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Chairman: Mr. Mario MAJOLI (Italy).

AGENDA ITEM 49

Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1960 (A/4492, A/4507, A/4508, A/4580, A/C.5/816, A/C.5/836) (continued)

United Nations activities in the Congo (ONUC) for the period 14 July to 31 December 1960 (A/4580, A/C.5/836) (continued)

1. Mr. HAILEMARIAM (Ethiopia) said that, since certain assertions, including press reports, about the Congo situation had been accepted as true, he wished to recapitulate some relevant facts.

2. On 7 July 1960, a week after the Republic of the Congo had attained its independence, the Security Council had recommended to the General Assembly the admission of the Republic of the Congo to the United Nations.<sup>1/</sup> Soon afterwards, the Congolese army had rebelled against its Belgian officers who, even after independence, were to assume virtual command of the Congolese National Army. Following the rebellion, maltreatment of Belgian nationals had been alleged and the Belgian Government had sent military forces to the Congo to fight against the Congolese National Army without submitting a complaint to the United Nations. He did not think it necessary to debate the various versions of those events; it was reasonable to assume, however, that the Belgian Government would not have sent its troops into the territories of either the USSR or the United States on the pretext it had given for sending troops into the Congo.

3. A cable dated 12 July 1960, addressed to the Secretary-General, had been received from Prime

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, document S/4377.

Minister Lumumba and President Kasa-Vubu of the Republic of the Congo,<sup>2/</sup> requesting the urgent dispatch of United Nations military assistance. It had said that the re-entry of metropolitan Belgian troops into the Congo violated the treaty of friendship between Belgium and the Congo, that the unsolicited Belgian action was "an act of aggression", and that the essential purpose of the military aid requested from the United Nations was to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which was a threat to international peace. The Secretary-General had also received a cable dated 13 July 1960<sup>3/</sup> from both the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic of the Congo in which they stated that the purpose of the aid requested was not to restore the internal situation in the Congo but to protect the national territory against the act of aggression posed by Belgian metropolitan troops.

4. At the 873rd meeting of the Security Council on 13 and 14 July 1960, the Secretary-General had strongly recommended the Council to authorize him "to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Congo, to provide the Government with military assistance during the period which may have to pass before, through the efforts of the Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces are able to fully meet their tasks". The Secretary-General's request was embodied in operative paragraph 2 of the Security Council's resolution of 14 July 1960.<sup>4/</sup> Whether or not that request was in accordance with Articles 43 or 106 of the Charter was a legal question, and his delegation was not prepared to enter into a discussion of the matter in the Fifth Committee.

5. Operative paragraph 1 of the resolution called upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo. Future historians might well conclude that, but for the current divisions in the world, the Belgian military re-entry into the territory of the Republic of the Congo would have been regarded as aggression. In fact, the USSR had submitted an amendment under which the Security Council would have condemned "the armed aggression by Belgium". That amendment had been rejected. Belgium enjoyed a privileged position because it had influential friends in the Security Council with veto power. Had the USSR amendment been adopted, the problem of financing ONUC would have been much easier. However, the situation had been complicated by the Security Council's decision to avoid any condemnation of Belgium but, at the same time, not to absolve that country from all responsibility for the state of affairs in the Congo.

6. When the United Nations Force had arrived in the Congo, the Belgian troops had not left immediately.

<sup>2/</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/4382, section I.

<sup>3/</sup> *Ibid.*, section II.

<sup>4/</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/4387.

When they had begun to withdraw, it had been from Leopoldville only, and in a way which amounted to a token response to the Security Council's request. The resolution adopted by the Security Council on 22 July 1960<sup>5/</sup> had again called upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops speedily. On 23 July, nine days after the adoption of the Security Council's first resolution, the evacuation of Belgian troops from Leopoldville, but only from Leopoldville, had been fully completed.

7. By 31 July 1960 United Nations troops had entered all the provinces except the secessionist Province of Katanga. The fact must be faced that, eighteen days after the adoption of the first Security Council resolution, not a single United Nations soldier had set foot on Katanga soil, whereas the number of Belgians in that province was increasing. On 2 August, the Secretary-General had announced that United Nations military contingents would enter Katanga Province on 6 August, but on 5 August he had abandoned the plan and had requested a Security Council meeting. It had been reported that the local authorities in Katanga would have forcibly opposed the entry of United Nations troops into the province. It was difficult to understand how a world organization could have been so successfully intimidated by local authorities which were no more than the puppets of a small colonialist country.

