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Chairman: Mr. Mario MAJOLI (Italy).

AGENDA ITEM 49

Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1960 (A/4492, A/4507, A/4508, A/4580, A/C.5/816, A/C.5/836, A/C.5/L.638, A/C.5/L.639) (continued)

United Nations activities in the Congo (ONUC) for the period 14 July to 31 December 1960 (A/4580, A/C.5/836, A/C.5/L.638, A/C.5/L.639) (continued)

1. Mr. DA CUNHA D'ÊÇA (Portugal) said he appreciated that, under the draft resolution of Pakistan, Senegal and Tunisia (A/C.5/L.638), voluntary contributions from some countries would ease the burden on other Member States. That proposal would also have the advantage of establishing a special account for the expenses of the United Nations in the Congo which, in his view, should not be included in the regular budget. But, like the draft resolution of Ireland, Liberia and Sweden (A/C.5/L.639), it implied that all Member States would be obliged to contribute to the financing of the Congo operation.

2. His delegation did not consider that the question under discussion could be solved on the basis of purely technical or administrative criteria. It had serious political implications and, therefore, called for scrupulous application of the provisions of the Charter. The problem was to establish a principle which was acceptable to all Member States and which would be applicable not only to the specific case of the Congo, but to any other similar situation which might arise in the future. Such a principle must take into account not only capacity to pay but, above all, each Member State's responsibility and direct interest in the matter.

3. Requirements for the Congo operation, as recommended by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, totalled \$60 million. Even if

that figure was reduced by voluntary contributions, it still represented a heavy financial burden for some countries. It was against all the laws of logic to argue that expenditure on an action so extraneous to the normal activities of the Organization should be included in the regular budget which, according to the most elementary of rules of sound financial procedure, should be restricted to regular expenses. Since the Congo operation was a consequence of Security Council resolutions, it could not be considered a routine activity of the Organization and, consequently, should not be financed from the regular budget.

4. None of the Security Council resolutions on the Congo contained any provisions regarding the financial implications of the operation. Accordingly, it was necessary to determine by reference to the Charter how the expenses involved in implementing those resolutions were to be apportioned. The only provision which could be applied to the Congo operation was Article 43. That Article seemed to leave no doubt that Member States providing armed forces and other assistance at the request of the Security Council did not automatically assume a financial obligation. The conditions under which armed forces were to be provided by Member States were to be determined by special agreement or agreements to be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members. Such agreements were to govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. It was reasonable to infer that the financial implications of the provision of armed forces at the request of the Security Council would be dealt with in those agreements or in other special agreements concluded for that purpose.

5. The expenses arising out of the Congo operation were, admittedly, United Nations expenses, but they were expenses of an exceptional nature because they ensued from the type of situation envisaged in Article 43 and should, therefore, be financed in the manner laid down in that Article. Furthermore, his delegation did not see how Member States which had no direct nor indirect responsibility in the matter and which had at no time been consulted could be obliged to assume a financial burden resulting from the Congo operation. When the Secretary-General had approached Member States with a view to the organization of the United Nations Force in the Congo, his country had not been consulted or informed, although it had a Permanent Mission to the United Nations. That omission was all the more strange in that Portugal had a common frontier with the Congo. In drawing attention to that fact, he did not wish to imply any criticism of the Secretary-General, but merely to emphasize the fact that his delegation had not been consulted with regard to arrangements for the United Nations Force. It therefore considered that it was confronted with an exceptional activity, resulting from a situation for which its country had had no responsibility whatsoever.

6. Another relevant consideration was that, under its second development plan for the years 1959 to 1964, Portugal was making an intensive effort to accelerate its economic development in order to improve its people's standard of living. It was putting that plan into effect at a time when it was beginning to feel the consequences of its participation with more industrialized and powerful European countries in the European Free Trade Area. A development plan on that scale required the mobilization of all available national resources as well as large foreign investments. For that reason, his Government found it extremely difficult to assume additional international financial commitments. Its efforts to raise its people's standard of living and level of education, and to provide better opportunities for employment in an atmosphere of peace, friendship and racial harmony were nevertheless helping to achieve the high objectives of the United Nations in Africa. His Government had provided all the assistance directly requested by the Secretary-General at the most critical stages of the Congo crisis; it had for instance, assisted in the evacuation of refugees and had provided transportation facilities and supplies of food and medicines. The Congolese authorities and the Portuguese authorities in Angola had been in constant contact and an official mission from Leopoldville had already visited Luanda as a first step towards the conclusion of bilateral arrangements. His Government intended to do everything in its power to increase its assistance to the Republic of the Congo on a bilateral basis, upon request from the Congolese authorities.

7. In his delegation's view, the costs of the United Nations operation in the Congo should be covered by a special fund established for the purpose and financed solely by voluntary contributions from Member States. His Government prided itself on the fact that it had always paid its contributions to the regular budget of the United Nations. It regretted, however, that it could not agree to the cost of the Congo operation being included in the regular budget and that it was unable to contribute to the extraordinary expenses resulting from that operation. For those reasons, his delegation would vote against draft resolutions A/C.5/L.638 and A/C.5/L.639.

