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Chairman: Mr. Milton Fowler GREGG (Canada).

AGENDA ITEM 59

United Nations Operation in the Congo: cost estimates (A/5560, A/C.5/983) (continued)

1. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said he wished to explain once again his delegation's position on the question of the United Nations Operation in the Congo. It was common knowledge that the operation had been undertaken in accordance with a decision adopted by the Security Council on 14 July 1960,^{1/} which sought to defend the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo against foreign aggression, at the request of Prime Minister Lumumba. The Soviet Union had frequently repeated that that decision of the Security Council could have been implemented in a very short space of time had the colonial Powers not stepped up their interference in the internal affairs of the Congo, thereby making it impossible to attain the Security Council's objectives and to bring about the withdrawal of foreign troops from Congolese territory. The United Nations operations in Katanga and other parts of the Congo had invariably met with the hostility and resistance of the colonial Powers, which were attempting to use those operations, whether military, political, economic, or financial, for their own purposes, i.e., for the greater profit of their monopolies and not in the interest of the Congolese people.

2. The Secretary-General had stressed the need to end the United Nations Operation in the Congo as quickly as possible and, in his report of 17 September 1963 to the Security Council, he had stated that he was preparing the "complete withdrawal from the Congo of United Nations troops by 31 December 1963".^{2/} The Secretary-General had explained that it was "reasonable not to expect the United Nations to underwrite for any country permanent insurance against internal disorders and disturbances"^{3/} and he had added that "the Congo's internal situation no longer poses a threat to

international peace".^{4/} Those statements were fully in line with the position of the Soviet Union, which considered that under the Charter of the United Nations, the Organization had no authority to take action relating to the maintenance of law and order inside a country, a task which was the sole prerogative of the national government. In the case of the Congo, the maintenance of United Nations troops there to carry out police duties would be a flagrant violation of the Charter, particularly as those troops were being used to cover up the interference of outside forces in the internal affairs of the Congolese State and the designs of the neo-colonialists on that territory.

3. Yet, although the Charter prohibited any interference in the internal affairs of States and despite the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council and the absence of any decision by the Council, cost estimates relating to the continuation of the Congo operations during the first six months of 1964 had been submitted to the General Assembly (A/C.5/983). That document contained not only cost estimates but also detailed information on the 1964 operations (the strength of the troops, their organization, the composition of military units, the nationality of the soldiers, their equipment, disposition, etc.). Thus, in contradiction to the conclusions of his report to the Council, the Secretary-General was asking the Committee to authorize him to continue the Congo operation in 1964. Furthermore, the Secretary-General had fixed the total strength of that force at 5,350 officers and other ranks, whereas the Prime Minister of the Congo, Mr. Adoula, in his letter of 22 August 1963,^{5/} had only asked the Secretary-General to maintain a strength of 3,000 men in the Congo.

4. Quite apart from the fact that the maintenance of United Nations troops in the Congo to carry out police duties inside the territory would be a flagrant violation of the Charter, the General Assembly was not competent to take decisions which were the sole prerogative of the Security Council. The Congo operation was by definition an "action" and as such had to be "referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion" in accordance with Article 11 of the Charter. The General Assembly could only make recommendations, whereas the Security Council, on the other hand, took decisions which were binding on Member States (Article 25 of the Charter); Chapter VII of the Charter, and particularly Articles 43 and 48, established clearly the exclusive responsibility of the Security Council in that respect. It thus followed that the procedures used for policy making and financing with regard to ONUC were illegal and that the proposal to continue the financing of that operation during the first half of 1964 could be regarded only as an attempt to usurp the powers of the Security Council.

^{1/} Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, document S/4387.

^{2/} *Ibid.*, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1963, document S/5428, para. 4.

^{3/} *Ibid.*, para. 19.

^{4/} *Ibid.*, para. 20.

^{5/} *Ibid.*, annex I.

5. Since the United Nations Operation in the Congo had been made necessary by the colonial Powers and since it was those Powers which were responsible for the unjustified prolongation of the operation, having impeded into execution for selfish reasons that had nothing to do with the maintenance of international peace and security, the only fair and acceptable solution would be for those Powers to assume full financial responsibility for the operation. The Congo operation, which was being conducted in violation of the Charter and whose costs did not come under Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter, placed no financial obligation on any Member State. The Soviet Union, therefore, would not consider itself bound by any recommendation which might be adopted on the financing of the operations in 1964 and would not share in the cost.