8. In its resolution of 9 August 1960<sup>6/</sup> the Security Council had called upon the Belgian Government to withdraw immediately its troops from the Province of Katanga. The tone of that resolution had indicated the Security Council's impatience at Belgium's reluctance to abandon its immense reservoir of wealth, which it had exploited at the expense of the Congolese people. Moreover, the fact that the Security Council resolution had referred to Katanga as a province was significant from the standpoint of the ultimate unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo.

9. In all three resolutions Belgium had been called upon to withdraw its troops from the Congo, thereby indicating the Belgian Government's particular responsibility for the situation prevailing in the Congo. At its fourth emergency special session, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1474 (ES-IV) which had endorsed the three Security Council resolutions and requested the Secretary-General to continue to take vigorous action in accordance with the terms of those resolutions. It had called upon all States, including, of course, Belgium, to refrain from the direct or indirect provision of arms or other materials of war and military personnel and other assistance for military purposes in the Congo during the temporary period of military assistance through the United Nations.

10. Paradoxically, the Government of the Republic of the Congo was in the process of disappearing despite the presence of ONUC. The Prime Minister who had asked for United Nations assistance was now imprisoned and was being maltreated. Elements friendly to the colonialists were in the ascendant. The second progress report of the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Congo (A/4557, part A) clearly showed that such elements were present everywhere in the Congo. Other friends of colonialism were also at work behind the scenes.

<sup>5/</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/4405.

<sup>6/</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/4426.

11. In those circumstances, his delegation considered that the problem of financing ONUC in 1960 should be tackled on an *ad hoc* basis. That view was strengthened by the recent announcement that several States which had contributed military and other personnel to ONUC had decided to withdraw their assistance, and by the fact that there might be more withdrawals in the near future. Moreover, owing to the various differences between ONUC and UNEF, different methods of financing were called for. Lastly, in determining the scale of assessments for financing ONUC, regard should be paid to Belgium's special responsibility for the development and continuation of the Congo situation.

12. In conclusion, his delegation accepted the Advisory Committee's recommendations in paragraph 18 of its report (A/4580). His Government would not attempt to bring pressure to bear on other countries which were reluctant to share in the expenses of ONUC for the reasons they had given but it would, nevertheless, be willing to pay its own assessment in accordance with whatever decision was eventually reached.

13. Mr. EL HAKIM (United Arab Republic) said that the question under discussion was primarily political in character and, in his delegation's view, the Committee could not deal with its technical or financial aspects in isolation.

14. In implementation of the Security Council resolutions on the Congo, certain countries, including the United Arab Republic, had been called upon to provide military contingents for the United Nations Force. Those countries had responded immediately, and without any hesitation, in order to safeguard the unity, territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of the Congo, and to assist its legitimate Central Government to restore and maintain law and order. He regretted, however, that the United Nations efforts in the Congo had been impeded by the activities of certain elements.

15. The Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Congo had stated in paragraph 7 of his second progress report (A/4557, part A) that there had been increasing evidence of the return of Belgian nationals into many phases of public life in the Congo. He had gone on to say that there had been a substantial incursion of those elements which appeared to seek a dominating influence in the councils of administration and to exclude or obstruct the application of United Nations technical assistance and influence, that some Belgian nationals were believed to have been actively arming separatist Congolese forces, that advisers of Belgian nationality had been returning to governmental ministries both in Leopoldville and the provinces and that the motives and activities of a significant portion of those returning officials appeared to be clearly at variance with the principles of the General Assembly resolution and with ONUC's basis objectives. In paragraph 48 of his report he had stated that Belgian influence was also seen in the military field.

16. It was abundantly clear from that report that Belgium had consistently ignored the Security Council's decisions and had always tried, and was still trying, to obstruct the work of ONUC by every means and to prevent it from achieving the objectives defined in the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

17. Furthermore, it was well known that Colonel Mobutu, Mr. Tshombé and Mr. Kalonji were receiving

large sums of money from certain Belgian enterprises. If the Belgian Government had complied with the Security Council resolutions, there would no longer have been a Congo problem and his Government would have gladly paid its share of the cost of ONUC. But, in view of the situation which he had described, his delegation felt that the cost of the United Nations activities in the Congo should not be considered as a supplementary estimate to the 1960 budget. Nor should it be apportioned among Member States but should, in all fairness, be borne by the country which had been responsible from the outset for the existing unhappy situation. Any other course would, in his delegation's view, be an encouragement to Member States to disregard Security Council decisions whenever it was in their own interest to do so.

