returned to their homes" or "Greek children have not yet been returned to their homes".

33. If the existing text were retained, he would ask that a vote on the draft resolution should be taken paragraph by paragraph.

34. The CHAIRMAN called upon the authors of the proposal to give their views on the various suggestions and draft amendments that had been submitted.

35. U So NYUN (Burma) stated that, although his delegation was prepared to vote in favour of the existing text, in order to reach unanimity, he wished to suggest the following drafting for paragraph 2:

*"Expresses the hope that all Greek children will be returned to their homes in response to the unanimous recommendation contained in the above resolution . . ."*

36. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) stated that he was in favour of an amendment similar to that proposed by the representative of Venezuela.

37. He fully agreed with the interpretation of the word "homes" put forward by the Australian representative. That question was extremely important for Yugoslavia. In the first place, there were in that country half a dozen Greek children who had been claimed by parents residing in Australia, whereas several hundreds had been claimed by their parents in Czechoslovakia, Romania and Hungary. In the second place, certain Greek children who were now in the three latter countries, especially in Czechoslovakia, had parents in Yugoslavia. The parents concerned were, for the most part, Greek citizens speaking the Slav Macedonian language, who had settled in Yugoslav Macedonia, probably forever, because of the oppression to which the Slav minority was subjected in Greece. Those parents' claims in regard to their children were of primary importance. Thus, it was not the Australian interpretation of the word "homes" that would prevent him from voting in favour of the existing text of paragraph 2.

38. Mr. DE LA TOURNELLE (France) agreed with the views expressed by Mr. Bebler. The Greek children should be returned to their homes, wherever they might be as a result of the vicissitudes of war.

39. He approved the existing text of paragraph 2, but with the deletion of the words "with concern".

40. Mr. GONZÁLEZ ALLENDES (Chile) supported the Australian representative's interpretation of the word "homes" and considered that any amendment to the text of the draft resolution should retain that word, since, in the opinion of his delegation, it represented the actual residence of the parents.

41. He considered that the existing text of paragraph 2 might be retained, with only one amendment, that of the omission of the words "with concern".

42. Mr. BOHEMAN (Sweden) was in favour of the present text of paragraph 2 if the word "homes" was interpreted as indicated by the Australian representative and the words "with concern" were deleted, if that was essential to reach a unanimous decision.

43. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel) supported the amendment proposed by the Lebanese representative, since he considered it to be the most likely to eliminate controversy.

44. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) thought that in order to reach agreement the words "with concern" might be deleted and that the Venezuelan representative's suggestion should be adopted.

45. Sir Terence SHONE (United Kingdom) proposed the following wording for paragraph 2, provided that the other authors of the proposals were prepared to accept it:

*"Notes that the Greek children have not as yet been returned to their homes in response to the unanimous recommendation in the above resolution, notwithstanding the co-operative attitude of certain of the Governments concerned, and recognizes the necessity of further efforts for the full implementation of this resolution" (A/C.1/523).*

46. Baron VAN PALLANDT (Netherlands) stated that he intended to vote in favour of the joint draft resolution in its existing form, since he did not consider that political questions were involved. He regretted that the United Kingdom was prepared to delete the words "with concern", but he would vote in favour of the resolution as amended by the United Kingdom, since that did not affect the substance of the question.

47. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) accepted the amendment proposed by the United Kingdom.

48. Mr. CHOCANO (Guatemala) pointed out that there seemed to be general agreement on the interpretation of the word "homes"; it was therefore essential that paragraph 4 be amended, to avoid incompatibility between that concept of "homes", on the one hand, and that of repatriation, on the other. Paragraph 4 should mention the "early return of Greek children to their homes", and not their "repatriation".

49. Mr. MAKIN (Australia) stated that he was prepared to accept the amendment proposed by the United Kingdom representative.

50. Mr. CHENG (China) considered that paragraph 2 corresponded to the facts. Nevertheless, in the interests of a unanimous decision, he would accept the amendment proposed by the United Kingdom representative.

51. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) requested the Chairman to ask the authors of the joint draft

resolution on the one hand whether they were prepared to support the amendment submitted by the United Kingdom delegation, even if it were not adopted unanimously by the Committee, and on the other the representatives of the Byelorussian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR, Poland and the Soviet Union whether they would accept that amendment.

52. The CHAIRMAN called upon the authors of the joint draft resolution to inform the Committee whether or not the replacement of paragraph 2 as a whole by the United Kingdom amendment would be dependent on its unanimous adoption.

53. Sir Terence SHONE (United Kingdom) said that his amendment had been submitted in the hope that it would obtain the majority of the Committee's votes and perhaps full acceptance.

54. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that he would have to obtain the Russian text of the United Kingdom's representative's amendment before he could give his final views on it.

55. The main argument put forward by certain representatives in favour of paragraph 2 was that it stated the facts. Those facts, however, were actually contained in paragraph 1 of the first draft, which referred to the report of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies. That report mentioned the enormous work performed by the Governments that had received the Greek children as well as by the Committee and the League. It pointed out that those Governments had acted in that humanitarian work as a matter of duty. Much organizing work still remained to be carried out, since it had not yet been possible, for technical reasons, to take final measures for the return of the children. In those circumstances, it was difficult to imagine what reproaches could be made to the countries concerned. Neither the authors of the draft resolution nor the USSR delegation could find any, and his delegation therefore considered the insertion of paragraph 2 in the draft resolution unnecessary. The Greek representative's statement left no doubt that that

paragraph had political implications, and that only confirmed the Soviet Union delegation's conviction that the paragraph should not be retained.

56. If he understood the United Kingdom amendment correctly, it seemed to stress the fact that the General Assembly should recognize the necessity of further efforts for the implementation of the provisions of the previous resolution. That idea, however, was already expressed in paragraph 4 and the inclusion of two paragraphs dealing with the same subject in one resolution could serve no useful purpose.

57. He reserved the right to give his views on the United Kingdom amendment when he received the printed text.

58. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that he could not express an opinion on the amendment until the text was distributed.

59. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) suggested that the first three paragraphs of the joint draft resolution should be amalgamated into one paragraph constituting the preamble to the proposal. The words "Notes" and "Recognizes" could be replaced by the words "Noting" and "Recognizing".

60. The CHAIRMAN proposed that an attempt should be made to submit a final text for consideration at the next meeting.

61. Mr. SUNDE (Norway) considered that paragraph 2 was not indispensable. Nevertheless, if there were any objections to its deletion, he would support the amendment proposed by the representative of Ecuador, for the adoption of the following wording:

"Notes that Greek children have not yet been returned to their homes".

62. He also supported the amendment to paragraph 4 submitted by the representative of Guatemala.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND TENTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 3 November 1949 at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman:* Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

#### **Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece** (continued)

DISCUSSION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION CONCERNING REPATRIATION OF GREEK CHILDREN (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the joint draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/514/Rev.1, and to the United Kingdom amendment thereto (A/C.1/523). He inquired whether the sponsors of the joint draft resolution had any observation with regard to the suggestions made, respectively, in the course of the morning session, by the representatives of Lebanon and Guatemala to the effect that the first two paragraphs of the joint draft resolution should be considered as a preamble and that in paragraph 4 the words "early return of Greek children to

their homes" be substituted for the words "repatriation of the children".

2. Sir Terence SHONE (United Kingdom) said he would accept the Guatemalan amendment and added that his delegation was prepared to delete from paragraph 2 (A/C.1/523) the words "in response to the unanimous recommendation in the above resolution".

3. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that since there seemed to be an endeavour on the part of the First Committee to reach a unanimous decision on the draft resolution concerning the Greek children, his delegation would submit the following compromise text as a substitute for paragraph 2:

"Notes that the Greek children have not as yet been returned to their homes in accordance with



the resolution of the General Assembly despite the favourable attitude of the Governments concerned to this question".

4. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) said that his delegation could not endorse the Byelorussian SSR amendment, since it amounted to an expression of gratitude towards certain States with regard to the manner in which they had treated the Greek children. Such an approach would be inopportune and not in accordance with the facts.

5. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) disagreed with the representative of Greece and referred to the fact that the principle expressed in the Byelorussian SSR amendment was already included in the English text of the joint draft resolution proposed, among others, by the United Kingdom.

6. Mr. COHEN (United States of America), in the hope of reaching a unanimous agreement, said that his delegation would submit the following text in lieu of paragraph 2:

"Notes that the Greek children have not as yet been returned to their homes in accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly and recognizes the necessity of further efforts for the full implementation of the resolution."

7. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that if the sponsors of the joint draft resolution were indeed not guided by political considerations, the Byelorussian SSR amendment should prove acceptable to them. He thought he could agree to the proposal of the United States delegation but saw no need for the second part of the paragraph suggested by the United States representative since the principle it contained was covered by paragraph 4 of the joint draft resolution.

8. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece), Mr. DE ALBA (Mexico) and Mr. MAKIN (Australia) supported the amendment submitted by the United States representative.

9. Mr. BOHEMAN (Sweden) saw no substantial difference between the Soviet Union and the United States proposals.

10. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) repeated his contention that the second part of the United States amendment was repeated in paragraph 4 of the joint draft resolution.

11. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) said that if the USSR representative insisted on the deletion of the second part of the United States proposal, he would, for the sake of unanimity, accept that suggestion.

12. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) wished to retain the part of the paragraph in question since its deletion would cause an abrupt transition from the preamble to the operative part of the resolution. It would seem to be more logical to state the need for further action in the preamble and then determine the means giving effect to that action.

13. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) could not agree with the view of the representative of Lebanon that if the preamble did not take note of the necessity for further efforts towards implementation, such efforts would no longer be made.

14. The CHAIRMAN then put to the vote the second part of the United States amendment

reading as follows: "and recognizes the necessity of further efforts for the full implementation of this resolution".

*The second part of the United States amendment was adopted by 31 votes to 7, with 13 abstentions.*

15. Following an inquiry by Sir Terence SHONE (United Kingdom), the CHAIRMAN took a vote as to whether the Committee was in favour of using the word "noting", instead of "note", in the first two paragraphs.

*The proposal was adopted by 19 votes to 6, with 27 abstentions.*

16. Finally, the CHAIRMAN put to the vote the whole joint draft resolution as amended.

*The joint draft resolution, as amended, was adopted unanimously<sup>1</sup>.*

#### CONSIDERATION OF GENERAL DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

17. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/513) and to the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/518). In view of the fact that the Committee had held a lengthy discussion on the substance of the matter contained in those draft resolutions, he hoped that the discussion would be restricted to the texts only, thus enabling the Committee to reach an early decision.

18. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) said that the joint draft resolution took into account the different stages through which the Greek question had passed in the different organs of the United Nations. On the other hand, the USSR draft resolution summarily dismissed all references to the previous efforts made by the United Nations with a view to solving the Greek problem. The General Assembly should make recommendations lying within its own jurisdiction. The joint draft resolution satisfied that condition. Furthermore, it instructed the Special Committee to continue its endeavours to arrive at an acceptable solution to all parties concerned. Those instructions were still within the scope of the General Assembly, whereas the draft resolution of the Soviet Union was not, since it called for the declaration of a general amnesty and general and free elections in Greece under United Nations supervision. Those were indeed tantamount to an interference in the domestic affairs of Greece which fell outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations.

19. Moreover, in view of the failure of the efforts of the Conciliation Committee, Mr. Belaúnde saw no need for the creation of a joint commission to control the frontier, as suggested in subparagraph (d) of the USSR draft resolution.

20. The representative of Peru described at length the machinery established by the Pan-American States at Bogotá and Rio de Janeiro with a view to dealing with conflicts similar to those arising out of the Greek question, and noted that the joint draft resolution happened to be in conformity with article 7 of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro dealing with conciliation in case of hostilities.

21. Mr. Belaúnde was at a loss to understand the answer given by the representative of Albania who had declared that his Government had never recognized the legality of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (308th meeting). Obviously, a candidate for membership

<sup>1</sup> See document A/C.1/524.

in the United Nations, such as Albania, should have started by complying with the recommendations of the General Assembly as a proof of ability for membership.

22. Mr. Belaúnde concluded that the Greek problem which seemed to be nearing a solution might also prove the possibility of co-operation between those two worlds which were considered incompatible.

23. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) considered that the statement of the previous speaker was not germane to the Greek question. He appealed to the Chairman to insist that future speakers restrict themselves to the item under discussion and expressed the opinion that there was a tendency in the Committee to attempt to delay the debate of the next item on the Committee's agenda which was the Soviet Union's proposal for a condemnation of war-like preparations and conclusion of a Five Power Pact for the strengthening of peace. The Sixth Committee was the proper organ to consider the legal issues which the Peruvian representative had raised and not the First Committee, which was concerned with political questions. Mr. Manuilsky rejected the slanderous assertions which the Peruvian representative had cast upon the Soviet Union and commented that Mr. Belaúnde showed little understanding of events in the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.

24. Turning to the substance of the Greek question, Mr. Manuilsky noted that the Peruvian representative had criticized the proposals contained in the Soviet Union draft resolution as interference in the internal affairs of Greece. Why was it that the Peruvian representative was so anxious not to infringe upon the national jurisdiction of the Greek Government when he had taken a very different position in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee during the discussion of the alleged violation of human rights in Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania? For its part, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR could not remain silent when it saw in Greece a return to the barbaric cruelties of the Middle Ages. Before the Second World War, when appeals for aid from the victims of the nazi prison camps had been received, world public opinion had insisted that something must be done and it was mainly in order to provide the instrument for such action that the United Nations had been created. Now that there was a United Nations what reason could there be for permitting the reign of terror in Greece to continue? Mr. Manuilsky considered that the Greek representative had flung a challenge in the face of the First Committee when he had said that with or without the assistance of the United Nations the Greek Government had done and would continue to do what it had been doing thus far. After such a statement the Greek representative had no right to demand that the Albanian and Bulgarian Governments should bind themselves to accept a recommendation of the General Assembly.

25. With regard to the joint draft resolution, Mr. Manuilsky asked whether the members of the Committee could say honestly that it served the cause of conciliation and pacification and would not exacerbate the Balkan situation. He believed otherwise. That kind of proposal was merely a challenge to Greece's northern neighbours. It

would not help to normalize the situation; on the contrary, if there were not already a civil war, it would create one by inflaming the passions on both sides. Its purpose in so doing was to create disorder in the Balkans and thus serve the interests of certain aggressive circles in the United States. Mr. Manuilsky appealed to the First Committee, if it wanted to solve the situation which had been created as a result of sabre-rattling by militaristic circles, to reject the joint draft resolution and seek some other peaceful solution.

26. Mr. Manuilsky handed to the Chairman of the Committee two telegrams which he had received which contained appeals on behalf of certain Greek seamen detained by United States immigration authorities pending their surrender to the Greek Government. In one case, a group of seamen was being held aboard a ship at Baltimore while in the other, 29 men were being detained on Ellis Island. All were members of the Federation of Greek Seamen who were politically opposed to the Greek régime and feared that if they were to return to Greece, they would immediately be victimized.

27. Mr. COHEN (United States) said that the question of the Greek seamen had no possible relationship with the subject under discussion. The persons concerned were being held for deportation, not because of their political conviction, but because they had violated United States immigration regulations. Some of them were guilty of serious breaches of United States law. For example, one, who had been the representative of the Federation of Greek Seamen in New York had arrived in the United States in April 1944 with permission to reside for 29 days. Subsequently, his permission to stay had been extended until May 1946. Thereafter he had stayed illegally until 9 May 1947 when he had been arrested. True, the political convictions of the seamen involved delicate considerations with regard to their eventual deportation to Greece, but that was a question which must be left to the decision of the United States courts. Their fate had nothing to do with the subject under discussion by the Committee and the question could only have been raised in order to confuse the debate.

28. When Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) wished to speak on that same question, the CHAIRMAN ruled that the incident was closed and that the Polish representative could only raise the question as a point of order after the Committee had taken a decision upon the draft resolutions before it.

29. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) disagreed with the Chairman's ruling. It was not correct to assume that the fate of the Greek seamen was unconnected with the substantive question. The representative of the Ukrainian SSR had referred to the two telegrams in connexion with the criticisms of the Soviet Union draft resolution adduced by the representative of Peru. The fate of the Greek seamen was directly connected with the Soviet Union proposal for a general amnesty in Greece. Moreover, when the First Committee had adopted its resolution in connexion with certain death sentences passed by the Greek military tribunals (298th meeting) it had created a precedent and had shown that the fate of individuals politically op-

posed to the Greek régime was definitely relevant to the question under discussion.

30. The CHAIRMAN replied that the Soviet Union proposal was for a general amnesty in Greece, and was not a question relating to a private amnesty in the United States. That was why the question had been ruled out of order.

31. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) believed that there was a connexion. It was unjust for the United States Government to return to Greece political refugees who had sought asylum in the United States. Mr. Manuilsky recalled that when his Government had asked for the return of certain spies and traitors, who had aided the nazis, in order that they might be punished, the United States Government had refused to surrender them citing the right of political asylum.

32. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that paragraphs 12 and 13 of the joint draft resolution, which provided for the return to Greece of Greek nationals who found themselves abroad as the result of the operations of the guerrillas, contained a most dangerous proposal which did not take into account all the discussions which had taken place regarding the danger to the lives and liberty of all persons who opposed the Greek régime. It was known that such a danger existed and that the Greek Government had not kept its promises in the past regarding appeals for clemency. Nevertheless, the joint draft resolution provided no guarantees of protection for those who returned to Greece. It was known that the *émigrés* were political opponents of the Greek régime, whether or not they had taken up arms against it. The appeal by the Greek seamen at Baltimore and on Ellis Island showed that they feared a return to Greece and preferred starvation and even death to repatriation. If the General Assembly accepted the proposal contained in the joint draft resolution it would be held responsible for the fate of those persons upon their return. The treatment of the seamen by the United States courts showed what would happen if the proposal was adopted. Denial of the right of asylum for political refugees was directly contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which the General Assembly had adopted.

33. The Peruvian representative's approach in his analysis of the two draft resolutions had been interesting as it had clearly shown that he believed that the United States delegation alone was in the right. One of his criticisms of the Soviet Union draft resolution was that it did not take into account the previous decisions of the General Assembly. In Mr. Katz-Suchy's view, that was an advantage. Surely, if the General Assembly had been endeavouring to reach a solution for three years without success, it must have been following the wrong course. In that case, there was no reason for the General Assembly not to recognize its previous errors and to adopt a new approach. The earlier decisions to which the representative of Peru had referred as having been of great constructive effort actually constituted a black record in the annals of the United Nations.

34. It was noteworthy that wherever a course of action was proposed which some delegations disliked, they had always recourse in the last resort to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. Yet whenever the majority of delegations wished to act, that Article was forgotten and it was

always Article 10 which was brought to the foreground. That had happened in the case of the alleged violations of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, although, quite clearly, any action would have been an infringement of domestic jurisdiction.

35. The representative of Peru had criticized the representative of Albania for stating that his Government would not accept certain recommendations by the General Assembly. But the General Assembly resolutions were not even binding upon Member States and several earlier Assembly resolutions had not been implemented by all Member States. In fact, the Peruvian Government had failed to implement several resolutions, including the resolution concerning Franco-Spain. Hence, there could be no right in demanding a greater degree of compliance from a non-member State. In Mr. Katz-Suchy's opinion, every Government, whether a Member or not, was entitled to decide upon the legality or illegality of any recommendation and to act in accordance with its own judgment. If there was an outstanding difference between the political concepts of the People's Democracies and the Western Powers, it was that the former regarded the States as existing for the benefit of the individual while the so-called "free enterprise" concept could be described as "survival of the fittest". It was true that Greece had once been the centre of freedom and democracy. But the present régime was characterized by complete suppression of human rights although it maintained a façade of high ideals.

36. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) pointed out that the proposal for the return of Greek nationals contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the joint draft resolution was fully in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights since it spoke only of the peaceful repatriation of those who wished to return. The United States delegation fully intended to respect the provisions of the Declaration and the latter ought not to be exploited for political ends.

37. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) found the joint draft resolution unacceptable. In addition to the criticisms which he had already adduced, he noted that one of the bases for accusing Albania and Bulgaria of supplying personnel to the Greek partisans was the assertion, in paragraph 121, of the Special Committee's report in which it was alleged that children, aged from 5 to 17, were being drafted into the guerrilla units. It was obviously ludicrous to imagine that such young children could participate in military action and it was perfectly apparent, therefore, that the accusation was totally unfounded.

38. Secondly, the representative of the Ukrainian SSR had already drawn attention to the plight of the Greek seamen in supporting the adoption of the USSR proposal for a general amnesty. Such amnesty would put an end to the terror in Greece and was designed to normalize the situation so that seamen, such as those referred to, would not be in fear of their lives if deported. Mr. Kiselev urged the First Committee to endorse the Soviet Union draft resolution. If it failed to do so there would be little possibility of bringing peace to the Balkans because the Greek monarcho-fascist Government, which did not wish such pacification, would continue its

campaign of terrorism. The Soviet Union draft resolution alone provided the means for bringing peace to the Balkans and normalizing the situation in Greece.

39. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) asked for an explanation of the term "Greek guerrillas" in paragraph 12 of the joint draft resolution. He wondered whether it would apply to Greek seamen under arrest in the United States and whether the paragraph would be interpreted by the United States Government in such a way as to imply an obligation to give such persons either asylum or an opportunity to emigrate to another country of their choice rather than be repatriated forcibly to Greece.

40. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) said that he could reply only for his own delegation. As he understood the phrase "Greek nationals" situated outside Greece "as a result of the Greek guerrillas' operations", it would include not only those who had fought on behalf of the guerrillas but also those who might find themselves in other States because of the civil war. Paragraph 12 appealed to States harbouring Greek nationals to facilitate their peaceful return only if they desired to go home. If they did not, there would be nothing in the draft resolution to compel them to go or to prevent them from going to other States if they so desired.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 4 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece (continued)

##### CONSIDERATION OF GENERAL DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued)

1. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said he would not reopen the discussion to reply to the casuistry which certain delegations had resorted to the day before instead of speaking on the item on the agenda. His delegation had previously clearly described its attitude to the four Power joint draft resolution (A/C.1/513) and to the Soviet Union resolution (A/C.1/518).

2. His delegation had, in particular, proved that the Special Committee did not deserve any praise, for it had, in fact, been kept in leading-strings by the Greek police. The Special Committee had worked on the basis of evidence given by witnesses who had been screened and presented by the Greek police. It was that Anglo-American version of the Arabian Nights that had served as a basis for the four Power joint draft resolution.

3. Hence if the Greek question was to be considered objectively, it was impossible to admit for a single moment that the joint draft resolution could contribute to the solution of the internal problems in Greece or to the solution of that country's external difficulties. The sole purpose of that draft resolution was to divert the attention of the First Committee and the General Assembly from the deep-rooted causes of the evil and from the fundamental necessity of restoring normal internal conditions in Greece, and for that purpose to give prominence to Greece's relations with its northern neighbours.

4. It was clear from the statements of Mr. Evatt, who had been Chairman of the first Conciliation Committee, set up during the third session, that the question of the internal situation in Greece was connected with the question of Greece's relations with its northern neighbours or, rather, that the two were parts of a single problem and should be solved simultaneously.

5. It was in that spirit that his delegation had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/518) which he firmly expected would lead both to a decisive

improvement in the situation in Greece and to the restoration of relations between that country and its northern neighbours.

6. By contrast, the joint draft resolution submitted by Australia, China, the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/513), far from being a remedy, would merely aggravate matters and complicate Greece's relations with its northern neighbours. The authors of that text were merely hoping to fish in troubled waters and in the resulting confusion to justify the external interference of the imperialist Powers in Greece. His delegation would therefore vote against the joint draft resolution, and in favour of its own. The USSR text, in conjunction with the draft submitted by the Conciliation Committee and amended by the Soviet Union in the particular concerning the frontier between Greece and Albania, was the only one that could serve as a basis for the solution of the Greek question.

7. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the draft resolution submitted jointly by Australia, China, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/C.1/513).

*The joint draft resolution was adopted by 38 votes to 6, with 2 abstentions.*

8. The CHAIRMAN put the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/518) to the vote. At the request of the representative of the Soviet Union, the vote was taken paragraph by paragraph and by roll-call.

9. The Chairman put the following part of the text to the vote:

"With a view to regulating the position in Greece,

*"The General Assembly*

*"Appeals to the conflicting parties to cease military operations and"*

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Norway, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:*

Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, France.

*Against:*

Norway, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand.

*Abstaining:*

Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Mexico.

*That part of the draft resolution was rejected by 32 votes to 7, with 10 abstentions.*

10. The CHAIRMAN put the following passage to the vote:

*"Recommends that the following measures also be taken:*

*"(a) The declaration of a general amnesty;"*

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*The United States of America, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:*

Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*Against:*

United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

*Abstaining:*

Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Thailand.

*That part of the draft resolution was rejected by 31 votes to 6, with 15 abstentions.*

11. The CHAIRMAN put the following passage to the vote:

*"(b) The declaration of general and free parliamentary elections, provided that the supreme Greek body responsible for carrying out elections in Greece includes representatives of Greek democratic circles at the head of the national freedom movement in Greece;"*

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Colombia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:*

Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

*Against:*

Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,

Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China.

*Abstaining:*

India, Israel, Yemen, Argentina.

*That part of the draft resolution was rejected by 45 votes to 6, with 4 abstentions.*

12. The CHAIRMAN put the following passage to the vote:

*"(c) The establishment of supervision by representatives of the Powers, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to ensure that the elections are fairly held in Greece;"*

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Canada, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:*

Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

*Against:*

Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma.

*Abstaining:*

India, Israel, Yemen.

*That part of the draft resolution was rejected by 46 votes to 6, with 3 abstentions.*

13. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the following text:

*"(d) The establishment of a joint commission of the Powers, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to control the frontiers between Greece and her northern neighbours;"*

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Canada, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:*

Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

*Against:*

Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma.

*Abstaining:*

Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France,

Haiti, Honduras, India, Israel, Mexico, Panama, Thailand, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia.

*That part of the draft resolution was rejected by 36 votes to 5, with 16 abstentions.*

14. The CHAIRMAN put the following passage to the vote:

“(e) The cessation of military assistance to the Greek Government in troops and equipment from foreign Powers, and the fixing of a time-limit for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Greece;”

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Burma, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:*

Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia.

*Against:*

Canada, China, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Iceland, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil.

*Abstaining:*

Burma, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Iran, Israel, Mexico, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina.

*That part of the draft resolution was rejected by 40 votes to 6, with 12 abstentions.*

15. The CHAIRMAN put the following passage to the vote:

“(f) The dissolution of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans.”

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Uruguay, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:*

Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*Against:*

Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

*Abstaining:*

Guatemala, Israel.

*That part of the draft resolution was rejected by 50 votes to 6, with 2 abstentions.*

16. The CHAIRMAN stated that the First Committee had thus disposed of the first item on its agenda.

17. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) requested that, under rule 118 of the rules of procedure, the Soviet Union draft resolution should be put to the vote as a whole.

18. The CHAIRMAN read rule 118 of the rules of procedure and said that all the parts of the draft resolution having been successively rejected, there was no “resulting proposal” to put to the vote.

19. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) considered that rule 118 referred to the result of a vote, without differentiating between a positive or a negative vote. Although the Committee had voted against all the parts of the text, it should now be asked to vote on the text as a whole. That had been the procedure followed in the past, and his delegation felt there was no valid reason to depart from it.

20. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) recalled that rule 118 of the rules of procedure had been interpreted more than once in different ways and that there were many precedents, both in Committee and in plenary session, that authorized a vote on the draft resolution as a whole, irrespective of the results of the votes on the parts thereof.

21. Those results were by no means insignificant: 31 votes had been cast against an amnesty and 45 against free elections in Greece. In view of those results, it was well worth while to proceed to a vote on the resolution as a whole.

22. The CHAIRMAN agreed that there were precedents for both methods of procedure.

23. Mr. DE FREITAS VALLE (Brazil) thought that there were several interpretations of rule 118. To settle the point his delegation challenged the Chairman’s ruling, even though regarding it as justified and even though it held the view that when all the parts of a proposal had been rejected no “resulting proposal” remained to put to the vote.

24. The CHAIRMAN said he would put the Brazilian challenge of the Chairman’s ruling to the vote.

25. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said the Brazilian representative’s motion was merely designed to elicit a vote that was in no way justified by the rules of procedure.

26. The consideration of that item on the agenda should now be concluded by a vote on the Soviet Union draft resolution as a whole, which would be in accordance with the majority of the precedents.

27. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said the procedural discussion would take more time than a vote on the draft resolution of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, when the different parts of a text had been rejected in the past, that text had nevertheless been put to the vote as a whole. That had also been Mr. Evatt’s procedure when he had been President of the General Assembly.

28. Hence it would be preferable to follow that tradition rather than establish new rules, all the more since rule 118 clearly granted any delega-



tion the right to submit its draft resolution to the vote as a whole.

29. There had been many abstentions during the voting on the parts of the draft resolution of the Soviet Union, and that was yet another reason for asking the First Committee to vote on the text as a whole. Besides, some delegations, presumably prompted by admirable principles of international morality, had seen fit to vote against the amnesty. It was to be hoped that those delegations would take up a definite position on the whole of the draft resolution of the Soviet Union without further delay.

30. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that difficulties had hardly ever arisen when a proposal of which the parts had been rejected was nevertheless put to the vote; indeed, that had been the usual practice. Yet, arguments had invariably ensued whenever attempts had been made to establish a precedent for the procedure to the contrary.

31. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) recalled that, during the second part of the third session, a ruling from the Chair that a proposal which had been rejected in its component parts should not be voted upon as a whole had been challenged by a delegation. The ruling of the Chair had been sustained by a large majority of the First Committee.

32. Mr. STOLK (Venezuela) moved, pursuant to rule 102, that the Brazilian motion should be put to the vote immediately.

33. The CHAIRMAN stated that that would be done.

34. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that the Venezuelan representative seemed to have forgotten that the Brazilian delegation had been asked to withdraw its proposal, in order that the Soviet Union draft resolution might be put to the vote as a whole.

35. Mr. DE FREITAS VALLE (Brazil) stated that his delegation's sole purpose was to help the Chairman and put an end to the procedural discussion.

36. The Polish representative had asserted that in the past certain draft resolutions had been put to the vote as a whole after all their component paragraphs had been rejected. The fact, however, that there was more than one interpretation of rule 118 made it all the more necessary to vote in order to establish the legal position. The Brazilian delegation could not, therefore, respond to the appeal of the Soviet Union delegation to withdraw its motion unless the Chairman decided that no vote would be taken on the Soviet Union draft resolution as a whole.

37. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) stated that he did not question the justice of the Chairman's ruling. The delegation of the Soviet Union would surely not want a vote to be taken on a text that had been reduced to nothing by preceding votes.

38. Nevertheless, the United States delegation was prepared to suggest, subject to the Committee's agreement, that the Soviet Union draft resolution should be put to the vote as a whole, in the form in which it had been originally submitted.

39. The CHAIRMAN stated that the best way of determining the Committee's wishes was to put

the Brazilian motion to the vote, since, in accordance with rule 102, such a motion had to be voted upon immediately.

40. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Brazilian representative did not appear to be pressing for a vote on his motion. He suggested that the Chairman might therefore adopt the same attitude as that of the representatives of Brazil and the United States and put to the vote the Soviet Union draft resolution as a whole, as the United States representative had suggested, in accordance with legal requirements.

41. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the Brazilian representative had stated that he was maintaining his motion, in order that a decision of principle might be taken.

42. Mr. DE FREITAS VALLE (Brazil) stated that it was for the Committee to reject or approve the ruling of the Chair, according to whether or not it wished a vote to be taken on a draft resolution as a whole after all its component parts had been rejected.

43. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote his ruling that when all the parts of a draft resolution had been rejected, there was no longer any need to vote on it as a whole.

*The Chairman's ruling was maintained by 43 votes to 5, with 10 abstentions.*

44. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) stated that his delegation had abstained in the procedural vote that had just taken place. The Chairman's opinion was undoubtedly justifiable, but, generally speaking, it might be useful to know how many votes were cast for and against a given text; votes taken on the different paragraphs did not provide adequate information in that respect.

45. Mr. KURAL (Turkey) stated that his delegation had voted against the Soviet Union draft resolution and in favour of the four Power joint draft resolution, because the latter was the only resolution which approached the solution of the Greek problem in the correct way, refraining from any interference in the internal affairs of Greece.

46. With regard to the USSR representative's statement that Greek partisans had received arms from Turkey, the Turkish Government declared that the assertion was absolutely unfounded and that there had been no traffic in arms between Turkey and the Greek partisans, even in the form of contraband.

47. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) stated that his delegation had abstained in the procedural vote. If the Chairman had formal logic on his side, political logic would demand that every delegation should be able to perform both a political act and an act of sovereignty, by expressing its views on the whole of a draft resolution as important as that of the Soviet Union.

48. Mr. DE FREITAS VALLE (Brazil) stated that his delegation had voted against the Soviet Union draft resolution. Brazil had always condemned interference in the internal affairs of a State. The Soviet Union draft resolution called for a general amnesty in Greece: it was for Greece itself to take that decision, although all delegations were, in principle, in favour of such an amnesty in Greece.

49. With regard to the Yugoslav representative's statement that each delegation should be able to express its views, the explanations of votes afforded such an opportunity of which, incidentally, the Yugoslav representative had made full use.

50. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that his delegation could not regard the procedural vote that had just been taken as a precedent, since it constituted a flagrant violation of the right of any delegation to request, in accordance with the rules of procedure, that a vote should be taken on the draft resolution that it had submitted.

51. The Belgian representative's argument was of no significance whatever, for when Mr. van Langenhove had been Chairman of the First Committee his only motive in objecting to a vote being taken on the whole of the Soviet Union draft resolution on the former Italian colonies had been a desire to play into the hands of the colonial Powers.

52. The statements made by the representatives of Turkey and Brazil after the vote had obviously been intended for the Press. The Soviet Union delegation would ignore those statements, which did not even represent an attempt to refute the facts put forward by the head of the Soviet Union delegation.

53. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) stated that his delegation had voted against each one of the paragraphs of the Soviet Union draft resolution, since it considered that those paragraphs were interdependent and that the draft resolution as a whole did not approach the problem in the correct way.

54. The United States delegation considered that if an amnesty was to be made possible and an atmosphere of good will created, it was essential to eliminate external threats to the independence and security of Greece. Generally speaking, the Government of the United States favoured a policy of tolerance and good will and free elections, not only in Greece, but in all the Balkan countries, so that the day might come when the spirit of the Yalta declaration would prevail.

55. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) recalled that his delegation had always stressed the desirability of bringing the situation in Greece back to normal and of improving the relations between the monarcho-fascist Government and Greece's northern neighbours. The joint draft resolution, however, could only serve to aggravate the situation.

56. The votes cast by the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR could be explained by a number of facts. Whereas it had been alleged that an amnesty had been declared, the Minister of Justice had submitted a plan to a Greek parliamentary commission according to which the chiefs of fascist bands in the Peloponnesus were to be pardoned, but not the partisans. Thus, the facts did not correspond to Mr. Pipinelis' statement; on the contrary they fully justified the provision concerning an amnesty contained in the Soviet Union draft resolution.

57. Furthermore, a bill to pardon the Ministers of the puppet Government which had collaborated with the hitlerites was presently being studied in Greece. Four Ministers had already been liberated by royal decree: that was what an amnesty

meant in Greece. The manner in which the First Committee had been deceived would, however, be exposed before public opinion and those revelations would serve as a basis for a reconsideration of the problem.

58. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR had therefore considered that it could not vote in favour of a draft resolution that did not take account of the facts. It had therefore supported the Soviet Union draft resolution, which constituted an attempt to find a solution to the Greek problem and which was still the only equitable solution. The majority was, of course, free to take its own decisions, but those who had voted against the amnesty in Greece would bear the responsibility for every human life that might be sacrificed in that country.

59. Mr. DE ALBA (Mexico) recalled that his delegation had already expressed the hope that the Conciliation Committee would continue its efforts to achieve results. The letter from the Chairman of that Committee (A/C.1/503) showed that, although the results were negative, so far, they were not entirely disappointing. It would therefore be useful to know whether the adoption of the joint draft resolution would involve the discontinuance of the Conciliation Committee's activities or whether that Committee would continue its work during the current session of the Assembly.

60. The CHAIRMAN stated that the Conciliation Committee was still in existence. He would ask the Chairman of that Committee whether it was desirable for the Committee to resume its activities, in view of the discussions that had taken place in the First Committee.

61. Mr. MAKIN (Australia) shared the views of the Mexican representative. He hoped that the Conciliation Committee would try once again to reach a solution that would guarantee peace in the Balkans.

62. Mr. J. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) explained that he had voted against the joint draft resolution, since that proposal could not contribute to the normalization of the situation in Greece, nor could it serve as a basis for the peaceful settlement of the disputes between Greece and its neighbouring States. The debate had confirmed that the draft of the Conciliation Committee, with the USSR amendment on the settlement of the question of the Albanian-Greek frontier, was the only one that could serve as an acceptable basis. All the difficulties arose out of the fact that four delegations had not agreed on that point and had defended the territorial claims of Greece.

63. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) fully agreed with the views of the Mexican representative. His delegation had approved the joint draft resolution, but if a more effective and more rapid method of achieving conciliation were to be found, it was obvious that that method should be followed. The Peruvian delegation therefore hoped that the Conciliation Committee would renew its efforts to achieve a result.

### **Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies (*continued*)**

REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE 17 (A/C.1/522)

64. The CHAIRMAN reopened the discussion of the following item on the agenda, that of the

disposal of the former Italian colonies. He pointed out that Sub-Committee 17, instructed to study the various draft resolutions that had been submitted during the discussion of that question, had concluded its work and had submitted its report (A/C.1/522).

65. Mr. HOOD (Australia) stated that after three weeks' intensive work the Sub-Committee had been able to submit a single recommendation concerning the disposal of the three former Italian colonies. The Sub-Committee had made recommendations with regard to each of those three territories and had subsequently decided to submit a single comprehensive recommendation.

66. The Sub-Committee had recognized unanimously that Libya should constitute a single, sovereign and independent State, and had considered that its independence should become effective not later than 1 January 1952; during the transition period, the United Nations would exercise control through the agency of a High Commissioner, who would if necessary avail himself of the co-operation and advice of the Power which administered the territory at the moment. He would be assisted by an Advisory Council of ten members, six of whom would be represen-

tatives of Member States, while the other four represented the three parts of Libya and the minorities.

67. The Sub-Committee recommended that Somaliland should be granted independence in ten years, unless the General Assembly decided otherwise when that time came. In the interim period, Somaliland would be placed under Italian trusteeship.

68. There had been difficulties in the way of a solution for Eritrea. The Sub-Committee had therefore recommended the establishment of a commission, consisting of representatives of five Member States, to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of Eritrea and to report to the General Assembly at its fifth session.

69. The CHAIRMAN thanked the members of Sub-Committee 17 for the difficult work that they had carried out under the chairmanship of the representative of Mexico. He expressed the hope that the discussion in the Committee would be confined to the consideration of the text of the Sub-Committee's report and of the attached draft resolutions.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND TWELFTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 4 November 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman:* Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

#### **Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies (*continued*)**

##### DISCUSSION OF THE REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE 17 (A/C.1/522)

1. Sir Carl BERENDSEN (New Zealand) said that his country had a special interest in the problem at issue not only as a Member of the United Nations, but also on account of the substantial part that New Zealand forces had played in the liberation of North Africa. The New Zealand delegation had voted for the proposals presented at the previous session, but had not done so without great doubt and anxiety. Since those proposals had been rejected, it was now possible to emphasize the principal cause of his delegation's reluctance to approve them, namely that they had appeared in a large measure to disregard the wishes of the inhabitants. Those wishes, however, need not be the decisive consideration if the General Assembly considered them premature or ill-advised; nor was it always possible to ascertain what the exact wishes of the inhabitants were. Examining the nature of the evidence as to those wishes, and speaking in the most general terms, with a clear recognition that in every instance minorities existed holding the strongest of opposing views, he considered that the majority of the inhabitants of the territories had been and were clearly opposed to any return to Italian control in any kind of form. Therefore, it would not be wise, or in the interests of the world, of Italy or of the inhabitants themselves, to force such a return upon them.

2. In that respect, the present proposals marked a substantial and welcome improvement over those

submitted at the previous session, and he was particularly happy to recognize that Italy had now come forward in support of proposals for an independent Libya. While the present proposals represented an improvement, however, his delegation did not find them in general acceptable, for the same reason to which he had previously referred, namely that those proposals paid insufficient regard to the wishes of the inhabitants in so far as those were known. While the members of the Sub-Committee might have arrived at different conclusions regarding the wishes of the inhabitants, or while they might have thought that heed should be taken of considerations other than those wishes, it did seem to his delegation that those wishes as it understood them had once again been overridden. He was unable to understand how so many Members of the United Nations who, in the Fourth Committee and the Trusteeship Council had been such vehement and undeviating supporters of the rights of non-self-governing peoples and the principle of self-determination, could possibly have felt that the proposals laid before the Committee, both now and at the previous session, were in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants.

3. Sir Carl suggested that it would be a grave mistake to insist that acceptance of any one of the Sub-Committee's proposals should depend upon acceptance of the others. Entirely separate considerations applied to the various areas and peoples, and in order to arrive at a decision, each area and people must be examined separately and individually. The proposals which had received the largest amount of support at the previous session had been based on the assumption that the peoples of Libya were not yet ready for self-government. The present proposal, presented

only six months later, assumed the contrary to be true. It might well be that neither was completely right, and he was far from convinced that it was in the interests of the peoples concerned to postulate premature self-government. However, it was better to err on the side of freedom than on the side of control, and his delegation would accept the general principle of the early independence of each of the three constituent portions of the area known as Libya. While he further agreed that a united Libya would be the best solution, it seemed quite improper to impose upon the people of Libya or on any of the three divisions of Libya, a unity which they might not desire. In that respect the General Assembly should assist and not insist. The impression left in his mind by the statements of the representatives of Cyrenaica had been that while the latter did not insist or ask for a united Libya, they would be prepared to accept a united Libya on condition that the country be united under the leadership of the Emir of the Senussis. He had understood that those representatives opposed a united Libya unless that condition were met. It was clear that, in so far as their wishes were known, the inhabitants of Cyrenaica did not desire a united Libya in the form recommended by the Sub-Committee, and, until his delegation was convinced that the people of Cyrenaica did desire a united Libya in that form, he could not support the proposal now before the Committee.

4. Sir Carl said that having had lengthy practical experience in administration, he could not imagine anything more likely to create confusion and distrust than the Sub-Committee's proposal to appoint a commissioner and a council comprising ten members to advise that commissioner. He considered that proposal to be a practical mistake and suggested that the Committee reconsider it seriously with a view to its elimination.

5. New Zealand was among those holding that Ethiopia, which had suffered so grievously under the aggression of fascist Italy, was entitled to redress and to an assured access to the sea. His delegation also agreed that where people of the same or a kindred race desired union with Ethiopia, it was not for the Assembly to place any obstacle in the way. However, in view of the difficulties created by the existence of large bodies of extraneous peoples and the doubts that had been expressed as to whether Ethiopia was in a position, unassisted, to develop those territories successfully, if such a proposal were adopted, specific undertakings should be entered into by Ethiopia to safeguard the rights and interests of those substantial and economically developed minorities. As for the suggestion that the remainder of Eritrea be included in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, where the people would find themselves united with a people of similar characteristics, while he could understand the reluctance of those apprehensive as to the wisdom of that proposal, he would be prepared to accept it as practical solution in certain circumstances. On the information available, it did not seem that Eritrea by itself was, or in the foreseeable future could be made, a viable independent entity. Nor did he think that those desiring union with Ethiopia should be deprived of their wishes in order to permit a dubious solution for the problem of those who did not desire union with Ethiopia. There was much that could be said for a federal solution if that should be acceptable to the

parties. Though he would wish to see the just claims of Ethiopia recognized and satisfied without delay, he was prepared to support the Sub-Committee's proposal that further inquiries should be made on the spot by a United Nations Commission before a final decision was arrived at.

6. Sir Carl thought that, with regard to Somaliland, the Sub-Committee was making the same mistake as had been made previously, that of paying inadequate regard to the wishes of the inhabitants. While he agreed that the comments heard from the representatives of the people of that territory had been gravely contradictory, it seemed to be true that the majority of the people of former Italian Somaliland did not wish, and indeed would resist, the return of Italian control in any form. That judgment was confirmed by the conclusions arrived at by the Four-Power Commission of Investigation. While the cause of those people had been gravely jeopardized by recent riots in the territory, and had not been assisted by the clamourings of the Soviet group in that respect, in theory there would appear to be much to be said for a United Nations trusteeship. There would be much more reason for such a proposal had it not been for the behaviour of certain Members of the Organization who had gone so far in endeavouring to stultify the latter's work as to render, in the opinion of many, such a trusteeship quite impossible as things were at present. He was not prepared to go that far, however. A system of United Nations trusteeship would ensure that the people of Somaliland were brought forward to self-government as rapidly as possible and that no opportunity was lost as time passed of re-uniting all Somalis under one administration. Such a solution would also afford the Assembly and the Trusteeship Council some practical experience, but he did not wish to form or express any final opinion on the matter at present.

7. The Sub-Committee's proposal almost necessarily implied that in ten years' time Somaliland would be declared independent, since it seemed unlikely that the General Assembly would decide by a two-thirds majority that independence was not to be conceded to any country, whether it was ready or not. Ten years was a short time, and it was probable that at the end of that period the territory would be a little more ready for self-government than it was at present. In that connexion, Sir Carl drew attention to the fact that because of the sacrifices and efforts of the United Kingdom, which had administered the territory at a cost which it could ill afford, the administrative and educational language in Somaliland for the last decade had been English. While it was a minor point, the disruption and delay that would result from a sudden reversion to Italian should not be ignored.

8. He did not believe that the people of Somaliland desired Italian trusteeship or that the benefits the territory would receive from such trusteeship were so obvious and overwhelming as to warrant overriding the wishes of the population. If the purpose was either explicitly or implicitly to give trusteeship over Somaliland to Italy as a kind of consolation prize, he must say that such a proposal was unworthy of the Assembly and of the problem entrusted to it and was most unlikely to be welcome to a great nation such as Italy. However, he did not wish to express any final conclusion and therefore suggested the desirability

of extending the activities of the proposed commission for Eritrea to include Somaliland. If there was any support for that suggestion, he would be prepared to submit a formal proposal to that effect.

9. In conclusion, Sir Carl said that the people of the territories were entitled to expect from the General Assembly the most careful and earnest judgment based on the universal principles of equity, justice and fair dealing. There should be no dispute on the matter except as to what was indeed in the interests of those peoples.

10. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq), referring to the statement made by the representative of New Zealand, said that according to information that he had just received, all sections of the Libyan people, including those of Cyrenaica, were emphatic in their desire for unity. Unity was the natural situation in Libya. The Sub-Committee had wanted to avoid the imposition of partition on those people, who were one according to every consideration.

11. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom), referring to the Sub-Committee's proposal regarding Eritrea, said that his Government still felt that there was only one solution for that territory: the union of the central and eastern provinces with Ethiopia, a solution which took into account the ethnic, geographic and economic claims of that country and at the same time provided the basis of a stable situation. However, he did not intend to criticize the work of the Sub-Committee and would support and vote for the proposal relating to Eritrea.

12. The Sub-Committee's proposals regarding Italian Somaliland were in line with those consistently offered by his delegation. However, he felt that some provision must be made in the resolution for the early transfer of authority to the new Administering Authority, namely Italy. According to the present text that transfer could not take place until a trusteeship agreement had actually been approved by the General Assembly, or, in other words it would be delayed about eighteen months. Such a delay would be unfair both to his Government and to the people of the territory itself. Once the decision was taken, it should be implemented as rapidly as possible. He therefore intended to submit an amendment to the Sub-Committee's proposal to take account of that fact.

13. Referring to the Sub-Committee's proposal regarding Libya, Mr. McNeil said that though his Government would have preferred, for the purposes of efficiency and smooth transition, perhaps another year, the proposal to give Libya independence by 1 January 1952 was completely acceptable to his Government.

14. From the point of view of the inhabitants of the territory, the unity of Libya was not an abstract idea or a slogan, but a difficult and involved physical reality. Perhaps as a result of the methods followed by the Sub-Committee, the principle of the rights of the inhabitants in its proposal had been somewhat obscured. In fact, the present text would compel the inhabitants of Libya to adhere rigidly to a single unified form of political structure. While it was clear that the three areas of Libya could not lead independent or economically viable lives as separate States, and indeed that even if physically possible such a

separation was of doubtful desirability, as the USSR representative had pointed out, a State could take many different constitutional shapes. While the Libyan people had many elements in common, there were differences in the three territories, perhaps of political level and certainly of administrative patterns. Therefore, if the people of Libya preferred something different from the rigid unit proposed, they should have the choice. Referring to the proposal for the establishment of a national assembly in the third paragraph of the Sub-Committee's proposal relating to Libya, Mr. McNeil said that while all agreed that the representatives of the three elements, with the probable addition of the representatives of the minorities, must consult together, those representatives must be given the unfettered right of determining their own form of government, provided the latter led to the conception of a sovereign single Libya by the proposed date. He explained that because of those considerations, his delegation had circulated four amendments (A/C.1/526) to the Sub-Committee's proposal regarding Libya.

15. Mr. McNeil pointed out that under the terms of the Italian Peace Treaty, the Governments of France and the United Kingdom, the present Administering Powers, were responsible for taking the appropriate measures to give effect to the General Assembly's recommendations. Moreover, the Treaty provided that until final disposal was made, Libya and the other former colonies were to continue under their present administration. While it was reasonable and understandable that the United Nations should be kept informed of the steps being taken by the Administering Powers to execute the General Assembly's recommendation, and should have some instrument capable of independent report to that end, the Sub-Committee's proposals in that respect seemed unwise and likely to retard rather than assist the progress of the Libyan people towards independence. What was proposed might involve, as Sir Carl Berendsen had pointed out, the existence in the territories of two rival authorities. One, the organ of the United Nations, would have great prestige but no power while the other, a national administration, would have a mandate from the Assembly to perform a certain task with attendant obligations. To put it mildly, that would not be a very tidy situation. Furthermore, the presence of representatives of foreign Governments on the Commissioner's Advisory Council would involve some risk of projecting into the territory or parts thereof those very inter-governmental disputes which had made a settlement of the question of Libya so difficult in the past. The United Kingdom Government understood that the United Nations might feel that it had a right to have its own agent or agency, but in satisfying that right he thought that the Committee had an obligation to consider the difficulties of the administrators and to remember some of the political problems with which all were familiar through their work on the subject. In conclusion, Mr. McNeil said that in spite of the minor amendments and the reservation submitted by his delegation, his Government supported whole-heartedly the basic principles enunciated in the Sub-Committee's draft resolution.

16. Mr. VAN PALLANDT (Netherlands) believed that the conclusions of the Sub-Committee were to a large extent the best that could be reached

with regard to the welfare of the peoples of the territories concerned. The draft resolution concerning Italian Somaliland tallied with his Government's opinion, which he had stated on 3 October (280th meeting), and he would support that proposal unless a far better solution were proposed. Though it had seemed to his delegation that the best solution for Eritrea would have been its division and incorporation, partly in Ethiopia and partly in the Sudan, the contradictory evidence and divergent opinions with regard to the feelings of the population made it seem wise to refrain from making a hasty settlement, and to take steps to ensure that further evidence and material were discussed at the next session of the General Assembly. In that connexion he stressed the statement, made by the representative of the Union of South Africa in the Sub-Committee, to the effect that in ascertaining all the relevant facts concerning Eritrea, the commission to be set up should make a particular study of the viability of the territory. That was a matter which should not be neglected in the interests of the well-being of the population.

17. As regards Libya, his delegation agreed with the proposal to grant it full independence at as early a date as was feasible. However, the recommendation made in paragraph 1 of the proposal seemed to him to prejudice the shape that the new State might take. It might well be that the peoples of Libya would want a federated State. The intermediary period had been conceived especially for the purpose of ascertaining whether those peoples wanted stronger or looser ties. In that connexion, while he did not doubt the sincerity of the statement of the representative of Iraq, he did not believe that it could serve as evidence in the Committee's discussion. In conclusion, Mr. van Pallandt stated that his delegation would support the United Kingdom amendments (A/C.1/526).

18. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) stressed the obligation which rested upon the General Assembly in discharging its responsibilities with regard to the disposal of the former Italian colonies. Obviously, in attempting to find a solution for each of the three territories it could not be expected that the views of each of the Members of the General Assembly would be fully satisfied. The United States delegation had stated in the Sub-Committee what it believed would be best in each case. However, it had recognized that it was necessary to accommodate its views in order to reach a compromise solution. Nevertheless, there was a point at which accommodation must stop. There could be no compromise with the fundamental principles stated in annex XI of the Italian Peace Treaty and any settlement must take account of the wishes and welfare of the indigenous inhabitants and of the interests of peace and security. The United States delegation had been able to contribute to the elaboration of the draft resolution adopted by the Sub-Committee because, while it did not offer the best possible plan, it did conform to those fundamental principles. The United States delegation was consequently prepared to support the substantive proposals contained in the draft resolution, namely, (a) that Libya should be granted independence within a short time, (b) that Somaliland should be given independence after a period of trusteeship and (c) that, in the case of Eritrea, there should be a United Nations commission to obtain

more information which would enable the General Assembly to decide upon a final settlement at its fifth session. Mr. Jessup explained the attitude of his delegation towards the three proposals adopted by the Sub-Committee.

19. With respect to Libya the Sub-Committee's proposals were based largely on suggestions made by the United States delegation. The latter supported the substantive provisions contained in part A of the draft resolution, which, if adopted, would at last set in motion the processes leading up to the early independence of Libya, so long desired by the indigenous inhabitants.

20. As regards Italian Somaliland, the Sub-Committee's proposal, likewise, had the approval of the United States delegation. Mr. Jessup explained that his Government had consistently urged that the people of Somaliland should be guided toward independence through the United Nations Trusteeship System. The draft resolution contained a specific provision that the active guidance of the people toward ultimate self-government should begin at the very outset of the trusteeship period. Furthermore, Sub-Committee 17 had specifically stated that, from the outset, there must be constitutional guarantees ensuring the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the inhabitants. The United States Government, in addition to insisting upon adequate safeguards for the welfare of the people, had also consistently advocated the selection of Italy as the most desirable choice for Administering Authority. That view had been endorsed at the previous session of the General Assembly by thirty-four other Member Governments. The Italian representative had assured the First Committee that his Government would discharge its administrative responsibility in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and of the Trusteeship System (250th meeting). If the Somali people were to be made ready within ten years to assume full self-government, the task confronting Italy was indeed a difficult one, but Mr. Jessup did not doubt that Italy's unique experience and knowledge gained from its previous contact with Somaliland, placed it in an especially advantageous position to carry out the task. Mr. Jessup believed in the sincerity and good faith of the new democratic Government of Italy and in its determination and ability to discharge the responsibility of trusteeship in accordance with the terms of the Charter.

21. The Sub-Committee had recommended that Somaliland should become independent at the end of ten years unless the General Assembly decided otherwise. At the outset of the discussion in the Sub-Committee the United States delegation had stated its agreement with the conclusion of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation that the economic development of Somaliland was a long-term problem and that it was not possible to determine definitely when the territory would be ready for independence. In the United States draft resolution presented to the Sub-Committee, it had been recommended that the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council should review the progress and development of Somaliland from time to time with a view to determining when independence could be granted. However, after hearing the arguments raised by other members of the Sub-Committee who believed that the fixing of a definite time-limit would stimulate both the Somalis and the



Administering Authority to greater efforts, the United States delegation was inclined to agree upon a period of ten years. Hence, it was now ready to support the proposal of the Sub-Committee.

22. Turning to Eritrea, Mr. Jessup recalled that, in the early stages of the Sub-Committee's work, his delegation had submitted a draft resolution similar to that which it had proposed at the third session of the General Assembly. That draft resolution recommended the reunion with Ethiopia of all Eritrea with the exception of the Western Province which would be incorporated with the Sudan. There had, however, been considerable divergence of opinion in the Sub-Committee. Altogether four proposals were advanced: (a) independence, (b) a United Nations trusteeship, (c) separate treatment for different parts, the Eastern going to Ethiopia, the Western to the Sudan, (d) a United Nations commission of inquiry.

23. Faced with such a divergence of views the United States delegation had joined with the delegations of Brazil, Iraq, India and Liberia in an effort to seek a compromise solution which might be acceptable to the majority of the General Assembly. That joint proposal had envisaged a temporary federal union between Eritrea and Ethiopia under the leadership of the Ethiopian Emperor. The control of foreign affairs, finance, communications, commerce and currency would have been exercised by the Federal Government, in which Eritrea would have participated as an autonomous unit. In all other affairs there would have been full self-government for Eritrea as soon as a constitution had been agreed upon. The task of drafting a constitution would have been undertaken under the guidance of a United Nations commissioner and a group of experts, and would not have become effective until approved by the Emperor of Ethiopia on behalf of Ethiopia, and by the United Nations Commissioner on behalf of the Eritreans. In order to safeguard fully the wishes of the Eritrean population, there would have been a plebiscite at the end of ten years, by which time any province of Eritrea would have been able to decide to continue in the federation, to secede therefrom, or to unite more closely with Ethiopia.

24. Mr. Jessup expressed his gratitude to the Indian representative on the Sub-Committee, who had taken great trouble in preparing a model draft of a constitution in order to illustrate to the Sub-Committee the type of federal government which might have been established.

25. Nevertheless, the joint draft resolution had not proved acceptable to the majority of the Sub-Committee nor had a second proposal advanced by the representative of Argentina in a further effort at reaching a compromise. Actually, the United States delegation had been among those which had opposed the last-mentioned alternative. Thus it had become apparent in the Sub-Committee that there was only one plan capable of general approval.

26. Several representatives had stated their dissatisfaction with both the quantity and the quality of the information regarding Eritrea available to the General Assembly. The United States delegation did not share that dissatisfaction because it believed that the report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation together with the

testimony which the General Assembly had received from various representatives from the indigenous population, furnished ample evidence of the conditions existing in Eritrea and showed the course which should be taken. Nevertheless, if the majority of delegations preferred that a commission of investigation should be sent out to the area before a final settlement was decided upon, the United States delegation would support that proposal. Although such a decision might be disappointing to many Eritreans as well as others, who were impatient for immediate settlement, a further consultation by the United Nations would ensure that the views of the inhabitants would be fully taken into account.

27. The United States delegation was prepared to support the Sub-Committee's draft resolution provided the First Committee agreed to approve it without any undue substantive changes. Mr. Jessup reserved the right, however, as did other members, to submit or resubmit his own proposals in the event that the Sub-Committee draft resolution was substantially changed.

28. So far the only amendments were those submitted by the United Kingdom delegation (A/C.1/526) which were designed to ensure that the form of the Government to be established in Libya should be determined freely by the inhabitants and should not be arbitrarily imposed from outside. The representative of Iraq had asserted that the inhabitants of the area desired unity. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General had received a communication from the inhabitants urging that the form of Libyan unity should be left for the people to decide according to their own wishes. The amendment proposed by the United Kingdom delegation was in full accordance with the principle of self-determination and would therefore receive the support of the United States delegation. Doubtless, other delegations would also submit amendments either to the substance of the proposals, or for the purpose of clarifying the language. So long as their suggestions did not prevent the General Assembly from taking a final decision during its present session and so long as they did not violate the fundamental principles enunciated in annex XI of the Italian Peace Treaty, the United States delegation would give them sympathetic consideration.

29. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA Khan (Pakistan) expressed his appreciation for the hard and earnest work undertaken by the members of the Sub-Committee. As had already been explained, all representatives on the Sub-Committee had co-operated in an effort to find a compromise solution and had reserved their right to criticize the final plan when it was discussed in the First Committee or in the General Assembly. By and large, however, the Pakistan delegation believed that the Sub-Committee's proposal regarding Libya was in conformity with the criteria laid down in annex XI of the Italian Peace Treaty and with the principles of the Charter. There was however a detail of the proposal with which the Pakistan delegation could not agree. That was the provision contained in section A paragraph 8 which empowered the United Nations Commissioner to call upon different members of the Advisory Council to advise him with respect to different regions or different subjects. The representative of Pakistan thought that it was for the Advisory Council as a whole to assist the Commissioner and that, if the responsibilities were

to be divided among the individual members, the Council itself would become unnecessary. With the exception of that point the Pakistan delegation was prepared to accept the Sub-Committee's proposal with regard to Libya.

30. As to the proposal for Eritrea, he recalled that his delegation had expressed a certain view as to the real wishes of the indigenous inhabitants. That interpretation of its desires had been questioned in the Sub-Committee and therefore the Pakistan delegation had taken the attitude that its viewpoint should be tested by a further consultation with the Eritrean people. Hence, the Pakistan delegation had had no choice but to accept the proposal to establish a commission although it believed that independence was not only desired by Eritreans but offered the most feasible solution.

31. As regards Somaliland there had been considerable divergence of opinion in the Sub-Committee; that was evidenced by the fact that the Sub-Committee's proposal had been adopted by a majority of only 12 to 8 with one representative abstaining. True, as the United States representative had pointed out, section B paragraph 5 laid down that the Trusteeship Agreement should include an annex containing a declaration of principles guaranteeing the rights of the Somalis and providing for institutions designed to insure the inauguration, development and subsequent establishing of full self-government. Also, there need be no doubt that the present Italian Government was worthy of the General Assembly's trust and would implement the resolution sin-

cerely. However, he entertained serious doubt as to whether the Somali people shared that faith in the Italian Government. Unless it was certain that there was going to be a large degree of co-operation between the indigenous inhabitants and the Italian Administration, the Sub-Committee's plan could not succeed. He believed that any final settlement must contain some provision to ensure co-operation on the part of a majority of the Somalis. He hoped that the First Committee would be able to work out such a plan.

32. Finally, the representative of Pakistan was of the opinion that the First Committee should not submit to the General Assembly an inclusive draft resolution dealing with all three territories concerned but separate proposals in each case. He explained that the purpose of his proposal was to prevent the recurrence of the situation at the previous session when it had been impossible to find a settlement for any of the territories simply because the plan as a whole had not obtained the necessary two-thirds majority.

33. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) was of the opinion that the future of the three ex-Italian colonies must be dealt with in a single inclusive resolution since to do otherwise would be a violation of the General Assembly's terms of reference. He recalled that the four great Powers had not instructed the General Assembly to seek a partial solution. They had placed the matter in the General Assembly's hand as a single and indivisible question.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Saturday, 5 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### **Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies (*continued*)**

REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE 17 (A/C.1/522)  
(*continued*)

1. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) said that he would speak on the statements made at the Committee's previous meeting. Those statements had, in the main, stressed the need to permit the populations of the former Italian colonies to play a direct part in the decisions to be taken on the disposal of those territories. His delegation had always borne that need in mind, and had proposed that Libya and Eritrea be given their independence immediately, while Somaliland should receive its independence after a certain lapse of time. That was why his delegation had been somewhat surprised by some of the statements made at the preceding meeting.

2. For example, the New Zealand representative had said that he was not sure that the Sub-Committee's draft resolution fully took into account the wishes of the populations, especially in the case of Somaliland. He wondered whether the Committee could say with certainty that the statements it had heard from the local representatives truly expressed the wishes of the inhabitants. When those representatives had been questioned by the Committee their views had

been inconsistent or at least exaggerated. Those statements could only be regarded as expressing the wishes of certain sections, and not of the entire population. It should be made clear that neither the First Committee nor the General Assembly were bound to solve the problems submitted to them strictly in accordance with the statements of the representatives of sections of the population. Final judgment would have to be passed on the basis of the report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation and of the daily statements made in the territories or published in the Press.

3. Since it had been impossible to ascertain clearly the aspirations of the peoples of Eritrea, the Sub-Committee had been obliged to suggest deferring a decision on that subject to a later date.

4. By contrast, the Sub-Committee had felt that it was in a position to interpret the aspirations of the peoples of Libya and Somaliland. The parts of the draft resolution dealing with those two territories provided, moreover, that their populations would be consulted on the spot, and that consequently any mistake which might have been made could be corrected by the population itself. There could be no doubt in regard to Libya. As to Somaliland, Italian trusteeship would be exercised in accordance with certain constitu-

tional principles, and the United Nations could at any time intervene, through the Trusteeship Council, to smooth out any difficulties which might arise during the ten years preceding that territory's acquisition of independence.

5. The New Zealand representative had used a metaphor to express his misgivings in regard to the establishment of an Advisory Council to assist the United Nations Commissioner in Libya in the execution of his duties. Those misgivings had been shared by Mr. McNeil. Sir Carl Berendsen had compared the Commissioner with a car driver who might be disturbed by the advice given by nine passengers. In expressing such misgivings the New Zealand and United Kingdom representatives seemed to have forgotten that the driver would not be alone at the wheel, but that the Administering Authority of the territory would be sitting next to him. The purpose of establishing an Advisory Council was precisely to maintain, with the aid of nine persons, the balance between the intentions of the driver—the United Nations Commissioner—and those of the person sitting beside him—the Administering Authority.

6. It had also been said that the Sub-Committee's proposal seemed to prescribe a certain type of government for the new State. That interpretation was certainly wrong. The Sub-Committee's plan was that Libya should be a single State but that in no way prejudged the question whether it would be a federal, confederated or unitary State. It left the decision on that point to the population of Libya itself. In any case, the United Nations could not deal with the type of government Libya was to have since, to do so, would be to intervene in the domestic affairs of a State, contrary to Article 2 paragraph 7 of the Charter.

7. In regard to the future of an Italian Administration in Somaliland, he said that the Italians had always been a peace-loving people and that they had been forced, by fortuitous circumstances, into a war which the majority of the population had not desired. Indeed, Italy had no right not to be a peace-loving country. Italy should be like Switzerland: its neutrality should never be threatened. Its rich and varied heritage did not belong to it alone but to all mankind. Italy showed every sign of becoming progressively more peace-loving, and under the Sub-Committee's draft resolution it would be forced to remain so, even against its will.

8. Sir Mohammad Zafrullah Khan had expressed some doubts regarding the draft resolution's provision that the United Nations Commissioner in Libya would be able to consult different members of the Advisory Council on various questions. The sole purpose of that provision was to give the Commissioner a large measure of discretion as the Council would certainly number among its members many experts specializing in certain questions. In authorizing the Commissioner to consult with the one or other member of the Advisory Council according to need, it had not been intended to exclude consultations with the other members. In doubtful cases the Commissioner would naturally consult the Advisory Council as a whole.

9. In regard to Somaliland, the representative of Pakistan had said that as the vote in the Sub-Committee, on the part of the resolution

dealing with that territory, had resulted in 12 votes in favour to 8 against, with 1 abstention, he would not state his final views on that matter, and that he hoped the full Committee would be able to find a solution which would meet with a greater degree of approval. The representative had also held misgivings on the possible reaction of the population of Somaliland to Italian trusteeship. The fact that some factions of the population had opposed the return of an Italian Administration, while others had taken just the opposite stand. That being so, if the Committee were to take the statements of the various local representatives literally, it would be forced to take conflicting decisions. The proposed formula was intended to reassure those who feared disturbances, as it provided that Italy would be aided and advised in any case of emergency.

10. In the case of Eritrea, although the Argentine delegation was in favour of immediate independence, it had submitted a second proposal under which the population of that territory was to have been called upon to state its wishes before a final decision was taken. That proposal had also taken into consideration the economic aspects of Ethiopia's legitimate claims: on the one hand, Ethiopian products could have crossed the existing frontier to the port of Massawa, and, on the other hand, it enabled the road giving access to the port of Assab in the southern part of the territory to be used. His delegation was convinced that the Eritrean people must attain their independence and that, if part of that people wished to be united with Ethiopia, that union should be accomplished in pursuance of a decision of the Eritrean people and not of a decision by the United Nations.

11. His delegation had supported the decision to submit the Sub-Committee's draft resolution as a single draft in three parts, instead of submitting those parts in the form of three separate drafts, as some delegations had proposed; it had felt that, if three separate draft resolutions had been submitted, the Committee would have been asked to take a decision on one or two of the drafts and to leave the third aside.

12. Finally, he reserved his delegation's right to give its views later on the different clauses of the draft resolution.

13. Mr. JOOSTE (Union of South Africa) agreed with the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States that the part of the proposal concerning Libya and concerning the future unity of that territory should be amended. The future form of the union and the government should be decided by the Libyan people themselves, and the United Nations should do nothing that might compromise the freedom of their decision. The amendments submitted by the United Kingdom delegation (A/C.1/526) were intended to improve the Sub-Committee's proposal, without prejudicing the independence of the territory or the form of its future constitution. His delegation would, therefore, vote for those amendments.

14. With regard to the establishment of an Advisory Council, his delegation considered that the aid that the United Nations Commissioner might require would be of a technical nature and could therefore be provided to him by the attachment of one or two experts instead of the proposed Council which, in view of its political

character, might lead to difficulties when authority was transferred to a Libyan Government. His delegation had voted against that clause in the Sub-Committee and would follow with great interest any developments that might occur in the discussion of that particular point in the First Committee.

15. With regard to Somaliland, his delegation was in favour of the original United States proposal that the capacity of the inhabitants of the territory to govern themselves should be reviewed periodically. The development of Somaliland would take place under the supervision of the United Nations and hence could not be retarded; but that development should be a natural process, to be concluded in a manner dictated by circumstances. Nevertheless, if the majority of the members of the First Committee preferred the solution proposed by the Sub-Committee, his delegation would raise no objection.

16. The Union of South Africa considered that Italy should participate in the future development of the African continent, that being in the interests of Italy, of the continent itself and of international co-operation. Accordingly his delegation hoped that it would be decided to place Somaliland under Italian trusteeship.

17. As regards Eritrea, his delegation felt that the data submitted did not make it possible to take any final decision on the future of that territory. His delegation, therefore, strongly supported the proposal to set up a commission to re-examine the problem. That commission would take into consideration all the suggestions previously advanced on the fate of Eritrea, and should take particular account of the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants, of peace and security in East Africa and of the claims and rights of Ethiopia. Such a procedure could only be considered as a proof of the United Nations wish to carry out its task conscientiously.

18. Ato AKLILOU (Ethiopia) considered that there was every reason to congratulate the Sub-Committee on the proposal it had reached with regard to Libya.

19. As regards Eritrea, the solution of that problem was a *sine qua non* to the maintenance of peace and security in East Africa. That question should not be separated from that of Somaliland, since those two territories surrounded Ethiopia in the north and south. The first impression conveyed by the work of the Sub-Committee with regard to those two territories seemed to be that the Sub-Committee's primary pre-occupation had been to satisfy the interests of Italy, in spite of the protests against Italy's return to Somaliland that had been voiced before the establishment of the Sub-Committee. It was true that the Four-Power Commission of Investigation had stated, in its report, that certain groups of the population of Somaliland would not object to Italy's return, but that did not mean that the population as a whole would approve that return.

20. The Sub-Committee proposed to establish a new commission of investigation to ascertain the wishes of the population of Eritrea, although it had been proved beyond doubt that a large majority of the population of Eastern Eritrea was in favour of union with Ethiopia. It was alleged that such a union, even if it were only provisional and subject to a referendum, would

be contrary to the wishes of the population of Western Eritrea. Moreover, there seemed to be an implication that, if a minority of the population asked for independence, it should be imposed upon the majority, whatever its wishes might be.

21. In May 1949, Italy had claimed trusteeship over Eritrea, under the pretext that that territory was not yet prepared for independence. Subsequently, however, in the hope of gaining control over Tripolitania, Italy had renounced Eritrea, on the basis of the Bevin-Sforza Agreement. When that plan had been rejected, Italy had tried to obtain compensation in Eritrea by indirect means. Thus, although the situation in Eritrea had not changed in any way, the same political interests on which allegations had been based in May that Eritrea was not yet prepared for independence were currently used to support the argument that it would be unjust not to impose that independence upon the people of Eastern Eritrea. It was regrettable that the United States plan for the immediate union of Eastern Eritrea with Ethiopia had not received the consideration it deserved. It was also regrettable that the efforts made by the United States, India, Brazil, Iraq and Liberia had not resulted in a formula which the Sub-Committee could have adopted. His delegation had hoped that common ground would have been found between the plans based on the idea of a federation, which had been discussed by the five-Power group, and the original suggestions submitted by the United States delegation. Finally, his delegation regretted that its suggestion that Ethiopia should provisionally administer Eastern Eritrea pending the holding of a referendum had not met with any support in the Sub-Committee. By proposing an establishment of a new commission of investigation, the Sub-Committee had in fact admitted its inability to solve the problem. Ethiopia was confronted with a two-fold threat to its national security, one arising out of the postponement of a decision on Eritrea and the other arising out of the satisfaction of Italy's claims to Somaliland. Ethiopia's opposition to a new commission of investigation was not due to any fear of what the commission might find; his delegation merely considered the establishment of that commission unnecessary, precisely because it knew perfectly well the results that the commission would attain.

22. In those circumstances, Ethiopia was quite naturally declining to be a party to the delimitation of the frontiers of Somaliland and to the establishment of Italian or any other trusteeship over that territory.

23. In spite of the efforts made in the Sub-Committee, the First Committee was in a position of not conforming with the provisions of the Treaty of Peace under which the question had been referred to the General Assembly. Under those provisions, considerations of peace and security in East Africa had to be respected but the combined effect of the two proposals submitted by the Sub-Committee with regard to Somaliland and Eritrea were in conflict with those considerations.

24. The insistence on a single formula for three territories and peoples as distinct and disparate as Libya, Eritrea and Somaliland seemed to indicate a wish to promote imperialist aims and not the wishes and welfare of the populations concerned. The fact that a decision concerning a

territory on which there had been general agreement in May 1949 had been postponed for a year, proved that political motives were involved. Such machinations were hardly calculated to give peoples the confidence that their future would be decided in accordance with the principle of self-determination. For those reasons his delegation felt obliged to appeal to the members of the First Committee, which was dealing with the problem for the fourth time, to endeavour conscientiously to provide all the peoples of East Africa with the equitable solution they had awaited for so long.

25. Mr. HOÚDEK (Czechoslovakia) recalled that, at the previous session of the General Assembly, his delegation had supported the granting of independence to each of the three former Italian colonies; in so doing, it had based itself on the concept that the result of the war against fascism must have encouraged non-self-governing peoples to seek their independence. The Czechoslovak delegation had not changed its point of view. Those territories should be granted independence by the United Nations in accordance with the principles of the Charter. For that reason it had supported the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/487), which provided for the implementation of those principles.

26. The Sub-Committee had recommended that independence should be granted to Libya not later than 1 January 1952. Although the Czechoslovak delegation was in favour of granting immediate independence, it had no basic objections to the proposed time-limit. The other provisions concerning Libya were, however, unacceptable. If independence were not granted immediately, a system of international trusteeship in accordance with the principles of the Charter should have been contemplated and entrusted to a certain number of States including the four great Powers, which bore the chief responsibility in the matter. Mr. Hoúdek was opposed to the principle of a trusteeship régime entrusted to one Power, which would be reminiscent of the colonial system. He also opposed the appointment of a Commissioner whose functions were too independent of the Advisory Council. Moreover, that Council should have included a representative of the USSR for the same reason that it included representatives of the other three great Powers. The solution proposed by the Sub-Committee therefore had a fundamental defect.

27. The principle of a united, independent and sovereign Libya proposed by the Sub-Committee was based on the wishes of the local populations. The Czechoslovak delegation therefore opposed the United Kingdom amendment (A/C.1/526/Rev.1) which by-passed the application of that principle.

28. The Sub-Committee had unanimously proposed that Somaliland should become independent. It only provided for the implementation of that principle, however, after a period of ten years and, moreover, it allowed the General Assembly to decide otherwise at the end of that period. The Czechoslovak delegation could not support a proposal for the independence of Somaliland at a too distant date and which permitted the General Assembly to reconsider the question at the appropriate time. It also opposed the suggestion that the trusteeship of Somaliland should be entrusted to Italy because, while the differences

between fascist Italy and the current Italian Government were not to be denied, the sufferings inflicted on the indigenous populations by Italy could not be forgotten. Moreover, the population of Somaliland had already expressed its concern in that respect.

29. With regard to Eritrea, the best solution would have been to grant that country its independence as rapidly as possible, taking into account the wishes of the local populations and granting Ethiopia an outlet to the sea. Other proposals to partition Eritrea and to annex one part of that country to Ethiopia had been presented. He recalled that Czechoslovakia had always been sympathetic to Ethiopia, particularly when it had been the victim of Italian aggression in 1935, when France and the United Kingdom had sabotaged the sanctions against Italy decided upon in the League. Czechoslovak friendship for Ethiopia had not changed, but that did not imply that it approved of the annexation of Eritrea to Ethiopia, if that was not in accordance with the wishes of the Eritrean people. It was difficult to understand the solution proposed by the Sub-Committee, if it was recalled that States which now considered that not sufficient information was available on the question, had earlier proposed concrete solutions. If a mistake were made, however, a mistake granting independence would be the least serious because it would not be in opposition to the wishes of the population who, on the contrary, would thus have an opportunity freely to decide their future.

30. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India) considered first that the draft resolution submitted by the Sub-Committee was a compromise which, without giving full and complete satisfaction to everyone, co-ordinated the various points of view and thus made it possible to avoid a deadlock.

31. He pointed out that there was not a great difference between the principle of a single, independent and sovereign Libya as recommended by the Sub-Committee and the principle contained in the amendment of the United Kingdom delegation (A/C.1/526/Rev.1). A single and sovereign State could, under its constitution, adopt a completely unitarian régime, a régime in which self-government was partially recognized, or a régime granting a large measure of self-government and even providing for secession. Thus, if Libya started off as a single State, that would not prevent eventual secession if the constitution so decreed. He recalled that in Burma a similar problem had confronted the constituent States. The Shan states had not been in favour of union. The constitution, however, had provided for a large measure of self-government and for the right of secession. That had enabled those States to join the union, which had later been cemented by the election of the head of one of those States as the first President of Burma. Mr. Rau asked the United Kingdom delegation to consider that point of view before pressing his amendment. Personally he preferred to encourage the unity of the country at the very beginning.

32. With regard to Eritrea, he pointed out that the solution proposed by the Sub-Committee satisfied the concern of the Indian delegation which was happy to learn that the Argentine delegation, in order to calm certain fears, intended to offer amendments in connexion with the solution proposed for Somaliland. The Indian dele-

gation, with the same purpose, had proposed that a declaration to reduce the power of the Administering Authority, to vest sovereignty in the people of Somaliland, to make the Administrator of the territory responsible to the United Nations and to enable the General Assembly to amend the constitution in order to further the country's development towards independence and to ensure the application of human rights should be annexed to the Trusteeship Agreement for Somaliland. If that declaration were adopted, the Administering Power would simply be in its role acting as the representative of the United Nations.

33. Mr. TARCHIANI (Italy) declared that Italy, in its concern to promote the well-being of local populations and to ensure the maintenance of peace and security, was prepared to accept the Sub-Committee's conclusions. It expressed its gratitude to those who during the debates had recognized the part which republican Italy could play in those territories.

34. With regard to Libya, he assured the Committee that all types of exchange between Italy and Tripolitania would contribute to creating good understanding and agreement between the Italian people and the Arab peoples. He added that Italian minorities wished to co-operate without hostile intentions in the formation of the new State and to play a constructive part in that effort.

35. The Italian Government thought that Eritrea should evolve towards independence naturally but without precluding co-operation with Ethiopia. He added that he had noted with regret that some delegations had charged that Italy fascist or democratic was still the same. He thought, however, that that was only an expression of opinion which was not shared by the majority of the Committee, and he stated that, in any case, Italy was ready to accept the Indian proposal to annex to the Trusteeship Agreement for Somaliland a declaration on the powers of the Administering Authority and the guarantees to be granted to the local populations.

36. With regard to the anxiety shown by the representative of Ethiopia, concerning the so-called threat to the security and territorial integrity of Ethiopia, he pointed out that Italy had asked to exercise trusteeship over Somaliland, in order to enable that country to gain independence and without any hostile intention whatsoever towards Ethiopia. He added that granting independence to Eritrea would not, in itself, facilitate aggression against Ethiopia, especially since Italy was disarmed and had no aggressive intentions. On the contrary, it wished to co-operate with Ethiopia, and thought that the implementation of point four of President Truman's declaration could be of benefit to all the populations of East Africa. Italy wished to consolidate harmony and peace in the world. It hoped that it would receive the confidence it deserved.

37. Mr. GARCÍA BAUER (Guatemala) pointed out that the Sub-Committee's recommendation was a compromise reflecting the general desire to find a practical solution which took into account the wishes of the populations for independence and the concern for maintaining international peace and security.

38. The principles of Libya's independence not

later than 1 January 1952 and the possibility of Libya becoming a Member of the United Nations had been unanimously adopted. The unity of Libya had been recognized for historical reasons and because it had been considered to the interest of the local populations. During the period of transition, a commissioner, assisted by an Advisory Council, would represent the United Nations. The delegation of Guatemala agreed with that principle, although it thought that a United Nations commission would offer greater guarantees.

39. The delegation of Guatemala had proposed, and the Sub-Committee had accepted, that a representative of the minorities of Libya should take part in the work of the Advisory Council. Defence of minorities was a recognized principle of international law, which had been applied by the League of Nations and had been incorporated in the Italian Peace Treaty. It was implicit in the United Nations Charter and had been studied by the Sub-Committee of the Commission on Human Rights. Moreover, the size of the minorities in Libya warranted their being taken into account, because they were much greater in number than the population of one of the three parts of Libya: the Fezzan. He then quoted the number of Italians, Maltese, Jews and Greeks in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The delegation of Guatemala would have preferred the representatives of the local population not to be appointed by the commissioner in order to ensure better representation of those populations. His delegation accepted the draft resolution on Libya as a whole, because it took into account both the wishes of the population and the maintenance of international peace and security.

40. The solution proposed for Somaliland took into account the fact that that territory did not as yet seem ready for independence. The Four-Power Commission of Investigation had stated, in fact, that the mode of life of the populations of Somaliland was still very primitive. For that reason, the solution proposed by the Sub-Committee was judicious. Italy was particularly suited to carry out the trusteeship, in view of its experience in the field and of its incontestable contribution to culture and civilization. Moreover, there were additional guarantees in the fact that a declaration limiting the powers of the Administering Authority and ensuring the application of human rights was to be annexed to the Trusteeship Agreement which was to be ratified by the General Assembly, and finally in the fact that the Trusteeship Council could send visiting inspection missions to Somaliland. The delegation of Guatemala agreed with the delegation of the United Kingdom that the transference of power to the Administering Authority should take place as soon as possible.

41. Mr. García Bauer stated that it was his delegation which had submitted to the Sub-Committee a proposal to set up a commission of inquiry for Eritrea. No other solution could be found in view of the contradictory information and the differences of opinion between the delegations and, in particular, between the four great Powers.

42. The delegation of Guatemala would vote for the draft resolution submitted by the Sub-Committee and, if the occasion arose, for any amendments to improve its wording.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.



## THREE HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 7 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

### Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies (*continued*)

REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE 17 (A/C.1/522)  
(*continued*)

1. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), pointing out that the report of Sub-Committee 17 only represented the views of the majority of that body, said that in fact, on a number of important questions, the majority itself had been divided. In addition to the proposals submitted by the majority of the Sub-Committee, the USSR proposals (A/C.1/487/Rev.1) were still before the First Committee and were being supported in their entirety by several delegations. Other delegations supported some of the main features of those USSR proposals. The two sets of proposals reflected two approaches to the question at issue. The approach of the majority of the Sub-Committee reflected the struggle among various Powers to partition the former colonies, while the USSR draft resolution was designed to secure the self-determination of the local population while safeguarding the interests of the United Nations as a whole. While the Sub-Committee's report evidenced the unsatisfactory outcome of that body's work, the First Committee could correct and remove the elements of failure contained in it.
2. The decision of the majority to partition the former colonies had been described as a compromise. That compromise, however, was one that had been reached between the colonial Powers and indeed, the Sub-Committee's proposals showed that where those Powers had been unable to reach understanding, the issue had been left unsolved and had been postponed. That view was borne out by the postponement of a decision on Eritrea and by the conditional solution proposed regarding former Italian Somaliland. That compromise was based on the secret Bevin-Sforza Agreement and was intended to secure the political, military and strategic interests of the colonial Powers, at the expense of the interests both of the indigenous populations and of the United Nations as a whole.
3. It had been said that the Sub-Committee proposals, while not completely satisfactory to any one country, represented the best that could be achieved in the circumstances. That view was not in accordance with reality since the proposals involved one of the worst possible alternatives, and if there was any satisfaction it was for the colonial Powers rather than for the populations of the territories. Mr. Arutiunian stated that the USSR proposals were founded on the right of the self-determination of peoples, and on the main element necessary for a solution of the question, in that they would secure true independence for the former colonies. Outlining the main provisions of the USSR proposals, he stated that the latter would ensure a fair and democratic solution.
4. The USSR delegation proceeded on the assumption that Libya was prepared for independence and that it should be granted such independence immediately. The majority of the Sub-Committee, on the other hand, had proposed a

delay of some two and a half years which was completely unwarranted if a decision was to be based on the interests of the people of Libya. The experience regarding transfer of authority in other countries had shown that such matters could easily be solved in considerably shorter periods. The delay could only be explained by the desire on the part of the British and French Authorities to prolong and maintain their occupation of the various areas of Libya. In that connexion, Mr. Arutiunian pointed out that the membership of the proposed Advisory Council was also intended to secure those ends. Four of the members of that proposed body would be colonial Powers directly concerned while only two of the members would be free of imperialistic interests, namely Egypt and Pakistan. In the same way the Sub-Committee had rejected a Polish proposal to include the Soviet Union in the membership of any such body in spite of the convincing arguments which had been advanced in favour of that proposal. As had been pointed out, the great Powers had undertaken joint responsibility for the disposal of the former colonies under the Treaty of Peace with Italy. If any great Power were to be a member of that Advisory Council, therefore, and, *a fortiori*, if three great Powers were to be members, there was no valid reason for excluding the USSR. Such exclusion must be intended to give certain Powers the possibility of acting freely as colonial Powers in those territories. It was clear that the proposals of the majority of the Sub-Committee were intended to permit the establishment of a kind of government and administration in Libya which would be fully under the control of the United Kingdom, France and other colonial Powers. That process had in fact already begun, for in June 1949 the United Kingdom had announced its intention to set up a Cyrenaican Government headed by the Emir of the Senussi. The proposed delay was intended to complete successfully that process of setting up puppet governments in the other parts of Libya and thus strengthen the economic, political and military position of the colonial Powers. The United Kingdom, having been evicted from Palestine, wished to organize itself in Libya and set up bases on the Mediterranean coast. At the same time, in violation of the Peace Treaty with Italy, the United Kingdom Government had placed the Mellaha air base at the disposal of the United States. The Soviet Union had already drawn the attention of the United Kingdom and other Governments concerned to the illegal and unilateral character of that act (240th meeting). Nevertheless, the United Kingdom had proceeded with that policy, which appeared to be a form of payment for various kinds of support granted by the United States.

5. Having set up air bases there, the United States had become particularly interested in that colony from the political and strategic points of view and had entered the struggle overtly; previously the question of Libya had involved a clash between the United Kingdom, France and Italy. In that connexion, recalling that the USSR proposed that all foreign military forces be withdrawn within three months and that all military

bases be liquidated within the same period, Mr. Arutiunian said that the maintenance of such forces and bases was incompatible both with the principles and purposes of the United Nations and with the interests of the Libyan people. Those forces could only be required for exerting pressure on the population in pursuit of political objectives, for setting up Libyan puppet governments, and strengthening the position and hold of the colonial Powers.

6. The amendments submitted to the Sub-Committee's proposals by the United Kingdom (A/C.1/526/Corr.1) were equally clearly designed to secure the colonial interests of the United Kingdom and others. According to those amendments the representatives of the people of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan would decide upon the form of their future union and government, "whether unitary, federal or other". The wording of that amendment made it clear that it would be the "other" solution that would be adopted, and the word "other" was designed to conceal the Bevin-Sforza Agreement which was the main factor determining the approach of the colonial Powers to the question. That agreement was designed to dismember the territory and give the United Kingdom permanent control over Cyrenaica, France control of the Fezzan and Italy control of Tripolitania. The latter would in fact be under the colonial control of the United States, which, since the beginning of 1948, had been establishing a row of military and strategic bases in that area. That was why the United States representative had supported the United Kingdom amendments. The proposal of the majority of the Sub-Committee had been intended to conceal the idea of dismemberment. The third paragraph of the part relating to Libya, however, had already provided an opening for the other solution proposed in the United Kingdom amendment. The latter merely made clear and obvious the fact that the Bevin-Sforza Agreement was the basis of the solution desired by the Anglo-American group. While there were some differences between the Sub-Committee's proposals and the Bevin-Sforza Agreement, they were not substantial, and the substance of the resolution (A/873) rejected at the previous session<sup>1</sup> was retained in the Sub-Committee's proposals, namely the dismemberment of Libya. Mr. Arutiunian could not support such a proposal and stated that the USSR draft resolution represented the only fair, just and democratic solution of the problem.

7. In the case of Somaliland, also, the original Bevin-Sforza Agreement had been maintained in the original form which had been rejected at the previous session. The substance of that Agreement was to place the territory under Italian trusteeship, contrary to the wishes of the people of Somaliland, who desired immediate independence or, failing that, direct United Nations trusteeship for a brief period of time. The wishes of the population, which had been evidenced by demonstrations against Italian trusteeship so widespread as to require armed repression, could not be ignored. While it might be well that the General Assembly would in fact ignore those wishes, in furthering the interests of colonial Powers, he wished to make it clear that such a decision would be contrary to the basic principle of self-determination. In fact, the present proposal sub-

mitted by the Sub-Committee with regard to former Italian Somaliland was worse than that rejected at the previous session, in that it left the door open for the maintenance of Italian control for an indeterminate period. That proposal would make it possible for the territory to be administered in such a way as to prevent independence being attained after ten years. In that connexion, Mr. Arutiunian pointed to the fact that, though Italy had controlled Somaliland for much more than ten years, it had not prepared the territory for independence. It had been said that the conditions required for independence did not exist in either Eritrea or Somaliland. If such were the case, that would be a clear condemnation of the colonial system in backward areas. The qualified time-limit proposed by the Sub-Committee would induce the Administering Authority to ensure that Somaliland remained in a backward state and would open the door for Italy to renew, under another name, its colonial empire which it had lost as a result of the war. Moreover, the qualified time-limit would naturally nurture suspicion among the people that they were not to be prepared for independence. Such suspicion would not facilitate co-operation or contribute to the normalization of the situation in the area. The USSR representative therefore concluded that the only reasonable and just solution was to guarantee genuine independence for Somaliland after a five-year time-limit, and ensure that the territory was prepared for independence by means of a direct United Nations trusteeship.

8. The colonial Powers had been unable to reach a similar understanding regarding the partition of Eritrea and had therefore postponed a decision on the matter. It was well known that, at the present session, the United States had proposed a partition of the territory, but the majority had failed to reach an agreement in spite of all kinds of negotiations, most of which had been conducted outside the organs of the United Nations. That failure had been due to the fact that none of the Governments concerned had wished to abandon its interests in favour of the legitimate claims of Ethiopia, and thus all sorts of pretexts had been brought up. The Four-Power Commission of Investigation had collected substantial information regarding Eritrea, and while there were *lacunae* the latter applied equally to the information regarding all three territories. In fact, of course, the criteria applied to Somaliland and Libya on the one hand and to Eritrea on the other hand differed, and it was political considerations rather than shortage of information which had resulted in the Sub-Committee's proposal. The delegation of the Soviet Union considered that there was every reason to solve the question of the disposal of Eritrea at the same time as a decision was taken in regard to the other territories. He considered that Eritrea should be given independence after five years under direct United Nations trusteeship.

9. The problem of the disposal of the former Italian colonies could not be solved without taking the legitimate claims of Ethiopia into account. The warning of the leader of the Ethiopian delegation, to the effect that the proposed solution represented a dire threat to the security and national independence of Ethiopia, could not be disregarded. Experience showed that Somaliland and Eritrea had been used as springboards for aggression against Ethiopia. While it was true

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly*, Part II, 218th plenary meeting.

that times had changed, the same anxiety remained, particularly if recent happenings in Italy were borne in mind. In that connexion he quoted the statement made to the Italian Senate on 8 October 1948 by the Italian Minister of Defense, to the effect that the Italian Government intended to organize its armed forces in such a way that the country might be turned into a nation at arms at any moment. The whole world and particularly Ethiopia knew the meaning of such statements, all the more so since Italy had decided to enter into a military alliance of a distinctly aggressive character. Mr. Arutiunian stated that those misgivings should not be interpreted to mean that the national interests of the Italian people were being ignored. The USSR proposals were based on the premise that the interests of the population of the territories should be satisfied while at the same time safeguarding the legitimate interests of the Italian people. Reviewing the provisions of the USSR proposal regarding Eritrea and Somaliland, he concluded that they took those interests fully into account. Only a direct United Nations trusteeship would ensure peaceful relations between the Italian and the indigenous population without jeopardizing the interests of the latter or of Ethiopia. That solution would permit full and fruitful co-operation. However, it was known that Ethiopia desired more than that and in particular desired that the Eastern Province of Eritrea should be annexed to Ethiopia. In fact, the Ethiopian delegation identified the Eritrean desire for independence with the desire for union with Ethiopia. If such was indeed the case, Eritrea could decide the question by itself on attaining independence and there was no need to prejudice the matter. However, his delegation believed that it was the duty of the General Assembly to satisfy the minimum legitimate claims of Ethiopia immediately and to provide that country with an outlet to the sea through the port of Assab. Moreover, the establishment of a direct United Nations trusteeship over former Italian Somaliland and Eritrea would remove the concern felt by Ethiopia with regard to the Sub-Committee's proposals with respect to those territories. In conclusion, Mr. Arutiunian reiterated that the only correct solution under existing conditions was that contemplated in the USSR draft resolution.

10. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) said that, in solving the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies, democratic Italy should not be discriminated against. The four Powers were unable to solve the problem *ad libitum* since they were not dealing with the spoils of a victory, but with a problem they had to solve in accordance with international law. In being seized of the problem, the General Assembly had accepted that responsibility and was therefore expected to find a solution in accordance with the principles of international law and, specifically, in accordance with the principles emanating from the Charter.

11. His delegation noted that the draft resolution suggested by the Sub-Committee strictly adhered to various principles contained in the Charter, namely, trusteeship and self-determination of peoples, constituting thus the best possible solution to the problem.

12. The suggested draft resolution called for the independence and unity of Libya, thereby bringing into existence the international personality of the State of Libya, which was quite compatible with

any type of government resulting from the choice of the indigenous inhabitants. In that regard, the United Kingdom amendment (A/C.1/526/Corr.1) overcame many of the weaknesses of the suggested draft resolution and safeguarded the principle of self-determination. Nevertheless, that amendment constituted a mere clarification which might be included in the summary records. As for the proposed National Assembly, the draft resolution seemed to imply the establishment of one Assembly for all of Libya, and not of three. That point should be clarified so as to enable the representatives to vote on the draft resolution more diligently. Moreover, if the principle of self-determination of peoples and the will of the inhabitants were to prevail, the High Commissioner and the Advisory Council, representing all the interested parties in Libya, could decide as to the method by which the proposed Assembly would be created.

13. The representative of Peru was at a loss to understand the objections raised by the representative of the USSR with regard to the proposed Council. Since countries like Egypt and Pakistan were included in the proposed Council, no undue fear should be entertained in view of the fact that the representatives of those countries as well as the representatives of the local inhabitants constituting a majority in the Council would defend the interests of the Libyan people and prevent any discrimination.

14. The representative of New Zealand had contended (312th meeting) that the proposed Council would be heterogenous and would be unable to work in a co-operative manner; he could not follow that view. It had been said that the Advisory Council should be replaced by a committee of experts, but such a political responsibility in the opinion of Mr. Belaúnde, should not be entrusted to individuals but to Governments, and to a Council representative of all interests, including those of the minority.

15. As to Somaliland, the representative of Peru said that it was obvious from the report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation that the economic situation of that territory militated against its independence. In that case, trusteeship was the only solution. However, in drafting the Trusteeship Agreement, the General Assembly should respect the religious and cultural physiognomy of the territory. That could be effected by the application of the Articles of the Charter dealing with trusteeship. As to the time-limit, his delegation thought that the proposed period of ten years was satisfactory and that the words "unless the General Assembly decides otherwise" should not be construed as an inducement for the Administering Power to remain in the territory for a longer period than that proposed.

16. His delegation could not support the Liberian amendment (A/C.1/527) calling for the extension of the terms of reference of the proposed commission on Eritrea with a view to covering the territory of Somaliland. The Sub-Committee which had aimed at a final solution in regard to Eritrea had suggested the establishment of a commission of investigation in view of the fact that the representatives of the local inhabitants had expressed divergent views as to the disposal of their territory. But the case of Somaliland was different since the proposed trusteeship represented a transitory solution for which sufficient information had been obtained.

17. Moreover, since a single-Power trusteeship was preferable to collective trusteeship, Italy, which practised no racial discrimination and which possessed a universalist point of view, should be entrusted with that responsibility on the understanding that it would be aided in its task by an Advisory Council, on which the population concerned would be represented.

18. With regard to Eritrea, Mr. Belaúnde said that his delegation still maintained its previous position. He recalled that that position had been explained in a memorandum submitted on 16 April 1949 to a sub-committee of the Latin American countries which was then holding consultations with France, the United States and the United Kingdom with a view to solving the problem under consideration. That memorandum had then suggested that the above-mentioned Powers should constitute a technical committee to carry out geographic and economic studies and, after considering the wishes of the populations concerned, should report to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly on the final disposal of the Eritrean territory. Moreover, the report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation had described the complexity of the problem due to the existence of different racial, religious and ethnic groups. Thus, in suggesting the establishment of a commission, the Sub-Committee had endorsed the views of the Peruvian delegation as expressed in the above-mentioned memorandum. Besides, all the Latin American countries had agreed to the necessity of granting Ethiopia an access to the sea. His delegation hoped that the proposed commission would take that view into account.

19. His delegation was firmly convinced that the solution suggested by the Sub-Committee was not perfect. However, if the United Nations was to arrive at any result, it should refrain from seeking perfect measures with a view to achieving Utopian solutions. Finally, the representative of Peru expressed his firm belief that if that atmosphere of suspicion were to be discarded, the commission would surely arrive at a fair solution of the problem under consideration.

20. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) regretted that his delegation could not endorse all the proposals recommended by the Sub-Committee.

21. His delegation noted that the proposed solution for Libya conformed with the principles of the Charter, as well as with the provisions of the Peace Treaty with Italy. In that regard, it amounted to an improvement of the resolution proposed during the course of the previous session. Since his delegation favoured the independence of Libya, notwithstanding the form of its future government, it would be prepared to support the draft resolution proposed by the Sub-Committee as it stood or with the United Kingdom amendment.

22. With regard to Eritrea, though his delegation had abstained on the proposal recommended by the Sub-Committee for a further study of the problem, it would support the establishment of a commission to ascertain fully the views of the indigenous inhabitants as to the final disposal of that territory.

23. With regard to Somaliland, Mr. Cooper stated that, much to its regret, his delegation could not endorse the solution suggested by the Sub-

Committee. He remarked that whereas in the case of Libya and Eritrea, the interests and welfare of the indigenous inhabitants constituted the guiding principles, it represented the consolation of Italy for the loss of its two former colonies. That had become the paramount concept when the future of Somaliland was being considered by the Sub-Committee. The Liberian delegation was not sure as to whether the Somalis would welcome such a solution despite the many attributes given to the new democratic Italy. The representatives of Somaliland did not seem to be impressed by the new title given to Italy since the return of that country to Somaliland symbolized to them the return to foreign rule.

24. Mr. Cooper said that the Sub-Committee had not attempted to grant the Somalis their minimum wishes. The Somalis had asked for independence, but they had been told that they were not yet ready for self-government; they had then asked for independence after a period of ten years under United Nations trusteeship but their request had been denied; they had finally asked for a four-Power trusteeship excluding Italy, but they had been told to accept Italy as an Administering Authority.

25. Mr. Cooper recalled that some delegations had contended that the Somali Youth League did not represent the people of Somaliland. Even if that fact were true, it could not have been contended that that organization did not at least represent a section of the people of the territory since the report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation itself acknowledged the fact that the nationalist movement led by that organization had rapidly spread throughout the country, embracing most of the urban classes wherever located. Moreover, the representative of the United Kingdom had told the First Committee of the anti-Italian demonstrations that had taken place throughout Somaliland (289th meeting). Accordingly, Italy would have had to carry out the proposed Trusteeship Agreement in the face of a deadly opposition on the part of the inhabitants. If that solution were adopted, instead of settling the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies in a peaceful manner, the United Nations would find itself a partner in a ruthless campaign of subjugation.

26. Mr. Cooper assured the Committee that his country had no quarrel with Italy and that it would even support an Italian trusteeship over Somaliland, should that solution prove to be acceptable to the local inhabitants. His delegation was opposed to any proposal contrary to the wishes of the inhabitants of any territory.

27. Furthermore, the representative of Liberia recalled that, during the discussion in the Sub-Committee, the establishment of a frontier commission had been proposed with a view to fixing the boundaries between Ethiopia and Somaliland. Those who suggested that Ethiopia and Italy should be members of that commission must have forgotten that it was from Somaliland that the Italians had invaded Ethiopia and had held that land under subjugation for a number of years. Moreover, it would be too much of an irony to ask the Ethiopians to assist in restoring that very country that had ruined and sacked their homes as their neighbour. Mr. Cooper recalled that the representative of Ethiopia had stated that the return of Italy to Somaliland would, in the view

of his Government, constitute a threat to Ethiopian security (286th meeting). Despite that timely warning, the First Committee was restoring Italy as the Administering Authority in Somaliland without any defined boundaries thereby creating the possibility of border incidents, which would, as usual, end in armed conflict. Thus, in view of the Liberian delegation, any action which the Ethiopians might take would be justified, even if it led to the occupation of Somaliland. It should not be forgotten that it was to a similar organization that the Ethiopians had appealed when their country had been invaded by the Italians. The only redress they had received was a quasi-moral support. Ethiopia therefore could not be condemned for failing to place its confidence

and trust in an Organization such as the United Nations, which, unmindful of the principles of its own Charter, would seem to be seeking settlement of the fate and destinies of people by political bargaining.

28. To that end, the approval of the suggested draft resolution on Somaliland would be contrary to the Peace Treaty with Italy as regards the expressed wishes and welfare of the inhabitants and the peace and security of the world.

29. In conclusion, Mr. Cooper stated that his delegation had submitted its amendments (A/C.1/527) with a view to satisfying the aforementioned principles.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 7 November 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies (*continued*)

REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE 17 (A/C.1/522)  
(*continued*)

1. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) thought that the long discussions in Sub-Committee 17 had been due to efforts, not only in the Sub-Committee but also behind the scenes, to re-establish the Bevin-Sforza plan. In spite of the resistance of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, the Sub-Committee had adopted a scheme which was, in fact, simply a new edition of that plan. The amendments submitted by Mr. McNeil (A/C.1/526/Corr.1) revealed once more that British colonialism intended to defend its position to the last resort, if not in its own interest at least in that of its impatient partner and heir. As had always been the case in the past, the United Kingdom spoke of freedom when in fact it was proposing partition. Poland's own experiences in that respect had made it wary: it was enough to recall what had happened at the Congress of Vienna. Mr. McNeil claimed that by dividing Libya into three parts, which he called Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan, he would be satisfying the aspirations of the Libyan people. However, that type of reasoning did not convince the Libyans. The Polish representative quoted an article from the *New York Times* of 18 May 1949 referring to demonstrations by the Libyan population against what had been called the Bevin-Sforza plan. The wishes of the Libyan people had been voiced in the statements of various organizations, which although they sometimes disagreed among themselves when they came before the Committee, were nevertheless unanimous on the question of Libyan unity.