8. Mr. JEREMIC (Yugoslavia) said that his country had always advocated the speediest and most effective action by the United Nations to safeguard peace and security, and had supported measures for giving the necessary assistance.

9. It had followed with deep interest and great concern the developments in the Congo from the outset of the crisis in that country. Realizing that, owing to outside intervention, events were moving in a direction which constituted a threat to the independence and territorial integrity of the Congo, his Government had requested on 8 September 1960^{1/} an urgent meeting of the Security Council in order to examine the situation which had arisen and to take appropriate measures. It had played an active part in the discussion of the matter both in the Security Council and at the fourth emergency special session of the General Assembly, and had placed pilots, technicians and the other personnel at the disposal of the United Nations Force in the Congo.

10. His Government believed, however, that owing to the unsatisfactory policy pursued by the Command of

the United Nations Force, the objectives laid down in the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the Congo were not being achieved, with the result that a grave situation was being created in the Congo and the prestige of the United Nations was being seriously impaired.

11. The Yugoslav Government considered that the continuation of such a situation could lead to even more serious consequences. Accordingly, it had stated in the memorandum it had submitted to the Secretary-General on 7 December 1960 that, as a Member of the United Nations, it did not wish "to bear or share, in any way, the responsibility for what is taking place at present in the Congo, in the presence of the United Nations Force and of other United Nations organs" (A/4628). It had, therefore, decided to withdraw its pilots, technicians and other personnel and reserved its right to request material compensation from the Organization for the expenditure incurred as a result of the activity of its personnel.

12. His country had always paid its contributions promptly. It had regularly paid its contribution to UNEF and would continue to support that operation because it was convinced that the Force was carrying out the tasks with which it had been entrusted.

13. Since the United Nations operation in the Congo was an extraordinary activity like the United Nations action in Egypt, it would be more appropriate to raise funds on an *ad hoc* basis, as in the case of UNEF. For that reason, his delegation would support the establishment of a special account for the expenses of the United Nations in the Congo. His country would, however, be compelled to re-examine its position regarding its financial obligations if the Command of the United Nations Force in the Congo maintained its present policy.

14. Mr. CHIKARAISHI (Japan) said that, in his delegation's opinion, the cost of the Congo operation should be included in the regular budget. In view of the unfortunate experience with UNEF, it would be unwise to establish a separate account for that purpose.

15. His delegation considered that contributions should be paid by all Member States in accordance with the present scale of assessments. There were, however, a large number of countries whose financial resources were limited and which might find it difficult to contribute the whole of their assessment. An appropriate formula should be devised which would substantially reduce those countries' assessments.

16. Draft resolution A/C.5/L.638 was acceptable to his delegation with the exception of operative paragraph 1, which would establish a special account for the expenses of the Congo. His delegation believed it was essential to incorporate those expenses in the regular budget, because that seemed to be the best way to secure payment by all Member States.

17. With regard to draft resolution A/C.5/L.639, he could support operative paragraph 1 which would establish a new section in the 1960 budget estimates for the expenses incurred by the Organization in the Congo. He could not, however, support operative paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. The adoption of operative paragraphs 3 and 4 would not help to reduce the financial burden arising from expenditure on the Congo operation for those Member States which were not in a position to pay their full assessment.

^{1/} Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, document S/4485.

18. His delegation, therefore, preferred draft resolution A/C.5/L.638, which took care of the interests of the large number of Member States with limited resources.

19. Mr. MEINANDER (Finland) said that his delegation regarded the establishment and the operations of United Nations forces as a joint undertaking for the maintenance of international peace and security, which was one of the main tasks of the Organization. Responsibility for the financial expenses resulting from such undertakings was one of the obligations his country had assumed in subscribing to the Charter. His delegation realized that the Congo operation constituted a heavy financial burden, but it considered that, as a Member State, his country had an obligation to pay its share.

20. The Charter gave the General Assembly the task of deciding on the apportionment of the expenses of the Organization. His delegation felt that the regular scale of assessment, which was fixed after expert scrutiny of the economic position of each State, provided the most appropriate and equitable basis for the sharing of those expenses.

21. Since expenses relating to ONUC were the result of Security Council decisions, his delegation considered that they constituted "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of the Charter, and that it was logical to include them in the regular budget.

22. Mr. QUIJANO (Argentina) said that his delegation had pointed out at the 806th meeting that the Congo operation was the collective responsibility of all Member States, that the extraordinary activities of the United Nations had to be financed in an extraordinary manner, and that a method of financing had to be found which would make it possible to cover the expenses already incurred and to carry on the operation.