18. Mr. THOMMESSEN (Norway) endorsed the contention of previous speakers that, since ONUC had been undertaken under resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, its cost should be apportioned among all Member States in accordance with the regular scale of assessments. The Norwegian Government was prepared to ask Parliament for a contribution in accordance with that scale, and had already requested authority for a voluntary contribution of approximately \$490,000—the amount of Norway's assessment under the regular budget—to the United Nations Fund for the Congo. Norway was grateful to those Member States whose generous voluntary contributions had reduced the amount required under the supplementary estimates, and would support any reasonable formula devised to help those Member States least able to bear the additional financial burden.

19. The Committee should establish the principle that the obligation to cover the cost of ONUC was shared by all Member States, and should eschew the unsatisfactory financial procedure applied to UNEF. Moreover, such an expression of solidarity in regard to the costs of a mission of peace would encourage those Member States which were willing and anxious to contribute to the expansion of the technical assistance programme and the Special Fund.

20. The Secretary-General, in his statement at the 796th meeting had left the Committee in no doubt of the urgent need to solve ONUC's financial problem. If the General Assembly failed to do so, the United Nations treasury would be empty, and those countries which had supplied troops for the United Nations Force in the Congo would have to bear a large proportion of the cost, with grave consequences for the Organization. His delegation therefore hoped that all Member States would discharge their responsibility in the matter.

#### AGENDA ITEM 54

Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the United Nations with the specialized agencies and with the International Atomic Energy Agency: report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/4415, chapter VII, section I; A/4599, A/C.5/820, A/C.5/841, A/C.5/847 and Add.1, A/C.5/L.632, A/C.5/L.634) (continued)

21. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) expressed some misgivings with regard to part A, operative paragraph 2, of the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.5/L.632). Firstly, the report referred to in that paragraph entitled Five-Year Perspective,

1960-1964<sup>7/</sup> had not been examined by the Committee. Secondly, the action proposed in the paragraph should properly be initiated by the Economic and Social Council, and should be taken up by the Second or Third Committee. Thirdly, as the Advisory Committee had pointed out in its report (A/4599, para. 11), the information on budgetary trends given in the appraisal report was somewhat limited; hence the report in question was less the concern of the Fifth than of the other Main Committees he had mentioned. Fourthly, the adoption of the paragraph would imply that the report referred to was of unusual political and economic significance; the Fifth Committee was not the proper body to express such an opinion.

22. Mr. BANNIER (Netherlands) stated, with reference to the USSR representative's first objection, that both the Advisory Committee, in its report, and the Fifth Committee, in its discussion, had given consideration to the consolidated report of the Committee on Programme Appraisals. It was generally agreed that the report was sufficiently important to require action by the General Assembly. As to the USSR representative's second objection, chapter VII, section I of the Economic and Social Council's report (A/4415)<sup>8/</sup> had been referred to the Fifth Committee for consideration, and the Committee also had before it the relevant comments of the Second Committee (A/C.5/847 and Add.1) and of the Third Committee (A/C.5/841). Moreover, the Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 791 (XXX), had already taken the initiative by requesting the Secretary-General to arrange for the report to be given the widest possible circulation for the use of Governments, specialized agencies and other institutions concerned with international co-operation. The sponsors of the draft resolution considered that the General Assembly should follow up the Council's action by addressing a similar request to Governments.

23. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) felt that an approach to Governments went too far beyond the terms of the Council resolution.

24. Mr. ARRAIZ (Venezuela) proposed that, to meet the objection just raised by the USSR representative, operative paragraph 2 of part A of the three-Power draft resolution should read as follows:

"Calls the attention of Member Governments to the report entitled 'Five-Year Perspective, 1960-1964' and expresses the hope that they will give it the widest possible distribution within their respective administrations".

25. Mr. SERBANESBU (Romania) felt that the Venezuelan amendment would be more in keeping with the Council resolution if it ended with the words "Five-Year Perspective, 1960-1964".

26. Mr. MONTERO BUSTAMANTE (Uruguay) considered that, as the Netherlands representative had suggested, the Committee should follow up the Council resolution; however, the language of part A, operative paragraph 2, of the draft resolution as it stood was perhaps a little too stark, and his delegation would therefore support the Venezuelan amendment.

27. Mr. KITTANI (Iraq) agreed with the USSR representative that the report referred to in operative paragraph 2 was not a Fifth Committee document and

<sup>7/</sup> United Nations publication, Catalogue No.: 60.IV.14.