2. The United Kingdom representative had referred to the machinery required to bring about such unity, although that machinery had been set up for the specific purpose of dismembering the country. The United Kingdom had already shown its intention of splitting up the country by establishing the Government of Cyrenaica under the Emir Idris El Senussi. The amendment proposed by the United Kingdom was a further step backwards towards the Bevin-Sforza plan. It was an

attempt by the United Kingdom, the United States, France and even Italy to transform the United Nations into a tool to be used by the colonial Powers. It would be a grave mistake to regard the vote that had sealed the failure of the Bevin-Sforza plan as a purely formal defeat. That vote had proved that the age of colonialism had come to an end. Credit for the rejection of the plan was due to a certain extent to the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, where the very idea of colonialism had been completely eradicated. After the failure of that plan, the United Kingdom had altered its tactics and had promised Libya unity and independence, without, however, withdrawing its troops, and on the condition that the final decision on the matter was postponed until a later date. It had come to an agreement with Italy with the offer of trusteeship over Somaliland in exchange for the withdrawal of Italian claims on Tripolitania. The proposal before the First Committee provided for Libyan independence by 1 January 1952, although during the discussion nobody had been able to advance a single reasonable argument against the immediate grant of independence. The only conclusion to be drawn was that the authors of the proposal wished to retain their troops and military bases in that territory for two more years, in order to place the future Libyan Government in such a position of dependence that those bases could subsequently remain in their hands and even be strengthened. In order to provide some moral justification for their political and strategic plan and in order to prevent the Soviet Union from taking part in the work of the Advisory Council, the United Kingdom representative had invoked his country's share in the liberation of Libya during the Second World War, whereas, in fact, at the critical moment the decisive factor in that liberation had been that the troops of the Soviet Union had drawn the enemy troops to the Eastern Front.

3. The proposal to set up a commission of investigation for Eritrea was not in conformity with article 23 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy which stated that Italy had renounced all its rights and claims over its former colonial possessions in Africa. According to annex XI of the same Treaty, the four Powers had stated that should

they be unable to reach an agreement on the final disposal of those territories and proceed to establish boundaries, the matter should be referred to the United Nations. The stipulations of article 23 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy and its annex XI therefore called upon the United Nations to settle the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies as a whole. The Sub-Committee's proposal regarding Eritrea did not envisage any decision on the substantive question of the disposal of that territory, and the adoption of that proposal would be contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Italy and not in conformity with the conditions agreed upon for the United Nations to deal with the matter. Moreover, if the proposal were adopted, the United Nations would be recognizing the existing situation, thus enabling the Powers temporarily administering that territory to continue to do so.

4. Basing itself on the provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Italy and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Polish delegation felt that the proposal submitted by the USSR (A/C.1/487/Rev.1) represented a fair and equitable solution of the problem of the disposal of the former Italian colonies. However, its chief desire was that the matter should be settled during the current session, for, were it not, the existing situation would be maintained and the Powers currently administering those territories would be enabled to continue their arbitrary conduct there and to take decisions which could not be controlled by the United Nations. The Polish delegation therefore wished to submit certain amendments (A/C.1/529) to the Sub-Committee's proposal, so as to ensure a decision during the current session and above all so that due account might be taken of the interests of the populations concerned.

5. With regard to Libya, while the Polish delegation thought that territory should be granted independence immediately, it proposed, in a spirit of compromise, that independence should be granted by 1 January 1951, at the latest.

6. As currently proposed, the composition of the Advisory Council would include the representatives of three of the great Powers, whereas those not possessing military bases in Libya were not represented. Poland did not wish to insist on the inclusion of the Soviet Union in that Council. It simply suggested that instead of the United States, France and the United Kingdom, three small States with no direct interest in that part of the world should be chosen. It therefore proposed that Czechoslovakia, Mexico and Sweden should be included among the members of the advisory body.

7. The Polish delegation thought that a similar solution should be adopted in regard to Eritrea and Somaliland. It proposed that they should be subject to direct United Nations trusteeship, for a period of three years only, which would be sufficient to prepare them for independence. Since the just claims of Ethiopia should be taken into consideration, the Polish delegation proposed that a part of Eritrean territory which would provide access to the sea through the port of Assab should be transferred to Ethiopia.

8. He was sure that all who had the real interests of the peoples of those countries at heart and all who had remained faithful to the principles of the right of peoples to self-determination, would

support his amendments. The Committee must not forget that its discussions were not only followed by the peoples of the former Italian colonies but by those of all the Non-Self-Governing Territories. Their faith and their confidence in the United Nations would depend on the decision taken.

9. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) wished to congratulate the Sub-Committee on its work, but had a few comments to offer on some of the remarks that had been made, particularly in regard to the question of the unity of Libya. Some delegations had discussed that territory without taking due account of the fact that the United Nations was called upon in the first place to decide the destiny of the inhabitants and not the fate of desert lands. Article 23 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy indicated beyond any possible doubt that Libya was one single entity and not three separate territories. By a unanimous vote of its twenty-one members the Sub-Committee had not only accepted the concept of the unity of Libya but had recognized that Libya should in due course be admitted to membership in the United Nations. The Sub-Committee had also adopted the principle that the Administering Power should assist in the realization of that unity. Although from the administrative point of view it might seem that there were three provinces, from the political point of view such a division could not be imposed.

10. With regard to the question of an Advisory Council to assist the United Nations Commissioner in Libya, he shared the views expressed by the representatives of Argentina and Peru. He recalled that in the Sub-Committee the idea of a commissioner acting alone had been rejected, having obtained only five votes, whereas the proposal for a Commissioner assisted by an Advisory Council had been adopted by ten votes to four. It could be taken for granted that each of the members of the Advisory Council would be well acquainted with the needs of the population: four of them would be representatives of the population itself; it would also comprise representatives of countries such as Pakistan and Egypt, whose affinity with the Libyan people was a matter of common knowledge. By reason of its very composition the Advisory Council would therefore have no other purpose than to defend the interests of the Libyan population.

11. With regard to Somaliland, the Egyptian delegation could only reiterate what it had stated repeatedly, namely that it would support any proposal which would promote the independence of Somaliland at the earliest possible date. Since the USSR proposal to grant that independence after five years had not been adopted, the Egyptian delegation had supported the proposal for a joint trusteeship over that territory. It would be no surprise, therefore, that Egypt could not support the Sub-Committee's proposal on that question.

12. With regard to Eritrea, since none of the definitive solutions proposed hitherto seemed likely to receive the two-thirds majority necessary for its adoption by the General Assembly, the Egyptian delegation thought that the solution proposed by the Sub-Committee represented an acceptable compromise.

13. The amendments presented by the United Kingdom (A/C.1/526/Corr.1) unfortunately were not satisfactory to the Egyptian delegation.



14. Neither was the procedure proposed by the Sub-Committee, whereby one single resolution covering the whole question of the former Italian colonies should be presented to the General Assembly. Article 23 of the Treaty of Peace with Italy mentioned three different territories. There was not a single clause in that treaty which obliged the Assembly to deal with the three territories as if they were a whole. Paragraph 3 of annex XI of the Treaty of Peace stated that if the four Powers could not agree on the disposal of any one of those territories, the question should be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly. The fact that those territories were to be dealt with separately could not have been expressed more clearly. There was, moreover, a practical consideration against such a procedure. The longer a proposal was, the larger was the number of delegations who would oppose it. If one single proposal were submitted instead of three, there was a danger that no resolution would be adopted on any of the territories in question, and that would certainly not be in keeping with the responsibilities of the General Assembly.

15. Mr. Tsune-Chi YU (China) felt that the draft resolution presented by the Sub-Committee was in keeping with the principles of the Charter and in harmony with the provisions of annex XI of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, since it took into account the right of the people to self-determination, the welfare of the populations, the maintenance of international peace and security, international conciliation and justice. It testified to a will to co-operate on the part of the members of the Sub-Committee, on which geographic distribution representative of the General Assembly had been ensured. It was a formula which was likely to secure the necessary approval of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly. For that reason, the Chinese delegation recommended the adoption of that resolution.

16. China had always been in favour of the independence of Libya. At the Peace Conference the Chinese delegation had already expressed that point of view. The proposal that Libya should be granted independence by 1 January 1952 and that the territory should be administered during the interim period under the supervision of the United Nations had been received favourably by his delegation, which also supported the formation of a unified State. The Advisory Council, as envisaged, would enable Libya to achieve its independence in an orderly manner. The proposed composition of the Council was most satisfactory: France and the United Kingdom had experience in the field as Administering Authorities; Italy also had experience which should be taken into account; Egypt had been well chosen in that it was Libya's immediate neighbour. The United States could contribute to the development of that country, and Pakistan, which had recently gained its own independence, could also render valuable assistance to the rapid achievement of the independence of the people of Libya. The relations between the Commissioner and the Administering

Authorities should, however, have been made clear. For that reason, the Chinese delegation was submitting an amendment on that point (A/C.1/528).

17. Mr. Tsune-Chi Yu recalled that the principle of a trusteeship system for Somaliland, to be administered by Italy, had been approved by the Four-Power Commission of Investigation and later by the General Assembly at its third session. There was much to be said, therefore, for a proposal on those lines. There was a vital difference between fascist Italy and democratic Italy. Moreover, Italy was the only State which was willing and able to administer that trusteeship. In view of the fact that the admission of Italy to the United Nations had been unjustly delayed, it would be a compensation to grant Italy the trusteeship. The Chinese delegation favoured the future independence of Somaliland; it felt that under Italian trusteeship that country would be in a position to gain its independence within ten years and that in any case it would have nothing to fear, since that trusteeship would be under the supervision of the United Nations.

18. The Chinese delegation supported the claims of Ethiopia to attain access to the sea. It would, however, oppose the annexation of any part of Eritrea to Ethiopia if that annexation were contrary to the wishes of the inhabitants. The United Nations commission, however, would verify the facts and the Chinese delegation would support future annexation if that proved to be in accordance with the wishes of the people.

19. The United Nations would have an opportunity to assert its authority by adopting that just and reasonable draft resolution submitted by the Sub-Committee. For that reason, the Chinese delegation supported the draft resolution both as a whole and in all its parts.

20. The CHAIRMAN declared that since there were no further speakers for that meeting, the list of speakers might be closed the following morning. He suggested that the proposal of the Pakistan representative, to the effect that the draft resolution should be submitted in three separate parts, should be discussed.

21. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) pointed out that the Committee and the General Assembly obviously had the right to decide the form in which any draft resolution or resolutions should be presented. He felt, however, that it was preferable to discuss the substance of the draft resolution before putting that procedural question to the vote.

22. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) supported the Argentine proposal. The question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies had been entrusted to the General Assembly as one single question: it could not, therefore, be divided. Moreover, if the First Committee or the General Assembly were nevertheless to express a different opinion on that subject, it would be better first to finish the discussion on the substance of the matter.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 8 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies (*continued*)

REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE 17 (A/C.1/522)  
(*continued*)

1. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the draft resolution suggested by the Sub-Committee rejected the request of the Libyan people for immediate independence, thereby maintaining the occupation of Libya for another two years with a promise of a fictitious independence. Moreover, that two-year period was designed to allow the United Kingdom to set up puppet Governments, similar to that of Cyrenaica, all over Libya through unilateral actions. The United States and France were already following suit in Tripolitania and the Fezzan.
2. In submitting his amendments (A/C.1/526/Rev.1), Mr. McNeil had endeavoured to represent the United Kingdom as the defender of oppressed colonial peoples. On the contrary, those amendments purported to establish a machinery whereby unity would be completely destroyed. The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France as well as others, had endeavoured through their speeches in the Committee, to safeguard their colonial and oppressive régimes. That fact was borne out by their refusal to support the USSR proposals for a withdrawal of all foreign troops and for liquidation of all military bases within a period of six months, as well as by Press reports to the effect that the United States and the United Kingdom were building military establishments in Tripolitania. Moreover, according to the Sub-Committee's draft resolution, those States were granted the right to participate in the government of Libya, whereas the opposition of France, the United States and the United Kingdom to the Polish amendment had excluded the Soviet Union from any such participation. Moreover, the representative of the United States, although aware of the fact that the USSR was not participating in the work of the Interim Committee, had nevertheless presented a proposal to the Sub-Committee, a proposal which had later been adopted, to the effect that the proposed commission for Eritrea report to the Interim Committee which in turn should consider that report and submit its conclusions to the fifth regular session of the General Assembly. His delegation was convinced that the USSR proposals constituted a fair and equitable solution to the problem under consideration.
3. With respect to Somaliland, the proposals of the Sub-Committee merely reproduced the solution based on the Bevin-Sforza Agreement which had been rejected during the previous session. That proposal, as well as the present draft resolution, had caused serious disturbances in Somaliland. The representative of the United Kingdom had endeavoured to convince the First Committee that the forceful dispersion of the demonstrators and their victimization was merely a normal policy deriving from the obligation of the Administering Authority to maintain law and order in Somaliland. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR considered that the only solution compatible with the interests and welfare of the Somalis was contained in the USSR proposal (A/C.1/487/Rev.1) that Somaliland be granted independence after a five-year period during which the Trusteeship Council would be responsible for the administration of the territory. On the other hand, the solution envisaged by the Sub-Committee was contrary to the interests and wishes of the indigenous inhabitants and incompatible with the stipulations of the Peace Treaty with Italy as regards international peace and security.
4. With regard to Eritrea, the Sub-Committee's recommendations also failed to meet the desires of the indigenous inhabitants by postponing the solution. The reason for postponement was not, as it was alleged, due to the lack of information, but merely to the fact that the colonial Powers had not been able to reach an agreement similar to the one reached concerning the other two territories.
5. Mr. Kiselev reiterated his support for the USSR proposals placing Eritrea and Somaliland under United Nations trusteeship, since the Organization was more capable than any country, taken individually, to provide the necessary political, economic and cultural assistance with a view to preparing those countries for independence within five years. Such a solution would raise the prestige of the Organization and would earn it the gratitude of the colonial peoples. Finally, the proposals of the Soviet Union satisfied Ethiopia's legitimate claim for an access to the sea through the port of Assab.
6. Mr. DEJANY (Saudi Arabia) said that, although the solution proposed was not entirely satisfactory, it constituted a major improvement on the solution proposed during the previous session because greater consideration had been given to the wishes of the inhabitants of the territories.
7. With regard to Libya, Mr. Dejany stated that his delegation considered the draft resolution to be satisfactory in principle, since it recognized the fact of Libya's unity. Many of its details, however, were unsatisfactory. But his delegation would support it for the sake of facilitating the work of the First Committee with a view to finding the fairest possible solution to the problem as soon as possible. Accordingly, his delegation would oppose any amendment which would tend to weaken the draft resolution at the expense of the Libyan people, such as the United Kingdom amendments which were intended to obstruct the unity of Libya and to effect its partition.
8. In introducing his amendments, the United Kingdom representative had claimed (312th meeting) that unity was being imposed on Libya and that such a course was neither just nor in accordance with the wishes of the indigenous inhabitants. But the United Kingdom representative had already recognized the fact that neither Cyrenaica, Tripolitania nor the Fezzan were economically capable of leading an independent existence. Moreover, the religious, cultural and social characteristics of those three territories militated in

favour of their unity. The Sub-Committee itself had recognized that unity by the very wording of its draft resolution, thereby recognizing that the present administrative division of the country was temporary and dictated by military expediency only.

9. Mr. Dejanya refuted the argument of the United Kingdom and other representatives that the people of Libya did not desire the unity of their territory, by stating that the representatives of the overwhelming majority of the population had expressed desire for that unity. The minority of the population, although not speaking of unity, did not oppose it, but left it to the Libyans themselves to decide on that issue. The fact that they did not come out openly in favour of unity was not due to any doubt on their part as to the wisdom and necessity of such a unity, but was solely caused by alien factors resulting from the existing administration of Libya. Moreover, even if the minority did not favour independence, it would be against democratic practice to disregard the wishes of the majority with a view to satisfying a minority.

10. The representative of India had contended (313th meeting) that there was no difference between the United Kingdom proposal and that of the Sub-Committee, since the former would create three separate units with an option for unity, while the latter envisaged the creation of one unit with the option for its three component parts to set themselves up independently. That might well be the case had it not been for the existing abnormal situation whereby interference and pressure were most likely bound to hamper the achievement of the desired unity. Moreover, one of those territories might well enter into commitments unacceptable to the others thereby constituting an obstacle to the eventual unification of Libya.

11. Mr. Dejanya recalled that his delegation had expressed the fear (283rd meeting) that if the unity of the country were compromised, the consequences of such a solution might not be less unfortunate than if no solution at all were found at the current session.

12. It was not the intention of the Saudi Arabian delegation to impose any form of government on the Libyan people against its wishes. Moreover, the draft resolution proposed by the Sub-Committee could lead either to the unity or to the partition of Libya. Furthermore, the co-operation and good-will of the Administering Powers constituted a very effective element in attaining or undermining that unity. Accordingly, his delegation would oppose the United Kingdom amendment and would support the draft resolution submitted by the Sub-Committee.

13. With regard to Somaliland, his delegation could not support the draft resolution suggested by the Sub-Committee, despite the fact that it contained an annex to be included in the Trusteeship Agreement with a view to safeguarding the constitutional and human rights of the inhabitants. Since no ideal solution was likely to secure the necessary two-thirds majority for its adoption, his delegation hoped that further amendments to the present draft would be introduced so as to alleviate the apprehensions of many of the Somalis as well as of certain delegations.

14. As to Eritrea, his delegation had favoured the independence of that territory. Although it deplored the necessity of delay, it had, however, no alternative but to accept the establishment of a commission and would therefore support the proposed draft resolution in that connexion also.

15. Mr. MARTÍNEZ MORENO (El Salvador) said that the position of his delegation was exclusively based on the principle of self-determination of peoples, as set forth in the Charter, as well as on the recognition of the achievements of Italy in its former colonies. Accordingly, his delegation had immediately favoured the independence of Libya and Eritrea and Italian trusteeship over Somaliland, with a view to preparing that territory for independence. The recommendations of the Sub-Committee had therefore justified the position of his delegation.

16. Mr. Martínez Moreno said that, despite the uniformity and the indivisibility of the problem under consideration, some delegations had attempted to arrive at separate solutions for each of the three territories. Nevertheless, his delegation favoured the solution proposed by the Sub-Committee regarding Somaliland, due to the fact that many historical, political and moral reasons militated in favour of Italy as the Administering Authority.

17. Besides, no weighty argument had been levelled against that solution, and nobody had denied that the strongest parties in Somaliland favoured Italian trusteeship.

18. The representative of Ethiopia had expressed his apprehension regarding eventual threats of aggression (313th meeting). Such fears should not be entertained at the present time, in view of the existing democratic régime in Italy.

19. Moreover, his delegation had voted against the immediate independence of Eritrea and favoured the establishment of a commission with a view to studying the wishes of the Eritreans and the claims of the Ethiopian Government. Should the commission find that Eritrea desired to join Ethiopia, his delegation would support such a solution. In the meantime, it felt that it was indispensable for the commission to study the best means for granting Ethiopia an access to the sea.

20. Mr. Martínez Moreno regretted the fact that the representative of Pakistan had opposed the proposed solution for Somaliland and that he would present new proposals. That action might create a greater cleavage between the Members of the United Nations and would make a general solution of the problem more difficult.

21. Finally, his delegation would support the draft resolution recommended by the Sub-Committee or any better resolution if such a resolution was submitted.

22. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA Khan (Pakistan) said that his delegation had made it quite clear that its objective was not only the independence of Libya but also its unity. Indeed, it attached such great importance to the unity of the territory, that, assuming that the choice arose between delaying that independence in order that unity might also be achieved, and the immediate establishment of an independent but disunited Libya, his delegation would not hesitate in choosing the former alternative. Besides, that unity had been requested by the overwhelming majority of the

Libyan people. Accordingly, his delegation would support the draft resolution presented by the Sub-Committee and would oppose any amendments affecting the independence and, more particularly, the unity of Libya.

23. With regard to Eritrea, his delegation had been and was still of the view that the majority of the indigenous inhabitants desired independence. His delegation had also held the view that it would be practical to set up an independent Eritrea within the period of three years. However, in view of the suggestion of the Sub-Committee whereby a commission was envisaged, his delegation would not press that proposal, it being understood that any eventual proposal granting Eritrea its independence would receive the support of the Pakistan delegation. Moreover, should the proposed investigation prove that the majority of the Eritrean people desired union with Ethiopia, his delegation would also support that solution. For the time being, he reserved the position of his delegation as to the membership of that commission.

24. With regard to Somaliland, notwithstanding the capacity of democratic Italy to discharge the obligations of a trustee for Somaliland, his delegation was quite convinced that a large majority of the people of that territory was opposed to such a trusteeship.

25. He disagreed with the contention of the representative of El Salvador that the most important political organizations in Somaliland were prepared to accept Italian trusteeship. On the contrary, the Somali Youth League, which was the only organization worthy of that qualification, had persistently been opposed to that solution. Moreover, the representative of El Salvador had also stated that the Pakistan delegation would submit alternative proposals concerning Somaliland. That was not the case, since Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan had only said that unless a compromise solution were reached, his delegation would be compelled to oppose the draft resolution submitted by the Sub-Committee, since that proposal was not in accordance with the wishes of the people of Somaliland.

26. In connexion with the question of whether there should be one single draft resolution or three, he declared that if the majority of the First Committee was of the opinion that a solution likely to secure the two-thirds majority should be found for all three territories, then one single draft resolution should be submitted to the General Assembly. On the other hand, if the majority of the Committee took the opposite view, then the wiser course would be to submit to the General Assembly separate draft resolutions dealing with each of the territories. But the representative of Pakistan nevertheless reiterated the need for separate draft resolutions to be recommended to the plenary session, and he invited the Committee to ponder over the dangerous precedent which was liable to be created and to recur at every session if it adhered to the view that no partial solution should be adopted with regard to the problem of the disposal of the former Italian colonies.

27. MR. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that his delegation, in participating in the work of Sub-Committee 17, had been guided by two principal objectives. First, it had felt that every effort

should be made to reach a settlement at the present session of the General Assembly. Failure to reach a decision would entail a great injury to the prestige of the United Nations and would leave the indigenous populations in a state of suspense. Second, it had believed that any decision must take into account the legitimate interests of the inhabitants of the territories. The settlement must be based upon the principles of the right of self-determination and of the territorial integrity of the territories. It would be far better to take no decision at all than one which contravened the principles of the Charter.

28. With regard to Libya, the Iraqi delegation believed that independence and unity must form the basis of any settlement. There should be an immediate declaration of independence and thereafter the Administering Powers should transfer their authority to the Libyan people as quickly as possible. The Iraqi delegation favoured the plan put forward by Sub-Committee 17 but was ready to support any other proposal designed to bring about independence more speedily. As for Libyan unity, Mr. Al-Jamali whole-heartedly supported the Sub-Committee's formula and would oppose any amendment which might ultimately lead to the partition of Libya. He fully agreed with the views expressed by the Indian representative (313th meeting) in connexion with the United Kingdom's amendments to the Sub-Committee's draft resolution. Those amendments were very dangerous since they envisaged the possibility that Libya might not be unified. Mr. Al-Jamali pointed out that all the spokesmen for the various Libyan political groups had opposed partition and as a representative of a State member of the Arab League, he knew that those utterances represented the wishes of the Libyan people. He asserted that anyone who favoured partition represented neither the views nor the interests of the Libyans.

29. Certain representatives, including the representatives of the United Kingdom and New Zealand, held that the Sub-Committee's formula would impose a unitary form of Government without consulting the people. But they were in error. The unity of Libya did not necessarily entail a unitary form of government; territorial unity could be maintained under a federal system. It was incorrect of course for the General Assembly to attempt to decide the type of constitution which the Libyans should adopt, but that was not the sense of the Sub-Committee's plan. Mr. Al-Jamali therefore expressed the hope that the United Kingdom representative would reconsider the need for his amendments.

30. In the Sub-Committee, the representative of Iraq had been opposed to the establishment of a council for Libya with executive authority derived from the General Assembly. However, an Advisory Council, in the form finally adopted by the Sub-Committee, would exercise a valuable influence and would not hamper the work of the Commissioner and the administration.

31. Mr. Al-Jamali had one criticism of the Sub-Committee's plan for Libya with regard to the special treatment accorded the minorities by giving them a representative in the Advisory Council. He believed that there should be no discrimination of any sort and that the minorities should be treated as an integral part of the population. To single them out and give them separate treatment would not contribute to unity and harmony

among the population as a whole and would not be in the interests of the minorities themselves. The time was past when minority groups were utilized by foreign Powers to foment dissension in weaker countries. Nevertheless, it was not his intention to make an issue of minority representation and he stated his acceptance of the Sub-Committee's draft resolution, in so far as it referred to Libya.

32. With regard to Eritrea, he said that his delegation had worked hard in the Sub-Committee to find a just and acceptable solution but that that had proved impossible in view of considerable divergencies of opinion. The delegation of Iraq had urged at the outset that Eritrea should be given the right to self-determination after three years. Unfortunately that proposal had not been accepted nor had an alternative compromise proposal, which envisaged an immediate federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia. In view of the disagreement, which extended even to the interpretation of the information available, the Iraqi delegation felt that a commission of inquiry offered the best solution. It believed, however, that the commission should include a fair proportion of representatives from Asia and Africa. With that reservation the Iraqi delegation would support the Sub-Committee's proposal for Eritrea.

33. In so far as Somaliland was concerned, his attitude toward the Sub-Committee's plan was less favourable. In the first place, the formula proposed by the Sub-Committee offered no certainty that independence would be effected after 10 years; secondly, it had been decided that Italy should be entrusted with the trusteeship administration. While he did not doubt the sincerity and good-will of the new democratic Italy, two facts remained clear: (a) that a section of the population, at least, objected to any return of Italy and (b) that Ethiopia must be given some guarantees that its territory would never again be invaded from Somaliland. It was partially to allay the fears of the Somalis that the delegation of Iraq had first proposed a joint trusteeship and later a collective trusteeship by the United Nations. Both proposals, however, had been rejected. Nevertheless, the Iraqi delegation could not vote for a trusteeship of Somaliland by Italy alone. For the sake of unity and harmony, a formula must be found to allow the Italian administration to be assisted by other States. Likewise, Ethiopia's special position must be recognized and Ethiopia should be included in any new formula intended to supplement Italy's trusteeship over Somaliland. He also suggested that, if Italy was to be made trustee, a clause should be included in the Trusteeship Agreement preventing the establishment of military bases in Somaliland. Only the police forces necessary to maintain law and order should be permitted. In Mr. Al-Jamali's opinion there should be a further attempt at seeking a compromise solution which would ensure harmony among all those concerned in Somaliland.

34. MR. MARTIN (Canada) stressed the special responsibility which devolved upon the General Assembly in connexion with the present question as a result of the fact that its decision had already been accepted in advance by the four great Powers under the terms of the Italian Peace Treaty and would therefore constitute a final and binding decision and not a mere recommendation.

35. Mr. Martin then explained the basic principles which, he considered, should govern any decision. In the first place, he believed that the major consideration must be the interest of the inhabitants. Secondly, attention should be given to the necessity of reducing to the minimum the conflicts and dislocations which frequently characterized the transition of dependent peoples towards self-government. He recalled that the leader of his delegation, in his initial statement before the General Assembly,<sup>1</sup> had referred to the great change that was taking place in relationships between the peoples of the western world and the former dependent territories. That change presented complicated problems of adjustment and called for a statesmanlike approach by all. Mr. Martin said that the era of imperialism was rapidly passing and, while no one would regret the change, it must be recognized that special provision must be made during the transition period to lay the firm foundation for the independence of the former colonial peoples. The duration of the interim period would naturally vary with the capacity and willingness of the peoples concerned and their readiness to assume the full responsibility of self-government. Consequently, the chief concern of the Canadian Government in the present question was that any settlement must be in the interests of the inhabitants and hence contribute to the long-term requirements of peace and security. Instability in the Central Mediterranean would constitute a menace both to European and world security. Therefore, the Canadian delegation believed that the new political units must be large enough to constitute economically viable States. For that reason, the Canadian delegation was not inclined to support local separatist movements resulting from local prejudices or conflicting foreign interests. Its policy was to do everything possible to encourage the creation of viable political units which could be prepared for statehood in accordance with the spirit and letter of Articles 11 and 12 of the Charter. In the light of those broad principles, Mr. Martin examined the proposals of Sub-Committee 17.

36. In so far as Libya was concerned, the Canadian delegation supported the Sub-Committee's proposal. It was needless to repeat the many arguments which had been adduced in favour of Libyan independence. Mr. Martin believed that the short interim period recommended by the Sub-Committee was realistic and necessary. He also considered that the General Assembly should abstain from any action which might be interpreted as restricting the full freedom of choice by the people of Libya as to the form of their future Government and constitution. They alone should decide whether to establish a unitary or a federal State. Accordingly, the Canadian delegation welcomed the United Kingdom amendments (A/C.1/526/Rev.1) and would support the Sub-Committee's plan for Libya thus amended.

37. With regard to Italian Somaliland, the Canadian delegation believed that the information gathered by the Four-Power Commission of Investigation had made it clear that the territory was not yet ready for complete independence. The question arose, therefore, as to the best method of preparing the inhabitants for self-government. Due regard must be paid to the

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, 228th plenary meeting.*

historical background of the region and to the contribution of the Italian people to its development. It must also be recognized that, in most cases, a single trusteeship had proved more beneficial to the administered people than joint trusteeship. For that reason, the Canadian delegation supported the Sub-Committee's recommendations that Somaliland should be placed under temporary trusteeship administration by Italy. It likewise supported the proposal that a Trusteeship Agreement should be negotiated between Italy and the Trusteeship Council for approval by the General Assembly and that the Agreement should include an annex containing a declaration of constitutional principles guaranteeing the rights of the inhabitants. In that connexion, Mr. Martin commented favourably upon the proposals submitted by the Indian delegation.

38. As to Eritrea, the Canadian delegation regretted the necessity of postponing the final settlement but believed that in view of conflicting evidence it was the wisest course to take. The Canadian delegation would support the proposal for a commission of inquiry.

39. In conclusion, Mr. Martin stressed that the Sub-Committee's proposals were essentially a compromise solution, and it was in that spirit that the Canadian delegation supported them.

40. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) believed that the Sub-Committee's draft resolution constituted a decided improvement upon the recommendation which the First Committee had submitted to the General Assembly at the previous session. The Philippines delegation supported the Sub-Committee's plan for Libya. On the other hand, the amendments proposed by the United Kingdom delegation seemed to add nothing significant and did not appear to be relevant to the question of unity since it was generally agreed that Libya must remain a unified and single State, regardless of the form of constitution finally adopted. Mr. López did not think that the United Kingdom amendments envisaged the possibility of three separate independent States. Therefore, the freedom of action which they sought to guarantee was quite unnecessary. The freedom for the Libyan people to determine for themselves the form of government they wished to have was adequately guaranteed in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution of the Sub-Committee.

41. The Philippines delegation likewise supported in principle the settlement proposed for Somaliland. However, Mr. López did not approve the final phrase of section B, paragraph 2, which provided that, after the ten-year time-limit had elapsed, the General Assembly could decide that independence should not be granted. That phrase, he believed, constituted an escape clause which destroyed the value of the grant of independence. It had been said that the door should be left open for a continuation of trusteeship beyond the ten-year period if it was found that the territory was not yet ready for self-government. But if the General Assembly estimated that ten years were adequate it should stand by its decision and rely on the good faith of the Administering Authority and the collaboration of the Somali people. Mr. López cited the struggle of his own country to obtain independence as evidence of the danger inherent in any conditional clause which would make it possible for the General Assembly to undergo a change of heart. In effect, if the

Committee adopted the formula proposed by the Sub-Committee it would be giving Somaliland a post-dated check, while at the same time retaining the right to stop payment when the check became due. He urged that the clause to which he had referred be omitted from the resolution.

42. In Section B, paragraph 3, the Sub-Committee had recommended that Somaliland be placed under Italian trusteeship. The Philippine delegation was satisfied with the guarantees provided in paragraphs 5 and 6 and with the annexure proposed by the Indian delegation. Mr. López felt that with such guarantees trusteeship over Somaliland could very well be awarded to any State willing and able to undertake it. As regards the Indian proposal, however, he wondered whether the constitutional guarantees would not be given greater force and validity if they were included as an integral part of the resolution.

43. Nevertheless, he entertained certain doubts as to the desirability of granting trusteeship to Italy alone. He recalled that representatives of one of the political parties in Somaliland had threatened armed resistance to any return of Italian rule (270th meeting). The question therefore arose as to what the General Assembly and the present Administering Authority would do if armed opposition arose. Should not the General Assembly anticipate such a possibility and make some provisions? Perhaps the danger could be mitigated by considering either a joint trusteeship with Italy as one of the trustees or a single trusteeship by Italy, but assisted and advised by a council directly responsible to the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly. A similar question arose concerning Ethiopia's natural fear of Italy's return. The Philippine delegation, after a similar experience of conquest by Japan, could very well understand Ethiopia's fear and therefore believed that the maximum guarantees should be given to Ethiopia. No military fortifications should be permitted in Somaliland and Italian garrisons should be limited to the minimum required to maintain peace and order. Ethiopia should be a member of the Advisory Council and should also be admitted to the Trusteeship Council as soon as the Trusteeship Agreement had entered into force.

44. With regard to Eritrea, the Philippine delegation had been prepared to support the just claims of Ethiopia to the Eastern Provinces. However, since the Sub-Committee had recommended a further investigation, he was ready to approve the establishment of a commission of inquiry provided that Egypt and Ethiopia were represented thereon. He believed that their participation would be of great value to the other members of the commission and he expressed doubt as to whether any State could be regarded as truly neutral in the question.

45. In conclusion, Mr. López referred to the appeal by the Peruvian representative to the Committee not to fail to reach a final decision at the present session (314th meeting). While a decision was important to maintain the prestige of the General Assembly, it was no less important for the same reason, that the final settlement should be both just and practical and in the interests of all the peoples concerned.

46. Mr. ABOU-TALEB (Yemen) expressed wholehearted support for the independence and unity



of Libya. His delegation also favoured the political aspirations of Somaliland. However, if for any reason, it should prove impossible to realize those aspirations the delegation of Yemen would urge a joint trusteeship. Mr. Abou-Taleb added that his delegation could not accept the amendments proposed by the United Kingdom delegation and would vote against their adoption.

47. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) recalled that he had previously stressed his Government's support for the principle of self-determination for all former colonial peoples. Both the discussions and the recommendations of Sub-Committee 17 showed that the latter had not taken sufficient account of the aspirations of the indigenous peoples and, on certain issues, had utterly disregarded the right of self-determination proclaimed by the Charter. He cited as an example the Sub-Committee's plan with regard to Libya. All the Libyan representatives who had spoken before the Committee had urged independence and said that the Libyans were ready and willing to assume the administration of their country. Nowhere in their statements or in their written documents had they evinced any desire to postpone independence for any length of time. Nevertheless, it was obvious both from the recommended delay and the way in which the interim period was to be utilized that the Sub-Committee had only taken into account the desires of the present Administering Authorities. According to the proposal the United Kingdom would have a number of safeguards which would enable it to decide the form of governmental structure of the new State. For example, the United Kingdom, together with other colonial Powers, would be a member of the Council which would help the Libyan people to draft a constitution. Mr. Bebler could see no reason for such interference when the people were willing to assume all responsibilities and no one had doubted their capacity to take the necessary measures. In Mr. Bebler's view, the amendments submitted by the United Kingdom delegation offered even more alarming evidence that an attempt was being sought to partition Libya permanently and to submit it to continuing occupation.

48. As regards Somaliland, the situation was even clearer. The Somali Youth League, which, according to the Four-Power Commission of Investigation, represented the overwhelming part of the population, had unequivocally opposed Italian trusteeship and demanded independence. Nevertheless, the Sub-Committee had decided upon Italian trusteeship for ten years with a threat that it would be perpetuated thereafter. Such a denial of the wishes of the Somali people was amazing. Mr. Bebler stated that his delegation would oppose the Sub-Committee's recommendations regarding both Libya and Somaliland and would support the corresponding part of the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/487/Rev.1).

49. As regards Eritrea, it was to be regretted that a deadlock had made any solution impossible and would make it impossible to satisfy the just claims of Ethiopia. However, in view of the fact that the only possible alternative to adoption of the Sub-Committee's proposal was the permanent separation of all Eritrea from Ethiopia, the Yugoslav delegation would not oppose the Sub-Committee's recommendation for Eritrea.

50. Mr. COUVE DE MURVILLE (France) restated the position of his delegation. It regretted that the Sub-Committee had been unable to propose any final settlement concerning Eritrea. The French delegation fully understood the bitter feelings which the Ethiopian Government was bound to entertain and it likewise appreciated the anxieties and fears expressed by the Ethiopian delegation regarding the security of its country. However, those fears could be largely overcome if satisfactory precautions were taken in connexion with Somaliland. A number of suggestions had been made by various delegation and he hoped that the Trusteeship Council would take them into account.

51. As regards Somaliland, the French delegation welcomed the proposal for a single State Trusteeship. It still believed that collective or multilateral trusteeships offered many practical difficulties. The proposal of the Sub-Committee offered the best possible solution..

52. Turning to Libya, Mr. Couve de Murville restated his delegation's acceptance of the principle of independence. As he had explained previously, the only debatable question concerned the date when that independence would become effective. Various opinions had been expressed as to the duration of the interim period. At the previous session of the General Assembly it had been proposed that Libyan independence should become effective at the end of ten years. At the present time the proposal was for independence after a two-year period. In his view the best procedure would be not to set a precise date for Libya's independence. On the other hand, he was prepared to reverse that opinion if objections were raised by many delegations. Nevertheless, he found it difficult to agree that the transitional period should be as short as two years. Hence, the French delegation would reserve its position on that point.

53. There remained the question of Libyan unity. In that connexion the French delegation maintained the same position it had defended at the previous session of the Assembly. He cited section A, paragraph 11, as evidence that there was no intention on the part of any delegation to envisage a partition of Libya into three separate States. He believed that the differences of opinion in the Committee concerned modalities rather than principle, a fact which was illustrated by the United Kingdom amendment. The French delegation considered it essential to safeguard the right of the inhabitants of the three parts of Libya to ultimately determine their own form of government. The best thing for the General Assembly to do would be to refrain from intervening in the matter. It should leave to the people, or to the authorities which they might designate, the right of determining the way in which the State of Libya should be constituted. That was why he did not agree with the serious objections which had been advanced against the United Kingdom amendments. He found nothing objectionable in those amendments, nor did he believe that they were actuated by any ulterior motive. He reserved the right to speak at greater length on the language of the United Kingdom proposals during the drafting stage when he hoped to be able to dispel the anxieties of a number of delegations regarding the intentions of the United Kingdom delegation.

54. Finally, there remained the question raised by the Pakistan delegation as to whether the final General Assembly decision should take the form of a single inclusive resolution or three separate decisions, one relating to each territory. The French delegation had already stated that it favoured the submission of a single unified text. The future of the former Italian colonies formed a single question which had been transmitted to

the General Assembly by the signatories of the Italian Peace Treaty. Hence, it was the Assembly's duty to adopt a decision on the whole of the problem. Also, from the practical point of view a single resolution offered less difficulties. If the problem was divided, it was quite likely that effective solutions would be postponed indefinitely.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 8 November 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies (*continued*)

REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE 17 (A/C.1/522)  
(*continued*)

1. Mr. VOYNA (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that the considerations upon which the United States, the United Kingdom and France had based their views on the question were contrary to the wishes of the peoples of the former Italian colonies and to the requirements of peace and security. That was the reason why no solution had been reached in four years.
2. The documents concerning the debates that had taken place during those four years at the Paris Conference and in the Council of Foreign Ministers and the information concerning the lobbying going on and published in the Press revealed the colonial interests that the three Powers were trying to satisfy with such selfishness and hypocrisy.
3. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR had always been guided solely by the interests of the vast majority of the populations of the former Italian colonies and by the requirements of peace and security. It had severely criticized the attitude of delegations which, in considering the problem, had not wished to take those factors into account in spite of the political, economic and social development of recent years and had adhered to their colonial doctrines.
4. As a signatory of the Peace Treaty with Italy, the Ukrainian SSR had stated in the Council of Foreign Ministers that the establishment of trusteeship based on Article 76 of the Charter would be an appropriate solution of the problem of the disposal of the former Italian colonies, which could thus progress towards independence. The Ukrainian SSR had hoped for some time that the former Italian colonies might, under the above conditions, be administered by a democratic Italy, freed from fascism, if that country did not relapse into its pre-war errors. However, the Government in power in Italy had delivered that country, tied hand and foot, into the hands of capitalism and the Ukrainian SSR had realized the impossibility of allowing Italy to administer any of its former colonies. The Italian Government was at the moment trying to protect war criminals from justice and was denying the principles that had guided the United Nations during the Second World War. It was not surprising, therefore, that Ethiopia and certain other States were feeling great anxiety and serious doubts with regard to Italy. Peoples that had not known the horrors of Italian and German domination should make the necessary effort to understand the mentality of those victims of fascism. The Ukrainian SSR had nothing but hatred for all those who, on the basis of the fascist doctrine, were enjoying the support of the United States warmongers.
5. During the third session of the General Assembly, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR had supported the USSR proposal (A/C.1/433/Rev.1) for a direct United Nations trusteeship over the former Italian colonies, with the participation of Italy and the neighbouring States; Libya and Eritrea were to become independent after five years, and Somaliland after ten years. Finally, Ethiopia was to have had an outlet to the sea. Unfortunately, the United Kingdom, the United States, France and other delegations had not supported the proposal of the Soviet Union. A proposal had been made (A/C.1/446) that Libya should only be granted independence after ten years, if the General Assembly so decided. The real purpose had been to divide the former Italian colonies between the four colonial Powers, but the failure of the imperialistic plan to partition the former Italian colonies at the third session had led to the continuation of the occupation of those territories. That system was perhaps worse than the pre-war régime.
6. At the current session, it was to be feared that once again the question might not be solved in a satisfactory manner and that world public opinion and the populations of the former Italian colonies would have every reason to be indignant at that manifestation of United Nations impotence. The responsibility for that state of affairs lay with States which, while paying lip service to the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination, were really trying to perpetuate colonialism under the auspices of the United Nations. For those colonial Powers, the right of peoples to self-determination was synonymous with occupation troops, military bases and puppet Governments. It was doubtful that that had been the wish of the peoples who had struggled against fascism. The fact remained that freedom-loving peoples did not attach that meaning to the right of self-determination.
7. Certain speakers had argued that the draft submitted by Sub-Committee 17 was an improvement on the draft resolution (A/873) that had not been adopted during the second part of the third session. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR, however, wished to state after due con-

sideration that independence was extremely problematical when the verbal promise given was subject to innumerable reservations. Thus, the purpose of the draft resolution was not independence but the redistribution of the former Italian colonies among certain States which wished to use them as bases or for maintaining colonial régimes. Indeed, if the United States, the United Kingdom and France were really in favour of the independence of the former Italian colonies, they should be the first to give their consent to the withdrawal of occupation troops and to the abolition of military bases, in order to enable the people of Libya to decide their own fate.

8. With regard to Eritrea and Somaliland, a United Nations trusteeship should be established for a period of five years, an administrator should be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and advisory councils should be established, with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR objected to the recommendations of the Sub-Committee and considered that it was wrong to allege that any progress had been achieved in solving the problem.

9. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR regretted that, according to the report of the Sub-Committee, the majority of that body had not taken the proposals of the Soviet Union into account. He doubted if it was possible to place any confidence in the assurances of the United States, the United Kingdom and France that they wished to co-operate with the Soviet Union in solving important international problems. In the case under discussion, as in the case of the Indonesian and Palestinian questions, all possible methods were being used to prevent the Soviet Union and the people's democracies from participating in the settlement of those problems. The decisive contribution of those peoples in the struggle for democracy and against fascism was thus forgotten. Peace and security and even the functioning of the United Nations were jeopardized and, finally, the progress achieved by the Soviet Union, which had guided populations that had been held in subjection by the Tsarist régime to an advanced stage of civilization, was also being ignored.

10. Certain Governments were trying to sabotage that movement towards the liberation of peoples but events proved daily that they would not succeed. If the populations of the former Italian colonies could not achieve their independence with the help of the United Nations, they would know how to decide their fate freely for themselves. It was true that the failure of the United Nations would give rise to difficulties in Africa.

11. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR wholeheartedly supported the draft resolution of the Soviet Union (A/C.1/487/Rev.1). It reserved the right to give its views on the various amendments that had been submitted, especially on that of the Polish delegation (A/C.1/529).

12. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) endorsed the United States representative's plea that at least some of the problems concerning the disposal of the former Italian colonies should be settled during the current session.

13. The people of Lebanon were linked by ties of history and culture to those whose fate was being settled. Moreover, so far as Libya in particular was concerned, if the peace of the Middle East were threatened the interests of Lebanon would be affected.

14. The welfare of the populations must be the paramount consideration. No solution would be satisfactory, however, unless it were conducive to peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean. That latter factor was not in any way incompatible with the desire of the people of Libya that their country should become an independent State and take its place in the family of nations.

15. No delegation could lightly assume the responsibility of preventing the Assembly from reaching a decision during the current session. It might indeed lead to serious disorders if the people who had seen freedom within their grasp were now to see it escape them. Such disorders would be all the more serious because the Middle East, more than any other region of the world, was the centre of many cross-currents of feeling which could be defined in the following way.

16. In the first place, there were two opposing worlds filled with mutual distrust. One feared that any military bases in Africa would serve as bases for aggression, while the other's aim was to exclude the doctrines of Marxism from the African continent.

17. In the second place, the divergent opinions which had been expressed with regard to the problem of Libya were to some extent a reflection of the fact that perfect harmony did not reign in Western Europe.

18. In the third place, the progress of the native populations throughout the world could not be halted. Everywhere the peoples wished to assert themselves at their true worth.

19. In the fourth place, the independent nations of Asia were playing an ever more important part in the councils of the nations. They knew how to show great perseverance, and they were conscious of their important role.

20. Another factor connected with the last two was the at least temporarily receding political influence of Western Europe—a process that had been going on for the past fifty years.

21. In the sixth place, the great family of Latin nations was making its solidarity felt in the interests of peace and for the promotion of what was highest in man.

22. Lastly, a struggle was going on for the soul of Africa.

23. It was indeed a heavy burden for the Middle East to be at the centre of all those powerful forces.

24. On the specific question of Eritrea, the Lebanese delegation would support the solution recommended by Sub-Committee 17. Although it was unfortunate that no solution could be reached, it was better to postpone the decision on one of the problems under discussion than to adopt some solution which would not be really satisfactory.

25. With regard to Libya, the Lebanese delegation supported the draft submitted by Sub-Committee 17 which was the minimum the delegation could accept.

26. It would have been better if the United Kingdom delegation had submitted its amendments to the Sub-Committee. The United Kingdom had until then accepted the idea of the independence of Libya but now that it wished to submit some new wording (A/C.1/526/Rev.1), the discussion might have to be reopened in less favourable circumstances than had prevailed in the Sub-Committee. It was therefore to be hoped that the United Kingdom delegation would not press for the adoption of its amendments. Either the aim was to improve the drafting and, in that case, the amendments would not achieve their aim, or else the United Kingdom delegation was concerned with the substance of the problem. In the latter case, the idea of unity would certainly not be strengthened by the adoption of the amendments, and the Lebanese delegation could not accept any alteration which would weaken the concept of unity. If the United Kingdom delegation was contemplating the partition of Libya, Lebanon would reaffirm its conviction that when Libya achieved its independence it should be as a united country. If later on the inhabitants decided that they wanted a federal Government, or any other form of constitution, they would of course be perfectly entitled to follow their wishes. It was, however, much easier to divide up a unified territory than to unify a divided one.

27. The Lebanese delegation could not but reject the United Kingdom amendments if they were anything other than drafting changes and if they were really aimed at the partition of the country.

28. With regard to Somaliland, the Lebanese delegation could not accept the proposals contained in the Sub-Committee's report, which were, moreover, unlikely to obtain a two-thirds majority. Since, therefore, that part of the report might be rejected, and since the First Committee wished its decisions concerning the three former colonies to appear in one and the same document and to stand or fall together, the Lebanese delegation considered that a compromise should be sought. The best text was that which appeared in paragraph 41 of the Sub-Committee's report proposing that the territory should be placed under trusteeship and administered by three States. If that text was again submitted to the First Committee or to the General Assembly, the Lebanese delegation would support it.

29. Because of its conviction that a decision should be reached during the current session, the Lebanese delegation had decided to submit an amendment (A/C.1/530) which could, of course, be amended if necessary. His proposal was based on the following principles. In the first place, Italy was entitled to receive some satisfaction from the settlement. The Lebanese delegation did not agree with those who considered Italy a threat to the security and freedom of certain nations. Italy was a great nation and many countries owed more to it than to any other nation. Italy should therefore be the Administering Authority. Nevertheless, the fears and the reservations expressed by the representative of Ethiopia were genuine. Ethiopia had suffered under fascist aggression and it was entitled to receive certain guarantees, although the new Italy could not be regarded as a danger to Ethiopia.

30. The Lebanese delegation proposed, therefore, that an advisory council should be set up,

composed of five members. If the members of that council were chosen wisely it would represent a firm guarantee for Ethiopia, which was, moreover, championed by the countries of Asia. Fear of Italy need not, therefore, stand in the way of a solution of the problem of Somaliland.

31. The Lebanese delegation had listened with great attention to the statements of the representatives of Somaliland. Nevertheless, it was essential, in the interests of the United Nations, that a solution should be found during the current session. Moreover, if some such formula as that suggested by the Sub-Committee was the only one likely to be accepted with regard to Somaliland, the statute of that territory, the activity of the Trusteeship Council and the Advisory Council—if the establishment of that organ were accepted—the influence of the Asian countries and, finally, the different character of present-day Italy could be considered as sufficient guarantees both for the populations concerned and for Ethiopia.

32. Mr. EBAN (Israel) recalled that before the Sub-Committee had been set up, his delegation had advocated (283rd meeting) the early independence of Libya and the establishment in Eritrea and Somaliland of some system of government which would enable them to achieve complete freedom as rapidly as possible.

33. Before the war the three territories had been administered by Italy, but that was their only common feature. It was not, therefore, in any way essential to consider the problem as a whole. Separate and independent solutions were possible, as was shown by the proposals of Sub-Committee 17 and the various texts that had been submitted to the First Committee.

34. If procedural complications were once again to prevent the United Nations from achieving positive results, its reputation would be seriously impaired. At the existing stage of its development, its most useful achievement might be to assist the progressive emancipation of Non-Self-Governing Territories; in that way, the structure of world society would be given a final form by the emergence of new political units.

35. In the case under discussion, Sub-Committee 17 had, on the whole, recognized in a satisfactory manner the principle that Libya should be granted early independence. The draft resolution provided for a single independent State which would receive its independence after a transition period of two years. That period could not be regarded as excessive, if it were remembered that the most liberal proposals made during the previous session—proposals which the delegation of Israel had supported—had envisaged a collective United Nations trusteeship for five or ten years.

36. Undoubtedly—and the Israel delegation would be the last to deny it—some countries had gained their independence without any transition period. Such a procedure, however, was possible only when independent and representative organs had existed previously, which was not so in the case under discussion. The transition period might, indeed, prove to be of great value if advantage were taken of it to promote harmony and not to aggravate or foment certain antagonisms. Foreign domination must be genuinely abolished and external influences must not be consolidated by indirect means. Thus the Israel delegation considered that the presence of a body

of the General Assembly would be an essential element during that transition period: the four Powers had, after all, decided that the General Assembly, and not merely the present Administering Powers, should decide the future of Libya; that decision covered the procedure to be followed as well as the substance of the problem.

37. With regard to the composition of the proposed Advisory Council, the Israel delegation would be guided by the principle of geographical distribution. The smaller countries and those which were not directly concerned could play a particularly useful part. The delegation of Israel would therefore take a special interest in the attitude of the First Committee towards the Polish amendment (A/C.1/529).

38. The provision that the minorities should be represented on the Advisory Council should be retained. That proposal, submitted by the Guatemalan delegation, would contribute to the solution of a complex problem. In certain cases, the prospect of independence, which was welcomed by the population as a whole, aroused serious apprehension among minority groups which lacked any kind of protection. The participation of those groups in the foundation of the Libyan State would ensure its internal harmony. The delegation of Israel considered that the events of grave concern which had occurred in the Middle East showed the necessity of a timely approach to such minority questions.

39. With regard to the United Kingdom amendment concerning the unity of Libya (A/C.1/526/Rev.1), the Israel delegation had always believed that it was for the Libyan people themselves to decide the nature and degree of the unity of their country. It had therefore envisaged the three provinces giving voluntary and simultaneous consent to the establishment of an independent and unified Libya. As the representative of India had pointed out (313th meeting), the draft resolution submitted by the Sub-Committee provided for that process of union by mutual consent. The constitution of the country, upon which the inhabitants themselves would decide, would reflect the degree of unity or separation which the population desired. It was true that the draft resolution expressed a strong trend towards unity, but there was certainly no intention of imposing unity on the population, all the representatives of which had spoken movingly about the national personality of Libya. The sole intention was to ratify the desires of the population and in no way to run counter to them; unity should not be imposed, but neither should it be opposed. Just the imposition of unitary government on two entirely distinct elements would be out of the question, so it would be impossible forcibly to divide a territory the population of which made up a clearly recognizable nationality. On that understanding, the draft resolution submitted by the Sub-Committee should be adopted as it stood.

40. With regard to Eritrea, it was to be regretted that no solution had been able to command the support of the entire Sub-Committee. A similar situation would undoubtedly arise in the General Assembly. It was therefore clear that a new investigation should be embarked upon, so that the General Assembly might be in a better position at its following session to decide on a problem of vital interest to the Eritrean people and to Ethiopia.

41. The Israel delegation wished to make certain reservations at that stage about the possible use of the Interim Committee. It had clearly expressed its views about that body in another Committee.<sup>1</sup>

42. The representative of India had made a contribution of the utmost value to the examination of the problem of Somaliland by Sub-Committee 17. The constitutional safeguards which had been suggested would allay certain apprehensions expressed on behalf of the population of Somaliland, and it was to be hoped that they would be embodied in any future trusteeship agreement.

43. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTÉ (Ecuador) recalled that the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies had claimed the attention of the world after the Second World War just as the question of the disposal of the former German colonies had done after the First World War. Since the four great Powers had not been able to come to an agreement when the Treaty of Peace with Italy was drafted, the question had been entrusted to the United Nations, which was attempting for the second time to find a solution. It was essential to find an equitable solution without delay, not only because it was a question of the fate of 3 million inhabitants and of the interests of the countries which were administering those territories and of neighbouring countries, but also because the prestige of the United Nations was involved.

44. It should be noted that the way had already been cleared by Sub-Committee 17, which had presented a compromise formula. It was also interesting to note that the members of the Sub-Committee had decided unanimously in favour of the principle of independence. The only difference between the USSR proposal (A/C.1/487/Rev.1) and the draft resolution submitted by the Sub-Committee was a mere question of form. The USSR delegation wished independence to be granted immediately, whereas the majority of the members of the Sub-Committee, feeling that that point of view was not practical, were proposing a transitional régime between the colonial system and the formation of independent States. At any rate it would be possible to find a solution which would guarantee the ultimate independence of those territories.

45. The Four-Power Commission of Investigation had made a study in the territories of the former Italian colonies of the degree of maturity of the population, taking into account economic, social and cultural factors. The result of that inquiry had been negative. As regards Libya in particular, the report of that Commission noted that none of the three provinces of that territory was ripe for self-government. There was every reason to consider, however, that during the three years since the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Italy the rhythm of evolution in Libya towards independence and liberty had been accelerated. It was for the United Nations to encourage that sense of independence. For that reason the General Assembly, while avoiding too abrupt a solution, could disregard the Four-Power Commission of Investigation's conclusion and proclaim the independence of Libya. The Sub-Committee's

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 17th meeting.*

proposal contemplated a maximum delay of two years. The Polish amendment (A/C.1/529), which reduced that delay to one year, should be considered. At any rate a compromise could be reached on the time factor.

46. The draft resolution of Sub-Committee 17 rightly did not mention the form in which the government of Libya should be set up. It was important that the inhabitants themselves should choose the form of government best suited to them. It might be advisable, however, to mention that the government of Libya should be founded on democratic principles, especially as Libya would be encouraged to become a Member of the United Nations.

47. The Ecuadorean delegation did not think that immediate independence could be granted to Somaliland. It therefore supported the principle of a trusteeship for that country. A compromise might be reached, however, with regard to Italian administration of that trusteeship. In that connexion the Committee should retain the Lebanese representative's proposal (A/C.1/530) to create an advisory council of several members which would assist Italy in its task, supervise the administration and implementation of the Trusteeship Agreement, and guarantee that the trusteeship was administered for the benefit of Somaliland independence. There was no reason to fear that the question of the independence of Somaliland would be in the balance again at the end of ten years, after a trusteeship had enabled the population to attain political maturity, because in the case of Libya, for example, the members had unanimously decided in favour of independence at that time, whereas two years earlier the Four-Power Commission of Investigation had proposed the contrary.

48. Mr. Viteri Lafronte thought that the solution proposed for Eritrea was a step towards a definitive solution. According to the report of the Investigation Commission, it would be advisable, in due course, either to grant independence to Eritrea or to unite it with Ethiopia, depending on the wishes of the population.

49. The representative of Ecuador reserved the right to speak later on the text of the proposals and amendments, and urged the Committee to make every effort to find a solution during the current session of the General Assembly.

50. Mr. DE FREITAS-VALLE (Brazil) supported the Sub-Committee's recommendation, but reserved the right to approve any satisfactory solution which might receive the support of a considerable majority. As the delegation of Pakistan had said earlier, he thought that the solution was still to be found. The Sub-Committee's recommendations on each of the three territories suggested the creation of an independent Libya, the sending of a commission of investigation to Eritrea to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants, and the establishment of a trusteeship over Somaliland. Those recommendations were not the final decisions which the United Nations would have to take. On the other hand, except with regard to Eritrea, the Committee had been in a position to ascertain the hopes and the wishes of the local populations. In the circumstances it was advisable to entrust the trusteeship of Somaliland to Italy, which would be able to create the necessary conditions for the grant of independence

to the country. The Brazilian delegation hoped that before the end of the contemplated period, Italy, as a Member of the United Nations, would be able to inform the Organization that Somaliland was ripe for independence.

51. The principle of independence was not involved in the case of Libya. With regard to the unity of the country, however, the Brazilian delegation was prepared to co-operate to achieve any compromise solution in harmony with the interests of the populations.

52. Mr. AZOUNI (Yemen) recalled the failure of the General Assembly in the matter at the preceding session; he thought that a solution could be reached during the current session if it were not the subject of bargaining but were dealt with according to the principles of the United Nations.

53. The proposal to create an independent and unified Libya was a good one because Libya was both worthy and capable of independence. A recommendation on the unity of a country was not arbitrary, but, on the contrary, normal. There might be elements opposed to the formation of a unified State, but it must be pointed out that such dissident elements existed in all countries and the United Nations did not have to encourage them. He was therefore opposed to the United Kingdom amendment and hoped that the United Kingdom delegation would reconsider its point of view. He saw no reason to include a representative of the minorities in the Advisory Council. Indeed, he was afraid that possibilities of friction would be created by the introduction of that motion. When Libya became independent, minority groups would have the right to Libyan citizenship just the same as the other inhabitants. Their beliefs would be of little importance provided they were loyal to their country.

54. With reference to Somaliland, he wished to point out, though without questioning Italy's qualities, that the local population had expressed itself in the strongest terms as opposed to the return of Italy to that territory. That being so, the proper course was surely to try to obtain more information and to send a commission of investigation to Somaliland, as was planned in the case of Eritrea. If the populations were not mature enough for independence, the United Nations should promote such maturity, without imposing a state of affairs which might endanger peace and security. His delegation was opposed to that part of the resolution which dealt with Somaliland but would be in favour of collective trusteeship by the United Nations for a period not exceeding ten years.

55. There was no reason why there should be only one draft resolution, thus tying the future of the inhabitants of Libya with that of the Somalis and Eritreans. The only object in linking the three together in that way was to provide an opportunity for possible bargaining. However, three distinct peoples in different stages of development were involved, and all they had in common was that they had all been Italian colonies. Recalling the discussions in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on the admission of new Members, he pointed out that those representatives which had criticized the attitude of the Soviet Union delegation wishing all applications for membership to be decided upon together, were adopting precisely the same attitude in the case in point.



He hoped, therefore, that the draft resolution would be divided into three different parts, so as better to take into account the wishes of the populations.

56. U So NYUN (Burma) recalled that his delegation had at all times studied the problem from the point of view of the populations, while giving equal consideration to the maintenance of international peace and security. He was happy to see that the Sub-Committee had produced a compromise solution. He felt that the responsibility and prestige of the United Nations were at stake. Whereas in the past some decisions had not been respected, in the case in point, the great Powers had undertaken in advance to accept whatever solution was agreed upon. The Committee must therefore proceed slowly but surely. Some progress had been achieved since the previous session, all delegations having expressed themselves in favour of Libyan independence and unity, even though there were differences of opinion as to the methods whereby those objectives were to be achieved. His delegation would oppose any move directed against the principles of unity and independence and would study the amendments submitted by the United Kingdom delegation from that point of view. It was regrettable that a solution with regard to Eritrea should have been postponed, since the claims of Ethiopia were deserving of sympathetic consideration as was its anxiety over its own security.

57. Referring to Somaliland, he said Italy's attitude had certainly changed and, as a result, it would be quite proper to grant Italy trusteeship over Somaliland, provided that the trusteeship was calculated eventually and unequivocally to lead to independence. His delegation was opposed to granting the Assembly power to review the principle of independence at the end of ten years. It also thought that additional safeguards should be contemplated, either through the establishment of an advisory council or a system of collective trusteeship, or lastly by setting up a commission of investigation as in the case of Eritrea.

58. His delegation would study the problem of the three territories, each according to its merits, and in choosing a solution would be guided by the wishes of the populations, the interests of peace and security, the views of interested Governments and the provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Italy.

59. Mr. COSTA DU RELS (Bolivia) recalled that during the second part of the third session a solution had been found which took into account the desire of the populations to achieve independence, and the need of bringing about such independence gradually. Unfortunately, that solution had fallen short of the required two-thirds majority in the Assembly by one vote.

60. The sources which enabled the Assembly to form an idea of the peoples' wishes were the statements made by the representatives of those peoples and, in particular, the report of the Four-Power Commission of Investigation. He read aloud the conclusions of that report, which indicated that none of the three territories was ripe for independence. Neither Tripolitania, Cyrenaica nor Somaliland was in a position to form an autonomous government. The problem was still more complicated in the case of Eritrea, on account of its number of tribes and regions. More-

over, there was the question of granting Ethiopia an outlet to the sea. Nobody denied that Italian trusteeship over Somaliland would enable that country to become independent; still, Somaliland was the poorest of the three former Italian colonies and would be scant compensation to Italy for the loss of the other territories.

61. He wondered by what miracle the Sub-Committee had nevertheless proposed to grant Libya independence not later than 1 January 1952. The Polish amendment (A/C.1/529) reduced the time still further and the USSR proposal (A/C.1/487/Rev.1) went so far as to envisage immediate independence. The compromise arrived at by the Sub-Committee was extremely precarious and he was afraid that such independence, if granted, would lead the country into regrettable economic and political adventures. He believed that the wisest solution would be to grant the States independence after preparation within the framework of the Trusteeship System provided for in the Charter. He recalled that after fighting for their independence, the States of Latin America had passed through a stormy and painful youth; the countries progressing towards independence today ought to be happy to be able to profit from the United Nations Trusteeship System and thus avoid an excessively abrupt transition to self-government.

62. His delegation would agree to the proposal submitted by the Sub-Committee, but without enthusiasm. It considered that the proposal was based on bargaining and not on principles. It felt bound to say that it was not deceived by the demagogy surrounding that proposal; it would give careful study to the United Kingdom amendment, so as to facilitate the work of those who would be responsible for paving the way for independence.

63. Ato AKILOU (Ethiopia) wished to make it clear that the Ethiopian claims were imbued with a sentiment of justice and were based on the principle of the self-determination of peoples. There was nothing strange in envisaging the possibility of a union between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The delegations of Italy and the USSR, in particular, should not find it surprising, since Italy had been formed from a union of independent States and the USSR itself was a union of independent States.

64. A State must be its own judge of the security or threat which any proposal might constitute for it. Recalling the cases of France and Czechoslovakia in relation to Germany, he said that the return of Italy to Somaliland and the creation of an independent Eritrea constituted a threat to Ethiopia. It went without saying that his delegation supported the Liberian amendment (A/C.1/527) to establish a commission of investigation in Somaliland with the same functions as the commission of investigation in Eritrea.

65. Although he appreciated the spirit of the Italian representative's recent statement (313th meeting) on the subject of Italy's intentions towards Ethiopia, he wished nevertheless to mention an example of a kind likely to cause anxiety in Ethiopia. On the staff of the Italian Colonial Bureau attached to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs there were two fascist officials who had participated directly in the occupation of Ethiopia; one was the former Governor of Addis

Ababa, and the other the former Director of Native Affairs at Addis Ababa.

66. The past could not simply be wiped out, for the problem under consideration was itself a result of the war. On the contrary, Ethiopia must be helped to forget the past. In that connexion, his delegation had stated that fruitful co-operation might be contemplated if Italy renounced its policy of encirclement. Unfortunately, that statement had found no echo in the Italian representative's statement. His delegation had also proposed that Ethiopia should temporarily be made responsible for the administration of the eastern provinces of Eritrea, while at the same time a commission of investigation should be sent there; but that pro-

posal had not met with success either. Co-operation with Italy should be attempted but in the circumstances Italy had to take the first step.

67. The CHAIRMAN declared the general discussion closed. He recalled that seven proposals had been submitted, as well as five amendments to the Sub-Committee's proposal. Any delegations wishing to withdraw their draft resolutions in favour of the Sub-Committee's resolution, should do so not later than the morning of the following day. He also suggested that the discussion should bear only on the draft resolutions and the amendments submitted.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 9 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada);*

*later: Mr. Selim SARPER (Turkey).*

#### Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies (*continued*)

##### STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ITALY

1. Mr. TARCHIANI (Italy) wished to reply to the questions asked by the representative of Ethiopia at the previous meeting. Mr. Tarchiani said that when Italy had been asked to renounce its claim to Eritrea, his Government had done so unreservedly in proposing that Eritrea should become independent as a first step toward the establishment of friendly and co-operative relations between the Ethiopian and Italian peoples. The Italian Government had accepted the proposal to establish a United Nations commission of inquiry to ascertain the wishes of the population and to report to the Interim Committee with recommendations for the General Assembly. Italy would accept the final decision of the General Assembly and Ethiopia ought to be ready to do likewise. Whatever the decision, he assured the Committee that there would be no conflict between his Government and the Ethiopian people and that the settlement would be loyally accepted by the Italian minority in that territory. Mr. Tarchiani looked forward to a solution which would result in close friendly co-operation between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

2. The representative of Italy assured the Ethiopian representative that the officials of the Colonial Bureau in Rome were employed only in routine matters devolving from Italy's past connexions with the African territories. Their task was to supervise the payment of pensions, provide aid for refugees and settle outstanding economic problems. They would never become the instruments of future aggressive expansion in Africa.

3. Mr. Tarchiani gave an assurance that the small military force which Italy would send to Somaliland would be the minimum necessary for police purposes and would be utilized with the utmost moderation. Certainly the Italian Government did not even dream of establishing military bases. The formal control of the United Nations, together with Italy's earnest desire to maintain the best possible relations with the local popula-

tion, ruled out any thought of adventure. In Mr. Tarchiani's opinion the United Nations itself was Ethiopia's best guarantee of security. Time would show the sincerity of Italy's intentions. The Italian Government looked forward to a period of reciprocal respect and co-operation with Ethiopia which would operate to the common advantage. The paths of development and prosperity were open to Ethiopia and Mr. Tarchiani hoped that Ethiopia would be ready to co-operate with Italy and, together, forget a past of errors that must be buried for ever.

##### REQUEST FOR A NEW HEARING FROM THE SOMALI YOUTH LEAGUE

4. The CHAIRMAN read a letter from representatives of the Somali Youth League requesting an opportunity to express its views on the recommendations of Sub-Committee 17. Observing that the general discussion was closed and that if the Somali Youth League was given an opportunity to speak it would be unjust to refuse a similar privilege to other representatives of the indigenous populations, the Chairman asked for a decision from the Committee.

5. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) thought that it would be inappropriate to grant the request at the present stage of the Committee's work. He proposed that all the groups representing the indigenous populations which so desired should be authorized to submit their views briefly in writing.

6. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) disagreed with the preceding speaker on the ground that the Committee should give full freedom of expression to the peoples whose fate was being decided. He proposed that the representative of the Somali Youth League should be heard.

7. The CHAIRMAN put the Argentine proposal to the vote, it being understood that if it was adopted no vote would be taken on the Liberian proposal.

*The Argentine proposal was adopted by 25 votes to 19, with 2 abstentions.*

##### CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

8. The CHAIRMAN noted that there were six draft resolutions which had been submitted before

Sub-Committee 17 had submitted its report. The Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/491) had been withdrawn, and the representative of Pakistan had indicated (291st meeting) that he reserved his right to introduce his draft resolution (A/C.1/499) at a later date. He asked whether the authors of the other draft resolutions wished that they be voted upon.

9. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) requested that consideration of his delegation's draft resolution (A/C.1/489) be postponed for the time being.

10. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) was willing to postpone consideration of his draft resolution (A/C.1/497) until the draft resolution submitted by Sub-Committee 17 had been considered. However, while he thought the Sub-Committee's proposal should be given priority, he would not object if any other delegation wished to have its own draft resolution voted upon first.

11. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) asked that his delegation's draft resolution (A/C.1/490) be considered before that of the Sub-Committee was put to the vote.

12. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) likewise insisted upon priority for his delegation's draft resolution (A/C.1/487/Rev.1), which he said had priority over the others.

13. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) requested a vote paragraph by paragraph on the Soviet Union draft resolution.

14. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) asked that a separate vote be taken on each of the two sentences of paragraph 1.

15. The CHAIRMAN put the first sentence of paragraph 1 of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/487/Rev.1) to the vote.

*The first sentence of paragraph 1 was rejected by 24 votes to 20, with 8 abstentions.*

*The second sentence of paragraph 1 was rejected by 31 votes to 11, with 11 abstentions.*

16. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) said that he had abstained in the second vote on the grounds that the second sentence of paragraph 1 had been invalidated by the rejection of the first sentence.

17. The CHAIRMAN then put paragraph 2 of the USSR draft resolution to the vote.

*Paragraph 2 was rejected by 33 votes to 6, with 15 abstentions.*

*Paragraph 3 was rejected by 34 votes to 12, with 9 abstentions.*

18. The CHAIRMAN stated that, since all paragraphs had been rejected, it was unnecessary to vote on the Soviet Union draft resolution as a whole. The Committee would proceed to consider the draft resolution submitted by the Liberian delegation (A/C.1/490).

19. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) asked for a separate vote on each of the two sentences of the second part of the proposal beginning with the word "Recommends".

20. In reply to a request from Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) Mr. COOPER (Liberia) said he was unwilling to change the ten-year period to one of five years.

21. The CHAIRMAN put the preamble of the Liberian draft resolution (A/C.1/490) together with the first sentence of the operative part to the vote.

*That part of the draft resolution was rejected by 27 votes to 21, with 5 abstentions.*

22. Following a request from Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon), Mr. COOPER (Liberia) stated that he would not insist on a vote on the remainder of his draft resolution.

23. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee would now proceed to vote upon the draft resolution submitted by Sub-Committee 17 together with the various amendments thereto.

24. In connexion with the proposal for three separate draft resolutions, one dealing with each of the former Italian colonies, he proposed that the Committee should decide that question after it had considered the separate paragraphs and before voting on the Sub-Committee's draft resolution as a whole.

25. He put the two paragraphs of the preamble of the draft resolution submitted by Sub-Committee 17 (A/C.1/522) to the vote.

*The preamble was adopted by 54 votes, with 1 abstention.*

26. The CHAIRMAN proposed that the Committee should next vote on the Indian amendment (A/C.1/531) to Section A, paragraph 1, since it was furthest removed in substance from the Sub-Committee's text.

27. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India) explained his amendment which read as follows:

"1. That Libya, comprising *the territories of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan shall be constituted* into a *united* independent sovereign State."

28. He recalled that he had previously pointed out (313th meeting) that the difference between the original text proposed by the Sub-Committee and the formula contained in the United Kingdom amendments was not as great as some delegations believed. Since then he had consulted most of the delegations concerned and had offered the present amendment as a compromise. Briefly, the proposal involved two main substitutions in the Sub-Committee's draft: the words "be established" were replaced by the words "shall be constituted" and the word "single" by "united". He explained that the substitutions were designed to make clear the real intention of the Sub-Committee, namely that the three territories of Libya should be brought together into a single political unit but that the form of unitary government should be left for the Libyan National Assembly to decide.

29. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) pointed out that the word "*constituée*" was used in the French text of the Sub-Committee's draft resolution and therefore, since both English and French texts were equally valid, the substitution could be made in the English text as a drafting change without the Committee having to take a formal vote.

30. As to the substitution of the word "united" for the word "single" the Indian representative's proposal might be acceptable so long as it did not give any additional weight to the notion of a federal form of Government. Mr. C. Malik asked

for an assurance from the Indian representative that his proposal was not designed to give any additional weight to a specific kind of constitution for Libya.

31. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India) stated that there was no intention to favour any particular kind of solution.

32. Mr. HOOD (Australia) supported the Indian amendment as reflecting more closely the intention of the majority of Sub-Committee 17 to provide the maximum flexibility as regards the form of the Libyan Constitution. The main provisions of the paragraph, namely that Libya should be independent and sovereign, remain unchanged.

33. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) withdrew his delegation's amendments (A/C.1/526/Corr.1) in favour of the formula proposed by the Indian representative. His main criticism of the Sub-Committee's text had been that it did not sufficiently provide for the preliminary steps which the Administering Authority had to take before Libya could achieve full unity and independence. Obviously, the majority of the Sub-Committee had fully appreciated that such steps must be taken and that the Administering Authority must continue to discharge its responsibilities until Libyan independence became effective. Nevertheless, that aspect of the problem had not been sufficiently clarified and the United Kingdom delegation had been careful lest it might be wrongly accused of not properly implementing the General Assembly's decision. The United Kingdom Authorities had already begun to plan the preparation of Libya for independence, one of the first steps being to endow Tripolitania with a measure of internal autonomy comparable to that existing in Cyrenaica. The United Kingdom Government would discharge its responsibility faithfully in conformity with the General Assembly's decision, and as soon as Libya became independent the role of the United Kingdom would come to an end.

34. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) pointed out that in Spanish the word "constituted" had a much more emphatic meaning than the word "established". The former would therefore put the desired emphasis on the unity of Libya. He did not think that there was much disagreement on the matter, since the national unity of Libya had been accepted. The Indian amendment would permit avoiding any possibility of misinterpretation.

35. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) thought that the existing text of the Sub-Committee's proposal was clearer and hoped that the Indian representative would agree to delete the words "the territories of" from the first line of his amendment. With that exception he would support the amendment.

36. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) agreed that the use of the word "constituted" would not involve substantive change, as the Lebanese representative had pointed out, though it would help to create the right psychological climate for the adoption of the substantive part of the Indian amendment. Libya did not comprise three separate territories which must be united subsequently. It had always been one territory and had been divided for administrative purposes after the occupation, resulting from the war, by the troops of the United Kingdom and France. The premise for the proposal

that Libya should be united would therefore be a recognition of the fact that Libya had been partitioned. The support given by the United Kingdom representative to the Indian amendment had served to expose the substance of that amendment. It was in fact designed to legalize the partition of Libya into three parts, and would unite Libya in such shape as to maintain the control of the colonial Powers over various sections of that territory. The Indian amendment represented a serious deterioration when compared with the original proposal of the Sub-Committee, and in that connexion he supported the remarks of the Lebanese representative. Mr. Arutiunian stated that he would vote against the Indian amendment and would press for the maintenance of the existing text.

37. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said that it was amazing that the United Kingdom amendments, which had not been supported by the members of the Committee, had disappeared and had been resubmitted in another form by the representative of India. He pointed out that the French and English texts of the Indian amendment did not correspond in that the English text omitted the word "*seul*". Moreover, he questioned whether "*unifié*" corresponded to "united".

38. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTE (Ecuador) believed that the Committee ought to avoid the use of any qualifying words and should state only the technical, political and constitutional facts. The matter could be covered perfectly clearly by the statement that "Libya, comprising Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan, shall be constituted into an independent sovereign State". That language made the matter perfectly clear, and use of the word "single" was superfluous. Moreover, avoiding the use of qualifying words would also obviate the problem raised by the USSR representative in that there would be no reference to the present situation or to the influence of the United Kingdom and France.

39. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that his delegation had continuously supported the concepts of the independence and sovereignty of Libya and of the unity of that territory. Fortunately those concepts had been supported by the Sub-Committee. However, it had never been intended to prejudice the form of government to be chosen by the people of Libya, and in that connexion he welcomed the assurance given by the Indian representative. He hoped that a similar guarantee could be given by the Administering Powers that nothing would be done to prejudice in any way the ultimate goal of unity for Libya. That assurance if given would clear his conscience. He requested the Rapporteur to include his explanation in the Committee's report to the General Assembly.

40. U So NYUN (Burma) recalled that his delegation had been prepared to support the United Kingdom amendments if it could be convinced that the latter would not detract from the unity of Libya. He therefore welcomed the United Kingdom representative's assurance that the Indian amendment conveyed the intention underlying the amendments submitted by the United Kingdom delegation. Stating that the word "established" implied that independence should be established forthwith, which would therefore be contrary not only to the intentions of the Committee but also to the terms of paragraph 2 of the draft resolution submitted by the Sub-Committee,

he considered that the word "constituted" should be used. Since the word "united" was a broader term than "single" and would not imply prejudice in favour of the unitary type of government, he preferred it. For those reasons he would support the Indian amendment.

41. Mr. COUVE DE MURVILLE (France) agreed with the Polish representative's view that the French text of the Indian amendment did not quite correspond to the English. However, it would be perfectly easy to make the necessary changes. Referring to the proposal of the representative of Ecuador to omit the word "united", the French representative stated that his delegation did not have any strong views on the matter. As had been said, it was quite clear that the three territories were to be united into one State, and the addition of the word "united" would not make any great difference.

*Mr. Sarper took the Chair replacing Mr. Pearson.*

42. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA Khan (Pakistan) said that, like the delegation of Iraq, his delegation had insisted upon the two concepts of unity and independence. As he had previously stated (316th meeting), if it came to a question of postponing one or the other, his delegation would rather postpone independence than unity. However, there seemed to be agreement on the substance of what was to be expressed in the paragraph under discussion. As to the form, he considered that the more simply the meaning was expressed, the better it would be for the Administering Authority and the other organs called upon to implement the resolution that might be adopted. He therefore supported the suggestions of the representatives of Egypt and Ecuador to omit the words "the territories of" and to replace "into a united" by the word "an".

43. Mr. EBAN (Israel) said that the discussion was rendered superfluous by the wording of paragraph 3 of the Sub-Committee's draft resolution, which would make the Libyan people the sole arbiter of their constitution. That paragraph supported the point of view of the representatives of Ecuador and Pakistan, which would avoid qualification and would put faith regarding the constitutional outcome in the processes of determination by the Libyan National Assembly.

44. Mr. MENDOZA (Guatemala) believed that the text which the Committee should adopt was the one originally submitted by Sub-Committee 17. Paragraph 14 of the report of that Sub-Committee made it clear that the Sub-Committee had decided that Libya should be "a single independent sovereign State". It was therefore surprising that members of the Sub-Committee who had supported that principle should now be submitting amendments to it. However, if the text submitted by the Sub-Committee were rejected, he would support the text submitted by the representative of Ecuador.

45. Mr. DE MARCOS (Cuba) thought that the whole matter could be reduced to the substitution of the word "constituted" for the word "established".

46. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) was anxious to know the reactions of the United Kingdom representative to the various amendments which had been moved to the Indian amendment. In the

light of the new circumstances, was he still withdrawing his own amendments?

47. Mr. MORALES MARENCO (Nicaragua) pointed out that if the Indian representative accepted the suggestions made by the representatives of Ecuador and Pakistan, the only alterations proposed by the Indian amendment would amount to replacing "established" by "constituted" and deleting the word "single".

48. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom), replying to the question put by the representative of Lebanon, said that he would have no objection to the changes suggested by the representatives of Egypt, Ecuador and Pakistan if the representative of India found those changes acceptable. He reiterated that he did not wish the position of his delegation to be at all ambiguous. That did not mean that the USSR representative's fears had any substance, however. If the conception of a sovereign Libya was accepted, as in fact it had been by almost every delegation including his own, it was difficult to understand how the colonial Powers were going to have an opportunity to disport themselves in those territories. Stating that the procedure suggested by the representative of Nicaragua was attractive, Mr. McNeil said that his delegation would agree to say "That Libya, comprising Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan, shall be constituted an independent sovereign State." The process of constitution was a legal and political one with which the members of the Committee were familiar in all its variations and on behalf of his Government as Administering Power he thought that the word "constituted" was probably better than "established".

49. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India) said that he had included the words "the territories of" in order to make it clear that Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan should not be regarded as States. However, if it was considered that there was no need to emphasize that point he was prepared to omit those words. The same applied to the word "united", which had been included to emphasize the idea of "unity". He had no objection to its omission if that were desired.

50. The CHAIRMAN stated that he would put the modified Indian amendment to the Committee in the following form: "1. That Libya, comprising Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan, shall be constituted an independent and sovereign State".

51. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) requested a vote by roll-call.

*A vote was taken by roll-call on the modified Indian amendment as follows:*

*El Salvador, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt.

*Abstaining:* New Zealand, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

*The amendment was adopted by 51 votes, with 7 abstentions.*

52. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that he had abstained because he considered that the amendment worsened the text of paragraph 1 of the Sub-Committee's draft resolution. Even though the majority had adopted the amendment, the original paragraph 1 should be put to the vote separately.

53. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) supported the request of the USSR representative.

54. Sir Carl BERENDSEN (New Zealand) explaining his vote on the amendment stated that while the unity of Libya was incontestably the best solution of the problem, he had felt it necessary to abstain because his delegation was not completely convinced that that solution was indeed in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants.

55. The CHAIRMAN agreed with the views expressed by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Lebanon and put to the vote paragraph 1 of section A of the draft resolution submitted by Sub-Committee 17, as amended.

*The paragraph was adopted by 56 votes, with 2 abstentions.*

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 9 November 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman:* Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

#### Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies (*continued*)

##### CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (*continued*)

1. The CHAIRMAN stated that he would put to the vote paragraphs 2 onwards of section A of the draft resolution submitted by Sub-Committee 17 (A/C.1/522) and the amendments relating thereto.

2. He put to the vote the Polish amendment (A/C.1/529) to section A, paragraph 2.

*The amendment was rejected by 25 votes to 15, with 11 abstentions.*

3. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraph 2 of section A.

*The paragraph was adopted by 54 votes, with 2 abstentions.*

4. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraph 3 of section A.

*The paragraph was adopted by 56 votes, with 1 abstention.*

5. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraph 4 of section A.

6. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) stated that he would abstain, since the nomination of a Commissioner and the establishment of an Advisory Council might involve duplication which would not make for efficiency.

7. Mr. MORALES MARENCO (Nicaragua), supported by Mr. HENRÍQUEZ UREÑA (Dominican Republic), drew the attention of the Committee to the necessity of substituting the phrase "*para Libia*" for the words "*en Libia*" in the Spanish text.

8. The CHAIRMAN stated that the Spanish translation would be checked in the light of the remark that had been made.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*Paragraph 4 of section A was adopted by 44 votes to 6, with 6 abstentions.*

9. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the part of the Chinese amendment (A/C.1/528) relating to paragraph 5 of section A.

*The amendment was not adopted, 18 votes being cast in favour and 18 against, with 22 abstentions.*

10. Mr. YU Tsune-chi (China) regretted that he had not been able to explain his amendment before it was put to the vote. Although he considered that the draft resolution submitted by the Sub-Committee was an excellent one, he thought that any possible overlapping between the mandates of the Administering Authorities and the Commission should have been avoided. In the circumstances, he would like to have the opportunity later of explaining a similar amendment that his delegation had submitted for the same purpose to section A, paragraph 10, of the draft resolution.

11. The CHAIRMAN assured the Chinese representative that he would be given that opportunity.

12. He then put to the vote paragraph 5 of section A.

*That paragraph was adopted by 47 votes, with 11 abstentions.*

13. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the part of the Polish amendment (A/C.1/529) relating to paragraph 6 of section A.

14. Mr. RYDBECK (Sweden) stated that, as the attitude of the Swedish delegation had been to abstain on the whole question, it could not accept membership of the Advisory Council, as the Polish delegation was proposing.

15. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) regretted that the Swedish delegation was declining to assume that responsibility, since a State that systematically refrained from taking a position was objective in its attitude and, therefore, suitable. In the circumstances, the Polish delegation proposed that Sweden be replaced by Haiti.

16. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) thanked the Polish delegation for having thought of his country as a possible member of the Advisory Coun-



cil. He stated, however, that since the Mexican delegation had participated in the work of the Sub-Committee, taking into consideration the objections made against the principle of an Advisory Council, and had voted for the ten members proposed for that Council, it would prefer not to be appointed.

17. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) regretted that a Latin-American country, which had actively participated in the solution of the problem and which assumed special responsibilities for the emancipation of colonial peoples, should now refuse such responsibility. He proposed that Mexico be replaced by Lebanon.

18. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) thanked the representative of Poland, but regretted that his delegation was unable to accept that generous proposal, since it considered that Arab countries would be represented on the Council by Egypt and Pakistan.

19. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said that, in that case, he would propose a Slav country, namely, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

20. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) pointed out that the question of the membership of an Advisory Council for Libya was an important question of principle. A struggle was actually going on among the colonial Powers for the possession of Libya. France wished to maintain its position in the Fezzan and the United Kingdom was trying to secure permanent control over Cyrenaica, by means of a Government dependent upon it.

21. The colonial interests of the United States and Italy were also involved in that territory. That struggle for the partition of the territory had made it impossible to reach a solution of the problem at the second part of the third session. The problem might, however, be solved if countries directly concerned did not participate in the Advisory Council and were replaced on it by States which had no military, strategic or economic interest in Libya. He recalled that on the preceding day one speaker had alluded to the existence of two blocs, one wanting the withdrawal of foreign troops from Libya, because it feared lest Libya be used as a spearhead against the USSR by the Anglo-American bloc and the other wishing to consolidate its position in that region. In that connexion, he would say that his country did not fear aggression, since it was prepared to give blow for blow, but that in any case a war was useless and that the peoples of the world desired peace above all.

22. Furthermore, if the United Kingdom and France were represented on the Advisory Council, they would be acting in the twofold capacity of members of that Council and of Administering Authorities. It would be easy to imagine what pressure they would be able to exercise in such circumstances on the Commissioner to make him adopt policies compatible with their interests.

23. Finally, since the four great Powers which had signed the Treaty of Peace with Italy bore the main responsibility for the disposal of the former Italian colonies, there was no reason whatever to exclude the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from that Advisory Council, if the other three Powers were to be represented on it. The exclusion of the USSR was yet another indi-

cation of the tendentious approach to the matter of composition of the Advisory Council. It would represent the interests of the colonial Powers, and not the interests of Libya. Only an Advisory Council composed of small States without colonial interests would be able to ensure that the General Assembly's decisions on Libya would be respected. He was surprised at the refusal of the representatives of Sweden and Mexico to participate in the Advisory Council, since the fate of Libya would not be settled by the adoption of the proposal under discussion but by the manner in which that proposal would be implemented. The USSR delegation would support the Polish amendment. It would have preferred that amendment in its original form, but since the two States concerned had refused to participate, it would support the amendment in its existing form.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*The Polish amendment was rejected by 35 votes to 5, with 18 abstentions.*

24. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 6 of section A.

*The sub-paragraph was adopted by 46 votes to 7, with 5 abstentions.*

25. At the request of Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon), the CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first part of sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 6 of section A reading as follows: "one representative of the people of each of the three regions of Libya".

*That part of the sub-paragraph was adopted by 53 votes, with 6 abstentions.*

26. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the second part of the sub-paragraph of paragraph 6 reading as follows: "and one representative of the minorities in Libya".

27. At the request of Mr. GARCÍA BAUER (Guatemala), the CHAIRMAN stated that the vote would be taken by roll-call.

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Thailand, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America, Uruguay, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Israel, Iran, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland.

*Against:* Yemen, Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria.

*Abstaining:* Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Burma, Denmark, Ethiopia, Greece, India, Liberia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Philippines, Sweden.

*The second part of the sub-paragraph was adopted by 32 votes to 7, with 20 abstentions.*

28. The CHAIRMAN put paragraph 6 of section A to the vote in its entirety.

*Paragraph 6 was adopted by 47 votes to 7, with 5 abstentions.*

29. Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa) explained that he had voted against sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 6 in section A, he had abstained from voting on paragraph (b), and had voted against paragraph 6 as a whole, fearing that the Advisory Council, as it would be constituted, might have a political character. He had, however, no objection to the appointment of any of the individual members. He had also abstained from voting on paragraph 5 of section A; he had not opposed paragraphs 4 and 5 since his delegation considered that the Commissioner had no need of the support of an Advisory Council and that he might well be assisted by experts. The delegation of the Union of South Africa would, however, not vote against the proposal as a whole.

30. The CHAIRMAN put paragraph 7 of section A to the vote.

*The paragraph was adopted by 47 votes to 5, with 5 abstentions.*

31. At the request of Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon), the CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first part of paragraph 8 of section A, including the words: "That in the discharge of his functions, the United Nations Commissioner shall consult and be guided by the advice of the members of his Council".

*The first part of paragraph 8 of Section A was adopted by 48 votes, with 11 abstentions.*

32. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the second part of paragraph 8 of section A.

*The second part of paragraph 8 of section A was adopted by 43 votes to 4, with 11 abstentions.*

33. The CHAIRMAN put paragraph 8 of section A to the vote, as a whole.

*Paragraph 8 was adopted by 46 votes, with 11 abstentions.*

34. The CHAIRMAN put paragraph 9 of section A to the vote.

*Paragraph 9 was adopted by 47 votes, with 7 abstentions.*

35. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the part of the Chinese amendment (A/C.1/528) relating to paragraph 10 of section A.

36. Mr. YU Tsune-chi (China) reminded the meeting that, in the Sub-Committee, he had already suggested that the text of the draft resolution should mention the necessity for co-ordination and collaboration between the Administering Authorities and the Commissioner. The Chinese amendment to paragraph 4 having not been adopted, the voting being 18 in favour and 18 against, and the fact that the representative of China had not had an opportunity of putting forward his point of view, made it necessary for him to call the attention of members of the Committee to the importance of avoiding friction and overlapping of authority between the Commissioner and the Administering Authorities, and of achieving co-operation between the two. Unless the text of the draft resolution included a clause to that effect, it would be obviously incomplete.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*The amendment was adopted by 29 votes to 8, with 17 abstentions.*

37. The CHAIRMAN put paragraph 10 of section A, as amended, to the vote.

*Paragraph 10, as amended, was adopted by 50 votes, with 6 abstentions.*

38. The CHAIRMAN put paragraph 11 of section A to the vote.

*Paragraph 11 was adopted by 56 votes, with 1 abstention.*

39. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that section A did not embody any provisions for the expenditure involved in the appointment of a Commissioner and the establishment of an advisory council.

40. Mr. DE HOLTE CASTELLO (Colombia) proposed that the question should be referred to the Secretary-General for an estimate of expenditure which might be submitted to the Fifth Committee.

41. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) supported the proposal of the Colombian delegation, pointing out that the Sub-Committee had decided that the question should be settled by the Fifth Committee.

42. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) recalled that, in the view of the Sub-Committee, the First Committee could take a decision on the appropriation required to give effect to the resolution and that the matter should afterwards be studied by the Fifth Committee.

43. He therefore thought that a provision should be added to section A whereby the Secretary-General would be authorized to determine the remuneration of the United Nations Commissioner in Libya and the travelling expenses and *per diem* for the members of the Advisory Council, in accordance with established practice and to provide the necessary staff and facilities to carry out the work of that Council and assist the Commissioner. He submitted an amendment to that effect (A/C.1/533).

44. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) considered that the addendum proposed by the United States was unnecessary, since rule 142 of the rules of procedure laid down explicitly the course to be followed in the matter. Moreover, budgetary questions did not lie within the scope of the First Committee.

45. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) agreed with the point of view of the representative of the USSR regarding rule 142 of the rules of procedure. The Secretary-General should, however, communicate an estimate of expenditure to the First Committee before the draft resolution was voted on as a whole.

46. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the Committee was naturally bound by rule 142. He added, however, that financial provisions had been embodied in the draft resolution concerning Eritrea. He thought that the same should be done in the case of Libya.

47. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) agreed that the Secretary-General should be instructed to present a budget estimate. He nevertheless thought that the best course to take would be to finish voting on the various sections of the draft resolution. Later, when it had been decided whether the Committee should submit one or three draft resolutions to the General Assembly, it might be decided whether a financial estimate should be included in every draft resolution, or whether, in the event of only one draft being submitted to

the Assembly, it should embody a single financial estimate covering the whole draft resolution.

48. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) shared the view of the representative of the United States. If the Secretary-General was to put forward a budget estimate, the First Committee must first give him some guidance on the matter. The question might then be referred to the Fifth Committee. He could see no objection to including a financial estimate in the separate parts of the draft resolution or to its inclusion in the draft resolution considered as a whole.

49. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) agreed that the financial aspect of the problem could be examined once the Committee had decided whether it would submit one draft resolution or three.

50. Mr. HOOD (Australia) agreed with the representative of the United States. He reminded the meeting that the Sub-Committee had thought that, at the appropriate time, the Secretary-General would give an explanation on the matter to the First Committee.

51. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) supported the United States proposal.

52. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) pointed out that the First Committee should give some indication of its views on the question before it was referred to the Fifth Committee. The Sub-Committee had expressed the opinion that the representatives of Governments on the Advisory Council should not be paid. It was important that the First Committee should take a decision in the matter after previous study of the expenditure involved and that it should submit its views to the Fifth Committee or to the Secretary-General. He agreed, however, that the question might be postponed.

53. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA Khan (Pakistan) also considered that the budgetary aspect could be postponed. He pointed out that provision of the kind had already been made for Eritrea while none had yet been made for Libya, and suggested that the Secretary-General might draw the conclusion that it was not the First Committee's intention that the remuneration of the Commissioner and the expenses of members of the Advisory Council should be met from the United Nations budget. It was therefore desirable, in any case, to include a provision on the question.

54. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said the Fifth Committee was not just a counting-house; it was a Committee responsible for deciding the policy to be followed in the financing of the activities of the United Nations.

55. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) enquired if the Chairman intended to put section A as a whole to the vote.

56. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the previous day (318th meeting) he had suggested that a decision should first be taken on each of the sections A, B and C, so that before deciding whether there would be a single draft resolution or three separate ones, the First Committee might know the contents of the different sections.

57. Unless therefore there were any objections to that procedure, the Committee would proceed to vote on section B, it being understood that that

did not prejudge the question whether there would be one or three draft resolutions.

58. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA Khan (Pakistan) asked whether the expression "Italian Somaliland" was correct.

59. The CHAIRMAN said the territory was in fact known by that name.

60. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA Khan (Pakistan) said the usual term used was the "former" Italian colonies.

61. Mr. HOOD (Rapporteur of Sub-Committee 17) indicated that the Sub-Committee had thought there was no other way of describing that country.

62. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA Khan (Pakistan) said that before voting on section B it would be preferable to consider the Liberian amendment (A/C.1/527); that amendment proposed that a commission should be appointed to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of Somaliland.

63. Mr. COUVE DE MURVILLE (France) thought it would be simpler to vote on section C first and to revert to section B when once the question of a commission of investigation had been settled.

64. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) said the Committee should first rule on the Liberian amendment, since section B would go by the board if that amendment were adopted.

65. His delegation accepted the principle of the Lebanese amendment (A/C.1/530) concerning Somaliland which contemplated the establishment of an advisory council of five States. Moreover, his delegation had stated during the general discussion (282nd meeting) that it would make a proposal aimed at allaying the anxieties of Pakistani and of certain other delegations which did not think that Italy should administer Somaliland alone.

66. Hence Argentina proposed that two other countries should assist Italy in carrying out its task, and Argentina submitted an amendment under which one Latin-American and one Arab country would be represented on the Advisory Council (A/C.1/532).

67. His delegation expressed the hope that that formula might enable certain delegations to agree to the Sub-Committee's draft resolution on Somaliland.

68. The CHAIRMAN said the best procedure would be, as suggested by the representative of Argentina, to take a decision first on the Liberian amendment.

69. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTE (Ecuador) supported that procedure and reserved the right to speak on section B if the Liberian amendment was rejected.

70. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that the Lebanese (A/C.1/530) and Argentine (A/C.1/532) amendments disposed, to a large extent, of the difficulties raised by the Sub-Committee's draft resolution. He proposed, however, that Ethiopia should be a member of the Advisory Council, in order that the latter might carry out its work more objectively and bring peace to Somaliland.

71. Mr. GONZÁLEZ ALLENDES (Chile) said the procedure suggested by the Argentine representative, for an immediate vote on the Liberian amendment, struck him as being the soundest.

72. Mr. SUNDE (Norway) declared himself in favour of the Liberian amendment (A/C.1/527). But his approval could not be interpreted as denoting a lack of confidence in the democratic Republic of Italy. His delegation subscribed to the praise bestowed on Italy and on the Italians; it regarded Italy as fully capable of exercising trusteeship over Somaliland.

73. The First Committee, however, did not have the necessary information and, on account of the contradictory nature of the evidence which had been heard, there were still doubts as to the real wishes of the population of Somaliland.

74. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) said he could not, in principle, oppose the desire to ascertain the true wishes of the population. Yet, the First Committee was faced by a heavy responsibility. A decision was about to be taken. But the Liberian proposal was of a nature to upset the structure which had been erected with such difficulty. Accordingly his delegation could not support the Liberian amendment, the consequences of which might be disastrous.

75. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA Khan (Pakistan) said his delegation feared the Sub-Committee's draft resolution might not be accepted by the population, whatever amendments were adopted.

76. If the population did not co-operate in the proposed experiment there might be disastrous consequences for the State exercising trusteeship or even for the present Administering Authority.

77. Although those fears were perhaps exaggerated, it would be better to find out the wishes of the population both of Somaliland and of Eritrea and avoid running a dangerous risk.

78. His delegation therefore supported the Liberian amendment (A/C.1/527).

79. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said the solution of the problem could not be postponed indefinitely. A decision should be taken at that session not only on Somaliland but also on Eritrea.

80. His delegation therefore supported the Polish amendment (A/C.1/529) so far as both Somaliland and Eritrea were concerned. If the future of both countries was to be settled in the same way, the General Assembly should rather adopt a final decision both for Eritrea and Somaliland rather than not to adopt a solution in either case.

81. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) said his delegation also felt there should be an investigation to determine the wishes of the population of Somaliland.

82. Opinions had been divided: the Somali Youth League had violently opposed the return of the Italians, whereas the other party had stated that it desired their return. It would, therefore, be logical to settle that contradiction by ordering an investigation.

83. Some delegations had declared themselves in favour of an enquiry in the case of Eritrea, which, however, was much clearer. There was all the more reason for acceding to the request of the Somali Youth League.

84. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) agreed with the Soviet Union representative that a decision had to be reached during the current

session: the General Assembly could not evade its responsibilities.

85. His delegation had attempted to bring the other members of Sub-Committee 17 round to its point of view. It had only been partially successful in that but the Sub-Committee's report, imperfect though it might be, represented a definite advance. The First Committee had already successfully carried out part of its task by voting on the first part of the draft resolution contained in the report of Sub-Committee 17. His delegation could not, therefore, support the Liberian amendment and, as it had previously indicated, it would vote for section B of the draft resolution of a Sub-Committee.

86. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) said the General Assembly owed it to itself to settle the problem which had been submitted to it, as the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union had said.

87. It was, besides, incorrect to say that the part of Sub-Committee 17's draft resolution which dealt with Eritrea was incomplete: in reality it laid the foundations for a future solution.

88. As to the remarks of the Pakistan representative, a distinction should be drawn between the case of Eritrea and that of Somaliland. For Somaliland there were only two possibilities: immediate independence, which his delegation could not accept for the reasons previously indicated, and trusteeship. For Eritrea, however, several very different formulae had been proposed. The question of the population's future was a real issue, which presupposed that its wishes should be clearly established.

89. The trusteeship to be established in Somaliland was only a transitional solution which would lead eventually to independence. His delegation therefore considered the proposal to send a commission of investigation to Somaliland unjustified and would vote accordingly.

90. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) recalled that several delegations had emphasized that it was the General Assembly's obligation to solve the problem of the former Italian colonies during the current session. It was indeed high time to bring some order into international affairs and, in particular, to settle the thorny question of the former Italian colonies.

91. Hence his delegation could not support the Liberian amendment. Moreover, it considered that, logically, the problem of Eritrea should also be settled. Greece for its part still considered Ethiopia's claims justified.

92. His delegation would therefore vote against the Liberian amendment and would be guided by the same principles in the votes concerning Eritrea in the First Committee and in plenary meeting.

93. The CHAIRMAN put the Liberian amendment (A/C.1/527) to the vote.

94. At the request of Mr. COOPER (Liberia), the CHAIRMAN stated that the vote would be taken by roll-call.

*The vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*The Union of South Africa, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Yemen, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines.

*Against:* Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

*Abstaining:* Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand.

*The amendment was rejected by 40 votes to 11, with 8 abstentions.*

95. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India) recalled that on 3 October, or eight days before Sub-Committee 17 was established, he had already stated (280th meeting) that his delegation could not support a recommendation concerning Somaliland or Eritrea before a United Nations commission had been sent to those two countries. The Indian delegation's vote in favour of the Liberian amendment could not, therefore, be interpreted as a disavowal of the decisions of Sub-Committee 17.

96. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraph 1 of section B of the draft resolution of Sub-Committee 17.

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Argentina, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan.

*Abstaining:* Sweden.

*The paragraph was adopted by 58 votes, with 1 abstention.*

97. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) proposed that in paragraph 2 of Section B the following phrase should be deleted: "unless at the end of that period the General Assembly decides otherwise."

98. The Philippine representative referred to the statement which he had made the previous day (316th meeting) on that paragraph. The problem had been submitted to the United Nations for a final decision and, legally, it was doubtful whether the current decision could be conditional on a subsequent decision to be taken at the fourteenth regular session. However, the

Philippine delegation placed the question on a higher level. The United Nations should not, in fact, by unwarranted reservations, lessen the effect of an action of high moral significance, which the General Assembly was called upon to make: to give and take back at the same time was an ambiguous and unwise policy.

99. Mr. WIERBŁOWSKI (Poland) said that his delegation desired that the decision provided for in paragraph 1 of Section B concerning the independence of Somaliland should become effective. Paragraph 2 not only stated that a delay of ten years was necessary before that decision could become effective, but also that the General Assembly would again have to take a decision on the question at the end of ten years.

100. The statements made by the representatives of the population had shown that Somaliland was ready for independence. The First Committee had therefore adopted paragraph 1 of section B. Why should the population be made to wait ten years for another decision by the General Assembly?

101. The Polish delegation was therefore of the opinion that a delay of three years was amply sufficient to ensure the fulfilment of all the necessary conditions for the establishment of an independent State.

102. The Philippine amendment was already contained in the Polish amendment (A/C.1/529), which excluded any later decision by the General Assembly. That was therefore a point on which the two delegations agreed.

103. The Polish delegation therefore urged, as stated in its amendment, that the decision to be taken by the General Assembly should be final, and that it should come into force after three years.

104. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that the Polish amendment was justified by the decision of the First Committee, which had already recognized the fact that Somaliland deserved its independence and which should forthwith make that decision effective.

105. The population of Somaliland had already shown that it reacted sharply to the decisions of the United Nations. According to the Press, the Somali people were anxious to become independent and it was the duty of the First Committee to take account of those aspirations, which had been clearly expressed by the representatives of the population and, to that end, to adopt the Polish amendment. The United Nations would thus show that it was for granting effective independence without delay so that the peoples of the former Italian colonies could become master in their own house.

106. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR was also in favour of the Philippine amendment. In point of fact, the last words of paragraph 2 of section B were superfluous and even dangerous. They signified that the General Assembly would have to consider the question anew after a period of ten years, and that independence would be postponed until the Greek calends. The General Assembly, taking back with one hand what it granted with the other, would be granting independence to Somaliland while at the same time refusing to make it effective.

107. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR was in favour of rapid and effective independence, in conformity with the aspirations of the population. It would therefore vote for the Polish and Philippine amendments.

108. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA Khan (Pakistan) said that the Somali representatives who had appeared before the First Committee were divided into two groups, one of which had requested immediate independence; they believed that trusteeship was unnecessary and were in every respect opposed to the proposal on which the First Committee was to be asked to vote.