6. Mr. IDZUMBUIR (Congo, Leopoldville) wished to point out to the Soviet representative that the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 14 July 1960, i.e., the only one of the Council's resolutions that was relevant, had set no date for the withdrawal of United Nations forces from the Congo. He might speak at greater length when he was in possession of the French translation of the Soviet representative's statement.

7. Mr. TURNER (Controller) felt that two points bearing on the Secretary-General's position needed to be clarified. First, the Secretary-General recognized that there were urgent reasons in support of prolonging the stay of the Force and that equally there were impressive reasons for its early withdrawal. His views were clearly and objectively stated in paragraphs 37 and 38 of his report to the Security Council. Secondly, the report on cost estimates submitted by the Secretary-General (A/C.5/983) was neither a proposal, nor a recommendation, nor a request for funds. It was simply a factual statement of what the cost would be if the Assembly should decide to maintain the Force. The Secretary-General had prepared that document at the Fifth Committee's own request (1007th meeting), in accordance with established practice.

8. Mr. JAYASINHA (Ceylon) considered that the problem of the Congo must not be regarded as a subject of controversy. The fact that the Prime Minister of the Congo, Mr. Adoula, had proposed the maintenance of a force of 3,000 men and that the present estimates did not correspond to that figure was merely a question of detail. The substance of the problem was quite simply the fact that it was the Congolese Government itself which had requested the maintenance of the United Nations Force in the Congo.

9. Mr. IDZUMBUIR (Congo, Leopoldville) announced that a number of delegations would submit a draft resolution on the continuation of the Congo operation at the end of the meeting. That draft resolution might be discussed at the next meeting.

AGENDA ITEM 57

Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1963
(A/5525, A/5558)

10. Mr. QUIJANO (Argentina) said that the most outstanding feature of the Secretary-General's report on the supplementary estimates for the financial year 1963 (A/5525) was that, for the first time, there was not a deficit but a surplus, which the Secretary-General estimated at \$983,000 but which the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions felt should be put at \$1,034,500 (A/5558, para. 30).

11. Of course, a considerable part of that decrease in expenditure compared with the appropriations was due to the fact that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development had been postponed to 1964; the unobligated balance of funds would have to be carried over to 1964 and a further appropriation would have to be made because the Conference would last longer than originally planned. Nevertheless, the supplementary estimates for 1963 showed that the Secretary-General and the Secretariat had made a commendable effort to keep expenditure within reasonable limits.

12. Moreover, in contrast to the financial year 1962, with a few exceptions, there were no supplementary estimates for special missions or for meetings away from Headquarters. The comments made by the Fifth Committee at the seventeenth session drawing attention to the need in the Assembly and the Main Committees to conform to the letter and the spirit of United Nations financial regulation 13.1 and rule 154 of the General Assembly's rules of procedure^{6/} had had some effect.

13. Turning to the other aspects of the supplementary estimates, he endorsed the comments of the Advisory Committee, particularly on the supplementary appropriations requested under section 8 of the budget (Permanent equipment) and section 10 (General expenses). It was to be hoped that the Secretariat would bear those comments in mind and would try, in the future, to defer foreseeable expenditure for the acquisition of new furniture and equipment to the following year if it could not be met within the appropriations approved by the General Assembly or by the curtailment of other expenditures.

14. By applying the recommendations of the Fifth Committee and the Advisory Committee, it should be possible gradually to arrive at a point where all necessary expenditure was met without the need for supplementary appropriations. In other words, the kind of supplementary estimates submitted for 1963 should become the rule rather than an exception.

15. The Argentine delegation supported the Advisory Committee's recommendation regarding the supplementary estimates for 1963.

16. Mr. KITTANI (Iraq) welcomed the fact that for the first time in many years expenditure for 1963 would be lower than the appropriations. However, the expected surplus represents savings which were more apparent than real, having regard to the main factors to which the surplus was due. First, the Secretary-General wished to carry over to 1964 the unobligated balance of the 1963 appropriation for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which, incidentally, would require a much larger appropriation than the present \$700,000. Secondly, the net decrease of \$860,800 for the whole of section 3 (Salaries and wages) was explained by the number of established posts which had not been filled in 1963 and which, as the Advisory Committee had pointed out in paragraph 18 of its report, were largely highly technical posts for which qualified candidates were difficult to obtain. That was really forced saving, not the result of a true austerity policy.