<sup>8/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Supplement No.3.

that it related mainly to matters within the competence of the Second and Third Committees. It was nevertheless the Fifth Committee's responsibility to take action under the current agenda item.

28. Since the phrase "the widest possible distribution" appeared in both the three-Power and the Venezuelan versions of the paragraph, he would be grateful for information on the availability of copies of the report for that purpose.

29. Mr. TURNER (Controller) said that the normal print order for such a document was 4,000 to 5,000 copies. Budgetary limitations would create a problem if Governments requested substantially more than their normal quota of copies. They were, however, at liberty to reprint the report if they considered it necessary to do so.

30. Mr. BANNIER (Netherlands) stated that the sponsors of the three-Power draft resolution accepted the Venezuelan amendment.

31. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that the new version of operative paragraph 2 went even further beyond the terms of the Council resolution and the terms of reference of the Fifth Committee than the original text. His delegation supported the Romanian suggestion.

32. Mr. EL HAKIM (United Arab Republic) also supported the Romanian suggestion. He also proposed that the words "the importance and usefulness of" should be inserted before the words "the report".

33. Mr. BANNIER (Netherlands), speaking for the sponsors of the three-Power draft resolution, and Mr. ARRAIZ (Venezuela) rejected the Romanian suggestion for the deletion of the second half of operative paragraph 2, as amended, but agreed to the insertion of the words proposed by the United Arab Republic.

34. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) asked for a separate vote on the second half of operative paragraph 2, as amended, beginning with the words "and expresses the hope...".

*The second half of operative paragraph 2, as amended, of part A of the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.5/L.632), beginning with the words "and expresses the hope", was adopted by 37 votes to 9, with 13 abstentions.*

*The three-Power draft resolution as a whole, as amended, was adopted by 54 votes to none, with 4 abstentions.*

35. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to the draft resolution which was set forth in the note by the Secretariat (A/C.5/L.634) and which was on the same lines as the corresponding decisions adopted by the Committee at previous sessions.

36. Mr. BANNIER (Netherlands) proposed that the words "with appreciation" should be inserted after the words "Takes note" in paragraph 1 of the draft resolution.

*The Netherlands proposal was adopted.*

*The draft resolution contained in document A/C.5/L.634, as amended, was adopted.*

## AGENDA ITEM 61

### United Nations International School: report of the Secretary-General (A/4541 and Corr.1 and 2, A/4624)

37. The CHAIRMAN recalled the terms of the resolution on the United Nations International School which the General Assembly had adopted at its fourteenth session, (resolution 1439 (XIV)) and drew the Committee's attention to the report by the Secretary-General (A/4541 and Corr.1 and 2) and the report of the Advisory Committee (A/4624), particularly to paragraph 12 of the latter.

38. Mr. GREZ (Chile) said that, as in previous years, his delegation would support any draft resolution which offered a suitable solution to the problems confronting the School and would enable the latter to cater to the greatest possible number of children of delegation members, Headquarters staff members and other persons connected with the United Nations. It did not wish to see the School's annual deficits met by means of an increase in tuition fees as such a measure would be contrary to the democratic principles supported by the United Nations and would also be prejudicial to members of delegations and staff members, most of whom had only limited resources.

39. His delegation would therefore support a contribution by the United Nations of \$61,000 in 1961 to meet the School's current deficit, as well as an additional provision of \$20,000 for the purposes indicated in paragraph 8 of the Advisory Committee's report.

40. Mr. HILLIS (United Kingdom) said that General Assembly resolution 1439 (XIV) had been adopted in spite of the considerable misgivings which had been expressed by a number of delegations, including his own. The Committee was now faced with a new situation. The International School Fund had been established. The Secretary-General had transmitted to the Committee a report by the Board of Trustees on the operation of the Fund (A/4541 and Corr.1 and 2, annex) and had given his own recommendations on the means of financing future contributions.

41. The Committee would have to consider, first, whether the new arrangements which had been adopted would help the School to become independent and self-sufficient within the five-year period specified in General Assembly resolution 1439 (XIV), and to attract the private funds necessary to provide it with a permanent building, and, second, whether—and in what amount—financial assistance should be provided to meet the operating deficit expected during the school year 1960-1961.