109. The other group had considered that trusteeship was necessary and that Italy should be the Administering Authority. As to the duration of the trusteeship arrangement, the representatives of those organizations had said that 500 posts in the higher civil service were at present occupied by Somalis, that there were several hospitals, roads and schools in Somaliland and that the proportion of Somali judges in the higher courts was as much as 50 per cent. The answers given by those representatives to certain other questions had left one wondering what gaps the trusteeship arrangement was to fill.

110. That was the exact question which the Polish representative had put to those representatives and their reply had been that they did not possess sufficient experience. If the views expressed by those representatives—which were presumably also the views of the Italians in Somaliland—correspond to the facts, it might be asked why ten years should elapse before Italian Somaliland would be ready for independence. It was precisely the statements of those representatives of those organizations which had been taken as a basis for the conclusion that at least one large section of the population would give a favourable reception to Italian trusteeship. He wondered what remained of the arguments that had been put forward in favour of a ten-year trusteeship.

111. If, moreover, the point of view of those opposed to Italian trusteeship was taken into consideration, then, if Italy was nevertheless given that responsibility, it would have to be established quite clearly that it was the intention of the General Assembly and the Administering Authority to enable the population to become independent as soon as possible. If the good faith of the United Nations and the Administering Authority was clearly established, there were grounds for hoping that that part of the population would accept the formula proposed.

112. His delegation would therefore vote for the Polish amendment and if it should unfortunately be rejected it would vote for the Philippine amendment.

113. The CHAIRMAN put the Polish amendment (A/C.1/529) relating to paragraph 2 of section B to the vote.

114. At the request of Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland), the CHAIRMAN called for a vote by roll-call.

*The vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Saudi Arabia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet So-

cialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland.

*Against:* Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru.

*Abstaining:* Sweden, Thailand, Burma, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon.

*The amendment was rejected by 35 votes to 18, with 6 abstentions.*

115. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Philippine amendment proposing the deletion from paragraph 2 of section B of the words: "unless at the end of that period the General Assembly decides otherwise".

116. At the request of Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) the CHAIRMAN called for a vote by roll-call.

*The vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*China, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

*Against:* Colombia, Denmark, France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile.

*Abstaining:* China, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Sweden.

*The amendment was adopted by 33 votes to 22, with 4 abstentions.*

117. The CHAIRMAN read the amended text of paragraph 2 of section B as follows: "This independence shall become effective at the end of ten years from the date of the approval of the Trusteeship Agreement by the General Assembly."

118. The CHAIRMAN put paragraph 2, as amended, to the vote.

*Paragraph 2 of section B, as amended, was adopted by 55 votes, with 4 abstentions.*

119. Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa) moved the adjournment.

120. There being no objections, the CHAIRMAN declared the meeting adjourned.

The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m.



### THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTIETH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 10 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies (*continued*)

##### STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ITALY

1. Mr. TARCHIANI (Italy), noting that some delegations had raised doubts as to the sincerity of his Government's intentions in the matter, reiterated that, should the Italian Government be entrusted with the trusteeship of Somaliland, it would scrupulously observe the time-limit established by the General Assembly and, on the appointed date, would transfer its powers to a duly constituted Somali Government.

##### CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (*continued*)

2. The CHAIRMAN drew the attention of the Committee to paragraph 3 of section B of the Sub-Committee's draft resolution (A/C.1/522) to which amendments had been submitted by the delegations of Poland, Lebanon and Argentina.

3. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) pointed out that the amendment submitted by his delegation (A/C.1/532) merely filled out the blanks in the Lebanese amendment (A/C.1/530), which his delegation had already accepted. The object of the proposal was to give satisfaction to those who had expressed the desire that Italy should not be alone in the exercise of the trusteeship over former Italian Somaliland. Since the amendment related to paragraph 3 of section B, he thought that it should be considered before that paragraph was voted upon.

4. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) proposed that the contemplated Advisory Council should include the Union of South Africa in addition to the members proposed in the Argentine amendment.

5. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) supported the Argentine representative's view that the Lebanese amendment as modified should be considered as an amendment to paragraph 3 of section B of the original proposal of the Sub-Committee. It was reasonable to take that course since the amendment would add something to the proposal of the Sub-Committee, which restricted the administration exclusively to Italy. Moreover, the attitude of several delegations towards paragraph 3 might well depend largely on the action taken with respect to the Lebanese amendment as modified by Argentina.

6. Mr. AL-FAQIH (Saudi Arabia) pointed out that the amendment submitted by his delegation (A/C.1/534), which would add the Philippines to the proposed Advisory Council, had priority over the amendment the representative of Belgium had just proposed.

7. The CHAIRMAN agreed with that view. He ruled that the part of the Polish amendment (A/C.1/529) referring to paragraph 3, being the furthest removed from the original text, would be voted on first.

8. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) said that the description and functions of councils similar to

the ones proposed in the Argentine and Lebanese amendments had previously been co-ordinated. Since the proposed council was to "aid and advise", he hoped that the representatives of Lebanon and Argentina would agree to omit the word "advisory".

9. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said that the amendment to paragraph 3 submitted by his delegation (A/C.1/529) was the closest to the spirit of the Charter and provided the safest way to prepare such territories for independence. To place Somaliland under the trusteeship of one country, especially when that country had previously oppressed Somaliland, would mean that the General Assembly would be taking a measure that would cause a deterioration of the situation in the territory rather than measures guided by the interests of Somaliland.

10. Ethiopia had been the first victim of fascism and the Ethiopian people could not forget that fact, nor could they be expected to forget it. The Ethiopian people could not feel secure if Italy were granted trusteeship over Somaliland. Stating that adoption of the Polish amendment would not involve replacing the old colonialism by a new one, he said that those who represented peoples and countries recently liberated from colonialism and imperialism should support it, as should those who championed democratic principles and the principle of self-determination of peoples everywhere.

11. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) thought that the debate on the question of the former Italian colonies had clearly indicated that the worst type of trusteeship was a collective one. In that connexion he referred to the statement made on the subject of collective trusteeship by Mr. Molotov to the effect that the worst student was the one who had a great number of teachers. Trusteeship was a definite responsibility which should be vested in a nation rather than an individual. Mr. Belaúnde emphasized that the Committee had no right whatsoever to doubt the motives and ideals of the Italian Government. Moreover, the statements of the representatives of Ethiopia and Italy showed that mutual trust did exist. Since Italy, if given the authority to administer the territory, would be helped by an Advisory Council under the supervision of the General Assembly and of the Trusteeship Council, and since there would of course be a Trusteeship Agreement, the criteria on which the Polish delegation based its proposal could not be considered either by the Committee or by the General Assembly.

12. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) supported the Polish amendment which would place Italian Somaliland under direct United Nations trusteeship. The guiding principle in solving the problem of the kind of trusteeship to be set up ought to be the interests of the population of the territory concerned. Though there were some differences of opinion among the Somali people, it could not be denied that the majority of them would violently oppose any Italian administration of Somaliland. That distrust was well founded and could not be removed

by any kind of pressure. In that connexion he quoted an extract from a letter addressed to the Chairman of the First Committee by the Somali Youth League which reproduced an article from *The East African Standard* of 28 October 1949. That article had reported the anti-Italian demonstrations which had taken and were still taking place in Somaliland as a protest against the proposal submitted by the majority of Sub-Committee 17. The discontent and disturbances reported by that article gave no reason to hope or believe that the people of Somaliland would acquiesce peacefully in Italian administration. Mr. Arutunian noted that it had been asked whether the Italians would suppress that discontent by force. The question had not been answered, however, nor had the United Kingdom representative commented on the point. It was clear that the proposed solution for Somaliland would aggravate discontent and disturbances throughout the territory and would be contrary to the desires and aspirations of the people. It was impossible to impose such a trusteeship, which would be a new occupation and colonial control.

13. The anxiety felt by Ethiopia regarding the proposed establishment of Italian trusteeship over Somaliland was only too well founded and was based on the fact that the Italian Government had recently joined a military bloc of a patently aggressive character. Moreover, statements that Italy and its traditions had always been universal led to further concern since that universality had always been linked with aggressive and expansionist tendencies. In that connexion, he recalled that he had already quoted (314th meeting) the statement of the Italian Minister of Defence regarding the armed Italian nation.

14. As for the Peruvian representative's reference to a statement of Mr. Molotov, the USSR representative pointed out that United Nations trusteeship would not mean that there would be a number of administrators. Such trusteeship would involve one administration by an authority which, unlike the present Italian Government, had no connexion with aggression or expansionism. He quoted from a speech made by Mr. Molotov at the Paris Peace Conference on 13 August 1946 which had shown what Italy did in fact represent and how Italian traditions could and should be evaluated. That statement had indicated the high opinion held by the Soviet Union with regard to Italian culture and the Italian people. That did not mean, however, that Italy's contribution in the struggle against the Allies in the Second World War could be forgotten. The same was true of the policy of the present Government in Italy.

15. Only a United Nations trusteeship could secure the interests of the indigenous population of Somaliland and, at the same time, safeguard the interests of Italy and Italian settlers in that region. In that connexion he recalled that the USSR proposals had recommended that native and European populations of Somaliland should be represented in the Advisory Council.

16. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) said that a line must be drawn between control and enterprise. The Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly were excellent controlling powers, but a trusteeship involved an enterprise with individual management. As he had previously said, it would be preferable to have a nation, rather than an

individual responsible to the General Assembly, since a nation always represented greater possibilities in carrying out such responsibilities. The opinion of the Somali population was known and it could not be stated that there would be open resistance to Italian trusteeship. Part of the population was prepared to accept such trusteeship, and it must be supposed that the other part, about which little was known, could be convinced that that trusteeship would be satisfactory. The Somali population would know that there would be control by the United Nations and that certain constitutional principles would be established. They would also know that Somaliland would achieve independence after a certain number of years.

17. Mr. BELAÚNDE said that when he had used the word "universalism" he had meant the attitude which excluded differentiation between races. The words of Mr. Molotov were a great tribute to that tradition of Italy. In conclusion, Mr. BELAÚNDE said that he was sure that Italy would apply the ideals of Christian democracy not only in its own territory, but in any other territory which the United Nations gave it to administer.

18. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) said that his delegation in principle favoured collective trusteeship of the United Nations. It had supported a proposal in that sense at the previous session. Regrettable as it might be, it appeared from the discussion that the present machinery of the United Nations was incapable of assuming the burden of such responsibility, and he would therefore abstain from voting on the Polish amendment.

19. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) said that he would vote against the Polish amendment because the latter was at variance with the recommendations of Sub-Committee 17. He thought that the views expressed by the USSR representative seemed to indicate complete lack of confidence in the Trusteeship System and in the Trusteeship Council. That representative had intimated that adoption of the proposal making Italy the Administering Authority would constitute a return to a system of colonial administration. The United States delegation did not share that point of view and believed that the Trusteeship System set forth in the Charter was adequate to provide for the rights and interests of the inhabitants. The amendments submitted by the representatives of Lebanon and Argentina would give even added assurance and he would support them.

20. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) emphasized that his Government and people had always respected the Italian people. A distinction must be drawn between the Italian people, on the one hand, and Italian colonialists and those who had pushed Italy into the North Atlantic Treaty on the other. Since the views of the masses of Italy regarding a single Italian trusteeship over Somaliland were not known, the Polish amendment could not be termed discriminatory with respect to Italy, nor did that amendment show lack of confidence in the United Nations and in the Trusteeship Council. Indeed, as had been made clear by the representative of Iran, the handing over of the trusteeship administration to one single State, even though it was under the control of the United Nations, was a vote of no confidence in the United Nations as a whole.

21. The representative of Poland referred to various forms of universalism and especially to the

Spanish and to the Roman notion of universalism which included various classes of citizens, to say nothing of the slaves. Mr. Wierblowski pointed out that the distinction between supervision and management drawn by the Peruvian representative was not altogether correct. If there were a United Nations trusteeship there would be a commissioner to administer the territory and the same thing would happen under Italian trusteeship, in which case an administrator would also be required.

22. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India) said that as a general principle his delegation favoured direct United Nations trusteeship and would support it if at all feasible. According to present information, however, it did not appear practicable and he would therefore abstain from voting on the Polish amendment.

23. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) noted that some representatives and in particular the representative of Peru, had endeavoured to lead the Committee astray on the issue under discussion. What was being discussed, however, was the contemporary history of colonial expansion and domination. The basic task confronting the Committee, namely solution of the question of the disposal of the former Italian Somaliland, could best be discharged by the course contemplated in the Polish amendment, since the United Nations must heed the wishes of the majority of the Somali people as expressed by their representatives. It was clear that the Somali people did not wish to have the oppression of their former colonizer, Italy, imposed upon them again. Failing independence the majority of that people obviously wanted a direct United Nations trusteeship. Furthermore, the Polish proposal met the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. Quoting Article 76 of the Charter, Mr. Kiselev noted that Article 77 listed the particular territories that might be included under the provisions of Article 76. Included among them were territories which might be detached from enemy States as a result of the Second World War. Former Italian Somaliland was clearly one such territory. It was impossible to restore the old colonizers in a slightly different form, since all the qualifications proposed still meant that Italian troops would return to the territory and would once more oppress the population if Italy were given trusteeship over former Italian Somaliland. The Somali people would of course take up arms and defend their honour, independence and freedom. The Committee had no right to close its eyes to that reality. Mr. Kiselev said that the proposal to return Italy to the territory would mean repeating history. However, while its course might be diverted for a short time, the stream of history could not be altered. In conclusion, he stated that he would support the Polish amendment.

24. U So NYUN (Burma) declared that his delegation would abstain for similar reasons as those expressed by the representatives of both India and Iran.

25. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) said that his delegation had always supported the principle of direct trusteeship under United Nations auspices. The Secretary-General had recommended it in his last annual report<sup>1</sup> and he knew better than

anybody else whether the United Nations had the administrative capacity to perform that task. However, in view of the fact that the feasibility of such a trusteeship with regard to the problem under discussion, had not received general support, his delegation deemed it necessary to abstain in the vote on the Polish amendment.

26. Mr. EBAN (Israel) expressed similar views to those of the representative of the Philippines.

27. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) said that since his delegation had expressed serious doubts as to the real wishes of the inhabitants of Somaliland and since the final text of paragraph 4 had not been decided upon, his delegation would abstain in the vote on the Polish amendment.

28. The Chairman put the Polish amendment to paragraph 3 of section B of the draft resolution submitted by Sub-Committee 17 (A/C.1/522) to the vote by roll-call as requested by the Polish representative.

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*The Philippines, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Liberia.

*Against:* Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru.

*Abstaining:* Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Yemen, Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan.

*The amendment was rejected by 35 votes to 8, with 16 abstentions.*

29. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) remarked that his delegation had voted in favour of a United Nations trusteeship of Somaliland in view of the fact that the indigenous inhabitants of Somaliland had been consistently opposed to an Italian trusteeship over their territory.

30. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) explained that his delegation had supported the Polish amendment because it was not fully convinced by the argument to the effect that the United Nations was not able properly to undertake its responsibilities with regard to a direct United Nations trusteeship, since such a trusteeship had not yet been fully tested.

31. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) wished to explain the amendment submitted by his delegation (A/C.1/530). The Advisory Council was suggested with a view to helping and advising Italy in its administration of Italian Somaliland. Moreover, the town of Mogadiscio had been suggested as the headquarters of that Council with a view to securing intimate relationship with the activities of the Administering Authority. Furthermore, the

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 1.

precise functions and relationship of the proposed Advisory Council with the Administering Authority had been left entirely to the discretion of the Trusteeship Council when negotiating the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement with the Administering Authority. His delegation had also emphasized the need for inclusion, in the proposed Trusteeship Agreement, of the right of those States members of the Advisory Council, in case they were not represented on the Trusteeship Council, to sit on that Council and participate, without the right of vote, in the debates relating to the administration of Italian Somaliland. Obviously, as long as the members of the Advisory Council were Members of the United Nations, they should be accorded the right to sit during any discussion by the Trusteeship Council on that question.

32. With regard to the two countries proposed by the representative of Argentina (A/C.1/532) for membership on the Advisory Council, Mr. Malik declared that although he approved the candidacy of Colombia and Egypt, he felt it essential for the Committee to first decide the size of the proposed Council. Moreover, although he preferred to characterize that Council as "advisory", he would not insist on such a qualification if the representative of Egypt insisted on the deletion of that qualification.

33. In conclusion, the representative of Lebanon submitted that although the Somali people were apprehensive of the fact that Italy would be the Administering Authority of Somaliland, the text of the present draft resolution contained genuine guarantees against any abuse on the part of the Administering Authority. Those guarantees could be summed up as follows: The prospect of definite and ultimate independence after ten years' trusteeship; the proposed Trusteeship Agreement whereby the members of the Trusteeship Council would avail themselves of the opportunity to plead the cause of the Somali people with a view to securing adequate guarantees for the inhabitants of Somaliland; the inclusion in the Trusteeship Agreement of constitutional provisions safeguarding the fundamental human rights of those people; the proposed Advisory Council which would participate in the debates of the Trusteeship Council regarding the administration of the territory; the inclusion in the Advisory Council of some Asiatic and African countries which would have the interests of the people of Somaliland at heart; the fact that the Trusteeship Council itself would be continuously watching the development of the territory towards full independence; and finally, the need for the Organization to have faith in the new and democratic Italy by entrusting it with the task of administering the territory of Somaliland.

34. Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa) agreed with the views expressed by the representative of Lebanon to the effect that the Com-

mittee must first decide as to the size of the proposed Advisory Council.

35. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) said that although his delegation was agreeable to the creation of an Advisory Council, it could not support the suggestion of the representative of Egypt for the elimination of the advisory character of that Council. Moreover, his delegation could not support the principle inferred in the statements of the representatives of both Lebanon and the Philippines to the effect that the proposed Advisory Council would share, along with Italy, in the administration of the territory. As to the composition of the Advisory Council, his delegation accepted the suggested candidates, namely Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Philippines and the Union of South Africa, it being understood that the representative of Argentina would agree to such an increase of membership. However, his delegation could not support the request that the members of the Advisory Council should be given the right to sit in the Trusteeship Council, since that request would violate Article 90 of the Charter, which stipulated that the Trusteeship Council should adopt its own rules of procedure. In that connexion, his delegation would prefer a change in the text of the Lebanese amendment to the draft resolution submitted by the Subcommittee to the effect that the General Assembly recommended to the Trusteeship Council the invitation of those States members of the Advisory Council to sit during the course of its deliberations regarding Italian Somaliland.

36. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) agreed to the change in the text of his amendment, as suggested by Mr. McNeil, with a view to eliminating any possible violation of Article 90 of the Charter.

37. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) said that although he preferred the Advisory Council to be composed of two members, he would not oppose the increase of the membership to three countries, if the Committee so desired.

38. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that his delegation favoured the creation of the proposed Advisory Council since, on the one hand, it would allay the fears of the Somali people while, on the other hand, it would constitute a proof, on the part of democratic Italy, of its good intentions with regard to the people of Somaliland.

39. As to the proposed membership of the Advisory Council, his delegation, after consultation with the Ethiopian delegation, wished to support the Philippines instead of Ethiopia.

40. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) said that, since Italy, which was not a member of the United Nations, could not sit in the Trusteeship Council, it seemed illogical to allow members of the Advisory Council to take part in the deliberations of the Trusteeship Council as regards the administration of Somaliland.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIRST MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 10 November 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman:* Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

#### Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies (*continued*)

##### CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (*continued*)

1. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) felt serious objections to the Egyptian representative's suggestion to delete the word "Advisory" qualifying the word "Council" in the Argentine amendment (A/C.1/532) to the Lebanese amendment (A/C.1/530) relating to section B of the draft resolution contained in the report of the Sub-Committee (A/C.1/522). The General Assembly could not establish trusteeship except in conformity with the provisions of the Charter. The Charter only provided for one Council, namely, the Trusteeship Council, and hence it would be in conflict with the principles of the Charter to limit the responsibility of the Administering Authority by creating, alongside with it, a council that would not be purely advisory in nature. Accordingly, the resolution eventually adopted by the Assembly should make it quite clear that the Council's function would be purely advisory.

2. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) pointed out that the proposed council must have advisory functions. Nevertheless, he did not see that it was necessary to mention that explicitly, although the deletion of the word "Advisory" might give rise to complications. He thought that the Council should be called a United Nations council.

3. As to the composition of the Council, his delegation felt it should consist of at least three members. Since the Argentine representative saw no objection to adding one member, the Saudi Arabian amendment (A/C.1/534) proposing a Council consisting of Egypt, Colombia and the Philippines might be adopted.

4. He reserved the right to explain his vote when paragraph 3 of section B was put to the vote.

5. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) recalled that the Lebanese representative and other representatives had said there were in fact two questions to be settled: the number of States to be represented on the Advisory Council, and the choice of those States. He suggested that a vote should first be taken on the number of States which would participate in the Council, and then on the selection of those States.

6. The CHAIRMAN said that that was precisely the procedure he was going to propose to the Committee.

7. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) pointed out that, in proposing the deletion of the word "Advisory" before the word "Council", his intention had been to find a better formula. He was in agreement with the Belgian representative on the advisory functions of the Council. Yet the Council would have more than one function. It would not only have to advise the Administering Authority in the name of the United Nations, but would also take part in the subsequent discussions on Somaliland in the Trusteeship Council. Those were not purely and simply advisory functions.

8. He recalled that, in the case of Libya, the draft resolution mentioned a council, not an advisory council. As the Council proposed for Somaliland was primarily to give a guarantee to the population of Somaliland and to the United Nations, it would be advisable not to weaken that guarantee.

9. He had no objection to the United Kingdom representative's suggestion that the word "include" in the Argentine amendment should be replaced by the word "recommend". However, he thought that suggestion might not be necessary at all, since the General Assembly would present the resolution in the form of a recommendation. He also thought that it would be more logical for the amendment not to constitute a separate paragraph, but that it should simply be added to paragraph 3.

10. He was glad that the Philippines had been proposed as a member of the Council.

11. ATO MEDHEN (Ethiopia) recalled that his delegation was opposed to the Sub-Committee's proposal concerning Somaliland. He did not consider that the Lebanese amendment (A/C.1/530), as amended by Argentina (A/C.1/532), in any way diminished the threat to Ethiopia. The addition of States that had no interests in the area could not alter the situation. The setting up of a purely Advisory Council therefore provided no guarantee whatsoever. His delegation would therefore vote against those two amendments, and against the amendment submitted by the Saudi Arabian delegation (A/C.1/534).

12. Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa) recalled that his delegation was opposed to the principle of an Advisory Council operating in conjunction with the Administering Authority. It was still more opposed to the participation of that Council in the administration. It had previously indicated that it would be in favour of Italian trusteeship over Somaliland. However, if the majority was in favour of an Advisory Council in Somaliland, his delegation would not maintain its opposition but would abstain from voting. It suggested that, if such a Council were established, its membership should be reduced to a minimum, or to two members, as the Argentine delegation had proposed (A/C.1/532). His delegation appreciated the Belgian delegation's nomination of the Union of South Africa as an additional member. If the Council had consisted of two members only, the Union of South Africa would have considered the possibility of being one of the two. But it was afraid that the Council in the form in which it was contemplated would be an obstacle rather than an asset; accordingly his delegation could not be considered as a candidate for the Council, but would reserve its position in that connexion.

13. Mr. COUVE DE MURVILLE (France) said his delegation was prepared to support the principle of an Advisory Council for Somaliland. Although that Council was not necessary and although Italy could perfectly well discharge the mission entrusted to it by the United Nations, his delegation subscribed to the idea of an Advisory Council,

because it felt that the establishment of such a Council might allay fears; it gave its support the more willingly because the idea had previously been expressed at the preceding session of the General Assembly in connexion with Italian trusteeship over Tripolitania.

14. His delegation considered that the Advisory Council should consist of not more than two or three representatives. The Council's name was certainly less important than its terms of reference. The Council would have two functions: (a) advising the Administering Authority on the spot and (b) participating, without the right to vote, in the Trusteeship Council's consideration of the Administering Authority's report. Those two functions were essentially similar, since that Advisory Council would have no deciding power either on the spot or in the Trusteeship Council. Hence, it was quite proper to call it an Advisory Council. The Council would of course be advisory, but it was preferable to say so expressly and to retain the title mentioned in the Lebanese and Argentine amendments.

15. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) began by proposing an amendment to his delegation's amendment (A/C.1/530), to the effect that the words "the right of" should be replaced by the words "a provision whereby the Trusteeship Council shall invite the".

16. With regard to the title of the Council, it seemed difficult to leave out the word "Advisory" after what had been said by the United Kingdom representative at the previous meeting. In any case, the Lebanese delegation had never intended that the Council should interfere in the administration of the territory entrusted to Italy. He did not think that the title "United Nations Council" that had been proposed by the Pakistan representative was suitable since it might lead to confusion.

17. The Lebanese delegation would be prepared to amend its proposal to the effect that Colombia, Egypt and the Philippines should be appointed if the principle of a Council of three members was adopted.

18. He could not agree with the Egyptian representative's suggestion that the amendment be added to paragraph 3 of section B of the draft resolution. He pointed out that the function of the Administering Authority would be essentially different from that of the Council. It was therefore preferable to include the provisions relating to that Council in a separate paragraph.

19. Mr. AL-FAQIH (Saudi Arabia) recalled that there were many arguments mitigating in favour of including the Philippines in the Advisory Council for Somaliland. The Committee could not ignore the fact that part of the population of Somaliland was violently opposed to Italy's return to that territory. Thus, the greater the liberality of the Advisory Council, the less the danger of opposition in Somaliland. Moreover, the choice of the Philippines would improve the geographical representation of the Council. Finally, it would be a guarantee for the United Nations and for the population of Somaliland to include in that Council a member who had fought to prevent the principle of Somaliland's independence being questioned at the end of ten years.

20. The Saudi Arabian delegation would have been pleased to see Ethiopia become a member

of that Council, but since the offer had been declined, it considered that a Council of three members would be adequate.

21. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) was grateful to the Saudi Arabian delegation and to other delegations which had supported the idea of participation of the Philippines in the Advisory Council. He assured members that, if his country was elected, the Philippine representative on the Advisory Council would do everything in his power to safeguard the interests of the population of Somaliland and to co-operate with the Administering Authority.

22. He added that there were certain difficulties in the text of the Lebanese amendment which provided that the Trusteeship Council would invite the States members of the Advisory Council. He considered that it would be more logical for the Trusteeship Council to invite the representatives of those States; otherwise a State might send different representatives to the Advisory Council and to the Trusteeship Council. He also considered that a State member of the Trusteeship Council represented on the Advisory Council should have two representatives on the Trusteeship Council, namely, the representative normally sitting on that Council and the representative on the Advisory Council. He pointed out that in other cases the Administering Power was represented on the Trusteeship Council by its representative as well as by the administrator of the territory.

23. Mr. Fausto Soto (Chile) recalled that his delegation had agreed, in the Sub-Committee, that Italy should be entrusted with the administration of Somaliland, since it had the qualifications necessary for the effective administration of that territory. The Chilean delegation would, therefore, prefer the proposal to be adopted without amendments, but would not vote against the Argentine amendment, in order not to prevent a solution. It would be advisable for the number of members participating in the Advisory Council to be reduced to a minimum; in any case, the number should not exceed three.

24. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) recalled that his delegation was in favour of granting Somaliland its independence after the shortest possible period of direct trusteeship by the United Nations. In the circumstances, he was not enthusiastic about Italy as an Administering Power aided by an Advisory Council of limited competence. In view of the fact that the purpose of the draft resolution was to promote the development of Somaliland towards independence, representatives of the local population should be included in the Advisory Council. He therefore proposed an amendment (A/C.1/538) to the Lebanese amendment (A/C.1/530) consisting in the addition of the words "and of three representatives of the local population, elected by the political organizations of the territory" after the words "representatives of the following States" . . . [five States]. That principle had been acknowledged in the case of Libya, and seemed even more advisable in the case of Somaliland since that territory would once again be under Italian control.

25. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon), in reply to the Philippine representative, expressed the view that various States should be allowed to decide for themselves whether or not they would send their



representatives on the Advisory Council to the Trusteeship Council. He did not consider that a State member of the Trusteeship Council and of the Advisory Council for Somaliland should have two seats on the Trusteeship Council. In accordance with United Nations practice, the representative normally accredited to the Trusteeship Council might be assisted by the representative of the same country on the Advisory Council.

26. With regard to the Polish amendment (A/C.1/538), he recalled that the text of the annexure (A/C.1/522) to the Trusteeship Agreement proposed by India provided for such an eventuality in due course. Nevertheless, for the time being it was not a matter of drafting a constitution, but of implementing a trusteeship system. It was therefore unnecessary at the moment to consider the participation of the local population on an equal footing with Members of the United Nations.

27. Mr. VOYNA (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) considered that, since the question under discussion was of primary interest to the local population the Polish amendment (A/C.1/538) was logical. He could not understand why the Lebanese representative was opposed to collaboration between representatives of the United Nations and the representatives of the local population, especially in view of the fact that a precedent had been established in the case of Libya. It was true that trusteeship was contemplated in the case of Somaliland, but the purpose of trusteeship was to assist the population to govern itself freely and the Polish amendment was, therefore, most appropriate. It was surprising that a representative of the Arab States refused to accept a proposal in favour of the inhabitants of Somaliland.

28. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) reminded the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic that he had not said that the local populations should not be represented. On the contrary, he was in favour of the Indian proposal on that matter. The populations should be heard in due course, when a constitution was drawn up for the country.

29. Mr. HOUDEK (Czechoslovakia) recalled that his delegation was in favour of independence for Somaliland after the shortest possible period of transition. That was why it had supported the USSR proposal (A/C.1/487/Rev.1) and would vote for the Polish amendment. The Czechoslovak delegation's opposition to the exercise of trusteeship by Italy alone had been strengthened by the United Kingdom representative's statement that the terms of reference of the Advisory Council should be restricted in order not to embarrass the Italian Administration. In that connexion, the Czechoslovak delegation supported the suggestion submitted by the Egyptian representative.

30. He read a passage from a statement by a representative of the Somali Youth League to the effect that part of the population violently opposed the return of Italy and pointed out that the Polish amendment might satisfy that section of the population and thus avoid serious dissension. The solution adopted in the case of Libya should be used as a precedent and the foundations should be laid immediately for the participation of the populations of Somaliland in the administration of their country.

31. Mr. YU Tsune-chi (China) recalled that the principle of Italian trusteeship over Somaliland had been approved successively by the four Powers, by the Assembly at its previous session and by the Sub-Committee. Since then, arguments had been advanced for and against the independence of Somaliland and for and against the principle of Italian trusteeship. The establishment of an Advisory Council, therefore, seemed to be a desirable compromise solution and, in the case under consideration, it would be sufficient for the Council to consist of three members.

32. He considered the Philippine representative's remark on the Lebanese amendment to be pertinent. No State should assume the functions of a judge and be one of the parties at the same time. He therefore considered that a State member of the Trusteeship Council should be specially represented on that Council if it was a member of the Advisory Council for Somaliland. Hence he proposed an amendment (A/C.1/540) to the Lebanese proposal, in order that the Trusteeship Council could invite all the members of the Advisory Council.

33. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon), in reply to the Chinese representative, said that several representatives of the same State could serve on the same delegation without difficulty. He added that the Trusteeship Council was composed of Member States and not of representatives of those Member States. He was therefore unable to accept the amendment submitted by the Chinese delegation (A/C.1/540).

34. The CHAIRMAN thought that question would be decided by the vote on the Chinese amendment. The representative of Lebanon having included the names of three States in his proposal, the problem was simplified. The Committee, however, still had before it the Argentine amendment that the Advisory Council should be composed of the representatives of two States only.

35. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) indicated that he would agree to the Council being composed of three members.

36. The CHAIRMAN stated that in those circumstances the Committee had before it a proposal presented jointly by Lebanon and Argentina and amendments thereto submitted by the delegations of Poland and China.

37. In reply to a question by Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) concerning the Egyptian representative's suggestion that the word "Advisory" before the word "Council" should be deleted from the proposal, Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) stated that he had not presented a formal proposal to that effect.

38. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) thus formally proposed that the word "Advisory" should be omitted from the joint Lebanese-Argentine proposal.

39. The CHAIRMAN said the Committee was accordingly dealing with three amendments to the joint proposal, two submitted by Poland and one submitted by China.

40. He put the first Polish amendment (A/C.1/528) to the vote.

*The amendment was rejected by 33 votes to 9 with 17 abstentions.*

41. Mr. YU Tsune-chi (China) proposed the following amendment to the concluding passage of the joint proposal of Argentina and Lebanon:

“That the terms of reference of the Advisory Council shall be determined in the Trusteeship Agreement and shall include a provision whereby the Trusteeship Council shall invite members of the Advisory Council to participate without vote in the debates of the Trusteeship Council on any question relating to this territory.”

42. Under that amendment the Philippines—already a member of the Trusteeship Council—if it also became a member of the Advisory Council, would be able to be represented in the Trusteeship Council first by its representative on the Trusteeship Council, and secondly by its representative on the Advisory Council.

43. The CHAIRMAN put the Chinese amendment to the vote.

*The amendment was rejected by 25 votes to 6, with 27 abstentions.*

44. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Polish amendment to delete the word “Advisory” in the joint Argentine-Lebanese proposal.

45. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) having asked for a roll-call vote the CHAIRMAN called for a vote by roll-call.

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*The Philippines, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Liberia, Pakistan.

*Against:* Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru.

*Abstaining:* Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran.

*The amendment was rejected by 37 votes to 14 with 8 abstentions.*

46. The CHAIRMAN put the joint Argentine-Lebanese proposal to the vote.

47. At the request of Mr. ARCE (Argentina) the CHAIRMAN said the vote would be taken by roll-call.

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Czechoslovakia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba.

*Against:* Ethiopia.

*Abstaining:* Czechoslovakia, Denmark, New Zealand, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

*The joint amendment was adopted by 48 votes to 1, with 10 abstentions.*

48. The CHAIRMAN said the Committee would proceed to deal with paragraph 3 of section B of the draft resolution contained in the report of Sub-Committee 17 (A/C.1/522).

49. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) recalled that at the previous session and also at the current session, Pakistan had opposed a single-nation trusteeship over Somaliland; it would have preferred collective United Nations trusteeship administered by the Trusteeship Council. Since, however, the majority of Member States thought that the circumstances were not yet ripe for the Trusteeship System administered by the United Nations, whether in the case of Somaliland or in the case of any other territory, his delegation had not insisted that a vote should be taken on that proposal.

50. During the debate in the Sub-Committee, great improvements had been introduced into the proposals which it had originally had before it. It was to be hoped that the Committee would adopt the clause requiring a declaration of the constitutional principles guaranteeing the rights of the inhabitants of Somaliland to be annexed to the Trusteeship Agreement, as well as the Indian amendment (A/C.1/537) to the effect that the Trusteeship Council and the Administering Authority should be guided by the terms of the annexure to the draft resolution. Paragraph 3 of the annexure was particularly important. There were to be not fewer than five representatives of the principal political parties or organizations in the Trust Territory in order to ensure just representation to all political parties. The confidence of the peoples of those territories, and particularly of the Somali Youth League, must be gained with regard to the trusteeship plan. The original proposal had been further improved in that the clause stating that the granting of independence to Somaliland after a period of ten years should be subject to the approval of the General Assembly had been dropped.

51. He appealed to all the parties and groups among the population of Somaliland which had hitherto protested against the idea of Italian trusteeship to reconsider the trusteeship proposal as a whole. The Committee should try to convince them of the necessity of applying that proposal, if adopted, in such a way that they could be granted independence at the earliest possible date. The Administering Authority should also be urged to avoid any discrimination in the choice of local political leaders in favour of those who had supported the idea of Italian trusteeship. Both sides should give the necessary guarantees to permit the successful implementation of the proposal which the General Assembly would adopt.

52. Ethiopia had certain fears with regard to the proposed plan. It must be hoped that when they had studied the proposal as a whole, both the Government of Ethiopia and the people of Somaliland would react favourably.

53. On the basis of the confidence shown within the Committee and pending the reaction of the Ethiopian Government and of certain sections of the population of Somaliland, his delegation would not object to the trusteeship over Somaliland being entrusted to Italy. It would abstain from voting on that paragraph in the First Committee.

54. Mr. TARCHIANI (Italy) wished to assure the Committee in the name of his Government that no discrimination of any sort would be exercised *vis-à-vis* those who had opposed Italian trusteeship. On the contrary, their loyal co-operation for the development and well-being of Somaliland would be appreciated by Italy in the most friendly spirit.

55. Mr. LONDOÑO Y LONDOÑO (Colombia) wished to express his gratitude to the Committee for the confidence shown in his country in designating it a member of the Advisory Council for the administration of Somaliland. He particularly thanked the Argentine delegation for having taken the initiative in that respect. Climatic and geographical conditions were very similar in Somaliland and Colombia and that would help the Colombian representative to understand the problems in Somaliland.

56. Colombia, being opposed to the ideas of colonialism and, like all the peoples of South America, favourable to the emancipation of non-self-governing peoples, would endeavour to give the Administering Authority all the advice in its power in order to lead Somaliland nearer to independence.

57. The CHAIRMAN put paragraph 4 (formerly paragraph 3) of the proposal under section B of the draft resolution submitted by Sub-Committee 17 to the vote.

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*China, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile.

*Against:* Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

*Abstaining:* Liberia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden.

*Paragraph 4 was adopted by 48 votes to 7, with 4 abstentions.*

58. Mr. SUNDE (Norway) said he had voted for the text although he would have preferred

the situation to be further clarified by a commission of investigation.

59. At the request of Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland), the CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Polish amendment relating to paragraph 5 (formerly paragraph 4) of section B.

*The amendment was rejected by 44 votes to 4, with 5 abstentions.*

60. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraph 5 (formerly paragraph 4) of section B.

*Paragraph 5 was adopted by 46 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions.*

61. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraph 6 (formerly paragraph 4) of section B.

*Paragraph 6 was adopted by 53 votes, with 1 abstention.*

62. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) supported the amendment submitted by the representative of India (A/C.1/537) to paragraph 7 (formerly paragraph 6) of section B.

63. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India) said the object of the annexure which his delegation had added to the Sub-Committee's draft was to guarantee Somaliland's advancement to independence in ten years and to ensure that during the transition period the administration of Somaliland would be responsible to a representative local council for all internal questions and to the United Nations for all questions relating to the territory's foreign relations. That annexure would tend to inaugurate a new trusteeship formula. Italy, with the assistance of certain other States, would have the privilege of being the first country to work in the new field. He took it that Italy would be favourable to that formula both in the interest of the inhabitants of Somaliland and in its own.

64. Mr. EBAN (Israel) supported the amendment submitted by the Indian delegation. He thought that the representatives of the local political organizations should derive their authority from those organizations and not from the Administering Powers. He proposed that paragraph 3 of the annex should be replaced by the following text (A/C.1/539):

"3. To assist him in the discharge of his functions the Administering Authority shall consult with a council consisting of five representatives to be elected or nominated by the principal political parties and organizations in the Trust Territory."

65. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Indian amendment (A/C.1/537) to paragraph 7 (formerly paragraph 6) of section B.

*The amendment was adopted by 50 votes, with 7 abstentions.*

66. The CHAIRMAN put paragraph 7 (formerly paragraph 6) of section B to the vote as amended.

*Paragraph 7, as amended, was adopted by 56 votes, with 3 abstentions.*

67. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider the annexure proposed by the Indian delegation and pointed out that an amendment (A/C.1/539) had been submitted by the Israel delegation to paragraph 3 of that annexure.

68. Mr. WENDELEN (Belgium) recalled that Sub-Committee 17 had not given its views on the

text of the annexure proposed by the Indian delegation. He therefore doubted the Committee's competence to vote on that text and considered that, if the Indian delegation were to accept the amendment of the Israel delegation, that amendment might be inserted in the annexure without a vote being taken.

69. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) agreed with the Belgian representative that the Committee should neither give its views nor vote on the annexure submitted by the Indian delegation, since Sub-Committee 17 had not given its views on that text.

70. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) stated that he had abstained from voting on section B, paragraph 7, of the Sub-Committee's proposal for similar reasons to those expressed by the Argentine representative. The fact that the Committee was referring to the text of the annexure without making any comments on it was surprising. Nevertheless, it seemed to be difficult to do anything else, in view of the decision taken.

71. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) considered that the best solution would be to transmit the Indian proposal to the Trusteeship Council, with a general recommendation. The Trusteeship Council had its well-defined responsibilities and should be allowed to study the recommendation submitted by the Indian delegation.

72. Mr. GARCÍA BAUER (Guatemala) thought that the Committee was not competent to discuss the details of that annexure, for which the Indian delegation and not Sub-Committee 17, was responsible. The detailed consideration of that annexure should take place during the discussion of the Trusteeship Agreement which would be drafted by the Trusteeship Council.

73. Mr. WENDELEN (Belgium) wished to point out that there was no objection to the Trusteeship Council using the text proposed by the Indian delegation as a basis for the preparation of the Trusteeship Agreement. If the Committee were to vote on the text, he thought it probable, however, that it would approve its wording, though it had not been examined in detail either by the Committee or by the Sub-Committee.

74. The CHAIRMAN considered that, since the Sub-Committee had not voted on the annexure, that text did not call for any decision on the part of the First Committee.

75. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) considered that the annexure submitted by the Indian delegation should be considered, since that text would then have a certain authority.

76. For instance, paragraph 5 of the Indian text stated that the Council which would assist the Administrator in his legislative work might be enlarged as the Administrator saw fit. The article in the present form would enable the Administrator to appoint six members to that Council. Those six members could then impose their will upon the five representatives elected by the political parties and organization of the population.

77. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India) stated that the constitution proposed by his delegation did not of course represent a complete document. That was why it was provided in paragraph (a) of paragraph 8 of that text that "the United Nations acting through its appropriate organs may: make rules to supplement this constitution".

The question of how the representatives provided for in paragraphs 3 and 5 would be elected could be decided by the Trusteeship Council.

78. The CHAIRMAN considered that it was for the Committee to decide whether the annexure submitted by the Indian delegation should be an official document, on which the Committee wished to give its views, or whether it wished to confine its approval of that annexure to the opinion it had expressed in paragraph 7 of section B of the draft of Sub-Committee 17.

79. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) suggested that any remarks that might be made in connexion with that annexure should be discussed in the Trusteeship Council. By adopting paragraph 7 of section B the Sub-Committee's proposal, the Committee had indicated that the Trusteeship Council should be guided by the annexure. If the Committee were to amend the Indian text, that would amount to a reconsideration of paragraph 7 and would therefore, under the rules of procedure, require a two-thirds majority vote.

80. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) did not agree with the United States representative's interpretation. The Committee's position was similar as if it were to adopt part of a resolution including clauses for which the implementation was provided in the subsequent paragraphs. In the present case, paragraph 7 of section B was one clause and its implementation was provided for in the annexure. Since the Committee had recommended that annexure, it should have definite views in its regard. Nevertheless, the First Committee was not the most competent body to deal with those questions which, in fact, lay within the competence of the Fourth Committee. The annexure under discussion should therefore be referred to that Committee for consideration and for a report.

81. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) shared the views of the United States and Argentine representatives and supported the Chairman's suggestion that the Committee should not give its views on the annexure.

82. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) thought that there could be no question of referring the text to another Committee for consideration without having previously studied it.

83. Mr. GARCÍA BAUER (Guatemala) considered that the annexure should not be altered by the First Committee, but should be submitted to the Trusteeship Council in its existing form.

84. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) thought that the Committee should submit the annexure to the Trusteeship Council, since that organ was competent to deal with it.

85. The CHAIRMAN ruled that the annexure submitted by the Indian delegation would be attached in its existing form to the draft resolution which would be adopted by the Committee.

86. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) was prepared to accept that ruling, but expressed certain doubts in that respect.

87. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) recalled that his delegation had explained in the Sub-Committee that the imposition of Italian trusteeship upon Somaliland constituted a threat to the independ-

ence and security of Ethiopia, and that the Government of that country was unable to participate in any way in the work of a body entrusted with the delimitation of the frontiers of Somaliland. The question would certainly arise when a Trusteeship Agreement for that territory was discussed by various organs of the United

Nations. The Ethiopian delegation would be obliged to maintain its position on that subject while the interests of the security of its country were not respected.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SECOND MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 11 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies (*continued*)

##### DISCUSSION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (*continued*)

1. Mr. EBAN (Israel), on a point of order, drew the Committee's attention to the procedural situation resulting from the vote on paragraph 7 (formerly paragraph 6) of section B at the previous meeting. He recalled that before the vote had been taken, he had suggested a new formulation of paragraph 3 of the annexure to section B according to which the Trusteeship Council and the Administering Authority would be guided by the principle of nomination and election in the constitution of the local council rather than by the principle of appointment. The author of the annexure to section B, referred to in paragraph 7 (formerly paragraph 6) of section B, the representative of India, had appeared to have been in favour of the proposed change, and therefore, Mr. Eban had voted on the proposal on the assumption that the change had been made. After the vote had been counted, however, the Chairman had ruled that the amendment did not exist. Mr. Eban reserved his delegation's opinion as to whether it was either possible or appropriate for the Committee not to vote on an amendment submitted by any delegation. In order to avoid prolonging the debate, he suggested that the report to the General Assembly should contain an account of the procedural steps which had been followed in respect of the Israel amendment, in order that it might be possible to raise the issue again at a later stage.

2. The CHAIRMAN agreed with the suggestion of the representative of Israel and thought that it would be possible to include a statement on the matter in the Committee's report.

3. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) considered that the report should refer to all amendments and divergent opinions expressed on the annexure to section B for the information of those who might work on this question at a later stage. He asked that the amendment of his delegation should be mentioned.

4. Mr. EBAN (Israel) commented that it was his understanding that the report customarily referred to all amendments which had been accepted or rejected. He had made a special request with regard to the Israel amendment because it did not fall in either category.

5. The CHAIRMAN said that the report would place it on record that suggestions had been made to the delegation of India for changes in the text, and that those suggestions had received ap-

proval from certain delegations. In that sense, the views of the various delegations would be made available to the authorities dealing with the question in the future. It should, however, be borne in mind that the annexure to section B was not an official text. Sub-Committee 17 had taken no decision on the text, nor had the Committee. Consequently, the annexure to section B was a text of the delegation of India and there could be no formal amendments to such a text. That was the sense of his ruling on the previous day.

6. The Chairman said that the Committee would now proceed to consider section C of the Sub-Committee's draft resolution. The first amendment to be examined was that proposed by the Polish delegation (A/C.1/529).

7. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom), on a point of order, said that he had not understood that section B had been disposed of. He asked for an assurance that, if the Committee proceeded to examine section C, delegations would still be able to propose additions to either of the preceding sections at a later time.

8. The CHAIRMAN recalled that he had stated at the previous meeting that, although section B had been disposed of, there still remained the task of adding to that section, or to a separate draft resolution dealing with the substance of that section, some paragraph relating to administrative and budgetary matters. As he understood the situation, the Committee had agreed to postpone consideration of organizational matters until after it had decided to submit to the General Assembly one inclusive draft resolution or three separate ones. He was aware of no other purpose which would require re-examination of section B.

9. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) observed that it might be necessary, in the light of forthcoming decisions, to adopt certain complementary provisions with regard to any of the three separate sections. As he understood the situation, no delegation could be prevented from returning to sections A and B at a later stage if it so desired.

10. The CHAIRMAN agreed that that was possible because the sections had not been adopted as a whole.

11. In reply to a request for clarification from Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom), the CHAIRMAN explained that the Committee would have to return to each section later when it came to vote upon them as a whole. At that time, the Committee would be able to deal with the various sections in any way it desired and, if it so decided, it could make additions.

12. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) said that apparently the United Kingdom representative wished to add substantive texts to section B. In his opinion additions of substance should be considered at the present time. He asked further clarification from the Chairman on that point.

13. The CHAIRMAN was inclined to agree that an amendment of substance to section B should be discussed before the Committee commenced consideration of the following section.

14. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) insisted that the matter had already been decided. It was still possible to propose additions to section B of a complementary, procedural or budgetary character. Amendments dealing with the substance, however, would require a two-thirds majority vote before they could be considered.

15. The CHAIRMAN said that, since section B had not been approved as a whole, if any delegation wished to add a new paragraph, it had the right to submit an amendment in that sense, either before the Committee opened consideration of section C or at a later stage in the debate.

16. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) agreed with the Chairman's ruling. The Committee had still to consider the problem of the delimitation of the frontiers of Somaliland, and the Argentine delegation intended to propose an addition to section B which would provide for the eventuality that the United Kingdom might wish to withdraw from Somaliland before Italy had taken over the trusteeship administration. Moreover, as the representative of Peru had pointed out, it might be necessary to add certain complementary provisions at a later time.

17. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee would now pass on to consider section C of the draft resolution. The first amendment to be examined was that submitted by the Polish delegation.

18. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) explained the purpose of his delegation's amendment (A/C.1/529). The proposal to establish a new commission of inquiry was merely a traditional delaying tactic which had been resorted to because the plan of certain delegations to dismember Eritrea had failed. The Sub-Committee's proposal was contrary to the terms of the Italian Peace Treaty, article 23 and annex XI of which clearly provided that the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies should be dealt with as a single whole and that a solution for each territory should be reached simultaneously. The Sub-Committee's proposal in regard to Eritrea did not constitute a final settlement and, if the General Assembly were to adopt it, it would be violating its terms of reference. Failure to reach a final decision with regard to one of the former Italian colonies would make it impossible to solve the question as a whole. Therefore, adoption of the Sub-Committee's draft resolution with regard to Eritrea would mean that the Powers administering the former Italian colonies would continue to discharge their function and that the United Nations would thus be subordinated to the will of those Powers.

19. At the same time, postponement of the General Assembly's decision with regard to Eritrea could not possibly be acceptable to the population since it would leave the future of Eritrea in the balance. Mr. Wierblowski believed

that it would be unjust to disregard the aspirations and desires of the Eritrean people which, as had been clearly shown in the Sub-Committee as well as in the First Committee, sought independence. If, for certain reasons, that independence could not be granted immediately then the Eritrean people wanted a specific time-limit to be set, after which independence would be granted immediately. The Polish amendment took account of the real interests and desires of the people of Eritrea.

20. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) said that the problem of the future of Eritrea had been thoroughly debated in the Sub-Committee. Several delegations had tried to find a satisfactory solution, but that had not proved possible because of a certain divergence of views regarding the proper interpretation of the available information as to the real desires of the population. On the one hand, the report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation alleged that the territory could not be considered as a single political unit because one portion was closely connected by ethnical, geographical and historical ties with Ethiopia, while another area was equally bound to certain other countries neighbouring Eritrea. On the basis of those considerations, the Four Power Commission of Investigation had recommended that Eritrea be divided. On the other hand, other sources, including certain representatives of the population, had urged that Eritrea could become a viable sovereign State and should be granted independence. In the face of that contradictory evidence, the only course which had been possible for the Sub-Committee was to seek further information and recommend a new investigation which would permit the General Assembly to reach a decision.

21. Mr. Santa Cruz agreed with the Polish representative that it was the General Assembly's duty to take a decision on the entire problem of the disposal of the former Italian colonies but, lacking the necessary information, it was perfectly proper to call for a new investigation in Eritrea and it would be absurd, on that account, to postpone the decision with respect to Libya and Somaliland.

22. The Polish representative had stated that his proposal conformed with the expressed desires of the Eritrean population. Mr. Santa Cruz recalled that he had heard statements by some representatives of the indigenous population urging that a certain part of their country be annexed to Ethiopia. Likewise, other representatives had urged immediate independence. However, he had not heard any representative Eritreans request collective United Nations trusteeship as provided for in the Polish amendment. If the Polish delegation greatly desired immediate independence for Eritrea, the best procedure would be the establishment of a commission of inquiry which would permit the General Assembly to take a final decision at its following session and possibly to declare Eritrea independent prior to the time-limit proposed in the Polish amendment.

23. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) recalled that he had been one of the first to press for a single inclusive resolution by the General Assembly dealing with all the former Italian colonies concomitantly. However, he did not agree with the Polish representative that adoption of the Sub-Committee's proposal in regard to Eritrea would mean divid-



ing the question. What the Sub-Committee had proposed was a decision of substance since it laid down the principle that the final settlement must be based upon the right of self-determination of the Eritrean people.

24. True, the decision would not be complete as regards Eritrea but that was because of the very complex problems involved as the result of different geographical, ethnical, religious and economic claims. Clearly it would be impossible for the General Assembly to be just to all concerned unless it had more complete information at its disposal. That information could only be obtained through a plebiscite carried through a United Nations commission.

25. Mr. Belaúnde urged the Committee to adopt the Sub-Committee's draft resolution and to reject the Polish amendment.

26. Mr. HENRÍQUEZ UREÑA (Dominican Republic) likewise believed that the complicated problem of Eritrea could not be solved satisfactorily without additional information which could be obtained only by a United Nations commission. The United Nations had already obtained a good result in a similar situation by adopting a similar procedure with regard to Palestine. Had it not sent a commission of investigation to the latter territory, the General Assembly would probably still be groping in the dark. It was quite true that the Sub-Committee's proposal would mean postponing the final settlement for Eritrea, but at least there would be an assurance that the final decision would be in accordance with the wishes of the population. Although the delegation of the Dominican Republic very much favoured granting independence to all peoples, it was of the opinion that it would be unwise to adopt such a measure until all the aspects of the situation had been investigated. He therefore strongly supported the Sub-Committee's draft.

27. Ato AKLILOU (Ethiopia) agreed with the Polish representative that there could be no global solution for the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies so long as no final settlement had been reached with respect to Eritrea. However, the Ethiopian delegation was opposed to the granting of independence to that territory. While it fully supported the principles laid down in annex XI of the Italian Peace Treaty, the Ethiopian delegation felt that the wishes of the population were of paramount importance. The report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation showed that the majority of the population, amounting to 96 per cent of the people of the Eastern Provinces, which in turn amounted to 68 per cent of the total population, demanded union with Ethiopia. Hence, the proposal for independence did not take into account the wishes of the population. Likewise, it did not take into account the requirements of international peace and security or the interests of the countries concerned. Both at the present and at the previous sessions of the General Assembly, representatives of Eritrea had stated that, as far as they were concerned, self-determination implied union with Ethiopia and not the creation of a sovereign Eritrean State. The Ethiopian representative added that the proposal for independence of Eritrea, together with a grant of trusteeship of Italy over Somaliland, would constitute a terrible threat to the security of Ethiopia. He was

therefore strongly opposed to the Polish amendment.

28. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he had listened to all the arguments in favour of the Sub-Committee's draft resolution to establish a commission of investigation and to postpone the final decision regarding Eritrea but he had found no validity in those arguments. In his opinion the report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation provided ample information upon which a decision could be based. The fact that the First Committee had been satisfied with the Commission's information regarding Libya and Somaliland showed that in connexion with the question of Eritrea, the Committee was employing a different yardstick. To be candid, certain delegations were not basing themselves on the available information but on other considerations. Surely, there had been ample information showing that the people of Somaliland did not wish Italian trusteeship and insisted, if not on immediate independence, at least on a collective United Nations trusteeship. Of course, it was possible to disagree as to the proportion of the population of Somaliland that objected to Italian trusteeship but it was an indubitable fact, borne out by the recent disturbances in that territory, that a substantial proportion was actively opposed to any return of Italian rule. Nevertheless, in spite of the demands of the population, the First Committee, by a majority vote, had decided (321st meeting) to impose Italian trusteeship. Mr. Arutiunian believed that the complaints about the shortage of information regarding Eritrea were unfounded and were nothing less than a political manoeuvre. If, in the case of Somaliland, the Committee could adopt a solution contrary to the demands of the people, then it was no use complaining about the lack of information or the faulty quality of such information with respect to Eritrea.

29. The second argument adduced by supporters of the Sub-Committee's plan was that there had been some divergencies of opinion regarding the real desires of the people of Eritrea. Actually, those divergencies of opinion had really existed among the members of the First Committee. Nevertheless, there had been similar disagreements in the case of Somaliland and that had not prevented the majority from adopting a decision in disregard of the desires of the Somali people. Furthermore, even if such divergencies of opinion had to be taken into account that was not a logical reason for rejecting the Polish amendment. Once Eritrea had been declared a sovereign independent State, then the people of Eritrea would be free to make any adjustments they desired. If the majority wanted to be united with Ethiopia, then an independent Eritrea could easily solve that question on the basis of democratic methods.

30. Of course, the real reason for postponing the settlement was that the colonial Powers had failed to reach agreement on the disposal of Eritrea. Hence, those Powers were seeking to postpone the final decision in the hope that, during the interval before the next session of the General Assembly, they would be able to reach an understanding on Eritrea which would redound to their benefit. It was well known that the secret Bevin-Sforza Agreement lay at the basis of the decision adopted by the majority of the First Committee in connexion with Libya and Somali-

land. In the case of Eritrea, the Bevin-Sforza Agreement provided for partition and, largely on the initiative of the United States delegation, attempts had been made to implement parts of that agreement. However, partition had not been accepted and that was why the majority of delegations were trying to delay the final settlement in the hope that it would be possible to agree on partitioning Eritrea.

31. On the other hand, no attempt was being made to satisfy the claim of Ethiopia which had been the victim of Italian aggression. For his part, Mr. Arutiunian could not imagine how the General Assembly could solve the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies without any concession to Ethiopia. The Committee had heard the Ethiopian representative's statement that the majority decision with regard to Somaliland represented a formidable threat to the national security of his country (317th meeting). What was the result of all the General Assembly's work on the question of the former Italian colonies as far as Ethiopia was concerned? Anxiety and concern was rapidly growing in that country as a result of the First Committee's decision. Mr. Arutiunian said that since one of the real sources of the Second World War had been Italy's aggression against Ethiopia, it was impossible to conceive that one of the last instruments for the solution of the problems arising out of the war should be so formulated as to aggravate Ethiopia's anxiety for its national security. That was another reason why the Soviet Union delegation disagreed with the proposal of the majority of Sub-Committee 17.

32. Mr. Arutiunian gave his delegation's support for the amendment of the Polish delegation.

33. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) said that although his delegation wished a final solution regarding Eritrea, it could not agree to the contention that the United Nations was bound to come to a final solution for each of the former Italian colonies at the present session. That fact was borne out by paragraph 3 of annex XI of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, which envisaged the possibility of the four powers finding a solution for one or two territories only. Moreover, his delegation could not support the views expressed by certain delegations that, if no solution was recommended with regard to Eritrea, any recommendation regarding Libya, for example, should be postponed. There was no logic in such a reasoning. His delegation was well aware of the fact that despite the strenuous efforts of the Sub-Committee, no acceptable solution concerning Eritrea had commended itself to a majority of that Sub-Committee. The creation of a commission of investigation, therefore, was the only acceptable alternative. It could not be said that such a decision amounted to a postponement of the question; on the contrary, that was a positive step since the commission of investigation would ascertain fully the real wishes of the inhabitants of Eritrea whose representatives had so far expressed conflicting views before the First Committee. His delegation, accordingly, would vote against the Polish amendment, as well as against any other attempt to prevent the establishment of such a commission.

34. Mr. DE MARCOS (Cuba) declared that the present political evolution in international relations witnessed the twilight of colonialism.

Although his delegation was always in favour of the principle of independence for all peoples, it could not acquiesce to the Polish amendment, in view of the claims of the Ethiopian representative to the effect that the majority of the Eritrean people desired annexation to Ethiopia. In view of the serious doubts entertained by his delegation with regard to those wishes, it preferred to support the establishment of a commission with a view to ascertaining the real wishes of the inhabitants.

35. Finally, as regards the statement of the representative of the USSR to the effect that one of the causes of the Second World War had been the Italian aggression against Ethiopia, he wished to appeal to the members of the First Committee to work for the future without going back to past memories.

36. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) said that since the Polish amendment was in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the Eritrean people, his delegation would support it, or, in case of its rejection, would vote in favour of the establishment of the proposed commission.

37. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said that although he agreed with the representative of Cuba that the era of colonialism was coming to an end, the solutions proposed by the First Committee merely constituted an old-fashioned redistribution of colonies. Moreover, he could not support the appeal of the Cuban delegation regarding oblivion of past memories, since Poland had suffered heavily from the events of the Second World War. On the contrary, in disposing of the former Italian colonies, the First Committee should take into account the experiences gained from studying the causes of the Second World War.

38. The representative of Egypt had contended that the stipulations of paragraph 3 of annex XI of the Peace Treaty with Italy did not prevent the United Nations from recommending partial solutions to the problem under discussion. Yet, he did not take into account the fact that the very text of that paragraph stipulated that, in case the four Powers disagreed among themselves, the General Assembly might adopt a recommendation regarding the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies as a whole and not regarding any particular territory.

39. In so far as the statement of the representative of Peru was concerned, to the effect that the proposed solution regarding Eritrea constituted a substantive decision, his delegation could not acquiesce in that interpretation since, in its opinion, the establishment of the commission would amount to a procedural decision as to the method whereby a solution was sought.

40. His delegation supported the contention of the representative of the USSR that the establishment of a commission regarding Eritrea was due to the disagreement prevailing among the colonial Powers and not to a lack of information with regard to that territory.

41. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) said that in disposing of Eritrea, the First Committee could not apply principles similar to those taken into account while solving the problem of Somaliland. Whereas the unity of Somaliland had not been questioned, with regard to Eritrea, three different proposals

had been submitted, namely, the Sub-Committee's recommendation, the Polish amendment for its independence, and the Ethiopian claim for the incorporation of the territory into Ethiopia. Moreover, the report of the Four Power Commission of Investigation had itself acknowledged the complexity of the problem, thereby necessitating a different approach to the question. Therefore, the need for ascertaining the real wishes of the population through a commission was obvious. On the contrary, the solution insinuated by the representative of the Soviet Union, namely a solution without prior consultation of the population would be an old-fashioned one. Moreover, in issuing certain specific directives to the proposed commission, the General Assembly would then be adopting a substantive and not merely a procedural decision.

42. Mr. MORALES MARENCO (Nicaragua) said that his delegation would vote against the Polish amendment, not because it was opposed to granting Eritrea its independence, but because it favoured the creation of a commission to ascertain the real wishes of the local inhabitants. Of course, should the proposed commission recommend independence for the territory, his delegation would support that recommendation. Moreover, although it recognized the claims of Ethiopia, it would reserve its position regarding that matter, pending the report of the commission of investigation.

43. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) pointed out that the present deliberations resorted to procrastinations and postponement in dealing with the problems arising from the defeat of the axis Powers. That was remi-

niscient of the methods of the old-fashioned diplomacy. Moreover, Mr. Kiselev contended that the postponement of the Eritrean question was not due to lack of information but merely to disagreement among the colonial Powers themselves, and he gave a detailed description of the proceedings of the Sub-Committee in support of that contention.

44. The representative of Peru had contended that, in solving the problem, due account should be taken of the real wishes of the inhabitants of Eritrea. But those wishes had been conveyed in a letter addressed on 10 November 1949 to the Chairman of the First Committee by the Eritrean Bloc for Independence, wherein the Bloc expressed its regret for the failure of the Committee to adopt a decision and protested the doubts, artificially raised, as to the reality of their unanimous will for independence.

45. His delegation agreed with the views expressed by the representative of Poland with regard to the necessity of remembering the causes of the Second World War, since a fair recollection of the Italian attack on Ethiopia would greatly contribute to the understanding of Ethiopia's apprehensions as a result of the proposed solution for Somaliland.

46. Since the Polish amendment was in accordance with the real wishes of the population of Eritrea, his delegation would vote in favour of it and would remind the First Committee that the adoption of the majority proposal would merely lead to a repetition of the events of 1936.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THIRD MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 11 November 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies (continued)

##### CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN said the discussion would deal with that part of the Polish amendment (A/C.1/529) to section C of the Sub-Committee's draft resolution (A/C.1/522), which dealt with Eritrea. He recalled that that important problem had already been fully debated in the First Committee and expressed the hope that delegations would confine their observations strictly to the amendment.

2. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said he had intended to reply to the Peruvian representative, but in view of the Chairman's remarks he would refrain from taking the floor, the Peruvian representative's speech (322nd meeting) having dealt mainly with matters extraneous to the debate.

3. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) asked for separate votes on paragraphs 1, 2 and 7 of point 6 of his amendment, which dealt with Eritrea.

4. The CHAIRMAN put paragraph 1 of point 6 of the part of the Polish amendment (A/C.1/529) related to section C of the Sub-Committee's draft resolution to the vote.

*Paragraph 1 was rejected by 27 votes to 10, with 14 abstentions.*

5. The CHAIRMAN put paragraph 2 to the vote.

*Paragraph 2 was rejected by 30 votes to 11, with 13 abstentions.*

6. The CHAIRMAN put paragraph 7 to the vote.

*Paragraph 7 was rejected by 17 votes to 15, with 22 abstentions.*

7. The CHAIRMAN put paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of that part of the Polish amendment (A/C.1/529) which dealt with Eritrea to the vote.

*Paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 were rejected by 35 votes to 6, with 13 abstentions.*

8. The CHAIRMAN said the Committee would next vote on paragraph 1 of section C as it appeared in the report of Sub-Committee 17 (A/C.1/522). He recalled that the Burmese delegation had submitted an amendment to that paragraph (A/C.1/535).

9. Mr. DE FREITAS-VALLE (Brazil) said that his delegation, as previously indicated during the general debate in Sub-Committee 17, was in favour of the Sub-Committee's draft resolution. Accordingly it would vote for the establishment

of a commission of investigation, while still hoping that Ethiopia's legitimate claims would be satisfied in the near future and some arrangement reached with its neighbours.

10. U So NYUN (Burma) stated that the sole object of his delegation in nominating Canada, Guatemala, Lebanon, Norway and the Philippines had been to choose countries with no direct interest in the problem, so far as that was feasible in the United Nations. The delegations mentioned in his amendment (A/C.1/535) had not been previously consulted, but he hoped that they would be willing to serve on the commission of investigation.

11. Mr. MARTIN (Canada) thanked the Burmese representative, but said that his delegation wished to withdraw in favour of other delegations which had expressed the desire to serve on the commission of investigation.

12. Mr. KURAL (Turkey) supported in principle the establishment of a commission of investigation, as the very facts on which the First Committee would have to base its decision were being questioned.

13. His delegation also approved the principle which had guided the Burmese delegation in the selection of the members of the commission of investigation. Yet, having heard the Canadian representative's statement, the Turkish delegation proposed the Union of South Africa as a member of the commission. That country met the condition stated by the Burmese representative; it was geographically sufficiently distant not to have any direct interest in the problem. In addition, the Union of South Africa was naturally familiar with African problems.

14. U So NYUN (Burma) said his delegation accepted the Turkish representative's suggestion and proposed that the Union of South Africa should replace Canada on the list of members of the commission of investigation.

15. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) recalled that his delegation had already been asked to serve on the Advisory Council for Somaliland. Although it did not usually shirk such duties, it would like to withdraw in favour of Burma, the history of which was in some respects analogous with that of the Philippines. Moreover, such a substitution would not alter the geographical distribution of seats on the commission of investigation. Burma would undoubtedly be able to carry out its tasks in the most satisfactory manner.

16. U So NYUN (Burma) said his delegation, if designated, would be happy to serve on the commission of investigation.

17. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) remarked that the delegation of the Union of South Africa would be able to give effective assistance to the commission of investigation; moreover, it was not directly concerned in the question of Eritrea.

18. His delegation accordingly supported the Turkish representative's suggestion that the Union of South Africa should serve on the commission.

19. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) said that before Burma had been nominated, his delegation had intended to propose Pakistan as a member of the commission of investigation. The presence of

Pakistan would constitute a valuable safeguard for the Moslem population and would at the same time be a recognition of Pakistan's great contribution towards the solution of the problem.

20. Burma having been nominated, however, his delegation would not propose the alternative it had had in mind.

21. Mr. DE FREITAS-VALLE (Brazil) thanked the Iraqi delegation for nominating Brazil for the commission of investigation (A/C.1/542); but his delegation felt that Guatemala should be designated instead. Guatemala would fulfil its task very well indeed.

22. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) reminded the Chairman that his delegation, too, had submitted an amendment (A/C.1/542) which might be merged with the Burmese amendment.

23. His delegation had been guided by two considerations: geographical distribution and the interests of the population, with which many States were particularly concerned.

24. The CHAIRMAN replied that the Burmese amendment had been submitted before that of Iraq; the choice between the two texts was, of course, a matter for the Committee to decide.

25. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) thanked the Burmese representative for proposing Lebanon for membership of the commission of investigation. Nevertheless, his delegation, which had not sought nomination and which had not even been consulted, regretted that it would be unable to serve on the commission.

26. Mr. GHASSEMZADEH (Iran) thanked the Iraqi delegation for proposing Iran's nomination for participation in the commission of investigation, but regretted that his country would be unable to serve on that commission.

27. ATO AKLILOU (Ethiopia) said his delegation had abstained, in Sub-Committee 17, from voting on the establishment of a commission of investigation. Firstly, it was unnecessary to send out a commission after all the information that had been placed at the First Committee's disposal; but secondly, Ethiopia, being certain of the results of such an investigation, had nothing to fear.

28. His delegation would therefore abstain from voting on the principle of the establishment of an investigating commission, but reserved the right to participate in the votes on the various paragraphs and, in particular, on the composition of the commission, which was a major question.

29. There were two possible approaches to the question of the membership of the commission; one could either designate countries directly concerned or, on the contrary, delegations which were neutral and hence certain to be objective. His delegation was prepared to accept either method. It would even prefer not to serve on the commission of investigation and to have the commission composed of neutral delegations exclusively. Indeed, if the General Assembly considered that it had insufficient information, the reason was that it did not trust the delegations which had previously investigated the question. Consequently the work should be entrusted to neutral delegations that had not declared themselves too strongly in favour of one side or the other.

30. His delegation consequently regarded the Union of South Africa, Guatemala, Lebanon, Norway and Burma as generally acceptable. If, however, the commission was to include countries which had declared themselves openly as strongly favouring one side, or countries which were directly concerned, then Egypt and Ethiopia should be appointed.

31. Mr. RIEMENS (Netherlands) supported the nomination of the Union of South Africa for membership of the commission of investigation first, in view of the part played by its armed forces in the liberation of Ethiopia and East Africa, and also, because it was necessary to nominate an African country which was not directly concerned and yet had a certain competence.

32. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) remarked that Lebanon had withdrawn its candidacy and that, if the Burmese delegation agreed to the substitution of Pakistan for Lebanon, the representative of Iraq might perhaps agree to the following composition of the investigating commission: Brazil, Burma, Union of South Africa, Guatemala and Pakistan, and withdraw his amendment.

33. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) thanked the Chilean representative. His delegation had not asked for the honour of serving on the commission of investigation, but would be happy to do so if appointed by the Committee.

34. Ato AKLILOU (Ethiopia), referring to his earlier remarks, said that if countries which had strongly favoured one side were appointed, then the countries concerned, namely Ethiopia and Egypt, should also be appointed.

35. Consequently, if Ethiopia was not chosen, Pakistan whose interventions during the debate would be remembered should not be selected either.

36. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) said that as a result of the nomination withdrawals, seven countries able to serve on the investigating commission remained. Hence a decision might be reached on the basis of equitable geographic distribution, Burma representing Asia; Guatemala, Latin America; Egypt and the Union of South Africa, Africa; and Norway and Denmark, Europe.

37. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the First Committee had two different amendments before it, each of which should include a list of five States. The Burmese draft (A/C.1/542), however, was left with only four names: Union of South Africa, Guatemala, Norway and Burma; of the Iraqi nominations (A/C.1/542), only Egypt and Denmark remained.

38. Mr. KAUFFMANN (Denmark) said two amendments were before the First Committee and both should be examined.

39. His delegation, while thanking the Iraqi representative for the confidence shown in it, felt bound to say that its name had not been proposed at its request, and in fact without its knowledge, and that it consequently wished it struck from the list of members proposed for the commission of investigation.

40. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) as the mover of the proposal that Pakistan should be appointed to the commission of investigation, wished to reply to the arguments advanced by the Ethiopian representative.

41. The Ethiopian representative took the view that Pakistan, having taken a definite stand in the debate, could not be neutral and take part objectively in the investigating commission's work. But surely it would be wronging a delegation not to trust it to change its position if the facts produced during an investigation required it.

42. Accordingly the Chilean delegation still maintained the nomination of Pakistan.

43. U So NYUN (Burma) said his delegation had the highest esteem for the contribution made by Pakistan to the work of the First Committee. He had earlier stated the considerations by which he had been guided in the composition of the investigating commission. He had felt that the commission should consist of delegations not having a direct interest in the question. There were six nominations: the Union of South Africa, Guatemala, Norway, Burma, Pakistan and Egypt; the Pakistan delegation had taken a clear stand on the question of Eritrea, and Egypt was certainly not totally uninterested in the question. He was prepared to propose four names and to leave it to the Committee to choose between Egypt and Pakistan unless other nominations were presented.

44. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said the discussion was drawing out to such an extent that it was becoming less and less likely that the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies could be completed during that meeting.

45. It would therefore be logical and in conformity with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly to vote by secret ballot on the composition of the commission of investigation. Accordingly his delegation formally moved that a secret ballot should be held.

46. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) felt that the secret ballot was suitable only for the election of individuals, and not for that of certain delegations. There was therefore no reason why the First Committee should not vote openly.

47. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said the secret ballot, under the rules of procedure, could apply to the designation of a delegation as well as to that of an individual. Thus the vote on the vice-presidencies of the General Assembly had been by secret ballot.

48. Moreover, through his proposal the First Committee would be able to choose freely the members of the commission of investigation, independently of the proposals contained in the different amendments.

49. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) said that in a secret ballot, election to the investigating commission required an absolute majority.

50. The CHAIRMAN said that, according to the rules of procedure, that was quite correct.

51. Mr. TRANOS (Greece) said the objection to a secret ballot was that it was impossible to know which delegations would agree to be members of the commission.

52. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the four countries mentioned in the Burmese amendment would accept membership in the commission of investigation. It would therefore be simpler to decide upon the Burmese amendment than to

choose the members of the commission of investigation from among the fifty-nine delegations by secret ballot.

53. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) said that before the Burmese amendment could be voted on it had to contain five names in order to be put to the vote.

54. Besides, if the fifth member of the commission of investigation were voted on before the four members nominated by Burma, there was yet another disadvantage. Any delegation receiving a given number of votes might not be chosen as the fifth member, whereas any one of the other four members might have been elected without obtaining a majority and even without receiving as many votes as the fifth member, if there were a sufficiently large number of abstentions.

55. His delegation therefore felt that it would be better to adhere to the rules of procedure and proceed to the vote.

56. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) thought that only delegations whose nomination had been proposed in one of the two amendments should be eligible for the secret ballot.

57. Mr. DE FREITAS-VALLE (Brazil) thought the First Committee could not proceed to a vote on the fifth member of the commission of investigation, unless it had first been settled that the commission would consist of five members.

58. The CHAIRMAN replied to the representative of Iraq that his proposal was perhaps preferable, but that the Polish proposal consisted in choosing five countries from among the fifty-nine Members of the United Nations.

59. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) indicated that his delegation would vote against the Polish proposal which involved the risk that votes might be cast for States which did not agree to membership of the commission of investigation, or else that votes might be spread in such a way as not to take account of the two amendments. Those amendments, however, had priority, and the Committee should vote as soon as possible on the Burmese amendment. However, as the Chairman had proposed, the Brazilian proposal might be considered an amendment to the Burmese amendment and, as such, might be put to the vote immediately.

60. Mr. COUVE DE MURVILLE (France) said he had asked for the floor to make precisely the same point made by the United States representative.

61. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said the representatives of the United States and France did not seem to have a very high opinion of the intellectual capacity of the members of the First Committee. He failed to see why a secret ballot should necessarily have such disastrous results.

62. In any case, the simplest procedure would be to take a vote immediately on the Polish proposal. Moreover, rule 84 of the rules of procedure, though applying to the General Assembly, could, by analogy, apply to the First Committee.

63. Mr. KAUFFMANN (Denmark) said he would vote against the Polish proposal. In elections of members of such a commission, delegations were guided by the desire to elect either an interested country, or else a so-called neutral country. Further, they were guided by considerations of

geographical distribution. But in an election by secret ballot in which it would be possible to vote for any one of the fifty-nine delegations, it would be impossible to apply those principles.

64. Moreover there was still the danger that several of the delegations which had been nominated would not be willing to serve.

65. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) recalled that several delegations had expressed the desire to know whether the delegations named would accept to serve on the commission of investigation. Since it had been proposed to nominate Egypt, his delegation stated that it would willingly serve if elected.

66. As his delegation had previously stated, in Sub-Committee 17, a real solution had to be found for a real situation and, for that purpose, countries should serve which were acquainted with that area and its population, understood the aspirations and language of those peoples, and had contacts with them. The countries familiar with the problem should not necessarily constitute the whole or even the majority of the commission. But Ethiopia and Egypt could make a contribution not less important than that made by the British Administration, which in practice would co-operate in the work of the commission as closely as its members themselves. Just as there was no question of dispensing with the services of the United Kingdom, so Ethiopia's and Egypt's co-operation should be sought. Countries geographically very distant from Eritrea might make serious mistakes with the best intentions in the world, unless they were allowed several years in which to become familiar with the problem. It would therefore be advisable that two of the members of the commission of investigation should come from that area.

67. There could not be more than five members in the commission, but there could be fewer than five, for instance, four.

68. As to the Polish procedural proposal, his delegation would vote against it because the procedure it suggested would hold up the Committee's work.

69. U So NYUN (Burma) said there did not seem to be any serious objection to the nomination of the Union of South Africa, Guatemala, Norway and Burma. Since, moreover, no delegation had proposed a fresh alternative for the fifth country and a choice lay between Egypt and Pakistan, his delegation would choose Pakistan, because that country was more remote from Eritrea. Accordingly he proposed the following members: the Union of South Africa, Guatemala, Norway, Burma and Pakistan.

70. Mr. AZIZ (Afghanistan) agreed with the Egyptian representative that the interested countries should participate in the investigation; for if they were to raise objections later, the same difficulties might recur in the future.

71. Mr. TRANOS (Greece) said that since the Philippines had expressed the desire not to be a member of the commission of inquiry, the Pacific area to which the Philippines belonged was no longer represented. His delegation therefore proposed that New Zealand should serve on the commission of investigation, if it was willing, so that Australasia might be represented.



72. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that the two amendments of Burma and Iraq, being nominations, should be voted on simultaneously. The Committee was dealing with an election and any delegation had the right to submit nominations. The amendment of Iraq should, moreover, be treated as an amendment to the Burmese amendment.

73. The CHAIRMAN said it was impossible to have a simultaneous vote on two texts. The Burmese amendment which had been submitted first would be put to the vote first but naturally delegations which preferred the amendment of Iraq could vote against the Burmese amendment in order to have the opportunity of voting on the other text.

74. Sir Carl BERENDSEN (New Zealand) said the correct procedure and perhaps, in the long run, the quickest would be to choose the members of the commission of investigation by secret ballot from the fifty-nine delegations, although in that way the risk remained that four of the five delegations elected might refuse to form part of the commission. At all events, the worst solution would be to let the discussion drag on. If, therefore, a secret ballot was taken, the majority of delegations would have the sense to vote for countries which had already been nominated and which had accepted their nomination.

75. So far as New Zealand's participation in the work of the commission was concerned, his delegation, while appreciating the honour bestowed upon it, was not at present in a position to indicate whether it would accept nomination if the case arose.

76. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that his delegation withdrew its amendment and wished to submit an amendment to the Burmese text, which was to add the name of Egypt.

77. The CHAIRMAN stated that in that case a fresh alteration would have to be made since, under the Burmese amendment, the commission would consist of not more than five members.

78. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said he would also propose such an amendment.

79. Mr. MARTÍNEZ MORENO (El Salvador) recalled that under the Burmese amendment, the commission of investigation might consist of only four members. Since, however, there were four nominations which had aroused no opposition, that would perhaps be the simplest solution.

80. Mr. WENDELEN (Belgium) thought that if the Committee were to vote by secret ballot it would be impossible to take account of the geographical distribution of membership. Would the First Committee find itself automatically bound by the result of a vote by secret ballot, even if five Slav or Latin-American countries were elected?

81. The CHAIRMAN stated that it would be for the various delegations to think of that difficulty when voting.

82. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) enquired whether it was correct that the Egyptian representative had nominated Ethiopia.

83. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) recalled that his delegation had said earlier, both in Sub-Committee 17 and in the First Committee, that Ethiopia should be a member of the commission of investigation. But it would be simpler if the

representative of Iraq, himself, altered his amendment to the Burmese amendment accordingly.

84. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) accepted that suggestion. His delegation consequently proposed that the commission of investigation should have seven members, being the five delegations proposed by Burma, as well as Egypt and Ethiopia.

85. Mr. AZIZ (Afghanistan) seconded the Iraqi proposal.

86. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Polish proposal that the five members of the commission of investigation should be elected by secret ballot.

*The proposal was rejected by 24 votes to 23, with 9 abstentions.*

87. At the request of Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) the CHAIRMAN put to the vote separately the part of the Iraqi amendment proposing that the commission of investigation should consist of representatives of seven Member States instead of five.

*That part of the amendment was rejected by 21 votes to 11, with 24 abstentions.*

88. The CHAIRMAN stated that the second part of the amendment submitted by the representative of Iraq was thereby also rejected.

89. Mr. MARTÍNEZ MORENO (El Salvador) proposed that the Commission should consist of representatives of four Member States instead of five.

90. The CHAIRMAN put the El Salvadorean amendment to the vote.

*The amendment was rejected by 16 votes to 15, with 25 abstentions.*

91. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Burmese amendment (A/C.1/535) amended to show that the commission of investigation would consist of the representatives of the Union of South Africa, Guatemala, Norway, Burma and Pakistan.

*The amendment thus modified was adopted by 40 votes to 6, with 9 abstentions.*

92. The CHAIRMAN put paragraph 2 of section C of the Sub-Committee's draft resolution to the vote.

*The paragraph was adopted by 49 votes with 8 abstentions.*

93. The CHAIRMAN put paragraph 3 of section C to the vote.

*The paragraph was adopted by 47 votes with 6 abstentions.*

94. The CHAIRMAN put paragraph 4 of section C to the vote.

*The paragraph was adopted by 45 votes to 5 with 6 abstentions.*

95. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) observed that in the English text there was no equivalent of the words *et notamment* in the French text of paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (c) of section C.

96. With the Committee's approval, the CHAIRMAN stated that the words "in particular" would be inserted at the appropriate place in the English text.

97. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of section C would be examined when the Committee had decided

whether one or several draft resolutions were to be submitted to the General Assembly.

98. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) fully understood the attitude of Ethiopia to the participation of Pakistan in the work of the commission of investigation. He had not withdrawn Pakistan's candidature because it might have given the impression that his country did not feel itself entirely qualified to take part in the work of the commission. Pakistan had no desire to defend any particular interests. Its only wish was to discover the real aspirations of the majority of the Eritrean population.

99. Ato AKLILOU (Ethiopia) said that, although he had at first opposed the appointment of Pakistan as a member of the commission, his opposition had been in no way directed against that country but had been based solely on the principle that countries which were directly concerned, including Ethiopia, or those which had adopted a specific position in the matter, should not be members of the commission. He had abstained from voting on the matter and he had no doubt that Pakistan would carry out its duties impartially.

100. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) observed that when he had suggested that Ethiopia and Egypt should be members of the commission of investigation, his intention had been to enable those two countries to contribute to the commission the knowledge of Eritrea which they were considered to possess, and in no way to impugn the impartiality or the good-will of Member States outside the African area.

101. The CHAIRMAN proposed that the Committee should decide whether the report to be presented to the Assembly would be in the form of a single draft resolution or of three separate draft resolutions.

102. Mr. GARCÍA BAUER (Guatemala) was in favour of submitting one single draft resolution.

103. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) shared the opinion of the representative of Guatemala.

104. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) thought that three separate draft resolutions should be submitted to the General Assembly because the case concerned three different territories. In addition, if three draft resolutions were put to the vote, it was likely that each would obtain a larger number of votes than any single draft. He therefore proposed that the vote should be taken on three separate draft resolutions.

105. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) was in favour of a single draft resolution. He pointed out that his delegation, together with the Turkish delegation, had submitted a single proposal concerning the fixing of boundaries for all three territories (A/C.1/536/Rev.1) and that a proposal dealing with budgetary matters, also concerning all three territories, had been submitted by another delegation. If three separate draft resolutions were submitted to the General Assembly, it would be necessary to repeat the provisions regarding frontiers and budgetary estimates three times.

106. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) thought that, since the case involved three separate territories for which the Committee was proposing different solutions, a separate draft resolution for each one would be more explicit and less likely to give rise to eventual misinter-

pretations. The difficulties mentioned by the Argentine representative regarding the incorporation of proposals dealing with frontier and budgetary matters was purely a matter of wording.

107. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) pointed out, in reply to the Egyptian representative, that the number of votes obtained by a draft resolution as a whole did not in any way change whatever opinions had been expressed on the various parts of that draft resolution.

108. As far as the remarks of the representative of Pakistan were concerned, it was true that the Committee had dealt with three separate subjects, but it had done so in carrying out a single mandate. If only one proposal was adopted, the organs responsible for carrying out the various parts of the resolution would have a single mandate conferred upon them by the General Assembly for the purpose of performing one of the most important tasks which had fallen to its lot.

109. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was also in favour of a single draft. The item on the General Assembly's agenda with which the Committee was dealing was entitled "the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies". It had been referred to the General Assembly by the four great Powers as a single item. It seemed reasonable, therefore, that a single draft resolution on the item should be submitted to the Assembly.

110. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) stated that paragraph 3 of annex XI of the Italian Peace Treaty made it clear, in his opinion, that the General Assembly was to decide on the disposal of three distinct and separate territories. If a single draft resolution were presented, some delegations, being unable to accept a given provision, might be obliged to vote against the draft resolution as a whole and that being so, no resolution would be adopted at all. Furthermore, if three draft resolutions were put to the vote separately, each of them might command a greater number of votes, thus giving it greater weight.

111. Mr. Soto (Chile) was in favour of adopting a single draft resolution. The question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies had been included in the agenda as a single item, and Sub-Committee 17 had dealt with each of the three territories separately only in order to do its work more efficiently.

112. Moreover, as the Argentine representative had already pointed out, the provisions concerning the adjustment of boundaries and budgetary matters should not be repeated in three different resolutions.

113. Mr. Yu Tsune-chi (China) was also in favour of adopting a single draft resolution.

114. The Egyptian representative's interpretation of paragraph 3 of annex XI of the Italian Peace Treaty was open to question. It would appear that when the General Assembly asked for "a" recommendation, a single task had been set, even though three territories were involved.

115. Finally, it would be regrettable if the General Assembly were to adopt solutions with respect to one or two territories, when it seemed possible to solve the question as a whole.

116. Sir Carl BERENDSEN (New Zealand) stated that his delegation would prefer the adoption of

three separate draft resolutions, since it would then be able to vote for the solution proposed for Eritrea and to abstain on others, but if a single proposal were to be put to the vote, his delegation would be obliged to abstain on it.

117. Ato AKLILOU (Ethiopia) recalled that his delegation had always been in favour of three separate draft resolutions, in view of the fact that three territories distant from each other were concerned. It would be unfair to their populations to make the disposal of Libya, for example, depend on that of Eritrea or Somaliland. Ethiopia had voted for independence for Libya, had opposed Italian trusteeship of Somaliland and had abstained on the question of establishing a commission of investigation for Eritrea. It would consequently be obliged to vote against a single proposal dealing with all three territories.

118. Mr. RIEMENS (Netherlands) said that his delegation would vote in favour of adopting a single draft resolution.

119. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the proposal that the Committee should submit to the General Assembly three draft resolutions corresponding to sections A, B and C of the Subcommittee's draft resolution.

*The proposal was rejected by 28 votes to 25, with 4 abstentions.*

120. The CHAIRMAN stated that the Committee had before it the joint draft resolution submitted by Argentina and Turkey (A/C.1/536/Rev.1) and the Argentine amendment (A/C.1/541).

121. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) observed that one of the provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty specified that the problem of boundaries must be settled. The boundaries fixed before the war should not, of course, be changed. There were, however, some points of disagreement between Libya and Egypt, and no definite frontier existed between Ethiopia and Somaliland. The only point of the Argentine proposal was that a study should be made of the procedure to be adopted to settle those boundaries and that the results of the study should be submitted to the General Assembly at its fifth session.

122. Mr. KURAL (Turkey) thought that, under the Italian Peace Treaty, it was for the General Assembly to consider such adjustment of the boundaries of the former Italian colonies as might be necessary. Nothing had as yet been done in that respect, and the situation might have a bad effect on the relations of certain countries. Unless use could be made of the Interim Committee, the study of the problem could not be begun before the fifth session of the General Assembly. It was for that reason that the draft resolution proposed that the Interim Committee should study the procedure to be adopted to settle the question of the boundaries of the former Italian colonies in so far as they were not already fixed by international agreement, and to report with conclusions to the fifth regular session of the General Assembly.

123. Mr. CLUTTON (United Kingdom) remarked that the recital of the joint draft resolution referred to certain provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty according to which adjustment of boundaries could be made, whereas the operative part did not deal with adjustment but with the

delimitation of boundaries. Adjustment of boundaries, however, presupposed that those boundaries had already been fixed.

124. With respect to the adjustment of boundaries, the United Kingdom had submitted a request, during the discussion in the Council of Foreign Ministers, for the adjustment of the frontier between Italian and British Somaliland. That request had been withdrawn.

125. With regard to the fixing of boundaries, the frontier between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland was marked on the map and on the ground for a distance of about 200 miles but thereafter the boundary was not indicated either on the ground or on the map. Moreover, for a length of some 50 miles, the frontier between Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland was marked on the map but not on the ground.

126. The United Kingdom delegation was in favour of having the Interim Committee study questions concerning both the adjustment and the delimitation of boundaries and suggested that the representatives of Turkey and Argentina should amend the recital and, if necessary, the operative part of their proposal in order to take into account the distinction which should be made between those two types of problems.

127. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the delegation of the Soviet Union was opposed to the joint Argentine and Turkish draft resolution for three reasons.

128. Annex XI, paragraph 2 of the Italian Peace Treaty only mentioned the four great Powers and not the General Assembly. It was only under annex XI, paragraph 3, that the four Powers had referred the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies to the General Assembly for settlement. Under paragraph 2, the four great Powers assumed the dual task of deciding on the disposal of the former Italian colonies and of fixing their boundaries. A careful study of paragraph 3 showed that the four great Powers were only referring the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies to the General Assembly, whereas in accordance with paragraph 2 the responsibility for fixing the boundaries lay exclusively upon the four great Powers. Consequently, the reference to paragraph 2 in the joint Argentine-Turkish draft resolution was erroneous.

129. The problem of the boundaries could not be referred to an international body. Normally boundaries were fixed in accordance with bilateral agreements concluded between independent States or, if necessary, between independent States and Administering Authorities or even between several Administering Authorities. There was no reason to depart from such procedure in the case under discussion particularly since the four great Powers had not referred the matter to the General Assembly.

130. Lastly, the delegation of the Soviet Union was opposed to the joint Argentine-Turkish proposal because it suggested that the question should be referred to the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, an illegal body set up in violation of the Charter. Even if the Committee was not in agreement with the delegation of the Soviet Union concerning the anti-constitutional nature of the Interim Committee, how could it contem-

plate referring, to that Committee, a question which had been referred to the General Assembly by four Powers, one of which did not recognize the authority of the Interim Committee? The fact that such a procedure had been proposed could only raise difficulties and create obstacles. Any procedure adopted by the Committee in the matter should be accepted by the four great Powers which had referred the question to the General Assembly, and it would obviously be easy to find a procedure acceptable to the Soviet Union which would not impede co-operation.

131. Mr. COUVE DE MURVILLE (France) thought that the matter of adjustment of boundaries was not covered by the joint Argentine-Turkish proposal which seemed to deal solely with the delimitation of boundaries. The adjustment of boundaries which might be requested by the countries neighbouring on the former Italian colonies was, however, a question which should be settled, if the need arose, in another way.

132. In the circumstances, the French delegation shared the views of the delegation of the Soviet Union that the proposal did not concern the implementation of the Italian Peace Treaty. Moreover, if the boundaries of some of the territories in question were not fixed at the present time, it was obviously the General Assembly's responsibility to deal with the question so that the decisions it took could be successfully carried out. To that end he suggested that the authors of the proposal should agree to substitute the words "*Considering* the recommendation relating to the disposal of the former Italian colonies" for the text between the words "The General Assembly" and the operative part. He further proposed that the words "the procedure to be adopted to settle the question of the boundaries of the former Italian colonies" in the operative part should be replaced by the words "the procedure to be adopted to delimit the boundaries of the former Italian colonies in so far as they are not already fixed by international agreement" (A/C.1/543).

133. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) considered that annex XI, paragraph 3 of the Italian Peace Treaty only affected the General Assembly in so far as the disposal of the former Italian colonies was concerned and that, consequently, the Assembly had no competence in questions concerning the rectification of adjustment of boundary lines which was not mentioned at all in that paragraph. Even if it were claimed that the General Assembly was competent to discuss adjustments of boundary lines, that competence could not extend to Somaliland, the boundaries of which had not even been demarcated. As that question should be settled between the two sovereign States concerned, the Ethiopian delegation thought that the joint Argentine-Turkish proposal could not be applied.

134. In the circumstances, the Ethiopian delegation would abstain from voting on the proposal.

135. Mr. KURAL (Turkey) was prepared to accept the French representative's suggestions.

136. With regard to the remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union, he thought that the legality of the Interim Committee could not be questioned. That Committee was open to all Members of the General Assembly, and Turkey would be glad to see the Soviet Union participate in its work.

137. The delegation of Turkey shared the opinion that questions concerning the delimitation of boundaries should, in general, be settled by sovereign States, when that was possible. But in the case under consideration, it was not only a question of sovereign States, but also of a Trust Territory of the United Nations.

138. With regard to the reference to annex XI, paragraph 2 of the Italian Peace Treaty, he personally thought that the question of fixing the boundaries of the former Italian colonies was a part of the whole question of their disposal. He would, however, like to know the opinion of the other parties to the Italian Peace Treaty on that subject.

139. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) agreed with the representative of Turkey regarding the suggestions of the French representative. He added that he saw no disadvantage in entirely omitting the recital or in amending it along the lines proposed by the United Kingdom delegation. He also agreed to the use, in the operative part, of the expression "to delimit the boundaries".

140. With regard to the remarks of the USSR representative, he thought that, whatever might be the opinion held concerning the legality of the Interim Committee, that organ would assist the General Assembly in its work. The conclusions which it would reach would be submitted to the First Committee, in the debates of which the delegation of the Soviet Union would participate. The competence of the General Assembly in the matter would consequently not be exceeded. He wished to point out that it had never been the intention of the Argentine delegation, in referring the problem to the Interim Committee, to prevent the Soviet Union from participating in its consideration.

141. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) was of the opinion that the problem of the delimitation of boundaries was a fundamental problem which was inherent in the disposal of the territories in question and that, consequently, it must, under paragraph 3 of annex XI of the Italian Peace Treaty, fall within the competence of the General Assembly.

142. He supported the suggestion that the recital of the joint draft resolution should be omitted, and also supported the other amendments proposed by the French representative.

143. With regard to the right of sovereign States to settle their boundary problems bilaterally, he called attention to the fact that the operative part of the joint draft resolution provided for the possibility that the Interim Committee might decide that the States concerned or the Administering Powers should settle such problems among themselves.

144. He shared the opinion of the representative of Turkey concerning the competence of the Interim Committee and joined with him in renewing the invitation to the Soviet Union to participate in the work of that Committee.

145. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that it was incorrect to refer to paragraph 2 of annex XI of the Italian Peace Treaty which dealt with adjustments of boundaries, because that question had nothing to do with the one which had been referred to the General Assembly by the four Powers.

146. With regard to the amendments submitted by the French delegation, he thought that, if they were adopted, they would deprive the joint draft resolution of its very foundation. The sole purpose of the amendments was a face-saving one. If it were desired to delimit boundaries, there was no need to resort to an international procedure, whether it was a question of boundaries between sovereign States, between colonies, or between Trust Territories. For example, Egypt and Libya would agree on any necessary delimitation of their boundary by direct negotiation. In the case of Somaliland, Ethiopia refused to recognize a commission such as the one which it was proposed to set up. How could Ethiopia be forced to change its opinion? What would be the reaction of the representative of Argentina, for example, if it were proposed to fix the boundaries of his country according to such a procedure?

147. The proposal of Argentina and Turkey was based on false premises, and was an attempt to give the Assembly powers to which it was not entitled.

148. With regard to the Interim Committee, the First Committee must respect the fundamental right of the Soviet Union in the matter of choosing the procedure to be followed in considering a question which had been referred by it to the United Nations. The purpose of the proposal to refer that matter to the Interim Committee was to prevent the participation of the Soviet Union in its solution.

149. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) stressed that international procedure in the settlement of boundaries had been used long before the United Nations had been established.

150. With regard to the participation of the Interim Committee in the study of the question, he recalled that paragraph 4 of section C, as adopted, provided for the use of the good offices of that Committee considering the report and proposals of the Commission of Investigation for Eritrea.

151. Mr. KURAL (Turkey) stressed that he agreed with the representative of the Soviet Union concerning the procedure for settling problems of boundaries between sovereign States. In the case under discussion, however, one of the territories involved had not yet attained its sovereignty and when its boundaries with a sovereign State were to be established it would be for the United Nations to negotiate with that State with a view to finding a solution.

152. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) stated that he had been convinced by the arguments advanced by the representative of the Soviet Union. It was in no way certain that the question of the delimitation of boundaries had been referred to the United Nations by the four great Powers. It even seemed more or less clear that the question of the adjustment of boundaries had not been referred to it.

153. On the other hand, since a delimitation of the boundaries of sovereign States was involved, the procedure should take into account the respective rights of Egypt and Ethiopia. In the case of Somaliland, the question was much more complicated in view of the fact that the territory would be brought under the Trusteeship System. Libya, however, would be able to deal with Egypt on an equal footing. If the two States could not come to an agreement, a procedure approved by both would have to be applied.

154. The Committee would facilitate its work by not dealing with a proposal which raised serious difficulties of definition with regard to the General Assembly's competence.

155. Mr. JOOSTE (Union of South Africa) stated that he would not vote against the proposal in question, since it was merely to refer the study of the question to the Interim Committee. He doubted whether the question of the delimitation of boundaries was included in the provisions for their adjustment, and reserved his delegation's right to state its view on the subject in the Interim Committee.

156. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) felt that any delimitation of boundaries should be settled by negotiation between sovereign States. That would apply to the boundary between Egypt and Libya as the latter would be independent in two years. But how could there be any question of fixing the boundaries of Eritrea as long as no decision was taken on the future of that territory? With regard to Somaliland, contrary to the wishes and the views of the Polish delegation, it was to be brought under the trusteeship of Italy, which would thus exercise sovereignty over that territory until it became independent. There was consequently no practical reason for adopting any international procedure for fixing the boundaries of those territories.

157. The proposal to make use of the Interim Committee in the solution of the problem was liable to stir up conflict and revealed the intentions of certain delegations. If the desire to relieve the current tension in international relations was sincere, making such proposals should be avoided.

158. The Polish delegation would vote against the joint draft resolution.

159. The CHAIRMAN put the French amendment (A/C.1/543) to the joint draft resolution of Argentina and Turkey (A/C.1/536/Rev.1) to the vote.

*The amendment was adopted by 23 votes to 10 with 23 abstentions.*

160. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia) moved the adjournment of the meeting.

161. There being no objection, the CHAIRMAN declared the meeting adjourned.

The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Saturday, 12 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Selim SÄRPER (Turkey).*

#### Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies (*continued*)

##### CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (*continued*)

1. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) explained that the amendment submitted by his delegation (A/C.1/541) to section B of the Sub-Committee's draft resolution (A/C.1/522) was intended to provide for difficulties that seemed likely to arise. A member of the United Kingdom delegation had pointed out that if Italian trusteeship over Somaliland were recommended, the United Kingdom Government would be anxious to relinquish administration of that territory as soon as possible. However, his proposal had not been prepared in consultation with the United Kingdom delegation. He had also approached the Italian delegation, which had informed him that Italy did not have any interest in assuming the administration of Somaliland before the General Assembly had reached a decision. It had been suggested to him that there might be a delay before the Trusteeship Council had had time to discuss and approve the Trusteeship Agreement; that delay might extend to the fifth session of the General Assembly. He had no objection to accepting that proposal or any other proposal, but wanted to provide for a possible difficulty if on the one hand the United Kingdom wished to hasten the process of transfer and, on the other, the Government of Italy found some difficulty in fulfilling its responsibilities before the Assembly ratified the Trusteeship Agreement. He wanted to ensure that a change on a provisional basis could be approved regularly. He thought it fitting and timely to make such a proposal in order to avoid any subsequent difficulties in the future.

2. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) recalled that he had explained in the Sub-Committee that some arrangement must be made for a reasonably quick and orderly transfer to the designated Administering Authority. In the first place, his Government had its own responsibilities, and it did not think that the situation would be enhanced by any unreasonable delay. Moreover, the Administering Authority that might be designated must be given a fair chance in its new responsibilities. A more important point was the interests and welfare of the local inhabitants, which must be the principal consideration. The criticism advanced by the Soviet Union delegation with regard to the United Kingdom's action in Cyrenaica, where his Government had been reproached for having exceeded its functions, led his Government—though he did not accept those criticisms—to be very careful in regard to its position in those territories and therefore, for example in Somaliland, it had done little more than to keep the communities in a state of care and maintenance. That was not enough from the point of view of the inhabitants, and if his Government did anything departing substantially from the Argentine proposal it would be imposing upon the inhabitants a further period of uncertainty which would not be right or a reward for so extending its functions beyond the caretaker basis. The Committee had heard as-

surances from the proposed trustee regarding the facilities and stimulus it would provide, and he therefore hoped that the Committee would agree that provision must be made for a quick and orderly transfer of power, both from the point of view of the out-going caretaker administration and of the proposed trustee, and above all of the people of the territory. He doubted that the wording of the Argentine proposal could be improved upon.

3. Ato AKLILOU (Ethiopia) noted that the Argentine amendment proposed that Italy should have to give an undertaking to administer the territory in accordance with the provisions of the Charter relating to the International Trusteeship System pending approval of a Trusteeship Agreement by the General Assembly. To whom that undertaking should be given was not stated, and since the meaning of the provisions of the Charter referred to was by no means clear, it was obvious that it was intended to reimpose Italian authority over the territory, without the safeguards which had been adopted by the Committee. That view was not altered by the proposal that the administration should be temporary "pending approval by the General Assembly of a Trusteeship Agreement for the territory". Even such temporary administration amounted to saying that, so long as Italy did not agree to any particular text of a Trusteeship Agreement, it would remain in charge of Somaliland, without any conditions. In his view, it was obvious that the whole structure adopted by the First Committee would collapse if that amendment were adopted. Pointing out that the General Assembly had twice already failed to solve the problem of the disposal of the former colonies, he said that it was proposed to undo all the work that had been done, to once again appease Italy and leave the people of Somaliland without any safeguards. It was proposed to grant Somaliland to Italy without any conditions whatsoever, whereas Ethiopia had been refused provisional administration of Eastern Eritrea provided the wishes of the population of that territory were immediately ascertained. Any delegation voting for the Argentine amendment which would be a flagrant violation of the principles of the Treaty of Peace with Italy would bear responsibility for the disturbances and bloodshed that would undoubtedly follow. As had been pointed out, the frontiers between Somaliland and Ethiopia had never been delimited, and, as his delegation had stated on 8 October 1949 (286th meeting), Ethiopia would be compelled to take every measure of legitimate defence, which would be all the more called for in the light of the proposed amendment. The Second World War had started with the Wal-Wal incident, in the very area which it was now proposed to return to Italy. Such a proposal would make any peace and security on the continent of Africa impossible.

4. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) endorsed the comments of the representative of Ethiopia. Turning to the constitutional character of the Argentine amendment, he pointed out that paragraph 2 of article 23



of the Treaty of Peace with Italy made it clear that pending the final disposal of the former Italian colonies, those territories would remain under their present administration. In other words, until a Trusteeship Agreement had been approved by the General Assembly, and until a decision to that effect had been adopted by the four great Powers, the United Kingdom would retain the administration of Somaliland. While he did not rule out some possible adjustment, the latter could only take place pursuant to the Peace Treaty, namely upon agreement of the four Powers, which were responsible for the implementation of the Treaty and the final disposal of the former colonies. Though he understood and sympathized with the motives actuating the Argentine delegation, it must be noted that the amendment was contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Italy and could not even be considered in the First Committee.

5. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) wished to ask the delegations of the four Powers whether the present Administering Authority within the legal situation created by the Peace Treaty with Italy, would renounce the right to administer Somaliland until a given time, or could propose the shortening of that time. In any case, he thought it necessary to state that Italy would administer Somaliland provisionally, not only in accordance with the provisions of the Charter but also with the principles incorporated in the draft resolution which had been adopted by the Committee. It could even be said in accordance with the spirit, at least, of the annexure to that resolution which the Committee had adopted in principle.

6. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) said that the USSR representative's observations on the constitutional aspect of the problem were worthy of study. It would be interesting to hear the opinion of the other signatory Powers, especially regarding the meaning of the words "final disposal" used in the Treaty of Peace with Italy. If those words meant the passage of a resolution by the General Assembly, the Argentine amendment was constitutionally acceptable. If those words meant the putting into execution of that resolution, the representative of the Soviet Union would evidently be right. In principle, Mr. Santa Cruz was inclined to favour the first interpretation. The remarks of the United Kingdom representative showed that the contingency which the Argentine amendment was intended to deal with seemed likely to arise. Referring to the statement of the Ethiopian representative, Mr. Santa Cruz believed that Italy was not interested in taking over the administration of the territory until it had precise directives as a model for its administration. He thought that the problem raised could be solved along lines indicated by the representatives of Argentina and Peru. Since a draft Trusteeship Agreement would be negotiated with Italy by the Trusteeship Council in January 1950, and since that agreement would include the constitutional provisions submitted by the Indian delegation, the Argentine amendment might be modified so as to make it clear that Italy would undertake the provisional administration after the Agreement had been negotiated and that the administration must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of that Agreement and of the Charter. His delegation thus submitted an amendment to the Argentine amendment to that effect (A/C.1/545). He hoped that the Argen-

tine representative would accept the amendment and suggested that the representative of Italy be invited to express his opinion on the matter.

7. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) regretted that the Ethiopian representative had felt it necessary to speak about war, since the Committee was endeavouring to establish the basis for peace. It was clear that Italy was unlikely to attack Ethiopia. Stating that he accepted the Chilean amendment, the Argentine representative said that the representative of Ethiopia had nothing to fear from any proposal submitted by the Argentine delegation, because the latter had been fighting to secure recognition of the legitimate aspirations of Ethiopia.

8. Mr. TARCHIANI (Italy) wished to make it clear that Italy had not asked for anything on that score and that when consulted, unofficially, his delegation had stated that the Italian Government wished to take over the administration of Somaliland only when it had the official and final title to that as granted by the United Nations. It was up to the United Nations alone to decide when that title should be granted.

9. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) appreciated the efforts of the Argentine representative in submitting the amendment under discussion, in view of the explanations given by the representative of the United Kingdom. It was not fair to keep a people in suspense. The trusteeship must be applied as soon as possible and the transfer must be made as speedily as practicable. However, he wondered whether it might not be possible to have the Trusteeship Agreement prepared by the Trusteeship Council and passed by the General Assembly during the present session. In that case the amendment would not be needed nor would it be needed in the event that the General Assembly met again the following spring. If those points were answered in the negative, and there were no legal difficulties, he would wish it to be mentioned that the Advisory Council would start functioning with the beginning of the Italian administration, and that Italy would also be bound by the constitutional annexure submitted by the Indian delegation. Those matters had been covered by the Chilean amendment (A/C.1/545) which, like the Argentine amendment, he was prepared to support, provided there were no legal hitches.

10. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTE (Ecuador) suggested that, in accordance with rule 70 of the rules of procedure, the debate on the present matter should be postponed until the following Monday in order to enable delegations to study the problem and formulate any amendments to the Argentine amendment which they might deem necessary. He inquired whether the representative of Argentina was willing to ask that the matter be postponed and that the Committee should in the meantime proceed to deal with the other aspects of the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies.

11. The CHAIRMAN commented that it was rule 108 of the rules of procedure which dealt with proposals for postponement. He asked whether the representative of Ecuador desired to make a formal proposal.

12. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) complied with the Ecuadorean representative's request and asked that the discussion of his amendment be postponed to the following meeting. Thus, the Com-

mittee would be able at the present time to complete its work on the other aspects of the question.

13. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) believed that the relevant rule of procedure was rule 105 which provided that, in the event of a motion to adjourn a discussion, two representatives might speak in favour of adjournment and two against. If the Chairman agreed that that rule was applicable. Mr. Padilla Nervo asked that he be permitted to speak against motion of adjournment.

14. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile), on a point of order, explained that the Argentine representative had withdrawn his amendment and intended to re-present it as a separate draft resolution. Hence, it was unnecessary for the Commission to take a decision on the point raised by the representative of Mexico.

15. In reply for a request for clarification from the CHAIRMAN, Mr. ARCE (Argentina) stated that he was willing to resubmit his proposal as a separate draft resolution which could be taken up after the Committee had completed discussion of the other aspects of the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies.

16. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) considered that rule 105 of the rules of procedure was still applicable to the situation. If the Chairman intended to put the motion for adjournment to a vote, he himself would ask for an opportunity to speak against the motion.

17. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) shared the point of view of the Soviet Union representative. He asked whether it was the Chairman's interpretation of the situation that the Argentine amendment should be withdrawn and resubmitted as a separate draft resolution. If that was the case, then the United Kingdom delegation could not agree to the procedure because it considered that the Argentine proposal had become the property of the Committee. For obvious reasons the United Kingdom delegation would be unable to vote upon the whole of the substantive draft resolution until a decision had been taken upon the Argentine amendment which constituted an important part of it.

18. The CHAIRMAN was of the opinion that once a draft resolution or an amendment had been tabled and discussed it was the property of the Committee. Hence, if the representative of the United Kingdom was against postponement it would be necessary for the Committee to take a decision in accordance with rule 105 of the rules of procedure.

19. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) did not share the Chairman's view and pointed out that, according to rule 111 any motion could be withdrawn by the author before the voting had begun, provided that it had not been amended. In the view of the Chilean delegation the Argentine amendment had been withdrawn and could no longer be discussed.

20. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) was against postponing discussion of the Argentine amendment. While he agreed that the problem to which it related was of great importance and required careful study, it was his opinion that an exchange of views at the present time would help to clarify the problem and would make it easier for dele-

gations to determine their positions. If the representative of Argentina withdrew his amendment at the present stage, Mr. Padilla Nervo would himself present an amendment in the same sense as the Argentine amendment by taking into account the points raised by the representatives of Chile and Iraq.

21. The CHAIRMAN ruled that the situation called for application of rule 105 of the rules of procedure. Since the representative of Mexico had already spoken against postponement it was permissible to hear one further speaker against the motion and two in favour.

22. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland), on a point of order, drew attention to his draft resolution (A/C.1/547) which offered an alternative procedure which might be acceptable to the representative of Ecuador. The Polish draft resolution recommended that the question raised in the Argentine amendment be referred to the Sixth Committee for an advisory opinion. If it was adopted, it would, of course, mean that consideration of the problem would be postponed for a few days.

23. Mr. VITERI LAFRONTE (Ecuador) said that his proposal for postponement had been advanced in the hope that it might be possible to avoid an unnecessary discussion. However, that purpose had already been frustrated and he therefore withdrew his motion.

24. The CHAIRMAN stated that consideration of the Argentine amendment would continue.

25. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) said that, as his Government was a party to the Peace Treaty with Italy, it was desirable for him to state his position regarding the legal interpretation of article 23, paragraph 2, of that Treaty to which the representative of the Soviet Union had referred. In his opinion, the final disposal of the Italian colonies was a decision of the General Assembly regarding the future of those areas. Assuming that the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee, Mr. Jessup believed that its action would constitute a final disposal with regard to Libya and Somaliland. With regard to Eritrea, however, the General Assembly would not make the final disposal since the draft resolution provided for the creation of a commission of inquiry to report with recommendations to the fifth session. Since no final disposal of the territory of Eritrea would be effected, the United Kingdom, as Administering Authority would continue its functions in that territory. Nevertheless, as regards Libya and Somaliland the decision would be final and the fact that further measures of implementation would have to be taken in no way affected the finality of the decision.

26. Referring in particular to the question of Somaliland, Mr. Jessup explained that the General Assembly's decision as to the final disposal of the territory envisaged two main phases. The ultimate phase was the independence of the territory after a period of ten years. Surely, no one would contend that the disposal would not be final until those ten years had elapsed and independence had been achieved. Obviously, the disposal was final now both in respect to the ultimate independence of Somaliland and of the interim period of Italian trusteeship. All the interim measures were, in fact, parts of the imple-

mentation of the final disposal and consequently, did not violate the terms of the Peace Treaty with Italy. In Mr. Jessup's opinion there was nothing in the Argentine amendment or in the proposals of the Chilean and Mexican representatives which was contrary to the terms of the Peace Treaty with Italy.

27. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the issue was a legal one and must be decided dispassionately on purely juridical grounds. The question was whether the General Assembly was legally competent to adopt a decision of the kind proposed by the Argentine representative. The representative of Chile had expressed the opinion that the adoption, by the General Assembly, of any resolution on the matter would constitute a final disposal of the question of the former Italian colonies. However, he did not share that view. He pointed out that the authority of the General Assembly was substantially limited by the terms of paragraph 3 of annex XI of the Peace Treaty with Italy. It stated that the General Assembly should submit a recommendation on the question to the four Powers who had undertaken, in advance, to accept the recommendation and to take the necessary measures for its implementation. Hence, three legal points were established as follows: (a) the General Assembly was empowered only to submit a recommendation (b) the four Powers had undertaken to accept that recommendation (c) the four Powers reserved the right to take the necessary measures for its implementation. Furthermore, examination of the other relevant provisions of the Treaty confirmed that it was the four Powers which must make the final disposal. Whether the decision of the General Assembly was final in character or not was quite immaterial. From the legal point of view it was nothing more than a recommendation which could have no legal force until the four Powers had carried out their promise to accept it and to take the necessary measures for its implementation. Moreover, article 23, paragraph 2 of the Peace Treaty stated quite unequivocally that the present administration of the Italian colonies would continue until the final disposal had been made. Obviously, therefore, the Argentine amendment was legally unjustifiable.

28. The Chilean representative had, in effect, admitted that the decision of the General Assembly did not constitute the final disposal of the former Italian colonies because, without the understanding, the Chilean amendment would be baseless. The Chilean amendment would postpone the establishment of the provisional Italian régime in Somaliland until a draft Trusteeship Agreement had been ratified by Italy and the Trusteeship Council. But a draft agreement was binding upon no one until it had been confirmed by the competent authority. Clearly, therefore, the Chilean amendment revealed the basic weakness of the entire proposal. Until a final Trusteeship Agreement had been adopted and the four Powers had sanctioned the Assembly's decision and taken the measures necessary for its implementation, there could be no legal grounds for any action by the General Assembly in respect of the transfer, whether provisionally or not, of the administration of Somaliland to any other State.

29. Furthermore, the Committee had already decided that the question of the disposal of the

former Italian colonies was to be determined by a single inclusive resolution. Consequently, if any delegation wished to introduce an additional resolution then it would be necessary to reconsider the Committee's decision in accordance with the relevant rules of procedure.

30. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) believed that some action should be taken by the Committee on the point raised by the Argentine representative, in the interest of the population of Somaliland.

31. With regard to the arguments adduced by the Soviet Union representative as to the legal grounds for the proposed action, the representative of Mexico considered that the General Assembly decision would constitute the final disposal of the question. It was for that reason that every provisional measure should be dealt with in that single resolution.

32. As to the substance of the Argentine proposal, Mr. Padilla Nervo said that his view coincided to some extent with that expressed in the amendment submitted by the representative of Chile. He believed that Italy ought not to be placed in actual charge of the administration of Somaliland before a Trusteeship Agreement had been drawn up to guide its actions. Likewise, it was desirable that the Advisory Council should begin to discharge its functions as soon as the Italian Government assumed control. Consequently, Mr. Padilla Nervo submitted an alternative amendment (A/C.1/548) to section B of the Sub-Committee's draft resolution.

33. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) noted the criticisms which the Soviet Union representative had made on the Chilean amendment to the Argentine proposal. It had never been affirmed that the draft Trusteeship Agreement negotiated between the Trusteeship Council and Italy would have any legal value before it had been approved by the General Assembly. The purpose of the Chilean amendment had merely been to establish certain guiding principles upon which the provisional administration would be based and it had been thought only logical to take advantage of the draft agreement for that purpose. Mr. Santa Cruz was convinced that the principles agreed upon by the Trusteeship Council, even if they were not accepted in their entirety by the General Assembly, would at least lay the necessary basis for the Italian Administration to carry on in a manner satisfactory to all.

34. The CHAIRMAN announced that the list of speakers was closed.

35. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) remarked that the Committee was really concerned with two questions: the legal aspect of the Argentine proposal and its practical implication. The legal aspect fell into two parts. First, there was the question of the meaning of the term "final disposal". As Mr. McNeil understood annex XI, paragraph 3 of the Italian Peace Treaty, the four Powers were bound to accept and to implement the General Assembly's resolution. Clearly, it would be nonsense to interpret the intention of the Treaty in the sense that the four Powers reserved their approval until the solution had been successfully implemented. There were many factors involved and no one could envisage all the possible eventualities which might necessitate

changes in the plans during the interim period. In Mr. McNeil's opinion, what the four Powers had agreed was that, if they could not find a solution for the disposal of the former Italian colonies within a period of one year, they would submit the whole question to the General Assembly and the latter would be free to take any decision provided that it was in accordance with the interests and welfare of the populations, as well as in the interest of international peace and security. The final disposal, therefore, would emerge with the decision of the General Assembly. Hence, Mr. McNeil believed that the General Assembly was competent to take a decision along the lines proposed in the Argentine amendment. There could be no legal objection to the establishment of an Italian Administration.

36. The representative of Iraq believed that it would be better to leave the question to be decided later at a special session of the General Assembly in the spring of 1950. But, although it was true that the Trusteeship Council might be able to conclude its work on the draft Trusteeship Agreement in February of that year, it would not be possible to convene the General Assembly without substantial delay. Likewise, it would not be possible to adopt the Trusteeship Agreement at the current session of the General Assembly unless the delegations were prepared to remain in session for several months.

37. Mr. McNeil believed that the Argentine proposal, as amended by the representative of Chile, offered the best solution and his delegation would support it. The Mexican proposal was likewise acceptable and had the advantage of being a simpler formulation. Mr. McNeil thought it desirable that the Advisory Council should come into operation during the provisional Italian Administration, as it would provide the General Assembly with an observer on the spot.

38. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) said that the problem of the General Assembly's competence had been fully clarified by the statements of the United States and the United Kingdom representatives. He considered that the decision of the General Assembly would constitute the final disposal of the matter. Consequently, the Committee had now to decide only on the best solution. In Mr. Belaúnde's opinion that would take the form of a compromise between the Argentine, Chilean and Mexican proposals.

39. Mr. COUVE DE MURVILLE (France) shared the views of the United States representative on the legal aspects of the question. Although, legally and formally the decision of the General Assembly would be a recommendation, it would constitute a final disposal of the question since the four Powers had previously agreed to accept it. Mr. Couve de Murville did not agree with the Soviet Union representative that article 23 of the Italian Peace Treaty required the present Administering Authorities to remain in office until all the necessary measures had been taken to implement the General Assembly's decision. Clearly, the General Assembly was perfectly entitled to adopt provisional measures as it saw fit.

40. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that none of those representatives who disagreed with his opinion had adduced any new valid juridical arguments to justify the procedure which was advocated. Legally, the

decision of the General Assembly was a recommendation and nothing else and, the final decision was left to the four Powers. The fact that the four Powers had agreed to accept the General Assembly's recommendation did not in any way alter its legal character. Moreover, it was clearly stated in annex XI, paragraph 3 of the Italian Peace Treaty that the four Powers retained the right to take appropriate measures to implement the General Assembly's recommendations. Mr. Arutiunian fully appreciated that, for many delegations in the First Committee, legal considerations were subordinate to political considerations but that could be no justification for violating the provisions of the Peace Treaty with Italy in the manner proposed in the Argentine amendment and the other related proposals.

41. Following a request from Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland), the CHAIRMAN called for a vote upon the Polish draft resolution (A/C.1/547) which recommended that the Argentine proposal and the amendments thereto be transmitted to the Sixth Committee for an advisory opinion.

*The draft resolution was rejected by 33 votes to 9, with 10 abstentions.*

42. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) suggested the possibility of amalgamating the Argentine, Mexican and Chilean proposals into a single amendment to the draft resolution. That could be done by adding the final paragraph of the Mexican amendment (A/C.1/548) to the Argentine amendment (A/C.1/541) as modified by the changes proposed by the Chilean delegation (A/C.1/545).

43. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) asked whether the representative of Mexico would agree to adding, at the end of paragraph 8 of his amendment, the words "and in accordance with the terms of the Agreement". In that way, the proposal would include the suggestion of the Chilean representative.

44. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) said that he had no objection to either suggestion since, whatever text was adopted, the substance would remain the same. If the Argentine text, as amended by the delegation of Chile, was taken as the basis for agreement, then Mr. Padilla Nervo suggested that, in sub-paragraph (i) the word "Italy" should replace the words "Administering Authority". Similarly, in the Chilean amendment to paragraph (ii) (A/C.1/545), he suggested the deletion of the word "draft" before "Trusteeship Agreement".

45. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) accepted the changes presented by the Mexican representative.

46. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Argentine amendment as amended by the Chilean representative and modified by the changes suggested by the Mexican representative. That text read as follows:

"8. (i) At a time and pursuant to arrangements for the orderly transfer of administration agreed upon between Italy and the United Kingdom, *after the Trusteeship Council and Italy have negotiated the draft Trusteeship Agreement and*

"(ii) On condition that Italy gives an undertaking to administer the territory in accordance with the provisions of the Charter relating to the International Trusteeship System *and to th*

*Trusteeship Agreement*, pending approval by the General Assembly of a Trusteeship Agreement for the territory.

"9. That the Advisory Council shall commence the discharge of its functions when the Italian Government begins its provisional administration".

*That text was adopted by 38 votes to 8, with 10 abstentions.*

47. Mr. D'SOUZA (India) explained that he had voted in favour of the Polish draft resolution and abstained in the vote on the combined amendment because, though his delegation fully approved the proposals contained in the latter from a human and political point of view, it considered that the legal difficulties had not been fully resolved.

#### DISCUSSION OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS (SECTION D)

48. The CHAIRMAN recalled that it had previously been agreed to defer the question of administrative provisions until the Committee had completed its consideration of all substantive proposals. He drew attention to the amendment (A/C.1/533) previously submitted by the United States delegation which had been withdrawn in view of the submission of the text of a new draft submitted as Conference Room Paper No. 3. The Chairman read the text of the new draft which read as follows:

*"D. With respect to the above provisions:*

"1. *Invites* the Secretary-General to request the necessary facilities from the competent authorities of each of the States in whose territory it may be necessary for the Commission for Eritrea to meet or travel;

"2. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General, in accordance with established practice,

"(a) To arrange for the payment of an appropriate remuneration to the United Nations Commissioner in Libya;

"(b) To reimburse the travelling and subsistence expenses of the members of the Advisory Council for Libya, of one representative from each Government represented on the Advisory Council for Somaliland, and of one representative and one alternate from each Government represented on the Commission for Eritrea;

"(c) To assign to the United Nations Commissioner in Libya, to the Advisory Council for Somaliland, and to the United Nations Commission for Eritrea such staff and to provide such facilities as the Secretary-General may consider necessary to carry out the terms of the present resolution."

49. Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa) said that he would be unable to vote in favour of the adoption of the proposed text because his delegation believed that, since the members of the Advisory Councils for Libya and Somaliland were to be governmental representatives and not technical experts, the expenses of those Councils should be defrayed by individual Member States and not by the United Nations. After all, the States responsible for administering the territories would have to pay a considerable sum out of their own budgets and, moreover, the Govern-

ments members of the Advisory Council for Somaliland would be required to participate in the discussion in the Trusteeship Council. The position of the United Nations Commissioner for Libya was, of course, different since he would be appointed by the General Assembly. Clearly, his expenses and those of his staff should be defrayed out of the latter's budget.

50. The CHAIRMAN stated that the staffs of all the Advisory Councils and of the Commissioner would be combined into a single administrative unit under the authority of the Secretary-General.

51. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) asked why the proposal provided for only one representative from each Government member of the Advisory Council for Somaliland, whereas there would be a representative and an alternate representative on the Commission for Eritrea. He also requested deletion of the qualifying word "Advisory" with regard to the Council for Libya.

52. The SECRETARY-GENERAL explained that the provisions contained in the Conference Paper were the standard provisions which had been used in similar cases for the past two years and which had been approved by the Fifth Committee. The text was based upon the United States proposal with respect to Libya and the Sub-Committee's proposal with respect to Eritrea. In so far as Somaliland was concerned, it had been thought unnecessary to include more than one representative from each country represented on the Advisory Council. However, the whole matter could be discussed from the budgetary aspect in the Fifth Committee.

53. Mr. MORALES MARENCO (Nicaragua) asked for an assurance that the principle of geographical distribution would be applied in recruiting the secretariat for the various missions. With that assurance he was prepared to vote in favour of the proposal.

54. Mr. VOYNA (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) asked for information as to the authorship of the Conference Paper. In his opinion the expenses of the missions should be shared by the Governments concerned and not be defrayed by the United Nations. While he quite agreed with the Secretary-General that the Fifth Committee would have to take the final decision on the budgetary aspects of the proposal, he believed that there were certain political considerations involved which could only be decided by the First Committee.

55. The CHAIRMAN, replying to the question of authorship of the Conference Paper, said that he believed the document was the result of the will of the First Committee.

56. Mr. WENDELEN (Belgium) remarked that any adjustments in the administrative provisions which were necessitated by political considerations could be introduced in plenary session by the General Assembly when it came to consider the Fifth Committee's report.

57. Mr. CLUTTON (United Kingdom) said that his delegation would vote in favour of the proposed text although that must not be interpreted as approval of all its contents. In the opinion of the United Kingdom delegation the only bodies whose expenses should be paid from the United Nations fund were the Commissioner for Libya

and the Commission for Eritrea. Since membership in the other bodies was a privilege for the Governments concerned, those Governments should defray their own expenses.

58. Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa) asked whether the Fifth Committee would be entitled to amend, in any way, any of the provisions of the proposed text, except in so far as it related to the total budget to be allocated to the various bodies.

59. The SECRETARY-GENERAL cited rule 142 of the rules of procedure which stated that no proposal involving expenditure could be recommended by a Committee for approval by the General Assembly unless it was accompanied by an estimate of expenditures prepared by the Secretariat. Likewise, no resolution involving expenditures could be voted by the General Assembly unless the Fifth Committee had examined its budgetary implications. The Fifth Committee was certainly bound by the decisions of the First Committee, but it had a right to express an opinion on administrative and budgetary matters. However, if there was any conflict between the decisions of the First Committee and of the Fifth Committee, it would be for the General Assembly to take a final decision.

60. The Secretary-General added that the staffs of the various bodies established by the First Committee under the present agenda item would be provided by the United Nations Secretariat. He also explained that the document before the Committee was based upon two proposals, one emanating from the United States delegation and one from Sub-Committee 17.

61. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) reiterated his opinion that the Advisory Council for Somaliland should comprise one representative and one alternate representative from each Government. He also doubted whether it was appropriate for the Committee to adopt a text which had not been submitted by a delegation.

62. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) said that since the question had been raised he wished to make it clear that his delegation sponsored the proposal contained in Conference Room Paper No. 3. His delegation had accepted the text contained in that paper in lieu of the text originally submitted in its amendment. He further stated that he accepted the deletion of the word "Advisory" in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 2, as proposed by the representative of Egypt.

63. Mr. COUVE DE MURVILLE (France) shared the points of view expressed by the representatives of the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom. His delegation believed that the expenditures of the Council for Libya and the Advisory Council for Somaliland should be paid by the interested Governments. The situation of Eritrea was somewhat different. There the Commission was one of investigation and was to prepare a report for the General Assembly. Therefore his delegation did not object to having the expenditures for Eritrea met by the United Nations. He said that the statement of the Secretary-General to the effect that the Fifth Committee would have to take a decision with regard to the budgetary implications of the paragraph, if the latter were adopted, was quite clear. He wished to know, however, whether that text could

be changed in substance or could be modified by the Fifth Committee.

64. The SECRETARY-GENERAL replied that he thought that it would be necessary to refer the matter to the General Assembly if there were any disagreement.

65. The CHAIRMAN said that, in his view, the Fifth Committee was bound to the provisions of a political character decided by the First Committee. He thought it probable that the decision of the Fifth Committee would relate only to budgetary matters in connexion with the implementation of the decisions taken by the First Committee.

66. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) was inclined to agree with the interpretation of the Chair. It might be advisable, therefore, to add a mention of the alternates in the case of Libya and Somaliland, as had been done in connexion with Eritrea.

67. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) thought that previous practices of the United Nations provided sound reasons for following the differentiation indicated in the present text, which he preferred to retain as it stood.

68. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) proposed that the words "and and their alternates" be added after the words "expenses of the members" at the beginning of sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 2. He also proposed the addition of the words "and one alternate", in connexion with the Advisory Council for Somaliland, in the same paragraph, after the words "of one representative".

69. The CHAIRMAN put the Egyptian amendment to the vote.

*The amendment was rejected by 24 votes to 16, with 14 abstentions.*

70. The CHAIRMAN noted that the United States representative had consented to the deletion of the word "Advisory" in connexion with Libya in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 2 of the amendment contained in Conference Room Paper No. 3. He put that text to the vote.

*The text was adopted by 40 votes to 5, with 10 abstentions.*

71. At the request of Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), the CHAIRMAN stated that he would put to a vote the various sections of the draft resolution submitted by Sub-Committee 17, as modified. A vote would then be taken on the entire text.

72. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) requested that those votes be taken by roll-call.

73. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Preamble and section A of the draft resolution recommended by Sub-Committee 17.

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Lebanon, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Ar



gentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel.

*Abstaining:* New Zealand, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

*Section A, including the preamble, was adopted by 50 votes with 8 abstentions.*

74. The CHAIRMAN then put section B to the vote by roll-call.

*A vote was taken by roll-call on section B as follows:*

*The Union of South Africa, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey.

*Against:* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

*Abstaining:* Liberia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden.

*Section B was adopted by 47 votes to 7, with 4 abstentions.*

75. The CHAIRMAN then put section C to the vote.

*A vote was taken by roll-call on section C as follows:*

*Iraq, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran.

*Against:* Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

*Abstaining:* Liberia, Philippines, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Greece.

*Section C was adopted by 47 votes to 5, with 6 abstentions.*

76. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote by roll-call the draft resolution of Sub-Committee 17, as amended, as a whole.

*A vote was taken by roll-call on the draft resolution as a whole, as follows:*

*Luxembourg, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, voted first.*

*In favour:* Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia.

*Against:* Ethiopia.

*Abstaining:* New Zealand, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

*The proposal was adopted by 49 votes to 1, with 8 abstentions.*

77. The CHAIRMAN stated that a vote would be taken on the entirety of the administrative provisions, in order that the matter should be recorded clearly.

*The administrative provisions were adopted by 47 votes to 4, with 4 abstentions.*

78. The CHAIRMAN stated that a vote would be taken on the second draft resolution submitted by Sub-Committee 17 (A/C.1/522).

79. Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa) explained that he would abstain from voting on that draft resolution because his delegation, while convinced that the proposed committee would make a good recommendation for the post of Commissioner for Libya, felt that the General Assembly should not bind itself to accept the only recommendation that might be made by that committee. His delegation felt that it would be preferable to have the committee recommend two or three candidates.

*The second draft resolution was adopted by 46 votes to 4, with 4 abstentions.*

80. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) asked that it be mentioned in the Committee's report that the USSR delegation wished to maintain its draft resolution regarding the disposal of the former Italian colonies.

81. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) stated that the amendments submitted by his delegation in the First Committee would be resubmitted in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly. He wished to have the matter recorded in the report.

82. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that those draft resolutions and amendments would have to be re-introduced formally in the General Assembly, since the First Committee could not transmit them.

83. Ato MEDHEN (Ethiopia), referring to certain remarks of the representative of Argentina,

who had suggested that Ethiopia had nothing to fear from the proposed return of Italy to Somaliland, without any conditions whatsoever being imposed, said that the Argentine representative might reflect on an announcement which had appeared in the Italian newspaper *Il Progresso Liberale* of 8 November, to the effect that an expeditionary corps of 16,000 Italians was being prepared in the region of Caserta to be sent to Somaliland. In that connexion, Ato Medhen also wished to refer to demonstrations which had taken place in Rome on 25 July, the slogans of which had been in support of Mussolini and Fascism.

84. Mr. TARCHIANI (Italy) stated that the announcement referred to had been absolutely arbitrary. There was no truth in the statement that an expeditionary corps of 16,000 men had been prepared for Somaliland. As for what a fascist

newspaper in some part of the world might say, he wished to point out that Mussolini was dead and he could not therefore come back and attack Ethiopia.

85. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) wished to point out to the Ethiopian representative, that Italy, on assuming the responsibility of Administering Authority in Somaliland, would have to comply with the Charter and the purposes of the United Nations.

86. Mr. ARUTIUNIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) wished to have it recorded that fascist newspapers, or newspapers which printed fascist slogans, were being published in Italy.

87. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) moved that the meeting adjourn.

The meeting rose at 2.55 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 14 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace**

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that the purpose of the draft resolution (A/996) his Government had submitted to the General Assembly on 23 September 1949 was to condemn preparations for a new war and the use of atomic weapons as well as to conclude a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace. Those proposals were an expression of the line of conduct based on principle, which the Soviet Union had followed since the beginning of its existence in November 1917.

2. As early as the United Nations General Assembly's first session in 1946 the Soviet Union Government had proposed a reduction in armaments and armed forces.<sup>1</sup> The General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1946 (41 (I)) had, in fact, been based on that proposal in which the Government of the Soviet Union had expressed its desire to ensure world peace. In 1947, during the second session of the General Assembly, his Government had taken the initiative through a draft resolution to condemn all propaganda for a new war.<sup>2</sup> At the General Assembly's third session in 1948, the Government of the Soviet Union had made a new effort for peace and international co-operation and had proposed to the five great Powers that they should reduce their armaments and armed forces by one third, prohibit the atomic weapon and establish an international control organ under the auspices of the Security Council to supervise the carrying out of these measures.<sup>3</sup> The proposal had been rejected by the majority of the General Assembly,

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the second part of the first session of the General Assembly*, annex 7.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the second session of the General Assembly*, First Committee, annex 13A.

<sup>3</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly*, Part I, annex to the plenary meetings, document A/723.

which, as in other cases, followed the example given by the United States and the United Kingdom. The same fate had overtaken a similar draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union in the Security Council.<sup>4</sup>

3. Now the USSR was again raising its voice to defend the peace-loving peoples against the aggressive intentions of the United States and the United Kingdom. Who could oppose such proposals, except the enemies of peace and international co-operation, to whom preparation for war and even a new war represented a source of profit as well as a means of strengthening their domination of the world? At a meeting of representatives of American business, finance and industry on 8 November 1949, Mr. Sumner Sleter, a professor of Harvard University had admitted that the cold war with the Soviet Union was favourable to the American economy. That statement was, unfortunately, not an isolated one. The war psychosis was fed by the activities of reactionary circles in the United States and certain other countries. Had there not been, during the current session, slanderous and concerted attacks on the Soviet Union by the Kuomintang and Tito delegations, and by many others, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, with the aim of sabotaging the Soviet Union Government's plan to put an end to the activities of warmongers? The signal for the attacks had been given by one of the leaders of the Anglo-American bloc at the beginning of the current session when, on 26 September,<sup>5</sup> Mr. Bevin had attempted to distort the USSR proposals by alleging that they and the whole foreign policy of the Soviet Union were directed against the work of international co-operation in the United Nations. No impartial person who was aware of the Soviet Union delegation's repeated declarations ever since the General Assembly's first session and of USSR foreign policy, could feel

<sup>4</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year*, No. 10, page 2.

<sup>5</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 229th plenary meeting.

any doubts about the Soviet Union's desire to strengthen the authority of the United Nations as an instrument of peace. On 26 September, Mr. Bevin had defended such aggressive measures as the North Atlantic Treaty, the Brussels Pact, the division of Germany, the armaments race and the preparation for a new war, while attempting to throw the responsibility for all those facts and events, and in particular for the Berlin crisis, on the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. But no one was ignorant of the fact that the Berlin crisis had been artificially created by the United States and the United Kingdom in order to mask their policy of dividing Germany. Mr. Bevin had even gone so far as to allege that the Government of the Soviet Union would rather risk a war than renounce control of Berlin. Such inventions were intended to divert public attention from the Soviet Union proposals and discredit them. The Canadian representative, Mr. Pearson, speaking after Mr. Bevin at another meeting of the Assembly,<sup>1</sup> had referred to a so-called new post-war imperialism, and had made unworthy allusions to the Soviet Union. He had attempted to dispose of the USSR proposals by alleging that they were pure and simple propaganda manoeuvres. But that would convince nobody: the unbridled armaments race of the United States, the United Kingdom and their allies, as well as the constant increase in their military budgets, were facts which nobody could deny. When there was talk of propaganda, attention should be drawn to such statements as that of Mr. Johnson, Secretary of Defense of the United States, who had said in August 1949, that the military vacuum in Eastern Europe was a great temptation for the Soviet Union and international communism. Was not such a statement a direct incitement to war?

4. The USSR proposal's reference to the mighty popular movement for peace in all countries had particularly impressed Mr. Pearson. He had alleged that it was an expression with a very special meaning in the communist vocabulary. He was right: the search for peace was one of the characteristics of the communist movement, just as war was one of the characteristics of capitalism. The peoples of the whole world were opposed to war and rallied eagerly to the standard of peace. The instigators of a new war had launched a crusade against those aspirations because their fulfilment would mean the collapse of the policy of military adventure and world domination in the leading circles of certain countries like the United States and the United Kingdom. Thus, reactionary United States circles had done everything to destroy the significance of resolution 110 (II) condemning all preparations for a new war which had been unanimously adopted by the Assembly in 1947 following a proposal made by the USSR, in spite of the United States delegation's attempts to wreck it. War propaganda had not ceased to expand. However, it was now faced by growing resistance on the part of the popular democratic forces. In that connexion, it was enough to recall the World Congresses for Peace held in Paris and Prague in April 1949: delegations from 561 national and twelve international peace organizations, representing 600 million persons, had taken part in them. The mighty movement bore witness to the fact that the

peoples represented a force capable of curbing the aggressors, as Mr. Malenkov had said in Moscow on the occasion of the 32nd Anniversary of the October Revolution.

5. Today, the instigators of a new war no longer limited themselves even to propaganda, but were drawing up military and strategic plans. The aggressive nature of the North Atlantic Treaty was revealed by the fact that it included countries which, geographically, did not form part of the Atlantic region, but which, in the eyes of the warmongers, had the highly important qualification of being neighbours of the Soviet Union: Turkey and Iran. Not only did the Treaty completely ignore the possibility of a new German aggression but there were even plans to use Western Germany as a base from which to attack the Soviet Union. Was it not significant that only one of the great Powers which had fought against Hitlerite Germany—the Soviet Union—was not participating in the Treaty? That showed without a shadow of doubt that, although the North Atlantic Treaty was disguised as a defensive measure, it was directed against the Soviet Union. Had not a member of the British Parliament, in an unguarded moment, asked when the defensive would pass into an offensive phase? The real nature of the aggressive unions formed by the United States and the United Kingdom could not be kept from the peoples indefinitely; nor could the fact that the ever-growing system of United States air and naval bases was intended not for defence against a non-existent threat from the Soviet Union, but for an attack against that country. The same was true of the billions of dollars spent on armaments. Mr. Truman had revealed that the military budget for 1950-51 would probably be even larger than that for the preceding year. It should be noted that he had proposed to include in the 1950-51 budget an unspecified sum of between 2 and 3 hundred million dollars for the supply of military equipment to the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. The United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Johnson, had recently declared that the aim of the United States policy was peace by force. General Arnold had said that the United States was maintaining the world balance of power through its monopoly of the atomic bomb, and General Bradley had said that the United States was the only country capable of carrying out strategic bombardments. Those statements had been interpreted by the United States Press as an indication of that country's determination to use the atomic bomb against any aggressor. The war hysteria which had seized certain United States circles was again illustrated by the organization of conferences on the strategy to be used in the case of war against the Soviet Union. In the United States, the instigators of a new war had a free hand. They were making haste, because they knew that time was working against them: the forces of peace and democracy were growing more rapidly than those of reaction and aggression. In September 1949, Mr. Johnson had said that it was impossible to wait until military production in Europe was completely re-established because immediate action was necessary, and, if time were lost, there might be the risk of doing too little and too late. An end must be put to that state of affairs, and that was the precise purpose of the first paragraph of the USSR proposal.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 228th plenary meeting.

6. The United States and the United Kingdom were responsible for the deadlock over the question of prohibiting the atomic weapon. They maintained their initial position in support of the United States, so-called international, control plan as the Baruch-Acheson-Lilienthal Plan. The statement made on 6 June 1949, by Mr. Lilienthal, Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, that the United States had been practically denuded of atomic weapons in 1946, showed that the delay in considering the problem of prohibiting those weapons was due to the United States. The same conclusion emerged from the United States Atomic Energy Commission's report to Congress on 31 January 1949. According to *The New York Times* of 1 February 1949, the report stated that the Atomic Energy Commission's most important work was the production and improvement of atomic weapons. Thus, concurrently with the diplomatic conversations in which the United States and United Kingdom claimed to show their good-will with regard to prohibition of the atomic weapon, plans were being made in secret commissions for measures to supply the United States with a maximum stock of atomic bombs within the shortest possible time. That explained why the United States and the United Kingdom had never shown any spirit of conciliation and why they had always affirmed that so long as the Soviet Union did not accept the United States plan, no basis for agreement could be found. The President of the United States had struck the same note in his recent statement that the United States plan was the best.

7. Mr. Bevin had spoken to the same effect, and had also declared that the United States plan would ensure effective control of atomic energy, although that plan did not even mention the prohibition of atomic weapons. Mr. Bevin was in no way concerned by the fact that the plan would annihilate the sovereignty of States. Mr. Pearson, the Canadian representative, had said in the General Assembly that the United States plan would, in fact, constitute a safeguard of that sovereignty. Yet it could hardly be denied that the plan would do away with any sovereignty in matters of national, economic, social and cultural policy. The true reason for the Anglo-American campaign against the sovereignty of other States lay in their desire to open the door to American monopolies and to remove the last existing obstacles to world domination by the United States. That campaign had, in particular, taken the form of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Marshall Plan. It had already been shown that the Marshall Plan was altogether incompatible with the sovereignty of States, as some British Conservatives had recognized. They had admitted that, if it had been applied to the letter, the United Kingdom would have become an integral part of a European federation precisely as the State of Virginia was an integral part of the United States.

8. The supporters of the United States plan of control were continuously saying that the United States was ready to make sacrifices by sharing the gains it had won in the atomic field. It was vain, however, to speak of sacrifice now that the illusion of a monopoly in that field had vanished. The question of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of international control of atomic energy was still before

the United Nations. The French and Canadian proposal currently before the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee confined themselves to expressing pious hopes. But that was not enough. It was necessary to take practical steps to solve the problem without delay.

9. On 26 September 1949, Mr. Bevin had recalled that the nazis had not made use of poison gas during the second World War and had attributed that fact to their fear of reprisals on the part of the Allies.

10. In reality, however, fear was no guarantee that any given weapon would not be used. Sincere respect of the conventions in force was the determining factor. Consequently, that was hardly an argument against the prohibition of atomic weapons; nothing could prevent such prohibition if there existed a real desire towards that end.

11. If, on the other hand, there was no true desire that a convention to that effect should be concluded, it was easy to find pretexts and invoke precedents, as the United Kingdom representative, who was not hampered by scruples in that respect, would surely do. All such efforts could not, however, disguise the fact that, as stated in paragraph 2 of the Soviet Union proposal "the use of atomic weapons and other means of mass destruction" was "contrary to the conscience and honour of the nations and incompatible with membership of the United Nations" (A/996). Thus, the very dignity of the United Nations required that an end should be put to the dilatory tactics which for four years had been delaying the prohibition of atomic weapons. Three years had already passed since the United Nations had proclaimed the principle that the use of atomic weapons for military purposes was inadmissible. The Soviet Union therefore proposed that the General Assembly should declare that it considered "as inadmissible any further delay in the adoption by the United Nations of practical measures for the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of appropriate strict international control". The fact was that it was absolutely necessary to find some way of solving the problem. It was in that spirit that, on 23 September last, the Soviet Union had submitted its draft resolution (A/996) and had appealed to the five Powers which bore "the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" to "unite their efforts" and to "conclude . . . a pact for the strengthening of peace".

12. That proposal constituted a logical culmination of the foreign policy of supporting peace and opposing warmongers which the Soviet Union had pursued for thirty-two years. That policy in turn was based on the socialist structure of society under the Soviet régime; the world knew that the Soviet Union defended the interests of peaceful peoples, which were those of all mankind.

13. The Soviet Union was still pursuing its efforts to improve international relations and fighting against the establishment of military links between certain countries as well as for the consolidation of the United Nations which could not be left out of account. That attitude was in complete conformity with the position taken by the Soviet Union in 1934. At that time the Soviet Union had entered the League of Nations and

the head of the Soviet State, Joseph Stalin, had stated that although the League was weak it could unmask aggressors and constituted an instrument for peace that was doubtless inadequate but might be capable of preventing a new war.

14. The Soviet Union continued to be aware of the difficulties arising from certain military combinations and the creation of blocs as a result of the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty and the establishment of the Western Union. On the eve of the Second World War, however, the Soviet Union had not given up the struggle for peace even when disarmament had become a dead letter throughout the world and when every Power, including those which paid lip-service to the alleged doctrine of non-intervention, had thrown itself into the armaments race. The Soviet Union had successfully concluded non-aggression treaties and pacts with France in 1935, with Czechoslovakia and with Mongolia in 1936 and with the Chinese Republic in 1937. These represented so many successes for the Soviet Union and peace despite the atmosphere of hatred prevalent among the Soviet Union's neighbours and the all-out armaments race pursued by the capitalist countries. That was the period to which Marshal Stalin had referred when he had stated that the Soviet Union had remained as solid as a rock in times of crises and economic catastrophes and had devoted all its efforts to building the socialist State. In 1939 the head of the Soviet State had examined the state of international relations and had proclaimed the Soviet Union's peace policy and its firm will to continue to maintain diplomatic relations with all those countries which did not attack the interests of the Soviet Union.

15. During the Second World War, the Soviet Union had concluded agreements at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam which were of capital importance in the decision of post-war problems. A certain representative had of course not been afraid to say that these agreements no longer had any significance. But the Soviet Union discharged its obligations and it was not to blame if there was as yet no peace treaty with Japan and if its efforts to reduce armaments and prohibit atomic weapons had not yet been fruitful. The constructive proposals presented by the Soviet Union between the years 1946 and 1949 should be recalled and, in particular, these relating to war-mongers or to the reduction of armaments by one-third. Those texts had all had a single purpose, namely the maintenance of peace and security, and it was in the same spirit that the Soviet Union proposed that the five Powers, on whom rested the major responsibility in that field, should conclude an agreement to strengthen the peace and unite their efforts in the future.

16. The delegation of the Soviet Union expressed the hope that all peaceful delegations would support the draft resolution contained in document A/996 so that the United Nations might serve the cause of peace as was its duty to do.

17. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) noted that the representative of the Soviet Union had once more shown his habitual eloquence and had had recourse to his customary violence. The United Nations, however, was rather weary of it since they had heard the same virulent attacks so many times.

18. The Soviet Union delegation, on the instructions of its Government, accused a certain number of countries, and in particular the United States and the United Kingdom, of making preparations for a new war. Thus it was no longer "certain circles", it was the Governments themselves against which the accusations were directed.

19. It was deeply to be regretted that the Soviet Union devoted all its efforts to drafting proposals which had only a propagandist aim, instead of attempting to co-operate constructively to promote harmony in international relations. Provocative remarks would not help the cause of friendly co-operation among nations.

20. All the provocative proposals presented by the Soviet Union during the last four years were contained in the new draft resolution and the adoption of any one paragraph might be interpreted by the Soviet Union as a condemnation of the United States, the United Kingdom and the other States which were not specifically named in document A/996.

21. With regard to paragraph 2 of the USSR draft resolution, which was drafted in extremely vague terms, it merely evaded effective control by deceptively promising prohibition. Furthermore, the First Committee would recall that the control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons were being discussed in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and it would not of course wish to cause the problem to be given prolonged consideration. The Atomic Energy Commission's report was the fruit of four years work to organize an effective and practically applicable system of international control which would be proof against fraud and violation. The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee also had before it a report on the consultations in progress between the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission. That was the setting in which that vital problem should be studied.

22. Paragraph 2 of document A/996 therefore constituted an attempt to oppose the stated will of the General Assembly which had rejected those very ideas at its last session and had stated that the establishment of an international body was the prerequisite for the prohibition of atomic weapons. The First Committee therefore should show its confidence in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and avoid the danger of two Committees taking contradictory decisions on the same subject.

23. Not only was paragraph 2 deceptive, but it was linked to the slanderous accusations in the previous paragraph which, in their turn, led up to a proposal for a five-Power pact, so that an allegedly pacific pact assumed a belligerent tone.

24. If the real purpose had been to strengthen peace, a suggestion of that kind would never have been placed in such a context. Moreover, the five permanent members of the Security Council had already pledged themselves, by signing the Charter, to ensure the maintenance of peace. Their responsibilities in that respect carried with them certain privileges, the abuse of which had constituted the main obstacle to fruitful co-operation: for one of those five, the Soviet Union, had disregarded the special responsibility that fell on permanent members of the Security Council. In fact, the tactics of obstruction and sabotage used by the Soviet Union were in complete disregard of the principle of unanimity embodied in Article

27, paragraph 3, which assumed that the five permanent members would co-operate in the maintenance of peace.

25. At Yalta, at Potsdam, in the Allied Control Council, in the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Security Council, the principle of unanimity had been used by the Soviet Union for its own purposes. To put an end to such practices, there was no need for a pact: all that was needed was that the Soviet Union should revise its policy.

26. The events of the past five years coupled with such events as the German-Soviet pact and the violation of the non-aggression pacts between the Soviet Union and the Baltic countries, had undermined confidence in the pledges of the Soviet Union. Too many acts of force had taken place for professions of pacifism to be believed, if one only recalled the promises for free elections in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania—broken in the latter case by Mr. Vyshinsky's mission to Bucharest—the depredation of Manchuria, the partition of Korea, the guerrilla warfare in Greece, the threat to Turkey, the obliteration of freedom in Czechoslovakia and of democratic opposition in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, and finally the nomination of a Marshal of the Red Army as Minister of Defence in Poland. Moreover, when force was held in check, as in the case of Iran and even Berlin, the result was only obtained thanks to the firm stand taken by the non-permanent members of the Security Council and certain Powers which had thwarted all the attempts of the Soviet Union.

27. At the present session, when the General Assembly had endeavoured to promote compliance with the Peace Treaties on the part of Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, the Soviet Union had combined excess of language with a disregard of agreements which no longer suited its convenience.

28. Moreover, the Soviet Union and the States still under its control had denounced other treaties concluded with Yugoslavia, at the same time carrying out troop movements and provoking frontier incidents, accompanied by abuse.

29. Faced with those threats, the peace-loving nations had been compelled to organize a system of collective security to protect themselves against the aggressively reactionary policies of the Soviet Union and the *Cominform* which claimed that everybody but itself was out of step.

30. The General Assembly was being asked to condemn the efforts to defend peace and international security such as the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the Mutual Defence Assistance Act. The Soviet Union cared little that those agreements were serving the cause of the United Nations and that their purpose was to ensure the security of States whose only ideal was peace: the Soviet Union was attacking the United States, the United Kingdom and "an unspecified number of other States" and asking the General Assembly to condemn those agreements.

31. Such safeguards, however, would never be used unless the Security Council was unable to prevent a clear violation of international peace. The States that had concluded these agreements had not given up hope that the Soviet Union would one day join the other Members of the

United Nations to strengthen collective security, and they considered, as they had always done, that the Charter was still binding upon the Soviet Union. It was true that the *Cominform* had turned a blind eye to the facts and had described the North Atlantic Treaty as an aggressive alliance, even before it had been concluded. That was in complete disregard of the declaration made in the name of the people of the United States by the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which, in presenting the North Atlantic Treaty for ratification, had stated that the basic objective of the Treaty was to assist in achieving the primary purposes of the United Nations, namely, the maintenance of peace and security within the framework of the Charter. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee had added that the Treaty, if it could be called an alliance, was an alliance only against war itself.

32. In the same way, when the Mutual Defence Assistance Act was passed, President Truman had reaffirmed that the policy of the United States was to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations, so that armed force should not be used except in the common interest. The United States, President Truman had said, would continue to exert maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated in the Charter, agreements to achieve universal regulation and reduction of armaments including armed forces, under adequate safeguards against violations and evasions.

33. It was thus that a people of 150 million was doing its part "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". The American people was enthusiastically devoted to that task. But the United States wanted to co-operate with all States in the building of a universal system of collective security within the United Nations. It therefore rejected such a proposal as that of the Soviet Union, which pointed towards domination of world affairs by the major Powers, an old objective of Russian traditional policy.

34. What the world needed was peace, and not more commitments, and if treaties had to be concluded, they should be instruments of inviolable law and not instruments of propaganda.

35. From the day when the Charter had been signed, all the Members of the United Nations were bound to take effective collective measures for peace. Peace was everybody's business, and the peoples of the world did not want it in the form of domination by five major Powers. The United States had done everything in its power to strengthen international co-operation, which was the foundation of universal security and, despite many disappointing experiences, held firmly to the belief in such co-operation.

36. During the Second World War, the United States had sent a military mission to Moscow, and had constantly transmitted military and technological information to the Soviet Union forces despite a complete lack of reciprocity. Moreover, unofficial relief agencies had sent medical supplies and civilian goods to the Soviet Union, in addition to UNRRA aid valued at 250 million dollars.

37. Under lend-lease, supplies to a total value of 11,000,000,000 dollars had been sent, including for example, 427,000 trucks—approximately half



as many trucks as the Soviet Union had produced in its entire history before the Nazi invasion. The sovereignty of the Soviet Union had not been impaired by the economic assistance furnished by the United States, yet *Cominform* propaganda claimed that the United States provided economic assistance with the sole purpose of economic and political domination.

38. Despite the invitation extended to the Soviet Union to participate in the Committee of European Economic Co-operation, the *Cominform* had been established for the declared purpose of sabotaging that programme.

39. Similarly, in the sphere of political co-operation, the Soviet Union had rejected the offer of a mutual guarantee pact against German and Japanese aggression made by Mr. Byrnes. In October 1943, Mr. Hull had flown to Moscow to suggest the establishment of a post-war security organization, and President Roosevelt had devoted the closing weeks of his life to the same cause. The United States and other States Members had been so eager to secure participation of the Soviet Union in the work of the United Nations that they had agreed that the Soviet Socialist Republics of Byelorussia and the Ukraine, which were as much a part of the Soviet Union as California and Texas were of the United States, should be Members of the United Nations. But the Soviet Union had refused to participate in many of the United Nations specialized agencies, which were working to build a more peaceful and productive world. The participation of the Soviet Union in those agencies would be welcomed by all Members of the United Nations as evidence that that country was ready to serve the cause of peace and progress.

40. The most serious aspect of the matter was that the peoples under Soviet domination were deprived of all contact with the rest of the world at a time when the free exchange of ideas was essential to the maintenance of peace and international understanding. Through what medium did the Russian people obtain its knowledge of the outside world? Through organs controlled by the Government, which gave it that distorted idea expressed by the representatives of the *Cominform* in their abusive speeches.

41. On 24 October 1949,<sup>1</sup> President Truman had stressed the human factor, the human nature, and the harm which so-called national interests did to the common good. History had doubtless left a legacy of barriers and obstacles, but whilst most countries were striving to remove those survivals of the past, the Soviet Union was keeping the Russian people apart from the world community and enclosing it behind a "spite fence". It was in vain that in October 1945, for example, the United States had invited the Red Army Choir, theatrical groups and orchestras to visit the United States, and suggested the organization of exhibitions. In November 1945, Ambassador Harriman had proposed an exchange of students with no more success. In 1946, some American universities had extended invitations to Soviet professors and offered scholarships to students; but none of those invitations had ever been accepted. American ex-servicemen, with the authorization of their Government, had applied to study

in Soviet institutions; but their applications had been rejected.

42. In December 1946, after a statement by Marshal Stalin which appeared to be encouraging, Ambassador Bedell-Smith had submitted to Marshal Stalin a definite proposal relating to the visit of Soviet scientists to the United States; but that offer had come to nothing. Moreover, in June 1947, the Government of the Soviet Union had begun a campaign to prevent contact between the Russian people and foreigners, for cultural relations with the non-Soviet world were supposed to endanger the Soviet State. Today, a mere gesture of friendship towards a Soviet citizen was a threat to his well-being. While foreign broadcasts to the Russian people were being jammed, that people was being subjected to a propaganda of hatred and lies. Where, then, were mutual understanding and co-operation?

43. The censorship was so strict that today there was only one United States newspaper and two press associations represented in the Soviet Union. That was the root of the problem. There was no incompatibility between economic systems. The world was full of differing social and cultural institutions; but only in the area of the *Cominform* was contact with foreigners branded as treason.

44. If all the peoples could enter into contact with each other, international problems would come near to being solved; for the Soviet people, like the people of the United States, wanted co-operation and peace. The tragedy was that its Government forbade all contact with the external world. In such conditions, agreement between Governments could not be other than fragile. A Government which did not trust its own people could hardly be expected to trust others. Suspicion did not lead to peace.

45. If the Government of the Soviet Union really wished to strengthen peace, all it had to do was to cease fermenting hatred against the non-*Cominform* world and to forsake the doctrine that the outside world was its enemy. In a word, it must lift the "Iron Curtain".

46. The Preamble of the Charter had denounced the scourge of war, and all the great principles of the Charter could lead to international peace and security if they were expressed by action. Under the Charter, the fifty-nine Members of the United Nations had undertaken to settle their international disputes by pacific methods and to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner contrary to the Charter. They had, moreover, pledged themselves to carry out decisions reached by the community of nations through the United Nations, and to assist the latter in any action it might take in accordance with the Charter. Lastly, the Charter was based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all the Members.

47. All that was required now, therefore, was to fulfil those undertakings, which implied respect for international obligations, respect for the rights of others, faith in human rights, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States through indirect aggression or the subversion of Governments by such methods as the manipulation of monetary groups. Peace did not result from sweeping gestures but it was the product of a continuing process; and the consequence of scrupulous adherence to fundamental principles.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, 237th plenary meeting.*

48. It was in that spirit that the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/549) which directed attention to the basic requirements for enduring peace. The purpose was to provide the United Nations with a standard to which all who believed in peace might rally and work sincerely for the settlement of international disputes and the promotion of international co-operation.

49. There was no substitute for the performance of treaty obligations. The good citizen of the world was recognized above all by his respect for the essentials of peace. The adoption of that draft resolution would signify that the Charter of the United Nations was the most solemn pact of peace and that it laid down the principles of an enduring peace. Thus, the Assembly would proclaim that disregard of those principles was primarily responsible for international tension, and would invite all its Members to take the necessary steps in the spirit of co-operation on which the United Nations was founded.

50. On those realistic grounds, the joint draft resolution called upon all nations to refrain from threatening or using force contrary to the Charter; to refrain from many acts aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or integrity of any State, or at fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people in any State.

51. The draft resolution also called upon all nations to carry out in good faith their international agreements and to afford the organs of the United Nations their full support and free access to their territories.

52. Two paragraphs related to the dignity of the human person, to freedom for the peaceful expression of political opposition, to freedom of religion, to all the other human rights mentioned in the Universal Declaration, and to the standards of living of the peoples. All the Members of the

United Nations were called upon to participate fully in the work of the Organization. In particular, the five permanent members of the Security Council were urged progressively to broaden their co-operation, more and more, and to exercise restraint in their use of the veto, so as to make the Security Council a more effective instrument for maintaining peace. Finally, all nations were called upon to co-operate in supporting United Nations efforts in the settlement of outstanding problems, to co-operate in attaining international regulation and reduction of conventional armaments, and to agree to the exercise of national sovereignty jointly with other nations, to the extent necessary to attain such international control of atomic energy as would make effective the prohibition of atomic weapons and assure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

53. The draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom was incompatible with the Soviet Union draft resolution, which should be rejected, none of its parts being worthy either of amendment or adoption. That draft resolution was nothing but an attempt to slander, obstruct and deceive.

54. The United States delegation, having placed before the First Committee the Soviet Union's record of non-co-operation, was now submitting a draft on the essentials of peace. If the Soviet Union was prepared to accept those essentials, there was no need for a five-Power pact. If it was not so prepared, such a pact was a hollow proposal.

55. The draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States was therefore intended to secure fulfilment of the undertakings assumed under the Charter, to which the adoption of the resolution would give new life.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SIXTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 14 November 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman:* Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

#### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (continued)**

1. Mr. CASTRO (El Salvador) said that the item under discussion apparently included two completely different parts, namely, the condemnation of the preparations for a new war and the conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace. With regard to the latter, his delegation entertained strong doubts as to the competence of the United Nations to recommend the signature of a peace pact between five of its Members. With the exception of very special cases, the Assembly's recommendations for the maintenance of peace must include all Members, without dividing them into groups and addressing them different proposals. The USSR proposal limited the pact to the five great Powers, and excluded 54 Members of the United Nations. However, after careful consideration, his delegation felt that, in that particular case, the General

Assembly did have jurisdiction to consider the item proposed by the Soviet Union delegation.

2. The delegation of El Salvador had arrived at that conclusion for the following reasons: in the first place, the Soviet Union recognized as the basis for its proposal that the existing differences between the great Powers could ultimately endanger world peace; in the second place, it requested a particular action whereby the General Assembly might act as a mediator. However, Mr. Castro felt that the Soviet Union had definitely undermined the possibility of the conclusion of such a pact by unilateral actions, such as the recognition of the *de facto* Chinese Government. Since the other four great Powers only recognized the Nationalist Government, his delegation did not understand how the five great Powers could conclude such a proposed pact in view of such basic differences. Moreover, the principle contained in the USSR draft resolution was covered in the Charter itself. Obviously, in submitting such a proposal, the Soviet Union had explicitly implied that the Charter did not comply

with its objectives and ideals. The delegation of El Salvador, therefore, could in no circumstances subscribe to that view. The USSR could effectively contribute to the carrying out of the high ideals in its proposal, if it would only adapt its international policies to the principles of the Charter, thereby lessening the existing international friction. It could, for example, exercise its influence to put an end to the intervention by certain countries in the internal affairs of Greece; it could facilitate the return of normal life in Korea; it could restore the respect for basic human rights in Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. Moreover, the co-operation of Member States with the agencies of the United Nations would greatly contribute to the preservation of world peace. The policy of the USSR in ignoring the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans and the Commission on Korea had handicapped the work of the Organization. Furthermore, the excessive use of the veto had excluded peace-loving States such as Ireland and Portugal from membership in the United Nations, despite their qualifications. In that regard, the El Salvadorian delegation subscribed to the view that Bulgaria, Romania and Albania could not be considered as peace-loving States, and were therefore disqualified for membership, in view of the material help they had extended to the Greek guerrillas.

3. As regards the peace treaties with Germany and Japan, his delegation wished to recall the fact that many small States had declared war on the axis Powers. In Washington in 1942, the United Nations had agreed not to sign separate peace treaties. That declaration seemed to have been forgotten. Mr. Castro wished to point out that the Soviet Union could offer better co-operation with a view to signing those peace treaties.

4. Some delegations had alluded to the Inter-American Defense System. The El Salvadorian delegation felt it essential to note that that system was provided for in the relevant Articles of the Charter by the establishment of regional arrangements or agencies aimed at the preservation of peace.

5. For those reasons, his delegation would support the joint draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/549) but would vote against the draft resolution proposed by the USSR (A/996).

6. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) said that the terms of the item under discussion would have justified a debate upon its admissibility on the agenda. However, the French delegation had voted, both in the General Committee and in the General Assembly, for its inclusion in the agenda, in the belief that a debate was made necessary by the proclaimed purpose of the text and the circumstances of its submission. The USSR draft resolution began with formal and grave accusations against two Members of the United Nations, who were also permanent members of the Security Council. Such allegations as preparations for a new war, aggressive aims and organization of military blocs could not be brought lightly, still less should they be lightly introduced into a text submitted to the vote of fifty-nine nations.

7. When addressing the Assembly, on 29 September 1949, Mr. Vyshinsky had contended that the first two paragraphs of his draft resolution

were only statements of fact, although no supporting document or fact had been advanced. Despite those peculiarities, the matter was stranger than the manner and it should be fully examined and aired in public discussion. Paragraph 1 of the draft resolution confined itself to making serious accusations against two Powers designated by name; paragraph 2, after a condemnation of the use of weapons of mass destruction for military purposes, described as "inadmissible any further delay in the adoption by the United Nations of practical measures for the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of appropriate strict international control"; paragraph 3 after confronting the so-called warmongers previously denounced with the firm will of the peoples to avert the threat of a new war and ensure the maintenance of peace, adjured the five permanent members of the Security Council to unite their efforts to that end and to conclude among themselves a pact for that very purpose.

8. Re-reading that text led one to wonder whether or not that was dreamland. What could be the purpose of paragraph 2? Was the Assembly to be asked to condemn itself? And could it be forgotten that, on three questions, the Assembly had indicated—and by a considerable majority—the path to be followed to achieve both prohibition and control, a path which had been blocked by the very authors of the USSR draft resolution. As to paragraph 3, if one was really appealing for agreement and desired that appeal to be heard, was it conceivable that that plea should be launched in the form of an accusation and insult? If it was desired to persuade a future partner to consent to an arrangement, was it reasonable to denounce him solemnly as a warmonger, and have him repudiated by public opinion in his own country? Obviously, if the USSR did not wish to obtain the prohibition of atomic weapons and appropriate measures of control, and did not want a five-Power pact, but rather, hope that a majority vote would be cast against its draft resolution proposing those things, the text submitted to the First Committee would be no different. If the text was a propaganda document intended to provoke a rejection to be used for propaganda purposes, it would be no different either. The USSR would be pictured as bringing peace to the world, though being hindered by the warmongers; and those warmongers would no longer be any particular Power but the substantial majority of States Members of the United Nations. Furthermore, did paragraph 2 mean that if no agreement were reached upon the establishment of control, the Soviet Union would nevertheless insist that prohibition should come into force without any control at all? Those questions were pertinent in view of the fact that the USSR draft resolution submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee<sup>1</sup> proposed that conventions on prohibitions and control be concluded and put into effect simultaneously.

9. Paragraph 3 called upon the five permanent members of the Security Council to conclude, among themselves, a pact for the strengthening of peace. Did that mean a declaration of the principles upon which international security should be founded or did it mean an undertaking to respect those principles? Those undertakings were already embodied in the Charter. Was it desired

<sup>1</sup> See document A/AC.31/L.35.

to emphasize the special responsibilities incumbent upon the five Powers? In that case, paragraph 3 should have been drafted in terms which were not contrary to the Charter. He pointed out that Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Charter, entrusted the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security not merely to the five permanent members but to the Security Council as a whole. In any case, the value of a diplomatic instrument confining itself to making a statement of that nature was not clearly evident. Was it desired to promote private conversations among the five permanent members of the Council, and, for that purpose, to give an institutional character to a Council of the five Foreign Ministers meeting periodically and competent to deal with all questions concerned with the maintenance of peace and security? If so, it would be interesting to know if those conversations would be held outside the United Nations and parallel with it, or within the framework of the Organization. If the first alternative applied, Mr. Chauvel saw no room left for the United Nations to carry on a constructive work within a field which was one of the chief concerns of the Charter. If it were the second, he was at a loss to understand the position of such a five-Power Council within the mechanism of the United Nations, particularly in relation to the Security Council which, in fact, would be superseded.

10. Whatever practical form the USSR draft resolution took, it would merely ask the General Assembly to adhere to a principle which was not found in the Charter, and to give the five permanent members of the Security Council an additional privilege. Obviously, that course, if followed, would run counter to the democratic principle of the equality of the Members of the Organization. Even assuming that those questions could be satisfactorily answered, could it be seriously believed that the institution of a new procedure and the creation of another council would produce solutions? The permanent members of the Council had not awaited the signature of a five-Power pact before meeting and attempting to settle certain problems, in particular, the German question. The difficulties were, to some extent, inherent in the problems themselves, and any treaty which did not reflect a will to agreement was useless and even harmful. What reason was there for thinking that the Government of the Soviet Union sincerely wished to strengthen peace? There had been no sign at the peace congresses, or was there in the text of the draft resolution.

11. In making that statement, the French delegation did not contend that a will to war was concealed under the apparent offer of peace, but it believed that that offer was a cloak for various objectives, the pursuit of which might lead to war. The French delegation deemed it necessary to state that the will for peace was not enough but that there must also be a will to accept the conditions of peace by showing a spirit of compromise in international relationships. However, the vocabulary of the USSR in international negotiations appeared to be singularly limited. It was almost confined to a negative answer. That contention was borne out by the various attempts to solve the German and the Japanese problems as well as the major problems which had been raised in the United Nations. That negative answer had been heard forty-one times in the Security Coun-

cil and, very recently, in connexion with conventional armaments and the conditions on which information on atomic energy could be exchanged.

12. It would be easy, and perhaps tempting, to speak of conspiracy, of blocs and of automatic majorities. But when the same, or almost the same, minority had been automatically maintained throughout the years without gaining a single vote, despite an active propaganda, the least biased observer would be inclined to wonder whether the themes put forward by the leader of the small chorus were not essentially bad. Moreover, where was the will to agreement when a Government which noted that state of affairs and the impossibility of winning acceptance of its views refused to modify them and make the slightest concession?

13. France, whose sufferings from the war had been greater than those of many and equal to those of most, could not be suspected of aspiring to hegemony. France merely desired to rise again from its ruins with a view to building a better world where the individual could once again live in freedom. To that end, it had placed its trust in the Charter of the United Nations. France was ready, as had been declared elsewhere, to renounce the exercise of certain sovereign prerogatives in favour of and for the benefit of the world community. His country was aware that such a renunciation was conducive to an association for the exercise of those common rights in the service of the community. That readiness gave it the right to speak out and, with pain and regret but in all frankness, to denounce what appeared to be manoeuvres and pretence, in a field where they were out of place. For all those reasons, the French delegation would vote against the Soviet Union draft resolution.

14. On the other hand, the joint draft resolution submitted jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/549) contained principles to which all the Members of the United Nations had subscribed. Accordingly, the French delegation would vote in favour of it.

15. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) welcomed the opportunity for a reaffirmation of faith in the principles which constituted the very foundations of international peace and security. In fact, it was a tribute to the United Nations to see that the representatives of the two most powerful States could discuss such great differences so freely and strongly. That held out the hope that those serious problems could be discussed and a solution discovered in accordance with the principles of the Charter. All representatives would contribute to a better understanding of the problem and to the attainment of a fair and just solution. The great fault of international relations was the assumption that men could act with evil intent on behalf of a nation with impunity and even with advantage. Real peace would come only with the application to the conduct of nations of those simple standards in individual life which entitled a man to be called honourable. The world did not merely need the absence of armed conflict, but a peace where all righteous people would be free to pursue their lawful occupations without the fear of being despoiled of their liberty or the fruits of their labours.

16. He considered that the essential cause of the existing fears, doubts and suspicions was darkness.

Since God had made provision for mankind to be constantly led from darkness into light, it was necessary for darkness to be dispelled to introduce light in every corner of one's individual, collective, national and international activities. Full knowledge and free information would produce understanding and banish fear and suspicion. In that connexion, the representative of Pakistan wished to recall his statement made during the general discussion at the present session of the General Assembly<sup>1</sup> to the effect that the present ideological conflict did not only continue to divide the world but also to harass its peoples and to threaten peace and security. Tolerance was called for, and every nation must be free to develop its institutions along lines best suited to its own needs and expressive of its own genius.

17. On reading paragraph 1 of the USSR draft resolution, he had been most disagreeably surprised. In the background of his own acquaintance with the United States and the United Kingdom, it had come as a very great surprise that the representative of another great and powerful State should seriously believe such allegations. If one great nation held such a belief about two others, one must be uneasy about the prospects of the maintenance of international peace. Fear, suspicion and doubt was the result of lack of knowledge and information. Unless those fears were eliminated, international peace could not be secured. In the recent past, one of the main causes of war had been the principle of racial domination. Happily, the poisonous characteristics of that principle had been recognized and its final condemnation was contained in the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter. Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan wished to draw attention to recent progress in that field, and, in particular, he drew attention to the agreement recently reached between the Netherlands and the representatives of the Indonesian people; as well as to the adoption of the resolution concerning the disposal of the former Italian colonies.

18. The representative of Pakistan stated that all the essentials required to secure and maintain the kind of peace which his delegation desired were contained in the joint draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom. He had already indicated his delegation's attitude regarding paragraph 1 of the USSR draft resolution. The condemnation attempted therein could not be endorsed, and, furthermore, from all its knowledge of the policies of those two nations, his delegation could but repudiate that condemnation. While paragraphs 2 and 3 of the USSR draft resolutions contained two suggestions which, if divorced from the context, might help secure the object in mind, those matters were much more appropriately expressed in the draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom. The first four paragraphs of the latter touched upon the crux of the matter as far as the maintenance of political peace was concerned. Pakistan could confirm that, as it had suffered fears and anxieties and continued to suffer them on account of the non-observance of the principles set out in that draft. His delegation would therefore support that draft resolution (A/C.1/549) and in so doing would be supporting such of the suggestions contained in the USSR draft resolution as were acceptable.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 227th plenary meeting.

19. In conclusion, he wished to draw particular attention to the last paragraph of the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution not merely because it laid down the essential condition for the settlement of the only principles upon which international control of atomic energy could be based profitably, but also because, by endorsing it, the General Assembly would be accepting for the first time a principle which, as international co-operation increased, would show to an ever greater degree the ultimate way towards international peace and co-operation.

20. Mr. ANDERSEN (Denmark), referring to statements made by the USSR representative at the previous meeting and on 23 September<sup>2</sup> regarding the duty of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security, said that all the members of the Committee would no doubt agree that the United Nations had a duty to make an appeal for a joint effort to dispel the international tension, and a duty to devote all its energy to the maintenance of peace. While his delegation could agree in principle on the duty of the United Nations to take the initiative, the USSR draft resolution was not a suitable means of reaching that goal. Like all others, his country condemned all preparations for a new war and was anxious to have all disputes and differences settled by peaceful methods. The representative of Denmark asked, however, how anything could possibly result from a proposal in which the very parties which were called upon to co-operate, were being accused of preparing for a new war. If such accusations were deleted real understanding and co-operation would be assisted.

21. The idea of co-operating in any way in aggression was hateful to his country, which was deeply devoted to peace. Noting that the North Atlantic Treaty had again been attacked at the previous meeting by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Andersen said that, from the very first, his Government had realized that the Treaty was not intended as an instrument of aggression, but solely to serve defensive purposes. Had there been the least suspicion that the aims and contents of the Treaty might be anything else, his Government would have refrained from adhering to it. Recalling that, on 24 September 1947, the League of Nations had passed a resolution denouncing war of aggression as a crime, he stated that his Government and the Danish people still took that stand. Denmark's adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty had been due to the tension prevailing between East and West. On the basis of the fundamental principles of democracy and personal liberty, the participants in the North Atlantic Treaty stood together and were prepared—should it prove necessary—to fight together in common self-defence.

22. Stating that his Government was convinced that membership in that Treaty was fully compatible with membership in the United Nations, Mr. Andersen stated that his delegation supported the draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom. It was proper for the General Assembly to make that appeal, and he pointed to several paragraphs of the proposal with special satisfaction. Referring to the appeal to States to refrain from threats and use of force, he said that the so-called cold war was a scourge to the whole world. No people directly exposed to

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* 226th plenary meeting.

it could settle down and concentrate all efforts on peaceful tasks. He also wished to emphasize the references to removal of barriers to free exchange of information and ideas, and the call to the five permanent members of the Security Council. Referring to the last paragraph of the joint proposal, he said that he fully subscribed to the statement of the United Kingdom representative on 26 September<sup>1</sup> to the effect that a certain measure of sovereignty must be surrendered in order to achieve effective control of atomic weapons. It was no longer possible to recognize the concept of absolute sovereignty in international law. That must be admitted and realistic efforts must be made to create a feeling of security and safety for peoples of the world.

23. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) said that the Committee was certainly considering the most serious problem which confronted the world, namely that of world peace. The USSR draft resolution contained what he considered to be the most serious accusations ever made against a Member State. That accusation was directed against two great Powers to which the world owed a great deal. The General Assembly, which had been called the "town meeting of the world" and the "organ of human conscience", must establish the moral and real facts, bearing in mind the rights of international law.

24. He noted that the draft resolution of the Soviet Union contained two parts: the first appealed to the General Assembly as the main representative organization of the world conscience, and the second implied that the General Assembly and the United Nations were useless since peace could only be established by an agreement or pact to be concluded between the five great Powers. Dealing with the first part, Mr. Belaúnde stated that, from his knowledge and experience, the Western Powers, in particular France, the United Kingdom and the United States, had long shown a great spirit of peace. Perhaps the only accusation that could be levelled against them was that they had not taken all necessary precautions in confronting the fascist aggressor. Referring to the French confidence in the Maginot Line and to the re-occupation of the Rhineland, Mr. Belaúnde stated that the Second World War had been a defensive one for the Western Powers. Democracy based on truly ethical principles was bound to peace and could lean in no other direction. On the other hand, the imperialistic States, where religious, cultural and scientific elements were subjugated, necessarily tended towards war.

25. Referring to the statement made by the representative of Pakistan, he paid tribute to the evolution which had transformed the British Empire into the Commonwealth of Nations. That evolution, as was attested by those who had gained their independence, had been due to the United Kingdom's devotion to peace. Mr. Belaúnde also wished to state his appreciation of recent United States policy. Though the USSR representative had referred to the Spanish-speaking nations as part of the "mechanical majority", as he had once reminded Mr. Gromyko those nations participated in the debates and voted with complete independence. In that connexion he also wished to refer to the evolution which had come about in the relations between the American States during recent years. Thus the Monroe Doctrine, as seen

in connexion with the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, had developed into the basic principle which, in spite of economic differences and differences in power, placed all the countries of America on an equal basis. Mention might also be made of the principle of non-intervention which had been ratified at Bogotá as well as at earlier conferences. A further principle, that of consultations, had been introduced by Argentina. Mr. Belaúnde stated that the Lima Conference had approved the principle that international order was based on respect for the personality of the State, for its complete independence, its economic freedom and cultural life. After describing the development of that principle in relation to the development of the Agreement of Bogotá and the Charter of the Organization of American States, he said that it must be borne in mind that, in the event of a conflict, it was essential to have consultations and return to the *status quo*. The country which did not adopt peaceful measures should be considered as the aggressor. However, that question must be resolved by consultation and by an organization where the two-thirds majority vote prevailed and where there was no veto. In connexion, it must be recalled that the United States had renounced the interpretation of the Chapultepec Charter which offered it certain police powers in respect of the continent, and had accepted the method of consultation for arriving at solutions of difficult problems resulting from any conflict. Noting that the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro had been criticized, he stated that that Treaty was based on equality and the principle of mutual defence. The inter-American countries had become united with the objective of establishing lasting peace in the Americas and of co-operating towards the peaceful solution of all problems outside that continent.

26. Mr. Belaúnde pointed out that those historical processes made it clear that the United Kingdom and the United States were not guilty of the accusations which the USSR had advanced but for which it had offered no proof whatsoever. He believed that the North Atlantic Treaty, like the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, was the result of the exercise of the veto which had made the Charter in some respects useless. The veto had not been intended as a privilege; what had been approved at San Francisco was the rule of unanimity. The obligation of unanimity represented a great responsibility, that of the necessity of finding a solution. The veto right had been accepted on the premise that it would never be used unless it was absolutely essential and well founded. He recalled that he had made a statement to that effect at San Francisco.

27. In the same way as an individual liberty must be bound by the moral and juridical laws of a State, national sovereignty, to those who believed in a moral order over and above that of the State, must be subject to international law which itself was subject to the concept of justice. The principle of sovereignty could not be used as a taboo since it must be limited to some extent in the interests of maintaining peace and security. A State would be the more respected and would have the more influence if it accepted such necessary limitations voluntarily. Those considerations were especially important in connexion with the need for co-operation for international control of atomic energy. Transfer of control was essential, but the necessary limitations would not harm the sovereignty of State in any way.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 229th plenary meeting.



28. Turning to the second aspect of the USSR draft resolution, Mr. Belaúnde regretted that one of the founders of the United Nations should state that peace would never be reached through the Security Council and that the Charter was a useless document. However, even though the Security Council was paralysed by the veto, it could never be said that the United Nations was bankrupt. The General Assembly would always have the final and moral force to clear up such situations as might be completely put aside in

the Security Council. The USSR proposal had all the characteristics of propaganda, and on that occasion, it had been overdone. Stating that the USSR must be made to realize that it had followed the wrong road, Mr. Belaúnde said he felt sure that the fog of suspicion which existed everywhere would clear up if full understanding were established by means of constant consultations.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVENTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 15 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Acting Chairman:* Mr. Jean CHAUVEL (France).

*Chairman (later):* Mr. Selim SARPER (Turkey).

#### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (continued)**

1. In the absence of Mr. Sarper, Mr. ARCE (Argentina) proposed that Mr. Chauvel, representative of France, should take the Chair temporarily.

*It was so decided.*

2. Mr. DJILAS (Yugoslavia) stated that, by using the expression "Tito clique" to describe the representatives of Yugoslavia, the representative of the Soviet Union had revealed the real attitude of his Government towards the independence and sovereignty of Yugoslavia. By the same token, he had insulted the Charter, which defined the rights and duties of sovereign countries, as well as the Yugoslav people. Indeed, if the Yugoslav Government did not enjoy the full support of a people that had paid a high price for its independence and was still defending it strenuously, it could never have resisted the external pressure that was being exercised against Yugoslavia. As the representative of Yugoslavia had stated in the general debate,<sup>1</sup> the USSR proposal (A/996) contained some positive factors. Any initiative, however inadequate and contradictory, that would enable a step forward to be made towards peace and security, the prohibition of atomic weapons and control of atomic energy, relations between the great Powers, and also international relations based upon the principle of the equality of States, would have the support of the Yugoslav delegation. But, the USSR proposal contained certain fundamental deficiencies, and the actions of the Soviet Union Government were incompatible with its utterances. The Yugoslav delegation could, therefore, but consider that proposal in the light of the policy that the Government of the Soviet Union was pursuing with regard to Yugoslavia.

3. The definition of war propaganda and of the principal causes of the danger of war given in the USSR proposal was incomplete and biased. In so far as words were concerned, all Governments were usually peaceful, and open incitement to war in newspapers and on the radio was infrequent. There were, however, many other forms of war propaganda: for instance, certain

Governments endeavoured to present the conditions now prevailing in certain countries in a completely false light, in order to "morally" justify the pressure exercised against those countries and with the view to their future subjugation. On the other hand, the establishment of blocs on ideological pretexts could really only serve hegemonic purposes, which gave rise to preparations for war and threats to peace. The Soviet Union Government could not, therefore, pretend to be the only Government which was not planning the enslavement of other countries, which had not established hostile blocs against other States and which had not prejudiced the cause of peace by its propaganda. It was true that in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries, war propaganda was widespread and at times reached the stage of calling for military measures against certain countries; but Soviet propaganda, on the other hand, apart from its intrinsic harm, was providing weapons for warmongers and anti-democratic elements in the other camp.

4. In the existing circumstances, the disputes leading to war were not ideological: capitalist States such as Germany, Italy and Japan had waged war simultaneously against capitalist and socialist States. The conflicts arose out of the policy of States which, irrespective of their social structure, persisted in their wish to subjugate other peoples, to destroy their independence and sovereignty and to ignore their right to be treated on a basis of equality. The threat to peace, therefore, lay in aggressive policy and methods, and not in ideological or social concepts. Whatever ideology might be proclaimed, any propaganda tending to subjugate a State was war propaganda, and constituted part of a hegemonic plan, fraught with crises and conflicts.

5. Mr. Vyshinsky had stated in the general debate that the Soviet Union adhered to the principle of international peace and co-operation. He had, however, refrained from mentioning non-interference in the internal affairs of States, the equal rights of small nations and the abolition of all discrimination, namely, those very principles which had previously been referred to as the basis of the Soviet Union's policy. Thus, Mr. Vyshinsky's speech of 14 November had made no contribution to the peace he had mentioned so often. Mr. Vyshinsky seemed to consider the problem of peace only from the point of view of the four great Powers. Although the

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 228th plenary meeting.

great Powers indeed had special responsibilities, it was also true that peace was indivisible and that threats to small States could unleash a general conflict. How could the Soviet Union speak of universal peace and co-operation? No sooner had a series of demonstrations and meetings in favour of peace under the auspices of the Soviet Union been held in Paris and Moscow, for instance, than it had launched an aggressive campaign against Yugoslavia. How could there be any confidence in the sincerity of the leaders of a country who alleged that they were struggling for the peace of the peoples and, yet, at the same time, by their aggressive attitude exercised pressure against a small country, to the detriment of the real interests of peace, which called for respect for the independence and equality of States?

6. Since Mr. Vyshinsky was wont to base his speeches on facts and figures, the Yugoslav delegation would reply by quoting certain facts relating, in particular, to the Rajk trial which had been intended to reveal the anti-Yugoslav policy of certain Eastern European countries. In the indictment against Rajk, it had been alleged that Mr. Bebler, a Yugoslav representative to the General Assembly, had entered into contact with Rajk in a French camp in 1941, with a view to espionage. Mr. Bebler had, in fact, been seriously wounded in Spain in 1938, had been sent back to Yugoslavia and condemned in 1939 for his political activities. Since 1941 he had commanded partisan units. Similar slander had been advanced against General Maslaric, Chairman of the Pan-Slav Committee, who had lived in the Soviet Union from 1938 until the end of the war. Similar lies had been told about Karlo Mrazovic who, until quite recently, had been Yugoslav Minister to Moscow. Ivan Gosnjak and Kosta Nadj, Colonel-Generals in the Yugoslav Army, had been slanderously accused of having been Gestapo agents since 1941, whereas since that year they had commanded large units of the army of liberation and had inflicted serious losses upon the Germans. Thus, the Soviet Union advanced the incredible allegation that agents paid by the nazis would have been used to annihilate thousands of the soldiers of their employers and masters. The Yugoslav Minister for Mines, Mr. Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, had been accused, like Mr. Bebler, of having had contacts with Rajk in French concentration camps, although he had never left Yugoslavia before he had gone to Bulgaria and the Soviet Union in 1947-1948. It was true that later, after proof had been submitted by the accused himself, the indictment had been corrected and it had been alleged that the two men whose names had been mentioned at the trial were in fact Veber and Vukomanovic, although no Yugoslavs of that name had ever been in Spain. Finally, the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Rankovic, had been accused of having gone to Hungary to give instructions to Rajk, as if in a similar case a Minister would make such a journey, instead of sending his agents.

7. Furthermore, nearly all the Yugoslav diplomatic staff in the Eastern European countries had been accused of espionage by Governments trying to justify their acts of hostility against Yugoslavia.

8. Thus, all the leaders of the Yugoslav liberation movement, a large majority of the staff of the

Federal Government of the various Yugoslav Republics, and all senior officers and high officials had been accused of espionage for the Gestapo and of having offered their services to the United States. How, then, had those men carried out the political and social changes which the whole world had seen? The truth was that the purpose of that slander was solely to justify the anti-democratic and bellicose measures taken against Yugoslavia.

9. On 1 May 1942, Marshal Stalin had announced that partisan war had broken out throughout Yugoslavia. The decisions later taken at Teheran had stressed the necessity of giving assistance to the Yugoslav partisans. On 20 October 1944, when Belgrade had been liberated, a Red Army order of the day had mentioned the Soviet and Yugoslav units which had taken part in the fighting. At Yalta, the three great Powers had granted *de facto* recognition to the new Yugoslav State. Nevertheless, the testimony of two or three unknown persons at a trial that had manifestly been fabricated, had sufficed to enable the Soviet Union Government to draw a conclusion contrary to the policies of the war and of international conferences. Nothing could be more perverse or cruel than to ascribe the struggle of a nation that had lost 1,700,000 of its inhabitants to the Gestapo simply because that nation did not wish to sacrifice its past and its future to the hegemonic plans of the Soviet Union.

10. The Soviet Union, which was aware of those historical facts, had made the mistake of believing that it could turn Yugoslavia and the rest of the world into a dumb flock of sheep obedient to the voice of the shepherd. History remained, however, and the falsifications of the Rajk trial could not give rise to the admission that occupied Yugoslavia, which had played a decisive part in the revolt against the Germans and had thus given valuable aid to the Soviet forces, had acted upon the orders of the Gestapo. An attempt was being made to prove that Yugoslavia was prepared to invade Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania, and perhaps even Czechoslovakia and Poland, and probably also the poor little Soviet Union as well. Thus, the policy of the Soviet Union towards Yugoslavia shed a new light on the declarations of peace made by the Government of the USSR.

11. The Rajk trial had been intended to prepare the atmosphere of the present session of the General Assembly and to justify further pressure against Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union, without making the slightest attempt to reach an agreement, had then denounced the pact of friendship and mutual assistance with Yugoslavia which it had violated long before by attempting to destroy the independence and sovereignty of that country.

12. In the course of the campaign against Yugoslavia, that country had been accused of preparing to partition Albania. But one wondered what was the basis and purpose of that allegation, which was in contradiction to the whole history of Albano-Yugoslav relations and the brotherly and disinterested help given by Yugoslavia to Albania. In the name of the Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav delegation wished to state publicly and officially that that country had not and would never have the slightest aggressive intention against Albania, and that it would never make any attempt against

the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Albania and its other neighbours. Yugoslavia wished Albania, as well as its other neighbours, to be sovereign and independent States. Yugoslavia would support every action to preserve peace on the frontiers of Albania and to safeguard its independence, which was also the duty of the United Nations. Yugoslavia could not be responsible for the fact that the Government of Albania, at the instigation of the Soviet Union, had adhered to a bloc hostile to Yugoslavia, thus placing that country in a difficult position, instead of thinking of its own independence and development.

13. Another pretext invoked for exerting pressure against Yugoslavia was the arrest, by the Yugoslav Authorities, of White Guard émigrés in Yugoslavia who had obtained Soviet nationality after the war, and who had been accused of espionage and subversive activities against Yugoslavia. In reply to a menacing note from the Soviet Union, the Yugoslav Government had offered to repatriate those Soviet citizens and to settle any dispute by mutual agreement. Three months had elapsed since that proposal had been made, but the Government of the USSR, unconcerned with the fate of its citizens, had not even replied to the Yugoslav offer, and had merely used that matter to exert pressure against Yugoslavia and to menace the country. In spite of Yugoslavia's pacific attitude, there had been Soviet, Bulgarian, Hungarian and Romanian troop movements along the Yugoslav frontiers. Neither had the Soviet Union Government replied to the repeated requests of the Yugoslav Government and parents concerning the return of Yugoslav children who had been sent to Soviet schools after the war. Yugoslav citizens in the Soviet Union had been refused visas, although no proceedings had been taken against them.

14. The pressure exerted by the Soviet Union against Yugoslavia was only justified by statements of unscrupulous individuals who had repeated a lesson learned by heart at a staged trial, and by the arrest of Soviet citizens which that Government refused to repatriate. The Yugoslav Government had been accused of systematic hostility against the Soviet Union and the other States of Eastern Europe. But it was those States themselves which had taken a whole series of measures against Yugoslavia: the Soviet Union had reduced its trade with Yugoslavia by seven-eighths, and had refused to carry out a whole series of agreements. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, Albania and Romania had broken economic, cultural and scientific relations with Yugoslavia and had denounced trade agreements with that country, thus placing it in a state of blockade. The Soviet Union and the Governments which had been led into the struggle against Yugoslavia, with the exception of Albania, had, denounced their treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with Yugoslavia on some fallacious pretext without instituting any procedure of conciliation and in spite of the efforts of Yugoslavia. The different attitude of Albania was explained by a whole series of plans in which it played only a subordinate role. A few days previously Yugoslavia had, therefore, had to denounce its treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with Albania, in order to put an end to a shameful comedy.

15. In spite of the slanders directed against Yugoslavia for a year and a half, the Yugoslav

radio and Press had only stated the truth with regard to the Soviet Union, and far from indulging in hostile propaganda, had observed a strictly defensive attitude and had merely exposed falsehoods. But Yugoslavia, which defended the principle of the equality of all States, had been showered with abuse, which was the only argument of those who were in the wrong.

16. The propaganda of the Soviet Union, which protested its friendly intentions towards the Yugoslav people, accused the Yugoslav Government of having gone over to the enemies of the USSR and of having become the economic vassal of the West and particularly of the United States. The Americans supposedly had established military bases in Yugoslavia and had sent military experts, while Yugoslav enterprises had passed into the hands of foreign capitalists. It was true that care was taken to give no details, since the USSR Government only sought to conceal certain inadmissible aims by means of such calumnies.

17. The Government of the Soviet Union treated Yugoslavia more abusively than some countries which had relations of quite a different kind with the United States. That was not a mere coincidence: it could not forgive Yugoslavia for being independent. As a socialist State, it ought to come under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union, which thus revealed its desire for hegemony.

18. Yugoslavia had moreover been accused of not having a democratic régime. But, in that country, power belonged to the workers as a result of the popular revolution which had expelled the invaders and their henchmen. Since the war, there had been an evolution towards authentic and always more real democracy which had been more and more marked. From that point of view, Yugoslavia was much more advanced than those who criticized it, and it had made a notable contribution to the progress of humanity. Without laying claim to perfection, Yugoslavia was doing more every day for the people and was striving to grant ever-increasing autonomy to its various republics and to favour decentralization. That was where the shoe pinched for the enemies of Yugoslavia.

19. In reply to so many insults, it was sufficient to say that Yugoslavia saw through the machinations designed to force it to capitulate and not to treat it on a footing of equality. Like the character in Gogol's "Dead Souls" who became intoxicated by lies, certain countries of Eastern Europe were striving to prove that their inventions were in accordance with the facts, and it was well known to what lengths that might lead a psychopathic liar. Under the circumstances, the Yugoslavs remained quite composed knowing that the only aim of the pressure exercised on them by those anti-democratic and war-like methods was to subjugate them.

20. Thus, the policy of the Eastern European countries towards Yugoslavia, their threats and the pressure exercised at the instigation of the Soviet Union, constituted a serious obstacle to the strengthening of world peace and international co-operation. That was an incontrovertible fact in the light of which the Soviet Union's proposal should be studied. That Government no doubt claimed that its relations with Yugoslavia were its own concern, but since the pressure exercised

against that country had unfortunate repercussions on peace and security, the Soviet Union's proposal should be examined in close connexion with the war-like methods of that Government.

21. Yugoslavia was always ready to settle its differences with the Soviet Union and certain eastern European countries by peaceful means. The problems were indeed insignificant and might be settled diplomatically if those Governments so desired. If, however, those problems were to be used as a means of exerting pressure, the world should know that Yugoslavia refused to abdicate its independence and sovereignty on any conditions.

22. The Soviet Union proposal did not give a clear and complete definition of war propaganda. Although it contained certain positive elements, namely, general declarations in favour of peace, it did not clearly indicate the conditions necessary for a general peace, which were: mutual respect for the sovereignty and independence of States, elimination of all discriminatory measures and non-intervention in the internal affairs of a country. More exactly, the procedure of drawing a false picture of the conditions existing in certain countries in an attempt to justify the measures taken against them, should be condemned. Finally, the Soviet Union proposal did not state with sufficient clarity that a general and lasting peace implied that an agreement between the five permanent members of the Security Council, who, though their function and role in the world had particular responsibilities, should not disregard the fact that all the other Members of the United Nations were concerned in the preservation of peace and the safeguarding of their independence and sovereignty. The proposal for a pact between the five great Powers should therefore go farther than the Charter, otherwise it would constitute an unnecessary repetition. Moreover, all nations who so desire should be able to accede to such a pact.

23. Because of the contrast between the peaceful declarations of a very general nature and the real policy of the Government of the USSR, as it appeared from its attitude towards Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav delegation could not support the Soviet Union proposal as a whole, although it was ready to facilitate the practical application of certain general principles of the Soviet Union draft resolution relating to the strengthening of peace.

24. The Yugoslav delegation could agree to almost all the paragraphs of the draft resolution submitted by the United States and United Kingdom (A/C.1/549) with the exception of one or two clauses which prejudged, to a certain extent, the attitude of the various delegations regarding the veto and the control of atomic energy. The principles of the Charter were embodied in that draft resolution, and obviously they should form the basis of the peace policy of all countries. Declarations, however, were easily forgotten. It would be preferable to take concrete steps to put an end to the cold war, and to promote international co-operation. In that respect, the draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom marked no progress. Wherever the responsibility for the existing situation lay, the propaganda battles which took place in the form

of general declarations were not the right way to strengthen peace, even though certain questions might be elucidated in the course of such discussions. Every problem should be solved peacefully and international co-operation developed with the mutual respect of independence and the equal sovereignty of States. That was the road to peace; any other was merely an illusion, and illusions were a poor defence against the danger of war. The Yugoslav delegation could not therefore support the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution in its entirety.

*During the speech of the Yugoslav representative, Mr. Sarper replaced Mr. Chauvel in the chair.*

25. Mr. MARTIN (Canada) said that the USSR representative had often referred (325th meeting) to the speech made by the Canadian representative in the General Assembly during the general debate. Unfortunately, his replies to the arguments adduced had not been satisfactory, for he had confined himself to abuse. There was a saying that applied to the situation: "If you wish to disturb a man's equilibrium, tell him the truth". The USSR representative's speech had nevertheless had one good effect: it had drawn the Committee's attention to the danger that unsolved problems in international affairs might lead to another war. Mr. Vyshinsky had not failed to launch an attack of unparalleled violence against the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, to which he attributed all the evils of humanity.

26. The USSR representative would have served the Committee better if he had pointed out objectively what he regarded to be the major issues threatening peace and had made suggestions for the solution of those problems on a basis of compromise and negotiation. Many delegations would probably have disagreed with his analysis and made reservations about his suggestions for settlement. If, however, those suggestions had contained the slightest indication of compromise on the part of the Government of the USSR, the Canadian delegation would have put its full weight behind any process of negotiation which might have led to a settlement. It was therefore regrettable that the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/996) merely proposed in the most general terms the conclusion of a peace pact between the five great Powers, especially since, having violently attacked two of those Powers, it could not be said that Mr. Vyshinsky had created the confidence liable to the establishment of the pact he proposed.

27. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR had already signed, together with his colleagues of the other great Powers, a series of documents pledging their countries to settle international problems peacefully. It was not more signatures that were needed, but effective settlements. If Mr. Vyshinsky wanted peace, he only had to submit concrete proposals about specific problems that would give some hope of a settlement based on mutual confidence and tolerance. It could therefore be concluded that, in submitting his proposal, Mr. Vyshinsky had had no intention of strengthening peace but simply of misrepresenting Western civilization once again and, in particular, the United States and the United Kingdom. Those misrepresentations were like the distortion of curved mirrors. The Western Powers were described by Mr. Vyshinsky as either

lean or fat, tiny or tremendous, depending upon the view-point which he adopted. In fact, the USSR representative did not care about what replies were made to his speech nor did he care what resolution might be adopted. His only concern was to be able to have the communist Press of the world reproduce his speech, accusing the Western Powers of being responsible for the fears which gripped the world, of course without their publishing any reply or contradictory statement. Yet recourse to abuse was but a sign of weakness.

28. The vital problem was the fear and insecurity which lay in the hearts of men everywhere. If gradual understanding were to come, however, the representative of the Soviet Union would have to renounce his attitude that he was always right and admit for a moment the reasons for the anxiety felt in the Western world in regard to the Soviet Union and the countries it dominated. Unfortunately, Mr. Vyshinsky had recently stated, during the debate on the Greek question, that compromise was only possible upon points where one would be in the wrong, never, when one was in the right. As the Soviet Union always thought it was in the right, such declarations did nothing to dispel the uneasy watchfulness that characterized relations between East and West.

29. Although the leaders of the Soviet Union denied the fact from time to time, the USSR policy was based on the theory that war between the communist States and the non-communist States was inevitable. Lenin had written that it was inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to exist for any length of time side by side with imperialist States; that ultimately one or the other must conquer, which meant that if the proletariat wanted to rule it would have to prove itself the ruling class by military organization. Unless, therefore, Mr. Vyshinsky and the Soviet Union Government were prepared categorically to refute the Marxist analysis of history, they must believe that one day, whenever the occasion arise, they would wage war on the rest of the world. The newspaper *Red Fleet* had stated in that respect, on 24 October 1946, that war found its origin in class society founded on private property and that the task of the Soviet people was to increase its economic and military might.

30. Those who really prepared for war were those who believed in its inevitability. The Western nations, on the contrary rejected that fallacious principle and believed that all political problems could be solved by negotiation. War became inevitable only when some nation was determined to obtain what it wanted or resorted to force. The Western world thought the same about civil war, and upheld the principle that no individual or group of individuals could be permitted to have its way by the use of force. Mr. Vyshinsky certainly did not believe that it was possible to govern with the freely expressed consent of the people. The system in the USSR did not allow a man to take his own decision; he had to accept the party line. It was considered dangerous to the State if a man had an active conscience of his own, because there was a State conscience which sought to substitute for man's free mind the pattern of State-controlled thought. It was therefore possible that the USSR representatives might not really understand the meaning of "negotiation" or "compromise". Since they considered that

force was an inevitable aspect of their government at home, it was not surprising that they should also accept the inevitability of conflict in world affairs. If that was the case, the hopes of the Western world of finding a compromise solution were indeed illusory. If, however, the rulers of the USSR could bring assurance to the peoples of the world that they were willing to agree to a compromise, they would be doing more to strengthen peace than could be accomplished by the signing of a dozen pacts.

31. Although Mr. Vyshinsky said he wanted peace, he violently attacked the States which had concluded treaties of collective security against aggression and particularly the States which had adhered to the North Atlantic Treaty. That Treaty, however, was not aimed against any specific country, but only against any State which might commit an aggression. In that connexion he read a statement, made by the Prime Minister of Canada, in the Canadian Parliament on 28 March 1949, in which he had pointed out that the purpose of that Treaty was to preserve peace by warning a possible aggressor that he might suffer the same fate as the Kaiser after the First World War or Hitler and Mussolini after the Second.

32. It was probably because the Soviet Union Government wanted the States not subservient to it to be weak and divided that it criticized all the efforts made to organize collective security and all the efforts made by the specialized agencies to organize prosperity and welfare in the economic, social and cultural fields.

33. The delegation of the USSR had also refused to participate in a world organization to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes and ensure the effective prohibition of atomic weapons. Mr. Vyshinsky explained his refusal by asserting that international co-operation in that field would be incompatible with the sovereignty of the USSR, which would be threatened by a kind of super-trust dominated by the United States. That explanation showed that the Soviet Union Government was obsessed by the idea of domination. It could not imagine an international organization in which one of the parties did not dominate the other. It was true that Mr. Vyshinsky did not openly reject the principle of international co-operation for atomic control, but he would limit it so drastically that his proposals were completely ineffective.

34. When Mr. Vyshinsky was prepared, on a basis of reciprocity, to allow international inspectors to go anywhere, at any time, in the USSR in order to satisfy themselves that no clandestine operations for the production of atomic explosives were taking place; when he was prepared to accept quotas on the amount of nuclear fuel to be produced, and limits to the size and nature of atomic energy facilities; when his Government was prepared to give up the right to act alone in producing and possessing atomic explosives—then humanity would have taken a great step forward towards peace. If, however, Mr. Vyshinsky could not accept those principles, the Western States would remain on guard, for, in that matter, no State's unverified word was sufficient.

35. The peoples of the whole world and most of the Governments, including the Government of Canada, wanted disarmament. Disarmament could

not, however, be unilateral. The experience of 1930 had proved that the disarmament of the democracies encouraged dictators in their policy of aggression; and assurances of peaceful intentions from dictators were not enough. In 1930, those deceptive assurances had engendered a false sense of security, which had been the precursor of war. That was why at the present time the problem of the prohibition of atomic weapons should be linked with the establishment of effective control; and that was why the question of reducing conventional armaments should be linked with proposals to establish methods of inspection and verification. In view of the USSR representative's systematic refusal to accept that system of control and verification, the Western States could not help asking what the motives of USSR policy were. In that connexion he recalled a quotation from Lenin's book *The Infantile Sickness of Leftism in Communism*, according to which it was necessary to resort to cunning, unlawful methods and lies; and he pointed out that, unfortunately, those methods were too often employed by the various Communist Parties in the Western States.

36. Mr. Martin also drew the Committee's attention to another cause for alarm resulting from the economic and political pressure exercised by the USSR on the States within its sphere of influence. In that connexion, he recalled that the representative of Yugoslavia had told the General Assembly<sup>1</sup> how the Yugoslav people had been mercilessly exploited by joint Soviet-Yugoslav enterprises. Nor was the appointment of a marshal of the Soviet Union to the post of Minister of War in Poland a manifestation of free and friendly relations between weak and sovereign States. A communist leader in the Free Territory of Trieste had said recently to a representative of *The New York Times*, when speaking of Tito, that the touchstone of a man's progressiveness was his attitude toward the Soviet Union, and that anyone who began to fight against its leadership inevitably joined the enemies of communism.

37. The present relations between the Soviet Union and the States on its borders were a danger to peace, for they were based on force and the threat of force. The USSR was attempting to be the only dominant Power in that area, and had assumed the responsibility for maintaining peace there: those who might endanger peace would incur a heavy responsibility in the judgment of history.

38. That policy of domination was an application in the international field of the Stalinist principle that the Communist Party of the USSR controlled the Communist Parties of the whole world. Puppet governments were the logical consequence of the fifth columns which the USSR had sought to establish almost everywhere. The basic principles of those Communist Parties was party loyalty and blind subservience to the rules of the USSR. Louis Budenz, a former editor of the American newspaper *Daily Worker*, had written in that connexion that the first duty of a communist was to serve the Soviet Union, and that no person or State was right which was not in complete agreement with the Soviet Union. Since Mr. Vyshinsky had raised the question of

the principles on which peace should be based, it was well to point out to him that the best contribution his Government could make in that connexion would be the disbandment of its fifth columns abroad, for the claims of the USSR to the blind subservience of the citizens of other States was a threat to the peace of the world.

39. The policy pursued by the Soviet Union with the purpose of isolating the people of the USSR from the rest of the world was also a matter of anxiety to the States of the West. The Government of the USSR wished to give its population a false impression of the Western world, and consequently it prevented free access to its territory, obstructed the movement of foreign journalists and diplomats on Soviet territory, and even excluded tourists. The ordinary Soviet citizen was denied the opportunity to read about or study Western culture. The Government of the USSR systematically represented the Western Governments as warmongers. It was helping to instill fear and hatred of the Western world in the hearts of the Soviet people. It was a well-known fact that war grew out of fear and fear out of ignorance. Peace was based on a community of interests among individuals which led them to adjust their differences by peaceful means. Today, the Government of the USSR was denying its people the right to belong to the world community which was developing not only among nations but among the people themselves. The present debate was an attempt to excite the hatred of the people of the USSR against the peoples of the West. Peace would be better served if, after the debate, instead of spreading fear and distrust, Mr. Vyshinsky proposed to the population of the USSR that it should co-operate with the West on a basis of confidence.

40. The representative of Canada stated that his Government was disturbed by the fact that the Government of the USSR was systematically withdrawing the immense territories under its influence from the free play of moral, intellectual and spiritual forces which had enabled the Western world to develop. Freedom of belief and expression was at the basis of all progress towards peace. It was the individual who was the basis of all political activities; the individual was an end, and not a means. He was certainly not, as Karl Marx had written in 1848, the personification of economic or social categories.