17. Actually, the question of a policy of effective economy arose more specifically in connexion with

^{6/} See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 61, document A/C.5/927.*

sections 8 (Permanent equipment), 9 (Maintenance, operation and rental of premises) and 10 (General expenses). In paragraph 7 of his report, the Secretary-General was careful to recall that at the seventeenth session he had cautioned the General Assembly that it might not be possible to contain expenditures under those headings within the lower amount proposed by the Advisory Committee. In all fairness to the Committee and to the Assembly, it should be pointed out that some of the supplementary estimates were attributable to factors which no one could have foreseen when the budget estimates for 1963 had been under consideration by the Advisory Committee; on the other hand, the acquisition of new furniture and equipment, the purchase of library books and some other expenses under sections 8 and 10 could not really be called unforeseeable expenditures. The Advisory Committee gave a succinct statement of the criteria for determining unforeseeable and extraordinary expenditures in paragraph 13 of its report.

18. In conclusion, he said that his delegation would support the recommendations of the Advisory Committee, which in the present instance had displayed moderation and understanding of the Secretary-General's position.

19. Mr. SERVANESCU (Romania) said he would like to interpret the results obtained in 1963 as marking a turn for the better in the Organization's financial policy; unfortunately, the surplus of \$983,000 was only apparent, if the reason for it was taken into account. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development had simply been postponed and on the other hand the large surplus under section 3 was perhaps only a proof that the Assembly had been too generous. Moreover, the original estimates had been exceeded for sections 8, 9, and 10, over which the Secretary-General could more easily exercise strict control. The increase in the expenditure for information activities and for certain special missions should have been avoided. In the future, therefore, the Secretariat would have to exercise stricter control so as to preclude the necessity for supplementary estimates. It would be easier for the Advisory Committee to help it in that task if the Secretariat furnished it with information on the financial situation periodically, instead of only once a year. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the trend which had emerged in 1963 would be accentuated year by year.

20. Mr. SOKIRKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) regretted that the balance of appropriations over expenditure was not really the result of a policy of austerity. The unobligated balance of the appropriation for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development would merely be carried over to 1964. Another unspent balance would be surrendered, but that balance was attributable to the fact that actual sales of United Nations bonds had been somewhat less than had been anticipated. The only savings worthy of the name amounted to \$113,800, which was the difference between the additional requirements for 1963 and the anticipated surpluses on some sections of the budget. That figure might be larger if the Secretariat and certain United Nations bodies had a greater respect for budgetary discipline. As the Advisory Committee had pointed out, in paragraph 13 of its report, "as a rule, budget appropriations approved by the General Assembly set limits on expenditure which should not be exceeded". All additional expenditure, except for expenses which were really unforeseen and extraordinary, was contrary to budgetary discipline. The Advisory Committee gave several examples of that in paragraph 12 of its report.

21. Turning to section 3, he said that every year the Assembly seemed to approve appropriations which were in excess of normal needs of the Secretariat, which did not succeed in using the entire appropriation. That was conclusive proof that the staff of the Secretariat could be substantially reduced, as the Soviet delegation had repeatedly pointed out. The Secretary-General should make a more rational and economical use of his staff. In that connexion, he observed that the Committee was justified in expecting the Advisory Committee to study the various departments of the Secretariat one by one from the standpoint of the use of staff and administrative efficiency.

22. The absence of strict control and of any real concern for saving also explained why the probable cost of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was now estimated at almost twice the initial amount; that could not be explained by the mere fact that the Conference had been postponed to 1964. In conclusion, he recalled that at the seventeenth session the Soviet delegation had not voted for the budget estimates for 1963, because it had considered that some expenditures, such as those under section 3, were too high and that others such as the payment of interest on United Nations bonds and certain special missions, were unjustified. It would vote against the supplementary estimates for 1963 for the same reasons.

23. Mr. AGHNIDES (Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) agreed with the representative of the Soviet Union that it was very useful for the Advisory Committee to study the operation and use of staff resources in one or two Secretariat departments every year. The reason why the Advisory Committee had not undertaken such a study in 1963, as it had in previous years, was that the Administrative Management Service of the Controller's Office was making an over-all study of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and the Advisory Committee was obliged to await the results of that study.

24. Mr. CARRILLO (El Salvador) welcomed the fact that for the first time there was a budget surplus which might amount to more than \$1 million, instead of a deficit. The decrease in expenditure was only apparent, however, as the Assembly would later be called upon to approve new appropriations for activities whose precise scope was still unknown. Reserving the right to speak again when those questions were discussed, he supported the recommendations of the Advisory Committee regarding the supplementary estimates for 1963.

25. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Committee should consider the supplementary estimates section by section.

26. Mr. SOLTYSIAK (Poland) said that he would like to make some general comments on the supplementary estimates at a later meeting.

27. Mr. SOKIRKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) felt that in view of what had just been said, it was too early to take up the supplementary estimates section by section; he proposed the adjournment of the meeting.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.