42. It was generally desired that the School should become prosperous and independent of United Nations subsidization, which could only lead ultimately, to greater involvement of the Organization in its affairs. Over a ten-year period grants totalling \$177,900 had been made to the School by the United Nations. The amount of the grants had increased progressively, the sum of \$100,000 voted in 1959 having been considerably more than the total of all the previous grants. His delegation had therefore awaited with some anxiety a report on the outlook for 1960-1961, trusting that some progress might have been made towards wiping out the School's operating deficit. However, the gap between expenditure and income had in fact widened. For 1959-1960 the deficit was of the order of \$70,000 and for 1960-1961 it was expected to be of the order of \$91,000.



A net deficit of over \$61,000 remained and a further \$20,000 might be needed to meet the costs of the plans and estimates referred to by the Secretary-General.

43. His delegation had been among those which had urged an increase in tuition fees as a first step towards eliminating the School's deficit. The fees had in fact been increased but, at the same time, the provision for scholarships and bursaries had more than doubled. Expenditure would have about matched the original estimate of income but, because enrolment had fallen short of expectations, there had been a shortfall in income of about \$25,000.

44. If the deficit was to be eliminated, the School's enrolment would have to be increased above the 400-pupil level and expenditure on bursaries and scholarships would have to be brought to a more realistic level, in relation to the gross total of fees and reduced to the minimum necessary to open the School to talented children whose parents could not otherwise afford the fees. There might also be scope for other minor economies. The only alternative would be the retrograde step of reducing the ratio of teaching staff to pupils.

45. The General Assembly had agreed in principle to assist the School for a limited period and his delegation would not oppose the granting of some subsidy for the current school-year. However, it was not happy about the position, as it did not believe the United Nations should become involved in the practical business of education and felt it inappropriate to discriminate, through the budget, in favour of those members of the Secretariat who sent their children to the International School and against those who preferred to have them educated in their own country. It might be preferable to review the level of the United Nations education grants. Furthermore, he doubted whether the United Nations should, through its budget, collectively assume the responsibility, which properly belonged to individual Governments, of subsidizing the education costs of members of delegations. Nor was it appropriate that the United Nations should subsidize, out of its budget, the education of children whose parents had no connexion with the Organization.

46. His delegation therefore hoped that the trustees would earnestly consider how they could eliminate the School's operating deficit within the five-year period envisaged by the General Assembly. In considering the School's finances, it was necessary to bear also in mind the general financial position of the United Nations which itself had a deficit of the order of \$20 million.

47. Mr. AIKEN (United States of America) said that his delegation shared the concern expressed by the Advisory Committee and by the United Kingdom representative regarding the School's finances and the deficit anticipated for the school year 1960-1961, which

was no doubt the result of an unrealistic approach on the part of the School management. His delegation therefore strongly endorsed the suggestions made by the Advisory Committee in paragraph 12 of its report.

48. Mr. KITTANI (Iraq) said that resolution 1439 (XIV) had been adopted as a compromise, when the Secretary-General's suggestion mentioned in its preamble had not been adopted. A contribution of \$100,000 to the International School Fund had been approved in 1959, but the United Nations had assumed a commitment for a limited period only.

49. The economic viability of the school depended on two factors—the obtaining of a site for new school premises and the securing of private sources of financing. The two factors were interrelated, the second being dependent on the first. He disagreed with the United Kingdom representative's pessimistic view of the situation and drew attention, in particular, to the information provided by the Secretary-General in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of his report (A/4541 and Corr. 1 and 2). However, he agreed with the United Kingdom and United States representatives that the management of the school should spare no effort to wipe out the deficits or at least reduce them to a minimum.

50. Neither the Secretary-General nor the Advisory Committee had made any specific proposal regarding a contribution to the International School Fund for the 1960-1961 school year but some action was nevertheless called for under General Assembly resolution 1439 (XIV). Consultations had taken place between certain delegations with a view to the submission of a draft resolution on the subject and he suggested that the Committee might wish to postpone further discussion until it had a draft text before it.

51. Mr. CUTTS (Australia) said that his delegation fully supported the views expressed by the United Kingdom representative. At the fourteenth session, his delegation had accepted resolution 1439 (XIV) on the understanding that it was a temporary measure only. He had been very much surprised at the size of the School's current deficit, which appeared to reflect a lack of realism on the part of the management. Rather than subsidize the School by meeting such deficits, the Organization might be well advised to consider some modification of the present education grant. Nevertheless, should the promised draft resolution call for a contribution in the amount of \$61,500, his delegation would support it, provided the two points mentioned in paragraph 12 of the Advisory Committee's report (A/4624) were emphasized. He doubted, however, that his delegation could support such a large contribution in the following year.

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.