41. Lastly, he declared that the principles he had expounded were at the basis of the attitude which his delegation would adopt towards the draft resolutions which had been submitted. He was of the opinion that the General Assembly should call upon each Member of the United Nations to renew the solemn pledges of the Charter; to renounce the theory that war was inevitable; to co-operate fully and loyally with the efforts of the United Nations and the specialized agencies to prevent war by removing its causes; to maintain or restore freedom of communication between the peoples of the world; to support efforts to achieve the maximum degree of disarmament consistent with security; to accept the limitations on national sovereignty necessary for those purposes; and to pledge itself never to impose its will by force or threat of force upon another Member.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, 228th plenary meeting.*



## THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGHTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 15 November 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Selim SARPER (Turkey).*

### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (continued)**

1. Sir Carl BERENDSEN (New Zealand) said that the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/996) was the latest in a long series of draft resolutions which that delegation was wont to submit at every session of the General Assembly not with the expectation that they would be acted upon but purely for propaganda purposes. One wondered whether it was useful to discuss them seriously since, quite obviously, anyone who was deceived by them was beyond the reach of logical argument. However, in view of the existing world situation, it did not seem possible to dismiss the Soviet Union proposal without comment.

2. Paragraph 1 proposed that the General Assembly condemn the preparations for a new war being conducted in a number of countries, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom. Sir Carl did not think that there was a single individual who believed that the United States and the United Kingdom were contemplating a war of aggression. Nor did anyone believe that those Governments were encouraging war propaganda. If there was an "armaments race", "inflation of military budgets", or if "military, navy and air bases" were being established, as the authors of the proposal well knew, that was due to the just apprehension of those countries and their associates as to the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union. Those facts were known all the world over and the accusations contained in the Soviet Union proposal were so far from the facts as to merit nothing but ridicule.

3. One had only to consult the record to see that it was the Soviet Union which had deliberately stultified the activities of the United Nations and which was maintaining the most formidable array of forces in the world today. On the other hand, the United States and the United Kingdom, after the war had immediately abandoned their unquestioned military superiority and had reduced their armaments and armed forces to an extent which, if it seemed imprudent, was nevertheless a conclusive indication of their peaceful intentions. The Soviet Union, after the end of the war, had extended its borders by hundreds of thousands of square miles and had forcibly included under its jurisdiction approximately twenty million hitherto free people. Yet, the United States had undertaken no territorial expansion while the British Empire was, by deliberate choice, much smaller than before the war. In Sir Carl's opinion the facts spoke for themselves and demonstrated the ridiculous nature of the assertions in paragraph 1 of the Soviet Union proposal. Nevertheless, he warned the Committee to beware of such nonsense and he recalled how long the world had been deceived by the obvious absurdities that characterized the nazi propaganda during the 1930's. True, no one had believed for a moment that the statement of the nazis could be taken seriously but they had nevertheless dominated Europe and threatened mankind.

4. In paragraph 2 of the draft resolution the Soviet Union, of all the Members of the United Nations, came forth with crocodile tears to condemn atomic weapons as "contrary to the conscience and honour of nations and incompatible with membership in the United Nations", and urged the prompt adoption of practical measures for their unconditional prohibition and for the establishment of strict international control. Sir Carl found that proposal astonishing. He recalled that when the atomic weapon had first been used, the United States, which alone possessed it, had offered to submit it to international control providing that that control was real and not fictitious. It was the USSR and its satellite nations which refused to agree to any practical system of inspection and thus precluded any effective measure of control. In paragraph 2, as in the preceding one, the same propaganda technique was apparent as that which had been used by the nazis: the guilty were attributing to others intentions which they themselves held. Even the words were the same. Sir Carl remembered how often Hitler had deceived the world by accusing his enemies of "warmongering". However, no one today would be deceived by that propaganda, except those who wished to be deceived, because the world had learned to its bitter regret that the Soviet Union's policy was opportunistic and would change as often as the Government of the USSR believed such a course to be in its interest. Who was there who had not compared the honesty and logic of the statement by the United States representative with the polemics employed by the representative of the Soviet Union? In Sir Carl Berendsen's opinion the statement of the former was in itself evidence of the sincerity and justice of the United States position.

5. Whether the Soviet Union did or did not possess the secret of the atomic bomb it was obvious that there could be no solution to the problem until all the nations of the world were prepared to subject themselves to strict international supervision without which any plan of atomic control would be a farce. There need be no dereliction of national dignity or sovereignty in accepting such supervision. On the contrary, it was Sir Carl's opinion that to accept such an agreement would be an exercise of sovereignty. He stressed that there could be no solution of the problem unless all Member States were prepared to sink some portion of their individual rights for the common good. No one should under-appreciate the seriousness of the problem. It was a matter of life and death not for individuals or groups, but perhaps for mankind as a whole. The United Nations could not afford to take any risk in the matter and there was no solution short of that strict international inspection and control which had been postulated from the outset by the Western Powers and which had repeatedly been rejected by the Soviet Union. If the latter was really sincere in its insistence upon "appropriate strict international control" then the other nations would unhesitatingly accept that proposal with delight. However, they had been disappointed so often in the past that Sir Carl, for one, could not believe that the Soviet Union proposal was

anything more than mere propaganda. Reassuring phrases were valueless unless their authors could be relied upon to carry out their assurances. It was regrettable, however, that there were certain Governments whose past actions did not create confidence as to their willingness to carry out such an undertaking. Consequently, the Soviet Union's proposals were dangerous in the highest degree since they would be accepted and implemented by those nations whose intentions were honourable and give an enormous advantage to those who did not intend to keep their obligations. Promises had proven to be worth nothing in the past and were not made more valuable by the addition of another promise. It was therefore infinitely better to admit a temporary failure than to deceive the world by accepting anything less than the minimum. Nothing less than effective international inspection and control could suffice or should be considered for a minute.

6. Paragraph 3 of the Soviet Union draft resolution called upon all States to settle their differences by peaceful methods and to refrain from resort to force or the threat of force and urged that the five great Powers conclude among themselves a pact for the strengthening of peace. Sir Carl Berendsen asked what would be the purpose of such a pact among the five great Powers alone and whether it would advance the cause of peace in any way. Was not the Charter of the United Nations intended for precisely that purpose? And if the Charter was insufficient, would a five-Power pact be adequate? The New Zealand representative believed that the answer to those questions lay in the negative. The existing world situation was not such as could be resolved by a mere declaration. He urged the Committee to face the fact that a great part of the world was in fear of aggression from the Soviet Union and it was for that reason that nations felt it incumbent upon them to prepare their defence. If their fears were groundless then the delegation of the Soviet Union could easily remove the insecurity from men's minds by agreeing to accept, as an equal in the family of nations, those necessary precautions which were a prerequisite to international confidence. If the Soviet Union was willing to do so, it would find co-operation on all sides. But the world had been given reason to fear that the Soviet Union would not accept the necessary precautions.

7. Sir Carl stated that his delegation would vote against each of the paragraphs of the Soviet Union draft resolution on the ground that not one proposal contained therein was a genuine attempt to remedy the situation which confronted the world. The New Zealand delegation would support the joint draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom.

8. Mr. TSIANG (China) said that under ordinary circumstances when a group of States indulged in controversy, it was inappropriate for a third Power to intervene. However, no delegation could adopt an attitude of neutrality in the present question because the Soviet Union condemnation of a group of States was a serious matter which concerned every Member of the United Nations. Mr. Tsiang therefore proposed to examine the basis of the accusation of war-mongering on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom.

9. Firstly, it was necessary to point out that the United Nations possessed no verified census to enable it to compare the military strength of different nations. Nor was there a common denominator which would enable a comparison to be made between budgetary expenditures on armaments. Such figures of expenditures as were available could not be used for comparison because of wide organizational differences and varying price levels in Member States. Thus, although the estimate of budgetary expenditures might be the same in two given countries, the armaments of one might be two or three times as large as those of the other. Hence, the Committee would be unjust to condemn any State merely on the basis of its armaments programme.

10. In the final analysis the cause of war was imperialism and the imperialist State was the war-mongering State since territorial ambitions lead to aggression and the latter resulted sooner or later in open war. To evaluate the accusations levelled against the United States and the United Kingdom it was therefore desirable to inquire to what extent those nations were or were not imperialistic.

11. Mr. Tsiang considered first the record of the United Kingdom which in his opinion was a good one. In evaluating the real character of a Government's policy deeds were more important than words and, insofar as its action were concerned, the post-war record of the United Kingdom was above reproach. The peoples of Asia had seen one dependent territory after another granted independence. It might be true that the United Kingdom was strengthening its military establishments but certainly no State in the Far East had any fears of the intentions of the United Kingdom. Likewise, as far as Mr. Tsiang was aware, the States of Western Europe had no thought of aggression on the part of the United Kingdom Government or its people.

12. As to the record of the United States it would be remembered that, before the war, the latter had certain national interests in the Philippines which lay very close to China. Yet, it was a fact that the Philippines had been granted independence. Undoubtedly, there were capitalist interests in Wall Street, but instead of manoeuvring for opportunities of exploitation, those interests had refused to be pushed into large-scale investment in the Far East. With or without the alleged pressure from Wall Street the policy of the United States Government did not constitute a threat to the Far East. Of course, the United States was making some efforts to rearm but that was regarded by most of the peoples of the world as a guarantee against a future world war. Mr. Tsiang said that if the United States had rearmed prior to the First and Second World Wars and had definitely demonstrated its intention to fight against any aggression, the world would have been spared two great disasters.

13. In the estimation of the Chinese representative there was no apparent desire on the part of the United States or the United Kingdom to dominate or exploit other nations. Therefore, if the Committee really desired to condemn those who were preparing for a new war it should not begin by condemning those two States. In Mr. Tsiang's opinion the Soviet Union proposal was intended to hide certain designs of the USSR and was merely another phase in the cold war.

14. Regrettably it could not be said of the Soviet Union that it had no ambitions in Asia. The deeds of the USSR Government were in sharp contrast with its propaganda. In China the policy of the Soviet Union was reminiscent of Tsarist times and was obviously contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. Mr. Tsiang recalled how, after the previous war, the USSR had demanded certain privileges regarding the Manchurian railway and the seaports of Dairen and Port Arthur. China had granted those demands in return for a promise that the Soviet Union would respect China's administrative and territorial integrity in Manchuria. Was is not a strange situation when a State had to make concessions in order to receive a promise that another State would do what was merely its duty as a Member of the United Nations? Yet the Soviet Union had not even fulfilled its promise. It had obstructed the efforts of the Chinese Government to re-establish the administration in Manchuria and it had assisted the insurgence of the Chinese Communists. Mr. Tsiang recalled that before it had withdrawn its troops from Manchuria, the USSR had demanded the right to maintain a close economic connexion with the province which would have included joint operation of over 150 enterprises. If the Chinese Government had accepted that demand then the whole north-eastern part of China would have become a colony of the Soviet Union. Doubtless the communist régime would submit to the Soviet Union's demands. Mr. Tsiang said that there had been similar Soviet aggression and exploitation in the Sinkiang Province which was known to be rich in oil reserves. During the previous year, the Soviet Union had demanded the right to exploit Sinkiang's resources. It was especially noteworthy that the eastern borders of the USSR had been greatly extended since the end of the Second World War; at the present time it controlled more than half the continent of Asia. It was such facts which caused fear and suspicion of the Soviet Union. That country's actions of a similar nature in Europe were already well-known. Therefore, it could be stated clearly that it was the Soviet Union which seriously threatened the peace of the world and not the United States or the United Kingdom.

15. Mr. Tsiang wondered how the USSR delegation, after violating the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 could ask China to participate in another pact. He believed that the Charter of the United Nations was the only guarantee of peace and if it did not command observance, no additional treaty would suffice. Through its acts the Soviet Union had made the United Nations a mere debating society and had frustrated all its efforts by boycotting the various commissions that had been established. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was posing as the champion of peace. Mr. Tsiang considered that the peace of the world was too serious a matter to serve as a diplomatic football. If the 1949 session of the General Assembly was to earn the title of "peace Assembly" given it by General Romulo, it should state clearly to all nations of the world that peace could only be found through the strict observance of the obligations imposed by the Charter and by international treaties. The Chinese delegation would vote against the Soviet Union draft resolution and in favour of the joint draft resolution sub-

mitted by the United States and the United Kingdom.

16. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) said that the accusation of inciting a new war was one of the most serious that could be levelled within the United Nations and was an issue before which no Member could remain indifferent. Under the impact of such an accusation levelled by one great Power against two others, what could befall that co-operation upon which the United Nations was founded and upon which the proper functioning of the system of collective security, created by the Charter, depended? If the United States and the United Kingdom were the authors of a plot against peace then obviously the signatories of the Brussels Pact, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the Pact of Rio de Janeiro, a total of some thirty States, would be implicated. True, the Soviet Union proposal named only the United States and the United Kingdom, but it associated with those Powers an indeterminate number of other nations. How could it be imagined that the United Nations could continue to function if it were proven that more than half its Members were preparing armed aggression? Clearly, therefore, the Soviet Union draft resolution challenged the very existence of the United Nations. That was why the Belgian delegation could not remain silent in such a debate.

17. The French representative (326th meeting) and others had already shown how inconsistent and contradictory were the proposals of the Soviet Union. It was therefore unnecessary to speak at all of the five-Power pact which no one, not even the authors of the proposal, had taken seriously. As had been shown, the proposal was merely a propaganda manoeuvre intended for those who did not know any better. Mr. van Langenhove said that he would confine his observations to the accusations of warmongering directed against the United States and the United Kingdom.

18. Coming as it did from the Soviet Union, the accusation was particularly bewildering to public opinion in the countries of Western Europe, conscious as it was of the immense power of the USSR which, together with all its dependent territories contained more than one-third of the world's population and which formed the greatest empire in history.

19. It was to be noted that the States which were accused of plotting against peace were precisely those States where almost everything took place in broad daylight and where the maximum of publicity was accorded to every action of the Government. Military expenditures were discussed at length in the parliaments while the principal components of their military forces were well-known and openly discussed by the Press. On the other hand, the situation was quite different in the countries from which the accusation of warmongering emanated. There, the least attempt to obtain the most innocuous piece of information was considered as a formidable spy plot. A proposal based on the General Assembly's resolution 192 (III) of 19 November 1948 for carrying out a verified census of armaments was opposed by solid opposition. Nor was it only military forces that were clothed in secrecy: all data relating to economic life, such as population censuses and figures of agricultural and industrial production were kept secret. Wide areas of USSR territory were inaccessible to foreigners while liberty of

movement of foreigners was becoming generally more and more restricted throughout the Soviet Union. It was a state of siege which had never been exceeded in any other countries even when they had been at war. Was it, Mr. van Langenhove asked, the best way of fostering international confidence and co-operation as provided by the Charter? He added that, at the same time, tremendous efforts were being made by the Government of the Soviet Union to isolate its people from all outside news. Relations with foreign countries had been reduced to the barest minimum and almost all of the People's Democracies had cut themselves off from international co-operation in the social, economic and cultural fields.

20. At the previous session of the General Assembly the head of the Belgian delegation had explained the reasons for his country's anxiety.<sup>1</sup> The causes had not disappeared. Although the Berlin blockade had been lifted, a growing tension had occurred in Eastern Europe. While it was not Mr. van Langenhove's intention to dwell on the substance of the dispute which caused it, he felt bound to point out that some Members of the United Nations had had recourse to threats and economic and political pressure which were explicitly forbidden by the Charter. The latter formerly stated that international disputes must be solved by peaceful means and, if necessary, be submitted to the Security Council. Nevertheless, the world had witnessed, and was continuing to witness, a flagrant violation of those fundamental rules. The Belgian delegation condemned dictatorship and attempts at domination, whatever form they took. During the previous session of the General Assembly in Paris it had appealed for a new spirit of co-operation between States. Mr. van Langenhove reiterated that appeal, stressing the fact that such collaboration must be in accordance with the Charter.

21. Mr. CLEMENTIS (Czechoslovakia) said that in the general debate (228th meeting) his delegation had already had the opportunity to welcome the USSR proposal, since it did not only point out in a concrete form the reasons of the existing international tension, but also proposed workable measures for overcoming it.

22. He emphasized that the improvement in the international atmosphere was not due to the withdrawal of the warmongering elements or to a change in their imperialistic policy. It was attributable to the historic events in China, the powerful world-wide peace movement, and the growing strength of the socialist countries. Since the general debate, many events had shown the nature of the present international situation. The Members of the Assembly had once more witnessed the results of the strange mixture of die-hard prestige policy coupled with an attitude of teen-age immaturity. An example was provided by the draft resolution<sup>2</sup> adopted in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on the question of the Admission of new Members.<sup>3</sup> There was no need to underline the fact that in questions in which the military and strategic interests of the United States were especially involved, no endeavour was made towards working out a solution acceptable to all. That was the case in the so-called Korean and Greek questions. Those proceedings and the

attitude of the United States with regard to the election to the Security Council, could only lead to the conclusion that the leaders of the usual majority in the United Nations were determined to pursue their policy of intolerance and dictation, disregarding the world-wide interest in active co-operation among all peace-loving nations.

23. Furthermore, there seemed to be a prevailing opinion, even in those countries subjected to anti-Soviet propaganda, that the end of the United States monopoly of atomic weapons did not increase, but rather decreased the danger of war. That fact, in itself, destroyed the picture of the USSR as an aggressor because, even when living under the illusion of a monopoly, nobody had denied that atomic weapons were not only weapons of mass destruction and genocide, but typical weapons of aggression. That was made clear by the statement of General Vandenberg to the effect that atom bombs would "be valuable in achieving the initial advantage".

24. In the light of that situation, Mr. Clementis wished to draw attention to the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union as contained in the speech of Mr. Malenkov, delivered on the eve of the 32nd anniversary of the Soviet Revolution. The Press in the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies was concerned with the building of a socialist society and in contrast with the Press of the United States, which was sensational and full of articles on the theme of a third war.

25. In paragraph 1 of its draft resolution, the Soviet Union pointed out those dangers and in paragraphs 2 and 3, invited the Assembly to take decisions with a view to eliminating those dangers.

26. There was no doubt that the so-called post-war differences between the great Allies were partly due to the fact that the Soviet Union had emerged from the Second World War not only victoriously, but stronger than ever before. A very high United States personality had stated during the war: "If we see that Germany is winning, we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany, and that way, let them kill as many as possible". A similar statement had been made by a member of the Churchill cabinet.

27. The preparations for a new war, especially in the United States, were both ideological and material. It was, on the one hand, being maintained that the Soviet Union was the cause of all the troubles in the world and, on the other hand, it was said that the United States, the mightiest, wisest and richest nation on earth, was predestined to save the world for an American way of life and for the blessings of an everlasting capitalism.

28. It was hardly necessary to give the First Committee illustrations of the first line being pursued. As regards the second, however, Mr. Clementis wished to quote the declaration made by General Eisenhower before the House Armed Services Committee on 20 October 1949 to the effect that a unified United States could "whip the world". That was only a translation into military language of all the doctrines and theories dealing with the leading role and direct responsibility of the United States in world affairs. Those theories might lead to the conclusion that whenever that

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I*, 147th plenary meeting.

<sup>2</sup> See document A/AC.31/L.25.

<sup>3</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee*, 29th meeting.

so-called responsibility was offended, the United States would be entitled to act, thereby serving as a justification for unleashing a preventive war. Furthermore, the responsibilities of the United States had extended over such an area that the very existence of the Soviet Union and of the People's Democracies ran counter to that responsibility and constituted an excuse for a preventive war.

29. Mr. Clementis quoted from a letter of Mr. Lewis Mumford, dated 26 June 1949 and published in the *New York Herald Tribune* which referred to the well-known article by Rear Admiral D. W. Gallery published in *The Saturday Evening Post*. In that letter, Mr. Mumford contended that the American people had been committed by their elected officers and their military leaders to a doctrine of war which was utterly repulsive to American principles, to the decent opinions of mankind and to the traditions of civilization. The causes of that situation, the letter explained, were mainly due to the illusions of power and pride. With regard to the illusion of power, the United States leaders had treated the atomic bomb as a magic weapon which could inflict maximum damage to the enemy with the least possible loss of life to the American people. As to the illusion of pride, it was mainly due to the false belief that scientific and technological knowledge was mainly an American monopoly. Mr. Mumford had not realized that those phenomena were only by-products of the theory of the inevitability of a third world war and the material and ideological preparations for it. That was plainly illustrated by many statements of United States military officials. According to the *United States News and World Report* of 7 October 1949, General Bradley had said that, once Franco was armed, Western Germany could be permitted an army that might give the West equality, or even superiority on land. On 2 November 1949 the *Agence France Presse* had reported General Eichelberger of having praised the help which the Japanese would render to the United States in case of war against the Soviet Union. Those statements could only lead to the conclusion that German and Japanese soldiers would make up for the loss of the monopoly of the atomic bomb. Mr. Clementis then quoted from an article by Mr. Bruce Catton in the *Nation* of 12 November 1949, which explained that the competition among the three armed services had unleashed a propaganda contest, in every line and overtone, that the Soviet Union was the enemy of the United States and that war was inevitable.

30. Turning to the material preparations, Mr. Clementis recalled that he had already pointed out, in the First Committee during the first part of the third session, that the United States had retained, and even in some cases extended, some of the institutions set up during the Second World War, and that the American Army was being reorganized with a view to building an offensive force. Moreover, both civilian and military research work in the United States was directed towards the solution of the problem of an offensive war. The Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty constituted not only military projects but an actual interference in the domestic affairs of the countries concerned. He quoted General Marshall as saying, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives, that there had been criticism of the sixteen nations

benefiting from the Marshall Plan "for not arriving at agreements in six weeks that affected their national sovereignty and that involved making concessions never made before by any independent nation in the history of the world". Mr. Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense, had declared before the joint hearings conducted by the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Armed Services of the United States Senate that essential military aid should be added to the Marshall Plan and to the North Atlantic [military] Treaty. Obviously, that so-called unselfish economic help was designed to attain the economic and military objectives of the United States and not those of the European countries.

31. The representative of Denmark, who had so convincingly condemned (326th meeting) the waging of the cold war, had unfortunately not endeavoured to inquire as to the causes and purposes for starting such a cold war. In that connexion, Mr. Clementis wished to recall the reference made by Mr. Vyshinsky to Professor Sumner H. Schlichter's article published in the *New York Herald Tribune* of 20 October 1949, admitting that the building up of a new war machine and the rearmament race was hailed by United States capitalist circles.

32. The Marshall Plan was not sufficient to prevent the recession in the United States from developing into a depression. Moreover, what was good for the United States economy might prove very harmful for the economies of the European countries since their rearmament programmes were being carried out at the expense of the already low standard of living of the working classes. Such warlike preparations had caused a very dangerous psychosis, and paragraph 1 of the USSR proposal was a timely and justified challenge to all the Members of the Organization.

33. As to paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, various Members had objected that the question had already been discussed, and even decided upon, during the debates of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. However, even before that decision had been taken, an article in the *Daily Compass* had stated that it was taken for granted that the United States would be able to muster sufficient votes for passage of a resolution continuing the present international deadlock and that many of the votes would be half-heartedly cast in concession to United States world wide economic and political might, rather than out of conviction that the United States atomic programme was the best available.

34. In discussing the USSR draft resolution, and especially the paragraph 2 thereof, the First Committee would still have the opportunity to try once more to reach a complete agreement on that very serious and dangerous problem. It was well-known that the representatives of the Soviet Union had made very substantial steps to meet the point of view of the United States, but the answer of the latter had always been in the negative.

35. The opponents of the USSR draft resolution and, in particular, the representative of the United States, had so far concentrated most of their efforts against paragraph 2 on the ground that the proposed conclusion of the five-Power pact would merely duplicate the relevant provisions of the Charter. If that was the case, the represen-

tative of Czechoslovakia was at a loss to understand the need for the North Atlantic Treaty. He said that it was quite natural that the representative from Belgrade as well as the representative of the Kuomintang Government had tried to beat even their masters in anti-Soviet propaganda.

36. The joint draft resolution presented by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom was a very poor substitute for the USSR draft resolution for which the Czechoslovak delegation would vote.

37. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) said that his delegation had carefully studied the two draft resolutions on the strengthening of peace which had been submitted to the Committee in view of the importance of the problem raised therein.

38. Paragraph 3 of the USSR draft resolution gave the impression of being intended to inaugurate an era of peace among the great Powers, but only after those great Powers had exchanged the kind compliments included in paragraphs 1 and 2. Those rhetorical exercises could hardly be made consistent with any constructive elements. Nevertheless, the Greek delegation had attempted to extract those constructive elements with a view to utilizing them.

39. In spite of the radically different conceptions prevailing in the world, the United Nations should welcome the possibility even of a limited *rapprochement*. Moreover, in spite of the picturesque and metaphoric characteristics of the USSR draft resolution, there would be no reason to reject such a proposal just because it came from the delegation of the Soviet Union, provided it were designed to serve the welfare of mankind.

40. In view of the fact that Greece was in a region upon which the attention of a number of Powers had been focused, his delegation was particularly interested in obtaining a relief of international tension. However, paragraph 3 of the USSR proposal appeared extraordinarily incomplete, since the strengthening of peace might be viewed as a result of the settlement of the existing world problems. But, much to the regret of the Greek delegation, such a settlement was far from being a reality. Therefore, that proposal might be viewed only as an attempt to establish new machinery for the settlement of international disputes. If so, the First Committee was entitled to expect, from its authors, more clarification on the way in which the machinery was expected to function and decisions would be arrived at. Otherwise, such machinery would merely overlap with existing organs such as the Council of Foreign Ministers and the United Nations. If the decisions were to be taken unanimously, a similar impasse to that existing in the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Security Council would result. If the decisions were to be taken by a majority vote, there would be a complete change in the political situation of the world which would have serious drawbacks for the small nations but which would, nevertheless, constitute a new approach to the settlement of conflicts and the restoration of international order.

41. Moreover, the role of the small countries within that new machinery should be defined. Would they be mere spectators of the actions of

that new international board of directors, or could they, perhaps, be called upon to participate in the work of such a machinery?

42. Settlement of the difficulties confronting the world would require much more than the signature of a pact, or a pious statement that Members should solve their differences without the use or threat of force. The real political problems would have to be conciliated, some premises for an equitable settlement would have to be accepted unanimously, or, failing that, a precise and workable procedure would have to be elaborated. His delegation endorsed the joint draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom because it stated the standards of duty and law which, if implemented, would remove the principal causes of international friction.

43. Mr. Pipinelis said that the principal threat to peace arose from the forcible extension of the spheres of influence of the great Powers. Following the Second World War the Soviet positions had advanced into the very heart of Europe and in the wake of occupation armies the USSR had installed puppet Governments in Bucharest, Budapest, Sofia and Warsaw. It was often claimed that that was to some extent justified by the defence requirements of the Soviet Union. However, he must point out that each new bastion created further security problems and called for a further advance for its own protection. The policy of border defence and the establishment of friendly neighbouring Governments had degenerated into a policy of penetration and war. Of course that was not the complete explanation of the problem and it was also necessary to take into account the communist theory of universal revolution. In that connexion, he quoted Stalin's speech of 30 March 1925 on the national question of Yugoslavia. Stalin had emphasized that the Bolsheviks had always considered the national question as inseparably linked with the prospect of revolution. History had showed the stupidity of such expansionist political theories, because no people could resign itself to assuming the role of a satellite. National heresies arose and the indomitable energy of the oppressed masses was released. Purges were then in order to forestall palace revolutions and if all the purges failed stronger measures were called for. History showed that, after reaching the limits of expansion, all empires had fallen apart under the impact of local reactions of national dignity and independence. Already the signs of a reversal were beginning to appear and the propitious moment had come to make an appeal to the great Soviet empire to put an end to the nefarious and useless policy of penetration by which it sought to set up everywhere in the world Governments in its own image. It was for that reason that the joint proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom was an appeal of historic scope. If it met with some response on the part of the leaders of the Soviet Union the fourth session of the General Assembly would be the most fruitful international gathering of our times. He recalled his recent appeal to the Soviet Union representative (304th meeting) that occupation forces be withdrawn from Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. Now he endorsed the new appeal that, in common with other countries, the USSR should declare that it would do nothing, by the use or threat of force, or otherwise, to jeopardize the independence and freedom of any nation.



44. Mr. Pipinelis recalled that, within the framework of peaceful agreements of neutrality, Greece had been able to maintain friendly and close relations with its friends of the West and with the Empire of the Tsars. There had been a peaceful interplay of political and intellectual forces without detriment to Greece's relations with any Power. Once the respect for the independence of small countries was established, their relations with the great Powers could not cause offence to anybody. Sooner or later that concept would have to be accepted as the inevitable basis of normal international relations. The grandeur of the democratic system was to be found in the confidence with which the western nations accepted the free interplay and competition of forces all over the world. He asked whether a great country like the USSR could accept as final an attitude of mistrust toward the free interplay of forces which made it compete with most of the other peoples and which at the same time was a lamentable confession of weakness and failure. After all that had happened since the First World War, it was necessary to make a new start and to sum up in a few clear principles the needs and yearnings of millions of human beings, and first of all the hopes of those who were suffering under a foreign yoke or under the threat of invasion. That was why he welcomed the proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom as a move of great vision.

45. Mr. CARÍAS (Honduras) acknowledged that the great Powers carried a major historical re-

sponsibility. Considering the grave international problems confronting the world, he regretted and wondered at the lack of confidence and good-will. He could not believe that the tragedies and lessons of the war had been forgotten. The small nations had a great moral duty to discharge and they must play their part. Since all the people of the world would suffer in any future war, the Members of the United Nations must try to eliminate psychological barriers and conceptions of racial superiority. The participants in the work of United Nations were no longer simple observers and must take upon themselves the duty of deciding the future of humanity. It was necessary to close all doors to hatred and to look for a new living interpretation of justice. He believed that it was possible for man to recover faith and to create a new atmosphere of hope instead of despondency. The delegation of Honduras would give its enthusiastic support to the joint draft resolution of the United States and United Kingdom, which was based on the Charter and established the fundamental principles for a permanent peace. Failure to respect those principles would certainly lead to the continuation of international tension. It was absolutely essential that all Members should act in accordance with those principles, in the spirit of co-operation in which the United Nations had been founded.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-NINTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 16 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Selim SARPÉR (Turkey).*

#### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (*continued*)**

1. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) stated that, while it was easy enough to reply to Mr. Vyshinsky's arguments (325th meeting), he could feel no enthusiasm at taking part in a debate which would serve no useful purpose. Although discussion to reach and eventually carry out an agreement was the very basis of the political life and the strength of the United Kingdom, that was unfortunately not the case in the Assembly, where agreement was impossible unless the views of the USSR were adopted.

2. The case made by Mr. Vyshinsky was not a new one. He had asserted that the United Kingdom, the United States and certain other countries were preparing a new war of aggression, and gave as proof of his thesis the facts that their military budgets were being increased; that they were extending their network of strategic bases; that a campaign of slander had been launched against the Soviet Union; and that those States were blocking all progress towards international control of atomic energy and of atomic weapons.

3. It would be interesting to know whether Mr. Vyshinsky in fact believed that the democracies were preparing for an aggressive war. If that were so, he would have been deceiving himself

with his own propaganda, and in that case other methods of discussion should be used. Nevertheless, Mr. Vyshinsky's work and intellectual capacity, and even his arguments, showed that he was not allowing himself to be deceived by his own propaganda and that he must therefore be aware of the gulf that separated the facts as they were from the facts as he presented them.

4. No one could deny that the people of the Soviet Union wished for peace. In that connexion, the people of the USSR did not differ from any other people in the world. As a matter of fact, Mr. Vyshinsky admitted that fact when it suited him. Was not the basis of his propaganda in the United Nations and the propaganda to which he gave free rein at so-called peace congresses that the peoples normally and passionately wished for peace? Nevertheless, it had to be said that the closer a Government was to the people, the more a people could apply pressure on the Government and the less likely was the danger of aggressive war. Thus, if Mr. Vyshinsky wished to persuade the First Committee that the United Kingdom was preparing for a new war, he would have to prove that the Government of the United Kingdom was in a more authoritarian position in relation to its people than the Government of the USSR was in relation to the Soviet people.

5. It was well-known that elections in the United Kingdom took place by secret ballot, that opposition was not only permitted, but encouraged, and that newspapers could publish any information

and present arguments against the Authorities, provided that they conformed with the laws of the country, which protected all citizens, irrespective of their position. Mr. Vyshinsky, on the other hand, could not give a similar picture of the relation between the Government and peoples of the USSR. Everyone, including Mr. Vyshinsky and the Government of the Soviet Union, knew that in modern times no freely-elected Government could launch an aggressive war against anyone: that was a political impossibility. But it was also a fact that the democracies would never abandon their dignity and their freedom. They would not stand idle before threats against their freedom: their experience had shown them that union was the only possible means of defence. Rightly or wrongly, they had reached the conclusion that the Soviet Union constituted a threat for them, and they had therefore decided to organize their defence jointly.

6. In speaking of the so-called peace congresses, Mr. Vyshinsky had stated that the Soviet Union was marching at the head of 600 million people throughout the world who believed that the USSR was the only leader of the peace movement. It would be interesting to know where those 600 million persons were to be found, since the Communists had lost an enormous number of votes in the elections recently held in Norway, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, New York State and the United Kingdom. Wherever free elections had been held recently, the results had shown that their electoral successes of 1945 and 1946, which had been due to admiration for the resistance of the Russian people against Hitlerite aggression, had disappeared. That sympathy for the Russian people had vanished because of the ambition and arrogance shown by the Soviet leaders in their statements and activities.

7. The number of the sympathizers of the Soviet Union had diminished in the elections that had taken place recently in democratic countries because free peoples were no longer deceived by the melodious accents of Mr. Vyshinsky. Behind the mellifluity of his speech they had discovered the poison fangs of the Soviet Union Government, and had therefore organized their joint defence.

8. Mr. Vyshinsky had alleged that the military budgets of the United States and the United Kingdom had been increased. In that connexion, Mr. McNeil would recall that the military forces of his country had been reduced from 5 million to 750,000 men and that in the current year, at a time when, according to Mr. Vyshinsky, the joint action of the United States and United Kingdom had reached its culminating point, another 20,000 soldiers had been demobilized. On the other hand, the Committee had not been informed of any comparable reduction of USSR military forces, which in the preceding year had totalled 4 million men. Although the military budgets of the democratic States were greater than their Governments would wish, they were nevertheless of modest dimensions when compared with that of the USSR.

9. It was true that the United Kingdom and the United States had a certain number of bases in various parts of the world. In the case of the United Kingdom, those bases were necessary for the defence of communication routes between the United Kingdom and its dependent territories which were scattered throughout the world.

Nevertheless, those bases were of a purely defensive nature. Furthermore, contrary to Mr. Vyshinsky's statement, neither the United Kingdom nor the United States had, since the war, extended that network of bases in order to encircle the USSR. British and American troops had evacuated China and Burma, and the United Kingdom troops had been withdrawn from Australia, New Zealand and New Guinea; they had also been withdrawn from French territories overseas, from Italy, from Greece, from Syria, from Lebanon and from other areas. On the other hand, Soviet troops still remained in nearly all the territories acquired by the USSR at the end of the war: they still remained in Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Eastern Poland, Ruthenia, Bessarabia, and even in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. It was noteworthy that the announcement of the withdrawal of British troops from Greece had not changed the attitude of the Soviet Union delegation and had evoked no comment from it. That might perhaps be explained by the fact that the withdrawal had taken place at a time when the Soviet Union was installing Marshal Rokossovsky in Warsaw.

10. Mr. Vyshinsky had endeavoured to prove that the United Kingdom and the United States were carrying out a campaign of slander against the USSR, and, as usual, he had made use of newspaper clippings to prove his point. That being the case, why did he not explain to the Committee why those same newspapers could not circulate freely in the USSR? And how could he explain that the Soviet Union was trying to jam the broadcasts of the BBC? The USSR policy to prevent the broadcasts of foreign news could only be compared to Goebbels' policy during the war. While the initial attempts at jamming had had some success, that was no longer true in the Moscow region, where the BBC programmes could be heard without difficulty on frequencies in the 25, 31 and 13 meter bands. If, however, the USSR again tried to jam the BBC news, the Soviet people would inevitably come to the conclusion that the USSR Government was afraid to let truth be known.

11. Mr. Vyshinsky's last charge concerned the problem of atomic energy. In that respect, the USSR representative had stated that the United States had made every attempt to draw up a plan which could not be adopted. If such was the case, Mr. Vyshinsky would only have to indicate his willingness to accept the plan in order to refute the United States. It would then be possible to see whether the United States really intended that its plan should not be adopted. In support of his argument, Mr. Vyshinsky had also mentioned the stocks of atomic weapons which had been accumulated by the United States; but he had also indicated that the USSR possessed stocks of atomic weapons. How could those stocks constitute, on the one hand, the proof of the pacific intentions of the USSR, and on the other, the proof of the aggressive intentions of the United States?

12. Mr. Vyshinsky, moreover, maintained that the international body envisaged by the plan of the majority would be a danger to peace, because it would be dominated by the United States. The USSR representative did not make the same objection with regard to his plan, although the proportion of Americans in the international secretariat of the body he proposed would probably be the same. The real reason for that difference of attitude lay in the fact that the system proposed

by the USSR delegation would be ineffective, and that, consequently, Mr. Vyshinsky took no interest in the composition of that body's secretariat. Finally, the system of periodic inspection proposed by the USSR plan was absurd. Had Mr. Vyshinsky not himself stated, when the Greek question had been discussed (306th meeting), that the proposed inspection to control on the spot the conditions in which Greek partisans had been interned in Albania was ludicrous? If the inspection of such a simple matter appeared absurd to the USSR delegation, periodic inspection of the much more complicated problem of the production of atomic energy would be even more ludicrous.

13. The USSR representative had rightly recalled that one of the essential elements in the preparation of a war of aggression was the fanning of national hatreds. He had attempted to maintain that the United Kingdom was carrying out such a campaign of hatred, but his efforts had been fruitless, because in the United Kingdom, it was the people who controlled the Government, not the Government the people. But the States in the best position to develop such propaganda of hatred were those which possessed governmental propaganda machines. It was superfluous to recall the power exerted by the USSR through the Communist Party and the *Cominform*. That propaganda was carried on not only through the Press, but also by means of the radio, cinemas, theatres, conferences, art galleries and even scientific laboratories. It had contaminated the pacific peoples of half a continent, and whatever the language in which it was disseminated it aimed everywhere at creating confusion and hatred.

14. Four years previously, Soviet sabotage might still have produced some effect, but at the present time, it would be in vain for Mr. Vyshinsky to try to convince the Committee that the policy of his country was based on peace. Every one knew that the strategy of the Soviet Union was based on the idea of the inevitability of war between the Soviet Union and the so-called imperialist Powers, as explained by Lenin and repeated by Stalin in the latter's book *Problems of Leninism*. In the Soviet opinion, therefore, war was inevitable and the proletariat of the Soviet Union must be certain of military supremacy, because its ultimate aim was world hegemony. In such conditions, why did the instigators of war seem so interested in peace? Why were instructions sent to the various peace congresses which were held periodically almost everywhere? Why were meaningless, evasive, and insulting resolutions submitted by the USSR representatives in favour of "Soviet peace"? The reply was simple: it was because, in the existing circumstances, those tactics furthered the aims of the Soviet foreign policy, namely world revolution and Soviet supremacy. In the circumstances, it was useless for Mr. Vyshinsky to quote still other passages or to refute the passages from the works of Stalin or Lenin which had just been mentioned. Mr. Vyshinsky would not convince anyone of his Government's change of attitude until that Government told the Soviet people that the ideas of Leninists concerning the inevitability of war were ideas of the past and that a new period was about to begin. Unfortunately, Soviet propaganda was now declaring that the military expenses of the democratic States were impoverishing the people, while the Red Army and the armies of the satellite States were glorified as the bulwarks of peace, without any

effort being made to explain why those two comparable phenomena should be so different.

15. The peaceful intentions of Mr. Vyshinsky must not be judged by the texts of his proposals, but by the acts of his Government. Unfortunately, since 1945, the Soviet Union had systematically refused to co-operate with other nations. It had refused to accept the plan of international control of atomic energy adopted by an overwhelming majority, and it had prevented any progress being made in the Commission for Conventional Armaments, rejecting even a plan providing for the exchange of information concerning military effectives. It had refused to participate in a number of specialized agencies of the United Nations; in at least one case, it had rejected decisions of the International Court of Justice and had refused to submit to that Court questions which it had discussed in the Assembly on legal grounds. Lastly, it had used the Trusteeship Council merely to spread confusion. It was obvious that the Western democracies, confronted with such a systematic effort to sabotage peace, could not be blamed for having used discretion.

16. Mr. McNeil called the attention of the members of the Committee to two other factors which constituted, on the part of the Soviet Union, an obstacle to international co-operation. The first was Mr. Vyshinsky's adherence to a narrow concept of national sovereignty. That concept was obsolete. The political reality of the twentieth century was the joint exercise of national sovereignties for the purpose of solving problems which could not be solved unilaterally. A State did not lose its prestige or surrender any of its essential functions by taking part in a joint action. The idea of national sovereignty belonged to the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, international co-operation had become indispensable.

17. The second of those factors was the idea of the authority of the Soviet State in domestic policy. In his book, *The Law of the Soviet State*, Mr. Vyshinsky justified for the dictatorship of the proletariat the right to pitilessly suppress its adversaries. The democratic States had every reason to fear that the use of force might not be confined to internal policy, but extend to the foreign relations of the Soviet Union. It might be wondered, therefore, whether Mr. Vyshinsky, as Minister of Foreign Affairs of his country, did not have the same concept of the authority of the State as that which he defended as Public Prosecutor. The rigid and inflexible language which he used to express his ideas concerning national sovereignty seemed to confirm that view.

18. In conclusion, Mr. McNeil recalled that, with the exception of the delegations which had consistently voted with the USSR delegation, all Members had stated that progress in international co-operation would be impossible unless there was a radical change in the policy of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, no one knew whether the Soviet leaders were aware of that fact, and certainly the Soviet people knew nothing of it. Mr. McNeil appealed to the USSR representative to inform his colleagues of the view-point of the Governments outside the Soviet sphere of influence. He should tell them of the growing despair of peoples wishing to have friendly relations with the Soviet Union, but being prevented from doing so by its policy; he should tell them that the conscience of the world was revolted by the cynicism

of the Soviet regime, that the peoples of the world were rising against the outmoded beliefs of the nineteenth century which separated nations and continents and to which the Soviet Union still adhered tenaciously, and that those people were on the march against isolationism, the mistaken belief that a nation could be self-sufficient. Mr. Vyshinsky should also tell his colleagues of the desire of the Western democracies to see changes brought about, provided that those changes did not endanger the virtues rescued at such a price from the hitlerite domination.

19. He recalled that Iran, France, the Czechoslovakia of Benes and Masaryk, Chile, China, Canada, Yugoslavia, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of South Africa, Turkey, Norway and Denmark had, in varying degrees, been subjected to pressure or propaganda on the part of the USSR, and noted that Denmark had been obliged to abandon its policy of neutrality of more than a century. Could all those countries be described as instigators of war? Could it be said that Denmark harboured aggressive or territorial ambitions? If those countries had been obliged to unite in defensive military action, it was not because they wanted war, which they detested, but because they feared the return of another bestial conflict. That coalition had been formed under the pressure of events. But the existence of that pressure was carefully hidden from the Soviet people, and it was kept in ignorance of the fear other countries had of the Soviet Union.

20. If today the coalition of opinion against the Soviet Union was stronger than it had been against the Hitler régime, during its darkest period, the reason could be found in the fact that a dictatorship was endeavouring to impose its will, not only on its own people, but by direct action in Europe and Asia and by indirect methods in every part of the world.

21. The world was no doubt not on the verge of war. It was true that the Stalin régime was not contemplating war, nor was any other Government. But it was plain that the Soviet campaign to sabotage peace was having disastrous consequences. Relations between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world were not improving, and there was a danger that they would be reduced to a minimum. But the world was too small for division. Separation would be fatal for all, and would constitute a threat of future war. The democratic nations were therefore pleading that the Government of the Soviet Union should co-operate, however modestly, with all other Governments in order to contribute to the restoration of international confidence on which any world agreement or world changes must be founded.

22. Mr. McNeil appealed to the Soviet Union Government to raise the curtain isolating its country. He asked the USSR authorities to allow foreign reviews and newspapers to circulate freely, to grant free transit to journalists, so that the people of the USSR and the other peoples of the world might know exactly what was happening in foreign countries. An immediate lessening of political tension would be the result, for truth would immediately render propaganda ineffective.

23. The United Kingdom representative felt that agreements, no matter how modest, should first be reached on various questions. In fact, if an agreement could not be reached on Berlin, there

was little hope of reaching an agreement on the atomic bomb, and if a trade agreement on the routes for aircraft proceeding to Moscow could not be signed, it was improbable that an agreement would ever be reached on Berlin. Above all, the USSR delegation should re-examine its reactionary conception of the sovereignty of the State. The United Nations was the result of the need of the twentieth century for joint action. The United Nations Charter not only authorized, but obliged its Members to seek jointly a solution to their problems. Mr. McNeil stated that he did not wish to comment on the five-Power pact. A treaty of such importance was not suddenly produced from nothing. Moreover, the need was not for new treaties, but for the implementation of the numerous existing ones.

24. Mr. WIERBLOWSKY (Poland) stated that scarcely had Mr. Vyshinsky completed his statement in the First Committee on Monday, 14 November (325th meeting), when the text of Mr. Austin's speech and proposal had been distributed, a fact indicating that those documents had been prepared in advance without regard for the arguments brought forward by Mr. Vyshinsky. Sure of the support of the majority, Mr. Austin had not troubled to burden his speech with arguments. He had merely sprinkled it with anti-Soviet headlines culled from the American Press.

25. The cold war now waging had been provoked by the ruling circles of the United States, and it must not be allowed to become a conflagration which would bring with it the destruction of civilization. The pseudo-monopolists of the atomic bomb had posed as leaders and saviours fighting an imaginary danger originating in the Soviet Union. Thousands of millions of dollars had been expended to further the aims of those who would profit from a new war. That policy had had a certain amount of success in the United States and the United Kingdom, but it could not ultimately succeed, for the masses of the people throughout the world knew very well who had liberated them from German national socialism, Italian fascism and Japanese militarism. They had not forgotten the heroic defence of Stalingrad, and they knew that the Soviet Union, busy as it was with the reconstruction of its war-devastated cities, would never entertain aggressive intentions.

26. The Soviet Union had submitted a constructive proposal. That proposal called for the condemnation of the preparation for a new war now being made in some countries, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom. The Press gave new information on that subject every day. The military budget of the United States was growing rapidly. New weapons were being manufactured. The network of military air and naval bases was spreading ever further along the Mediterranean coast, in the territories of the former Italian colonies and in the Pacific. Western Germany and Japan were being progressively transformed into United States military bases. Military blocs of an aggressive nature were being established by the United States and the United Kingdom. The contention that such a development was defensive was contradicted by an increasingly violent war propaganda. Mr. Canon, a member of the Congress of the United States, had gone so far as to propose that an atomic bomb should be dropped on Moscow. Similarly, the United States General Bradley had stated that strategic bombings had priority in United States

military preparations because during the first stage of the future war, the United States would not have sufficient troops to fight against the Soviet Union. The Press was attempting to stimulate hatred against the Soviet Union and the countries of the people's democracies. It consistently treated the Soviet Union as a potential aggressor. All that was taking place in spite of obligations under the Charter and in spite of resolution 110 (II) against war propaganda unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on 3 November 1947. The United Kingdom and the United States were also aware of resolution 190 (III) unanimously adopted in 1948, appealing to the five great Powers to compose their differences by peaceful means and to strengthen co-operation amongst themselves. During the discussion that had taken place, no one had denied the existence of war propaganda. On the other hand, an attempt had been made to lead the discussion towards subjects having nothing to do with that with which the Committee was concerned. The word "propaganda" had been flourished incessantly. If that word meant that the position taken by the countries of the people's democracies expressed the feelings of the masses, there could be no objection of its use. But those who set the peoples of the world against each other and used the atomic bomb as a threat should be ashamed of their war propaganda. How could they describe as propaganda manoeuvres the resolutions submitted by the Soviet Union since 1946: the proposal for the withdrawal of armed forces, the resolution against warmongers, the proposal made in 1948 for the reduction by one-third of conventional armaments?

27. Mr. Austin was falsifying history in order to accuse the Soviet Union of having abused the unanimity principle at Yalta, Potsdam, in the Allied Control Council, in the Council of Foreign Ministers and during the negotiations on the Peace Treaties. But how could such an accusation be made, since it was precisely at Yalta that the voting formula had been established? Mr. Wierblowsky quoted the report of the late Mr. Stettinius, former United States Secretary of State, on the Yalta Conference, which pointed out that the Soviet Union had made more concessions there to the United States and the United Kingdom than those two had granted to the Soviet Union, and that the Conference had been a diplomatic triumph for the United States. Senator Barkley, today Vice-President of the United States, had said that the result of the Conference had represented a great success for President Roosevelt. Mr. Harry Hopkins, one of the members of the United States delegation to the Conference, had expressed the same opinions. The examples quoted by Mr. Austin on the subject of the Potsdam Conference were just as fallacious. With regard to the Allied Control Council in Germany, that body had functioned until the United States had refused its co-operation. As for the Council of Foreign Ministers, it had prepared five peace treaties as well as numerous decrees, laws and orders, and it was only thanks to the spirit of co-operation shown by the Soviet Union that those treaties had come into force. With regard to the Peace Treaty with Italy, Mr. Wierblowsky asked where the responsibility lay for the failure to elect a governor for the Free Territory of Trieste? It had been enough for the Soviet Union to support the nomination of a candidate suggested by the United Kingdom for the latter country to refuse to accept him.

28. Who had actually failed to observe their commitments during and after the Second World War? As early as 1942, the Western Allies had undertaken to open a second front, and for two years they had failed to keep their promise, in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union was fighting 200 German divisions. The purpose of that delay was to weaken the Soviet Union in order to impose upon it, after the war, the will of the Anglo-American bloc. The violations of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements on Germany had reached their culminating point in the establishment of the puppet Government of Bonn, in which hitlerite elements were represented. The Conference that had just taken place in Paris between the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom and France was one more step towards the development of a German military potential and the incorporation of Western Germany in the Western Union.

29. The Truman doctrine, which it was claimed was an extension of the Monroe Doctrine, really sanctioned the principle of interference in the domestic affairs of States. The American Professor Burchard had justly said that that doctrine knew no frontiers. It flagrantly violated Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter, just as did the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with the Truman doctrine, Greece and South Korea had become United States colonies.

30. Mr. Austin had mentioned figures relating to the military aid rendered to the Soviet Union by the United States during the war. But how could the sacrifices needed to win a war be assessed in dollars? Those in Europe who had known and felt what war was, judged their effort by the blood shed by their soldiers. If there had been no Soviet army, the world would now be a prey to the hitlerite nightmare. For the countries of the people's democracies, the war which had recently ended had not been a war of domination, a war of conquest for the acquisition of new territories or a war for the domination of markets; it had been a war of liberation, on which the invaded nations' very existence had depended. If any State had come out of that war richer and more powerful, it was certainly the United States. Moreover, the United States had increased its possessions: had Mr. Austin forgotten the Pacific islands, the unilateral administration of Japan, and American economic penetration into other countries? The difference between the attitude of the United States and that of the Soviet Union with regard to small countries was very well illustrated by the following fact: that the Soviet Union, which had received from Denmark bases on the island of Bornholm under the same conditions as the United States had received bases in Greenland, had left those bases as soon as the war had ended, and had restored to Denmark its sovereignty over the island, whereas American troops were still stationed in Greenland, and the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty were being used to stifle Denmark's protests in that respect.

31. Mr. Austin had also insinuated that the elections which had taken place in Poland some three years earlier had not been free, and he had accused the Soviet Union of having manipulated them. It should be remembered that 90 per cent of the electorate had taken part in those elections, and that the opposition parties had secured about 20 per cent of the votes. Hundreds of foreign journalists, especially American, had

been moving about in the country at the time and the majority of them had observed that the elections were entirely free. Mr. Austin, however, would obviously have preferred elections like those which had taken place in Greece, Portugal, South Korea and Italy, not to mention those which were customary in the states of Alabama, Virginia and South Carolina, where the property qualification was still in force. Mr. Austin had not mentioned that 30 per cent of the negroes in the United States were officially denied the right to vote, whilst a further 30 per cent of them were in practice debarred from voting. As for the results of the elections in Italy mentioned by Mr. McNeil, the latter should remember that the Popular Front had secured 48.7 per cent of the votes. It was a pity that he had not spoken of France, nor of China, which had also voted, but without having recourse to a ballot. Mr. McNeil would soon have to concede the result of that vote.

32. Mr. Austin had also alluded to a so-called partition of Poland, whereas that country had never been as united as it was today. If anyone desired its partition, it could only be Mr. Austin and his friend Mr. Bevin, who would like to give Western Poland to Germany. If the allusion in question related to the territories of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, it should be emphasized that the Polish Government considered the reunion of the peoples of the Ukraine and Byelorussia to be a just and fair act. That decision, moreover, had been taken on the advice of the United Kingdom Government. In that connexion, Mr. Austin might ask Mr. McNeil who Lord Curzon was, and what was meant by the Curzon Line.

33. Mention had also been made of Marshal Rokossovsky. He was a Pole, born in Warsaw, where he had spent his childhood and his youth and had joined the workers' movement. Poland at that time had formed part of Czarist Russia, and all Poles had been enlisted in the Russian Army. That was how he had come to Russia, where he had stayed for many years. It was not surprising that a Pole should have fought in the Soviet Army, for one of the traditions of the Polish people was to fight for other countries, in the defence of their liberties; the Polish Generals Zablowski and Danbrowski had been leaders of the Paris *Commune*, the Polish General Bem had fought for Hungarian freedom, and the Poles Kosciuszko and Pulaski fought for the independence of the United States. But they had always returned to their country, as Marshal Rokossovsky had done.

34. Mr. Austin and Mr. McNeil had referred to the respect of human rights. Instead of concerning himself with the alleged violation of those rights in other countries, Mr. Austin should devote his attention to the problem of racial discrimination in the United States. Since President Truman had come into Power there had been 90 cases of lynching, but not a single conviction.

35. In regard to the exchange of ideas and freedom of movement, to which Mr. Austin had also referred, it would appear that Mr. Austin considered the purest expression of that concept to be the "Voice of America". Anyone who had heard those broadcasts knew that they transmitted nothing but libellous propaganda against the Gov-

ernments and the peoples to which they were addressed. Similar activities were carried on in Warsaw by the American Information Centre, which abused diplomatic privileges. As to the question of visits to the United States by students and scholars, a few specific cases might serve to illustrate the state of affairs that prevailed. The Polish Professor Szebiatowski, holder of a UNESCO fellowship, on his arrival in the United States, had immediately been taken to Ellis Island and subjected to interrogation, as if he had been a common criminal. Another Polish holder of a fellowship, Mr. Morawieski, had been sent to the United Nations Secretariat to complete a course of several weeks, as a reward for a paper he had written on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. His visa allowed him to travel only between his place of residence and Lake Success. There was no need to recall the restrictions imposed on the freedom of movement of the foreign scholars who had attended the Peace Congress in New York last year. In regard to journalists' visits to Poland and the United States, over 500 Press correspondents, the majority of them American, had visited Poland during the past three years, whereas the correspondents of Polish newspapers had to wait for months on end before obtaining their entry visas to the United States and were subjected to every kind of interrogation by the United States Consulate.

36. Mr. Austin had reproached the Soviet Union for not participating in the work of the United Nations specialized agencies. Poland was a member of nearly all those agencies and had been able to experience the negative benefits of participation in their work. The Polish request to the International Bank for a loan for the reconstruction of war-devastated areas, for instance, had remained unanswered, despite the favourable conclusions of the Economic Commission for Europe on the advantages of some of the plans proposed. The President of the Bank had stated in the Economic and Social Council that the Bank had not been influenced in its decision by economic factors. To quote another example, Poland had wanted to build a laboratory for penicillin production, the equipment for which would have been procured by the World Health Organization and had to be bought in the United States. But the United States Government had refused to grant the necessary export licenses, despite the recommendations of the World Health Organization. How, in the circumstances, could one believe Mr. Austin when he affirmed his desire for international co-operation?

37. The statement of the Tito representative was modelled on Mr. Austin's argument and was nothing more than a series of attacks against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. The Titoists had thrown off the mask and revealed themselves as enemies of peace. Mr. Djilas had slandered the Soviet Union, affirming that it was threatening Yugoslavia's independence and sovereignty, whereas Tito's supporters, suffering from megalomania, were working for hegemony in the Balkans, the idea of a greater Serbia, and the economic and political colonization of Albania. Even without the Rajk trial in Hungary or the Petrovich trial in Poland, the statements by the Tito representatives in the First Committee would have been enough to show that they were the servants of imperialism.



38. Neither Mr. Austin nor the representatives supporting him could deny the obvious facts mentioned in paragraph 1 of the USSR proposal. What Mr. Austin was asking the Members of the United Nations to do was to approve propaganda for a new war and preparations to that end. The adoption of such a conception would seriously endanger the existence of the United Nations.

39. The second purpose of the Soviet Union draft resolution was to condemn the use of the atomic bomb as well as other weapons for mass extermination which had been recognized by all as contrary to the conscience of the civilized world and incompatible with membership in the United Nations. The condemnation of those weapons was the logical result of paragraph 1 of the USSR proposal, for war propaganda and threats of the use of the atomic bomb were closely linked. The United States policy, in regard to the atomic bomb, was responsible for the war propaganda. The prohibition of the use of the bomb and the condemnation of those who threatened to use it would certainly dispel the existing tension in the world and would clear the way for closer international co-operation. Those who opposed prohibition had lost their argument that control was a prior condition to prohibition, since the Soviet Union had declared that the door was open for such control. That was why the USSR proposal simply called upon all States to settle their disputes by peaceful means without resorting to force. It was a logical consequence of the obligations arising from the Charter.

40. In reply to the Soviet Union proposal that a pact be concluded between the five great Powers in order to strengthen peace, all that was being said was that the principles underlying that proposal were already embodied in the Charter. But the Charter was based on the principle of collective security, which the Soviet Union had proposed well before the end of the Second World War. That principle meant that the independence of all States must be respected, that there could be no interference in the internal affairs of other countries. If the principle of collective security were strictly observed, according to the letter and spirit of the Charter, there would be no need to strengthen peace, but the Truman doctrine was the most flagrant violation of that principle. The same was true of the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty; attempts were being made to justify that Treaty by strange interpretations

of the provisions of the United Nations Charter, according to which it was merely a regional pact. But what was that elastic region without frontiers? Article 3 of the Treaty did not refer to legitimate defence measures but to mutual military assistance, which was in flagrant contradiction and incompatible with international law. Article 5 introduced the concept of automatism even in the case of provoked attack. In other words, an act of legitimate defence by a State that was attacked would authorize another State signatory of the Treaty to have recourse to aggression. Who then would be the aggressor? The United States had thus, through unilateral action, contrary to the principle of collective security, violated not only the spirit, but also the letter, of the Charter.

41. There had been criticism of the fact that the Soviet proposal restricted participation in the pact to the five Great Powers. Such limitation arose from Article 106 of the Charter, however, which provided that the five great Powers, in accordance with their declaration of 30 October 1943, should consult together and take joint action for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. It was precisely because the principal of collective security had been violated by the United States that it was essential to stress once more the principle of co-operation between the great Powers. If the United States opposed that theory, they would only be giving further proof that they did not want to co-operate. The United States seemed to require that all other States should renounce their sovereignty. Mr. McNeil had already renounced that of his country. He appeared to support Mr. James Burnham's theory that the United States should promote the establishment of a federation including as many States as possible and impose it by force if the other peoples objected.

42. In regard to the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/549), it merely stressed the well-known fact that the Charter was the most solemn pact in the history of mankind. But the authors of that draft resolution did not respect the Charter themselves, and their proposal was merely an attempt at diversion with the object of misleading world public opinion.

43. In the struggle for peace, the Soviet Union draft resolution represented a step forward and those who were in favour of peace should support it.

The meeting rose at 1.40 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 16 November 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Selim SÄRPER (Turkey).*

#### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (continued)**

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was grateful for the Committee's courtesy in giving him priority in the list of speakers. His task was not easy because, though they had touched on irrelevant topics, many preceding

speakers had given such an arbitrarily distorted picture of the Soviet Union's position that their statements could not remain unanswered. Clearly, it had been their aim to lead the Committee astray from a true understanding of the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/996). However, that proposal was of vital importance for the cause of peace and, whatever might be said to the contrary, the five great Powers could not eschew the fact that they carried the primary responsibility for war or peace.

2. The United States representative had described the Soviet Union proposal as just another in the long line of propaganda manoeuvres which the Soviet Union had presented at every session of the General Assembly (325th meeting). But that merely proved two facts: first, that the propaganda for a new war was increasing steadily and was now taking the form of active preparations; second, that the Government of the USSR had always been consistent in its attempts to frustrate a new war. Consequently, the Soviet Union delegation would continue to submit such proposals until appropriate action was taken.

3. The United States representative had denied that war-like preparations were being undertaken. Apparently he had not been convinced by the facts which Mr. Vyshinsky had adduced. Yet it was noteworthy that the United States representative had not himself adduced any facts to show that the accusation was groundless. He had not attempted to disavow the nightmarish statements of General Bradley and Mr. Johnson, Secretary of Defense. Moreover, what reply could be made to the charge that, at Maxwell Field, a course of lectures had been given on the strategy of the future war against the Soviet Union? Mr. Vyshinsky would be very happy to be shown that his charges were unfounded, but the facts were evident and he had even read the text of the lectures to which he had referred. Furthermore, the reactionary Press of the United States was carrying out a slanderous campaign of hatred against the Soviet Union, and that was something that could not be denied. Mr. Vyshinsky said that he could submit many additional facts in support of his charges but had refrained from doing so, in order to save the Committee's time.

4. The United States representative had criticized the Soviet Union proposals and resented the plain statement of facts as they existed. He had said that provocative statements would not promote co-operation. But the provocation lay not in the Soviet Union's position but rather in the acts of militaristic circles of the United States which were preparing a new war. Doubtless that was a heinous accusation but it was a true one which had not been disproved by the unfounded statements of other representatives such as the New Zealand representative (326th meeting). The Committee should not attempt to evade the facts of the situation but should examine the charges as if it were a judicial body. It must recognize its responsibility to the majority of the peoples of the world who were not participating in the debate. By ignoring the charges and refusing to disprove them the delegations concerned had shown that the charges were in fact well founded. Mr. Vyshinsky again asserted that the United States, the United Kingdom and a number of other States which it was not necessary to name were preparing a new war under the leadership of certain militaristic circles in the United States which were responsible for the existence of bloated budgets, the establishment of military bases and the organization of political blocs specifically designed to wage war.

5. In 1945 Stuart Hansell, the Secretary of the Navy, had said that the United States must secure a gigantic network of military bases including bases in the Pacific, some of which had formerly belonged to the United Kingdom. From available statistics, during the war the United States

had established a total of 484 such bases in the Pacific and Atlantic areas. Since the war the number of bases had been increased. An official statement had been published in London confirming that the United States Army Air Force possessed permanent bases in the United Kingdom and that a total of ninety Superfortresses were stationed in that country, being divided in three bombing groups. As had already been pointed out, that force of bombers capable of carrying atomic bombs, would be equal in destructive power to 19,800 Superfortresses carrying conventional bombs. On 4 November 1949 *The New York Times* had published a report that, after careful consideration, the United Kingdom Government had agreed to the transfer of a number of B-29 planes to the United Kingdom as part of Marshall aid. All that showed that the United Kingdom Government did not trust its own military strength and was prepared to rely on the United States air power. But what was the purpose of such a powerful force in the United Kingdom and whom were they intended to attack. The silence of the United States delegation was self-explanatory. Mr. Vyshinsky knew well against whom those planes were intended.

6. No sensible persons would entertain the absurd thought that the Soviet Union wanted to bomb the United Kingdom. Obviously, it was those who were building military bases that were guilty of war-like intentions. To argue the contrary was ridiculous and would convince no one. There was further evidence of the war-like preparations of the United States and the United Kingdom. In 1948, *The New York Times* had published a report from Nicosia to the effect that the whole of Cyprus was being transformed into a bastion against the Soviet Union under the joint direction of the United States and the United Kingdom. In September 1948, there had been a meeting between the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and Franco. In return for granting bases to the United States, Franco had asked for admission to the United Nations and Marshall aid. Thus, a new light was shed upon the United States sponsorship of Portugal's application for membership. Clearly, once Portugal was admitted to the United Nations, Spain would submit its own application. According to Press reports, the State Department was seeking the right to establish military bases in various parts of Spain, including Cadiz, Cartagena, Valencia and Barcelona and was also seeking control of one of the Balearic Islands. There was also a report in *World Affairs* that, in 1948, a secret pact had been concluded with Spain giving the United States the right to establish a number of bases on Spanish territory. Similar reports were available to the effect that Portugal had granted the United States the right to establish bases in Portugal and its overseas territories. Furthermore, the Associated Press had made an announcement to the effect that the United States was preparing advance bases in the Arctic where planes could refuel. The Associated Press had also reported that budgetary appropriations were being proposed for the establishment of heavy bomber bases in Maine, and that planes from those bases after refuelling in Canada or in the Arctic would be able to fly across the North Pole. There was ample evidence of that nature relating to the establishment of military bases. Therefore, it was important to explain to world

public opinion for what purpose they were being created and against whom they would be utilized. Thus far, no answer had been given by the United States representative and talk about mutual defence and the need for filling the power vacuum left by the war was not convincing.

7. The head of the Belgian delegation had spoken blandly (328th meeting) about the existence of fear in the world, but it was an old and outmoded fairy tale to describe the army of the Soviet Union as a tremendous power ominously threatening the world. Such a vast army did not exist and there would be no danger of aggression on its part even if it could swim the Atlantic Ocean. Previous speakers had said that deeds were more important than words, yet while the Soviet Union delegation spoke about peace its opponents were engaged in warlike deeds.

8. Mr. Vyshinsky challenged the United States representative to adduce facts which would disprove the charge of war propaganda in the United States and which would explain the reason for the establishment of military bases. He believed that the United States representative had failed to do so simply because he could not contradict real facts. All the evidence which the Soviet Union delegation had brought forward was based upon the statements of responsible persons in the United States and the United Kingdom or upon authenticated testimony. It was insufficient to deny them and merely to assert that the aims of the United States were not aggressive.

9. Mr. Austin had quoted the Foreign Relations Committee, as asserting that the North Atlantic Treaty was designed to prevent war and that the policy of the United States was aimed at promoting peace through the United Nations. He had added that his Government sincerely desired to reach an agreement upon the armed forces which, according to the terms of the Charter, must be placed at the disposal of the United Nations. It was said to be United States policy to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations, so that armed forces should not be used, except in the common interest. Mr. Vyshinsky doubted the truth of such a description of United States policy. The United States representative had argued that since the Charter was the instrument for maintaining peace, there was no need for an additional five-Power pact. But the same argument applied to the North Atlantic Treaty. If there was need for a twelve-Power North Atlantic Treaty, then why was there no need for a five-Power pact? Surely, any measure designed to strengthen peace should not be rejected as unnecessary. Actually, it was quite incorrect to say that the North Atlantic Treaty was aimed at strengthening the United Nations. The latter had not asked for it and the Treaty included a number of non-member States while it excluded certain States which were Members. It was quite a different agreement from the pacts of friendship and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and the people's democracies. As was well known, those pacts were purely defensive and aimed at preventing a resurgence of German aggression which was being kept alive by the encouragement of the western world. Likewise, if the United States Government wished to strengthen the United Nations, why was it preventing any agreement upon the establishment of the United Nations armed force?

10. The United States representative had criticized paragraph 2 of the Soviet Union proposal, which related to the prohibition of the atomic bomb, as misleadingly phrased and contrary to the decision of the General Assembly to the effect that the problem could only be solved by transferring all atomic materials and processes to an international agency. Mr. Vyshinsky could find nothing misleading about his proposal. The Soviet Union delegation had already stated that it could not accept the majority proposal that all atomic raw materials and all processing facilities be transferred to an international control body on a basis of ownership or trusteeship. It was quite wrong to argue, as certain delegations did, that the Soviet Union had an incorrect concept of sovereignty. The delegation of the USSR had stated that complete international ownership of all aspects of atomic production would be impossible because the national economy of all those countries where atomic energy played a predominant role as a source of power would be crippled. Even the authors of the United States plan which the majority had approved, had agreed that it was impractical and that it would not ensure complete international security against clandestine activities. Obviously, as the authors of the United States plan had themselves admitted, it was unnecessary to transfer control over all aspects of Soviet Union production to an international body. The only reason for advancing such a plan must be a desire to create a world monopoly. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that he had quoted a report by Mr. Acheson and other official documents of the United States Government to show what were the real aims of the United States plan. If his statement had been incorrect why had the United States delegation made no attempt at disavowal? It was not the question of national sovereignty that was at stake, but the vital interests of all the countries concerned; only those States which were powerless to prevent foreign control of their economy could accept the plan. For its part, the Soviet Union Government was determined to defend the independence of its people and possessed the necessary armed forces to do so. In the past powerful enemies had tried to dominate the Russian people but had been overthrown. The people of Russia were confident of their ability to repel any future aggressor.

11. The Soviet Union proposals regarding atomic energy were modest in scope. They rejected completely the decision which had recently been taken by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee.<sup>1</sup> The conclusion was simple: the General Assembly should recommend to the Atomic Energy Commission not to delay any further in elaborating the necessary measures to prohibit atomic weapons and establish strict international control over atomic energy. Such a decision could harm no one whereas the decision of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee could have no practical effect. Either the First Committee should decide that practical measures must be taken or it should admit that such measures were not desired. Clearly, the United States and the United Kingdom Governments did not want any action. That was made clear in Mr. Acheson's letter to the Senate in 1945, in which he had explained that any decision by the United Nations would have to be ratified by the Senate and, until it was

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 37th meeting.*

ratified, the stockpiling of atom bombs would continue. A statement to the same effect had also been made by Mr. Lilienthal, Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. Obviously, the aim of the United States Government was to stockpile atomic bombs in order that it might have an advantage in time when the secret of the atomic bomb became known to others. However, the secret was no longer a secret. The Soviet Union possessed the atomic bomb and was making more rapid scientific progress than the United States. Mr. Vyshinsky pointed to the number of years that had been needed to prepare the few bombs which the United States possessed at the time of the Hiroshima bombing. Incidentally, it was noteworthy that the bombing of Hiroshima had been a blow at the Japanese people and not at Japanese imperialism which was still being encouraged by the United States Occupying Authorities.

12. Mr. Vyshinsky saw no objection to the First Committee adopting a decision regarding atomic energy in spite of the fact that the question had already been discussed by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. He thought it intolerable that there should be any delay in the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control.

13. Preceding speakers had accused the Soviet Union of aggressive acts towards the neighbouring People's Democracies of Eastern Europe. There had been references to the question of freedom of elections which had been discussed in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that he had already explained the true facts of the situation. He had also demonstrated the falsifications which had accompanied the last elections in Greece. That the elections had been characterized by cheating was proved by the dismissal of one of the foreign observers merely because he had criticized the manner in which the elections were being conducted. The United States representative had also asserted that in 1945, the Soviet Union Government had issued an ultimatum to the King of Romania demanding a change in government in that country. Actually, that story was quite untrue. In 1945, when the Red Army was advancing on Berlin, the Romanian Government, headed by General Radescu, had hatched a plot to attack the Red Army from behind. The Government of the USSR had therefore insisted that the Romanian Government be reformed in order that the lines of communication of the Red Army should not be threatened and so that the Government might be representative of the Romanian people. The United States representative could have told the Committee that, in 1945, an Allied commission had been established, comprising Mr. Vyshinsky, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr and Mr. Harriman for the purpose of advising the King of Romania as to how the Romanian Government could be strengthened and made more representative. With the help of the United States and the United Kingdom, the basis of the Groza Government had subsequently been broadened to include representatives of the Peasant-Liberal Party. That action had amounted to a recognition of that Government, and it could not be said that the latter had been set up by the USSR. The Groza Government was still in existence, though its membership had been somewhat improved, and it enjoyed the confidence of the Romanian people. Mr. Vyshinsky concluded that,

while the USSR proposals would no doubt be rejected, they had not been disproved or ever analysed.

14. The representative of the Tito clique had not merely said that the USSR proposals unilaterally defined the meaning of war propaganda and the preparation of a new war but had wanted a broader definition and clarification in a direction which was unnecessary since no one had designs on the independence or sovereignty of Yugoslavia. As for applying pressure and violating agreements, it was Tito who had violated the treaty regarding Danubian navigation and the agreement for the Yugoslav-Soviet air transport company. It was the Tito Government which had engaged in mass arrests of USSR nationals who had been accused, not of espionage, but of being partisans of friendly co-operation with the Soviet Union. That was necessary so as to incite the Yugoslav people against the USSR. The fact that the Yugoslav representative had repeated, almost verbatim, what Mr. Bevin had said at a plenary meeting of the Assembly showed that the Tito clique was becoming more and more an intrinsic part of the camp they were joining. In referring to the Rajk trial, Mr. Djilas had not mentioned the testimony of Brankov, who had been the principal Yugoslav spy in Hungary. Brankov had described the establishment of liaison during the war with the leader of the United States' spy organization in Europe, Allan Dulles, whose activities were dealt with in the Soviet Information Bureau publication *The Falsifiers of History* published in 1948. In addition to the Anglo-American intelligence services, he had related that contact had also been established with the Trotskyite groups. Stating that the persons involved in that work now occupied high positions in the Yugoslav Government, Mr. Vyshinsky said that the Rajk trial had exposed the shame of the Tito clique, which claimed that it represented the Yugoslav people and that it was building socialism. It was in that context that the Government of the Soviet Union had had to consider its subsequent relations with Yugoslavia and the friendship agreement which that country had signed on the eve of the German attack. The Soviet note of 29 September 1949 had pointed out that during the trial it had been ascertained that the Yugoslav Government had been conducting an undermining activity against the USSR for a long time, under the hypocritical cloak of the treaty of friendship. The fact that that note had been withheld by the Yugoslav Government and that that Government had trampled upon the friendship agreement ought not to be forgotten and could not be concealed by unfounded counter-charges.

15. The Canadian representative thought that the main task of the General Assembly was not to condemn the preparation of a new war and strengthen peace but to deal with the problem of fears and anxiety. He would advise that representative not to concern himself about the regions supposedly under the mastery of the USSR, which were quite capable of taking care of themselves. Mr. Martin had expressed concern about another matter, namely, that war was supposed to be inevitable according to the teachings of Marxism and Leninism. In that connexion Mr. Vyshinsky asked why the Canadian representative, if he did not want war, did not want to endorse the USSR proposal for a five-Power pact

for the strengthening of peace. In support of his argument, the Canadian representative had quoted from the works of Lenin. For a clear understanding of those words, however, attention must be paid to what Lenin had tried to say and to the circumstances in which he had spoken. The statement had been made in 1919 when the USSR had been encircled by enemy countries and when Kautsky, the advocate of the capitalist classes, had preceded Mr. Martin in trying to accuse the Bolsheviks of being engaged in militarism rather than socialism. The crusade of fourteen Powers under the leadership of Winston Churchill had necessitated the building of a military organization of the proletariat capable of defending the borders of the USSR and the independence of workers. He recalled that the United States representative had made similar charges and claims at the previous session and had cited a passage from the history of the Communist Party to the effect that war was the concomitant of capitalism and that there were just wars designed to liberate the people from capitalist slavery. Mr. Austin had endeavoured to prove that the Soviet Union wanted to disarm the capitalist States because it considered war inevitable and that the USSR proposal for the strengthening of peace must therefore be mere hypocrisy. Those would-be interpreters of Lenin and Marx had not understood the true meaning of the development of human society in accordance with certain laws. The true concomitants of capitalism, which was based on class suppression, were war, crisis, unemployment, crime and prostitution. Those social phenomena were engendered by the very social structure of capitalist society, and not by the individual psychology of any particular human being. The great merit of Marxism and Leninism was the discovery of the key to the study of the laws of development of human society. That key had been found in analysis of the methods of production, of the organization of social and particularly of productive relations in every historic period. However, the subordination of the development of human society to those laws did not rule out the individual human being, who was capable of organizing social inter-relations so as to promote social development in accordance with those laws. On the other hand, the individual could hamper such development and in that case played a reactionary role in society. The role played by every individual was particularly important in the case of those called upon to regulate human and social relations. The task and policy of the socialist States was to remove all those factors engendering conflict and was therefore to organize the peace-loving forces of society in all countries and to create mutual trust and confidence. Mr. Vyshinsky quoted a statement made by Lenin to that effect, in an interview twenty-seven years previously. That statement made it clear that Leninism called for peaceful relations among nations, without which it was impossible to promote and develop everything of value in human civilization. Thus, at the All Union Congress of the Soviet in 1920, after two years of civil war, and when the USSR was still encircled by hostile States, Lenin had said that every step in military victory brought nearer the time when all efforts could be devoted to peaceful construction. At that same Congress, Lenin had proposed a resolution saying that the USSR wished to live in peace with all nations of the world and to direct all its efforts

towards all aspects of the internal reconstruction which had been prevented by the aggression of German imperialism and subsequently by the intervention of the *Entente* and the hunger blockade. There was no contradiction between the law that war was the inevitable outcome of capitalist society and the statement that war could be curbed by the forging together of the forces of the democratic world. Human solidarity and reason could harness the laws of nature in the service of mankind, and could also harness the laws of human development, placing them at the service of human progress and advancement. Just as it was absurd to say that, because it believed that crises were inherent in capitalism, the Soviet Union wished to foster such crises, similarly the statement that war was a concomitant of capitalism did not imply support of such war. The task was to modify the action of such laws if the latter were harmful.

16. In connexion with what he had just said, Mr. Vyshinsky recalled the history of the period prior to the Second World War when Hitlerite militarism had been fostered by American dollars and by the shameful Munich policy of France and the United Kingdom. The USSR had raised its voice in the defence of the Czechoslovak Republic and had exposed that policy which was bound to lead to the Second World War and which had in fact resulted in it. Only madmen could say that the Soviet Union had wanted that war in which it had suffered such tremendous losses. The Polish representative had described the role played by the USSR in that war and had recalled an important episode, when the Allied forces on the Western front under General Eisenhower, had been in a very difficult position. Mr. Vyshinsky quoted the text of a telegram sent to Generalissimo Stalin by Mr. Churchill on 6 November 1944 describing the gravity of the situation resulting from the temporary loss of military initiative, and asking what the Generalissimo proposed to do. That telegram had called for heroic efforts on the part of the USSR to save the Western front. The USSR forgot how Churchill and others had violated their obligations to open the second front. On the following day Generalissimo Stalin had cabled a reply to the effect that, in spite of unfavourable weather conditions, the Soviet High Command had decided to complete preparations for broad offensive operations to be launched in the month of January. The subsequent success of the winter offensive of the Red Army had thwarted the efforts of the German offensive in the West. Mr. Churchill, in the name of the United Kingdom Government, had expressed gratitude and congratulations in connexion with that great offensive and had given assurance that action would be prosecuted on the entire Western front. In the face of such facts, Mr. Vyshinsky did not wish to dwell on statements such as those of the representatives of New Zealand and the United Kingdom to the effect that the USSR was repeating the action of Goebbels and Hitler. An elementary feeling of gratitude and fairness ought to preclude such speeches and thoughts.

17. The representative of France had asked thirty meaningless questions of the USSR delegation. He had even answered one rhetorical question to the effect that the USSR proposals were unnecessary, since they dealt with matters

already set forth in the Charter. According to his argument, those proposals must be rejected as superfluous as they contained principles which were already in the Charter. If they contained something which was not in the Charter, they were to be rejected as harmful. That kind of reasoning was unworthy of attention.

18. Turning to the statement of the United Kingdom representative, which had been a summing up of the arguments of previous speakers to the effect that the USSR did not want peace. Mr. McNeil had also been unable to prove that thesis and had therefore avoided dealing with the substance of the USSR proposal. Mr. McNeil's contention that normal human beings under normal conditions wanted peace was correct; only abnormal persons like the late Mr. Forrestal did not want it. It must be recognized that there were too many such abnormal people at large in some countries. However, the Committee was not talking about people but about the reactionary circles which wanted war. Mr. McNeil's statement that no war was threatening was similar to what the Munich men had said on the eve of the Second World War when the USSR had warned that Hitler was preparing war. That war had taken place because it had been prepared, but the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States had said that there would be no war and had appeased Hitler.

19. Mr. McNeil had disputed the USSR statement as to the 600 million supporters of peace and in that connexion, had cited elections in a number of countries. However, it was the system of elections which counted, and it was known that the Moch system in France and the rotten borough system in Britain were designed to make sure that whoever had the most votes would get the least seats. The fact was that the friends of peace and democracy were on the march.

20. Mr. McNeil also desired the figures on the USSR budget to indicate that the USSR was a militaristic Power. Those figures ought to be available to him because they had been fully published in all the Moscow newspapers on 11 March 1949. Citing those figures, Mr. Vyshinsky said that maintenance of the Soviet armed forces comprised 19 per cent of the proposed budgetary expenditures for 1949. The slight increase in those expenditures as compared with the previous year had been due to a rise in prices. The appropriations for military purposes were to secure all the expenditures of the Army on which the freedom and independence of the USSR undoubtedly depended. Mr. Vyshinsky compared those figures with the military expenditures of other countries. Those of the United Kingdom for 1949-1950 were twice as great as before the war and comprised 30 per cent of all expenditures. In the United States the figure was 34 per cent of the entire budget and according to a calculation, 69 per cent of that budget for 1949-1950 was assigned directly or indirectly to military purposes. Forty per cent of French Government expenditures were devoted to military purposes, and it was well known that the bulk of military measures were taken at the cost of the United States. The Press of those countries had pointed out that those expenditures exceeded all normal budgetary standards. That was a clear answer to the United Kingdom representative's question.

21. As to the jamming of BBC and "Voice of America" broadcasts, as the Polish representative had pointed out, those broadcasts were inimical propaganda which actually appealed for revolt against and war upon the USSR. If measures were taken to ensure the free transmission of such lies over the USSR, popular indignation would be aroused to such an extent that the result would be unpleasant for Mr. McNeil and others who desired such broadcasts. In connexion with the United Kingdom representative's desire to have British correspondents admitted to the USSR, Mr. Vyshinsky quoted from the book of a well-known British journalist in Moscow who had refused to go back to his country because, in his own words, he could not return to a country which was fomenting war against the USSR. That book showed that London correspondents worked in close contact with the Foreign Office as spies and intelligence agents, and that was presumably the reason for the insistence displayed by Mr. McNeil. However, he could not promise that the USSR could give access to such persons.

22. The United States representative in alleging that the Soviet Union did not want any cultural relations had ignored the fact that USSR delegates to a congress in New York in 1946 had had to register as agents of a foreign Power or leave the country and they had in fact left. The same had happened in March 1949 in connexion with a congress of scientific and cultural leaders for peace. Referring to the fact that traitors to the Soviet people were being harboured in the United States, Mr. Vyshinsky said that cultural relations could only be maintained on a basis of reciprocity. The mendacious talk about the so-called iron curtain was refuted by the fact that the USSR maintained broad cultural relations with other peoples, and he cited numerous instances of such relations.

23. Mr. Vyshinsky said that the United Kingdom representative's references to the teachings of Lenin and Stalin could not be taken seriously. That representative had also quoted a fable from Krylov, comparing Mr. Vyshinsky to a snake. He cited another fable by Krylov, which showed that slanderers were more evil and deadly than snakes.

24. Mr. DJILAS (Yugoslavia) wished to reply to one untruth stated by Mr. Vyshinsky and would reply to the others at a later stage. It was not the Yugoslav Government which had violated the agreements for the Danubian transportation companies since it had merely sent a note to the USSR Government asking that those agreements be revoked. Mr. Vyshinsky had agreed to that and ought to remember his own notes, even if he wished to forget others.

25. Mr. Djilas said that after the publication of the *Cominform* resolution, Brankov was the only Yugoslav in Budapest to endorse it. Brankov had merely been utilized at the Rajk trial as a USSR agent and his fate was unimportant as he had become a traitor to Yugoslavia.

26. Mr. DE MARCOS (Cuba) said that the Soviet Union draft resolution was self-contradictory in that it invited the five great Powers to conclude a pact for the strengthening of peace only after accusing two of them of instigating war. The United States representative had been quite cor-



rect in stating that the Soviet Union proposal was defamatory. One might think that any conciliatory proposal was at once invalidated if it was preceded by a series of injurious statements or contained in its preamble repeated defamations. Likewise, it might be felt that the position of the Soviet Union was illogical and was being taken deliberately in order to increase the existing political dissensions or to serve as propaganda, and thus to prevent any just and honourable solutions. The proposal of the Soviet Union was certainly a strange way of promoting understanding and conciliation. First the United Kingdom and the United States were violently accused of seeking war and then they were invited to subscribe to a pact for the furtherance of peace. Mr. Vyshinsky had appeared in the role of prosecutor when he had affirmed that the Berlin crisis of the preceding year had been created by the United Kingdom and the United States, that both Powers had violated the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements and that the North Atlantic Treaty was really a militant bloc organized in preparation for an offensive against the Soviet Union. It was hardly necessary to point out on behalf of the participants in the North Atlantic Treaty, that they had been moved by the common instinct of self-preservation. Mr. Vyshinsky had asserted that his Government was pursuing a policy of peace and that, in carrying out that policy, the Soviet Union objected to aggressive blocs. However, nobody was aware that the Soviet Union was pursuing a policy of peace. Of course, it was not to be doubted that, during the early days of the communist régime, the guiding principle of the Soviet Union had been a desire for peace. But thirty-two years had elapsed since then and nothing could be more certain than that the USSR had emerged from the Second World War with a desire for domination. Mr. Vyshinsky had quite correctly recalled the many peaceful treaties signed by the Soviet Union prior to the Second World War. He only forgot one agreement, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement for the partition of Poland, the result of which had been to encourage Hitler to embark on the path of war in September 1939. A Soviet Union spokesman, writing in a Moscow review, had stated that no people wanted war and what was needed was to create a new life of peace in the world. Yet, when the representatives of the USSR spoke of the need for peace they lightly entered into a play of deceit and fallacy. It was not sufficient to speak of peace; what was needed was a spirit of confidence and co-operation throughout the world. So long as the representatives of the Soviet Union sought to impose peace according to their own conception, which implied territorial and ideological imperialism, there could result only a constant and repeated exchange of threats and intimidations. The Soviet Union proposal was unacceptable because, under the guise of promoting peace, what it really implied was destruction of the Charter and its basic principles. To say that the maintenance of peace was primarily a responsibility of the five great Powers was simply a manoeuvre to create a privileged position for a certain group of States. It was tantamount to establishing a form of trusteeship over the world. The aim of the Charter was to bring about a greater degree of equality among all States, large and small. Article 24 of the Charter stated that the Members of the United Nations conferred upon the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-

national peace and security and added that in discharging its duties, the Security Council should act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Thus, the responsibility for maintaining peace and security did not lie with five States alone but with one of the organs of the United Nations acting on behalf of all Member States.

27. For all the foregoing reasons, Mr. de Marcos said that his delegation would vote against the Soviet Union proposal and would support the joint draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/549). He believed that the latter, if adopted, would strengthen the purposes and principles of the Charter which alone could be the foundation of peace in the world.

28. Mr. de FREITAS-VALLE (Brazil) said that the debate taking place should be welcome since, if good faith prevailed in it, the critical situation of the international family would be somewhat clarified. The Charter of the United Nations was the finest instrument of international co-operation yet conceived and was so perfect and balanced that the Governments of the world had been willing to admit that five Powers, because of services rendered, were qualified to assume a prime responsibility in the maintenance of peace and security. That step had not been easy but had been taken because full confidence had been placed in the five permanent members of the Security Council. Unfortunately the USSR had been unwilling to serve the ideals of the United Nations faithfully and, as a result, the fear of a new and total war had arisen which might lead people to lose faith in the United Nations. In that connexion, Mr. de Freitas-Valle cited the example of Canada, which in the next year was going to spend seventeen times as much on defence as it had spent for that purpose in the years prior to the Second World War. The Canadian Defence Minister in presenting that budget proposal to the Canadian Parliament had stated that Canada could not expect and could not be expected to defend its immense territory alone and for that reason, among others, had joined the United Nations and had signed the North Atlantic Treaty. That example was impressive. Canada had joined the United Nations and had put confidence in the Organization, but when the veto, meant to be used sparingly and conscientiously, had become an instrument of pressure and partisanship, then Canada and eleven other countries, determined on survival, had entered into the North Atlantic Treaty. Citing the main principles of that Treaty, Mr. de Freitas-Valle pointed out that it was avowedly patterned after the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro of 1947. Both of those Treaties were of a purely defensive character and could not be construed as military alliances for the attainment of specific political aims. The similarity of their provisions had resulted from the identical preoccupations which had led to their conclusion. Both Treaties were within the framework of the Charter and had been concluded only because the USSR veto had blocked the peace machinery of the Organization. That being so, he could not see why the USSR should now propose that the five permanent members of the Security Council should conclude a pact for the strengthening of peace. That pact would be needless if the USSR acted in accord with universal moral principles and with the spirit of the pro-

visions of the Charter. If the USSR insisted upon its present course of disturbing the normal life of peaceful nations by unbridled imperialistic encroachments, it would be necessary to stand by the Rio Treaty and North Atlantic Pact.

29. The "might popular movement" referred to in the USSR proposal was nothing but the abuse of the idea of peace which communists in all countries, in strict obedience to instructions from the USSR, were engaged in spreading. The real purpose behind the so-called peace congresses was to spread subversive propaganda against the democratic form of government. The USSR proposal was a transparent illustration of the truism that Soviet foreign policy and communist propaganda were indivisible, and his delegation would oppose it. He supported the United States-United Kingdom joint draft resolution which, for the sake of the happiness of the world, his delegation would like to see respected by the USSR.

30. The representative of Brazil agreed with the recent statement of the USSR representative to the effect that all mankind wanted peace. Some merely indulged in outward professions, however, while others spoke from their hearts. An expansion of one country into two continents was taking place and a godless credo was being disseminated throughout the world. Appealing to the USSR delegation to return to participation in the common aims of the United Nations for the establishment of peace and understanding among all peoples, he said that the idea of co-existence of the group under Soviet rule and the rest of the world was not an irreconcilable paradox. Refusal to associate with others would lead to distrust, and the people that did so ran the risk of perishing amid delusions begotten of its own pride. The only way to peace was to allow all peoples to lead their own lives in the prosecution of their chosen ideals.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 17 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Selim SÄRPER (Turkey).*

#### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (continued)**

1. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) stressed that the concern of the small nations in the preservation of peace was not less than that of the great Powers. The question was a vital one for the small countries because they suffered from the repercussions of conflicts.

2. The Committee had before it two draft resolutions (A/996 and A/C.1/549) which clearly showed the seriousness of the dispute between the two great blocs opposing each other. Both referred to peace, but one was expressed in terms of reproach and anger, whereas the other contained an attempt to persuade and an appeal to principles. Such discussions were not new to the General Assembly. Similar debates had taken place at previous sessions and the repetitions only served as a proof of the ill faith of the pretexts and the falsehood of the propaganda used by some. The USSR proposal implied that small nations should merely play the part of spectators in the tragedy that was being enacted. How could the small nations be content with that? They could not, for the very survival of the universe was at stake. They could not agree to be the dupes of hollow phrases. While referring to peace and to a pact for the strengthening of peace, the Soviet Union proposal used terms which led to the conclusion that its authors knew in advance that it would certainly be rejected. It was founded solely upon an arbitrary condemnation of two of the great Powers to whom participation in a peace pact was being proposed.

3. The world was divided into two all-powerful blocs, which mistrusted one another. Each was determined not to yield to domination by the other, and both were engaged in a furious armaments race. They were prepared to risk total war for total dominion. Whereas six or seven

great Powers formerly succeeded in maintaining a certain balance of power and preserving peace for a time by means of coalitions and combinations of alliances, now there were only two great Powers facing one another. Every country had taken one side or the other, or would be obliged to do so. The core of the problem was to ascertain whether there was a possibility of achieving peace, or at least a truce during which the basis of a permanent peace might be laid. There were sparsely populated parts of the world in which each of the two blocs was trying to establish a footing; other densely populated regions had not yet taken sides and the two blocs were tempted to face one another there. So long as that unstable situation lasted the two parties should refrain from resort to arms and accept the principle of peaceful co-existence and competition. If that could be done, the chances of a final agreement would be greatly increased. The idea of establishing peace by force would be an anachronism and would immediately entail the destruction of the universe. It was essential to keep cool and use common sense. If Marshal Stalin was as realistic as was claimed, he must have realized that the free world had the necessary strength and conviction to resist the pressure which he sought to bring to bear upon certain regions and parts of the world that had not yet taken sides. If that were so, the conflict might be avoided. The free world should try to eliminate conditions tending to aggravate dangerous friction. The standard of living in under-developed countries should be improved and human rights and fundamental freedoms should be scrupulously respected. Above all, it was necessary to hold the line along the portions of the newly independent States and the Non-Self-Governing Territories of the world.

4. The joint draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/549) incorporated some of those principles. It proposed terms that would enable the two conflicting worlds to co-exist. Its immediate purpose was that of maintaining a balance between the Powers. Although

it did not represent a solution that might create the "one world" that was hoped for, it might help to solve existing difficulties. It was essential to agree, by means of conciliation, to live side by side in relative peace. The danger of war could not be definitively eliminated in the shifting and uncertain position of the modern world. One of the proposals before the Committee was a restatement of principles to which there could be no opposition, and it would certainly be adopted. The other proposal, which was based on misconceived accusations and inspired by the wish to secure condemnation, should be rejected. But the adoption of a new resolution on peace was hardly likely to dissipate the atmosphere of tension that was hampering the efforts of the United Nations towards peace. A real easing of the warlike atmosphere could not take place until the two opposing great Powers agreed to stop casting accusations at one another and until the USSR stopped obstructing the peace machinery of the United Nations.

5. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said the discussion was vital to all and especially to nations which, whether they wished it or not, would be involved in a future war. The United Nations might do much towards the maintenance of peace if the parties concerned listened to each other's statements with an open mind and then determined their policies on the basis of those statements. The attacks addressed by some delegations to others were not calculated to promote the purposes of the United Nations.

6. Peace was based upon justice and truth and could only be achieved by a spirit of mutual tolerance and conciliation. Justice had lagged behind the progress achieved by modern science and technique. In a world of plenty, a deep gulf divided the "haves" from the "have-nots". If the world was to live in peace, it must be freed from want by raising the standards of living. On that point there seemed to be general agreement; it was on the methods to be applied to achieve the desired purpose that opinions were divided. One school of thought, that of the Soviet Union, was based on the concept of revolution. That philosophy had developed into an authoritarian and dogmatic faith. It subdued the mind of the individual through a dialectical technique; it subdued his freedom to the will of the State. It sought to propagate its doctrines throughout the world by means of an ideological and political penetration of every country. The adherents of that faith were fanatics, who could only see the world through distorting glasses. The Western democracies, on the other hand, were in favour of evolution; in their view the changes that would bring social justice and better living conditions took some time. That school of thought attached great importance to individual initiative. Where it predominated, the State was the servant of the individual and, although there was some religious and political indoctrination, the individual enjoyed freedom to develop his own mind. Those two schools of thought would have to be reconciled, if a conflict was to be avoided. No reconciliation was possible on the ideological level, but it was to be hoped that reconciliation was possible on the practical and political level. The changes that had taken place in the Soviet Union in recent years suggested that that country should be capable of adjusting its attitude to the same extent to which the Western Powers were prepared to

adjust theirs. History of religions had shown that those who had started as fanatics had gradually become increasingly tolerant and were trying to live in peace side by side with the adherents of other religions. The communists could have no reason to fear peoples which preferred a different ideology, but they should also realize that they had no right to impose their ideals by violent means.

7. Ordinary human intelligence revealed that exploitation and domination of individuals, classes and nations by others finally led to war, and war had become so destructive that it jeopardized the very existence of humanity. Those facts were obvious. The survival of humanity, therefore, depended upon international co-operation. On one side, there was a controlled Press and on the other freedom of information. Such conditions were not conducive to peace. If there was to be mutual understanding, common definitions of terms had to be used. For instance, the words "fascism", "democracy" and "people" were each used with more than one meaning.

8. The first step towards world peace was psychological disarmament. Tolerance and the spirit of conciliation were the first requisites for any international co-operation. In view of those considerations, the Iraqi delegation could not accept paragraph 1 of the USSR draft resolution (A/996) since that paragraph did not show any spirit of conciliation. It assumed that one of the parties was at fault while the other was righteous; in fact, action and reaction existed on both sides.

9. As to paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, its implementation would require mutual confidence. It implied an approach of "live and let live" and non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. Since such conditions did not yet exist, the Iraqi delegation would abstain in the vote on that paragraph.

10. With regard to paragraph 3, the Iraqi delegation believed that pacts between nations should be negotiated by the parties concerned and should not be debated in the United Nations. The Organization should only be concerned with pacts affecting all its Members. Furthermore, peace pacts had no value if they did not express a peaceful attitude, which presupposed friendly relations between the parties concerned. Consequently his delegation would be unable to vote for that paragraph.

11. The Iraqi delegation would vote for the joint United States-United Kingdom draft resolution which restated some of the principles of the Charter and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

12. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) said the delegations of the United States and of the United Kingdom had produced some cogent figures and facts to rebut the charges brought forward by the Soviet Union. In view of those facts, the Committee, which was really sitting as a jury, having to pass on the Soviet Union charges, would be able unhesitatingly to return a verdict of "not guilty". He praised the excellent statements of the representatives who had preceded him in the debate and felt that they left no doubt in his mind as to the eventual verdict.

13. The Iraqi representative had spoken of war psychosis. The Committee's efforts should be di-

rected primarily towards creating a climate in which such a psychosis could not flourish. Its bounden duty was to direct the discussion towards peace. It was not enough for the Committee to return a verdict of "not guilty" on juridical grounds. What was important was that no charges whatsoever should be brought before the Committee. The debates instead of being polemical should rather appeal to the conscience of every representative. An appeal should be made to the conscience of the world, in order to mobilize all minds in favour of peace.

14. The first step was to diagnose that war psychosis. The first symptom was the lack of confidence displayed by some countries. That was a fearful factor, whatever the Marxists who only attached importance to economic facts, might think. The Soviet Union lacked confidence and, quite mistakenly, feared being attacked. When suspicion was first aroused, it rapidly turned into nervous mistrust and then into unilateral action inconsistent with the very spirit of the Charter. In the end, certain nations were thus isolating themselves from the rest of the world.

15. In those circumstances, it was essential to continue to believe in the power of the human mind which was not inert and impotent as some claimed. To restore confidence, the nations should publicly announce to the Soviet Union that they were in no way preparing for war and that they only desired peace. It was inconceivable that countries which were geographically distant from the Soviet Union and whose intellectual activities were quite different should be planning to attack the USSR. With special reference to the United Kingdom and the United States, he said that one of those countries had been the scene of bold social reforms which had marked a new stage in human progress and the other great Power had showered the whole world with its gifts and had mitigated untold misery. If the Soviet Union would realize the sincerity and good faith with which the other nations were trying to improve the lot of man, its mistrust would be dissipated and a first obstacle on the road to peace would be removed.

16. But a second, even greater obstacle was formed by the concept of national sovereignty as understood in the Soviet Union and as recently defined by Mr. Vyshinsky. In his moving evocation of the sacrifices and sufferings of his country, Mr. Vyshinsky had given formal notice that Russia's national traditions excluded any surrender of sovereignty for the purpose of opening its territory to foreign inspection. Thus, the idea of social revolution combined with zealous and proud patriotism resulted in nationalism which, in turn, was liable to degenerate into formidable imperialism.

17. The danger was aggravated by the presence of a settled juridical doctrine, and not a psychological factor. Its terms which were as unjust as they were discourteous, Mr. Vyshinsky had said that Peru's conception of sovereignty was almost mediaeval. On the contrary, the doctrine that the State was subject and subordinated to international law though it, in a way, went back to early history, nevertheless, indicated the way to progress. On the other hand, the theory which identified law with the will of the sovereign and the formula of Roman Law which subordinated the law to the sovereign indeed gave evidence of

a state of mind which belonged to the Middle Ages and was truly reactionary. One should be optimistic and hope that that obsolete doctrine would cease to impede the development of international relations.

18. Even if those two difficulties could be solved, there still remained the danger of political mysticism, which was as destructive as religious mysticism was fruitful and truly creative. The representative of the Soviet Union had referred to Simon Bolivar, whose place in the philosophy and history of Latin America was well known: it would not be such a bad idea to gain more inspiration from the spirit of his political relativism, which was diametrically opposed to Marxist dogmatism and mysticism, for Marxism had inexorably led to sanguinary revolution and war.

19. Humanity's only hope lay in a spirit of universalism which, by forgetting the past and scrupulously refraining from passing judgment on anybody, would give every country its place in the family of nations, so that all might go forward together on the road to peace. Paragraph 2 of the Soviet Union draft resolution deserved careful study, since it re-stated the mandate which the peoples had given to the Organization, but it was bound up with paragraphs 1 and 2, which were unacceptable. By contrast, the real merit of the joint United States-United Kingdom draft resolution was that it expressed no censure. In particular, nothing in that text cast any blame on the Soviet Union; it was based on the sound theory that the United Nations should devote all its efforts to preparing the future and not to useless recriminations concerning the past.

20. The United Nations was not competent to invite the five great Powers to conclude a pact, as was suggested in the Soviet Union draft. Only the Powers themselves could take such a decision. What the United Nations could and should do was to urge the five permanent Members of the Security Council to expand their collaboration steadily, to have faith in the future and to consult ever more closely together, with the understanding that if they met with unsurmountable difficulties, they should refer them to the Security Council and, in the final instance, to the General Assembly of the United Nations. In view of those considerations, the Peruvian delegation would vote for the joint United States-United Kingdom draft resolution.

21. Mr. MAKIN (Australia) said the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/996) condemned preparations for a new war, deplored the use of atomic weapons and other means of mass destruction and called upon all States to settle their disputes and differences by peaceful methods. If the draft resolution had gone no further than that, it would have reflected the views of all delegations, though it would have been superfluous, since its contents were already stated in the Charter and in earlier resolutions. But in addition the USSR draft resolution contained certain assertions which, apart from being offensive, were sufficient to unmask the true intention of that text which was in no way directed towards the solution of existing difficulties. It was absurd to say that the United Kingdom and the United States were preparing for a new war. All the former allies of those two great nations knew well that such an accusation was ridiculous.

22. It should be remembered that the British Empire had entered the war against nazism in 1939, that it had fought almost alone in 1940 and that in 1941, without a moment's hesitation it had announced its intention to fight side by side with the Soviet Union. Nor could Australia forget that the United States had made the major contribution to the defeat of Japan apart from its enormous contribution to the defeat of Hitler and Mussolini. The Soviet Union had fought valiantly and had suffered grievously. Out of that wartime comradeship was born the Charter. Although small nations were also Members of the Organization, they knew that the smooth operation of the Security Council depended upon the unanimity of the great Powers. It was wicked, therefore, to submit a draft resolution which brought baseless charges against two of those great Powers; it was prejudicial to the co-operation of the permanent members of the Security Council.

23. At the end of the war, all nations had been well disposed towards the Soviet Union. As Mr. Austin had recalled (325th meeting) the United States in particular had given great assistance to all the countries of Eastern Europe. American aid, which was extending to all the war-devastated countries of Europe and Asia, was still being given to Eastern Europe through the agency of the United Nations. The much-reviled Marshall Plan had saved the lives or promoted the well-being of millions of people.

24. In spite of its economic difficulties, the United Kingdom, the second greatest contributor

to UNRRA, was doing more than its duty in various international organizations.

25. Mr. Makin could not believe that those actions were those of Powers seeking to dominate the world, destroy humanity and frustrate the development of democracy. The truth was that for four years those two Powers had tried to achieve the purposes of the Charter.

26. No one was seeking to destroy the Soviet Union. To people who attached any value to the liberty of the individual, communism was repugnant, but that ideological difference should not be a cause of war: war was certainly not inevitable. By working through the United Nations, all the nations could live in peace and achieve the conditions, in particular economic conditions, set forth as objectives in the Charter.

27. The Australian delegation would, without hesitation, vote against the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/996) the false insinuations and distorted philosophy of which could not contribute to international understanding and co-operation.

28. The Australian delegation whole-heartedly supported the draft resolution of the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/549) on the "essentials of peace", which was a dignified statement of the obligations undertaken by all Members of the United Nations and a programme of action likely to lead to the attainment of the purposes of the Charter.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SECOND MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 22 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (continued)**

1. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/996), submitted to the General Assembly at its plenary meeting of 23 September 1949,<sup>1</sup> had been received most favourably by all the true friends of peace throughout the world. That proposal was, in fact, in perfect accordance with the letter and spirit of the Charter, the preamble of which called upon the United Nations to preserve future generations from the scourge of war.

2. The manoeuvres, quibbles and intrigues of the enemies of peace and international co-operation, who took the nations for greater simpletons than they were, revealed the confusion which the USSR proposal had sown in the ranks of the warmongers. As early as 26 September,<sup>2</sup> Mr. Bevin had given the signal for the attack, and his emulators had hastened to state that the proposal had only a propaganda purpose. Those who talked thus, however, placed themselves amongst the ene-

mies of peace; for if the warmongers were permitted to escape the punishment and condemnation described in the Soviet Union proposal, whilst the champions of peace were being persecuted in various countries, it would be clearly apparent to all that peace was in danger.

3. The enemies of peace were displaying renewed insolence. In the best hitlerite tradition, the representative of New Zealand (326th meeting) had compared the policy of the USSR, which had beaten nazism and struggled for thirty-two years for the cause of peace, with the policy of hitlerite Germany. What was more serious, a Minister of the United Kingdom had, in his turn, repeated those slanderous attacks in an aggressive speech. If one remembered that the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom were united by a treaty of friendship, one could only regret that the United Kingdom representative had not sufficiently weighed his words and that he had not been more concerned about the effect they would produce in both countries.

4. Such speeches would be sufficient to demonstrate the timeliness of the USSR proposal. But there had been backstage intrigues to sabotage the draft resolution. Firstly, there had been great haste in placing the Greek question or problems relating to supposed violations of human rights on the agenda in order to envenom the atmos-

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 226th plenary meeting.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 229th meeting.

phere and thus to pave the way for the rejection of the Soviet Union draft resolution. Secondly, a manoeuvre of the United States (which, incidentally, seemed to have miscarried) had attempted to give priority to the Chinese delegation's proposal which was directed against the USSR. To gain time, the Soviet Union delegation had proposed that, when the First Committee was inactive, the Committee should proceed promptly to consider the Soviet Union's draft resolution. That suggestion had been rejected. Finally, now that the USSR proposal was under discussion, the organization of the General Assembly's work, and in particular the fact that the plenary meetings were being held at times when the First Committee was also meeting, tended to place the discussions on that proposal out of focus. Such were the dishonest means to which those pleading a weak case were resorting.

5. With regard to the speeches made by the opponents of the Soviet Union proposal, the United States representative had set the tone: the whole aim was to lead the Committee astray in one way or another. What, in particular, had been the purpose of the silly advice given by the Canadian representative on the subject of the internal régime in the Soviet Union, or of the statements made by Tito's fascist clique?

6. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia), speaking on a point of order, declared that the Yugoslav delegation had been insulted.

7. He recalled that the President of the General Assembly had said<sup>1</sup> that such practices must cease, and accordingly asked the Chairman of the First Committee, who had never before interrupted any delegation, whether he would allow such words to be uttered.

8. The CHAIRMAN said that speakers must scrupulously refrain from all insulting language in referring to delegations or their Governments.

9. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that the group to which he had referred had taken the liberty of hurling insults at a previous meeting, against his country, and that was an incomparably more serious offence than anything that might be said about fascist representatives.

10. The Yugoslav representative had striven to prove that his Government was not the instrument of foreign imperialist forces, although the fact had been proved during the Rajk trial and confirmed by the attitude of the Yugoslav delegation during the current session. In fact, those gentry were making common cause with the delegation of Chile, that of the monarcho-fascist Government of Greece and that of the Kuomintang, whereas the Soviet Union delegation had the people's cause at heart.

11. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile), speaking on a point of order, protested that such insults to delegations and to their countries were intolerable. Their real aim was to destroy the prestige of the United Nations. That was a well-known device which had been used by the nazi deputies under the Weimar régime and by communists in various parliaments.

12. The CHAIRMAN said that any offensive or insulting remarks would be ruled out of order.

13. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said he had not insulted the Chilean representative, although he would have been entitled to protest at the latter's comparison of statements by Soviet representatives with those of nazi deputies.

14. He proceeded to refer to the objections raised against the Soviet Union proposal; the United States representative had drawn an analogy with the attitude of a Soviet ballerina refusing an American invitation. But what treatment was being meted out to Soviet citizens in the United States? A young Soviet engineer on the staff of the United Nations who had been friendly with an American girl, had been arrested, in spite of his diplomatic passport, and accused of some unspecified anti-American activity.

15. Moreover, the Soviet Socialist Republics of Byelorussia and the Ukraine had been compared to Texas and California. The truth was that, like any of the sixteen federated Republics of the Soviet Union, Byelorussia and the Ukraine had a better claim to a seat on the United Nations than certain delegations whose representative capacity had been challenged by the true democratic Governments of their countries. It was impossible, however, to explain such matters to men whose political horizon did not extend beyond Texas and California, or possibly Vermont!

16. Delegations whose cause was just had no reason to be nervous. The Soviet Union proposal affirmed the position of principle taken up by the USSR delegation ever since the establishment of the United Nations: the United Nations, as Marshal Stalin had said, was a serious instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Soviet Union ceaselessly endeavoured to make each session represent a step forward, and all its efforts to that end were links in the chain of thirty-two years of Soviet policy. Ever since the first appearance of the atomic bomb the Soviet Union had been urging the prohibition of that weapon; in 1947 it had submitted a proposal designed to stop warlike propaganda. Subsequently, when the enemies of peace in the United Kingdom and the United States had reached the stage of practical preparations for a new war, the Soviet Union had proposed the reduction of all armaments by one-third.

17. An essential characteristic of the policy of the USSR was that it had not altered an inch when, in 1947, Soviet science, in the course of its work on the problem of the peaceful utilization of a great discovery, had, in addition, discovered the secret of the atomic weapon. On the contrary, the Soviet Union had thought it its duty to pursue with renewed energy the fight against preparation for another war and the utilization of atomic energy for military purposes. The Soviet Union had replied to the aggressive attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom by proposing a pact aimed at strengthening the peace. Such an answer was all the more praiseworthy since the North Atlantic Treaty, which was being described as peaceful, defensive and regional, had in fact aggressive purposes, as had the alliance of Western Europe, which was its complement. Although no State was threatening the United States or the United Kingdom with war, American industry was on a war-footing. Reserves of strategic materials and arms were being built up and at the same time the armaments of the West-

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 246th plenary meeting.



ern Allies were being standardized. The United States was becoming a gigantic arsenal for the alliance, while the American, British and French war budgets were laying a heavy burden on the populations. Moreover, while it was being contemplated to bring Western Germany into an alliance in which one ex-enemy country, Italy, already participated, the Soviet Union which for its part, had fought against the Axis was the only great Power excluded from the Treaty. The fact was that the North Atlantic Treaty, which was being represented as a complement of the Charter, was directed against the Soviet Union and constituted a violation of Articles 52, 53 and 54 of the Charter. Moreover, Senator Taft himself had said in the United States Congress that the North Atlantic Treaty would bring war, not peace, and that it was in conflict with the obligations assumed by the United States under the Charter. It was, in fact, significant that after the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty, Congress had granted credits to the other participating nations to enable them to re-equip their armies. The previous summer, a tour of inspection by the American Chiefs of Staff in Europe had aroused serious apprehensions on the part of the population.

18. No impartial observer could fail to realize the full significance of the USSR draft resolution, at a time when the North Atlantic Treaty and the Western Union were involving certain States in American-inspired adventures which had no connexion with international peace and co-operation. By contrast, a five-Power pact would create a more favourable atmosphere both in the United Nations and throughout the world. It would be the best possible guarantee of general peace, would ensure the security of the small States, and enhance the prestige of the United Nations. As to the argument that the conclusion of such a pact would be anti-democratic in that it would result in the creation of an omnipotent directorate which would replace the Security Council, that was an allegation devoid of any foundation. It was an indisputable fact that it was not the relations between small Powers that could threaten world peace: the small countries themselves had expressed the anxiety they felt as a result of the state of relations between the great Powers, particularly the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Precisely because the great Powers in fact controlled raw materials, industrial resources and powerful weapons, the Charter had entrusted them with special responsibilities and, as permanent members of the Security Council, it was for them to see that the peace was kept and, if conflicts arose, to settle them.

19. Hence, the Soviet Union had deliberately refrained from including the small States in the new contractual system which it wished to see established. The small States could thus benefit from the advantages of the system without risking incorporation in such blocs as those created by the United States. That, however, in no way precluded States, including small States, from subscribing or acceding to a pact, the provisions of which might be taken for granted as being those of a peace treaty: the parties to the pact would pledge themselves not to attack one another, to settle all their problems by peaceful means, to call a halt to the armaments race and to ban the atomic bomb.

20. It had also been said that the pact would be concluded without reference to the Security Coun-

cil, which was composed of eleven and not of five members. It had been forgotten that, on the initiative of the United States and the United Kingdom, the question of the atomic weapon had been withdrawn from the competence of the Security Council and referred to the five Powers and Canada; that procedure had not met with any objection.

21. It had also been argued that the fact that the Soviet Union maintained diplomatic relations with the Chinese People's Republic would stand in the way of the conclusion of a five-Power pact. It might, however, be asked since when the fact of maintaining diplomatic relations with a democracy constituted an obstacle to peace. The United Kingdom itself was proposing shortly to follow the example given by the Soviet Union with as much foresight as magnanimity. It only remained for the United States to decide whether it would take like action or would place itself beyond good and evil, content to publish white books on the failure of the Kuomintang. Whatever the case might be, conduct which was considered laudable in the case of the United Kingdom could not be condemned in the case of the Soviet Union and if the conclusion of a five-Power pact were made absolutely dependent on the absence of diplomatic relations with the new China, that would merely create confusion.

22. In view of the existence of the Charter, the pact had also been described as superfluous. It might then be asked of what use the draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/549) would be, since it was a mere collection of phrases culled from the Charter or other declarations. Those "essentials of peace" were neither essential nor pertinent—they were not of a nature as to constitute a bulwark of peace. Moreover, some provisions of that draft resolution would constitute a violation of the rights of Member States of the United Nations. That was true of the clauses which provided that foreigners claiming to act in the name of the United Nations should have free access to the territory of all States, regardless of any national interest which might exist. Similar objections arose in connexion with the free exchange of information to be supplied to other States to the detriment of national security, the limits they wished to set to the sovereignty of States, the paragraphs relating to human rights which might lead to the resurgence of fascist organizations and yet other paragraphs which violated the Charter—and particularly Article 27, paragraph 3—or concerned the international control of armaments, an idea intended to take the place of the limitation of armaments. The sole object of some other paragraphs, embodying certain declarations torn from their contexts, was to secure the passage of provisions contrary to the Charter.

23. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would therefore vote against the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States, since it was irrelevant to the question raised by the Soviet Union and was also harmful in itself.

24. It was not true to say that the provisions of the Soviet Union resolution was already embodied in the Charter. Moreover, ruling circles in the United States and the United Kingdom were daily violating the Charter, as shown by the destruction of Indonesian liberties, the help granted to

the monarcho-fascist Government in Greece, the establishment of a puppet regime in South Korea and the bloody oppression in Viet-Nam. The right of colonial peoples to self-determination had been violated. The intensive manufacture of armaments, the establishment of military bases, the Marshall Plan (which led to the enslavement of nations), were all violations of the Charter. The Soviet Union request that the Marshall Plan should be placed under the aegis of the United Nations had been rejected by the United States which was turning the Organization itself into an instrument of American policy and sought to reduce the status of the Security Council to that of the secular arm of the State Department, whereas it was intended to be one of the pillars of the Charter.

25. Thus, when the principles of the Charter proved a hindrance, ruling circles in the United States, with the backing of those in the United Kingdom, did not hesitate to violate them openly. When the Soviet Union thereupon endeavoured to take up the defence of the Charter and to make concerted action possible on a basis of mutual understanding, those same ruling circles in the United States described the attitude of the Soviet Union as an unfriendly act. The conclusion of a peace treaty would enable the nations freely to express their friendship for the Soviet Union and would re-create the atmosphere which had prevailed during the war.

26. The Soviet Union had, in any case, the support of an immense peace movement which was growing in all countries. The representative of France, with aristocratic arrogance, had characterized the Soviet Union proposal as an appeal to "the man in the street". But surely "the man in the street" meant the people which had captured the Bastille, had saved the world from fascism and was striving for peace. The representative of France could not have spoken as he did, had he not disdained the people—and the people knew the suffering that another war would bring.

27. By comparison with the forces for peace, there was only a handful of warmongers. The representative of the United Kingdom had sought to juggle with recent election figures. But the peace movement was spreading far beyond the Communist Parties which had originally lauded it. From day to day, the balance was swinging towards democracy and away from war, hence the nervousness shown by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States.

28. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR, in supporting the USSR draft resolution, wished to express its conviction that the masses would bring about its success, with or without or even against a majority of the delegations.

29. The CHAIRMAN stated that, in the General Assembly, there were no representatives of any cliques or various political groups, or even representatives of the "man in the street"; there were only representatives of States, who should be referred to as such. Any other designation would be considered irrelevant and out of order.

30. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) recalled that, on 4 February 1919, when the Soviet Government had made peace proposals to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan, President Wilson had pointed

out that the Bolsheviks had agreed to negotiate, but that their acceptance had been couched in deliberately insulting terms. Thirty years later, Mr. Vyshinsky was submitting a document purporting to be a peace proposal, but equally unacceptable in its wording. The object was the same: it was intended that it should be rejected. It was not by rhetorical jousting that the representative of the Soviet Union would succeed in breaking the unanimous opposition to his proposal; indeed, more than fifty nations had decided not to let themselves be deceived by that blatant endeavour to weaken the home front of the countries of the democratic world.

31. Some representatives had said that the attitude of the Soviet Union in international affairs could be explained by its Government's inability to reach agreement with the rest of the world, since the USSR leaders, in accordance with Marxist ideology as interpreted by Lenin, thought that war was inevitable and that any understanding between the capitalist and socialist camps was an impossibility. In that connexion, it was interesting to quote a passage from Stalin's book *The Problems of Leninism* where the author declared that it was possible for socialism to triumph at the outset in one single capitalist country. The victorious proletariat in such a land, having organized a régime of socialist production within its borders, would rise against the remainder of the capitalist world, winning over to its cause the oppressed classes in other lands, inciting them to revolt against the capitalists, and even, when needs must, having recourse to armed intervention against the exploiting classes and their States. It was thus obvious that, if the leaders of the USSR were Marxists and Leninists, they could not believe in peace.

32. The delegation of Chile believed, however, that, far from being a socialist State, Russia was a super-capitalist, totalitarian and police State. Marxism had been revised and distorted to fit the ends of Soviet bureaucracy and its expansionist plans. Marxist slogans and tactics were still in fashion, but the aim followed was not the establishment of a world socialist régime, but the weakening of the internal order of other States for the strengthening of Russian imperialism.

33. In the circumstances, there was no need to know what the Soviet Union delegation thought of the Marxist theory that war was inevitable. The important thing was to know whether that super-capitalist State was ready to find a permanent basis for peaceful understanding with the rest of the world. The representatives of the Soviet Union would also need to be convinced that the entire world was determined to prevent the fulfilment of their expansionist plans. It was the duty of the democracies to foster democratic principles, solve the problems created by the needs of the peoples, combat "fifth columns" and strengthen the democratic unity of free peoples; only thus could an enduring foundation for peace be ensured.

34. It was unnecessary to dwell on the fact that nearly all the undertakings of the USSR had aims incompatible with the realization of lasting peace and mutual comprehension. But there was one salient feature in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union which constituted a source of trouble and a threat to peace; the Soviet Union's foreign policy was not governed by normal diplo-

matic procedure, but by the Communist Parties of the whole world, acting on the orders of the Kremlin.

35. The leaders of the USSR were of course claiming that the *Comintern* or *Cominform* were bodies separate and distinct from the Government of the USSR, the Communist Party of the USSR being merely one of the partners. That argument could easily be refuted if it were noted that Mr. Manuilsky's policy as Foreign Minister of the Ukrainian SSR exactly coincided with the directives which he used to prescribe for the communist parties as Secretary-General of the Third International. In the same way, in 1947, Mr. Zhdanov had worked out for the *Cominform* an analysis of the world situation precisely similar to that which he had given a few months later as spokesman of the Government of the Soviet Union. Finally, the international policy fixed in Moscow on 7 November 1949 by Mr. Malenkov was identical with the one he had laid down as head of the *Cominform*. The policy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that of the Stalinist international organization were one and the same. Truth only came from Moscow and Marxism could not be interpreted either by Marshal Tito, or by Mr. Browder in the United States, or by Mr. Gomulka in Poland, and still less, by Mr. Duclos or Mr. Togliatti.

36. In whatever country, to the mystification of the workers and the peasants in their aspirations, communist parties were the instruments of the Soviet Union's foreign policy—they echoed the *Cominform's* slogans and imitated the violent phraseology used by the USSR. In 1947, the Soviet Union and the communist parties had aimed all their attacks at President Truman, in 1948 at Mr. Marshall and, 1949, at Marshal Tito. Whether in France, Burma or Chile, communist parties used the same language and concentrated their propaganda on the same ends and in so doing followed in parallel line the tactics employed by the Soviet Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

37. Twenty years previously, the Soviet Union, obsessed by the fear that the United Kingdom and France were preparing for war, had entered into closer relationship with Germany and had thus enabled the German Communist Party to strengthen its position in exploiting the idea of revenge on the victors of the First World War. At the same time, the *Comintern* was asserting that, in spite of their dissensions, the capitalist States, led by the United Kingdom, were preparing for war on the USSR. In the circumstances, it urged the workers of the world to defend the USSR against the attacks of capitalist Powers by all available means. That appeal showed that, in pursuit of its aggressive ends, the USSR was already then attempting to mobilize national groups against their own countries by maintaining that their Governments were seeking to encircle the USSR but keeping silent on the fact that the USSR was isolating itself from the rest of the world.

38. The history of the German Communist Party showed that it had obeyed the orders of the Soviet Union to the last, even to the extent of agreeing to its own destruction and refusing, on the orders of the International, to establish a common front with the Socialist Party against the growth of nazism. As it happened, the first victims of

nazism had been the German communists themselves.

39. For the first two years of the Second World War, the communists had taken the view that it was a conflict between two imperialist Powers and that the peoples themselves were not concerned with the defence of their native lands. The desertion of Maurice Thorez, in France, was a good illustration of that attitude. It was difficult to forget that, ten years previously, communist parties had served the propaganda of the German armies and that it was not until 1941, after the Nazi invasion of the USSR, that they had taken part in the resistance.

40. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that the Chilean representative had no right to say that the communist parties had served the propaganda of the German armies. He reserved the right to reply to all those slanders.

41. The CHAIRMAN said the Chilean representative's statement was within the scope of the discussion and that the USSR representative could reply to it in due course.

42. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile), continuing his speech, stated that if Mr. Vyshinsky wished to use that pretext in order to insult him, he would be quite able to reply to him as well.

43. He remarked that all those facts proved that the policy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that of the Third International were identical. Reading the newspaper *L'Humanité* or any other communist newspaper of any country would prove that from 1939 to 1941 the communist parties had waited to receive their orders from Moscow before engaging themselves in the struggle.

44. After the war, the communist parties and the USSR had simultaneously launched their offensive against the democracies, by endeavouring to sabotage the Marshall Plan and by accusing the leaders of the resistance or of the allied offensive of being fascists. The communists were more than obsessed by the fear of a war against the USSR. In every country they had declared that in no case and for no reason would they fight against the USSR, but they had never indicated that they would in no circumstances fight against their own countries. The intention was to accustom the population to the idea that aggression by the USSR should be regarded as a liberation. The various peace congresses which had taken place recently had also served as branch offices for the communist propaganda machine, which enabled the USSR representatives to maintain that those congresses represented the majority of the peoples.

45. At the present time, all the communist parties were heaping abuse upon Marshal Tito, on whom they had showered praises a few years beforehand, but who, since then, had refused to be automatically obedient to orders from Moscow. It was probable that communist propaganda would also attack Gomulka, who was already accused of wishing to remain a Pole. The propaganda machine of Goebbels could not rival that of the Soviets, which relied on whatever national sections of the *Cominform* were ready to betray their own countries.

46. In Latin America, the communist parties could have helped to solve the problems due to

economic under-development. But communist parties were not influenced by national considerations and not guided by the desires of the people. In Chile, the communist party had limited its action exclusively to the international policy advocated by the *Comintern* and the *Cominform*. It had sabotaged production, tried to prevent exports towards the democratic States and obstruct industrial development. In Argentina, the Communist Party had started a violent campaign against the Government of that country at the same time as the Soviet newspaper *New Times* of Moscow. In the previous twenty years, the Third International had sent a large number of instructors to all Latin-American countries.

47. Peace could only be safeguarded if the principle of the sovereignty of States was respected and if there was no intervention in the domestic affairs of States. The existence of anti-national groups in the service of an imperialist nation must be prevented. If the Soviet Union desired peace, it must dissolve its "fifth columns". Until it had given the guarantee that it would change its international policy and abandon the policy followed by its diplomatic service, by the *Comintern* and the *Cominform*, no one would believe in Mr. Vyshinsky's peace proposals.

48. The Chilean representative quoted extracts from Vladimir Potemkin's book *History of Diplomacy*, which indicated that at the Conference of Genoa in 1922, the Soviet Union delegation had adopted its policy by taking into account the influence of pacifists, without, however, sharing their bourgeois illusions. Lenin had written on that subject, on 14 March 1922, that proposals must be formulated just as if the negotiations were dealing with a business matter. It must be stated clearly before breaking off negotiations, that the Soviet Union had a complete programme, pointing out, however, that it had its own communist programme, but that as a good "businessman" it was its duty to support the pacifists in the bourgeois camp. Lenin had added that venomous and simple tactic would make it possible to divide the opposing bloc. Mr. Santa Cruz added that in view of the attitude of the Soviet Union and the communist parties throughout the world, the USSR proposal also appeared to be inspired by that venomous tactic.

49. Mr. Santa Cruz, analysing the essential conditions for a permanent peace, pointed out that since the Second World War, favourable conditions had developed likely to ensure peace, prosperity and happiness in the world. International peace was only possible if human rights were respected in a system of social peace. All the discriminations forbidden by the Charter should also be fought against, all parts of society should share in the benefits of an expanding economy and workers should be granted a legitimate right to a fair share in the products of society. In short, equal treatment and a system of freedom were the uniform conditions which all democratic nations would have to accept in order to continue the fight against totalitarian aggression. For that purpose, anti-democratic habits in each country must be eliminated. In fact, social snobbery and racial and religious discrimination were the most certain allies of a totalitarian Power, which needed a base from which it could spread despair and discouragement among free peoples. In one

word, the democracies must become still more democratic.

50. From the point of view of propaganda, the Soviet Union had a great advantage over the democracies: the latter were open to information, while the USSR only offered the world "official versions" of events taking place within the USSR. To counteract that disadvantage, it was above all important to understand that the Communists who were conspiring in Moscow, as well as those who persisted in maintaining conditions of life unacceptable to a civilized people, were the enemies of democracy.

51. It could be emphasized with satisfaction that, despite the prophecies of the representatives of the Soviet Union and despite the treason of the communist parties, great progress had been achieved in the sphere of international co-operation, especially in the economic field. In those circumstances, two conclusions could be drawn: (a) no threat of war existed among the democratic nations, since all their problems could be solved by peaceful means; no democratic nation represented a threat of war for anybody; (b) international collaboration must continue so as to assure the economic development of all peoples. When an honourable standard of life was attained in each country, the words of Mr. Vyshinsky would find no echo and peace would be maintained for a long time to come.

52. For all those reasons, the Chilean delegation would vote in favour of the joint draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/549).

53. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India) said that he would have been able to support the proposals contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution submitted by the USSR, if they had not been coloured by the comments of paragraph 1. Recalling the recent statement made by the Bishop of Birmingham and the point of view expressed by Mr. Jessup in his book on modern international law, the Indian representative observed that many people thought that the atomic bomb should be outlawed. If the prohibition envisaged in paragraph 2 of the USSR draft resolution could be implemented effectively, then the draft resolution could be supported.

54. It was also true that nobody could object to the text of paragraph 3 of the USSR proposal, although an atmosphere of sincere friendship between the great Powers was preferable to a mere pact of friendship. However, paragraph 1 contained an accusation against the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom that those Governments had aggressive intents. Such an accusation did not seem justified; the fact was that the United Kingdom, though it had been victorious, had been terribly weakened. It was regrettable that defence measures taken in an atmosphere of mistrust could be mistaken for measures of aggression, but it could hardly be said that the United Kingdom or any other country was really preparing for a war of aggression.

55. The allegations that new preparations for aggression were proceeding in various countries were due to the suspicion prevailing in international relations. One of the reasons for such an atmosphere of mistrust was probably that the representatives of the USSR over-estimated the ex-

tent to which the Press of the United Kingdom or the United States reflected the opinion of the Governments of those countries. Such an attitude was not surprising on the part of a country where the Government controlled all media of information.

56. Nor could the existence of an "iron curtain" fail to foster suspicions between the two blocs. While it was natural for the Soviet Union to surround itself with protective machinery in the early days of its existence, the time had perhaps come to dispense with that troublesome protection and to allow the USSR to enjoy greater freedom in its relations with the outside world.

57. A third source of mistrust was the fact that the same words were often used in different meanings: the word "sovereignty" was one such word. In India, law was considered "the king of kings", in other words, every State was subject to the law and no difficulty was experienced in accepting that every State, in exercising its sovereignty, had

to honour certain paramount obligations. Accordingly, so far as atomic energy was concerned, for example, India found no difficulty in applying the principle. But certain other countries regarded sovereignty as something sacred, and to those who thought thus, any plan providing for the control of atomic energy caused serious misgivings.

58. Without wishing to insist upon those three specific causes, the representative of India hoped that others would make their own analysis with a view to dispelling the current atmosphere of mistrust. India would support the joint draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom which, while condemning no one, sought the co-operation of all for the maintenance of peace. For the reasons already indicated, the Indian delegation could not support the draft resolution of the USSR.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-THIRD MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 22 November 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman:* Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

#### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (continued)**

1. Mr. THORS (Iceland) said that the problem under discussion was the paramount question in the minds of international society. His country being utterly defenceless and one of the smallest nations represented in the Organization, was obviously interested in peace even more than any other nation, since it had everything to lose in case of war. All nations had become practically within reach of each other and Iceland's geographical isolation was no longer a protection.

2. During the two world wars, Iceland had depended upon the United States for food and supplies, and particularly during the last war, when the commercial, economic and political ties between the two countries had become closer than ever. Mr. Thors recalled that in 1939 a German delegation had visited Iceland seeking the consent of the Icelandic Government for the establishment of an airfield. The solemn assurance had been given that an airfield would be used for commercial purposes only. Despite the fact that Iceland had extremely important commercial ties with Germany, his country did not hesitate to decline such an offer, being prepared to bear any future consequences. On 10 May 1940, British forces landed in Iceland with a view to protecting the country. It was true that his Government had not asked for such help, but the United Kingdom Government had known, as had later been proved, that the nazis had intended to occupy Iceland. The relations of the British forces with the Icelandic people had been most friendly and the solid and old friendship existing between the two countries had made his Government feel assured that the British forces would withdraw as soon as circumstances allowed. However, those forces had been compelled to leave sooner than had been ex-

pected, and, following a special agreement, freely negotiated with the President of the United States, American forces had landed in Iceland in July 1941 to assume the protection of the country. It did not take long before the American soldiers were welcomed by practically the whole Icelandic population. They had taken the greatest care not to interfere in the country's internal affairs. In October 1946, the American forces had withdrawn, in accordance with a freely negotiated supplementary agreement duly ratified by the Icelandic Parliament. It would have been a beautiful dream, had the people of the world been able to believe that there would never again be the slightest danger of war. Unfortunately, the present world was divided into two camps and, at the present time, any attempt at mediation on the part of the small nations seemed utterly futile. His delegation hoped that that sense of insecurity would not last and that friendship and free relations between the great Powers would replace mistrust and isolation.

3. In the meantime, however, Iceland had had to think of its own defence in case of another emergency. Since the United Nations had lacked the strength and efficiency to intervene in such an emergency or to avert it, his country could not but avail itself of the experiences gained during the war and join its friends and neighbours whom it could fully trust. Knowing that those neighbours would never resort to aggression, and would do their utmost to hinder any threat to the peace, and believing in the defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty, Iceland had deemed it its duty to adhere to such a Treaty. Obviously, therefore, no one could accuse Iceland of warmongering on that account. Besides, his country possessed no army, navy or air force and had been unarmed since the dawn of its history. By signing the North Atlantic Treaty, it wanted to make clear its desire to belong to the free community of democratic nations. He sometimes wondered if his country would have enjoyed its present complete freedom,

had it been occupied, during the war, by some other Powers. He even wondered if the foreign forces would have been withdrawn. Iceland could not help comparing its good fortune with the tragic fate of some of the other small nations in Europe.

4. His delegation had entertained the hope that the Foreign Minister of the USSR would have marked his presence at the current session of the General Assembly by offering a true olive branch, which would have been willingly accepted by all the Members of the Organization. But in reading the USSR draft resolution (A/996), one doubted whether it had not been submitted solely to cause a rejection which would subsequently be used for the purpose of accusing its opponents of warmongering.

5. In paragraph 1 the draft resolution of the Soviet Union condemned the United States and the United Kingdom as warmongers and, subsequently, those same Powers were asked to rally behind the Soviet Union and sign a peace pact with it. In that connexion, Mr. Thors recalled how the United States representative had explained (325th meeting) his Government's experience in connexion with the various pacts concluded with the Soviet Union in the recent past. However, the USSR draft resolution was drafted in a way that made it difficult for his delegation to support it. It would therefore support the joint draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/549). His delegation firmly believed that peace did not depend on the conclusion of a new pact but on co-operation between nations, many aspects of which were described in the joint draft resolution.

6. The second operative paragraph of the joint draft resolution called upon every nation "to refrain from any threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence, or integrity of any State, or at fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people in any State." Nothing was more dangerous and more likely to create unrest and even war, than interference of one State in the domestic affairs of other sovereign States, be it by a foreign Government itself or by its agents. The activities of fifth columns could become so grave as to endanger the free exercise of the powers of duly elected democratic governments and impede the normal means of livelihood and production within a nation.

7. The fourth operative paragraph of the joint draft resolution constituted an expression of the basic truth that a free world must consist of free men. When people were free to decide their own fate, there was very little danger of war, since they obviously knew that another war would mean ruin and misery for everyone. History proved that wars were created by dictatorship and could be avoided by granting full political freedom to all nations.

8. In conclusion, Mr. Thors recalled that four years previously, the peoples of the world were assured that the United Nations was determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. That assurance having been given, what was the reason for the existing false sense of security? In that respect, every nation, and especially the Soviet Union, should declare to the world its intentions and assurances as to the future, thereby

eliminating the existing tension in world affairs. The Icelandic delegation saw no need for the conclusion of a five-Power pact, in view of the existence of the Charter to which 59 Members had so far adhered. The small nations regarded with displeasure any attempt by the Big Five to form an exclusive club. Perhaps the intention was to divide the world into spheres of interest. Obviously, the most effective way to create international peace would be to implement the principles contained in the Charter.

9. In view of what he had said, his delegation would support the joint draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom.

10. Mr. STOLK (Venezuela) recalled that his delegation had indicated in the General Assembly, that the disagreement between the great Powers was the main obstacle to the solution of world problems.<sup>1</sup> As far back as the first part of the first session, in London, doubts had begun to be entertained as to the possibility of maintaining co-operation between the great Powers, which co-operation had led to victory against the aggressors and to the creation of the United Nations. Mr. Stolk recalled that, in January 1946, the question of atomic energy had been considered one of the fundamental problems that involved the dilemma of peace and war. However, a new hope had been based on the general desire to resolve all problems through understanding and tolerance and the willingness to respect the principles of the Charter.

11. The United Nations had already done great work, but had made practically no progress in the political field. International tension, culminating in the Berlin crisis, had reached a critical point during the first part of the General Assembly's third session. The failure of the four-Power system of occupation in Berlin which had been established as an experiment in co-operation between the East and the West, had forced the United Nations to try to deal with the danger which was threatening the whole world. That was the reason for the unanimous support given by all Member States to the Mexican proposal, whereby the great Powers were requested to renew their efforts with a view to solving their differences and finding means conducive to permanent peace.<sup>2</sup> Several delegations in the Security Council had made similar efforts to achieve conciliation. In response to a general demand, two of the great Powers had finally taken an initiative which had led to the solution of the problem.

12. With the exception of that *rapprochement*, the serious problems ranging from the Peace Treaties with Germany and Japan to the application of Article 43 of the Charter remained stationary. The Venezuelan delegation was optimistic as to the peaceful achievements of the present session, but the debate over such problems as Korea, the Balkans, the admission of new Members, atomic energy and disarmament had once again proved the reality of the division of the world into two camps. Sometimes incessant accusations and counter-accusations had completely departed from the point in question. The resolutions adopted during the current session with regard to atomic energy and disarmament offered little hope of progress towards a definite solution. The unanimous support of the permanent members of the Security Council which was required for any

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 226th plenary meeting.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, Resolutions, No. 190 (III)*.



settlement seemed well out of reach. Furthermore, those resolutions could not lead to a solution without an effective international control of atomic energy ensuring its use for pacific purposes and the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments.

13. In view of the progressive decline in confidence and since it seemed unlikely that the great Powers would compose their differences by themselves, his delegation considered that mediation by impartial and able persons, who would act in a personal capacity, not being instructed by any Government, in the name of peace and security, assisted by scientists and staff supplied by the Secretary-General might assist in settling the controversy between the great Powers. Moreover, the small States could not remain indifferent to the differences among those Powers when the prolonged disagreement of the latter endangered the community of nations as a whole. If mediation was used to harmonize the relations between the small States, the Venezuelan delegation saw no reason why that same principle could not equally be applied to the great Powers.

14. In attempting to solve the differences between the great Powers, the USSR representative had submitted a draft resolution whereby the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries were accused of preparing for a new war. Moreover, the thesis maintained in the subsequent paragraphs was based on the alleged veracity of the accusation levelled in paragraph 1. The Venezuelan delegation could not believe that any Government or people wished to wage an aggressive war, far less the two Governments which had been specifically accused. The causes of the international tension were to be found in a supreme lack of confidence, maladjustment in the economic and social fields, and the ideological conquests by forceful means. Many countries, therefore, desirous of preserving their common interests and civilization, were compelled to form political groups with a view to meeting any possible emergency. As fundamental agreements could not be reached in the prevailing atmosphere of insecurity, agreements seemed to be an indispensable safeguard against aggression, and the situation involved a vicious circle which could not be continued without a grave threat to humanity itself.

15. The second part of the USSR draft resolution contained two principles—the prohibition of atomic weapons and the international control of atomic energy—which had been more specifically recognized by General Assembly resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946. There was general agreement that it was indispensable that there should not be any delay in the establishment of an international system to achieve those purposes. The problem of timing could be solved on the objective basis that the prohibition would not be put into practice so long as the control system was not functioning effectively; but it was necessary to determine previously the method of guaranteeing the prohibition of atomic bombs, and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes alone. The controversy between the majority and minority must be straightened out. The declaration in the Soviet Union draft resolution perhaps represented a modification of the resolution adopted on that subject in Paris. In the light of the earlier accusation, that would lead to nothing.

16. Paragraph 3 of the USSR draft resolution invited the permanent members of the Security Coun-

cil to unite their efforts with a view to avoiding a new war and to conclude a pact for the strengthening of peace. All the Members of the Organization had a general responsibility in maintaining international peace and security. That responsibility under Article 24 of the Charter, was vested in the Security Council which, for the sake of rapid and effective action, was the agent of the United Nations. It would be necessary to know the contents of the pact in order to determine its repercussions on the Charter. He asked if the great Powers could be expected to reach an agreement on the terms of the pact after the discussions which had taken place during the meeting and in view of the difficulties confronting them. And even if the pact were signed, the fundamental divergencies separating the great Powers would not thereby be removed. If there was a sincere desire to settle the situation, an effort should first be made in order to compose the differences, which were the real cause of the cold war. Otherwise the pact would produce no results. The Venezuelan delegation considered the Charter as the best international instrument to promote co-operation among all Member States. The practice of the principles set out in the Anglo-American proposal was appropriate since it sought to translate into fact the precepts of the Charter and the principles recognized by the General Assembly. Still, it was not enough to appeal to those practices in order to settle the situation. The time had come to try out the processes of mediation and conciliation for composing the differences between the great Powers. If the United Nations were to take action on the lines suggested by his delegation, it might perhaps reconcile interests, not on the basis of excluding systems, but on the basis of friendship, good faith and effective international co-operation.

17. Mr. OSTRIA GUTIÉRREZ (Bolivia) said that the importance given to any particular Member of the Organization should not be relative to its size. Moreover, peace was not the exclusive concern of the great Powers, since the effects of war weighed more heavily on the smaller nations than on the larger ones. The smaller nations were justified in their apprehension about the future since, in case of war, no country could possibly remain neutral or free from the anguish of ideological struggle and the fear of fifth columns and civil wars.

18. In accusing the United States and the United Kingdom of preparing for a new war, the USSR draft resolution had indirectly levelled a similar accusation against the Latin-American Republics which had signed the 1947 Pact of Rio de Janeiro and against the countries which had signed the North Atlantic Treaty. Those small nations had been invited, along with the great Powers, to approve that draft resolution. It was paradoxical to note that the USSR representative had proposed peace in such bellicose terms. An atmosphere of mutual confidence and respect should necessarily exist prior to the signature of any pact. Clearly, in that case there was no desire to reach any agreement. Moreover, the arguments advanced by the representative of the Soviet Union did not convince the Bolivian delegation as to the veracity of the accusations directed at both the United States and the United Kingdom, since those countries did not maintain large occupation forces, such as those maintained by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Any impartial spectator must reject the charges that a systematic propaganda for war was taking place in the United States.

19. As to the indirect accusation levelled at the signatories of the Pact of Rio de Janeiro and the North Atlantic Treaty, everyone knew that those agreements were of a defensive character and had been concluded within the framework of the Charter. They were designed to ensure co-operation between all the signatories, and to avoid aggression.

20. The USSR draft resolution tended to weaken the Charter by accentuating the inequality among Members already accepted at San Francisco. It also referred to the problem of atomic weapons and other means of mass destruction. It was known that the study of that problem had ended in a deadlock due to the refusal of the Soviet Union to accept international control of atomic energy on the reactionary pretext of safeguarding its sovereignty. But every nation should voluntarily accept a partial limitation of its sovereignty if any constructive solution was to be attained. To propose the prohibition of atomic weapons while impeding at the same time its implementation amounted to a definite inconsistency corresponding to traditional USSR tactics. In that connexion, the representative of Bolivia recalled the proposal for total disarmament made by the Soviet Union at the Disarmament Conference in 1932. The meaning of that proposal had been explained by Mr. Madariaga, the great Spanish writer, who had pointed out that if all the countries were to disarm, the Russian bear only needed to embrace them.

21. The USSR proposal also suggested that the General Assembly should invite all Member States to solve their controversies and to abstain from resorting to the use of force or threat of force. In that connexion, the Bolivian representative wished to draw attention to Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter where that principle was already stated.

22. Turning to the joint United States-United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/549), he said that it was based on the necessity to preserve the dignity and value of man and to abstain from any act or threat contrary to the independence and integrity of States, or fomenting civil war. On the last question, he said that the subjugation of States had not ended with Hitler. The small nations particularly had to fight to maintain their independence against the pressure of fifth columns and the hostile use of arms, money and propaganda. The Bolivian delegation would support the joint draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom and would vote against that of the USSR.

23. Mr. VAN HEUVEN GOEDHART (Netherlands) said that the deep rift which existed between the two major ideologies had again become apparent in the United Nations. It was not, as sometimes alleged, a rift between modernism and progressive thought on the one hand, and reactionary forces on the other, but a difference between peoples who held that man was subservient to the State and had no claim to individual freedom, and those who believed that man was born free and that even the State could not deprive him of his inalienable rights. That difference was shown with unusual clarity by the basic divergence between the two draft resolutions, although both were worded with a view to furthering world peace and therefore at first sight pointed in the same direction.

24. His delegation fully subscribed to the exposures which many representatives had already made of the hypocrisy of the draft resolution of the Soviet Union.

25. As regards the joint draft resolution submitted by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, the Netherlands delegation wished to assert that, in its view, the Charter was, theoretically, a completely effective safeguard of peace. If indeed all the Members lived up to the high and sound principles contained in that Charter, there would be no danger of war. Unfortunately, the spirit of mutual co-operation and confidence prevailing at San Francisco had ceased to exist. Moreover, a rift had become apparent between the two major ideologies and between words and deeds and the two major camps were living in growing fear of each other. Although the finding of a common ground had become increasingly difficult, the Netherlands delegation ventured to submit that all the peoples of the world wished to live at peace with each other and that it was, therefore, up to the representatives of those peoples to harmonize the actions of their countries with a view to attaining common ends, as provided in Article 1, paragraph 4 of the Charter. He felt that the failure to achieve harmony was due to the malicious and deliberate governmentally-directed misinformation of peoples under communist control. The aim of one world could never be realized unless the nations lifted the barriers, promoted understanding accepted, not in theory, but in practical policies, the basic fact that all nations wanted peace.

26. If the representatives of the communist Governments used contemptuous terms in describing their opponents during Assembly debates, it would be reasonable to believe that even stronger terms would be used at home. As an example of the distortion of facts, the Netherlands representative recalled that during the 1948 elections in his country, a communist boy had insisted on casting his vote, though he was a minor, and had had to be turned out of the polling station. As a result, the Soviet peoples had been informed by their Press and radio that Dutch voters had gone to the polls under heavy military escort and that the elections had not been at all free as the communists had not been given the opportunity to exercise their voting rights. The Soviet Press had not, however, explained how seven communists had been elected under those conditions. Obviously, the effects of such misinformation could but poison the minds of all Soviet citizens as regards the Dutch people.

27. The relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia were another example. Marshal Tito had been worshipped as a hero by the Soviet Government and Press for many years but as soon as he and his ministers, faithful communists though they might be, had shown signs of sound nationalism by refusing to obey Soviet orders, they had overnight become enemies of the USSR, traitors, fascists, a clique, American puppets, warmongers and so forth. World peace could not be attained if Member Governments were distorting the facts about other Member States thus leading their citizens astray.

28. The latest example of that attitude on the part of the Soviet Union had been furnished by Mr. Arutiunian who had declared, in the course

of a plenary meeting<sup>1</sup> of the General Assembly that The Hague Agreement regarding Indonesia had been concluded through the intermediary of the United States between the Dutch colonial authorities and a group of traitors to the Indonesian people. The peaceful solution of such a difficult problem which could only be considered as a credit to all the parties concerned as well as to the United Nations, should certainly not have been decried by the USSR representative as a sinister scheme. Moreover, although the Soviet Union had persistently invoked Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, it had continuously attempted to interfere in the internal affairs of almost every State. That fact was evidenced by the order issued from Moscow to the communist parties to disrupt the constructive effects of the Marshall Plan. The USSR claimed that the Marshall Plan aimed at dominating other countries, although the Soviet Union had wiped out Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania and had recently installed Marshal Rokossovsky as one of the most powerful ministers in the Polish Cabinet. On the other hand, it should be recalled that when Sweden had chosen not to join the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States had not punished it by retaining its citizens or by enforcing economic pressure; no Press or radio campaign had been undertaken. The North Atlantic Treaty would have been unnecessary had the USSR not been pursuing its present policies. Although differing widely from the Soviet Union as to ideology and methods, the Dutch people would never refuse co-operation with the USSR. However, it most emphatically objected to any endeavour to interfere with the Dutch way of life.

29. The Soviet Union did not deny the existence of the rift between the two worlds, it simply denied the responsibility for it. He therefore suggested that the joint draft resolution constituted a fair means to put the sincerity of that denial to a test. If the Member States of the Organization were in full agreement with the principles enunciated in the Charter, no nation could refuse to recall in a resolution such as the joint draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom that the Charter was a solid foundation for the building of peace. Similarly, no country could refuse to reaffirm principles contained in the draft. Accordingly, the Netherlands delegation would support it.

30. U BA MAUNG (Burma) said that his delegation was unable to support the draft resolution submitted by the representative of the USSR and was in full accord with the proposal submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom. Explaining his position, the representative of Burma said that his country had only recently emerged from a state of dependency which had followed centuries of sovereignty. That yoke of dependency, though necessarily irksome, had on the whole been light. Burma had seen in the United Nations an escape from the rule of might to that of right and the machinery for repelling all assaults on the freedom, sovereignty and integrity of all States. Having been a dependency of a great Power, even though that great Power had been generous, his country could appreciate the value of sovereign status more deeply than could those nations which had not had to pass

through a similar stage, and could not be a party to forging new fetters on the sovereignty of small States. A small nation which had to watch the frowns of great Powers to which it bore the relation of client to patron, merely enjoyed the shadow of sovereignty. It was unthinkable that small nations should be submitted to bondage under five great Powers and that their actions should be regulated not according to the justice of each problem but according to the possible reactions of those great Powers. It was not that the material strength of the great nations and the weakness of the small was not appreciated. It was clear that the latter would be helpless, at least for the time being, if the great Powers were to adopt the principle of "might is right". His delegation had an undying faith in the essential sense of justice and love of right in all human beings, and it was on that faith that the United Nations had been founded and because of it that the Charter had enunciated the equal rights of nations.

31. Though his country's relations with the United States were not as intimate or of as long duration as those with the United Kingdom, nothing that his delegation knew of or had learnt about the activities of that State could make it accept the grave charges levelled against it by the USSR representative. Whatever the final outcome of a new war might be, the United States had nothing to gain but on the contrary stood to lose a great deal. The delegation of Burma, knowing all the good points and failings of the United Kingdom, felt that the latter was entitled to an honourable acquittal from the charges of war-mongering levelled against it by the representative of the Soviet Union. While the United Kingdom might appear too slow in acting, it did so without mental reservations. Thus, though the United Kingdom had been slow to recognize Burma's right to independent status, it had not sought to impose any fetters on his country once that status had been recognized. The United Kingdom had maintained scrupulous respect for the sovereignty of Burma, and that fact was, in his delegation's opinion, the best proof of the good faith of that country.

32. The delegation of Burma was prepared to believe that the USSR had not been planning another war knowingly or intentionally and did not rule out the possibility that the Soviet Union also desired peace, since, under modern conditions, there could be no real victory from a war. However, the means recommended by the USSR representative would not further the attainment of peace and the prevention of another war and would in fact defeat that common goal. Without challenging the honesty of those holding that view, his delegation could not agree that a pact between the great Powers, which would enable the latter to define and regulate the activities of the smaller Powers in the international sphere, would be the best way of ensuring world peace. Moreover, that proposal was definitely against the letter and spirit of the Charter. The affairs of the world and the concern for the peace of the world were not the monopoly of the great Powers, just as in the domestic sphere of any State the affairs of government were not the monopoly of the few in power. Just as all individuals should have an equal voice and an equal share in any State, so should the small nations claim an equal right to

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, 249th plenary meeting.*

solve the problems of peace and war, according to the terms of the Charter with the greatest and strongest of nations.

33. U Ba Maung emphasized that his Government did not align itself with any bloc, and intended to maintain the most cordial relations, if allowed to do so, with all the countries of the world. With that aim in view, it had on several occasions sought the friendship of the USSR. However, nothing had come out of those overtures. He pointed out that the Constitution of Burma, which had been shaped with the assistance of socialist ideologies as well as the principles of liberty received from the common law traditions of the British, was the best evidence that Burma was not aligned with any bloc.

34. In conclusion, U Ba Maung said that the United States and United Kingdom draft resolution, though it might not propose anything new, at least recalled the way in which the nations of the world had to work for the peace of the world in accordance with the Charter. That proposal reminded the Members of the Organization that that path must be resumed if peace was to be secured.

35. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the question of the condemnation of the preparations for a new war and the conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace was timely and of great concern to the peoples of the world, whose hatred of war and readiness to stand together and struggle against the enemies of peace, as well as their growing political awareness, led to the increasing isolation of the new warmongers and to increasing determination to defend the cause of peace. That was the reason for the nervousness with which the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc had confronted the USSR draft resolution. Thus, the representative of Chile had not been impressed by the seriousness of the question and had spoken of almost everything but the Soviet Union proposal. That representative's statement had been intended to divert attention from sober consideration of those proposals and had been guided by his hatred of democratic and freedom-loving peoples all over the world, including his own. In his capacity as an agent of Wall Street, Mr. Santa Cruz had adhered to his customary tactics of enmity towards the USSR. The Chilean representative was doing his best to disturb the international atmosphere and was thereby contributing to the preparations for a new war. Those who opposed peace did their best to obscure the clear issues brought up in the USSR proposals, which world public opinion knew to be a new step taken by the Soviet Union to curb the aggressors and encourage the forces of peace.

36. The Canadian and Chilean representatives had endeavoured to justify the inimical attitude of the Anglo-American bloc to the Soviet Union proposals for peace by stating that according to Marxist-Leninist teachings there could be no lasting understanding between the USSR and the capitalist States. The Canadian representative had considered the USSR proposals to be a tactical manoeuvre (327th meeting) and had given a distorted interpretation of a speech made by Lenin in 1919, at a time when the USSR had repelled attacks of British, American, French and other interventionists led by Winston Churchill. Mr. Kiselev quoted a statement written at that

time by Lenin and contained in *The Works of Lenin*, to the effect that the USSR was surrounded by persons, classes and Governments which overtly expressed enmity and hatred, and that workers and peasants must watch out and remember that the Soviet Union was always one hair's breadth from aggression. Subsequent events had confirmed that prediction, and after the defeat of foreign interventionists the USSR had repeatedly been subjected to attacks from capitalist countries. Thus, Japan had attacked the USSR in 1931 and in 1938. The treacherous attack of Hitlerite Germany had ensued on 22 June 1941. It had been precisely about such systematic attacks on the part of imperialistic States that Lenin had spoken in 1919. The Canadian representative had endeavoured to distort those statements to support his absurd allegations, but he could have found numerous facts which would have completely disavowed the view that Marxism-Leninism denied the possibility of good neighbourly or friendly relations between the USSR and capitalist countries in general and the United States and United Kingdom in particular.

37. Mr. Kiselev cited one such quotation from Generalissimo Stalin's book *The Problems of Leninism* to the effect that the USSR stood for peace and the strengthening of business and commercial relations with all countries and would continue to do so to the extent to which those countries adhered to the same relations with the Soviet Union and did not violate its interests. Another such instance was provided by the interview given by Generalissimo Stalin to Mr. Harold Stassen on 9 April 1947. In that conversation, it had been made clear that co-operation was quite feasible given a desire to co-operate. The history of Soviet foreign policy confirmed the correctness of those statements. Soviet foreign policy was clear. Thus, the Deputy Head of the USSR Government, Georgi Malenkov in his report on 6 November 1949, had stated that the people of the Soviet Union did not fear peaceful competition with capitalism and therefore spoke against a new war and defence of peace, though they were aware of their indomitable force. That was the true situation regarding the co-existence of socialist and capitalist States.

38. The Chilean, Canadian and Netherlands representatives had tried to accuse the USSR of failing to foster cultural and educational relations with capitalist countries. The fabrication of the United States representative regarding a mythical "iron curtain" between the West and the East had been repeated, as had the allegation that the Soviet Union tried to shut itself in within the framework of its own national culture. One fact made clear the Soviet people's and Government's relations and attitudes to the cultures of other peoples, namely, that the works of so many American authors had been translated into Russian and into the languages of the other peoples of the USSR between 1917 and 1948; Mr. Kiselev cited the names of those authors as well as figures regarding the circulation of the translated versions of their books. He also cited the names of important writers from other countries whose works were read in the USSR. Naturally books preaching fascism, relating wild inventions and pornography were not translated or published in the USSR. Hollywood films which demonstrated the decadence of American cinematic art and culture in general were not shown in the

USSR either. In that connexion Mr. Kiselev quoted the words of a USSR film director who had visited the United States at the beginning of 1949 as a member of the delegation of Soviet cultural leaders describing how he had found it impossible to show two USSR films in the United States during his stay. So much for the cultural co-operation praised by Mr. Austin.

39. Referring to the statement made by the representative of Cuba on 16 November (330th meeting) to the effect that the foreign policy of the USSR had changed considerably since the October Revolution, in illustration of which he had cited the 1939 treaty, Mr. Kiselev said that it was well known that after having engulfed Czechoslovakia, Nazi Germany had begun to prepare for war openly. Abetted by the United Kingdom and France, Hitler had abandoned any kind of ceremony, and it had become obvious that mankind was approaching an unprecedented military catastrophe. Talks on that question between the United Kingdom and France on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other had begun in March 1939 and had continued for four months. The ruling circles of the United Kingdom and France, accustomed to having other people pull their chestnuts out of the fire, had attempted to have the USSR assume the whole burden of the sacrifices in repulsing Hitlerite aggression while refusing to bind themselves by any obligation with respect to the USSR. The United Kingdom representative had not even had the plenipotentiary powers to sign any agreement with the USSR. The basic purpose of the Anglo-French diplomats at that time had been to bring about a conflict between Germany and the USSR as early as possible. The Government of the Soviet Union had not failed to detect that shameful scheme and had opposed it with open and unambiguous proposals designed to defend peace in Europe. The behaviour of the United Kingdom and French diplomats during those negotiations had made it clear that no serious understanding with the USSR had been intended, and it was not surprising that those negotiations had failed. It had subsequently turned out that the United Kingdom had simultaneously conducted secret talks with Germany to which incomparably greater significance had been attached, and in that connexion Mr. Kiselev referred to the USSR Information Bureau publication entitled *The Falsifiers of History*. The United Kingdom and France had not only had no intention of thwarting Hitler's intention to unleash war but had done everything to incite Hitlerite Germany against the Soviet Union. In those conditions, the alternatives facing the USSR had been either to accept the proposal of Germany for concluding a non-aggression treaty for purposes of self-defence, thus giving it time to prepare its forces to repel any possible aggressive attack, or else to reject the German proposal, thus making it possible for the warmongers of the Western Powers to lead the USSR into armed conflict with Germany under conditions completely unfavourable to the USSR. The Government of the Soviet Union had thus been compelled to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany, and that move had later turned out to be far-sighted and wise, since it had pre-determined the outcome of the Second World War, which had been favourable for the USSR and all other peace-loving peoples. It was slander to assert that the conclusion of a

pact with the Hitlerite German Government had been part of the plans of Soviet foreign policy. On the contrary, the USSR had always sought agreement with the Western Powers against the German-Italian aggressors so as to finally enforce collective security on an equal footing.

40. Turning to the statement of the Yugoslav representative (327th meeting) who had made a series of absurd and mendacious accusations against the USSR and had denied the testimony given at the Rajk trial, Mr. Kiselev said that the whole world now knew that the United States, the United Kingdom and the Tito clique had been behind the attempts of Rajk and his fellow conspirators to overthrow the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic and to wreck all the achievements of the Hungarian People's Democracy. Rajk and his followers had sought to return to the landowners the estates which had been distributed among the peasants and to restore the mines and factories to the capitalists. They had wished to transform Hungary into a colony of the same Tito who had turned Yugoslavia into the vassal of the United States and the United Kingdom. The representative of the Byelorussian SSR quoted from the records of the questioning of the principal representative of the Tito-Rankovich intelligence service, Brankov, regarding those activities. At the Rajk trial it had been proved by documents that the leaders of the Tito clique had been Anglo-American spies of long standing, and it had been established that the plot in Hungary had been a direct consequence of the notorious Churchill Balkan strategy designed to have the Balkan and Danubian countries occupied by Anglo-American troops so as to suppress the peoples' democratic movements, set up reactionary régimes and use those countries as springboards for attacks on the Soviet Union. That trial had taught all the peoples in the camp of democracy and socialism to be on guard, particularly in the present circumstances, when the Anglo-American imperialists were trying to wreck the historic advancement of the People's Democracies and to organize armed intervention against the latter in order to transform them into colonies.

41. The USSR draft resolution fully reflected the desires of the broad masses of the people, which were so great that even many sworn enemies of co-operation between the great Powers had to take them into account. The General Assembly must find ways and means of restoring that co-operation among the five great Powers, who should evince good-will and readiness to work in the interests of all nations. The USSR, true to its traditional policy of peace, had initiated measures designed to maintain peace, to reduce military expenditures and raise the standard of living of peoples all over the world. The USSR proposals under consideration constituted one of those measures. On the other hand, a mad armaments race was taking place in the United States and the countries of Western Europe. The United Kingdom was transformed into a stationary United States aircraft carrier; Italy and France were transformed into springboards for United States attacks and, in Western Germany, Prussian militarism was being fostered and revived. In that connexion, Mr. Kiselev quoted a statement made in the House of Lords by Lord Blackford on 23 July 1943 which called for guns rather than butter! According to the reckonings of military specialists, the programme of standardiza-

tion of armaments in the countries of the West would cost about ten billion dollars. Armaments had become the main feature of industrial production in capitalist countries. He quoted a statement appearing in *Newsweek* of 14 February 1949 by a former United States Under-Secretary of the Navy as to the dangers which the heavy burden of ever-growing military expenditures constituted. Mr. Kiselev pointed out that under those conditions the working masses became poorer, industrial and manufactured goods rose in price, and the buying power of the population dropped; the main factor stimulating the armaments race and designed to prepare a new war was the notorious dollar diplomacy.

42. Military and political pressure were being applied in various ways against the small countries and a world-wide network of military bases were being established. There was sabre rattling with the atomic bomb, and the hubbub of a new war; thus the monopolies were trying to prevent any reduction of military budgets and to maintain a high level of orders for deliveries of armaments and of profits therefrom. The war propaganda of the United States had assumed threatening dimensions and included appeals for the achievement of world domination by force or at least by the threat of war such as had been put forward in the book by Burnan which was a best-seller at the present time. That teaching did not go beyond the general tone prevailing in the United States war propaganda; in the name of peace and security, that propaganda must cease.

43. Quoting the text of paragraph 3 of the USSR draft resolution (A/996) Mr. Kiselev said the USSR proposal had aroused a warm response among all the peace-loving people of the world, who supported the idea of the conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace and had become convinced that the USSR expressed and defended its desire for international co-operation in the interests of peace. In defending that cause, the Soviet Union was concerned not only with its own welfare but with that of all peace-loving peoples and of human civilization. Soviet foreign policy had always been and remained that of strengthening friendship and peaceful co-operation among peoples. Those who described the peaceful policy and proposal of the USSR as "propaganda" followed the familiar pattern used when there was a shortage of convincing arguments. During the entire post-war period the USSR had evidenced its good will toward the achievement of agreed decisions and had decisively rejected the methods of dictation and blackmail. On the other hand, the controlling circles of the United States and the United Kingdom had followed a post-war policy which had led to the "cold war", and to the severance of economic relations between Eastern and Western Europe, to the detriment of the peoples of Western Europe. The people of the world knew that the policy of the United States and the United Kingdom was designed to create special groups of States to be thrown against the USSR and the countries of the People's Democracies. That policy deliberately undermined the co-operation of the five Powers which was the main condition for a lasting peace. The interests of all countries and peoples dictated the necessity of restoring a policy of honest international co-operation.

44. Mr. Kiselev said that the attempt to disguise the situation by slanderous assertions and references to alleged impending USSR aggression would not succeed. Even Senator Taft, who was not particularly sympathetic towards the USSR, would not believe those arguments. According to *The New York Times* of 25 July 1949, Senator Taft had declared that no Russian military attack threatened Western Europe, and that the Russians had not gone beyond the boundaries agreed upon at Yalta. The Senator had added that the rearmament of Western Europe—against pressure—would be ineffective and would lead to an armaments race such as had previously resulted in wars and that it would probably again do so in the future. The representative of the Byelorussian SSR said that the United States and the United Kingdom ought to find it possible to co-operate with the Soviet Union if they so desired. Refusal to do so and restoration of the previous policy designed to isolate the USSR would lead in the same direction as that that led to the Second World War. The reason for the Anglo-American attitude toward the USSR proposal was clear. The spectre of impending economic crisis was looming in the United States; production was falling and the number of unemployed was increasing. American monopolists were ready to resort to all kinds of international adventures, and it was clear that a State bent on aggression could not fail to lead the warmongers to a new world war. The USSR had led and would lead with increasing energy, a struggle for peace, in order to thwart the plans of the aggressors. History had never before seen such a mass movement as that of the partisans of peace which the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution was attempting to halt. It was the duty of the members of the Committee to reject that proposal and adopt the draft resolution submitted by the USSR.

45. Mr. ORDONNEAU (France), referring to the statement made at the previous meeting by the representative, namely, to distort statements or the latter had apparently found himself short of serious arguments and had resorted to a procedure used by certain delegations when they wished to attack a statement made by another representative, namely to distort statements or to invent phrases which were of course open to criticism, having been elaborated for that very purpose. However, since the speech of Mr. Chauvel to which Mr. Manuilsky had made reference had been circulated, it would be realized that he had, in fact, not made the statement attributed to him. Following that misrepresentation, the representative of the Ukrainian SSR had used another procedure, that of making personal attacks on other representatives. Mr. Manuilsky had said that only persons who had nothing but contempt for their people—the same people who had given such a magnificent example of resistance to the German occupiers—could speak in the language that had been used by the representative of France. The inference was obvious, but it was well known that Mr. Chauvel had been one of the leaders of the French resistance against nazism. The cause which Mr. Manuilsky wished to defend was certainly not served by such arguments.

46. Turning to the statement of the representative of the Byelorussian SSR, who had mentioned alleged secret negotiations between the United



Kingdom, France and Germany in 1939, Mr. Ordonneau pointed out that in fact those two States which were said to have negotiated with Germany had declared war on that country on 3 September 1939 in order to come to the defence of Poland. The Soviet Union which was claiming to be the bulwark of European defence against Germany, had that time signed a non-aggression pact with Germany and at the end of September 1939 had entered into an understanding with that country regarding a new partition of Poland and the absorption of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into the USSR.

47. Mr. ANDREN (Sweden) said that the real and permanent item on the agenda of the Committee was to make the United Nations a reality in words, in spirit and in deed. While Sweden took no part in the cold war, his delegation felt that if humanity were to be spared new and worse ordeals, an endeavour must be made to obtain at least a cease-fire as a first step towards that peace which all longed for. He did not think that the discussion had constituted any further steps on that road to peace. It had been a new expression of the constant disagreement between the USSR and the western Democracies. All differences, difficulties and accusations had been revived.

48. While he did not wish to add fuel to the discussion, he wished to refer to some of the aspects which made the present position problematical and difficult. The clever and dangerous propaganda poisoning the atmosphere of the political world made it difficult for truth to emerge, and solemn words of earnest statesmen were very often not trusted. There was some reason for doubt and misapprehension. Referring to the statement made a few days previously by the USSR representative, to the effect that there was nothing to fear from the Soviet Union, Mr. Andren said that under ordinary circumstances and especially in the previous century such words would have been of the greatest importance. The present time had heard too many well sounding assurances with bitter consequences, however, and had seen non-aggression pacts leading to aggression as well as friendship treaties constituting the first step towards war. If Soviet policy had shown the same good natured temper as the Foreign Minister of that country had demonstrated in his statement, the position would not be so serious. Mr. Vyshinsky had a task of the utmost importance in the future of the world

to make that temper a true expression of the foreign policy of his country. With the exception of those flashes of good humour in Mr. Vyshinsky's speech, there were very few reasons for optimism. The representatives of the Eastern Powers had in reality made no admission as to the facts and had not opened any road towards a compromise.

49. Mr. Andren said that what was needed was not new peace resolutions. There already was the solemn Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. What was needed was perhaps not even a re-dressed balance of power but a new balance of mind. He could not support the USSR draft resolution since his delegation could not believe that a declaration accusing one side of warmongering was a step in the right direction. It seemed more like another weapon in the cold war propaganda, even if hidden behind words of peace and understanding. The peoples of the world wanted peace with a maximum of sovereignty, with free co-operation, with a practical consideration of each other's interests and of each other's points of view. The draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom on the other hand, while it did not provide a solution to the difficulties and differences, nevertheless indicated the principles necessary for an enduring peace, in the form of a solemn declaration with the Charter as a background. His delegation would therefore vote for that draft resolution in the hope that it would be an appeal to the conscience of all peoples and would remind everyone responsible for the fate of mankind of the essentials and fundamentals most urgently needed to obtain peace and good will.

50. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), quoting the text of the passage of Mr. Chauvel's speech (326th meeting) that the representative of France had accused his delegation of distorting, said that, while he did not know whether Mr. Chauvel had participated in the resistance movement, the language used by the latter was clearly reminiscent of that of the Vichyites rather than that used by the French people of the resistance.

51. Mr. ORDONNEAU (France) did not think that the language used by the French delegation required any description. Much had happened since the time of the resistance.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FOURTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 23 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman:* Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

#### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (continued)**

1. The CHAIRMAN read the list of speakers and declared the list closed, though without prejudice to the right of representatives to answer charges made against their own countries.

2. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon), referring to Tolstoy's masterpiece *War and Peace*, said he thought

it was fitting that the United Nations should consider the problem of war and peace in connexion with Mr. Vyshinsky's proposal. The insistence of the USSR delegation to deal with that question was absolutely justified, for unless peace was assured, the work of the United Nations would go up in smoke.

3. Analysing the provisions of the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/996), he pointed out that his country would not be consulted on the preparation of the pact between the five great Powers,

for it was the great Powers which bore the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace. But the USSR representative was asking all Members of the United Nations to decide by their vote what action should be taken in the matter. War and peace were indeed problems which no Member could evade, and therefore the eventual vote should be approached most seriously.

4. The representative of the USSR had complained that the United States and the United Kingdom were preparing for war and that the policy of the ruling classes of those countries was to unleash a new conflict, whereas the USSR was seeking peace, offering, as proof of that contention, the olive branch represented by the five-Power pact proposed by Mr. Vyshinsky. That proposal by the USSR delegation was a tragic joke. The non-communist world, however decadent it might be, had not yet reached the stage of degeneracy in which truth was confounded with falsehood. Everybody knew that the non-communist world was on the defensive, and that communism had been attacking it since its emergence more than one hundred years beforehand in the name of a full-fledged philosophy of war and revolution.

5. Analysing communist doctrines of war and revolution, he pointed out that peace pre-supposed mutual trust. Rightly or wrongly, the non-communist world was convinced that communism in general, and the Soviet Union in particular, did not wish peace, that every peace offensive on the part of the Soviet Union was just a phase in a general war plan. That conviction was based on a study of communist philosophy which was closely linked to the action undertaken by the Communist Parties or States.

6. An examination of classical Marxism and its orthodox Soviet interpretation revealed four fundamental theses with respect to revolution: (a) Marxism was essentially a revolutionary doctrine; (b) the revolutionary conversion of the bourgeoisie structure into a proletarian society could only be achieved by the violent overthrow of existing régimes and by the violent seizure of power; (c) the success of a communist revolution in one or more countries would only be complete when it made possible the victory of the revolution in all countries; and (d) though the victory of the communist revolution was an inevitable consequence of the very nature of the capitalist system in its final stage, that inevitable result could and should be accelerated by human effort.

7. The revolutionary character of communism was a consequence of the Marxist dialectical conception of reality. From that dialectical metaphysics, it followed that the communist movement was necessarily dynamic and militant. That revolutionary spirit was well conveyed in the *Communist Manifesto* which began with the words: "A spectre is haunting Europe — the spectre of communism", and ended with the battle-cry: "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workers of the world, unite!"

8. The revolutionary aspect of communism had been confirmed by Lenin, and later by Stalin, who, in his *Problems of Leninism*, said that the merit of Lenin was his understanding of Marxism as essentially revolutionary, and his rescuing of Marxist revolutionism from the misinterpretation given of it by the pacifists and the opportunist leaders of the Second International.

9. A revolutionary movement or teaching might merely advocate a radical transformation of society, like, for example, the teachings of Christ. A revolutionary movement might also conceive that change as only possible through the violent overthrow of the ruling classes and the forcible seizure of power: such was the case with communism. Marx had written in 1871, that the precondition of any real people's revolution was not to transfer the bureaucratic and military machinery from one hand to the other, but to break it up. And Lenin had added, later, that the replacement of the bourgeois State by the proletarian State was impossible without a revolution.

10. Several corollaries followed from that thesis: first, the communists were antagonistic to reform, or more exactly, as Stalin had written: "The revolutionary will accept a reform in order to use it as an aid in combining legal work with illegal work, to intensify, under its cover, the illegal work for the revolutionary preparation of the masses for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie." Moreover, the communist was dissatisfied with parliamentary opposition and legal measures for the transformation of the bourgeois society into a proletarian one. In that connexion, Stalin had written that under capitalism the fundamental problems of the working class were solved by force by general strikes and by insurrection. Furthermore, the proletarian revolution must not wait until the proletariat constituted a majority in a country, but should take advantage of any favourable situation to hasten the final result. Finally, the proletariat must ally itself with all revolutionary elements, so as further to hasten the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

11. The third thesis of Marxism in respect of revolution was that it aimed at being world-wide in its scope and required, at each stage of its progress, appropriate strategies. Stalin, following in that the teaching of Marx and Lenin, said that the communist revolution must hasten the victory of the proletariat in every country. At the current stage of the communist revolution, the appropriate strategy, according to Stalin, was to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, using it as a base for the overthrow of imperialism in all countries. The main forces of the revolution were the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country and the revolutionary movement of the proletariat in all countries. The main reserves were the semi-proletariat and small-peasant masses in the developed countries, and the liberation movement in the colonies and Non-Self-Governing Territories. In his previously mentioned book, Stalin had said that it was the task of the communist leaders to make intelligent use of all those reserves to strengthen the revolution, adding that the conditions for victory were: (a) the concentration of the main forces of the revolution at the enemy's most vulnerable spot at the decisive moment; and (b) the selection of the moment for that action.

12. The fourth thesis of the communist theory of revolution was that that revolution was not merely inevitable but could be accelerated by human effort. Marxism was not merely a scientific theory, it was also a call for action. Lenin had pointed out that the root of the whole of Marx's and Engel's teaching was in showing the masses that violent revolution was inevitable. Stalin had added that the Party must stand at the head of the working class, must lead the prole-

tariat and not follow in its wake. Thus, it was clear that the leaders of communism felt they had a mission to fulfil, that they must call for revolution and not merely limit themselves to predicting that revolution was inevitable.

13. The communists claimed that the cause of war was to be sought in the capitalist system itself. In that connexion, it must be noted that the communist doctrine of revolution was still more disturbing than imperialist rivalries and wars. Those, who elevated revolution into a creed based on science, could certainly not claim to be the sole defenders of peace. The class war was no less savage and fierce than the war of nation against nation. Once peace and harmony had been disturbed within a community, they were more difficult to restore than peace between States.

14. In view of the communist doctrine of revolution, it was not surprising that the non-communist world was seeking to protect itself, and that it regarded the olive-branch offered to the world by the Soviet Union delegation as only a temporary tactic imposed by the situation of international relations. There was indeed a particular form of communism, which constituted a threat *sui generis* to peace and security, namely the provocation and support of communist movements in countries which were not communist.

15. The Lebanese representative pointed out that it was not with pleasure that he had been forced to conclude that the non-communist world must protect itself against possible communist aggression, external or internal, for his country was on good terms with the USSR and obviously desired nothing more than to be at peace with that great nation. He would rejoice if Mr. Vyshinsky could refute the conclusion that modern communism was militant and revolutionary.

16. The real question was not how war could be prevented. The world was already in a state of conflict and unrest. The question was rather how to achieve real understanding and whether peace was really possible when dialectical materialism postulated the inevitability of war and conflict.

17. One must first consider whether the communist revolution was not perhaps capable of doing away with all the injustices of the past, the exploitation of man by man, together with the material and social causes of misery, and whether the ends of that revolution did not justify the means. Mr. C. Malik said he personally denied that a good end in itself justified a bad means; but still the Soviet Union had done away with the Czarist autocracy, and, in thirty years, had set one-sixth of the globe on the path of industrialization; it had abolished all signs of social and economic discrimination; it had thrown itself passionately into the socialist experiment paying particular attention to the welfare of children and attempting to create equality for all by encouraging individual talent; and it had brought about a new harmony between peoples of diverse national, racial and cultural stocks. The world would always be indebted to the Red Army and to its leader Generalissimo Stalin for having freed it from the threat of hitlerism. Those undoubted achievements had, however, been achieved at the price of very heavy human and spiritual sacrifices. One must therefore consider whether the results of which communism could be justly proud, justified all the sacrifices which it rendered necessary.

18. The outlook of communism was determined by its fundamental materialism. Man was conceived as a purely material being whose spiritual and inward experiences could be reduced to the movement of the matter of which he was constituted. The dignity of man, which the classical and Christian tradition saw as emanating from man's status of having been created in God's image, was replaced in the communist philosophy by the status of man as a part of a greater whole, determined by his contribution to the production of material goods. Stalin had called man "the most precious capital".

19. Religion, which was for the West the response of many to the divine presence, was conceived by the communists as a product of the economic structure of society. The deepest stirrings of the human soul in the presence of divine glory and love which had characterized Western philosophy and culture were regarded by the communists as nothing more than superstitions propagated by exploiters for the doping of the exploited. In their eyes, religion was "the opium of the people". Western thinkers had regarded ethics as rooted in the nature of man and in an absolute order of values based on the transcendent order of the divine. Communism on the contrary rejected the very conception of unconditional moral judgments and obligations. Lenin had stated that communist morality was wholly subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat. Mr. Vyshinsky, in his book *The Law of the Soviet State* had stated that the conduct of the Soviet citizen was dictated by the interests of the socialist revolution, by the interests of the people, and by the task of the triumphant consummation of communism.

20. According to the traditions of the West, the individual, though part of society, constituted a whole which could not be subordinated to the interests of society. It was on the grounds of that dual status of the human person that his rights and obligations could be harmonized with those of society. To communism, man existed only for society, and society existed for the production of material goods.

21. Western thinkers from Sophocles to the philosophers of the eighteenth century had conceived man as the subject of basic, inalienable rights. In the communist philosophy those rights were not recognized but granted conditionally; they were rejected in theory and trampled under foot in practice by the communist States.

22. The fundamental freedoms pertaining to the dignity of the human person, were tolerated by the communists to the extent to which they conformed to the strict requirements of the moment. Mr. Vyshinsky had stated in his book, referred to earlier, that the Soviet Union Government had explicitly excluded the non-labour classes from the enjoyment of the freedoms granted to the workers. Those freedoms were guaranteed upon the condition that they were utilized in the interest of the workers and to strengthen the socialistic social order.

23. The tragic fate of intellectuals, scientists, poets and musicians under communist rule was not surprising, as the dictatorship of the proletariat suffocated spontaneity and all dynamism. The spirit of man was annihilated by indoctrination and censorship. The totalitarian control by

the State of every source of independence and freedom was contrary to nature. No man who had drunk from the living waters of the Western Platonic-Christian tradition could accept that spiritual tyranny. The university, the Church, the family, natural law, the intimate circle of love and friendship, God and even, within limits, free economic activity were higher than the State. The State did not determine their proper limits, but was determined by them. The head of a State would have much to learn from the teachings of a scientist, a mother, a priest, a saint, a lover or a philosopher.

24. The metaphysics of communism envisaged matter as the only reality, whereas the spirit was an independent and superior reality. According to the communists, the attribute of that reality was change, although in truth there was a stable order of existence on which the mind could really rest. The communists did not admit that there was such a thing as truth, whereas objective truth did exist. They believed only in the existence of the immanent and temporal, whereas in fact there were transcendent norms. They did not believe in God; but God was the loving Father and the Creator of the world. They only believed in the philosophy of Democritus, Lucretius, Feuerbach and Marx; in truth that materialist tradition was absorbed by the more positive and concrete tradition from Plato and Aristotle to Hegel. The communists believed in the perfectibility of man by his own efforts; whereas his perversity could only be cured with the assistance of God. Lastly, they thought that man was made for society; in truth society only existed for man.

25. Despite the passion of the communists for social and economic justice, therefore, and despite the remarkable results achieved by the communist world it was nevertheless true that the philosophy of communism was materialistic, atheistic, dialectical relativist, immanent and totalitarian. Communist existence did not therefore justify the communist revolution, even if the end justified the means.

26. The representative of Lebanon pointed out that communism had fortunately not exhausted the Russian soul. Russian nineteenth-century literature reflected the mysterious depths of the Russian soul much more authentically than the monotonous true-to-party-line statements of the USSR representatives. If the representatives in the First Committee were thoroughly familiar with the works of Pushkin, Gogol, Turgenyev, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, or Gorky, they would probably be in a better position to cope with the world situation. Fortunately, the Russian spirit as revealed in those authors was not dead; it was reflected even sometimes in the speeches of the Soviet representatives, when they referred to a Russian fable or proverb, or when they yielded to their deep humanity, boundless exuberance, playful imagination or sheer joy. Russian literature revealed the tragic sufferings of the Russian soul which seemed to have sought its salvation in sufferings for the world. There was not a trace of mediocrity or half-heartedness in the Russian soul. On the contrary, difficulties seemed to be a springboard rather than a hindrance. Russian literature still reflected those desires for human brotherhood and universalism, as well as the need for social justice and equality and for transformation of reality into something better.

There was a spiritual foundation in the Russian soul which made it possible for communism to be imposed upon it: the sense of communism and of love of one's fellow-being. The Russian soul was apocalyptic and prophetic. It revealed itself in a true religious consciousness which was completely opposed to materialism.

27. In any case, the Russian soul was complex and was not exhausted by communism. Whatever régime predominated in Russia, there was still a Russian problem because 250 million Slavs, with their vitality and culture, had enormous material wealth at their command. One had to reckon with the existence of Russia; consequently, the hope of peace was that the Russian soul might express its spiritual qualities and individualism.

28. Mr. C. Malik proceeded to say that a criticism of communism was easy because the doctrine was only a hundred years old and its application dated back only approximately thirty years. It was more difficult to elaborate a criticism of western civilization which was not based on a rigid and formal theory. The western system offered some repulsively materialistic characteristics, such as the spirit of gain, concupiscence, selfishness and unco-ordinated activities. Quality seemed obscured by quantity. Leadership in the West seemed incapable of coping with the difficulties of the era. At the same time, there seemed to be a bankruptcy of fundamental ideas. In such circumstances, communism was eagerly developing its own ideas, while the leaders of the West were not succeeding in satisfying the deep desires for friendship, understanding, truth and love.

29. The Western States would not serve the cause of peace by associating themselves with dark régimes under the pretext that it was easier not to disturb them. The more the people of the West were misled by their leaders, the more attractive would the watchwords of world revolution appear to them. It was not sufficient to reject communism. It was necessary, in addition, to reply to communism by spreading a spiritualized materialism which would endeavour to remove every trace of social injustice, without loss of the higher spiritual values.

30. Nor was it sufficient, in the twentieth century, to be happy and self-sufficient. If the leaders of the western States did not succeed in meeting the world-wide needs for truth, justice and security, leadership was bound to pass to others. It was not sufficient for them to ensure that order and prosperity prevailed in their own countries and to send technical assistance abroad; they must, above all, appeal to the mind. The challenge to civilization in the twentieth century was not only communism; the real issue was whether that civilization could return to its authentic sources by abandoning the worship of false idols. In any case, in spite of the weakness of the West, there was still hope because the University and Church were both free.

31. The pact proposed in the USSR draft resolution would not remove the prevailing mutual distrust. The world did not need new pacts, but a fundamental change in the relationship between the two opposed groups. The non-communistic world was fully awake to its dangers. Communism would deceive only itself if it thought that the western world was so decadent that it has lost all initiative.

32. Accordingly, it was to be hoped that the leaders of the Soviet Union would not pursue their policy of shutting in their country and isolating their people from the rest of the world. Every point of contact which still existed between the USSR and the rest of the world should be preserved and expanded. New points of contact ought to be sought. He was glad to be able to discuss that matter freely with the representatives of the USSR, but a change was also necessary so that true co-operation could be established in the realm of science and art.

33. It was to be hoped that the Soviet Union Government would allow the Russian people to assert again its spirituality and that the communists would abandon their doctrine of revolution and class struggle, without renouncing their desire for a better world. The non-communist world must feel at ease with the communists; therefore the communists must not be forever looking for the best opportunity to destroy it. It was also to be hoped that in the West a powerful spiritual movement would develop which would contribute to the welfare of mankind.

34. The only answer to communism lay in hope; if the western world could create that hope by eradicating poverty, exploitation and oppression, without resorting to oppression and dictatorship, communism would vanish and its spectre would disappear forever from the earth.

35. Mr. HENRÍQUEZ-UREÑA (Dominican Republic) said the Soviet Union draft resolution gave the impression that peace did not prevail, since that draft resolution postulated the need for an appeal for peace. That impression was strengthened by the fact that the draft resolution proposed by a pact outside the United Nations, which was tantamount to saying that the Organization was ineffective in that respect. It was true that there was no real peace, either from the technical point of view, since the treaties of peace had not been finally drawn up or ratified, or from the moral point of view, since the world was still living in anxiety. Peace could only prevail if all the peoples could live in freedom, without being subject to external pressures. If such pressures were exerted, they jeopardized moral, and sooner or later, material peace. It was claimed that apart from the advantages of independence there were in modern times those of interdependence; the answer to that was that all interdependence must be based on equality between the parties concerned. Some peoples were cut off from the rest by a kind of *cordon sanitaire* intended to protect them from ideological contagion. Yet the real danger lay not in ideas but in the use of force to impose them. The real division was between those who believed in the free discussion of ideas and those who were opposed to it.

36. In such an atmosphere of moral anxiety, the peoples formed themselves into coalitions and made ready for defence. That course offered the only safeguard for nations that were unwilling to allow themselves to be absorbed. Nevertheless, such treaties of mutual defence were being violently attacked, as witness the attacks on the republics of the New World. Yet the pact between those countries did no more than embody the will of the peoples of the Americas as it had been expressed for more than a century. The idea had been conceived by Bolivar in 1826. The creation

of the Pan American Union at the end of the nineteenth century had been a decisive step towards continental unity. The principle that a violation of the rights of one State was to be regarded as a violation of the rights of all the States on the continent had been clearly established as early as the Inter-American Conferences of 1936 and 1938, held at Buenos Aires and Lima respectively. Regulations had been laid down for its application at Rio de Janeiro in 1947. It was not, therefore, a matter of a convention concluded by chance, but the final crystallization of a historic principle. No objection could be raised against it since the Charter granted Members the right of self-defence. He wondered what genuine objection could be made to any pact of collective security covering nations belonging to some specific geographical region, as was the case of the North Atlantic Treaty, for example. Such pacts were all the more necessary because, technically, the world was still at war and was, in fact, at war from the moral point of view.

37. The two proposals before the Committee proved that for the time being the world climate was not propitious to international confidence. What the proposal of the Soviet Union regarded as factors opposed to peace were only the outward symptoms of a disturbance that had deep roots in the anxiety general throughout the world. Those outward symptoms were not the cause but the effect of that anxiety. The anxiety could only disappear, if all the peoples of the world could live in full freedom and decide their own future without being subjected to external pressure.

38. The joint draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/549), by contrast, tackled the root of the matter by taking into account the fundamental causes of the existing uneasiness.

39. The Soviet Union proposal for a five-Power peace pact would represent a return to the time of Locarno and the Briand-Kellogg Pact. If all States had sustained the League of Nations in a genuine fight for peace, the war might have been avoided. The same was true of the current situation; if all States fulfilled their obligations under the Charter, international confidence would be restored, since the Charter was the grandest and most effective instrument ever created by man to preserve peace. Only the unanimous co-operation of all nations could bring peace, whatever might be said of the responsibility of the great Powers. The draft resolution for a peace pact in which those Powers only would participate gave the impression that an attempt was being made to reach an agreement regarding their respective vital interests and spheres of influence, with no thought for the sovereignty of the small nations. If, on the other hand, the small nations were to be free to accede to the five-Power pact, it would be tantamount to charging the United Nations with inefficiency and proclaiming that it had been impossible to achieve the purposes of the Charter.

40. The effectiveness of the United Nations was impaired above all by the fact that the Organization was not yet universal. To remedy that state of affairs, it was essential to admit all States which fulfilled the conditions prescribed in the Charter.

41. The joint draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom was an appeal for the application of the principles of the

Charter. Such an appeal was not without point. The American Republics had for more than fifty years proclaimed in countless treaties and declarations those principles of international morality which had become axiomatic in the relations between their peoples. The repetition of a doctrine

lent it renewed force and vigour and that was the purpose of the joint draft resolution. The delegation of the Dominican Republic would therefore vote in favour of it.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIFTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 23 November 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (*continued*)**

1. Mr. LONDOÑO y LONDOÑO (Colombia) fully supported the views expressed by the representative of Lebanon at the previous meeting. Not only had the latter correctly analysed the existing situation in world politics but he had offered conclusions which, if accepted, might assist greatly in the promotion of peace. Mr. Londoño y Londoño therefore wished to confine his remarks to an elaboration of certain points in the statement of the Lebanese representative.

2. In the first place, he was very conscious of the limited role that a small nation must necessarily play in any attempt to solve a conflict between the great Powers. Nevertheless, the dispute, in which the United States and the Soviet Union were the principal opponents, was continuously becoming more acute and more threatening to world peace. The great Powers were indulging in what could only be described as a brawl in which both sides accused each other of preparing aggression. But neither had any intention of coming to blows. Clearly, it was up to the representatives of the small nations to point out that if both sides really desired peace, that could only be achieved through agreement. The representative of Lebanon had stated that the crux of the problem lay in the fact that the Government of the Soviet Union subscribed to a philosophy which regarded war as inevitable. Mr. Londoño y Londoño fully agreed with that statement and urged the representative of the Soviet Union to ponder over its implications and submit a reply.

3. Secondly, he criticized the head of the Soviet Union delegation for approaching the problem in the manner of a court lawyer who sought only to adduce concrete evidence to prove his opponents' guilt. Mr. Vyshinsky had referred to a whole series of acts and incidents in support of his contention that the United States and the United Kingdom were preparing aggression and had challenged other delegations to adduce similar concrete evidence to disprove his accusations. However, it was also necessary to consider whether the alleged offence was in fact possible or not. For instance, it was both a practical and a moral impossibility that Yugoslavia could be preparing for war against the Soviet Union. Not only was Yugoslavia so weak in comparison with its powerful neighbour that aggression on its part was a physical impossibility, but obviously even to entertain hostile intentions would make Yugoslavia's position insecure. The same argument

applied to the Western Powers. Clearly, they could not threaten the Soviet Union since they did not possess preponderant military strength. Mr. Londoño y Londoño said that he had travelled throughout the countries of the West and was convinced, not only that they had no aggressive intentions towards the Soviet Union but that they greatly feared the latter's military power. It was absurd to assert that the French Government or the French leaders, Mr. Moch and Mr. Bidault, desired war with the Soviet Union. Likewise, no one would believe for a moment that the United Kingdom was preparing aggression.

4. Among the evidence which he had adduced in support of his charges, Mr. Vyshinsky had cited (330th meeting) the discussion of military tactics in United States newspapers and the lectures on polar warfare in various United States military training schools. He had asserted that they could only relate to a possible war against the Soviet Union. But, as was well known, it was characteristic of the United States that all military plans were discussed publicly and there was nothing alarming in the discussions to which Mr. Vyshinsky had referred. It might be asked, with equal justice, for what purpose the Soviet Union still maintained an army reputed to number 4 million soldiers. Obviously, the only explanation for the continuance of national armies was the fact that, under existing conditions of international mistrust, only the presence of military power could assure national security. Certainly, every army considered plans aimed at covering all contingencies. Mr. Londoño y Londoño looked forward to the time when there would be sufficient confidence and co-operation among nations to permit the abolition of national armies. In the meantime, he thought it was quite possible for nations to be peace-loving and co-operative while maintaining their military strength. No State could be condemned as being aggressive simply because it did not reduce its armaments. An excellent example was that of Switzerland which maintained a defence force although there was no likelihood of war between that country and its neighbours.

5. The representative of Colombia was indignant at Mr. Vyshinsky's statement that the British Empire was crumbling and that the United Kingdom was learning to become a follower rather than a leader. He believed such statements were ungenerous in view of the past record of the United Kingdom in the Second World War and its present adaptation to the changed political situation in the world. There was nothing nobler in the modern world than that serene relinquishment of power.

6. Doubtless the purpose of the Soviet Union delegation in proposing the present item of the



agenda had been to bring about a clear exposition of the policies and objectives of the great Powers. The purpose of the Soviet Union had been fully satisfied and the accusations against the Western Powers had been convincingly refuted. The debate had left no doubt as to the policies and objectives of the opposing sides. He welcomed the statements by the Chilean representative who had clearly shown that communist expansion in Latin America and elsewhere constituted one of the threats to world peace.

7. In conclusion the Colombian representative shared the view of the representative of Lebanon that the best remedy for the existing world situation would be for the Soviet Union to co-operate intellectually with other nations and remain within the limits of its own sovereignty. At the same time, the Western Powers were guilty of a certain lack of faith and must themselves offer more evidence of their desire for co-operation. Peace could be strengthened only by creating a spirit of good-will which would make armaments unnecessary. No fundamental solution could be found merely by way of an agreement for armaments reduction. He appealed to all Member States to act in accordance with the recommendations of the Lebanese representative. His delegation would vote in favour of the joint United States-United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/549) although it did not find the proposal entirely satisfactory.

8. Mr. EBAN (Israel) said that the debate on the present item had been of great value in clarifying the existing state of relations between the great Powers. During the general debate which had initiated the present session of the General Assembly, the representative of Israel had summarized the problem as that of finding means by which different ways of life might co-exist in common allegiance to a single international code.<sup>1</sup> The object of the United Nations was to harmonize the two opposing ideologies which divided the world and not to criticize them or to assess their respective validity. Obviously, the maintenance of peace would be easier if there was not a profound conflict in social and political thought but the United Nations could only achieve its goal if it adopted a realistic attitude toward the existing situation. The statement of the representative of Lebanon had raised the question whether a solution could not be found more easily if the Committee undertook, in the first instance, a profound critical analysis of the diverse traditions and ideals which motivated the actions of the various Governments. For his part, Mr. Eban did not think that that was the best approach to the problem. It was not the task of the United Nations to criticize the political and social doctrines of any Member State. Its task was solely to secure world peace within the framework of the ideological and cultural divergence which characterized the international community. Nations differing on almost every issue might nevertheless agree to prevent their difference from erupting into war. If it accepted the possibility of peaceful co-existence, then the United Nations must reject any theory that war was the inevitable result, either of capitalist development or of socialist revolution or of the impact of one upon the other. It must be assumed that all nations were capable of making it their

common objective to avoid war. For its part, the people of Israel accepted that assumption without reserve. Mr. Eban did not believe that any people or Government desired a new international conflict, least of all the three Powers which had sponsored the draft resolutions before the Committee. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union together had been mainly responsible for the victory over the axis coalition and it was they who had founded the United Nations for the purpose of ensuring that the erstwhile Allies should remain united to prevent a new conflict. Obviously, they had nothing to gain from renewed hostilities and, to believe that any of those three States was deliberately preparing for aggression, was to deny them any instinct of self-interest and idealism. The delegation of Israel, therefore, regretted the accusation in paragraph 1 of the Soviet Union draft resolution that the United States and the United Kingdom were preparing a new war. It was relieved to note that no such accusation was contained in the joint draft resolution of those two States. Mr. Eban said that his delegation opposed all such condemnation. He believed that the manner in which international relations were conducted was one of the causes of present world tension. Repeatedly during the current session of the General Assembly, the Israel delegation had withheld its support from resolutions condemning other States. It had done so because it believed that the duty of the United Nations was to alleviate the conflict between the two ideologies dividing the world and not to aggravate it by any denunciations even if animated by sincere moral judgment.

9. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Soviet Union draft resolution contained constructive proposals dealing with the need for effective control of atomic weapons and the improvement of Great Power relations by means of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace. The latter appeal itself implied that peace was the fundamental desire of all five Powers. It further implied that the five Powers were not instigators of aggressive war, for nobody would seriously suggest a pact between two deliberate warmongers and three peace-loving States.

10. The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Soviet draft resolution were paralleled by similar provisions in the United States-United Kingdom joint draft resolution. Just as the former called upon all States to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to avoid the threat or use of force, so the latter called upon all States to "refrain from any threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or integrity of any States". The delegation of Israel believed that it was useful and timely to reaffirm the right of all States to enjoy their freedom and integrity without the challenge of force. It was deeply concerned for the observance of the principle of the integrity of States both in so far as world-wide and regional disputes were concerned. World peace was not exclusively a problem of the relation between great Powers; it also required the pacific settlement of regional disputes.

11. The joint draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom delegations contained an affirmation of the principle that international agreements must be faithfully discharged. Many States relied for their security, not only

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, 229th plenary meeting.*

upon the provisions of the Charter, but also upon more specific agreements with their immediate neighbours. The doctrine that such agreements must be respected until revised or replaced by mutual consent was a fundamental principle of the world community and one of the direct causes of the present international tension was the failure of the great Powers to respect the agreements which they had made during the Second World War. The maintenance of peace presented many acute problems which, no less than the conduct of the war, required close co-operation between the Allied Powers. It was regrettable that the spirit of collaboration between them had collapsed even before the peace treaties had been signed. The danger inherent in that situation was well illustrated by the divergent policies of the great Powers towards Germany, their former enemy. The rivalry between the great Powers was resulting in a competition to win German sympathies which might well result in a disastrous resurgence of German military power.

12. The Israel delegation believed that the proposal contained in the joint draft resolution for efforts to promote a higher standard of living for all the peoples of the world was directly relevant to the problem of maintaining international peace. Consequently, Mr. Eban welcomed the unanimous agreement which had been reached in the Second Committee on the issue of technical assistance for economic development. The common interest of all nations in that question clearly illustrated the need for wider international co-operation in the economic field. The fight against poverty and disease was capable of uniting all peoples in spite of existing political barriers.

13. It was noteworthy that both draft resolutions contained the principle that the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of international control over atomic energy constituted urgent objectives. True, the Soviet Union draft resolution advocated "the establishment of appropriate strict international control" whereas the joint draft resolution stated that such control could become effective only by the joint "exercise of national sovereignty". Nevertheless, the basic agreement on principle and objective should not be underestimated. It was therefore all the more unfortunate that no agreement had been reached toward the implementation of that objective. The delegation of Israel was not a partisan of any one technique of effective control but obviously the only plan that could be adopted was one which could secure the approval of all the Powers possessing atomic plants. The Israel delegation supported that view that the need for rapid agreement must be set above any formal consideration, whether based on the defence of absolute sovereignty or on the text of previous adopted resolutions.

14. Both draft resolutions before the Committee recognized that it was the primary responsibility of the five permanent members of the Security Council to maintain peace and security. With respect to the Soviet Union draft resolution, however, many representatives of small States had found it necessary to affirm that the Charter placed a responsibility on all Member of the United Nations in addition to the particular responsibilities incumbent upon the great Powers. The Charter was itself a treaty for strengthening peace entered into by fifty-nine nations and it

would be regrettable if the idea of a five-Power pact were to appear in isolation from the Charter obligations which applied equally to all Member States. Although it was correct that the five great Powers had "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" the Charter made it clear that they exercised that responsibility not in their own rights but on behalf of all Member States. It was for that reason that the delegation of Israel had some reservations with regard to paragraph 3 of the Soviet Union draft resolution. However, it believed that the main purpose of the draft resolution, namely, to secure wider co-operation between the five great Powers, should be upheld by the First Committee.

15. Likewise, the Committee should unanimously support the request of the joint draft resolution that the five permanent members of the Security Council should "broaden progressively their co-operation". However, the injunction that they exercise restraint in the use of the "veto" raised a controversial problem. Since the permanent members of the Security Council did not possess an equal ability to influence the votes of the majority of their colleagues, it was evident that some permanent members could prevent action by the Security Council by merely withholding their support, while others achieved the same objective only by using the "veto". Thus, there was a balance between majority power on one hand, and "veto" power on the other. If the General Assembly desired to be strictly objective it should call for the exercise of restraint in the use of both those powers. However, Mr. Eban believed that the stress should be not on voting procedure but on the need for substantive agreement between the five great Powers. He believed, therefore, that it would be better to urge greater recourse to the method of prior consultation of the five permanent members in an effort to reach agreements which would preclude procedural complications.

16. In conclusion, Mr. Eban stated that, with the reservations mentioned above, his delegation would support the joint draft resolution. He believed however, that the underlying desire for peace which had been apparent in the debate was of more importance than any resolution which the Committee might adopt and he hoped that it had been perceived by all the great Powers.

17. ABDUL RAHIM Bey (Egypt) recalled that during the general debate which opened the present session of the General Assembly he had spoken of the prevailing atmosphere of tension in international relations and had urged that only by co-operation through the United Nations would it be possible to dispel the menace of a new war and create an atmosphere of genuine confidence and security. The discussion regarding the present item of the agenda had merely served to emphasize the fact that the world was divided into two hostile camps led by great Powers. In his opinion the indictment contained in paragraph 1 of the Soviet Union's draft resolution could not possibly contribute to the promotion of peace or in any way ease the tense situation. Accusations and rhetorical abuse could serve no purpose at the present time. Abdul Rahim Bey stressed that the purpose of the United Nations, as envisaged in the Charter, was to promote international co-operation and not to serve as a forum for ideological propaganda.

18. One of the most important contributions to peace which the United Nations had made since its inception had been to provide an opportunity for the small nations to join together in order to express their collective opinions on world problems. Although regrettably, some of the small nations had been subjected to unwarranted political pressure, they had nevertheless refused to remain silent upon issues connected with world peace because they had learned that the sufferings of war were inflicted on all nations, large and small. The fact was, that the small nations felt insecure because they realized that it was the great Powers alone which bore the responsibility for peace or war. Egypt was one of those smaller nations and in the past decade had already suffered from two wars. Abdul Rahim Bey assured the Committee that his Government was working loyally against many odds to promote peace in its part of the world and would co-operate to the fullest in the efforts of the United Nations to prevent a new conflict.

19. Clearly, so long as the world remained divided in two opposing camps, there could be no progress either in the political or in the international economic field. It was to be hoped that the present discussion had cleared the atmosphere and paved the way for future constructive efforts. Surely it was apparent to all that paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Soviet Union draft resolution merely emphasized principles which had been constantly proclaimed at all the preceding sessions of the General Assembly? It was a matter of great disappointment, especially to the small nations, that nothing had been done so far to implement those principles. The need for action was apparent. Yet it was not the small nations but the great Powers which bore the main responsibility. The Charter had placed them in a privileged position which carried with it special obligations. It was high time that they should accept those obligations. Recrimination must cease and be replaced by constructive acts.

20. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) remarked that the views of his Government upon the problem before the Committee and upon the two draft resolutions had already been stated (327th meeting). Consequently, he only intended to reply to attacks made against the earlier Yugoslav statement. The speeches concerned had avoided the main problem raised by Yugoslavia, namely, the Soviet Union policy of pressure. The representative of the Soviet Union had given no explanation of the absurd accusations being made against Yugoslavia nor replied to the question of how the threats contained in the note delivered to Yugoslavia and the troop movements along its borders could be reconciled with the obligations of the Charter. No explanation had been given of the reluctance on the part of the Soviet Union to settle amicably the problem of the white guard *émigrés*. The USSR representative had been unable to justify the accusations advanced by the Press of his country to the effect that American bases existed in Yugoslavia, nor had he been able to point out any such imaginary bases. Finally, the Soviet Union representative had failed to reconcile the peace-loving declarations of his Government with the policy of pressure and threats against Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union representative had merely declared that it was ridiculous to assert that there were threats

against the sovereignty of Yugoslavia and had repeated earlier slanders.

21. That type of reply was no more than an attempt to justify the policy of pressure. For instance, quotations had been given from the verbatim records of the Rajk trial. However, even the Soviet Union representative had not attempted to defend the basic thesis of that trial that the war of liberation from 1941 to 1945 had been directed by the Gestapo and that the subsequent socialist reconstruction had been directed by western agents. The Soviet Union representative preferred details such as the assertion made by one of the accused that four Yugoslav diplomats were British spies. It should be noted that the defendant Brankov had deserted Yugoslav service after the *Cominform* had issued its resolution against Yugoslavia. Brankov had become an active agent of the Soviet Union and had travelled freely in Eastern Europe and in Moscow. Suddenly, Brankov had become a defendant in the Hungarian trial and had made the most fantastic confessions. Brankov could have resorted to his diplomatic immunity as a means of defence because of his status at the time of his alleged crime. However, the fact that Hungary had disregarded his immunity should not astonish anyone familiar with the practices in international relations in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the fact that Brankov had failed to claim his immunity showed that the matter was not a trial but a comedy. That was a point to which the Soviet Union representative had not referred to in his discourse.

22. In dealing with the four Yugoslav diplomats, the Soviet Union representative had quoted an assertion by Brankov from the verbatim report of the trial naming Laza Latinovic as Minister in Switzerland. Mr. Bebler described some of the posts held by Mr. Latinovic and pointed out that he had never been Minister in Switzerland. Indeed, until only a few days previously Mr. Latinovic had been Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow. The representative of the Byelorussian SSR had quoted Brankov as having asserted that Kardelj, Djilas, and Rankovic and various other ministers were Anglo-American agents and that that information had been taken from the files of the Ministry of the Interior. As Rankovic was Minister of the Interior, the nature of that fable was self-evident.

23. The Soviet Union representative and his associates had failed to reply to various points raised in the earlier Yugoslav statement, including the question of the references made to Mr. Bebler himself during the Rajk trial. In the Rajk indictment it had been stated that Mr. Bebler had attached himself to Rajk in French concentration camps after the Spanish Civil War. Mr. Bebler had denied that assertion in a statement to the Press, stressing the fact that he had never been in a French concentration camp. That denial had been noted by the court and the defendant and president of the court had not insisted upon it during the remainder of the trial. In the statements made by Rajk, Mr. Bebler's name had appeared several times in a distorted form. However, in the report of the trial published in Serbian for illegal distribution in Yugoslavia, Mr. Bebler's name had been completely distorted. He believed this was the first time in the history of justice that translators had been authorized to modify the indictment. Further, the

official Hungarian Press agency had stated that the reference to Mr. Bebler had been an error. Yet on 5 November 1949, *Pravda* had published an article stating that the Rajk trial had proved that Mr. Bebler had been a German and a French agent not only in the concentration camps in France, but also in Spain.

24. Mr. Bebler observed that the representative of the Soviet Union had alleged that it was the Rajk trial which had prompted his Government to re-examine its attitude towards the pact of friendship with Yugoslavia. However, it was well-known that the Soviet Union had pursued a hostile policy towards Yugoslavia for over a year before the Rajk trial had taken place.

25. Another argument used by the Soviet Union representative for his Government's changed attitude towards Yugoslavia was the allegation that the latter had abrogated the agreement concerning the two joint Yugoslav-Soviet companies. The facts were that Yugoslavia had proposed the liquidation of those two companies and had put forward principles to be applied during their liquidation and the Soviet Union had sent representatives to Belgrade for negotiations which had lasted several months. In due course, the liquidation had taken place in accordance with agreed provisions. The proposal for liquidation had been made after the Soviet Union and its associated Governments had broken almost all their economic agreements with Yugoslavia. The USSR had kept the agreement on the two joint companies as an exception because they were of advantage to it and disadvantageous to Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union representative termed the initiative for the dissolution of those two companies sabotage of normal relations.

26. That case proved beyond doubt that the Soviet Union did not want to entertain normal relations with Yugoslavia but intended subordination and unequal economic relations. That was the crux of the matter and that was evident from the speeches of representatives of other Eastern European States. Those speeches consisted mainly of accusations and insults since arguments were lacking. However, they proved that the Soviet Union was continuing its policy of pressure and interference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs. The Yugoslav people was not impressed by those insults but was only concerned in whether or not the Soviet Union was prepared to respect its international obligations and the will of the Yugoslav people. That was the point which Yugoslavia had raised in the Committee. An economic blockade had been attempted. Threats were made against the legal Government. There had been troop movements on Yugoslavia's borders. Those acts were in contradiction to the Charter. Thus the conflict imposed upon his country was no longer an ideological dispute but had become a matter closely linked with the problem of the maintenance of peace. That was why the matter had been raised in the Committee. The reaction of the Soviet Union representative could not be reconciled with the role claimed for his Government, namely, that of a champion of peaceful and good-neighbourly relations amongst nations.

27. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said he intended to reply to the comments and criticisms advanced against the Soviet Union draft resolution. He would limit himself to the essentials and would not for example deal

with the statement just made by the representative of Yugoslavia which raised questions that had already been dealt with and were moreover irrelevant to the matter before the Committee. Mr. Vyshinsky observed, however, that in previous interventions he had merely noted facts which had been established in documents and legal instruments. For the present, Mr. Vyshinsky would deal with other speeches such as those made by the representatives of Chile, Lebanon, New Zealand and Canada which also were irrelevant and evidently had the tactical objective of drowning the Soviet Union proposals in a welter of ideological questions. Those speakers had indulged in abstract theories and had tried to discredit the USSR proposals by avoiding giving them any serious consideration. The more recent statements were an inferior edition of what had been said at the beginning of the debate when at least, there had been some reference to the Soviet Union's draft resolution. Latterly, all kinds of extraneous topics had been introduced and the representative of Lebanon, for instance, had rambled through philosophy, religion, psychology, literature and various other fields of learning (334th meeting). For the most part, the statements made reflected the immaturity and lack of good faith of the speakers and that made it difficult to present a decent reply.

28. The representative of Iceland had tried to be humorous and had claimed that no one should call them warmongers since they had no armed forces (333rd meeting). In fact, no one had accused Iceland of warmongering. At the same time, Mr. Vyshinsky stated that it was possible to be a warmonger even though one did not possess any armed forces. If that were not so, the idea could be entertained that those with the greatest armed forces were the biggest warmongers. According to the representative of Iceland, it appeared that peace depended upon co-operation and not on any pact. Mr. Vyshinsky was of the opinion that pacts were useful for engendering peace and co-operation. If that were not the case there would be little need for the Charter. A pact could not impede co-operation but would rather tend to foster friendly relations. In that respect, the proposed pact would be similar to the Charter.

29. The representative of Venezuela (333rd meeting), had followed the same line of argument as the representative of Iceland but had gone further and said that even if a pact were concluded, the basic divergencies would remain. That was a very naive form of argument for no one imagined that any pact would have a magic effect and bring all differences to an end. Mr. Vyshinsky drew attention to the joint draft resolution of the United Kingdom and the United States which referred to the Charter as "The most solemn pact of peace in history." The Charter did not end divergencies but it was nevertheless a necessary instrument. That equally applied to the pact proposed by the Soviet Union. All would agree that divergencies existed which might lead to complications and even to war. The USSR therefore stated that all who wished to avoid war and particularly the permanent members of the Security Council should enter into a pact to assist in the solution of their differences. The Venezuelan attitude was a dangerous one. The representative of the Soviet Union argued that the proposed pact could present no obstacle to the solution of differences but that it was difficult to

maintain that the absence of a pact would render the situation easier. Somebody might perhaps claim that a solution could have been found more readily if the Charter had not existed, but the very existence of the United Nations opened a door to agreement and the Soviet Union was proposing to open yet another.

30. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled the statement of the representative of Uruguay to the effect that the dispute between Bolivia and Peru had only found a solution after sixty-six different proposals had been made. That was why, at the present time, Members of the United Nations should keep on striving to find a road leading to co-operation and the resolution of differences. Why not keep hoping that the solution would be found? The important question was whether the desire to find that road existed. There was no doubt that in all history, no treaty had ever ended all differences between the contracting parties. However, without the treaties the situations would have become more difficult. Mr. Vyshinsky accordingly rejected the reckoning of the representative of Venezuela.

31. That representative had also claimed that it would be improper to endorse a pact without knowing what its contents were. That criticism was an attempt to evade the issue and could not be taken seriously, since the draft resolution made it clear what the sense of the pact would be. It was intended to ensure the peaceful settlement of all differences; to curb the preparations for a new war; to reduce military budgets and lighten the burden of taxation; to eliminate foreign military and air bases; and to bring an end to aggressive blocs such as the one resulting from the North Atlantic Treaty. Being devoid of weighty arguments, the representative of Venezuela had raised a series of invalid pretexts for rejecting the proposed pact.

32. Mr. Vyshinsky turned to the statement of the representative of Chile (332nd meeting) which he considered remarkable for its display of ignorance, bad faith and rudeness. He had alleged that the proposal for peace negotiations made by Soviet Russia on 4 February 1919 to the United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan had been designed to be unacceptable. The representative of Chile had then said that the present Soviet proposals had also been so formulated as to ensure their rejection. Mr. Vyshinsky doubted that Mr. Santa Cruz had examined carefully or even read the full text of the 1919 proposal. The historical facts were that, at that time, Soviet Russia had gained great victories over its internal enemies and their foreign supporters in the East, South and in the Ukraine. Despite the intervention of no less than fourteen States, the Red Army had been victorious. The Soviet Russian Government had received a radio report and not a formal communication, to the effect that the five Powers were prepared to negotiate at Prinkipo Island with Communist Russia and Kolchak. The Soviet message dated 4 February 1919 had been in reply to that somewhat informal invitation agreeing to a conference on Prinkipo Island, noting the success of Soviet arms and stating the Soviet Government's interest in peace. In addition a number of specific proposals had been put forward: firstly, that negotiations should be initiated for the settlement of the debts of the Tsarist Government; secondly, that discussions

should be held on concessions to be granted to foreign capital; thirdly, that the possibility of settling credit questions should be examined by offering the creditors a certain amount of new materials; and there had also been a number of other important points including a statement of the readiness of Soviet Russia to undertake not to interfere in the internal affairs of other States.

33. The representative of Chile had chosen to brand that communication as a sample of hypocrisy and a series of proposals formulated to ensure their rejection. Such allegations whether made in connexion with the proposals of 1919 or the draft resolution currently before the First Committee were a distortion of the truth. It was quite apparent that the representative of Chile was guilty of bad faith and distortion because the 1919 communication contained nothing which he had attributed to it. Mr. Vyshinsky observed that the reason for the rejection of the 1919 communication was that the leaders in the capitalist countries had considered it inconvenient to conclude peace at that juncture, as it was their hope that they might yet strangle the new-born State.

34. The representative of Chile had again been wrong in asserting that that communication had been the first Soviet peace proposal. Mr. Vyshinsky stated that the first act of the Soviet Russian Government on 7 November 1917 had been to propose peace. That had been rejected by the "peace-loving" capitalist countries. Further proposals had been made during 1918, one addressed to President Wilson, personally, and others to all belligerents. In December 1918 and again in January 1919 further appeals for peace had been made. When the representative of Chile had said that the proposal of 4 February 1919 was the first Soviet peace offer, the question arose whether he had done so on account of bad faith or by sheer ignorance.

35. In dealing with statements made by Lenin, the representative of Chile had seen fit to falsify the texts. Not only had the representative of Chile injected words into the instructions sent by Lenin to Potemkin in 1922, but he had changed some words to give the impression that Lenin had stated that Soviet Russia was to organize intrigues or plots against the capitalist world. In fact, Lenin's words had been to the effect that Soviet Russia would bargain with the capitalist world on an equal footing and that they would be intrigued by its proposals. The Russian word used signified that Lenin had expected to arouse general interest. Lenin's instructions were that Potemkin should bargain with the capitalist world. Among the other distortions indulged in by the representative of Chile was the assertion that Lenin had said that there must be a reservation in all agreements made with capitalistic countries. In fact, said Mr. Vyshinsky, those supposed instruction had been pure invention.

36. Lenin's concept of international relations was clear in all his works. He had stated that both sides necessarily bargained for their own benefit. That could hardly be considered wrong. It was quite evident that the representative of Chile was pursuing his usual slanderous tactics in an attempt to undermine respect for the Soviet Union. Thus, he had claimed that USSR representatives were habitually hypocritical and false and that Mr. Vyshinsky himself adhered to the tradition. Mr. Vyshinsky stated that he was indeed

a successor Potemkin and Litvinoff and followed the teachings of Lenin and Stalin.

37. The Chilean representative had dealt with the relations of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs with Communist Parties abroad and had alleged that it was on instructions from the Soviet Union that the workers and peasants in France had stated that they would not fight against the USSR. Mr. Vyshinsky challenged the representative of Chile to produce documents containing any instructions. If Chile and other capitalistic Governments saw no harm in giving ideological aid to countries with a régime which was agreeable to them, such as Greece and Spain, there seemed to be no reason why the French Communist Party should not offer its sympathies to the Soviet Union.

38. If the representative of Chile objected to the fact that the working classes in some countries did not wish to fight against the Soviet Union, it would appear that he believed the workers ought to be prepared to fight the Soviet Union. Although no country's interest would be served by war, the representative of Chile evidently considered that war with Soviet Union would be advantageous to France.

39. In connexion with the statement by the representative of Chile that the United Kingdom had saved the Soviet Union in the Second World War, Mr. Vyshinsky stated that his country valued the wartime comradeship but that that statement was an exaggeration. In any event, remarks of that nature came ill from a representative of Chile. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled briefly the great offensive launched by the Soviet Union at the request of the Allies in Western Europe at a time the latter had lost the initiative. The Soviet Union sought no tribute for having done that, as it had merely been its duty.

40. The representative of Chile had dealt at some length with the preservation of the sovereignty of States. That reminded Mr. Vyshinsky of the status of Chilean sovereignty, particularly in connexion with its rich copper deposits which were exploited by the Anaconda Copper Company and other United States interests. Although the majority of the Chilean population suffered from malnutrition, the Chilean Government did nothing to raise the standards of living so that there would be cheap labour for the copper interests from whom the Government collected royalties. The Chilean Government also knew that the needs of armaments meant great demand for copper and therefore greater royalties. Chile was peddling its sovereignty.

41. Mr. Vyshinsky then addressed himself to the statement made by the representative of Lebanon at the previous meeting, observing that it was irrelevant and academic. The Lebanese representative had attempted to discuss the Russian soul and had dealt with some of the members of the Soviet Union delegation. Mr. Vyshinsky remarked that the Soviet Union had a population of some 200 millions comprising over seventy different peoples each with its own national soul. The Lebanese representative took his Russian soul from Dostoevsky who was a reactionary writer and could scarcely present a twentieth-century Soviet soul.

42. The Lebanese representative evidently did not understand Tolstoi's *War and Peace* either.

Moreover, he was incorrect in alleging that the communist doctrine of war and evolution ruled out the possibility of peaceful agreement between the communist and capitalist worlds. The arguments presented were without basis. For example, the Lebanese representative had claimed that communism was not defending itself but attacked capitalism and had done so for a century. Mr. Vyshinsky observed that a more thorough reading of the *Communist Manifesto* would have prevented the Lebanese representative from maintaining that communism was an aggressive ideology. Mr. Vyshinsky proceeded to elaborate upon the opening passages of the *Communist Manifesto*, where Marx and Engels had presented the thesis that the power of the bourgeoisie had by its own growth created a situation with which it was unable to cope. The means which the bourgeoisie had used to put an end to the supremacy of the aristocracy would inevitably be directed against itself by the proletariat which it had itself created. Mr. Vyshinsky stated that it was no more correct to claim that communism attacked capitalism than to allege the contrary.

43. The representative of Lebanon contended that the communist philosophy was one of war and revolution. Mr. Vyshinsky stated that was incorrect and that communist philosophy was rather one of peace and of improved industrial relationships. He recommended a closer reading of Lenin and Stalin. Lenin had stated that the main feature of communism was not force but the organization of society and production on a higher basis than obtained in capitalistic countries.

44. The Lebanese representative had produced quotations concerning the need to destroy the governmental machinery in order to create a socialist State. In that connexion, Mr. Vyshinsky observed that until the Paris Commune in 1871, Marx and Engels had assumed that a socialist society could be brought about peacefully. It was only after the suppression of the Commune by force that they had been led to believe that the working classes could not come to power by peaceful means. The fate of the Commune had shown that the main task of the proletariat was to break down the oppressive machinery of the capitalist State and to build governmental machinery to meet its own needs. No capitalistic Government could be expected to enjoy that, but it was a historical law that the bourgeois State would be bound to be replaced by the socialist State. There were, however, exceptions and Marx believed that because of its insular position Great Britain could achieve a socialistic society without resorting to a bloody revolution. That, however, had been before the First World War. Since that time both the United Kingdom and the United States had adopted the military and bureaucratic tradition of Continental Europe. Consequently, the prior condition of any people's revolution was the destruction of that governmental machinery. Mr. Vyshinsky recommended a thorough study of communist literature to the Lebanese representative who would then discover that the question of destroying the machinery of the State was one which depended upon circumstances.

45. War and revolution were not implicit in communist philosophy but were dependent upon circumstances. Mr. Vyshinsky observed that wars had occurred during centuries of capitalistic society and had arisen out of the competitive



nature of that system. On the other hand, there had only been one war with a communist State participating and even then that State had been an ally of capitalistic States. Mr. Vyshinsky did not wish to insinuate that the capitalistic system assumed that there would be war but he contended that it was a system in which there would always be dangers of war.

46. The representative of Lebanon was incorrect even when he stated that all decisive Soviet Union policies were derived from communist philosophy. Mr. Vyshinsky drew attention to the period of "war communism" during which the policies were dictated by the misery and destruction resulting from the first imperialist war and the civil war. Certainly, the NEP (New Economic Policy) period had been dictated by the necessity of educating the peasants in the need for collective farms. Communist philosophy was distinguished from that of the Lebanese representative by the fact that it was derived from real economic and social relations in a State and not from ethereal abstractions.

47. Although the thesis that communism presumed war was without foundation, the Lebanese representative had made it serve as a basis for his contention that communism and capitalism could not co-operate. Mr. Vyshinsky invited a glance into history and at present international relations. The Soviet Union had no desire for war but it would not be frightened. The interview between Generalissimo Stalin and Mr. Roy Howard in 1936 had indicated the Soviet Union policy in foreign relations. At that time Howard had asked whether the USSR would try to impose its ideology by force. Stalin had replied that while the people of the Soviet Union would wish to see socialism established in the neighbouring countries, it would leave it to the peoples concerned to effect the necessary changes. In reply to Howard's question regarding the possibility of world revolution Stalin had stated that the Soviet Union had never had any intention of bringing that about. Mr. Vyshinsky urged avoidance of confusion on two scores: on the one hand, that

world revolution was inevitable, and, on the other, that the Soviet Union was bringing it about. The inevitability of communist revolution had been indicated in the *Communist Manifesto* a hundred years previously. The Lebanese representative had expressed the hope that the people of the Soviet Union would abandon their revolutionary methods without giving up their ideas. Mr. Vyshinsky gave assurances that his people would not give up their ideas and he suggested that others abandon their abstract and idealistic position. Stalin had said that no plans existed to promote a world revolution and that the contrary impression had arisen out of a misunderstanding. He had explained that the Marxist approach was that revolutions would occur in other countries when that would be made possible and necessary by internal conditions in those countries but that revolutions were not for export and that any country wishing to have a revolution would have one, even as the Russian people had had one.

48. In view of the late hour, the CHAIRMAN requested the representative of the USSR to complete his statement at the following meeting.

49. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) proposed that the Committee should not meet the following day since it was the American Thanksgiving. He was prepared to move that formally if a vote was necessary.

50. The CHAIRMAN observed that meetings of the General Assembly and of other Committees were scheduled and he would therefore put the proposal to a vote.

51. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) pointed out that the Assembly had worked on previous "Thanksgivings" and also on previous national holidays. In view of the amount of work before the Committee, he hoped that members would agree to meet on the following day.

*The Argentine proposal was rejected by 21 votes to 15, with 10 abstentions.*

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIXTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 24 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (continued)**

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said the theoretical discussion upon which certain representatives had embarked was incompatible with the tasks of the Committee. If, nevertheless, he had felt obliged to take up the challenge of the representatives of Canada, Chile and Lebanon, the reason was that Marxism and Leninism were being misinterpreted and that it had been falsely concluded that the Soviet Union proposal was insincere and prompted by considerations of tactics and strategy out of keeping with the USSR's real intentions. The purpose of those slanderous statements had been to discredit the peaceful policy that the Soviet State had followed

throughout the thirty-two years of its existence. Nothing could be further from the truth than Mr. Malik's allegation (324th meeting) that each proposal made by the USSR to strengthen peace was just another phase in a general plan for war. On the contrary, those proposals were the logical consequence of the socialist nature of the Soviet Government, which as a matter of principle refused to accept the fact of war, as it refused to accept other factors inherent in the social structure of contemporary capitalist society. The predominant feature of that society was the constant competition that inevitably led to disputes and wars between imperialist States. It was not surprising, therefore, that the primordial task of the Government of the Soviet Union should consist in taking all the necessary measures to prevent, or at least, to localize that danger. Mr. C. Malik could not understand that, since his philosophy was that of

idealism and imperialism. In that connexion, Mr. Vyshinsky read a passage from Lenin's work *The State and the Revolution* according to which the evolution of the capitalist States (even of those which were allegedly the most liberal) in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was characterized by the development of capitalist monopolies and their transformation into a State capitalism with monopolistic characteristics which, in turn, led to the establishment of a bureaucratic and military State machinery, which was increasingly accentuating its policy of the repression and oppression of the proletariat. That evolution had finally led to the establishment of the Soviet State, isolated amongst capitalist nations which, owing to the internal contradictions of their structure, had been obliged to wage a systematic and persistent struggle against the Soviet Union. The USSR, however, needed peace for its own development. In fact, the history of capitalist States was confined to the history of their wars for the possession of material goods, although all those wars had been camouflaged by ideological pretexts. The country represented by Mr. C. Malik was itself deeply involved in such materialistic conflicts. It was enough to recall the Mosul affair and the fight for the oil-fields. The quest for the domination of sources of power played a preponderant part in the evolution of the capitalist system. Thus, it was capitalism that engendered wars, whereas the fundamental idea of communism was the elimination of war.

2. If Mr. C. Malik understood Marxism and Leninism, he would understand that a socialist State could not be administered in the same way as a capitalist State. The governmental structure of a capitalist State was based upon a system of privileges and inequalities, whereas the principles upon which the governmental structure of the Soviet socialist State was founded suppressed such inequalities, eliminated poverty and hunger and forbade the exploitation of man by man. The Soviet Union had tried to introduce those principles into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by submitting amendments, but Mr. C. Malik and his colleagues had rejected those amendments, by refusing, for instance, to insert a clause providing for equal pay for equal work, without distinction as to sex.

3. The experience of the Paris Commune, which had been repressed with so much bloodshed, had shown Marxists that the proletariat could not free itself by peaceful methods and that it would have to resort to other means. Only those who derived their knowledge from Russian counter-revolutionary books could state that socialism could be achieved without altering the structure of the Government in such a manner as to enable it to apply the principles of socialism. But all that dealt with internal organization or policy, Mr. C. Malik, however, alleged that those factors affected foreign relations. In support of his theory, he had—erroneously—quoted Stalin's *Problems of Leninism*. Whereas that book stated that the proletariat, once it had come into power, should arm itself in order to defend itself from its external enemies, Mr. C. Malik interpreted that passage as an assertion that the socialist State, once in power, should take up arms in order to wage war against the outside world, or, in other words, against the capitalist States. Stalin's statements were correct; that had been proved by the experience of the October Revolution. Three-quarters

of Russia had then been conquered by the White Army which had been equipped by foreign interventionists—France, the United Kingdom and the United States—so as to destroy the young socialist State. The organization of the revolutionary armies had not been an expression of the wish to pursue an aggressive foreign policy but, on the contrary, had been due to the requirements of defence against the aggression of imperialist States, which were then hoping to overthrow the new socialist State. Moreover, history proved that the bourgeoisie of one country always supported the bourgeoisie of other countries in overthrowing a revolutionary Government and that it was impossible to organize a new State until such foreign assistance was overcome.

4. Mr. C. Malik had quoted out of context Stalin's remark that a victorious revolutionary country should regard itself as the instrument of the victory of the proletariat of other countries; in so doing Mr. C. Malik had attached to that passage a meaning that it did not possess. That passage occurred in a chapter dealing with the question whether the victory gained by the proletarian class of one country could be definitive and stating the conditions necessary for the consolidation of such a victory. The fact was that such a victory could not be definitive in one country if the capitalist system persisted in other countries and organized crusades against the socialist State, in the hope of restoring a capitalist régime. Generalissimo Stalin himself had told Mr. Howard in 1936 that the Soviet Union would of course prefer to be surrounded by socialist countries, but that the countries adjacent to the Soviet Union would have to decide their form of government for themselves and that the leaders of the Soviet Union were not proposing to export socialism or revolution. It was also stated in the book *The Problems of Leninism* that even when the bourgeoisie had been overthrown, it would continue for a long time to be more powerful than the proletariat which had come to power. The young socialist State should, therefore, devote its efforts to protecting itself against all danger of foreign intervention.

5. By using contrived examples and quotations out of context, Mr. C. Malik had misrepresented the Government of the Soviet Union's real attitude towards its neighbours. It was untrue that the Soviet Union wished to promote revolution in other countries. Although the USSR was surrounded by capitalist States, which certainly constituted a threat to it, it did not wish to attack those States and to pursue an irresponsible policy of adventures. The Soviet Union was not in any way dreaming of imposing socialism upon other countries by armed force. Mr. C. Malik had not understood that point and, furthermore, had absolutely ignored the danger of foreign interference with a view to restoring the former régimes in countries where socialism had triumphed.

6. Mr. C. Malik had stated that the Soviet Union peace proposals bore the stamp of pure cynicism. But surely it was not cynical to try to put an end to preparations for war and to the organization of aggressive and military blocs. Surely it was not cynical to propose a peace pact between the great Powers. In its draft resolution (A/996), the Soviet Union had merely expressed its wish for peace.

7. It had been alleged that it was illogical for the Soviet Union to accuse the United States and the United Kingdom of preparing for a new war and of organizing military blocs against the Soviet Union, while at the same time proposing the conclusion of a peace pact with those States; to argue thus was to misunderstand the manner in which the problem appeared. Indeed, it would have been illogical to propose such a pact if the activities of the United Kingdom and the United States had been inspired by peace. It was precisely because those States were preparing for war against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies that it was essential to sign a peace pact in which they would declare that they had no warlike intentions. If the Soviet Union had taken the problem to the General Assembly and had not approached the United States and the United Kingdom direct, the reason was that the United States had not expressed the intention of settling the outstanding disputes between the two countries, even after the conversations held between Mr. Molotov and General Bedell Smith and those held between Mr. Stalin and Mr. Kingsbury Smith and in spite of the assurances given by the USSR.

8. The Soviet Union considered that, in spite of the division of the modern world into two camps, the forces of humanity, if applied unanimously in the right direction, would succeed in eliminating the danger of war or at least in limiting them and keeping them in check. All the arguments and objections that had been brought forward against the Soviet Union proposal seemed hardly important. It was alleged that the proposed pact would be redundant in view of the existence of the United Nations Charter, but the Charter had not prevented the conclusion of other pacts allegedly intended to strengthen peace. If the Brussels Pact, the North Atlantic Treaty and the Inter-American Treaty could coexist with the Charter, surely so could the five-Power pact. Such a pact would serve as a concrete reaffirmation of the high principles of the Charter. Not only could such a pact be concluded but, in the existing circumstances, it had to be, though of course, it would have been unnecessary if the two Powers concerned had not been preparing for war.

9. Mr. C. Malik's proposal was that of the "third force", oscillating between good and evil, but always attracted towards evil, while having good words on his tongue. The doctrines of the Fathers of the Christian Church, of whom he had spoken, were certainly closer to communist theory than to capitalist theory, since the Church Fathers had wished to put an end to the exploitation of man by man. Mr. C. Malik had also spoken of human rights and had alleged that the Soviet State denied those rights. That was obviously untrue. The Soviet Union had asked that the right to work should be guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but the majority had objected to that proposal. What the Soviet Union did deny was the capitalist conception of human rights. For the communists there was no freedom of the Press if the people had no printing presses and paper at their disposal. It was true that the Soviet Union gave no rights to the enemies of socialism. On the basis of that principle, the Soviet Union had liquidated the "fifth column" instigated in 1938 by France, the United Kingdom, Japan and Germany. There was no room in the Soviet Union for the enemies of

socialism and for fascists. The Soviet Union would never tolerate fascist propaganda or a repetition of the history of the ten years between 1920 and 1930, when thousands of millions of American dollars had been placed at the disposal of hitlerism and German militarism. It had been said then, as it was still being said, that the danger of war lay only in Soviet propaganda, but the war had come, provoked by American and other monopolies, which had armed Hitler in the hope that he would attack some other country; but he had first attacked France and the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union would never admit that kind of freedom of action within its frontiers.

10. The representative of Lebanon felt sorry for the educated classes in the Soviet Union, although thousands of facts could be adduced to prove that the position of Soviet intellectuals was unequalled in other countries.

11. In alleging that in the Soviet Union the State was all-important, whereas the family, the Church and the individual should be superior to the State, Mr. C. Malik was forgetting that the Soviet Constitution of 1936 prescribed respect for religious beliefs and he also forgot that it stated that the individual could not exist without the State, just as the State could not exist without the individual, since they were mutually complementary.

12. Mr. C. Malik had tried to prove that the Soviet Union proposed was based solely on tactical considerations, that the philosophy of communism was war-like and aggressive and that communists tended to export their doctrine to other countries. On the contrary, the history of communism proved that the purpose of the communist philosophy was to eliminate war. The purpose of communism was to eliminate the causes of war that were inherent in the capitalist system, since capitalism was founded upon the principle of the exploitation of man by man.

13. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) said that, when Mr. Manuïlsky had reminded him (332nd meeting) of the existence of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, he had probably lost sight of the fact that, on 14 October 1947, Marshal Stalin had remarked to Mr. Zilliacus, the British M.P., that the establishment of the United Nations had made the treaty practically useless.

14. Mr. McNeil added that, if, as Mr. Eban had asserted, the tone of the language used in the Committee was indicative of the political tension of the time, it was not true that the language increased that tension. In fact, as far as some delegations were concerned, propaganda had replaced diplomatic conversations. It was inevitable when, in some countries, all the means of information were in the hands of the State, that diplomatic language should become more forthright, and the democracies must reply to the manoeuvres of Soviet propaganda.

15. The figures given by Mr. Vyshinsky on the percentage of military expenditure in relation to the budgets of various countries could not be taken seriously. In point of fact, different countries had very different methods of compiling their budgets and no comparison was possible. Thus, the USSR budget included the expenditure for the industrial organization of the country, whereas that expenditure did not appear in the United Kingdom budgets or those of the United

States and other countries. Municipal expenditure was not shown in the United Kingdom's budget either. Thus the figures quoted were misleading and could not usefully be compared.

16. A fairer method, however, would be to study the ratio between the military budget of the various States and their national income. Such a comparison would show that, in 1948, the military expenditure of the USSR represented 15 per cent of the national income of the Soviet Union, whereas that of the United Kingdom represented only 8 per cent, that of France, the Netherlands and the United States, 6 per cent, and that of Belgium, 2 per cent.

17. It would also be desirable that every State should give statistics of the strength of its armed forces. The United Kingdom published such figures annually. By contrast, Mr. Vyshinsky had been unwilling to reveal the total strength of the USSR armed forces. Mr. McNeil reminded the meeting that, the previous year, he had estimated the figure at approximately 4 million and the figure had not been denied. If the representative of the USSR wished to dispel anxiety, he should himself supply data and, if an international commission were allowed to check the information submitted, all suspicion would be ended. Unfortunately, Mr. Vyshinsky had persisted in his refusal and had submitted only those figures which could neither be compared nor checked. The only possible conclusion to be drawn from his attitude was that he was not seeking to enlighten the Committee, but to confuse the situation. The discussion would, in any case, have shown the Soviet Union why impartial and objective people dreaded the Soviet Union and its adherents, but did not dread the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. Mr. Vyshinsky had failed to convince the Committee of his good intentions and thus no progress had been achieved.

18. Mr. Vyshinsky might also say that he had no confidence in the good intentions of the democracies. It was difficult, however, to see how he could take such an attitude since history, and the history of the United Kingdom in particular, showed that that country had never nourished aggressive intentions and that its policy was controlled by public opinion. The representatives of Burma, Colombia, and India had pointed out that the statements made in the USSR draft resolution on the aggressive intentions of the United Kingdom and the United States were groundless. Moreover, the representative of the USSR could certainly not complain that the United Kingdom and the United States had never made concessions. Mr. McNeil recalled the concessions made to the USSR, both in Europe and in Asia immediately after the Second World War, in the hope of gaining the friendship of that country. Those efforts had, however, proved vain; nor had the vehement language in which Mr. Vyshinsky addressed the Committee helped to put their minds at rest. It was difficult to see how Mr. Vyshinsky could reproach the United Kingdom of not having made concessions, while his own attitude remained altogether inflexible. Had he not replied on the previous day to the representative of Lebanon that the standpoint of the USSR would not change and had he not appeared to boast that his views were beyond criticism? Had he not also declared, a year previously, that the USSR would never accept the plan for the control

of atomic energy proposed by the majority? In the circumstances, it was difficult to see how he dared pose as the champion of progress, when he did not budge an inch in his ideas. It was an old British tradition to believe in discussion as a means of solving problems. Where there were mutual concessions, it was always possible to reach a solution without yielding on principles. If Mr. Vyshinsky was resolved to refuse in advance to consider even the possibility of concession, no progress would be made in any direction; yet, if the two halves of the world wished to survive without having recourse to war, they had to make a joint endeavour to restore the broken lines of communication.

19. The representative of the United Kingdom read a telegram from Prague stating that the *United Nations Bulletin* of 16 November had been confiscated by the Czech Authorities because it gave the complete text of the joint draft resolution put forward by the United States and the United Kingdom calling upon every nation to promote full freedom for the peaceful expression of political opposition. Thus Mr. McNeil wondered whether any useful purpose could really be served by putting forward and considering draft resolutions that the populations of the People's Democracies were not even allowed to read textually. Such methods, just as the "jamming" of BBC broadcasts, were unlikely to make for mutual understanding.

20. At a previous meeting (335th meeting), Mr. Vyshinsky had said that ideological intervention might lead to war. On the one hand, that statement might prove accurate if there was any tampering with facts to mislead the peoples. From another point of view, however, the statement was not true since it was essential that peoples should have access to facts, that they should be able to absorb them and test them in the light of their own experiences. The free exchange of information was thus one of the essential conditions if international relations were to remain possible and if ideological intervention were to be avoided.

21. The representative of the USSR also considered that it was inevitable that changes would be brought about by revolution. That being so, he might legitimately be asked whether he was more concerned for the maintenance of peace in the world or for furthering the relentless march of world revolution. Did not the troubles fomented by communist agents in Greece, Korea and other parts of the world constitute ideological interventions which were endangering peace?

22. A new era of peace might dawn if the communists would realize that the maintenance of world peace was more important than their local attempts at disturbance. Similarly, if the representatives of the USSR were to tell members of the Communist Party to disassociate themselves from violence, by that act alone, they would be making a real contribution to the preparation of world peace and would make it possible to break down the barrier separating East and West.

23. Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa) recalled that, if it was true that peace was an absence of armed conflict, then peace did exist at the present time. But was that a fact? The very fact that it was possible to ask that question showed that the USSR had been right in sub-

mitting a draft resolution on that subject. The United Nations must study it closely if they were to fulfil their main obligation: the maintenance of peace and international security.

24. The small States did not provide grounds for fear. They had really hoped that peace could in fact be assured by collective security. Unfortunately, the great Powers had failed to achieve that collective security and it was they who possessed the most deadly weapons. To satisfy the demands of the USSR, the other four great Powers had doubtless made concessions which, alas, had been of no avail.

25. Recalling that Mr. Vyshinsky had complained of the automatic majority in the Committee, Mr. Jordaan pointed out that the USSR and its associates had cut themselves off from the rest of the world by a barrier of fear. Had it not been for that fear, nations desirous to co-operate with other States would not have been obliged to sign the North Atlantic Treaty.

26. It was for the USSR to take the initiative in dispelling that fear, since no one could seriously believe that the United Kingdom and the United States were preparing for a war of aggression against the USSR. It was good to notice the readiness of the United Kingdom and the United States to establish friendly relations with the USSR and to note that Mr. Vyshinsky had in fact stated that widely differing ideologies could live side by side.

27. In the light of those considerations, it was strange that the USSR draft resolution should begin with a condemnation of the States to which it was holding out the olive branch. Furthermore, there seemed to be no need for a new pact, since the Charter laid down the principles governing peace. Hence, it would be advisable rather to respect engagements already entered into than to conclude others.

28. The joint draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/549) seemed unnecessary, since it added nothing to the principles of the Charter. Nevertheless, with some reservation on drafting amendments, particularly with regard to atomic energy, the delegation of the Union of South Africa would support the draft resolution so as not to oppose the general tendency to reaffirm the principles of the Charter.

29. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) thought that the discussion with the representatives of the majority was reminiscent of a conversation with the deaf. In fact, those representatives had merely repeated outworn arguments, without replying to the arguments which had been submitted in the discussion. Mr. Santa Cruz had stated, in particular (332nd meeting), that in the democratic countries there were no questions which could not be solved by peaceful methods. If that was the case, should one conclude that Chile was not a democracy, since concentration camps existed in that country and since the police fired on demonstrators? As to the representative of Bolivia, he had maintained (333rd meeting) that the USSR did not wish to accept any control over atomic energy. Had he then forgotten Mr. Vyshinsky's statement, to the effect that the USSR was ready to accept such a control, without, however, surrendering the ownership of atomic plants to American super-trusts?

30. The representative of India had referred to freedom of the Press (332nd meeting). But that was a notion which lent itself to many interpretations. In the countries of the People's Democracies, freedom of the Press signified that it was free from the control of trusts and cartels.

31. Mr. McNeil had maintained that the Czech authorities had seized a United Nations news bulletin. Without giving an opinion as to the exactitude of that information, the representative of Poland pointed out that the United Kingdom and the United States Embassies in Poland also published bulletins reproducing official documents from their Governments, as well as records of United Nations meetings. The question was not that those bulletins published United Nations resolutions, but rather that they accompanied such reproductions with comments which were, at times, insulting. Thus, in one of those bulletins, Poland had been called a satellite State. Poland could not tolerate such insults, and would confiscate every injurious publication of that nature. It was highly probable that the confiscation of the *United Nations Bulletin* at Prague had been due to similar reasons which Mr. McNeil had omitted to indicate.

32. The representative of Poland agreed with the representative of India that the same word could have different meanings. Thus, the word "sovereignty" could have several meanings. It was surprising, however, that the representative of India did not recall that the USSR representatives had stated that their country was ready to renounce part of its sovereignty and that it had, in fact, already done so voluntarily by submitting to international obligations, such as the Charter, for instance. However, such renunciation of sovereignty should be made for the benefit of all mankind, and not for that of one State thirsting for power, such as the United States, which, in the field of atomic energy, wished to gain world control. The maxim "Law is the king of kings", which had been referred to by the representative of India, should be taught rather in the United States or in the United Kingdom, which for centuries had been guided by the principle "Might is right" in its relations with India.

33. Mr. McNeil had emphasized (329th meeting) that no one could possibly say that Denmark had aggressive designs, yet he himself had accused Albania of aggressive designs against Greece. Doubtless, Denmark was a small State. The accusation was not that that State was itself aggressive, but that it was used for purposes of aggression by the great Powers.

34. The representative of Poland wondered why Iceland had signed the North Atlantic Treaty, when that country was not threatened on the part of the USSR, and when the free community of democratic peoples, to which that representative had alluded (333rd meeting), was represented, not by the signatories of the Treaty, but by the United Nations. The representative of Iceland had stated that the United States troops had withdrawn from his country, but had forgotten to mention that they had maintained military bases there. That attitude of the United States could be compared to the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the island of Bornholm, on Danish territory, after hostilities had ceased.

35. Mr. Wierblowski recalled that the USSR representative had made a proposal, the preceding year, for the reduction of armaments by one-third<sup>1</sup> and that, in the current year, he had proposed a resolution on disarmament in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee<sup>2</sup>. If Mr. McNeil had not opposed those proposals, he would have obtained the figures he desired concerning the armed forces of the USSR. In fact, Mr. McNeil was opposed to all proposals on disarmament, on the grounds of the distrust prevailing in international relations. In order to dispel that distrust, one should begin by making concessions.

36. Replying to the representative of the Netherlands, the representative of Poland said that it was not true that hatred among peoples was being preached in the USSR. On the other hand, the American Press contained numerous examples of incitements to hatred and contempt. He quoted an article which had appeared in *Colliers*, in which the former military commandant in Berlin, General Frank Howley, had called the Russians liars, crooks and bandits. He pointed out that such propaganda was not of a nature to promote good relations among peoples.

37. He noted that most representatives, either because of a persecution mania or because of a political manoeuvre, saw the spectre of communism everywhere. He recalled, in that respect, the document "M", which had been manufactured by the British Intelligence Service, with a view to lending credence to the preparation of a communist plot in Germany. That theory was not a new one, and those who preferred to ignore the wishes of the masses, and to concoct stories would achieve no result.

38. As to the alleged Soviet nationality of the Polish Minister of National Defence, to which the representative of the Netherlands had alluded (333rd meeting), Mr. Wierblowski recalled once again that the allegations which had been made on that subject were untrue, and observed that the Commander-in-Chief of the Dutch Armies was not born in the Netherlands and had lived in Germany all his youth.

39. He said that Poland felt it had been betrayed by France during the "phoney war" of 1939, and that the Poles who had fought in France in 1940 had been deceived in the same way as the French people, by the French Government of that time. Poles knew that the Red Army, which had occupied Byelorussia and Western Ukraine, had merely accomplished an act of historical justice.

40. He felt that the joint United States-United Kingdom draft resolution was harmful. It had no bearing on the problem at issue, because it did

not name those who had violated the Charter and who were none others than the authors of the proposal themselves. In that regard, it was well to remember that at a Press conference, a few days previously, a United Kingdom representative had stated that his country would not comply with the decisions of the Assembly relating to Trust Territories, and that the United Nations flag would never be unfurled beside the British flag in those territories. In those conditions, how could one have any faith in the loyalty of the United Kingdom towards the United Nations?

41. The joint draft resolution did not provide for the destruction of atomic stocks and did not put an end to war propaganda. It put an end neither to the isolation of Eastern Europe nor to the North Atlantic Treaty. It was merely a hypocritical call on the small nations to assume all the responsibility of the cold war. If the United Kingdom was ready to make concessions, it would seem that its inclination depended on the party with which it was dealing. In any case, that draft resolution proved that the United Kingdom had made no concession to those countries against whom it had started the cold war. On the other hand, the USSR draft resolution offered a compromise. For that reason the Polish delegation would support it.

42. Mr. ORDONNEAU (France), in reply to the argument which had been advanced by the representative of Poland against French policy in 1939, pointed out that it was not France which had been responsible for the fact that Franco-Polish relations were no longer what they had been in the past. In a historical survey of the secular relations of brotherhood between the two countries, he recalled that in 1939 the United Kingdom and France had declared war on Germany in order to come to the defence of Poland, whereas the USSR had come to an agreement with Germany in order to carry out a new partition of Poland. Finally, if Munich was a painful memory for France, it must be an equally painful one for the representative of Poland. France, at least, had not benefitted from the partition of Czechoslovakia and had not claimed the territory of Teschen.

43. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) asked for permission to reply to the allusion which the representative of France had made to the USSR.

44. The CHAIRMAN stated that representatives could reply to remarks which had been made concerning their countries at the following meeting.

45. Mr. ANDREN (Sweden) proposed the adjournment and, there being no objections, the CHAIRMAN declared the meeting adjourned.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Annex to the Plenary Meetings*, document A/723.

<sup>2</sup> See document A/AC.31/L.35.

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.



### THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SEVENTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 25 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (concluded)**

1. The CHAIRMAN called on the Polish representative who wished to clear up a point regarding the French representative's statement (336th meeting).
2. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) recalled that the French representative had taken offence at certain allusions he had made to the role played by the French Government at the time of Munich and during the "phoney war". It was the French representative himself who had provoked those references by praising the attitude adopted by France towards Poland in September 1939 and by even going so far as to state that in 1939 France had defended Poland.
3. In his historical survey of two centuries of Franco-Polish relations, Mr. Ordonneau had made only one true remark. It was in fact true that France had done nothing to help Poland when that country had been first divided. Furthermore, when Poland had been in danger either France had been weak and thus unable to do anything or else, when it had been strong, it had been unwilling to do anything.
4. The French Revolution, to which everyone paid tribute, had been assisted to a great extent by Poles whose blood had flown freely in its defence. On the other hand, when the two Polish revolts of 1831 and 1863 had taken place France had provided purely verbal help.
5. In stating that France, the United Kingdom and the United States had freed Poland in 1918, Mr. Ordonneau had no doubt forgotten that France had agreed with its Russian ally not to raise the question of Poland. It had taken three revolutions and the heroic struggle of the Polish people to free Poland. One of the first acts of the Soviet revolutionary Government had been to declare the independence of Poland. As far as the events of 1938 were concerned, it was true to state that the attitude of the fascist Polish Government towards Czechoslovakia had been as odious as that of France. The only difference was that those who had then been masters of Poland had been removed from Polish political life while the same thing could not be said of Mr. Reynaud and Mr. Daladier. The following year, in 1939, France had not rendered any help to the Poles, while millions of them had been rescued from Hitler's clutches by the Soviet Union. Finally, the current attitude of the French Government towards Viet-Nam, Morocco and Madagascar was in striking contrast to that of Poland, which, revolted by the role of oppressor, had freed the Ukrainian and Byelorussian populations.
6. France had shown its gratitude to those Poles who had shed their blood for France betrayed, by presenting a bill for military supplies. If that was in fact the balance-sheet of the policy followed by the French Government towards Poland, the friendship which remained between the two peoples and which the heroism of the Polish members of the Paris Commune under the leadership of Jaroslav Dombrowski had sealed could not be forgotten. Thousands of Poles who had fought in the ranks of the French resistance had faith in the future of France, the revival of which would make for easier understanding between the two peoples.
7. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) was sorry that the Polish representative had engaged in a discussion which had nothing to do with the current debate and which, moreover, had become a matter of history. France could therefore only leave the responsibility for an unbelievably indecent speech to the Polish representative.
8. In 1944, when people had been fighting in Warsaw and in Paris for the same cause, Frenchmen and Poles had been fraternally united: the memory of that new episode in a friendship which had remained constant through the centuries only made the attitude of the Polish representative all the more regrettable.
9. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that one striking conclusion emerged from the discussion on the Soviet Union's proposal entitled "condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusions of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace" (A/996). All the efforts of the opponents of the USSR proposal had in fact tended to turn the discussion from the political plane to one of a controversy relating to Marxism and Leninism.
10. What had been the aim of the Lebanese representative and the small fry associated with the Anglo-American bloc? It had really been to make the First Committee forget the inability of the United States and United Kingdom representatives to give any reply to the facts, stated in the Soviet Union proposal, which had been irrevocably proved during the discussions. It was in vain that the representatives of Chile, Yugoslavia and Lebanon had played their "star" parts and had proved themselves more royalist than the kings of Wall Street and the City. The representative of Lebanon, in particular, had treated the members of the First Committee like schoolboys and had given them a beginner's course in Marxism.
11. That, however, was not the question. The question was merely whether the General Assembly did or did not condemn preparations for a new war, wished to prohibit the use of atomic weapons and desired a pact to be concluded between the five Powers. Those were the questions to which the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom should reply in person.
12. Moreover, the representative of Lebanon had, generally speaking, avoided touching upon the substance of the question raised by the USSR draft resolution, and the representative of the Soviet Union had already disposed of the few arguments adduced by the Lebanese delegation (335th and 336th meetings). Further, with regard to the religious mysticism, the political obscurantism and the pseudo-scientific charlatanism of Mr. C. Malik, some hypocritical remarks on

the role played by the Soviet Union during the Second World War and its work after the war, had ill concealed a fierce hatred of the Soviet Union which was ceaselessly fighting for peace. Under the guise of a sermon, a policy of war preparation against the Soviet Union was being approved. Mr. C. Malik, like Mr. Spaak, had pretended to fear the alleged aggressive intentions of world communism in his attempt to use a so-called menace on the part of the USSR to justify Anglo-American war preparations.

13. The proposal of the Soviet Union made short shrift of those accusations; it condemned the preparations for a new war and proposed the prohibition of atomic weapons and the conclusion of a five-Power pact. It had aroused the bitter opposition of the United States and the United Kingdom. But those who, like the Lebanese representative, followed their leader, were merely passing off their complete approval of United States policy with specious references to an eternal truth which allegedly had nothing to do with and was above the class struggle. The use made of such mysticism showed its real origin: it was a product of the ruling class, its only purpose was to serve the aggressive plans of leading circles in the United States and the United Kingdom and help them to cause the Soviet Union proposal to be rejected.

14. With the same end in view Mr. C. Malik had said that the real problem was not to prevent war, since the world was already in a state of war, but to put an end to the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union; he had asked how peace could be re-established when dialectical materialism denied any possibility of peace. It must be confessed that such an interpretation of historical materialism, which was accused of promoting war, betrayed somewhat surprising ignorance or dishonesty on the part of a propagandist of the eternal truth. Anxious above all to exculpate the United States and the United Kingdom, in whose service he had enrolled, Mr. Malik had disregarded the basic law of Marxist dialectics, the law of opposites. What would the progressive forces gain by provoking a war, when the new must inevitably gain ascendancy over the old and their triumph was assured in any case? It was, in reality, the forces of reaction which were inescapably doomed and which were pinning all their hopes in conventional armaments or in atomic weapons in order to delay the emergence of a new social order. Stalin had therefore been stating a scientifically unsailable principle when he had said that war was the inevitable handmaiden of capitalism, as were economic crises. That had already been proved by history. Had not the Second World War been unleashed by fascism, in other words, by grasping reactionary forces seeking to impede the inevitable action of the law of opposites? At the moment the sole objective of those who aspired to world domination was to prepare a new world war.

15. It was true that, in order to justify the preparations for a new war, another argument had been used, to the effect that war would be the result of ideological conflicts. But that "eternal truth" of which Mr. C. Malik had spoken had also been contradicted by the experience of the Second World War, in which British and American capitalists had fought against capitalist Germany,

Italy and Japan alongside a socialist Power, the Soviet Union. Moreover, the idea of an ideological war was not new. It dated from the time of the nazi party rallies in Nürnberg, when the militants of the party had been called upon to undertake a crusade against the Soviet Union and the communist conspiracy. The truth was that wars were caused by the action of imperialist cliques struggling for world markets, while trying at the same time to retain their positions and to acquire new ones. That was why Lenin had written that imperialism was the epoch of finance, capital, monopoly, and of the worst forms of reaction, whatever the differences in political structure. That period was marked by constantly growing oppression of nationalities and repeated annexations.

16. Those pages of Lenin were most actual at the present time when the greed of the monopolies was forcing peoples, one by one, to relinquish their right of sovereignty. History was once more bearing out the Marxist truth that aggressive wars were the product of a conflict of interests resulting from the action of monopolies in trying to impose their tyranny on the whole world. The representative of Yugoslavia, therefore, in his zeal to propitiate his masters, must have sunk very low to have asserted that a war could break out between socialist States.

17. The representative of Lebanon, in his anxiety to oppose the Soviet Union proposal and the peaceful co-existence of two different economic and social systems and their practical co-operation, had tried to hold the Soviet Union responsible for the difficulties facing the capitalist world. Had it by any chance been the Soviet Union, rather than imperialist circles, which had provoked two world wars? As recalled by Marshal Stalin on 9 February 1946, the Marxists had repeatedly pointed out the contradictions, highly productive of conflicts and crises, inherent in capitalism. Thus, the two latest world wars had broken out in the wake of economic crises. Was it to be wondered that an ever-growing number of countries were throwing off the capitalist system?

18. In a fresh attempt to undermine the confidence felt in the Soviet Union by millions of human beings, the representative of Lebanon had also resorted to slandering the structure of Soviet society in which, he said, human personality was no more than a grain of sand. Mr. C. Malik had deplored the importance attached by the Soviet Union to material factors. But that was forgetting that contemporary man was not a Robinson Crusoe. To ensure the development of each member of the community, certain material conditions were essential. In the Soviet Union, development of the mind had therefore kept step with the material development of the community. For the animal instincts of greed and contempt for one's neighbour, the Soviet Union had substituted altruism and a feeling for the good of the community which had inspired the heroes of Stalingrad, Moscow and Leningrad, heroes to whom the representative of Lebanon had himself had to pay tribute. Mr. C. Malik had, however, felt free to speak of the so-called tyranny which the Soviet State wielded, forgetting that that State was not indifferent to human needs, that it was a State of workers and peasants guaranteeing the rights of work and a solution to the problems

of social security entirely neglected in the United States. Moreover, merit was the only criterion for choosing the leaders of the Soviet Union and not, as in capitalist countries, fortune, birth or influence. Finally, no system of mystic individualism such as the one outlined by Mr. C. Malik could have produced men like the Soviet heroes of labour or the heroes of Stalingrad.

19. In all fields, Soviet culture had gained the admiration of the whole world. Would successes have been possible if the human personality had been oppressed and "regimented" as Mr. C. Malik had asserted? Such Soviet progress contrasted with the decline of Western culture, which had so few leaders and artists, because it was based on selfish interests and human personality was crushed in the bestial scramble for wealth and honours.

20. In order to distract attention from the superiority of Soviet culture, Mr. C. Malik had resorted to inflated rhetoric, just as in a book which had appeared at the time of the First World War on *The Problems of Idealism*, White Guards who had been driven out of the Soviet Union and had found refuge in the Western countries, had conducted a slander campaign against the Soviet Union. It was such nonsense on the part of *émigrés* that Mr. Malik wished to present as a novelty. But all his talk of morality and love could not hide the intellectual poverty of the West. It was especially distasteful to hear the representative of the Lebanon talking of human rights when, by his vote in the General Assembly, he had become the executioner of the Greek democrats. Mr. C. Malik, it was true, came from a part of the world which had known and still knew the imperialist yoke. It was not he, however, but the representative of the Soviet Union who raised his voice on behalf of the betrayed and massacred Indonesians, for instance. Even an atheist looked upon an appeal to the Supreme Being by a delegation which had become a party to the horrors in Greece and Indonesia as blasphemy. It was also blasphemy to speak of the cynicism of the Soviet Union, the true conscience of mankind, of which the optimism, courage and faith in the future of mankind was in such contrast to the Spenglerian pessimism of the Lebanese representative.

21. For a citizen of the Soviet Union, it was a sickening spectacle to see hypocrisy and mysticism serving as a veil for the aggressive aims of Mr. C. Malik's protectors.

22. In the same camp as the Lebanese representative, the representative of a Yugoslavia which had broken off its connexions with the free world and terrorized the friends of the Soviet Union, was now indulging in war propaganda. Those men were striving to sap the authority of the Governments of the People's Democracies. Having burned their bridges behind them, those renegades had gone over to the camp of the leaders of imperialist reaction whose favour they were trying to curry. They had to try to convince their protectors that their hostile attitude to the Soviet Union was based on real convictions and not on the fear of receiving well-deserved punishment. That explained the attitude of the Yugoslav delegation to the Soviet Union proposal. Uniting in the chorus of the slanderers of the Soviet Union, they dared to speak of so-called insincerity on the part of the Soviet Union and to claim that

that Power, instead of acting in accordance with its words, was refusing to recognize the rights of small countries. But the Soviet Union could not be asked to demonstrate the self-evident absurdity of the interpretation given by Yugoslavia of its break with the Soviet Union. The latter had indeed in no way imperilled the independence of Yugoslavia: it was Yugoslavia which had betrayed socialism and, under the auspices of the United Kingdom and the United States, had sought new friendships with the Kuomintang and the Athens Governments. That was the historical truth, which had already been established by the Rajk trial and which the attitude of the Yugoslav delegation during the current session had proved to be a palpable reality. The representative of the Soviet Union, in a masterly way, had disposed of the slanders of the Yugoslav representative and had completely defeated the pitiable arguments of the opponents of the Soviet Union and of Mr. McNeil in particular.

23. Mr. Manuisky could, therefore, at the moment, limit himself to recalling the statements he had previously made concerning his position regarding the draft resolutions before the First Committee.

24. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) observed that one of the psychological characteristics of "Soviet man" was that he did not even conceive of the possibility of an objective truth, and that he could not imagine any solution to a problem without relating it to the dogma of class struggle. Just as the nazis had conceived a specifically German science, in terms of race, so the communists only conceived of science in terms of the class concept. By systematically seeking the origin of social theories in the social class of their authors, and by relating all cultural problems to the same class concept, the Soviet Union representatives left no hope of achieving a positive result.

25. For once, Mr. Vyshinsky had found himself on the defensive. It was not an easy thing for him, indeed, to prove that Marxism-Leninism was not revolutionary and did not desire the violent overthrow of existing régimes; that the proletariat revolution triumphant in one country limited its action within the frontiers of that country and did not attempt to consolidate its position by contributing to the success of revolution in other countries; that revolution sprang inevitably from the very nature of capitalism but should not be accelerated by human intervention. In actual fact, the dogmas of Marxism-Leninism were diametrically opposed to those conceptions, and in spite of Mr. Vyshinsky's talent it was difficult to prove both the thesis and the antithesis. Mr. C. Malik added that he had not distorted the meaning of the quotations he had given from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, but that they reflected the fundamental dogmas of Marxism which could moreover be easily checked by reading those works.

26. He recognized that, although the USSR representative had attempted to maintain the objective and scientific character of the debate, he had been unable to prevent himself from using *ad hominem* arguments, claiming in particular, that the attitude of the Lebanese representative had been vitiated by the social class to which he belonged. If that dialectical reasoning was to be followed, Marxism also might be analysed in

terms of the social class, personality and origin of Marx.

27. Mr. Vyshinsky had been surprised at Mr. C. Malik's criticism of the Western world. That surprise was due to the fact that the USSR representative was not accustomed to the phenomenon of sincere self-criticism. The latter was to the honour of Western civilization and would enable it, in the future, to recover its pristine glory.

28. Mr. Vyshinsky has misunderstood the thought of the Lebanese representative when he believed that the latter was in agreement with the aims of communism but not with the means used by communism for achieving those aims. That was quite wrong; the problem might be stated in the following terms: could the aims of communism only be achieved by communist methods and by sacrificing the other spiritual values excluded by communism? Mr. C. Malik was convinced that the Western world might reach the same social advantages as those aimed at by communism, within the framework of its own spiritual values, provided communism did not constantly interfere in its internal affairs.

29. Mr. THORS (Iceland), replying to the USSR and Polish representatives, concerning the military bases which the United States supposedly maintained in Iceland first remarked that the Polish representative must have been the victim of a mistranslation, when he had declared that the United States had perhaps maintained in Iceland civil bases similar to those demanded by Hitler before the war. Iceland had never been occupied by Germany and, in 1939, had rejected hitlerite demands for the construction of civil air bases.

30. He added that the United States had no military bases in Iceland. According to an agreement reached between Iceland and the United States, in October 1946, installations built by the United States had been transferred to the Icelandic Government; all United States military personnel had been withdrawn from Iceland. The United States had only the right to employ civil aeronautical technicians so long as it had obligations in Germany resulting from the war. In the circumstances, one could not speak of United States military bases in Iceland.

31. Mr. RIEMENS (Netherlands) observed that Mr. Manuisky had contradicted Mr. Vyshinsky. On the one hand, the Ukrainian SSR considered itself the protector of the peoples of Indonesia; on the other, Mr. Vyshinsky had declared that the Indonesian negotiators were traitors. The Hague Agreement would guarantee the complete independence of Indonesia, and should not therefore be unfavourably received by those who called themselves the protectors of Indonesia. He would reply to the USSR representative in greater detail during the discussion of the Indonesian question.

32. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), replying to the French representative who had asked where the Soviet Union was in 1939 when France and the United Kingdom had attacked Germany in order to defend Poland, recalled that, in the spring of 1939, the French and British Governments had sent to Moscow second-class representatives without full powers to negotiate with the USSR, since those Governments, as Lloyd George had pointed out, did not in reality wish to reach an agreement with

the USSR. They had merely wished to use the Moscow negotiations as a screen to hide the negotiations between Hitler on the one hand, and Daladier and Chamberlain on the other. The United Kingdom and France had wished to push Hitler into a rapid attack on the USSR. As Marshal Stalin had explained, on 3 July 1941, the German-Soviet pact had been signed by the USSR with the sole aim of gaining time, for the Soviet leaders had known in advance that that pact would some day be violated by Hitler. In that way the USSR had been able to arm itself and, thanks to the victory of Stalingrad and the fall of Berlin, had been able to save France.

33. Addressing himself to the Lebanese representative, Mr. Vyshinsky indicated that he had never said, and that it would be absurd to say, that the fact of someone having sprung from a specific social class conditioned the correctness of his attitude. If such were the case, Mr. Vyshinsky would be speaking against himself since he himself had come from the small bourgeoisie and not from the proletariat or peasant class. It was equally absurd to say that the exact sciences were vitiated by class tendencies. What was true was that mathematics or other exact sciences might assume political significance according to the use made of them. Mr. C. Malik might read with profit Lenin's book *Materialism and Empirical Criticism* in which the author had indicated that physics, in a class society, might serve as a weapon to defend class interests.

34. He pointed out to Mr. C. Malik that, although he claimed to be poor, he in fact belonged to the capitalist class. To belong to that class, it was necessary to have been born in it or to be rich. The children of the rich had the opportunity of following their bents outside politics, while others, who served as their spokesmen, enrolled in their service for financial considerations.

35. He had never tried to prove, as Mr. C. Malik claimed, that Marxism was not revolutionary. Marxism was revolutionary; the philosophy of communism, however, was not a philosophy of violence. Lenin had indicated that, when it assumed power, the fundamental task of the proletariat was to establish new relationships in the field of production. As for violence, it was, as Marx had said, the corner-stone for the birth of any revolution. It was a mistake, however, to believe that everything must be reduced to violence. For example, the suppression of the bourgeoisie's right to vote was not an indispensable part of a revolution. If the USSR had done so, it was because the Russian bourgeoisie had joined with the French, British and American bourgeoisie in an attempt to re-establish capitalism in Russia. The same thing had happened in France and the United Kingdom during their revolutions in the eighteenth and seventeenth centuries respectively.

36. Contrary to what Mr. C. Malik believed, Mr. Vyshinsky had not been surprised that the Lebanese representative had criticized western civilization. He had, however, been surprised that Mr. C. Malik had distorted the facts by stating that the western world lacked leaders. Mr. Vyshinsky said that there were leaders in the West but that they were not in power.

37. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) stated that he would reply to the accusations which had been made against his country at a plenary meeting.

38. The CHAIRMAN announced that the discussion was closed and called for a vote on the USSR draft resolution (A/996).

39. At the request of Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) the CHAIRMAN stated that the vote would be taken paragraph by paragraph. He put the first paragraph to the vote.

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Greece, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

*Against:* Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France.

*Abstaining:* Yemen, Yugoslavia.

*The paragraph was rejected by 52 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.*

40. The CHAIRMAN put paragraph 2 to the vote.

*The paragraph was rejected by 38 votes to 3, with 16 abstentions.*

41. At the request of Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) the CHAIRMAN stated that the vote on paragraph 3 would be taken by roll-call.

42. At the request of Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) the CHAIRMAN stated that a separate vote would be taken on each of the two sentences of paragraph 3. He put the first sentence of that paragraph to the vote.

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Belgium, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Guatemala, Israel, Lebanon, Philippines, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan.

*Against:* Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia.

*Abstaining:* Burma, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Venezuela, Argentina.

*The first sentence of paragraph 3 was rejected by 19 votes to 14, with 26 abstentions.*

43. The CHAIRMAN put the second sentence of paragraph 3 to the vote.

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Afghanistan, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen.

*Against:* Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

*Abstaining:* Afghanistan, Argentina, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria.

*The second sentence of paragraph 3 was rejected by 41 votes to 6, with 12 abstentions.*

44. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the joint proposal submitted by the United States and United Kingdom (A/C.1/549).

45. At the request of Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) the CHAIRMAN stated that the vote would be taken paragraph by paragraph.

46. At the request of Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) the CHAIRMAN stated that the vote on the first paragraph would be taken by roll-call. He put that paragraph to the vote.

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Paraguay, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama.

*Abstaining:* Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

*The first paragraph was adopted by 54 votes, with 5 abstentions.*

47. The CHAIRMAN put the second paragraph to the vote.

*The second paragraph was adopted by 54 votes, with 5 abstentions.*

48. The CHAIRMAN put the third paragraph to the vote.

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa.

*Abstaining:* Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*The third paragraph was adopted by 54 votes, with 5 abstentions.*

49. The CHAIRMAN put the fourth paragraph to the vote.

*The fourth paragraph was adopted by 54 votes, with 5 abstentions.*

50. The CHAIRMAN put the fifth paragraph to the vote.

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Iran, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India.

*Against:* Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

*Abstaining:* Yugoslavia.

*The fifth paragraph was adopted by 53 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.*

51. The CHAIRMAN put the sixth paragraph to the vote.

*The sixth paragraph was adopted by 54 votes to 5.*

52. The CHAIRMAN put the seventh paragraph to the vote.

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Colombia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala,

Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China.

*Abstaining:* Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

*The seventh paragraph was adopted by 54 votes with 5 abstentions.*

53. The CHAIRMAN put the eighth paragraph to the vote.

*The eighth paragraph was adopted by 52 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.*

54. The CHAIRMAN put the ninth paragraph to the vote.

*The ninth paragraph was adopted by 54 votes with 5 abstentions.*

55. At the request of Mr. EBAN (Israel) the CHAIRMAN said he would take a separate vote on the first part of the tenth paragraph ending with the words "their co-operation".

*The first part of the tenth paragraph was adopted by 54 votes with 5 abstentions.*

56. The CHAIRMAN put the second part of the tenth paragraph to the vote.

*The second part of the tenth paragraph was adopted by 51 votes to 5, with 3 abstentions.*

57. The CHAIRMAN put the tenth paragraph to the vote as a whole.

*The tenth paragraph was adopted by 51 votes to 5, with 3 abstentions.*

58. The CHAIRMAN put the eleventh paragraph to the vote.

*The eleventh paragraph was adopted by 54 votes, with 5 abstentions.*

59. The CHAIRMAN put the twelfth paragraph to the vote.

*The twelfth paragraph was adopted by 53 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.*

60. The CHAIRMAN put the thirteenth and last paragraph to the vote.

*The paragraph was adopted by 50 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions.*

61. The CHAIRMAN put the draft resolution to the vote as a whole.

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Yemen, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq,



Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.

*Against:* Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*Abstaining:* Yugoslavia.

*The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 53 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.*

62. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) explained that he had abstained on the first, second, third, fourth, seventh, ninth and eleventh paragraphs since their wording merely reiterated the obligations already set forth in the Charter. He added that those paragraphs were intended to cloak the others in order to legalize violations of the Charter by the Anglo-American bloc.

63. The CHAIRMAN stated that the Committee had completed its consideration of that item of the agenda.

The meeting rose at 1.50 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-EIGHTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 25 November 1949, at 3.30 p.m.*

*Chairman:* Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

#### **Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945, and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations**

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) speaking on a point of order recalled that the item before the Committee had been included in the agenda of the General Assembly in spite of the opposition of the USSR delegation.<sup>1</sup> The provocative nature of that item had already been demonstrated, and it was obvious that there had been no threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of China nor to the peace of the Far East as far as the USSR was concerned. Nor could any claims of Soviet violations of the Charter be considered. The question had been submitted with the sole aim of diverting attention from current events in China resulting from the victories of the Chinese people over foreign reaction and reactionary oppression. The General Assembly had already been informed<sup>2</sup> that the USSR delegation supported the note of the Government of the Chinese People's Republic repudiating the delegation headed by Mr. Tsiang, which should not be accorded the right to represent the Government and people of China. The item before the Committee could not properly be considered, since it had been submitted by the Kuomintang ex-Government which had no right to claim that it represented the Chinese people and certainly had no authority over China with the exception of a small slice of territory. Stating that the support given to consideration of the matter by a number of delegations, notably those of the United States and the United Kingdom, had been a body blow to the prestige and dignity of the United Nations, Mr. Vyshinsky declared that his delegation would not participate in the consideration of the question, nor would the delegation of the Soviet Union take into account any

decision that might be taken upon the demand of the Kuomintang clique.

2. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that there was no Kuomintang delegation in the Committee. There was a delegation of China, and references to it by any other name were out of order.

3. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that in view of the fact that the Kuomintang delegation had been deprived of all authority to represent China in the United Nations, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would not take part in the consideration of the First Committee of the slanderous item submitted by the Kuomintang delegation, and would not consider binding any decision that might be adopted in connexion with that item.

4. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said that the item before the Committee contained a slanderous and unfounded charge against the USSR, levelled by the so-called Kuomintang Government. The only lawful Government of China was the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic. That Government, in a telegram dated 18 November 1949 (A/1123), had deprived the persons sitting in the chair of the Chinese delegation of the right to represent the Chinese people. In view of those facts, the Polish delegation would not participate in the discussion of the item and would not regard the decisions of the Committee on it as binding.

5. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) recalled that on 23 November 1949<sup>3</sup> his delegation had declared that it would not recognize the delegation of the Kuomintang Government since the latter did not represent China and did not have the right to speak in the name of the Chinese people at the present session of the General Assembly. The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China was the only legal Government representing the entire population of China. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR would not participate in the consideration of the item and would not recognize any decisions that might be taken with regard to it by the First Committee or the General Assembly.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 230th plenary meeting.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 253rd plenary meeting.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 254th plenary meeting.

6. Mr. CLEMENTIS (Czechoslovakia) recalled that he had pointed out on a previous occasion (277th meeting) that the urgency attributed to the item before the Committee could be motivated only by fear that before the item was discussed the legal Government of the Chinese People's Republic would already be constituted and that the delegation submitting the matter would have no right to represent anyone. The Committee had been notified by the Foreign Minister of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China that that Government had been constituted and legally represented the Chinese people. Moreover, the legal status of the delegation sent by the so-called Chinese Nationalist Government had been repudiated. Those facts excluded the right of the present delegation of the so-called Chinese Nationalist Government to be regarded as a Member of the Organization, and that delegation's proposals must be regarded as non-existent.

7. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) said that the great events that had occurred in China proved that the Government which had dispatched a delegation to the present session had lost the confidence of the Chinese people and that the Government of the Chinese People's Republic had acquired the right to represent the Chinese people abroad since it had obviously gained the confidence of the enormous majority of the Chinese people and had effective control of the greater part of Chinese territory. A number of Governments, including his own, had recognized that. The Committee therefore faced the question whether it could continue to discuss an item placed on the agenda by a delegation which had lost the right to represent China. The Committee should pronounce itself on that previous question first of all.

8. The CHAIRMAN, referring to the point raised by the representative of Yugoslavia, stated that the Chinese delegation had been recognized as such by the Credentials Committee. If the right to represent China was challenged, that challenge should be made in the proper agency of the General Assembly. Until that was done and a previous decision of the Assembly had been reversed, the delegation of China which was represented on the Committee would be recognized as such by the Chairman. He called upon the representative of China to initiate the discussion of the item before the Committee.

9. Mr. TSIANG (China) stated that he was most surprised by the statement of the Yugoslav representative, since if a delegation of the puppet régime of Peiping were to participate in the work of the General Assembly, it would make its first business to unseat the delegation of Yugoslavia. The Chinese Communists had denounced Marshal Tito and his followers as traitors to the cause of international communism. The Polish representative, who had recalled certain historical events at the previous meeting, had probably forgotten that China had been one of the few Powers to protest against the second partition of Poland.

10. Mr. Tsiang stated that up to the present time not a single official of the puppet régime in Peiping had been elected by the Chinese people. No law, ordinance or constitutional provision had had the sanction of the Chinese people or of their representatives. He stated that he represented a Government based on a constitution, adopted two years previously, which had been ratified by the

representatives of the Chinese people. That Government was headed by a president and vice-president, elected by the representatives of the peoples and responsible to a legislature all members of which had been elected by the people. It was slander to say that a puppet régime in Peiping represented China.

11. Mr. Tsiang said that, as he had pointed out on 22 September,<sup>1</sup> what had happened in his country during recent years was as serious as anything that had happened since the conclusion of the Second World War. The present danger in China and the Far East was in very large measure due to persistent acts of commission and omission on the part of the USSR, in violation of the various treaties and agreements pertaining to China and the Far East as well as of the underlying principles and major provisions of the Charter. Since the end of the war with Japan, his Government had most patiently tried to persuade the Government of the Soviet Union to live up to those commitments. The negotiations had been both protracted and difficult, as would be demonstrated by the evidence that he was going to present to the Committee. His Government had decided to bring the case to the General Assembly only when it had been fully convinced of the futility of further bi-lateral negotiations, and when it had been clear that, as a result of the persistent acts of treaty violation on the part of the USSR, the peace and security of China and the Far East were endangered.

12. The imperialistic designs upon China cherished by Tsarist Russia had been continued on a greater scale after the Communist Party had assumed absolute power in Russia. However, in addition to the old-fashioned methods of aggression used by the Tsars, the USSR Government had employed a new weapon, namely the creation and support of the Communist Party in China. Since its establishment in 1921, the latter had given conclusive evidence that it was completely subservient to the dictates of Moscow, and, in that connexion, Mr. Tsiang quoted from authoritative statement of Mao Tse-tung, the leader of the Chinese Communists. The Chinese Communist Party had been in open armed rebellion against the Chinese Government and on 1 October 1949 had announced the formation of the so-called Chinese People's Republic. That move had been timed to enable the USSR and its satellites to afford diplomatic recognition to the puppet régime even before the General Assembly had had an opportunity of discussing the item. That recognition had been forthcoming on 3 October 1949, and thereby recognition of the Government of the Republic of China had been simultaneously withdrawn by those countries. That was conclusive evidence that the USSR had been systematically fostering that puppet régime for the purpose of furthering Soviet imperialist designs on China. On 3 October 1949, the foreign Minister of China had announced the decision of the Chinese Government to sever diplomatic relations with the USSR, on the grounds that Soviet recognition of the bogus régime was the natural culmination of the long series of violations by the USSR of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1945, and thus constituted a threat to the peace and security of the Far East.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 223rd plenary meeting.

13. It would be recalled that one of the main treaties pertaining to the Far East was the Nine-Power Treaty concluded in Washington on 6 February 1922, the underlying principle of which had been the desire of the Contracting Parties to adopt a policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China and to promote intercourse between China and other Powers on the basis of equality of opportunity. The National Government of China had been established during the period following the conclusion of that Treaty. Since that Government had come to power in 1928, it had become, by general agreement, the most stable and effective Government in the modern history of China. It was due to the efforts of that Government from 1927 to 1937 that China had been able to fight the full-scale Japanese invasion alone for four long and hard years. Stating that the role of the National Government had been recognized even by the USSR, Mr. Tsiang quoted an editorial published in *Pravda* on 14 December 1946 to the effect that the Japanese militarists had correctly regarded the progress of the unification of China around the Chiang Kai-Shek Government as the deadly peril to the plan to turn China into their own colony.

14. Recalling the part taken by his Government in the San Francisco Conference, and pointing out that his country had been the first nation in the world to embody support of the United Nations in its constitution, in 1947, Mr. Tsiang said that his Government contended that the measures taken by the USSR in China were in violation of the underlying spirit, the Preamble, Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter, and he cited the relevant passages of Article 2. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, concluded on 14 August 1945, had been intended to implement the Yalta Agreement of 11 February 1945, which had been concluded without the participation of the Republic of China. For the sake of maintaining solidarity among the Allies in the prosecution of the war against Japan, and for the sake of finding some basis, no matter how painful, by which China and the USSR might develop that degree of friendliness and co-operation so essential to the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East, the Government of China, upon representation from the United States, had proceeded with the negotiations for a treaty with the Soviet Union. The decision to make that great sacrifice had been taken on the assumption that, by consenting to those infringements upon its territorial and sovereign rights by a war-time ally, China would be contributing to the cause of peace and to the formation of the United Nations whose Charter, at the time, had just been completed.

15. The Sino-Soviet Treaty provided that the two Contracting Parties would "act according to the principles of mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other". Under the terms of that Treaty and the Agreements annexed thereto, the Government of the Soviet Union, *inter alia*, had agreed to give to China its moral support as well as aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be entirely given to the National Government as the central Government of China. Manchuria had been recognized as part of China, the USSR having reaffirmed its respect for China's

full sovereignty over the three eastern provinces and having recognized their territorial and administrative integrity. The USSR Government had undertaken to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Mongolia; and, in respect to recent developments in Sinkiang, the Government of the Soviet Union confirmed, as stated in article 5 of the Treaty, that it had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of China. Mr. Tsiang emphasized that the provisions pertaining to respect for the sovereignty and territorial and administrative integrity of areas belonging to another State, and the pledge not to interfere in the internal affairs of another State, were the principles of normal relationships between nations. Even in the absence of a special treaty, any act at variance with those provisions would constitute a violation of the Charter. During the four years for which the Treaty and Agreements had been in force, the USSR had not honoured any one of those provisions but had taken measures entirely contrary to and inconsistent with those provisions. On 25 August 1948, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs had reviewed the whole situation with the then USSR Ambassador to China, calling attention to those obligations and pointing out specific cases of Treaty violations on the part of the Soviet Union. The USSR Ambassador had been implored to urge his Government speedily to take steps for the rectification of those violations and mistakes in order that friendly relations between China and the USSR might be maintained, but the effort had been of no avail.

16. Mr. Tsiang stated that the first outstanding case to be reviewed in support of the charges advanced by his Government concerned the re-establishment of Chinese authority in the key area of Manchuria, the general characteristics of which region he described. The Japanese had invaded Manchuria in 1931, and it was for the recovery of that region that China had taken up the Japanese challenge in July 1937. In recognition of that fact the leaders represented at the Cairo Conference on 1 December 1943 had declared that Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores Islands would be restored to the Republic of China. Recalling the time and circumstances of the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan, Mr. Tsiang pointed out that after the capitulation of the Japanese, the Red Army had occupied the whole area of Manchuria until May 1946, in spite of the fact that during the Moscow Conference which had led to the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, Marshal Stalin had stated that Soviet troops would commence to withdraw from Manchuria within three weeks after the capitulation of Japan and that three months would be the maximum amount of time necessary for the completion of the withdrawal. Those statements had been recorded in the minutes and duly initialled. Stating that he was submitting a document on the matter, Mr. Tsiang said that the behaviour of the Soviet Army in Manchuria had been such as to create great bitterness among the Chinese people.

17. In order to re-establish its authority in Manchuria, it had been necessary for China to transport troops to the region, the most obvious and convenient port being Dairen. However, in reply to a note dated 1 October 1945 from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 6 October 1945 the USSR Ambassador had informed the

Chinese Acting Foreign Minister that according to the Sino-Soviet Treaty, Dairen was a commercial port and that the landing of troops there, no matter of what nationality, was a violation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and would be opposed by the Government of the USSR. That position had been beyond the comprehension of the Chinese Government, since the USSR, in the Agreement on Dairen, annexed to the Sino-Soviet Treaty, had pledged to respect Chinese sovereignty in the control of all of Manchuria as an integral part of China. That principle had been reiterated in Mr. Molotov's note of 14 August 1945. According to the Treaty, with the exception of the rights granted to the USSR, the Chinese Government possessed all other rights with regard to Dairen. Subsequently the Soviet Union Government had advanced a new argument against the landing and stationing of Chinese troops at Dairen and Port Arthur, namely that a state of war still existed with Japan. It had repeatedly been pointed out to the USSR Ambassador that the Sino-Soviet Treaty and its annexes contained no provision preventing the landing of Chinese troops at those ports, that the Treaty had been designed against the common enemy and not against one of the parties to it, that no state of hostilities existed, Japan having surrendered more than a year previously, and that under any circumstances the entry of Chinese troops into those ports could not possibly interfere with the prosecution of the war which the USSR insisted to be still in progress. Moreover, there had been many instances in which Allied States had taken over, occupied and garrisoned territories formerly belonging to the enemy, and there was therefore absolutely no reason why China should be prevented from taking over areas which properly belonged to China, before the formal peace was actually concluded.

18. The Chinese Government had thus been prevented from dispatching troops to Dairen because of the obstacles interposed by the Soviet Union, and it had informed the USSR embassy that Chinese troops would proceed to Manchuria by way of other ports. Soviet Authorities had replied on 1 and 3 November 1945 that one of those ports was already garrisoned by troops of unknown origin and allegiance and that the USSR Authorities could not be responsible for the security of the landing. In other words, Chinese Communist forces had already been permitted by the Red Army to take over the ports and had been prepared to defy the landing of Chinese Government troops.

19. The Chinese Government had therefore decided to dispatch troops into Manchuria by land and by air. On 13 November 1945 the USSR Ambassador had informed the Chinese Government that only security forces and gendarmes could be transported by air and that the latter should proceed only three or five days before the evacuation of Soviet troops. The reasonable request of the Chinese Foreign Minister that a minimum period of one week was required on account of the necessary limitations of the air lift had been rejected by the USSR Authorities. Those authorities had also refused assistance to Chinese Government troops proceeding by land on the pretext that Soviet troops in the areas involved had already been evacuated, which in fact had not been the case.

20. The Chinese Government had therefore proceeded to recruit peace preservation units in

various areas of Manchuria, but that move had also been obstructed by the USSR on the ground that Chinese Authorities were secretly organizing underground forces. That contention was absurd, since the USSR had known about the whole process from the very beginning. The organization of underground forces for the purpose of hastening Soviet withdrawal would have been meaningless, in view of the fact that that withdrawal was to have been completed within a maximum period of three months. The purpose of the USSR in preventing local recruitment had been to prevent the National Government of China from re-establishing its authority in Manchuria.

21. That policy had been supplemented by the policy of aiding the Chinese communist forces to take over areas evacuated by the Soviet Army. The USSR Authorities had refused to advise the appropriate Chinese Authorities of the exact dates of the withdrawal of Soviet troops until two or three days beforehand, while the communists had been informed of Soviet plans from the beginning and had been able to occupy the areas in the wake of the USSR's withdrawal. In the case of the important city of Mukden, no notice had been given at all and active assistance had been given to Chinese communist forces to block the entry of Chinese Government troops into that city. Citing various instances of Chinese communist attacks upon Government troops, Mr. Tsiang said that those attacks would not have been possible without advance knowledge of Soviet plans which had been denied to the Chinese Government Authorities.

22. The Chinese Government had persisted in its efforts to negotiate with the USSR Authorities and an agreement had been reached on 1 April 1946. The USSR Authorities, however, had nevertheless contended that Soviet troops stationed north of Changchun could not await the arrival of Chinese Government troops before withdrawal and that, consequently, responsibility could only be transferred to whatever existing military forces there were. Mr. Tsiang emphasized that the latter were Chinese communist forces assembled through advance knowledge. In that way Changchun and the whole area north of that center had been turned over to the Chinese communist forces which the Soviet Authorities had assembled. By the action of the USSR Government, Manchuria had been turned into the base of operations of the Chinese communists in the open and armed rebellion against the Central Government of China.

23. Mr. Tsiang stated that active USSR assistance to the Chinese communists had taken a variety of forms. One had been to facilitate infiltration into Manchuria from North China in order to receive arms and ammunition captured from or surrendered by the Japanese. Another had been to permit the Chinese Communists to recruit locally large numbers of Japanese puppet troops as well as bandits, many units of which had been well armed. Citing figures regarding the equipment captured by the USSR in Manchuria, Mr. Tsiang stated that some 200,000 Chinese communist troops, which had infiltrated into Manchuria shortly after the surrender of Japan, had subsequently been fully armed and supplied with Japanese material. That material could only have been supplied by the Soviet

Army. Those matters had been substantiated by a mass of evidence and had been confirmed by many neutral reports.

24. Moreover, in addition to Japanese material, the Chinese communist forces in Manchuria had been assisted with arms and ammunition manufactured in the USSR itself. Mr. Tsiang described some samples of that equipment captured by Chinese Government forces. Those samples had also been described by an American correspondent in the *Washington Daily News* of 24 September 1947. USSR military aid to the Chinese Communists had also included military training which had been given openly, and he cited examples to that effect.

25. Mr. Tsiang recalled that it had been a general policy of the Allies, after the Japanese surrender, to repatriate Japanese soldiers and civilians as rapidly as possible. Unlike the other Allies, and though the whole Japanese Kwantung Army had surrendered to the USSR in Manchuria, the USSR had so far failed to carry out that policy. Though some small groups were reported to have been repatriated during recent months, the bulk of the Japanese Kwantung Army remained in Soviet hands. It had been the policy of the USSR Government to make use of those Japanese soldiers to carry out its aggressive policy towards China. The representative of China cited figures given on 28 September 1948 by the Chief of the Survey Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office and reported in *The New York Times* of 29 September regarding the number and functions of the Japanese serving with the Chinese Communists. That statement was substantiated by numerous specific cases known to his Government, several of which he cited and some of which concerned a large number of Korean communist forces used by the Chinese Communists.

26. In addition to assisting the Chinese Communists in the training of their military personnel both in China and in the USSR, and in ordering Japanese and Korean forces to fight for the Chinese Communists, the Government of the Soviet Union had permitted its own military forces to engage in the operational activities of the Chinese Communists. A particularly outrageous case had been the participation of Soviet vessels in the Chinese communist attack upon the Changshan Islands. Mr. Tsiang described that incident, which had formed the subject of a protest by the Chinese Government on 22 August 1949. The USSR Government had not replied to that protest and, in fact, when the Chinese communist forces had attacked and taken the islands in August they had used forty vessels which had come from the Soviet-controlled port of Dairen.

27. Mr. Tsiang gave instances of the many occasions on which Soviet Army personnel had actually manned the guns of the Chinese communist forces, and concluded that the USSR Government had been openly aiding the Chinese Communists in their armed rebellion against the Chinese Government. That assistance included practically all phases of military activities, including the supply of arms and ammunition, the training of army, naval and air force personnel both in China and the Soviet Union, and the actual participation of Soviet officers and men in operational activities. Far from extending the aid to the National Government of China which it had pledged under the Sino-Soviet Treaty, the Government of

the USSR had pursued the diametrically opposed policy of giving large-scale and effective assistance to the very force whose avowed policy was the armed overthrow of the National Government of China.

28. Over and above military aid, the USSR Government had had extensive economic relations with the Chinese Communists. Economic and technical assistance had been given to them to help exploit the resources of China for their subversive purposes and to obtain Chinese products in return for Soviet military supplies. After citing illustrations of such activities, which had actually amounted to a very large-scale operation, Mr. Tsiang said that Chinese military intelligence reports showed that the USSR Government had assisted the Chinese Communists in the rehabilitation of the production of military supplies. He listed various cases in which such aid had been extended to the Communists, including the services of Soviet technicians and experts. Similar assistance had been furnished to the Chinese Communists in rehabilitation of transportation and power industries. He cited various reports of assistance in rehabilitation of such industries, including reports published in *The New York Times* on 25 July and 16 October 1949 as well as in *The Times* of London of 13 October 1949.

29. The most outstanding case of clandestine and illegal transaction had been the conclusion of a comprehensive barter agreement between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists which had been widely publicized in the Soviet Press and concluded by an economic mission from the so-called "People's Democratic Régime in Manchuria" headed by the Chinese communist leader, Kao Kang. Under that agreement, which was to have lasted for one year, the Chinese Communists in Manchuria had undertaken to supply the Soviet Union with vegetable oils and cereals in return for machinery, petroleum, textiles and medical supplies. Nevertheless, on 6 August 1949, the Chinese Acting Foreign Minister had lodged a formal protest with the Soviet Union Government recalling the provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 and the annexed Agreements thereto and the previous attempts of the Chinese Government to draw the attention of the Government of the Soviet Union to its obligations under the Treaty. The so-called "People's Democratic Régime in Manchuria", the protest added, with whom the Soviet Union Government had concluded the barter agreement, was a rebel group pledged to the forceful overthrow of the Chinese National Government. That action, the protest concluded, constituted an infringement upon Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria, thereby clearly showing that the Soviet Union had been purposely violating the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1945. That protest had remained unanswered by the USSR.

30. The assistance rendered by the Soviet Union to the Chinese communist cause led to a profound expression of gratitude on the part of the Chinese Communists, to which the Soviet Union had responded. In that connexion, Mr. Tsiang declared that the Chinese Communists had been organizing a network of Sino-Soviet Friendship Associations. At the inauguration of that Association at Peiping, on 16 July 1949, the communist Commander-in-Chief, Chu Teh, had emphasized the role of the Soviet Union in its leadership of the

world democratic peace front and of the rapid and quick victory of the Chinese revolution, following the Second World War. Similar expressions of gratitude have been voiced by communist officials throughout the communist-dominated areas. The Secretary of the Manchurian Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, Kao Kang, for instance, had stated at a public conference in Mukden, on 17 August 1949, that the aid extended to the Chinese Communists by the international group headed by the Soviet Union had contributed to the victories of the Chinese people. Similarly, the communist commander-in-chief had also stated in an article in the *Cominform Journal* published in Bucharest on 1 September 1949, that the communist victory in China would have been impossible had it not been for the sincere and friendly help of the Soviet Union, the proletariat and all the revolutionary people of other countries.

31. Those expressions had been reciprocated by *Cominform* and Soviet leaders who had quite frequently spoken of the great victories of the Chinese people. Accordingly, Mao Tse-tung had become a hero of the communist world and his picture had appeared along with Lenin's and Stalin's. Moreover, Soviet missions had been sent to China and their emissaries had expressed their friendly feelings towards the Chinese Communists. Those expressions had been coupled with the familiar denunciations of "the imperialistic policies of the Western Democracies".

32. It was important to note that, in addition to their expression of gratitude, the Chinese Communists had adopted, as their fundamental foreign policy, the principle of complete subservience to the Soviet Union. Mao Tse-tung had stated, on 1 July 1949, that the policy of the Chinese Communists was to ally with the Soviet Union, with the new popular democracies in Europe and with the proletariat and masses of the people to form an international united front. Moreover, the statement added that there existed no half-way measure between imperialism and socialism, and that the Chinese Communists belonged to the anti-imperialist front, headed by the Soviet Union.

33. On 1 October 1949 the Chinese Communists had announced the establishment of the so-called "Chinese People's Republic". The familiar theme of Soviet Union guidance and leadership had been monotonously repeated in speeches and manifestoes. Even the fundamental statement on policy had announced that the Chinese People's Republic joined with all peace-loving nations and peoples and, above all, with the Soviet Union. Similar views had been expressed in the manifesto resulting from the conference held on 1 October 1949, in Mao Tse-tung's opening speech at the conference held on 20 September 1949 and in the declaration of Ho Hsiang-ning, one of the women delegates to that conference. That alliance with the Soviet Union obviously meant the co-ordination of the policy of the Chinese Communists with that of Soviet and Communist world policies. In that connexion, Mr. Tsiang drew attention to the manifesto signed by Mao Tse-tung and his associates whereby the North Atlantic Treaty was denounced as an instrument designed to instigate a new aggressive war and that, should the imperialist aggressive bloc dare to incite a reactionary war, the Chinese nation along with the Soviet Union would solemnly fight against

the aggressors with a view to achieving the liberation of the human race.

34. Besides obstructing the re-establishment of Chinese governmental authority in Manchuria, the Soviet Union had held economic designs upon Manchuria. When it had entered Manchuria, the Red Army had proceeded to remove all useful materials. Mr. Tsiang referred to the report of the Edwin W. Pauley Mission on Japanese Reparations, where it was alleged that the total value of the property removed from Manchuria by the Red Army amounted to 800 million dollars. However, according to the Chinese Nationalist Government's estimate, the figure was more than double. The economic and strategic needs of the Soviet Union should have been adequately met with the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1945, whereby the Chinese Government had agreed to cede to the Soviet Union part share of the trunk railway of Manchuria and in the two great ports of Port Arthur and Dairen. Nevertheless, besides those extraordinary concessions, the Soviet Union had proceeded to despoil Manchuria. In addition to dismantling and removing those industrial assets of Manchuria under the pretext of war booty, the Soviet Union Government had proposed to the Chinese Government, under threat of delaying the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria, a programme for joint Chinese-Soviet operation of industrial and mining enterprises in Manchuria, including civil aviation.

35. In explanation of that proposal, Mr. Tsiang recalled that on 24 November 1945 Mr. Slatekovsky, Economic Adviser to Marshal Malinovsky, Commander of the Soviet Army in Manchuria, had formally proposed to Dr. Chang Chiangau, Chairman of the Economic Commission of the Chinese Government's Headquarters in Manchuria, that 154 industrial and mining enterprises, comprising over 80 per cent of the heavy industry of Manchuria, should be placed under joint Sino-Soviet operation. On 4 December 1945, Dr. Chang had told the Soviet Commander that discussion on the subject could only begin after the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria. Marshal Malinovsky felt it advisable to proceed with the discussions. On 7 December 1945, Mr. Slatekovsky again brought up the question of the proposed joint enterprise, declaring that all industrial enterprises in Manchuria should be regarded as war booty of the Soviet Union. Dr. Chang had dissented with that view, explaining that war booty was a term confined to enemy combat material and supplies. Further discussions had ensued, during which Marshal Malinovsky had declared his inability to predict the date of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria before the solution of those questions. Failing to achieve its aims on a local basis, the the Soviet Union Government had then taken up the question formally through diplomatic channels and on 21 January 1946, Mr. Petrov, Ambassador of the USSR to China, had made necessary representations to the President of the Chinese National Government. Subsequently, on 27 March 1946, Mr. Petrov had handed to the Chinese Foreign Minister, the formal Soviet proposal for the joint operation, whereby the main industrial and mining enterprises—along with the airfields—of the principal cities of Manchuria, were to be under joint operation. It had further been



proposed that a joint Sino-Soviet stock company should be formed with each of the Governments holding 50 per cent of the stock and with a Chinese as Chairman of the Board of Directors and a Soviet citizen as the Vice-Chairman. As to the administration of those enterprises, the Government of the USSR had proposed that the General Manager should be appointed by the Soviet Union, and his assistant should be appointed by the Chinese Government. Finally, the joint stock company was to operate those enterprises for a thirty-year period, at the end of which all the enterprises concerned would be returned to the Chinese Government without compensation. Since no basis for agreement could be discovered either in Manchuria or through diplomatic channels, the negotiations did not lead to any results. However, had the Chinese Government yielded to those demands, Manchuria would have become a colony of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Chinese communist control over Manchuria had effected the economic designs of the Soviet Union. Such imperialism was contrary to the spirit of the present age and violated both the Charter and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.

36. In the course of those negotiations, the interests of the Soviet Union in controlling the economy of Manchuria had been so intense that the Soviet Authorities had taken all possible measures, including murder, to discourage and intimidate Chinese Government Authorities from controlling Manchurian economy. In support of that fact he cited the brutal murder of Mr. Chang Hsin-fu, the Special Commissioner of the Chinese Ministry of Economic Affairs, whose special mission was to take over the Fushun mines with a view to supplying the urgent needs of the Chinese Changchun Railway, who was murdered by Soviet troops on 18 January 1946. Those murderers had never been brought to justice by the Soviet Authorities.

37. Summarizing Soviet activities in Manchuria, the Chinese representative explained that those activities fell generally into three parallel categories, namely: (a) the obstruction on the part of the Soviet Union of the efforts of the Chinese Government in re-establishing its authority over Manchuria; (b) the deliberate help extended to the Chinese communist forces to assist them in securing the use of strategic centres of Manchuria as bases of operations against the Chinese Government; and (c) the active military, economic and moral support given the Chinese Communists by providing them with captured and surrendered Japanese arms and ammunition and military supplies manufactured in the Soviet Union itself. Finally, the Soviet Union was taking advantage of its occupation of Manchuria and the tragic circumstance of the civil war to request vast economic concessions in that country. Although the Chinese Government had refused those demands, there could be no doubt that the Soviet Union was completing the economic conquest of Manchuria with the connivance of the Chinese Communists. Those acts were in open violation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1945 whereby China's full sovereignty over Manchuria was recognized. Moreover, while pledging its moral support as well as its military aid to the Chinese National Government, the Soviet Union was carrying out a contrary policy by fostering the growth and expansion of the Chinese Communist Party which aimed at the forceful over-

throw of the National Government. That policy was a flagrant violation of the territorial integrity and political independence of a Member State of the Organization and constituted therefore a violation of the United Nations Charter.

38. The activities of the Soviet Union did not limit themselves to Manchuria alone, but had extended to the north-western borders of China. In explanation of those activities, the Chinese representative recalled the Sino-Soviet Agreement concluded in 1924, whereby the Soviet Union had recognized the fact that Outer-Mongolia constituted an integral part of the Republic of China. Nevertheless, when Outer-Mongolia had declared itself a People's Republic, the Soviet Union had immediately extended its recognition to that country and, in 1936, had signed a mutual assistance protocol with that so-called Mongolian People's Republic. Despite the Chinese Government's protests, the Government of the Soviet Union had maintained that in spite of the recognition and the signature of the mutual assistance protocol, the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1924 still remained in force. Furthermore, during the negotiations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945, the Chinese Government had declared that, after the defeat of Japan, a plebiscite should be held in Outer-Mongolia with a view to ascertaining the will of the people regarding their independence. The Chinese Government had pledged its recognition of Outer-Mongolian independence if the results of the plebiscite did reveal such a tendency. On its part, the Soviet Union Government had declared its willingness to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Mongolia. On 20 October 1945, a plebiscite was held and on 3 January 1946, the Chinese National Government had formally recognized the independence of Outer-Mongolia. Nevertheless, Mr. Tsiang added, according to reports received by the Chinese Government, the Government of the USSR was maintaining advisers and other personnel in all branches of the Government of Outer-Mongolia. Officials were being maintained in the ranks of the army and a virtual monopoly over foreign trade was exercised by the Soviet Union. Ever since Outer-Mongolia had attained its independence, an iron curtain had descended upon that State. However, many Mongolian citizens had succeeded in escaping into China. Those facts clearly showed that the Soviet Union had failed to live up to its solemn pledge to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of Outer-Mongolia.

39. Turning to another sector, the Chinese representative alleged that the Soviet Union had outrightly annexed the territory of Tannu Tuva, which formed a part of Chinese territory. Although the Kiakhta Boundary Convention of 1727, concluded between China and Russia, had recognized the territory of Tannu Tuva as part of China, in March 1948 the Soviet Union had incorporated that territory into the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic following a decision by the Supreme Soviet. The Chinese Government had strongly protested against that annexation on 7 May 1948. In the light of that action one wondered how many other people's republics would suffer the fate of the territory of Tannu Tuva.

40. Another example of Soviet aggressive policy was provided in the case of the Chinese province of Sinkiang, known as Chinese Turkestan, where

the Soviet Government had, for a considerable period of time, sought to exploit the complicated ethnic situation. That fact was borne out by the help extended to the Kazakh chief, Usman, who had rebelled in 1943. Subsequently, in 1944, the USSR Government had despatched Soviet airplanes to bomb the Chinese Government troops who were then attempting to suppress the Usman rebellion, and Mr. Tsiang gave numerous examples in support of that contention. On 9 March 1944, the Commissioner of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sinkiang had protested against the Soviet complicity, which the USSR Government had later denied. Later on, that same Government had taken further steps to create many incidents, such as the Ining and the Peit-a-shan incidents. In connexion with that latter incident, the Chinese representative recalled that, on 5 June 1947, Outer-Mongolian troops had crossed the Chinese border and had attacked, with the help of Soviet airplanes, Chinese Government troops at Peit-a-shan. Despite the fact that Peit-a-shan was located 200 kilometres away from the Chinese Outer-Mongolian boundary, the Government of the Soviet Union had maintained that that area was within the territorial confines of Outer-Mongolia and that, therefore, the action taken by Outer-Mongolia did not constitute a violation of Chinese territory. Despite numerous protests by the Chinese Government to the Government of the USSR, the Outer-Mongolian troops, which had crossed the boundary, had continued to foment trouble in the region. Although the incident had not been settled, it was clear that the action of the Soviet Union Government had violated the Charter and once again the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945. That aggressive imperialist policy on the part of the Soviet Union with regard to Sinkiang had been motivated by designs upon the economic resources of the area, where the Soviet Union had succeeded, without the consent of the Chinese Central Government, in winning privileges and concessions. Later on, on 24 January 1949, the Government of the USSR had proposed a three-year trade agreement, whereby it would enjoy the privilege of free import from and export to Sinkiang without corresponding privileges being granted to China in any part of the territory of the Soviet Union. It had also proposed the conclusion of a fifty-year agreement, setting up Chinese and Soviet parallel companies to explore and exploit the mineral and oil resources of Sinkiang. It was clear that those propositions, if accepted, would have granted the Soviet Union exclusive monopolistic rights and privileges in Sinkiang. Although preliminary exchange of views in that connexion had begun on 7 February 1949, from the very outset the Chinese Government had insisted that those proposals were unacceptable. When the Government of the Soviet Union had concluded an economic agreement which was in direct violation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945, with the bogus régime in Manchuria, on 3 October 1949, the Chinese Foreign Minister had declared that the preliminary exchange of views concerning Sinkiang should be discontinued forthwith.

41. The Chinese representative drew attention to his earlier statement submitted to the General Assembly on 29 September 1949<sup>1</sup> in which he had remarked that the question under discussion

was not a question between his Government and the Chinese Communists, but between the Chinese and the Soviet Union Governments. After calling the attention of the Committee to the spiritual and material relations between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union, he wished to describe the intentions of the Chinese Communists as regards the countries outside the Soviet sphere of influence. The extension of communist control in China, the Chinese representative declared, had meant the simultaneous extension of the iron curtain to the Chinese territory. Manchuria and, to a lesser extent, northern China and the Yangtze Valley had already been sealed behind the iron curtain. After a period of isolation, China had opened its doors to Western civilization and the Chinese people had subsequently arrived at cultural and social intercourse with the West. That process of cross-fertilization had been beneficial to both sides. However, with the rise of power of the Chinese Communists, that Chinese historical trend was being reversed, and the Chinese people were being told that the people's democracy in China, although recent, had already surpassed the democratic achievements of the United States and the United Kingdom which were presented as being the sources of all evil. Moreover, the Chinese Christian Churches were being persecuted, in a similar way as religious persecutions taking place in Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria. Mr. Tsiang gave numerous instances in support of that allegation.

42. In giving effect to that aggressive policy, the Soviet Union had been violating the political independence and the territorial integrity of a Member of the United Nations, in cynical disregard of treaty provisions solemnly entered into between the two States and in violation of the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. That aggressive design was not limited to China itself, but extended to Northern Korea, Manchuria, Outer-Mongolia, Tannu Tuva and Sinkiang. That imperialistic expansion had surpassed all similar movements in Russian as well as in world history.

43. Obviously, such an expansion would have its consequences over the countries lying to the south and south-eastern boundaries of China. Accordingly, Mr. Tsiang quoted the *Cominform Journal* of 7 October 1949 published in Bucharest stating, editorially, that the victory of the Chinese Revolution would unquestionably inspire the peoples of colonial and dependent countries, such as India, Burma, Indonesia, Viet-Nam and other countries of the East, to intensify their struggle for national aspiration, and that the People's Republic of China would be their loyal friend and reliable bulwark in the struggle against imperialism. Similar friendly help was promised by the Chinese Communists with a view to democratizing Japan and preventing the re-emergence of reactionary forces. As regards Indo-China, the Chinese representative quoted Mr. Léon Pignon, French High Commissioner in Indo-China, as stating on 31 July 1949 that there was evidence of co-operation between communist China and the Viet-Minh of Indo-China. A similar allegation was contained in an official *communiqué* issued on 24 March 1949 by the French Far Eastern headquarters. Subsequently, Mr. Tsiang contended that similar help would be extended by the Chinese Communists to the Malayan and Philippine guerrillas. Finally, he said

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 230th plenary meeting.

that the communist insurrectionary activities in South-East Asia had been planned and dictated by the International Communist Conference held at Calcutta in February 1948. Those insurrectionary activities were likely to spread far and wide.

44. Looking back over the catastrophic events of the four post-war years, Mr. Tsiang observed that the Soviet Union had combined world communism and imperialism with a view to controlling the whole world. If civilization was to be saved, a co-ordinated plan of world defense must be made. Moreover, China, having an extensive common boundary with the Soviet Union, stood on the frontier of that gigantic imperialistic design. Observers, who had confined themselves to the surface of events, had jumped to premature conclusion that China had failed. Even before 1937 the Chinese Nationalist Government had been doing effective work to prepare the country to meet the challenge of Japanese militarism. Nevertheless, after 7 July 1937, China had fought not with an economic surplus, but by deepening the already deep poverty of the people. In view of those facts, the Chinese representative wondered whether any country, in similar circumstances, could have achieved a different result from that of the Nationalist Government. Although the armed conflict in China had so far been unfavourable to the Nationalist Government, it had nevertheless admittedly cost the Chinese Communists 1,432,900 in wounded, killed, captured and missing. In that connexion, the Chinese representative quoted Representative John Davis Lodge as having stated on 16 August 1949 on the floor of the United States House of Representatives that an army which had caused more losses to the enemy than the Japanese and German troops had been able to inflict on the United States in almost four years of combat, could hardly be described as totally ineffective. Moreover, Mr. Tsiang quoted the *Pittsburgh Press*, of 18 April 1949, as stating that the two billion dollar figure which had been used to discredit the Chinese Nationalist Government consisted of

three major items, namely: lend-lease, the value of surplus military goods sold to the Chinese, and the American contribution to UNRRA; it had added that none of those items had been of any assistance in the war against the Communists. Furthermore, the Chinese Nationalist Government had not been given American financial help comparable to that extended to fight similar circumstances in the European sector.

45. Summing up his submission, the Chinese representative declared that, although the Chinese Nationalist Government was fully aware of the inability of the General Assembly to provide any military help, the Nationalist Government nevertheless expected the General Assembly to draw on the great moral fund it had at its disposal in the discharge of its obligations. Thus it expected that the General Assembly would pronounce judgment on the Soviet Union for obstructing the efforts of the Nationalist Government in re-establishing its authority in Manchuria and for extending military and economic aid to the Chinese Communists; that it would recognize that the cause of China's political independence and territorial integrity was a cause common to all the peoples of the world; and that it would recommend to all Member States to desist and refrain from giving further military and economic aid to the Chinese Communists. Finally, his Government expressed the hope that no State would accord recognition to the Chinese communist régime. In conclusion, Mr. Tsiang stated that his delegation would submit, at the following meeting a draft resolution containing the above-mentioned principles.

46. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) said that in view of the heavily documented statement made by the representative of China, he wished to propose the adjournment of the meeting until the following Monday morning.

*In the absence of any objection, it was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-NINTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 28 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### **Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945, and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations (continued)**

1. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) stated that a charge that a Member of the United Nations was violating both a treaty and the Charter was of serious concern to all, particularly when the alleged violation included assistance in attempting the overthrow of a recognized Government and when the parties concerned, as permanent members of the Security Council, had special responsibilities for the maintenance of

international peace and security. It would have been normal for the Member against which the charges had been made to make some reply and the United States delegation regretted that the Soviet Union had not seen fit to do so. Mr. Jessup recalled that equally serious, although not equally well-documented, charges had been made by the Soviet Union against the United States and the United Kingdom, in the discussion of the draft resolution on the "Essentials of Peace". Both those delegations had approved the inclusion of that item in the agenda and had participated fully in the debate. Had they not done so, it was not difficult to imagine the inferences which the Soviet Union delegation would have drawn as to the truth of those charges. However, the present occasion was not the first one when the Soviet Union had refused to participate in the discussion of an item which it regarded as un-

pleasant. The United States deplored such selective participation in the work of the United Nations, particularly in the light of the draft resolution just adopted by the Committee calling upon every Member to participate fully in the work of the United Nations. Mr. Jessup recalled that the Soviet Union delegation had abstained from voting on that provision on the grounds that the Charter had already bound all Members to such action.

2. The United States regarded with serious concern the charges made by the Chinese delegation and believed that the Assembly had to take cognizance of them and of the situation in the Far East. One of the basic tenets of United States policy regarding the Far East was to support the United Nations in encouraging the development of an independent China free from foreign control and to maintain peace and security in that area.

3. The First Committee had just been discussing the "Essentials of Peace" and—accordingly, as was inevitable, the debate had become focused upon the foreign policies—and measures of the Soviet Union. In that discussion representatives from all areas of the world had voiced concern over the imperialistic encroachments of the Soviet Union and had urged that the solution should be found in the fulfilment of the principles of the Charter in all good faith. The general charges made against the Soviet Union in that debate found a specific application in the present complaint before the Committee. The specific problem was one of maintaining an independent, unified and free country against the encroachments of a foreign Power.

4. Throughout its modern history, China had struggled for its independence and integrity against both internal pressures and external forces. Mr. Jessup reviewed briefly the problems which had confronted China during the last century as a result of its great increase in population and of the impact of foreign commerce and new ideas. Instead of adapting itself to the situation, the Chinese Empire had crumbled. The international mores of that period had now been superseded by the principles of the Charter. However, in the earlier period, the United States had taken the lead in an attempt to safeguard China's integrity and independence and had never entertained any territorial ambitions in China. Indeed, a major feature of United States policy had been to aid China in preserving its integrity against Russian and Japanese imperialism.

5. At the time of the Russian occupation of Manchuria at the turn of the century, the United States had exerted its influence to maintain the territorial and administrative entity of China by means of notes to the Russian and other Governments. Subsequent Russian pressure for a privileged position in Manchuria had brought a similar response from the United States. Repeatedly thereafter, during the clashes between Russian and Japanese imperialism in North China, the United States had sought to establish respect for the integrity of China. Mr. Jessup cited the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908, the proposal to remove Manchurian railways from Japanese and Russian competition, the United States reaction to Japan's Twenty-One Demands, and the role of the United States at the Washington Conference of 1922, as attesting to his Gov-

ernment's policy of upholding China's integrity. The United States also had co-operated with the League of Nations in its efforts to deal with Japanese aggression.

6. United States aid to China during the Second World War and its efforts to bring about internal peace were well known as was the insistence of the United States, over Soviet Union objection, that China should be included as one of the great Powers in the prosecution of the war and organization of peace and, consequently, as one of the permanent members of the Security Council. The continuing concern of the United States for the independence of China had been reflected on 5 August 1949 in a statement calling attention to the dangers of Soviet Russian imperialism and reaffirming the basic principles of United States policy which were opposed to China's subjection to or dismemberment by any foreign Power, whether by open or clandestine means.

7. The friendship between the United States and China transcended governmental relations and included educational, cultural, religious and social ties. The United States attitude could be seen in the contribution made to China's educational and social reconstruction. It was against that background of consistent support for the independence and integrity of China that the United States viewed with special concern charges which indicated a continuation of previous Russian attempts against China's integrity.

8. Mr. Jessup believed that the First Committee should examine what the Assembly was being asked to do and what it ought to do in the present case. Clearly, in considering the case, the Assembly would not be interfering in the domestic affairs of a Member State. The representative of China had urged the General Assembly<sup>1</sup> to give guidance to nations in the conduct of their relations with China. Appropriate principles were contained in Article 2 of the Charter and the General Assembly could, in any given case, indicate the particular application of those principles.

9. The United States delegation considered the problem before the General Assembly to differ from that confronting individual Governments in determining their policies towards China. The General Assembly had to set standards for the guidance of States in the application of the principles of the Charter. Regardless of each individual Government's attitude towards the problems of the civil strife in China, it was clearly in the interests of all that the principles of the Charter be maintained with regard to China. Establishment of standards required co-operative effort and could not be achieved through unco-ordinated and perhaps conflicting prosecution of national policies.

10. The representative of China had alleged that the Soviet Union had violated the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1945 and its accompanying exchanges of notes, and had cited in particular the questions of the restoration of Chinese control over Manchuria and the administration of the Port of Dairen. The United States delegation believed that the only effective disposition of that part of the case would be through adjudication by some such tribunal as the

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 223rd plenary meeting.

International Court of Justice. Such a course would require the consent of both parties and although the Soviet Union had not as yet given any indication of its readiness to submit legal controversies to the International Court of Justice, the United States hoped that the Soviet Union would co-operate more fully in that respect and give reality to Chapter XIV of the Charter.

11. A second charge was that the Soviet Union, in violation of the Charter, had jeopardized the independence of China by interference in its internal affairs and by assistance in the violent overthrow of the recognized Government. The complaint alleged an attempt at foreign domination of China through the Soviet-controlled communist movement masked as a national crusade. While it was for the people of China to decide the nature of their future institutions and policy, the United States believed that the General Assembly should work for the re-establishment of international conditions which would make it possible for the Chinese people to determine those matters freely without outside interference.

12. The representative of China had also alleged that the Soviet Union, contrary to the Charter, had infringed Chinese integrity by establishing special régimes in Manchuria and in the Inner-Mongolian and north-western provinces of China. That allegation was of special concern to the United States since it involved a violation of the Yalta Agreement on the basis of which the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 had been concluded. It had been the United States view that limited rights should be granted to the Soviet Union at Dairen and on the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railways. Such rights would not have impaired the sovereignty of China, and it had never been thought that the Soviet Union would impair that sovereignty by seeking complete control of the Dairen area and the railways or by establishing puppet régimes in the northern provinces. Serious questions arose as to whether certain provisions of the Yalta Agreement had been carried out in good faith by the Soviet Union. Three months previously, the United States Government had indicated that Soviet Union demands upon the Chinese Government in connexion with the negotiation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 had exceeded the provisions of the Yalta Agreement. There was cause for concern that a further attempt was being made to dismember China.

13. The United States believed that it would be proper for the General Assembly to reaffirm standards for the guidance of all nations in their relations with China. The representative of China had pointed out that the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, although concluded in an era of imperialistic encroachments upon China, had given that country an opportunity for constructive development. However, the Nine-Power Treaty had been cast in terms of banning encroachments upon Chinese sovereignty which would injure the rights of other foreign States. At the present time, international thought had progressed beyond the "open-door" policy and the Charter had established the general concern with any disputes or situations likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace. It continued to be true that the conscience of the world could find expression in a multi-partite declaration and the United States was ready to sponsor such an expression. Such dec-

larations were not futile. Despite attempted encroachments, after the Second World War, China had at least recovered its title to Manchuria. Even the Soviet Union, in a note dated 14 August 1945, had affirmed its respect for the complete sovereignty of China over the three eastern provinces. Such declarations were valuable though they might be flouted momentarily. It was the United States' hope that the General Assembly would give further assistance to China by those means. Accordingly, together with the delegations of Australia, Mexico, Pakistan and the Philippines, the United States delegation wished to present a draft resolution designed to promote international stability in the Far East (A/C.1/552).

14. After reading the text of the draft resolution, Mr. Jessup observed that its adoption could not be expected to cure all the difficulties inherent in the Chinese question. However, the draft did emphasize certain elements of concern to the United Nations: first, the maintenance of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of China; second, the right of the Chinese people to maintain political institutions free of foreign control; third, the observance in good faith of treaty obligations; fourth, a ban on the establishment by foreign powers of spheres of influence or of puppet régimes; and fifth, the proscription of special privileges which would give foreign Powers an exclusive position. Mr. Jessup believed that a pronouncement by the General Assembly on those matters would not be futile. The draft resolution represented the application to the Chinese question of certain basic principles of the Charter, and of the resolution on the "Essentials of Peace". It also represented the traditional policy towards China of many nations and would offer an expression of the General Assembly's concern for the welfare of the people of China.

15. The draft resolution stated principles which would be endorsed by the Chinese Government, by the great body of the Chinese people, and by anyone concerned with the true interests of China. Any nation pledged to the Charter could adhere to it. Indeed, failure to endorse it might be interpreted as an indication of imperialistic purposes in China. Mr. Jessup, therefore, hoped that the draft resolution would receive unanimous approval, although one Member was charged with violating the principles which it contained and that after its adoption all States would govern their relations with China in accordance with its principles.

16. China had suffered bitterly from the Second World War and the ensuing civil conflict. No State should be permitted to take advantage of those disturbed conditions. The United Nations was well aware of the Japanese efforts to dominate China and the Far East which had led to the point where they had plunged Asia and the whole world into war. The United Nations should ensure that the domination of China by one imperialism had not been displaced to make way for another. The rescue of China should not be nullified by acquiescence in new imperialist conquests by devices more subtle than outright war.

17. In conclusion, Mr. Jessup stated that the purpose of submitting the joint draft resolution was to show the specific application of certain basic principles of the Charter to the existing situation in China. If those principles were ac-

cepted and put into effect, the United Nations would have made a notable contribution to the maintenance of general peace and to the efforts of the Chinese people to promote in China the growth of free institutions, social progress and better standards of life.

18. Mr. PLIMSOLL (Australia) stated that the representative of China had presented a grave charge. Everyone was moved by the sufferings of China over a long period and recalled its contribution to the defeat of German and Japanese aggression. Having endured Japanese aggression since 1931, China had been entitled to hope for a period of peaceful reconstruction after the war. China, however, had become embroiled in civil strife which was no less arduous. Everyone was concerned with aiding China to attain stability and peace.

19. With regard to the charges which had been made, the Australian delegation did not believe that it would be appropriate, at the present time, for the General Assembly to adopt a resolution along the lines presented by the representative of China (A/C.1/551) which found one Member guilty and would determine rather too precisely the future conduct of the relations of nations with China. It seemed better to recall the principles of the Charter and apply them specifically to China. The Australian delegation accordingly had joined in the sponsorship of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/552). That joint draft referred to relevant portions of the Charter and presented four rules of conduct. The two main principles to be observed were respect for the political independence of China and respect for the right of Chinese people to choose freely their form of government without foreign interference. Since the representative of China had said they were not being observed those principles had to be re-stated. The political independence of the Members was one of the bases of the United Nations and it was essential for the future of the Organization that it be respected. The second principle contained in the joint draft resolution did not attempt to prescribe any type of government or social institutions for China but stated that such government and institutions should be freely selected by the Chinese people and freely maintained without outside interference or foreign control.

20. In addition, the joint draft resolution called for respect of existing treaties. That also was a principle of the Charter. The Chinese Government had entered into agreements with Member States and it was the intention of the draft resolution that they should be observed in all their provisions except when modified by the agreement of both parties. That paragraph of the draft resolution referred to past and present obligations which should continue to be observed. The fourth paragraph dealt with the question of future relations. It was clear that the acquisition of spheres of influence or the creation of régimes within China under foreign control was contrary to the Charter. Equally clearly any attempt to dismember China would be contrary to the Charter. The provision that special rights or privileges within China should not be sought was a natural development of international relations with China in the twentieth century. It was now recognized that other nations could no longer impose onerous terms upon China. During the Second World

War, the remaining extra-territorial rights had been eliminated and no Power could now seek to acquire them. Mr. Plimsoll believed that the third and fourth principles enunciated in the joint draft resolution followed logically from the first and second and offered guidance to nations in their relations with China. If all Members of the United Nations conformed to those principles, the Chinese people would have an opportunity for peace and reconstruction. It was with that object that the Australian delegation had joined in the sponsorship of the draft resolution.

21. Mr. KYROU (Greece) recalled that his delegation, in voting for the inclusion of the present item on the agenda of the General Assembly, had expressed the view<sup>1</sup> that, whatever the merits of the case, it was the duty of the General Assembly to examine any complaint from a Member nation of the existence of a threat to its political independence and territorial integrity. Having been a victim of armed aggression itself, the Greek people felt a deep sympathy for the sufferings of the people of China at the hands of communist imperialism. Obviously, therefore, in the present debate, the Greek delegation would favour action by the General Assembly to protect any nation that was threatened by armed aggression from abroad. However, that attitude did not stem merely from Greece's own experience. The main reason was that the Greek delegation believed that the Charter placed an obligation upon all Member States to insist that international law be universally respected, that any violation, either open or camouflaged, of the principles of the Charter should be punished, and that all Member Governments should conduct their relations in a spirit of good neighbourliness. Respect for those principles was of vital concern to all Member States because so long as a Government was resolved to disregard international law in furtherance of its own selfish interests, no one could say at what point it would stop. The existence of an aggression against one Member of the international community contained, in itself, a menace of similar aggression against all the others. That fact had been heavily emphasized by the tragic results of the Munich Agreement. Mr. Kyrou hoped that the Committee would recognize its grave responsibility and adopt a firm decision in the sense that international law must be universally respected if world peace was to be assured.

22. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) said that his delegation had listened with particular interest to the Chinese representative's statement because their two countries had long maintained close and friendly relations and because the Belgian people had felt a deep sympathy for China during its long ordeal.

23. No one could fail to note that, out of the four items which had figured on the agenda of the First Committee during the present session, three were closely related in their substance. Indeed, that relationship had been expressed in the titles of two of the items, relating to Greece and China, both of which contained the phrase "threats to political independence and territorial integrity". It was evident that the main obstacle which prevented consolidation of peace at the present time was the fact that many States felt

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, General Committee, 67th meeting.*



that they were being threatened from abroad. The task of the Committee was not to examine the internal situation in China, but to investigate the international aspect of the situation. In that respect the situation was very similar to that prevailing in Greece and the Chinese representative had merely confirmed the facts already well known, namely that China was a victim of external intervention and that assistance was provided from outside the country, in the form of large quantities of armaments and war materials, to the insurgent forces which were fighting the regular Chinese Government. All that further illustrated a certain policy which had been the principal subject of discussion during the preceding meetings of the Committee.

24. The scope of that policy and its essentially imperialistic character could be easily assessed by comparing its manifestations in the Far East and in Europe. Actually what the world was witnessing was the manifestation of a neo-imperialism which, although similar to preceding forms, possessed some new features capable of creating a misunderstanding as to its true character. The doctrinal and ideological basis of that neo-imperialism had been admirably described during the debate on the preceding item on the Committee's agenda. Essentially, it was an ideology which claimed universality on the one hand and, on the other, the right to dominate both in the spiritual and temporal domains. In so far as China was concerned, that neo-imperialism had not as yet taken the form of direct annexation as had been the fate of the Baltic States in Europe. Yet, although information was notably lacking, there could be little doubt that the Chinese representative had been correct in stating that in Outer-Mongolia effective control was being exercised by certain advisers and agents who had been placed in all the key positions of the Government. A similar objective could be seen in the proposals which the Soviet Union had submitted to the Chinese Government on 24 November 1945 and 27 March 1946. Those proposals were designed to place 154 industrial and mining enterprises in Manchuria, representing more than 80 per cent of heavy industry, under joint Chinese-Soviet management. It had been stipulated that the Director-General entrusted with control of those enterprises should be appointed by the Government of the Soviet Union and his deputy by the Chinese Government. Such tactics were not original in any way and were reminiscent of the methods used in eastern Europe.

25. A more complex situation arose in connexion with the military and economic assistance that had been furnished to the forces fighting the regular Government of China and seeking to replace it with a new Government. Doubtless, the existence of such external aid was not, in itself, sufficient ground for challenging the independence of the new Government. But there existed a much more valid reason for doubting its independence in the fact that the principal representatives of the new régime had received their authority from the leaders of a political party who were, at the same time, leaders of a foreign State and whose political philosophy demanded absolute obedience from their adherents. Clearly, that meant the subordination of national interests to the interests of the foreign State concerned and the existence of such subordination was borne out by the evidence adduced by the Chinese representative.

26. Moreover, the Committee had standards by which to judge the situation in the experience of recent developments in the relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The fundamental cause of the conflict between those two States was obviously that Yugoslavia, despite the communist conviction of its leaders, had been unwilling to subordinate its own national interests to those of the Soviet Union. As the Yugoslav representative had himself stated (330th meeting), Yugoslavia had refused to accept the role of a dependent territory which had been accepted by the leaders of other States in eastern Europe. A situation had arisen in that part of Europe and in the Far East which had not been envisaged by the authors of the Charter. The latter had laid down guarantees for the peoples of territories that had not yet achieved self-government, but they had been silent with respect to peoples who had been used to govern themselves, but had had the power of self-government removed from them. It would be inconceivable that the Committee should remain indifferent to their fate and that while wasting time combating the colonialism of yesterday, it should be blind to the imperialism of the present day which was aimed at the subjugation of peoples capable of self-government. Doubtless, the power of the United Nations to act at the present time was very limited. But the United Nations must have the courage to look reality in the face and pronounce itself unequivocally upon the situation as it existed. Only thus would the United Nations be discharging one of its essential functions, namely to harness the moral forces implicit in the fundamental principles of the Charter.

27. Mr. van Langenhove reserved the right of his delegation to state its position regarding the specific proposals contained in the draft resolutions at the end of the general debate.

28. Mr. TSIANG (China) drew the Committee's attention to certain aspects of the joint draft resolution which, he stressed, was not incompatible in substance with the draft resolution submitted by his delegation (A/C.1/551). In fact, the joint draft resolution merely dealt in greater detail with the substance of the final paragraph of the Chinese draft resolution, omitting all reference to its three preceding provisions. The Committee must decide therefore whether those other provisions of the Chinese draft resolution were in fact necessary or not. Mr. Tsiang explained the substance of the provisions contained in the Chinese draft resolution and stated the considerations which should guide the Committee's decision.

29. First, the Chinese draft resolution contained a determination that the Soviet Union had violated the Charter and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945. The Committee must decide whether the evidence which he had adduced was sufficient to form a basis for such a determination and whether a determination in that sense would be necessary or wise.

30. Secondly, the draft resolution urged all Member States to desist and refrain from giving military and economic aid to the Chinese Communists. In that connexion the Committee must decide whether or not such a request was contrary to the principles of the Charter and whether Member States should be permitted to continue to give military and economic aid to the Chinese

Communists. Likewise, it must be decided whether the request exceeded the obligations imposed upon the General Assembly by the Charter.

31. Thirdly, the Chinese draft resolution contained a recommendation to all Member States not to accord diplomatic recognition to any régime organized by the Chinese Communists. The question arose whether recognition of the Chinese communist régime was consistent with international law and the Charter and whether it would promote international peace and security which were the special concern of the United Nations. Mr. Tsiang stated his intention to explain at a later time why his delegation insisted upon the three provisions to which he had referred, in addition to the point covered by the joint draft resolution. In the meantime he asked that the Committee consider the points which he had raised.

32. Mr. STOLK (Venezuela), while not prepared to discuss the substance of the question, asked for a clarification by the authors of the contents of the two draft resolutions before the Committee. For his part Mr. Stolk doubted whether it was in order to issue an appeal to all Member States to stop aiding the Chinese Communists at the present time. The title of the agenda item related to the existence of threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East resulting from violations by the Soviet Union of the Charter and of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of

Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945. Clearly, the first task should be to ascertain whether the accusation was correct. If the General Assembly was to issue an appeal, it should be based on proven facts. In his opinion, the General Assembly should not issue an appeal indiscriminately to all States but only to such States which it had been proved had violated the Charter or had aided the Chinese Communists. If, on the other hand, the General Assembly merely wished to make a declaration of principle in order to "promote the stability of international relations in the Far East", without assessing the validity of the charges which had been made, then clearly the draft resolution should contain nothing more than a general statement of principles.

33. Mr. MUNIZ (Brazil) pointed out the importance of the two draft resolutions which had been submitted to the Committee and stated that his delegation would require time to study them and to consult its Government. He therefore proposed that the debate be adjourned until the General Assembly had completed consideration of the agenda item relating to "Condemnation of the preparations for a new war, and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace".

34. The CHAIRMAN put the motion for adjournment to the vote, in accordance with rule 105 of the rules of procedure.

*The motion was adopted by 36 votes to 2, with 8 abstentions.*

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND FORTIETH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 1 December 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### **Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945, and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations (continued)**

1. Mr. TSIANG (China) pointed out that the joint draft resolution submitted by the delegations of Australia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines and United States (A/C.1/552) was not inconsistent with the Chinese draft resolution (A/C.1/551), the main points of the joint draft resolution being embodied in the last point of the operative part of the Chinese draft resolution.

2. The latter contained, however, three other points, which were no less important. In the first place, it asked the General Assembly to determine that the USSR had violated the Charter of the United Nations and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945. Mr. Tsiang reminded the meeting that he had already given evidence of those violations (338th meeting), which added up to a case of outright aggression.

3. As for the question whether it might not be advisable, as suggested, to refer those charges of violation of the Charter and the Sino-Soviet Treaty

to the International Court of Justice, strictly speaking only one of those violations came within the scope of international law, and that was the shipment of Chinese troops through the port of Dairen. The Government of the Soviet Union had contended at the outset that the status of Dairen as a free port debarred its use for military purposes. The Chinese Government had replied that Dairen's status as a free port did not mean that China had lost its rights to use it for purposes other than commercial ones, since the treaty provided that China should retain its sovereign rights over the port. Later, the USSR had changed its line of argument and had adduced the technical state of war with Japan as a reason for preventing China from stationing troops in Dairen. The Chinese Government had replied that the treaty between China and the USSR did not prevent China from exercising sovereign rights over Dairen once Japan had surrendered unconditionally to the Allies.

4. Mr. Tsiang further pointed out that the decision of the USSR delegation not to take part in the Committee's discussion showed that the Soviet Union had no case. Since, moreover, that State had not ratified the Statute of the International Court of Justice, any legal appeal would be futile. Nevertheless, the Chinese delegation would agree that the question of Dairen should be brought before the International Court of Justice, provided that the USSR did not fail to

appear. The Chinese delegation would accept any means of international settlement for the Dairen question, a question too important to be simply dropped.

5. The other charges brought against the USSR, in particular that of giving help to the Chinese Communists, could not be submitted to the Court, since they did not fall within its jurisdiction. The Chinese delegation would, therefore, agree that all the charges, with the exception of the one relating to Dairen, should be referred to a special committee or to the Interim Committee for further study, if the First Committee should so decide.

6. Mr. Tsiang added that the charges brought by the Chinese delegation were too serious to be disregarded. The old imperialism had been replaced by another imperialism which might be called commu-imperialism, or imp-communism. That neo-imperialism, as the representative of Belgium had called it, was a threat to peace and security in the form of provocation from abroad towards non-communist States, as the representative of Lebanon had pointed out in his statement of 23 November (334th meeting).

7. In the period between the two wars, fascism had undermined the League of Nations and the peace of the world; today it was commu-imperialism that was the threatening factor. In both cases China had been the first victim, but it would certainly not be the last. When the Japanese had invaded Manchuria in 1931, the great Powers had been unable to agree to bring pressure to bear on the Japanese militarists. The smaller Powers had been more far-seeing, but they had allowed themselves to be overawed by the great Powers. While the League of Nations had fruitlessly debated the question, the Japanese militarists had launched their aggression, setting up puppet States, undermining the prestige of the League of Nations and preparing the way for the Second World War.

8. China, eighteen years after the first aggression of which it had been the victim, was again asking the world community to decide. The present aggressor was far more dangerous, since it disguised its policy with an ideology of social progress and justice. Nevertheless its imperialism was just as patent. The Chinese Government wanted the General Assembly to use its right to pass moral judgment on the Soviet aggressor. That was the least that the United Nations could do to keep the peace. That was no mere issue between two Member States, but something far more serious: an aggressor had to be prevented from pursuing its policy towards other States, both in the East and the West. For those reasons the Chinese delegation was asking the Committee to accept the first operative clause of the Chinese draft resolution, or to amend it, but not to delete it.

9. The second operative clause of the Chinese draft resolution contained an appeal to the Members of the United Nations to refrain from giving aid to the Chinese Communists. The representative of China pointed out in that connexion that the underlying policy of his Government was one of continued resistance against communist aggression. He recalled that on 22 April 1949, the leaders of the Chinese nation had announced at Hangchow that the Government would fight to the end to suppress the communist rebellion. The resistance would be long and bitter, but no price

was too high where national independence and freedom were concerned.

10. The Chinese Communists had admitted to suffering heavy casualties. Revolts were breaking out in the territory under their control. *The New York Times* of 25 July 1949 made particular mention of sabotage and guerrilla warfare carried out by the peasants against the Communists. The peasant rebellion, which had begun in Manchuria, was spreading into Central, North and South China. Some groups were springing up spontaneously, others were being organized by the Government, but all maintained close liaison with the central authorities.

11. The Chinese delegation, in asking Member States to refrain from giving aid to the Chinese Communists, was appealing for moral sanctions against those Member States which were behind the communist rebellion in China.

12. While supporting that provision of the joint draft resolution concerning the right of the people of China to choose freely their political institutions, Mr. Tsiang pointed out that it could not be maintained that the Chinese people were enjoying that freedom so long as foreign Powers continued to give military and economic aid to the Chinese Communists. The joint draft resolution should be completed by the addition of the second operative clause of the Chinese draft resolution, otherwise it would be nothing but a collection of beautiful phrases.

13. In the third operative clause, the Chinese draft resolution recommended Member States not to accord diplomatic recognition to any régime organized by the Chinese Communists. The so-called Peiping Government did not control the whole of China. Large parts were still under the rule of the Nationalist Government. In the communist-controlled areas, independent units of Government-sponsored or spontaneous forces were challenging communist domination. The large numbers of refugees showed that the communist régime was not supported by the population. It had, furthermore, shown no signs of willingness to take over China's international obligations. On 29 September 1949, the communist régime had proclaimed a "common programme", which laid down that the treaties and agreements concluded by the Nationalist Government with foreign Governments would be reviewed, recognized, revised or abrogated as the case might be.

14. Mr. Tsiang, quoting from a book by Professor Lauterpacht on *Recognition in International Law*, stated that that the provisions of the Chinese draft resolution regarding the question of diplomatic recognition were in accordance with the principles of international law, according to which a lawful Government, however adversely affected by the fortunes of civil war, must continue to be recognized *de jure* as long as the civil war, whatever its prospects, was in progress.

15. Mr. Tsiang thought that in the matter of diplomatic recognition, the international community should also apply the principle of joint exercise of national sovereignty, which had been called for and adopted by the majority of Member States in the field of atomic energy. It mattered little that, for some people, recognition did not mean approval. For the man in the street, diplomatic recognition was tantamount to approval and, in the case at issue, it would enhance the

prestige of the Chinese Communists, by striking a deadly blow at the cause of freedom in China.

16. According to Press reports, it would seem that the Government of the United Kingdom was about to recognize the Chinese Communists in the near future. The United Kingdom naturally desired to safeguard its investments in China, which amounted to about a thousand million dollars. However, a desire to protect those interests was not comparable with the fate and political independence of 450 million Chinese. Moreover, not only was the fate of China at stake, but the future of the whole world. In that connexion, the speaker read a dispatch from Hong Kong which had appeared in *The Times* on 28 November, relating to a conference held in Peiping at which were present representatives of the communist trade unions of Asia and Australasia, as well as members of the Executive Committee of the World Federation of Trade Unions. That conference had opened on 16 November 1949. That dispatch indicated that all the moral and material backing of communist China would, in future, be placed at the disposal of the communist movements in Asia. The Chinese communist leaders had said that it was the duty of Chinese workers to help workers in other countries, and particularly those in the colonial countries of Asia and Australasia. They had promised to support those fighting for national independence in Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, Indonesia and the Philippines. The conference had set up a permanent liaison bureau and a secretariat. The Indian delegate had stated that that liaison bureau would become a general staff to co-ordinate efforts in the Far East. Various representatives had spoken in support of a joint Asian front which would include all populations under the control of the Communist Parties.

17. Under those conditions, it was clear that British investments in China would not be secure for as long as the communists remained in power there. He added that certain Governments which were contemplating diplomatic recognition of the Chinese Communists hoped, in that way, to encourage "Titoism" in China. However, the Chinese Communists and, in the first place, Mao Tse-tung, were one hundred per cent communist. Furthermore, the Kremlin was demanding and was taking material steps to guarantee that no second Tito would arise. The USSR had already succeeded in dominating Manchuria, without which the Chinese Communists would not be able to supply their armies and their towns, and without which they would not be able to develop the industrialization of the country either.

18. The Chinese delegation believed that the most important part of its draft resolution was the part requesting that diplomatic recognition should not be granted to the Chinese Communists. It did not oppose the joint draft resolution submitted by the five Powers, although it considered that such a text would be meaningless if it were not supplemented by the three additional points of the Chinese draft resolution.

19. Mr. PÉON DEL VALLE (Mexico) stated that the question of China was of particular concern to his delegation, not only because of its substance, but also because it affected a people with which Mexico had traditionally maintained important demographic, economic and other relations. His delegation was taking part in the

discussion with the desire of assuring to the Chinese people the right to choose its political institutions freely and without external pressure.

20. The explanations given by the representatives of the United States and of Australia (339th meeting) in connexion with the joint draft resolution of which Mexico was one of the sponsors, eliminated the need for another detailed explanation. He wished to emphasize, however, the need for preserving in China the sovereign right of free self-determination; it was also important that the Assembly should act in the matter so that the consensus of the various delegations might be expressed with the firmness necessary for the implementation and respect of the Organization's decisions.

21. His delegation did not wish to underestimate the gravity of the situation in China, but its attitude was not one of despair. His delegation's main confidence lay in the great vitality of the Chinese people. In addition, it considered that the present was an excellent opportunity for preventing the establishment of spheres of influence in China, as well as the obtaining of special rights or privileges. For that reason, it drew the particular attention of members of the Committee to the fourth paragraph of the operative part of the joint draft resolution.

22. His delegation could not support the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of China.

23. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) regretted that the Chairman had considered that the previous question raised by the Yugoslav delegation with regard to the legality of the Chinese delegation's powers did not come within the competence of the First Committee. That previous question was, indeed, of a political nature. As in a lawsuit, the identity of the accuser was a fundamental consideration. In the present instance, the accuser could only be the Chinese people. The Chinese delegation, however, no longer represented that people, as it received its instructions from a Government which had lost the confidence of the people.

24. Since that consideration had been overlooked, the discussion had become confused and events in China had been presented in a false light. Everyone should, however, be able to recognize that the greatest people in the world had broken its links with the past and was progressing towards a future which would see the full development of its civilization, as well as towards its liberty and independence.

25. The Yugoslav delegation, which had recognized the Government of the Chinese People's Republic, was aware that that Government was hostile in its attitude towards Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was not, however, a State which judged a historical event on the basis of existing political contingencies.

26. The right of the Chinese people to decide its own policy should be recognized. If the General Assembly were to agree to the request made by the Chinese delegation, it might be accused of interfering in China's internal affairs. For that reason, the Yugoslav delegation would abstain from voting on that question.

27. Mr. TERAN (Nicaragua) retraced the history of the international conflicts which had taken place in China and in the Pacific since the end

of the nineteenth century. He recalled the various stages of the "open-door" policy with regard to China before the First World War, and pointed out that that policy, one of the main features of which was the guarantee of China's political independence and territorial integrity, had been strengthened, following the first Japanese attack on China in 1931, when Mr. Stimson, United States Secretary of State, had said that the United States would not recognize any conquests achieved by force. Later, in 1937, following the second Japanese attack on China, President Roosevelt, in his famous "quarantine" speech, had asked that the aggressor should be isolated from the rest of the world in the same way as a person suffering from an infectious disease would be isolated from the other members of his family.

28. After recapitulating the part played by China at the side of the Allies during the Second World War, Mr. Teran deplored the fact that the United Nations was at present unable to exercise its authority with respect to the unfortunate happenings to which the Chinese representative had referred. The joint draft resolution of the five Powers was satisfactory in so far as it stated the need at the present time to practise a policy of non-intervention or a "closed-door" policy, in order to prevent the outbreak of a new world war.

29. The Nicaraguan delegation would abstain from voting on the Chinese draft resolution, but would vote against the paragraph of the operative part referring to the recognition of the Chinese Communists, since recognition was an act of national sovereignty which could not be infringed by a decision of the United Nations.

30. Mr. ALEXIS (Haiti) said that although his delegation was in sympathy with the spirit of the Chinese draft resolution (A/C.1/551), it deeply regretted that it would not be able to vote for it. The delegation of Haiti was not in a position to determine the true wishes of the population of China. In international law the importance of facts should not, however, be underestimated: facts should form the basis of all diplomatic action.

31. As for the recommendation that Member States should not grant recognition to a régime set up by the Chinese Communists, that question was one for the various Governments alone to consider; it could not be debated in the First Committee.

32. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) stated that it was the moral duty of small countries to proclaim the principles of the Charter, and particularly the principle of the inviolability of treaties.

33. The distressing events which had occurred in China had led the Peruvian delegation to believe that the Chinese Government's assertion concerning the violation by the Soviet Union of the Charter and of its treaty of friendship and alliance with China was true.

34. Nevertheless, China, now fighting against the communist invasion, had given the United Nations powerful help. After having fought bravely during the Second World War, it had made a valuable contribution towards drawing up the Charter and had, in particular, been responsible for modifying a somewhat curt wording by stating clearly that the organization of peace should be based on justice. It was that delegation, which had given such useful assistance, that some wished to see replaced by the representatives of a Government which had come into being not by the will of the people but by the will of a foreign Power.

35. In expressing its feelings of sympathy for the Chinese people, the Peruvian delegation said it would vote for the joint draft resolution submitted by Australia, the United States, Mexico, Pakistan and the Philippines (A/C.1/552) which desired the people of China to be in a position to choose freely their political institutions and to maintain a government independent of foreign control.

36. The Peruvian delegation fully supported the spirit and the legal basis of Mr. Jessup's excellent statement (339th meeting). It was no doubt regrettable that the joint draft resolution had not included a more categorical condemnation. Nevertheless, in order that the text might have its full moral significance, it was essential that it should be adopted almost unanimously.

37. With regard to the paragraph of the Chinese draft resolution (A/C.1/551) relating to the Soviet Union's violation of its treaty with China, it was undeniable that international relations were only possible if treaties were respected: the maxim "*Pacta sunt servanda*" was therefore of fundamental importance. It was no doubt legitimate, in the absence of positive stipulations, to have recourse to some sort of praetorian international law, but that could only be a makeshift and, in that particular instance, a treaty did exist, the treaty of 14 August 1945.

38. The Peruvian delegation could not, however, vote for the recommendation contained in the paragraph of the Chinese draft resolution relating to diplomatic recognition. Indeed, the Charter of the Inter-American States contained a definite provision that recognition of a *de facto* Government did not constitute a decision that that Government was a lawful Government. It would be true that any action taken in that field would constitute a definite act of intervention. The Peruvian delegation would therefore vote for the provision contained in the joint draft resolution, according to which the Chinese people should choose freely its political institutions.

39. The Peruvian representative stated in conclusion that, by adopting the joint draft resolution, the General Assembly would be accomplishing an action of great legal and moral significance.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIRST MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 2 December 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).*

#### **Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945, and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations (continued)**

1. Mr. MARTÍNEZ MORENO (El Salvador) remarked that although frequent references were made to the Charter in the debates of the General Assembly, its principles were often forgotten and supplanted by political interests of a materialistic character obscured by rhetoric; and for reasons of fear or inconvenience urgent problems relating to peace and security were overlooked. The delegation of El Salvador believed that the present discussion proved that point. In order to defend transitory commercial interests, weak proposals had been offered which were incapable of defending the peace in the Far East. Those weak attitudes were jeopardizing the territorial integrity and political independence of China. Moral condemnation of the aggressor nation had not even been suggested. The attitudes of the great Powers, which should be the guardians of peace, illustrated their lack of foresight and political responsibility. The situation was reminiscent of the Munich era of appeasement which could be forgiven once but not a second time. There was also the case of the Ethiopian appeal against totalitarian aggression. On that occasion, Mr. Litvinov had tried to open the eyes of the West to the intention of the Axis Powers. On the present occasion, the Committee should hear the echo of that appeal now made against the Government which had voiced it at that time.

2. The Committee should not forget that the Soviet Union had participated in the civil war in China. The information offered by the representative of China showed the need for effective sanctions rather than weak evasive resolutions. The representative of China had proved that the Soviet Union had given moral and material aid to the Chinese Communists in violation of the Charter, the Yalta Agreement and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1945. The representative of China had shown (338th meeting) that those actions jeopardized the peace of the Far East and of the world and that they indicated that the Soviet Union was resisting any re-assertion of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria, particularly in regard to the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. It had also been shown that the Soviet Union had not respected the status of Mongolia, but had established puppet régimes in Manchuria, Inner-Mongolia, and in the north-western provinces of China. If the Committee was convinced of those facts, there was no reason for not supporting the Chinese draft resolution. Mr. Martínez Moreno asked why, if China was one link in the Soviet Union's chain of conquests, and if, in consequence, there was a threat to international peace and security, the collective measures provided for in Article 1 of the Charter should not be applied. He did not

see why a difference should be made between Greece and China when, in both cases, questions of territorial integrity and political independence were involved. It could not be considered proper to take different positions on questions which were the same.

3. In giving its support to the Chinese draft resolution (A/C.1/551), the delegation of El Salvador was concerned only with the contents of that proposal and not with the actions of the Nationalist Government of China which were the exclusive concern of the Chinese people. El Salvador wished merely to condemn the intervention of the Soviet Union in the territory of a Member State and express its sympathy for the Chinese people and its hopes for their future liberation.

4. The joint draft resolution (A/C.1/552) was vague and not closely related to the item before the Committee. It made no mention of aggression and referred only to the general stability of the Far East. El Salvador would vote for that joint draft resolution without enthusiasm and only if the Chinese draft resolution were to be rejected.

5. Mr. Martínez Moreno stated his delegation's belief that small nations should not remain indifferent or passive in great Power conflicts. They should be active and impartial and, if the great Powers did not promote democratic action, it was the duty of the small nations to do so.

6. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) said that that unhappy story of China's travail was not the first of its kind to be heard in the United Nations nor was it likely to be the last but in the case of China it was a story of genuinely epic proportions. The uneasiness of other delegations had been shown by the nature of their statements, and for the Philippines, which had been close to China for a thousand years, the experience was particularly afflicting. The same would be true for all neighbours of China and it was therefore difficult to remain objective in that matter.

7. The Committee was called upon to pass judgment on an indictment of a kind which was not new to the General Assembly. In the questions of Iran, Greece, Franco-Spain, Korea, Cardinal Mindszenty, Indonesia and Yugoslavia, remedies had been offered for the most part successfully. In those cases the Committee's purpose had been to apply a remedy and not merely to pass judgment. In that particular case, however, China expected no material aid and only sought a moral judgment. But Mr. López felt that the General Assembly was being asked to pass judgment on history. He hoped that if the Committee should prove reluctant to do so, the representative of China would understand that Members were not being insensitive but were honestly facing realities. If the Committee felt unable to give the Chinese delegation entire satisfaction, the latter should level no reproaches against the Committee, because any action that it could take would be inadequate under the circumstances and the request had come too late. The realities of the situation in China emphasized the unreality of the Committee's discussion. It was hard to debate what ought to be done in terms of what should have been done two or three years previously.



8. The Philippine delegation had followed the only feasible course and had sponsored the joint draft resolution. The judgment requested was implicit therein. The principles which it contained looked backwards as well as forwards and applied to all nations which found themselves at the present time, or might find themselves in the future, in the same situation as China. It was to be hoped that with the aid of those principles and with their innate love of liberty the Chinese people would be enabled to regain their independence.

9. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA Khan (Pakistan) said there could be no doubt as to the direction in which Pakistan's sympathies lay. However, the representative of China had presented the Committee with a very difficult problem. Had it been of a purely political nature and had the solution suggested by China been one which the Committee was competent to adopt, the course taken by his delegation would have been clear; but under the circumstances, it could support only part of the Chinese draft resolution, but it could not support the core of it, which called upon the General Assembly to make a judicial pronouncement and imposed upon it judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Despite Pakistan's sympathy with the people and Government of China in their sufferings, it could not endorse the finding as requested.

10. The first two paragraphs of the Chinese draft resolution were of a general character and his delegation could support them. The third and fourth paragraphs, however, presented difficulties. In connexion with the findings presented in the third paragraph, he wished to point out that only one side had been heard. That remark was not intended to suggest that when a party which had been indicted chose not to offer any defence, the United Nations could not reach an opinion. The difficulty was that the Committee could not reach a finding without an investigation of a judicial character. Whatever might be the future development of the United Nations, it was doubtful whether the General Assembly was as yet in a position to undertake such an investigation. It appeared to be rather a matter for the proper judicial organ. The same difficulty arose in connexion with the fourth paragraph, for if the General Assembly was unable to make a finding it could not determine what the situation was. The difficulty would not be so great if the matter were obvious and conclusions could be reached on the basis of a *prima facie* presentation. But even if the view as to the juridical nature of the question were incorrect, a lengthy investigation would be needed and the third and fourth paragraphs could not, for the present, be endorsed. Pakistan would have to abstain on the fifth paragraph. With regard to the sixth paragraph, even the representative of China would admit that recognition depended largely on factors with which the previous part of the draft resolution had little connexion. Pakistan could not support that paragraph and would oppose any recommendation seeking to compel Member States not to accord recognition to a régime which in view of the practice upon which recognition must depend might establish a case for recognition. The seventh paragraph contained a legitimate request and Pakistan could support it.

11. Pakistan had sponsored the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/552) knowing that the problem

was a very difficult and delicate one and feeling that the draft contained all the essentials with regard to which the United Nations ought to be anxious in respect of the situation in China.

12. Mr. VALENZUELA (Chile) said that the debate had given the impression that the Committee was facing a crucial question involving the survival of the United Nations. Yet, the debate had begun at a time when little or nothing could be done. It was regrettable that the question had not been brought up two or three years beforehand. That was particularly true when it was considered that the participation of the Soviet Union in the activities of the Communist Party in China had been known for years. Every event since the meeting between Sun Yat-sen and Joffe in 1923 was well known. A publication on the foreign policy of the Soviet Union published by the *Oxford University Press* in 1945 had devoted no less than seventy-five pages to list the various interventions of the Soviet Union in China, Sinkiang, Manchuria and Mongolia. How the present leaders of the Chinese Communist Party had achieved their high positions was also well known.

13. In theory, civil wars were internal matters. However, there were civil wars which were either created by foreign intervention or which later came under the control of a foreign Power once they had started. Mr. Valenzuela stated that the rebellion in China was not a popular movement but an insurrection controlled and supported by Moscow. Without the aid of the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist Party could not have been victorious.

14. The Committee had to consider whether the Soviet Union had presented threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East through violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 and of the United Nations Charter. It was evident that the Soviet Union's attitude in the Chinese civil war was that of an interested party. The United Nations could only pass moral condemnation, as provided for in both the draft resolutions. The Chinese draft resolution, in its findings concerning the Soviet Union, stated facts that had not been denied. The final paragraph urged Members of the United Nations to refrain from taking advantage of the situation in China. The only doubtful paragraph was that which asked that diplomatic recognition should not be accorded to a communist régime. That paragraph, however, only constituted a recommendation and said nothing regarding consular and commercial relations. Chile would support the Chinese draft resolution as a whole and in its separate parts.

15. The operative part of the joint draft resolution was inadequate. It called upon all States to respect the political independence of China, although it was well known that the Chinese People's Republic, born under the control of the Communist Party, was already a member of the Soviet bloc and had, therefore, lost its independence. The following paragraph invited States to respect the right of the Chinese people to choose their political institutions freely, yet events in eastern Europe were an illustration of what could be expected to occur. The third paragraph called for respect for existing treaties, although the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 had already been disregarded. The fourth paragraph urged States

to refrain from seeking spheres of influence when it was known that no nation other than the Soviet Union would be able to acquire them. It also asked States not to seek special rights or privileges in China, but the only privileges would in fact be given by and to the Soviet Union. The joint draft resolution was an example of extreme diplomatic prudence. The Chilean delegation would vote for it only if the Chinese draft resolution were to be rejected.

16. Sir Carl BERENDSEN (New Zealand) said that, while the present anomalous position of his delegation would be understood, he would be failing in his duty if he did not offer a few general observations on the matter before the Committee. His delegation approached that question with the deepest concern. The debt owed to China by the freedom-loving peoples was fully realized and could never be forgotten. China had been engaged in the war of the West long before the latter knew that it was in a war. It could be said that the Second World War had started with the Japanese attack on Manchuria. It was a reflection not without significance that the present situation in China had also originated in Manchuria. The world was bound to remember the lessons of 1932 and not to follow too closely the sombre pattern of events that had followed suit. All had witnessed the valiant defence put up by China against Japanese aggression at a time when very little assistance had been possible. All had watched with sympathetic interest the attempt to establish in that great country true democracy for all.

17. Remembering those facts, it was impossible not to sympathize with the Chinese people in the circumstances to which they had been reduced. Sir Carl said that serious defects had been attributed to the Nationalist Government, defects which were said to have increased as time passed. It was said that the Nationalist Government had never been or might have ceased to be one holding and deserving the respect of the Chinese people and of the world. He did not know whether that was in fact so. It must be remembered, however, that the Chinese Government had joined in the fight for democracy against what had seemed for a while insuperable odds. Whatever the merits or demerits of that Government, the people of China deserved well of the world, and particularly of those who had participated in the Second World War. It was distressing beyond measure to see how little could be done to help that people in their present straits, and it was regrettable that the charges under discussion had been brought to the United Nations so late. He could sympathize, however, with the moving presentation made by the Chinese representative, and knew that that sympathy was shared by the vast majority of the Committee.

18. Asking what the United Nations could do, Sir Carl said that Mr. Tsiang's request for sympathy and understanding could be granted, as could some of the other requests made in the Chinese draft resolution. Other requests made in that proposal were, however, beyond the Committee's reach or even wishes. It was painful to realize the gap existing between what members of the Committee would wish to do to help the Chinese people and what could actually be done. Turning to the joint draft resolution, the New Zealand representative said that he could not

object to anything in that proposal as far as it went, but that it did not go very far. All that was said in that draft resolution was true, but he wondered just how the United Nations, and in particular China, would benefit if it were to be adopted. That proposal might well be as much as the United Nations could do in the existing situation, but if such were indeed the case, it would be proper to say so and to express deep and bitter regret that such should be the fact. It would be improper to pretend that the situation was being faced squarely and that something was being done about it. If the General Assembly was indeed intending to wash its hands of the matter, it would do well to acknowledge it openly and honestly.

19. Sir Terence SHONE (United Kingdom) said that in view of the fact that the question already been dealt with in detail by a number of speakers, he merely wished to explain his delegation's attitude towards the two draft resolutions before the Committee. The United Kingdom delegation would support the joint draft resolution and would vote against that submitted by the Chinese delegation. In the circumstances, the joint draft resolution provided for the most appropriate action which the United Nations could now take on that very difficult and delicate question. His delegation's vote against the Chinese proposal should not be taken to mean that all paragraphs of the latter were unacceptable, for, as the Chinese representative had pointed out, the last paragraph of the Chinese draft resolution corresponded closely with the general lines of the joint draft resolution. While it was no doubt true that from a purely formal point of view it would be perfectly possible for the General Assembly to adopt both drafts, his delegation considered that the spirit, if not the letter, of the joint draft resolution conflicted with the proposal submitted by the Chinese delegation, and that it would be inappropriate for the Committee to vote in favour of both.

20. The joint draft resolution sought to define, by reference to the Charter, the principles which all Members of the United Nations should observe in their relations with China. On the other hand, the Chinese proposal not only invited Members to pass judgment on USSR policy in relation to China, but also to take sides in the unfortunate civil war in that country, and would bind Member States in their attitude towards one side. That method of approach was incorrect, while the method proposed in the joint draft resolution was correct.

21. His delegation's vote against the Chinese draft resolution should not be interpreted as a wish to acquit the Soviet Union of the charges brought against it, which had been impressively supported by the statement of the representative of China (338th meeting), and could not be dismissed lightly. Nor did the USSR delegation's refusal to take part in the debate strengthen its case. Nevertheless, the Committee had not thought fit to examine that aspect of the matter in detail, and it was doubtful whether it would be appropriate or useful to do so. As for the second operative paragraph of the Chinese draft, he understood that it was not suggested that economic sanctions should be employed. If the wording of that paragraph were to have any significance, however, it was difficult to see what

else could be meant. He had no doubt that all Member States, or at least those taking part in the debate, would wish to avoid any action which could be regarded as taking sides in the Chinese civil war or interfering in Chinese internal affairs. In Sir Terence's view, that principle, if accepted, would automatically preclude any suggestion of imposing an economic blockade of the areas of China controlled by the communist régime.

22. He felt bound to deal with the third operative paragraph of the Chinese draft in some detail, in view of the fact that the Chinese representative had implied that the United Kingdom Government would be prepared to sacrifice the Chinese people in an effort to preserve British commercial interests in China. That was an entirely unjust and unwarranted allegation. Sir Terence would not say anything at that time about his Government's intentions regarding recognition of the communist régime in China, which, as had been pointed out, was a matter to be decided by individual Member States. He could say something, however, about the principles on which the decision as regards recognition would be based. The primary consideration was that the decision should conform to the facts of the situation. If the Government in question was in effective control of the whole country or the greater part of it, there was at least a *prima facie* case for recognition. While other considerations must be taken into account, the decision must rest on fact rather than sentiment. That view was supported by the very passage from Professor Lauterpacht's book quoted at the previous meeting by Mr. Tsiang. Recognition did not imply any moral judgment, and did not constitute approval of the Government recognized.

23. His delegation had the utmost sympathy for the people of China, who were the chief sufferers in the struggle, and would certainly not

wish any action to increase that people's hardships. He fully shared the New Zealand representative's view that the Chinese people deserved well of the world. However, he could not agree that recognition or non-recognition of the communist régime would necessarily exercise a major influence for good or ill on the lives of the vast majority of the Chinese people. It was certainly not true that such recognition would be a betrayal, and it could be argued that if the communist régime controlled the destinies of the majority of the people of China, normal diplomatic and commercial relations could be established with advantage to that people. Though he did not wish to overweigh that single aspect of a most complex problem, for those reasons his delegation could not agree that Member States should bind themselves for an indefinite period to withhold recognition from the communist régime.

24. In conclusion, Sir Terence said that if the vote was taken paragraph by paragraph, his delegation would vote against each paragraph of the Chinese draft resolution, in accordance with the principle, which it had always supported, that a Committee should only recommend one resolution to the General Assembly where one was divergent from, or precluded, another.

25. Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa) said that, while the Chinese delegation need have no doubts as to where the sympathies of his delegation lay, in the absence of instructions from his Government, he must abstain from voting on both draft resolutions. He hoped to have received instructions by the time the item reached the General Assembly.

26. At the request of Mr. TSIANG (China), the CHAIRMAN stated that the vote on the draft resolutions before the Committee would be postponed until Monday, 5 December.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 5 December 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Selim SARPER (Turkey).

#### Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945, and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations (*continued*)

1. The CHAIRMAN stated that a new joint draft resolution submitted by Cuba, Ecuador and Peru (A/C.1/553) was now being distributed.

2. Mr. TRUJILLO (Ecuador) said that the proposal submitted by his delegation, together with the delegations of Cuba and Peru, constituted the real solution of the problem before the General Assembly. The delegation of China had made certain well-founded accusations which the First Committee had been unable to consider as they deserved. Without an exhaustive study of the problem, however, the United Nations could not

carry out its duty towards China, which had sacrificed itself in the struggle against Japan, in defence of democratic principles, and whose present difficulties, it had been contended, were largely the legacy of events that had taken place during the war.

3. The third paragraph of the Chinese draft resolution (A/C.1/551), which dealt with aid provided by the Soviet Union to the Chinese Communists, revealed the similarity of that problem to the Greek question. The United Nations could therefore scarcely adopt different attitudes in the two cases. That would be a disastrous precedent which might prove fatal to the prestige of the United Nations. Was it thought that the Chinese question was less important than the Greek question? A tendency had, indeed, become apparent to avoid detailed discussion, as if the Committee were in a hurry to end the session or afraid of what a thorough examination might reveal. In order, however, to make a decision based on full knowledge of the facts, the First

Committee should have at its disposal a carefully drawn up report like the one which the Interim Committee would have to submit to the next session of the General Assembly, if the draft resolution submitted jointly by Cuba, Ecuador and Peru were adopted.

4. The joint draft resolution of Australia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines and the United States (A/C.1/552), on the other hand, gave expression to noble principles, but ended disappointingly by evading the question. The adoption of that text would therefore amount to an acceptance of the *fait accompli*. That would be the very negation of the moral and legal principles on which the Charter was based. The three delegations of Cuba, Ecuador and Peru had therefore considered that, although the First Committee did not have the necessary data on which to condemn or absolve, it should nevertheless not evade its task. Those delegations therefore proposed that the solution of the problem should be deferred, so that the United Nations might be able to consider it more thoroughly, and that a decision in accordance with the facts might be taken at the following session of the General Assembly.

5. Mr. DE MARCOS (Cuba) recalled that Mr. Jessup had rightly stressed (339th meeting) that the Chinese problem was originally a moral problem. That was also how the matter had presented itself to the Cuban delegation. Of the two texts before the Committee, one was of merely verbal significance, whilst some aspects of the Chinese draft resolution was likely to provoke the opposition of certain delegations, particularly in regard to diplomatic recognition. To remedy that situation the three delegations had endeavoured to establish a new text, so that, instead of turning away from the problem, the United Nations might study it exhaustively and apply the solution best calculated to maintain the Organization's prestige and support the interests of humanity.

6. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) recalled that during the general discussion (340th meeting) his delegation had stated that it was morally convinced that the Chinese draft resolution was well founded. Peru had declared, however, that it would be unable to vote for the Chinese proposal (A/C.1/551) for technical reasons. The Peruvian delegation had also pointed out that it would vote for the draft resolution submitted by the five delegations (A/C.1/552), although it considered the draft to be inadequate. The problem should be approached from the point of view of the part to be played by the General Assembly as a moral authority. It would, therefore, be improper if, after having paid a tribute in words to the contribution made by China, the General Assembly were to reject that delegation's proposal. There was no doubt about the violation of the Charter by the Soviet Union, and whatever the extent of the revolutionary movement in China, it would never have grown to such a point without foreign aid.

7. The three delegations of Cuba, Ecuador and Peru had therefore concluded that the specific charges brought against the USSR should be duly examined, in order to avoid a position in which some delegations would have to vote contrary to their profound convictions by appearing to waive, for technical reasons, charges which they considered to be justified. Those delegations therefore proposed that the Interim Committee should ex-

amine the evidence so that the General Assembly might be able to pronounce a final opinion as a veritable jury.

8. Mr. TSIANG (China) thanked the representatives of Cuba, Ecuador and Peru, on behalf of his delegation, for the spirit in which they had made their contribution to the study of the question.

9. The Chinese delegation had clearly stated that the Soviet Union violated both the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and the Charter of the United Nations. China therefore requested that no Member of the United Nations should provide the Chinese Communists with any kind of assistance, or grant diplomatic recognition to any régime organized by them, and that all Members should refrain from taking advantage of the present situation. The Chinese delegation maintained its attitude on all those points.

10. Nevertheless, two facts were undeniable. In the first place, sympathy for China was general. The Assembly, however, had been unable adequately to study the infinitely complex antecedents of the present situation. Convinced that its position would be all the stronger if the General Assembly proceeded to make a more exhaustive study, the Chinese delegation accepted the draft resolution submitted by Cuba, Ecuador and Peru (A/C.1/553).

11. The Chinese delegation had been greatly impressed by the Ecuadorean representative's suggestion that the Chinese question and the Greek question were very similar. Moreover, Mr. McCormick, majority leader in the United States House of Representatives, had also declared that the United States, which had taken effective steps to resist attacks in Europe upon the principles on which its way of life was based, should act in the same way in the East. It was quite true that if it was intended to maintain universal peace, it was impossible to take action in one half of the world only.

12. Mr. BAKR (Iraq) said that the verdict of the United Nations on that problem was of great concern to hundreds of millions of human beings. There was no doubt that the statement made by the Chinese representative was heavily documented; but some points required verification. For its part, the Iraqi delegation was not in a position to decide on the substance of the matter. It therefore supported the draft resolution submitted by Cuba, Ecuador and Peru, and considered it fair that the General Assembly should be given time to make the necessary investigation.

13. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) paid tribute to the spirit which had animated the three delegations in submitting a new draft resolution. That action had been a fresh manifestation of the sympathy and feelings of friendship towards China and its people to which Mr. Tsiang had referred. In particular, no nation had maintained closer ties with China than the United States.

14. The United States delegation had just had the new draft resolution communicated to it. The idea of submitting the problem to the Interim Committee had occurred to the authors of the draft resolution submitted by the five Powers (A/C.1/552). Those delegations, however, had not been of the opinion that the intervention of the Interim Committee could provide the ele-

ments of a solution. The statement by Mr. Tsiang on 25 November (338th meeting) had no doubt been long and detailed, but during the ten days that had just elapsed, the question had not been that of a particular analysis of details in that statement, but of finding the appropriate action to be taken.

15. Referring to the remarks made by Mr. Belaúnde (340th meeting) on the legal aspect of the problem, he said it was inaccurate to say that the joint draft resolution of the five delegations was a judgment acquitting the Soviet Union. That draft resolution was, however, a proper expression of the attitude which the General Assembly should adopt in the interests of China and the Chinese people.

16. The representative of Ecuador had referred to the Greek question, and his speech had given the impression that, in his view, some Powers had not attached the same importance to the Chinese problem as to European matters. In reality, however, anyone acquainted with the history of the United States could not doubt the interest always taken by that country in China and in Asia as a whole. Moreover, with regard to the moral aspects of the problem, to which the representatives of Cuba and Peru had referred, the United States had demonstrated by its acts its sympathy with the sufferings of the Chinese people.

17. The draft resolution submitted by the five delegations had an undeniable moral foundation and was an attempt to deal with the problem in a spirit of sympathy towards China and its people, and of fidelity to the obligations of the General Assembly. The United States delegation was, therefore, still in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Australia, the United States, Mexico, Pakistan and the Philippines (A/C.1/552), and would not support the draft resolution submitted by Cuba, Ecuador and Peru (A/C.1/553).

18. Mr. PLIMSOLL (Australia) said that most delegations understood the motives that inspired the Chinese representative and made him desire action going beyond that recommended in the draft resolution submitted by the five delegations. The First Committee, however, should not lose sight of its real competence or the extent to which its intervention was desirable and possible.

19. The Chinese delegation was asking the General Assembly to condemn the Soviet Union, and not to have any further dealings with the Chinese Communists or grant them diplomatic recognition. The Australian delegation for its part, although its attitude should not necessarily be interpreted as a contradiction of the Chinese delegation's assertions, could not vote for the Chinese draft resolution (A/C.1/551) and thought it would be inappropriate to adopt it. The First Committee could not condemn any Power, and in any case it did not need to pass judgment on it one way or the other. The factual elements must be considered, and it should be borne in mind that any action to be taken was part of a general policy.

20. The Australian delegation therefore considered that the appropriate attitude was that suggested by the five delegations, which proposed that all States should be called upon to respect the political independence of China, the right of the people of China to choose their own Government,

to respect existing treaties, and to refrain from seeking to obtain special privileges.

21. The Australian delegation could not accept the draft resolution submitted by Cuba, Ecuador and Peru (A/C.1/553) for the reasons already stated by the United States representative. In fact, contrary to what the representative of Ecuador had said, that resolution merely shifted the problem and did not solve it. On the one hand, the realities in China and the Far East were such that no useful purpose would be served by referring the problem for investigation and, on the other hand, the Interim Committee, by its membership and terms of reference, was not the appropriate body in such a case. Thus, in the interests of the Interim Committee itself, the question should not be vainly referred to it.

22. The Australian delegation therefore considered that the draft resolution submitted by the five delegations (A/C.1/552) was the only suitable method in the circumstances.

23. Mr. MARTÍNEZ MORENO (El Salvador) recalled that his delegation's feelings towards China were well known. El Salvador had in fact supported the Chinese draft resolution, convinced as it was that the Soviet Union had interfered in China in violation of the treaties and the undertakings that had been accepted, especially at Yalta.

24. The delegation of El Salvador had said, in particular (341st meeting), that it had appeared incomprehensible that the United Nations should adopt a specific attitude in the case of Greece and a different one in the case of China. The delegation of El Salvador was therefore gratified that the Ecuadorean delegation had taken up the same argument. In both cases the Charter had been violated, and to accept the draft resolution submitted by the five delegations would be tantamount to absolving the conduct of certain foreign countries in China, or passing it over in silence. It was true, moreover, that diplomatic recognition fell within the national sovereignty of the various States, and that the Chinese proposal consequently raised certain difficulties.

25. The delegation of El Salvador was therefore in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Cuba, Ecuador and Peru to the effect that the question should be further studied before any final decision was taken.

26. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) recalled that his delegation had stated to be in favour of the draft resolution submitted by China and regretted that it had not received the support of a majority. The facts it set forth could not be contested, particularly in a political body such as the First Committee.

27. The new draft resolution (A/C.1/553) had nevertheless two advantages. It would prevent the Assembly from being restricted to adopting the draft resolution of the five Powers, which was inadequate and could only arouse disappointment in the democratic world, which expected positive decisions from the United Nations when the safeguarding of the territorial integrity of countries or the defence of the right of the peoples to self-determination was involved. The new draft of the three Powers would also enable a general debate to take place on the question of China in the near future, which, in any event, would show world opinion that the States Members of the

United Nations were watchful before the danger that threatened them.

28. The objections to that proposal raised by the Australian delegation in regard to the membership of the Interim Committee were not convincing. In fact, the countries which refused to participate in its work had themselves chosen that attitude. If they did not take part, they could still keep themselves informed of its proceedings and subsequently express their opinions in the General Assembly. In regard to the terms of reference of the Interim Committee, it had to examine all the questions referred to it by the General Assembly, without taking final decisions. It would therefore merely submit its report to the following session of the Assembly.

29. In the circumstances, the Chilean delegation would vote for the draft resolution submitted jointly by the representatives of Cuba, Ecuador and Peru.

30. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) thought that if the Committee voted against the Chinese draft resolution (A/C.1/551) as a whole, that vote might be taken to mean that the Committee considered the accusations unfounded. The fact was that the question raised by China had two separate aspects. The Chinese draft resolution contained a legal accusation. It was not possible, however, to judge that accusation without having previously studied the very full evidence submitted by the Chinese delegation. The second aspect of the Chinese question, as it appeared in the draft resolution submitted by the five Powers (A/C.1/522), was the stabilization of international relations in the Far East. That proposal and the new draft resolution (A/C.1/553) were not incompatible. The proposal by the five Powers gave a general definition of the principles that were likely to increase the stability of international relations in the Far East, without mentioning the accusations made by China. The new draft resolution, on the other hand, proposed that the Interim Committee should make a continuous study of those accusations. The adoption of the latter proposal would show that the Chinese Government deserved all the sympathy of Members, and that its accusations could not be declared inadmissible without prior study. The Soviet Union could, if it so desired, sit in the Interim Committee at any time. Moreover, the final decision would be taken by the General Assembly, in which the Soviet Union was represented.

31. Mr. RIDDELL (Canada) thought that there was general agreement in the Committee that the draft resolution by the five Powers represented the minimum that could be done for the time being. Moreover, the Committee seemed to find no contradiction between the Chinese draft resolution and that of the five Powers, or even the new draft resolution. The Committee should therefore express its opinion first on the draft submitted by the five Powers (A/C.1/552) and then—since the two texts were not incompatible—on the new draft resolution (A/C.1/553), although recourse to the Interim Committee did not appear very expedient in the case.

32. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) thought that, far from being inadequate, the draft resolution submitted by the five Powers outlined a general rule of conduct which should be followed in the future and expressed principles similar to those

that had been approved almost unanimously when the United States and United Kingdom proposal entitled "Essentials of Peace" had been adopted.

33. The Mexican Government would not be able to vote for some parts of the Chinese draft resolution, which asked that the Soviet Union should be condemned for violating certain treaties, and that Members of the United Nations should undertake not to recognize some particular régime in China. The Mexican Government could not thus commit itself in advance to a pledge that concerned the sovereignty of the individual States.

34. The General Assembly should be inspired in its decisions by the desire to deal with disputes in a manner likely to lead to solutions, and should adopt a realistic attitude. The accusations made against the Soviet Union by China could obviously not be left unanswered, but the debate which had taken place on the subject should have given China satisfaction, for it must have convinced any Members that had not been previously convinced of the truth of the accusations. It did not seem necessary, in the circumstances, to set out those accusations in a formal resolution. When the Greek question had been considered, the Mexican delegation had opposed the adoption of certain provisions which it thought might be interpreted as condemnations, but it had supported every practical effort for a final solution of the problem. Likewise, in the case in point, it would support the draft resolution of the five Powers and hoped that it would be adopted unanimously, for it indicated a rule of conduct applicable to all States in their relations with the Far Eastern countries, and in particular China.

35. In the case of Greece, the General Assembly had set up a Special Committee. The joint draft resolution submitted by Cuba, Ecuador and Peru was that the Chinese question should be referred to the Interim Committee for further study. If the work of that Committee was to elucidate facts which had not yet been established, a commission of investigation should also be set up. The Interim Committee's terms of reference did not, however, provide for investigations being made in the territory of any State without its consent having first been obtained. However, without an investigation on the spot, and without some guarantee as to the outcome of such an investigation, there was no hope of the dispute being finally settled. No advantage was therefore to be gained by giving such a task to the Interim Committee. The Mexican delegation regretted that, under the circumstances, it could not support the draft resolution submitted by Cuba, Ecuador and Peru.

36. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) thought that the new joint draft resolution was not incompatible with any of the proposals dealing with the substance of the problem. The new draft suggested that the question should be referred to the Interim Committee, thus adjourning for the present session any decision on the subject. It raised, therefore, a prior question which would have to be decided by the First Committee before a vote was taken on the other two proposals. Since rule 120 of the rules of procedure laid down that, unless the First Committee decided otherwise, proposals should be put to the vote in the order in which they had been submitted, the representative of Chile formally proposed that the



draft resolution of Cuba, Ecuador and Peru should be put to the vote first.

37. Mr. STOLK (Venezuela) thought the new draft resolution incompatible with the Chinese proposal, but not with that of the five Powers. The best way of deciding the question would perhaps be to come to a decision first of all as regards the nature of the new draft resolution. It would otherwise be difficult to determine in what order the voting should take place. The representative of Peru had, moreover, thought that the new draft resolution might possibly be treated as amending or supplementing the five-Power proposal. If the Committee adopted both the five-Power draft resolution and that of Cuba, Ecuador and Peru—the latter in the form of an amendment—the General Assembly would have before it a single draft resolution on principle, addressed to all Member States of the United Nations and intended to promote the stability of international relations in the Far East. The draft resolution before the Assembly would, moreover, give a decision regarding the charges put forward by China, in that the Interim Committee would be called upon to study them and submit its conclusions thereon to the following session of the General Assembly.

38. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) also thought that the new draft resolution was incompatible with the Chinese draft resolution. It was, in fact, a substitute for the latter, since it proposed that the concrete accusations made by China should be referred to the Interim Committee for study. The draft resolution submitted by Cuba, Ecuador and Peru, on the other hand, was not incompatible with that of the five Powers, inasmuch as the latter dealt only generally with the situation in the Far East by suggesting a line of conduct to be followed.

39. The delegation of Peru was therefore of opinion that the Committee ought to support both the draft resolution submitted by Cuba, Ecuador and Peru, and that of the five Powers.

40. Mr. TSIANG (China) thought that the joint draft resolution of Cuba, Ecuador and Peru, if adopted, would merely refer both the accusations made by his delegation, and his delegation's draft resolution as a whole, to the Interim Committee for study. The Chinese delegation would then submit fresh arguments and evidence to the Interim Committee. Thus there was no reason why the Chinese delegation should withdraw its draft resolution.

41. As the draft resolution of the three Powers was a procedural motion, in accordance with the rules of procedure, it should be put to the vote first. Since the sponsors of that draft resolution had expressed the opinion that it was compatible with the proposal of the five Powers, the representative of China emphasized that the only objection he himself had made to the draft resolution of the five Powers was that it was inadequate. To avoid misunderstanding he pointed out that, to his mind, that draft did not mean, or even imply, an acquittal of the Soviet Union. If there were divergent opinions on that subject, he hoped they would be brought to his notice.

42. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) associated himself with the observations made by the representative of Peru; the draft resolution of Cuba, Ecuador and Peru was not in contradiction with

that submitted by the five delegations.

43. Indeed, the vote on the Chinese draft resolution and the referral of the question to the Interim Committee were two completely different matters. It was conceivable that a vote could be taken on the Chinese draft resolution, and that the Interim Committee should be called upon to undertake a study of the problem.

44. The five delegations sponsoring the joint draft resolution had proposed certain rules of conduct for the future and the need to come to a decision on that point could not be obviated by the adoption of the draft resolution submitted by Cuba, Ecuador and Peru, which in no way contradicted that of the five Powers.

45. It was, moreover, untrue to say that the procedural question was a prior question, since the First Committee or the General Assembly had often taken decisions of substance, without excluding the possibility of the problem being further examined by the appropriate body. The vote which had taken place on the question of substance had therefore not definitively closed the consideration of the subject.

46. A decision by the First Committee to make a more thorough study of the situation in China would not, therefore, preclude the possibility of the texts previously submitted being considered.

47. The representative of China seemed to have indicated that he would not press for a vote on his draft in the First Committee if the draft resolution of Cuba, Ecuador and Peru were adopted. As regards the text of the five delegations, however, the vote could not be postponed for reasons of procedure.

48. Mr. KYROU (Greece) recalled that some representatives had said that the Chinese question was similar to the Greek question. The representative of Greece had himself stated (339th meeting) that his country, having suffered for four years from foreign aggression, sympathized with the Chinese people. The Greek people, however, with the moral assistance of the United Nations and the help of their great allies, had been able to overcome attacks which, in the case of China, had on the contrary been pursued unsuccessfully.

49. Nevertheless, the fact remained that foreign intervention had taken place, and the United Nations was under a moral obligation to intervene. That was the very basis of the five-Power and the Chinese draft resolutions; it was not entirely true to say, as the representative of Australia had said, that the two draft resolutions were inconsistent. It would even appear, as the representative of Canada had pointed out, that there was no contradiction between the new draft submitted by Cuba, Ecuador and Peru and the other two.

50. Item 68 of the agenda had been submitted by the Chinese delegation, which had proposed that the General Assembly should take action at the current session; the draft resolution of the five delegations had the same end in view. But the draft submitted by Cuba, Ecuador and Peru did not ask for immediate steps to be taken; it merely asked that the question should be referred to the Interim Committee.

51. If the Chinese delegation, therefore, was prepared to accept the latter suggestion, there was surely no need for the Committee to be more royalist than the king.

52. The representative of Mexico had stated that the submission of the question to the Interim Committee would raise certain difficulties. But, as drafted, the draft resolution of the three Powers only asked the Interim Committee to report back, and there was no doubt but that the latter body which, under the chairmanship of Mr. Padilla Nervo, had always proceeded with the greatest caution, would carry out its task satisfactorily.

53. Mr. STOLK (Venezuela) reminded the meeting that, under rule 109 of the rules of procedure, proposals could only be put to the vote if copies had been circulated to all delegations not later than the day preceding the meeting.

54. The Venezuelan delegation considered therefore, that it was better not to put the draft reso-

lution of Cuba, Ecuador and Peru to the vote that same day. In any case, a decision ought to be taken immediately on that point.

55. The CHAIRMAN recalled that rule 109 also laid down that the Chairman could always permit the discussion and consideration of texts that had not yet been circulated. It was nevertheless true, as a general rule, that before being discussed and put to the vote a text should have been circulated not later than the day preceding the meeting.

56. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) proposed that the Committee should adjourn until the following morning.

*There being no objection, it was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-THIRD MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 6 December 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Selim SARPER (Turkey).*

#### **Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945, and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations (continued)**

1. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) said that a question of procedure was involved. The draft resolution submitted by Cuba, Ecuador and Peru (A/C.1/553) had precedence because it implied the adjournment of the debate on item 68 of the agenda. If that draft resolution was adopted, the Chinese draft resolution (A/C.1/551) would no longer have any point, since the question would be referred to the Interim Committee.

2. Mr. Arce considered that the sponsors of the five-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/552) were entitled to request that it should be voted on after the draft resolution of the three Powers, with which it was not incompatible.

3. The Argentine delegation wished to request that a vote should be taken on the various drafts before the Committee paragraph by paragraph.

4. Mr. TSIANG (China) said he had asked for the floor in order to reply to what the representative of Mexico had said at the previous meeting. The statement made by the representative of Argentina had, however, served to clear up the misunderstanding. The Chinese delegation fully agreed with the Argentine delegation that the draft resolution submitted by Cuba, Ecuador and Peru should be voted on first; if that resolution was adopted, the Chinese delegation's draft resolution and statements should be referred to the Interim Committee, on the understanding that the First Committee might then proceed to a vote on the five-Power draft resolution.

5. Mr. DOMÍNGUEZ CÁMPORA (Uruguay) said that his delegation whole-heartedly supported the proposal put forward by Ecuador, Cuba and Peru. The General Assembly was in fact confronted by accusations of exceptional gravity to the effect that

the political independence and territorial integrity of a Member of the United Nations were being jeopardized by violations of human rights. The United Nations, had, however, been created precisely to organize collective security with a view to safeguarding the independence of all its Members.

6. The problem was therefore as follows: confronted with such imputations, it was essential that the General Assembly should establish the facts. If it lacked the time to do so, it had an elementary duty as the guardian of the political independence and the territorial integrity of the nations as to avoid superficial treatment of the question and to refer it to the appropriate organ.

7. Even though there was no definition of aggression which was universally accepted, certain effective formulae had been established in particular by the Treaty of London and by a number of treaties to which the Soviet Union had adhered. If, therefore, the General Assembly should prove powerless to confront aggression, it would be futile to place any further hopes in the United Nations. For those reasons, the delegation of Uruguay had submitted an amendment (A/C.1/555) to the draft resolution of the three delegations (A/C.1/553), providing that the question might be referred to the Security Council by the Interim Committee should immediate action be required to defend the political independence of a Member of the Organization.

8. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) said that his delegation had listened with great interest to the arguments in favour of referring the question to the Interim Committee and had reached the conclusion that it might be advantageous to do so. His delegation had therefore submitted an amendment (A/C.1/554) to the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/553), which, without differing substantially from the latter text, attempted to relate it to that of the five Powers (A/C.1/552).

9. If the First Committee was to consider two separate texts, it was desirable that there should be some kind of connecting link between them. As the five-Power draft was a statement of general principles, it might be advisable to relate the

consideration of the question by the Interim Committee to those principles.

10. The second Philippine amendment did not materially differ from the three-Power draft resolution but had the advantage of leaving the Interim Committee free to act in the light of the prevailing circumstances. The amendment had been discussed by the five sponsors of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/552) and, although Mr. López could only speak for his own delegation, he could safely state that the five Powers had considered that the new text would be favourably received. It consisted of the substitution of the phrase "Authorizes the Interim Committee . . . to examine . . ." for the phrase "Decides to refer . . ." used in the draft resolution of the three Powers. So far, the intention was the same. The Philippine text, however, departed from the three-Power text by including the words "if it decides that such action would promote the stability of international relations in the Far East", a change based on a desire to give greater freedom of judgment to a subsidiary body, which was normally a good policy. In the case under discussion, it would be dangerous for the General Assembly to define in too great detail the manner in which the Interim Committee should deal with a problem in process of rapid evolution.

11. The Philippine delegation therefore hoped that a wide measure of agreement could be reached on its amendment.

12. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) confirmed that the five sponsors of the draft resolution (A/C.1/552) had met to consider the Philippine amendment (A/C.1/554), as the representative of the Philippines had pointed out. The United States delegation wished to endorse the eloquent appeal made by Mr. López.

13. During discussion of the three-Power draft resolution, the problem of relating that text to the earlier five-Power draft had given rise to certain difficulties. The United States delegation agreed with the Chinese delegation that Mr. Arce's statement had shown that the two texts were not inconsistent. The Philippine amendment, however, had the merit of providing a clearer link between them. It was, in fact, necessary to relate the Interim Committee's consideration of the question to general principles of continuing application, the violation of which some delegations had been led to fear by past experience of USSR policy.

14. The undoubted gravity of the situation in Asia was yet another reason why the General Assembly should pronounce a unanimous verdict. There were no important differences of views among the delegations, all of which sincerely adhered to the principles set out in the draft resolution of the five Powers and all of which wished to help China and the Chinese people. If therefore the United Nations could declare with one voice its support of the draft resolution of the five Powers (A/C.1/552), as well as of the three-Power draft resolution and the Philippine amendment, it would have done its work worthily.

15. Mr. TRUJILLO (Ecuador) said he was aware of the considerable assistance given by the United States to China, as well as to Greece. Nevertheless, there had been some inconsistency between the two cases as regards their juridical treatment by the United Nations. The United States could not be blamed because events in China had not

taken the same course as in Greece, but the delegation of the United States would share, with all the others, grave responsibilities if the United Nations did not apply in the case of China the same principles as had been applied to Greece and, having checked aggression in one case by an inflexible policy, were now to act in regard to China in the same way as the League of Nations had acted in regard to Ethiopia and Manchuria.

16. The time had surely come to learn from history. A powerful aggressor had taken advantage of the weakness of a country completely disorganized by its war-time sacrifices. Although the question had been submitted somewhat tardily to the United Nations, a better answer could be found to the agonized appeal of a whole people who had become the victim of a cruel attack, rather than the mere reiteration of platitudes. The United Nations had been created for action and not merely for the expression of lofty principles. With respect to the United States, both the sacrifices and the spiritual and material contribution it had made to the cause of the freedom of peoples were well known, but that was no reason why in one particular case it should appear to fail in its task.

17. The three-Power draft resolution, on the contrary, was not a subterfuge, nor, as had been suggested by the representative of Australia, was it a device for shelving the problem; in fact, it placed the problem in its proper light. The representative of Mexico might indeed have thought that the Interim Committee would achieve nothing; nevertheless, it was true that if that Committee studied the problem as it should be studied, it would achieve the main objective.

18. With regard to the two amendments which had just been presented, that submitted by Uruguay (A/C.1/355) only added to the force of the three-Power draft, and the delegation of Ecuador accepted it as an important contribution.

19. As to the Philippines amendment, in the first place the omission of the words "and requires further examination and study" would only weaken the first paragraph of the draft resolution. Furthermore, it did not mention the words "prestige of the United Nations", though many delegations considered that the prestige of the United Nations was involved in the question before the Committee.

20. In the second place, the second paragraph of the Philippines amendment, although it seemed to assume that the draft resolution of the five Powers would be adopted, was nevertheless acceptable to the delegation of Ecuador.

21. The third paragraph was not so much an amendment as a new proposal which ruled out that of the three Powers, since it rejected the basic principles of the enacting terms of the latter, which was designed to bring the question before the Interim Committee however events in China might develop. A distinction must be made between the question of fact and the juridical problem which would continue to exist even if the Chinese Government were to succumb to aggression; in that case, the United Nations would not be absolved from all obligations towards a nation which, after having sacrificed itself in the common cause, had been the victim of aggression. The present Government of China might vanish, but

the aggression which it had suffered would remain a permanent fact of history and would not disappear.

22. On the basis of the Philippines text, however, which spoke only of the stability of international relations, no further action would be possible if the present Government were to fall and a new order were to be established. The particular merit of the three-Power draft resolution was to place the necessity for studying the problem above the financial and governmental interests of the moment.
23. The delegation of Ecuador therefore considered that the Philippines proposal was not simply an amendment; it would completely change the three-Power draft resolution, and for those reasons his delegation would reject the entire amendment.
24. Mr. DE MARCOS (Cuba) stated that he opposed the amendment submitted by the Philippines delegation because, in any case, it was inadequate. Contrary to what the representative of the Philippines had said, he considered that there was a vital difference between the expressions "decides" and "authorizes". The substitution of the word "authorizes" in place of the word "decides" completely changed the nature of the proposal put forward by Peru, Ecuador and Cuba, in spite of the statements made by the representatives of the Philippines and the United States.
25. It had been because the five-Power joint draft resolution, which was extremely vague, had no direct connexion with the problem at issue, that the delegations of Ecuador, Peru and Cuba had submitted a text which recognized the responsibilities of the United Nations. That text provided that the Interim Committee should study the question. The amendment presented by the Philippines delegation, however, introduced a conditional clause, under which the problem might be left in suspense. For that reason it was unacceptable.
26. Mr. SALAZAR (Peru) endorsed the moral, political and juridical views expressed by the representative of Ecuador. He considered that the Philippines amendment could not be compared with the three-Power draft resolution, as the amendment contained a clause expressed not in positive, but in conditional, terms. He believed that, for the sake of the prestige of the United Nations, a definitive solution to the problem must be found.
27. Mr. TSIANG (China) found the amendment submitted by the representative of Uruguay very interesting in principle. He wondered, however, if in view of the opposition shown to the draft resolution of the three Powers on the ground that it had gone too far, the amendment of Uruguay might not further impair the chances of its being adopted.
28. With regard to the Philippines amendment, he observed that while it was certainly desirable that a connexion should be established between the joint draft resolution of the United States, Australia, the Philippines, Mexico and Pakistan and that submitted by the three Powers, it was also clear that if both proposals were adopted, the Interim Committee would take into account the proposal of the five Powers in its consideration of the Chinese question.
29. In the circumstances, the Philippines amendment did not seem to be essential, especially as it was inadequate. Instead of giving the Interim Committee categorical instructions to consider the question, it only "authorized" it to do so; moreover, it did not propose any examination of the charges brought by the Chinese delegation, but only proposed that an examination should be made of possible violations of the principles set out in the draft resolution of the five Powers, thus implying unconditional surrender in the current instance, since such an attitude amounted to an admission that the silence and inaction of the United Nations would promote stability in international relations in the Far East.
30. It had been said that the accusation made by the Chinese delegation had been put forward too late. It should be pointed out, however, that free China was not dead but continued to fight for freedom. Furthermore, even if free China were to vanish, the question before the United Nations would not thereby vanish too. The fact that a murder had been committed did not mean that the community should take no action to punish the criminal. It should not be forgotten that though China had so far been the first victim of communist aggression, other victims would follow.
31. The representative of China declared that the United Nations was at present the only hope of the world, but that if that body resorted to escapism it would fail in its mission. In conclusion, he expressed surprise that any champion of the United Nations could have presented or supported such an amendment as had been submitted by the Philippines delegation.
32. Mr. DOMÍNGUEZ CÁMPORA (Uruguay), replying to the representative of China on the wisdom of the amendment submitted by the delegation of Uruguay, pointed out that in the presence of the accusations made by the Chinese delegation, three hypotheses should be considered: (a) if the accusation was justified judgment should be pronounced without delay; (b) if the accusation was not justified the fact should also be clearly noted; and (c) if the General Assembly had neither the time nor the means to take a decision based on full knowledge of the facts, the accusation should not be left in suspense, and the competent organs of the United Nations should be instructed to work on the matter with a view to reaching a decision.
33. The Interim Committee should therefore study the question. The study and consideration of the Chinese question should not, however, be made dependent on the allegation that an act had been committed compromising stability in the Far East. There was no legal connexion between the accusation made by China on the one hand and that condition of a political kind on the other. In view of the instability and complexity of the modern world, it would be difficult to determine what acts endangered stability. The present problem was, none the less, much simpler: an accusation had been made by one Member against another Member, which was charged with having infringed the political independence of the accusing country. If that was the case, the United Nations must take a decision. To transfer the question to the plane of the stability of international relations was to evade and distort the prob-

lem. The fact was that those two factors, violation of the principles of political and territorial independence on the one hand, and violation of the stability of international relations on the other were not legally related.

34. He was of the opinion that there was no essential difference between the draft resolution of the five Powers and that of the three Powers. He therefore suggested the establishment of a drafting sub-committee to co-ordinate the two draft resolutions and bring them into harmony.

35. Mr. KYROU (Greece) drew the Uruguayan representative's attention to the fact that the Interim Committee was a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly and could act only through the intermediary of the General Assembly. It could not therefore draw the Security Council's attention to any matter without first consulting the Assembly. He was of the opinion that the Uruguayan amendment did not take account of that fact.

36. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon) pointed out that the principles enunciated in the draft resolution submitted by the five Powers did not dispose of the problem before the Committee, namely, the problem of the accusation made by the Chinese delegation. The accusation should therefore be studied by the Interim Committee, even though the USSR, which was accused by the Chinese delegation, did not recognize the legality of that Committee.

37. He pointed out that there were two opposing theories regarding the interpretation of the question. If the draft resolution of the five Powers and the Philippines amendment were adopted, the Chinese question would be considered as settled, and the Interim Committee's task would be to maintain and strengthen a stability which the Philippines amendment considered to be already existing. That way of looking at the matter was a legalization of the *fait accompli*. It involved a danger, for it might result in the legalization of violations of the principles of the Charter. The draft resolution of the three Powers, on the other hand, was based on the fact that the accusation made by the Chinese delegation existed, and should be considered in order to enable the General Assembly to pass judgment on the accusation.

38. The Lebanese delegation did not accept the Philippines amendment but considered that, in order to establish a link between the draft resolution of the five Powers and that of the three Powers, it would be sufficient to amend the latter by adding after the first paragraph of the preamble, the second paragraph of the preamble to the Philippines amendment, and by inserting in the operative part the phrase "in the light of the above-mentioned resolution", namely the five-

Power proposal. Thus, a link would be established between the two draft resolutions without distorting the problem, which was to find out what judgment the United Nations should pass upon the accusation made against a Member of the Organization.

39. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Chinese draft resolution (A/C.1/551), the draft resolution submitted by the five Powers (A/C.1/552), and the Philippines amendment (A/C.1/554) to the three-Power draft resolution, should be put to the vote successively, and that a vote on the other texts should be taken afterwards.

40. Mr. DE DIEGO (Panama) asked whether the Philippines amendment should be considered as a new proposal or as an amendment, since the authors of the three-Power draft resolution and other representatives had considered that it was a distinct proposal.

41. Without giving a ruling from the chair, the CHAIRMAN said that refusal by the authors of a proposal to accept an amendment did not entitle them to express an opinion as to the nature of that amendment.

42. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) pointed out that, in its present form, the Philippines amendment was drafted as an independent proposal. He suggested that the Philippines representative should submit his proposal in the form of an amendment so that the Committee could vote on the three ideas included in the two paragraphs of the preamble and in the operative part of the proposal.

43. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) was of the opinion that the Philippines amendment should be considered as an independent proposal, both in form and in substance. That text authorized the Interim Committee to take certain action under certain specified conditions.

44. On the other hand, the draft resolution of the three Powers was a procedural proposal. Its purpose was to refer study of the Chinese question to the Interim Committee. Thus, it was not possible to vote on the Chinese draft without having first voted on the draft resolution of the three Powers.

45. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) invoked the provisions of rule 82 of the rules of procedure, and pointed out that his amendment really was an amendment. He could not therefore accede to the request made to him by the representative of Chile.

46. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that rule 82 was the only one of the rules of procedure to deal with the question of amendments, and that it did not lay down the form in which they should be submitted.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOURTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 6 December 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Selim SARPER (Turkey).*

#### **Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945, and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations (concluded)**

1. Mr. TSIANG (China), referring to the Lebanese amendment (A/C.1/556) to the draft resolution of Cuba, Ecuador and Peru (A/C.1/553), hoped that he had made it clear that his delegation had never opposed the joint draft resolution submitted by five delegations (A/C.1/552). Whether or not there was a specific reference to any resolution adopted by the General Assembly, the Interim Committee would in any case be bound by such a resolution. His contention was that the Interim Committee should consider the charges brought by the Chinese delegation, and he certainly did not wish to exclude consideration of the principles embodied in the five-Power proposal. As he understood it, the Lebanese amendment would permit consideration of the charges made by his delegation, and he would therefore support it. Mr. Tsiang said that he would bow to the Chair's opinion that the Philippine amendment (A/C.1/554) was in fact an amendment, though the Chairman had not stated that opinion as a ruling. He would nevertheless suggest that inasmuch as as yet the draft resolution referred to in the second paragraph of that amendment had not been adopted, it would be proper to insert the word "draft" before "resolution". He thought that the correct procedure would be to vote first on the amendments to the three-Power draft resolution. The order in which those amendments were voted upon was immaterial. If the three-Power proposal were adopted, there would be no need to vote on the Chinese draft resolution, which would automatically be referred to the Interim Committee, and it would remain only to deal with the five-Power draft.

2. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) fully understood the sentiments that had motivated the statement made by the representative of China at the previous meeting. However, he had previously endeavoured to express the feelings of the Philippine delegation regarding the situation in China and wished to assure the representative of China that those feelings remained, and would remain, in view of the ties binding their two countries. He further assured the Chinese representative of the Philippine delegation's loyalty to the principles of the Charter. Mr. López said that his delegation did not question anyone's loyalty to those principles and considered it natural that delegations might view matters in different lights. Referring to the statements made at the previous meeting by the representatives of Ecuador, Cuba and Peru, he said that the differences in points of view and method might be explained by the fact that those countries were further removed from the situation than was his own, and thus permitted themselves more emotional latitude. The principles to which the representatives of Ecuador and Peru had

alluded were embodied in the five-Power joint draft resolution. Pointing out that the central purpose of both the three-Power draft resolution and the Philippine amendment was to give the Interim Committee a chance to consider the matter under discussion, Mr. López stated that if either proposal were approved, the question would be placed before the Interim Committee, which would consider it in the light of prevailing circumstances. As for the contention that his delegation's amendment would not permit consideration of the charges made by the Chinese delegation, the final paragraph of that amendment would authorize the Interim Committee to examine any violation of the principles contained in the five-Power draft. Since one of those principles concerned the respecting of treaties, the central point in the Chinese charges, it was clear that there would be opportunity to consider them. In conclusion, Mr. López emphasized that, in submitting its amendment, his delegation had no desire whatever to destroy the principles embodied in the joint draft resolution of Cuba, Ecuador and Peru, and he must disavow any intention to reduce that proposal in any way.

3. Mr. DOMÍNGUEZ CÁMPORA (Uruguay) said that in view of the doubts expressed as to whether the Interim Committee had the power to bring a matter to the attention of the Security Council, he proposed to modify the amendment submitted by his delegation (A/C.1/555) by inserting, before the words "Security Council", the words "*of the Secretary-General in order to report to the*".

4. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) recalled that at a previous meeting he had formally proposed that the three-Power draft resolution be voted on first pursuant to rule 120 of the rules of procedure, and that he maintained that proposal.

5. Mr. TRUJILLO (Ecuador) supported the Chilean proposal.

6. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Chilean proposal that the draft resolution submitted by Cuba, Ecuador and Peru (A/C.1/553) be put to the vote first.

*The proposal was adopted by 32 votes with 24 abstentions.*

7. The CHAIRMAN stated that a vote would first be taken on the Lebanese amendment (A/C.1/556) to the joint draft resolution of Cuba, Ecuador and Peru, and that, at the request of Mr. JESSUP (United States of America), the two paragraphs of that amendment would be voted upon separately.

*The first paragraph was adopted by 31 votes to 5, with 16 abstentions.*

8. On the suggestion of Mr. KYROU (Greece), Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon) agreed to the insertion of the word "draft" before "resolution" in the second paragraph of the Lebanese amendment.

9. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) said that in view of the basic considerations raised by the vote on the second paragraph of the Lebanese amendment, he wished to explain his delegation's vote. As the Philippine representative had pointed



out, the debate at the previous meeting had revealed some misunderstanding of the last paragraph of the Philippine amendment to the three-Power draft resolution. Consequently, the positions of delegations supporting that amendment had been misunderstood. The main misconception had already been dealt with by Mr. López, who had pointed out that the Philippine amendment clearly did not preclude a discussion of the Chinese charges in the Interim Committee. If the Philippine amendment were adopted, the Interim Committee would be authorized to consider the violation of any of the principles in the five-Power proposal, and one of those principles was that of respect for treaties relating to China. As the Philippine representative had further pointed out, the charges of the Chinese delegation related to the violation of such a treaty. The Philippine amendment was therefore sufficient to cover that point, quite apart from the applicability of all the other principles in terms of the charges of the delegation of China.

10. In Mr. Jessup's view, favourable consideration should be given to the Philippine amendment because the latter was prospective in its application, whereas the joint draft resolution of Cuba, Ecuador and Peru as well as the second paragraph of the Lebanese amendment to that proposal, all refer to the Interim Committee only the specific item under discussion. The Philippine amendment envisaged a broader task, complementary to adoption of the principles embodied in the five-Power draft resolution, namely, the authorization and power to consider any possible future violation of those principles.

11. Reference had been made to the fact that the Philippine amendment would be giving an authorization rather than a direction to the Interim Committee. Since the adoption of that amendment would be giving it a certain amount of discretion, however, the word "authorize" was clearly appropriate to describe the powers which the Interim Committee should have.

12. Another question raised in the discussion was that of the origin and significance of the word "stability" in the last paragraph of the Philippine amendment. Mr. Jessup thought that it was merely a cross-reference to the title of the five-Power draft. The problem of stability of international relations in the Far East was clarified by the set of principles which were set forth under that title. Therefore, if the Interim Committee should for any reason decide that those principles had not been attacked, it would then decide that consideration of the matter under discussion did not affect the stability of international relations in the Far East. If, however, it believed that the principles had been violated, then the Interim Committee would clearly be deciding that there existed a danger to the stability of international relations in the Far East. Those relations were not static and could be considered by the Interim Committee when called upon to consider the item if the five-Power proposal were adopted by the General Assembly. Emphasizing his Government's support of the work of the Interim Committee, Mr. Jessup believed that there was nothing inappropriate in giving that Committee discretion to deal with the matter in its judgment as the situation was presented to it.

13. The United States representative hoped that it would be clear that his Government's policy

was against imperialism everywhere. It rejected imperialism for itself and condemned it when practised by any other States. The United States Government specifically condemned the USSR continuation of Tsarist imperialism in the Far East and its concern was that China and, indeed, all Asia, should be safeguarded against Soviet Union or other aggression. His Government believed that the joint draft resolution co-sponsored by his delegation (A/C.1/552), and supplemented by the Philippine amendment, was the most effective contribution that the United Nations could make at that stage towards accomplishing its purpose. Mr. Jessup was certain that the adoption of those proposals would not be misunderstood by those representatives who had not participated in the current debate, who must understand that the occasion of the joint draft resolution submitted by five delegations was the USSR action in the Far East, which raised acute fears for the safety, independence and integrity of China. Those who share those fears should unite their voices and action. Moreover, since those who had been participating in the debate were not fundamentally divided, he hoped that the conclusion of efforts, both in the Committee and in the General Assembly, would be an action speaking with one voice the intention of the United Nations that the principles which all agreed were sound principles, would prevail and would govern the actions of all States.

14. For those reasons the United States delegation would have to vote against the second paragraph of the Lebanese amendment because it seemed to imply approval of the original text of the three-Power draft resolution and his delegation preferred the text of the Philippine amendment.

15. Mr. TSIANG (China) said that the substance of the statement made by the United States representative was most gratifying to his delegation and wished to thank him for the clear statement of the policy of the Government of the United States. The Lebanese amendment, however, served the interests of China better than the amendment of the Philippines, and he would therefore vote for the second paragraph of the former and against the final paragraph of the latter.

16. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon) said that in view of the remarks made by the United States representative, he wished to explain his delegation's attitude to its amendment. The latter had been submitted to re-establish or readjust a situation that had been changed by the submission of the Philippine amendment. His delegation accepted the view expressed by the United States representative that, in accordance with the last paragraph of the Philippine amendment, the Interim Committee could study not only future, but also past violations. His delegation did not object to the word "authorizes" which was the only word that could be used when a condition was placed on a decision taken. However, that condition under which it would be possible for the Interim Committee to study future or past violations seemed to his delegation to distort the situation and to determine the order in which the question ought to be examined by requiring that such study should promote the stability of international relations in the Far East. That was the crux of the question. Mr. Azkoul emphasized that it was not

stability of international relations that mattered, but the charges which had been made as to violations of certain principles. The Philippine amendment did not mention those charges but subordinated the study of those violations to a stability of international relations which could on occasions result from violations; thus, if that view were followed, it would mean that violations of principles of the Charter could sometimes be countenanced if they promoted or reinforced stability in the world. It was the violations, whether real or alleged, that mattered. If the Philippine delegation were to agree to delete the words "if it decides that such action would promote the stability of international relations in the Far East", the Lebanese delegation would be prepared to support the Philippine amendment and would withdraw its own.

17. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) accepted the suggestion of the representative of Lebanon. He pointed out that adoption of the first paragraph of the Lebanese amendment in effect meant that the second paragraph of the Philippine amendment had been adopted. He asked that the Committee should first vote on the Philippine amendment which was furthest removed from the text.

18. Mr. MARTÍNEZ MORENO (El Salvador) asked whether the representative of the Philippines would be willing to substitute the word "instructs" for the word "authorizes" in the last paragraph of his amendment.

19. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) did not believe that the responsibility of the Interim Committee would be greatly affected by the suggested change of wording and asked the representative of El Salvador to accept the original text of the Philippine amendment which he thought to be adequate.

20. Mr. TSIANG (China) said his delegation would oppose the Philippine amendment, particularly as the suggestion of the representative of El Salvador had not been accepted, because it considered it inferior to the three-Power draft resolution.

21. Mr. TARN (Poland), on a point of order, said his delegation had intended to request a separate vote on the title of the draft resolution in accordance with a precedent set in a plenary meeting. As the title was contained in quotation marks in the first paragraph of the Philippine amendment, he wished to ask that a separate vote should first be taken on the heading.

22. Mr. DOMÍNGUEZ CÁMPORA (Uruguay) said he had been glad to hear the explanations given by the United States representative concerning the Philippine amendment. Those remarks had confirmed his feeling that a satisfactory solution could be reached. He might have been able to accept the Philippine amendment had the suggestion of the representative of El Salvador been accepted.

23. The CHAIRMAN remarked that if the Philippine amendment was adopted there would be no need to vote upon the three-Power draft resolution. Consequently, the first paragraph of the Lebanese amendment would be inserted at the end of the second paragraph of the Philippine

amendment. He then put the title of the Philippine amendment<sup>1</sup> to the vote.

*The title was adopted by 41 votes to 5, with 8 abstentions.*

24. Mr. STOLK (Venezuela) asked for clarification regarding the last paragraph of the Philippine amendment. It was his understanding that the sponsors of the three-Power draft resolution had not accepted the last paragraph of the Philippine amendment. Consequently, the final paragraph of their draft resolution (A/C.1/553) still remained. That was of importance because that paragraph of the three-Power draft had an amendment submitted to it by the representative of Uruguay. He therefore believed that the Committee should first vote on the last paragraph of the Philippine amendment since it was that which really modified the three-Power draft resolution, and was in fact an amendment to it; and then if adopted, the Committee could vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

25. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote by roll-call the last paragraph of the Philippine amendment (A/C.1/554) as modified by the representative of Lebanon.

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Norway, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, India, Iran, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand.

*Against:* Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Argentina, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq, Israel.

*Abstaining:* Norway, Sweden, Thailand, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Denmark, Ethiopia, Honduras, Lebanon, Nicaragua.

*The last paragraph of the Philippine amendment was rejected by 24 votes to 19, with 14 abstentions.*

26. The CHAIRMAN, having drawn attention of the Committee to the differences between the first paragraph of the three-Power draft resolution and the first paragraph of the Philippines amendment, said he would put the latter to the vote by roll-call.

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Brazil, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Canada, France, India, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium.

<sup>1</sup> "Threats to the independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945, and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations."

*Against:* Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Haiti, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Argentina.

*Abstaining:* Brazil, Burma, Denmark, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Iran, Liberia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Sweden, Thailand, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Bolivia.

*The first paragraph of the Philippine amendment was rejected by 25 votes to 15, with 17 abstentions.*

27. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Uruguayan amendment (A/C.1/555) to the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/553) as amended in the course of the debate and reading as follows: "after the words 'with recommendations' add the following text: 'or to bring it to the attention of the Secretary-General in order to report to the Security Council if it deems it necessary to do so as a result of the examination on the state of the matter submitted to it for study.'"

*The amendment was adopted by 21 votes to 18, with 16 abstentions.*

28. Mr. DE DIEGO (Panama) inquired whether the representative of Lebanon intended to re-introduce the second paragraph of his amendment in view of the result of the voting. Such a move in the circumstances would appear to be logical and would be in keeping with the spirit of the first paragraph of the Lebanese amendment which had been adopted.

29. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon) stated that he would re-introduce that paragraph if the Chairman allowed him to do so.

30. The CHAIRMAN stated that the second paragraph of the Lebanese amendment (A/C.1/556) could be re-introduced in accordance with rule 111 of the rules of procedure. He thus put that paragraph to the vote, namely the addition of the words "in the light of the draft resolution mentioned above" which would be added at the end of the first paragraph of the three-Power draft.

*That text was adopted by 35 votes to 5, with 15 abstentions.*

31. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon) made two comments upon the drafting of the three-Power text and of the Uruguayan amendment to it. With regard to the former, Mr. Azkoul suggested that, in order to avoid any possible ambiguity, the word "it" in the phrase "decides to refer it to the Interim Committee" be replaced by "that item". With regard to the text of the Uruguayan amendment, there appeared to be some disparity between the French and English translations. The French text contained the word "*également*" which appeared in the English text as "or". The French text appeared to be more precise since it intimated that there was an additional possible course of action, while the English text implied that there was an alternate course of action.

32. The CHAIRMAN stated that the suggestion to replace "it" by "that item" in the final paragraph of the three-Power draft resolution had been accepted by the sponsors. With regard to the other question raised by the representative

of Lebanon, he hesitated to make a ruling since there might be a question of principle involved.

33. Mr. DOMÍNGUEZ CÁMPORA (Uruguay) explained that he had not intended to confront the Interim Committee with the necessity of choosing between courses of action, but merely to confer additional power upon that Committee.

34. In response to a request from the CHAIRMAN, the RAPPORTEUR offered the opinion that the word "or" was the most appropriate translation of the original Spanish text.

35. The CHAIRMAN said the Secretariat would be requested to examine the point raised by the representative of Lebanon and decide which was the correct translation. He then put to the vote by roll-call, the draft resolution submitted by the three Powers (A/C.1/553) as amended and reading as follows:

*"Considering that item 68 regarding threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945, and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations is of special importance, involved the fundamental principles of the Charter and prestige of the United Nations, and requires further examination and study;*

*"Considering further the draft resolution on the promotion of the stability of international relations in the Far East;*

*"The General Assembly*

*"Decides to refer it to the Interim Committee of the General Assembly for continuous examination and study in the light of the draft resolution mentioned above, and to report to the next session of the General Assembly with recommendations, or to bring it to the attention of the Secretary-General in order to report to the Security Council if it deems it necessary to do so as a result of the examination or the state of the matter submitted to it for study and to report to the next session of the General Assembly with recommendations."*

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*The Netherlands, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* New Zealand, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Greece, Haiti, Iraq, Lebanon, Luxembourg.

*Against:* Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Israel, Liberia, Mexico.

*Abstaining:* Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, Yemen, Afghanistan, Burma, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Iran.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 23 votes to 19, with 14 abstentions.*

36. Mr. STOLK (Venezuela) made a statement in explanation of his position. His delegation

considered that if the General Assembly, for any reason, were unable to reach a conclusion upon the accusation made by China against the Soviet Union, the appropriate action for the First Committee would be to explain the circumstances and refer the question to the Security Council, which had been created to consider such matters. However, the Venezuelan delegation had not intended to oppose the three-Power draft resolution nor the amendments thereto because it did not wish to impede any action which other delegations believed might be appropriate.

37. The CHAIRMAN understood that the draft resolution submitted by China (A/C.1/551) would be re-introduced in the Interim Committee, and thus the only draft resolution still before the First Committee was that submitted by the five Powers (A/C.1/552). He put it to the vote.

38. Mr. TARN (Poland) requested a separate vote on the title, namely "The promotion of the stability of international relations in the Far East".

*The title was adopted by 44 votes to 5, with 5 abstentions.*

39. The CHAIRMAN then called for a vote by roll-call on the remainder of the draft resolution.

*A vote was taken by roll-call as follows:*

*Costa Rica, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, Colombia.

*Against:* Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

*Abstaining:* Guatemala, Israel, Yemen, Afghanistan, China.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 47 votes to 5, with 5 abstentions.*

40. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel), speaking in explanation of his vote, said that his delegation had been

unable to accept the contention of the representative of China that the situation in China was entirely the result of outside intervention. The delegation of Israel, moreover, had already expressed its opposition to draft resolutions containing denunciatory statements and accusations. Accordingly, he had voted against the three-Power draft resolution because, in fact, it made such charges. The delegation of Israel had abstained on the five-Power draft resolution since it was based on the assumption that China's political independence and territorial integrity were threatened by foreign intervention; if that were the case, the mere enumeration of the principles of the Charter would be inadequate. If it had been the intention of the five Powers to re-state principles to guide the conduct of international relations, the resolution on the "Essentials of Peace" just adopted by the General Assembly should be sufficient. However, if the purpose of the five-Power draft resolution was to establish principles for the promotion of stability in the Far East, the matter should be the subject of a thorough debate. In such a discussion, the delegation of Israel would point out that an essential for promoting stability in the Far East was higher standards of living to be achieved through economic development for the poverty-stricken masses of the population.

41. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon) suggested that the word "draft" be deleted from the reference to the five-Power resolution contained in the three-Power draft resolution submitted by Cuba, Ecuador, and Peru, as amended and adopted.

43. There being no objection, the CHAIRMAN declared that suggestion adopted.

43. He noted that the work of the First Committee for the fourth session of the General Assembly had been completed. He had received a letter from the Chairman, Mr. Pearson, who regretted his absence and expressed his thanks to the members of the Committee for their courtesy and co-operation. He had also asked that his appreciation be conveyed to Dr. Protitch, Secretary of the Committee, and to the staff of the Secretariat. Mr. Sarper, as Vice-Chairman of the Committee, and Acting Chairman at that meeting, wished to associate himself with the sentiments of Mr. Pearson. He particularly expressed his thanks to Mr. de Diego, the Rapporteur, and to the Secretary of the Committee.

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.

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