23. The draft resolution of Ireland, Liberia and Sweden (A/C.5/L.639) was therefore unacceptable because it treated the expenditure on ONUC as ordinary expenditure to be included in the regular budget. The draft resolution of Pakistan, Senegal and Tunisia (A/C.5/L.638) was more realistic, because it took into account the limited resources of some Member States, and his delegation would therefore vote for it, although it had some reservations about the mention in operative paragraph 4 of the "regular scale of assessments" as the basis for the apportionment of expenses.

24. Mr. BLOIS (Canada) said that, after much consideration, his delegation had concluded that draft resolution A/C.5/L.639 proposed a better method of dealing with the ONUC costs than did draft resolution A/C.5/L.638. For reasons of principle, it favoured the establishment of a new section of the budget for those costs rather than the establishment of a special account. The United Nations had been set up to deal with situations such as the one which had arisen in the Congo and it was inconsistent with the Charter to regard the resulting expenses as in any way "special".

25. However, his delegation's attitude was also affected by practical considerations. Each Member of the United Nations received early in every year a bill representing its assessed share of the expenses of the Organization for that year plus the supplementary expenses for the previous year. The establishment of a special account for certain expenses relating to peace and security would mean that Members would be faced with two bills which, in many cases, would require two separate appropriations and two separate parliamen-

tary debates. The impression would be created that a new international programme or budget had been established, although the United Nations would merely be carrying out a specific function entrusted to it by the Charter. In that connexion, it was necessary to bear in mind that the Governments of many Member States were becoming seriously concerned over the increasing proliferation of international programmes and budgets both inside and outside the United Nations, all competing for the resources which parliaments were able to make available for international purposes. The bill relating to the special account for the Congo would, of course, be paid, since it related to expenses of the Organization under Article 17 of the Charter, but payment of that bill might possibly be to the detriment of certain other international programmes and budgets.

26. His delegation believed the United Nations should put a stop to the unfortunate practice—which was all too prevalent in the United Nations family—of establishing special accounts. An effort should be made to allay the fears of many Governments and parliaments that international funds were being dissipated thinly and ineffectively over a multitude of diversified programmes and budgets.

27. If it was decided to establish a new section of the budget for ONUC costs, that decision would not be irreversible, as the General Assembly could at any future date transfer such expenses to a special account.

28. Instead of crediting the unreimbursed airlift costs and voluntary cash contributions to miscellaneous income, as proposed in draft resolution A/C.5/L.639, it would be preferable to credit them to an ONUC reserve account or even to the Working Capital Fund. That would make more cash available to ease the acute shortage which threatened to reduce the Organization to bankruptcy early in 1961. However, if that procedure proved unacceptable, the financial crisis would be considerably eased if the sum involved were credited to miscellaneous income in 1962 rather than in 1961. Member States would in effect, be giving the Organization an interest-free loan for one year to tide it over its present acute difficulties.

29. During the general discussion (808th meeting), his delegation had urged that all Member States should contribute a share of the Congo expenses equal to their share under the scale of assessment and it therefore approved operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.5/L.639. However, it did not insist that the scale of assessments should always be used. It had great sympathy for those Member States which found themselves unable to contribute to the full extent required by the scale of assessments when extraordinarily large financial burdens were imposed on the Organization. If the cost of maintaining peace should increase or even remain at its present level, the General Assembly might in future wish to depart from the scale in order to ease the burden on the less economically developed Members. However, he hoped that they would be able to contribute strictly in accordance with the scale in 1960 and to make more money available to the Organization in 1961.

30. Mr. FENAUX (Belgium) said that while the Chairman had rightly requested members of the Committee to refrain, as far as possible, from introducing political considerations into a discussion of budgetary matters, some representatives had made statements

which were so offensive to his country that he was compelled to speak in exercise of his right of reply. In fact, when the General Assembly was considering the need to review its methods and procedures, it might be appropriate to remind some delegations of the rules of behaviour and courtesy.

31. His delegation had dealt adequately elsewhere, particularly in the General Assembly, with the frequently slanderous charges which had been made against his country. However, some delegations had gone so far as to contend that his country had a moral obligation to contribute substantially to the financing of the United Nations operation in the Congo. They had even said that such a contribution would be, not a generous gesture, but an act of reparation.

32. His country firmly believed that it had performed a civilizing role in the Congo. It had brought order, health, education and prosperity to an area where tribal warfare, disease, ignorance and poverty had prevailed. It had left the Congo with a rapidly increasing population, one of the most extensive educational systems in Africa, substantial investments, and a portfolio valued at \$740 million on 31 December 1959 that was now the property of the Congolese State. The Congo's agriculture, industry and services had been among the most advanced in Africa.

33. Repetition would not convert a lie into the truth. It was not true that his country had found the Congo a rich country and had left it poor. It was not true that it had given the Congolese independence only to attempt to take it back from them a few days later. It was not true that it had committed an act of aggression for which the United Nations was being asked to foot the bill. It was not true that it had sought to take advantage of the new State's difficulties in order to resume its former powers and recolonize the Congo. On the contrary, his country intended to respect the sovereignty of the new State and would not interfere in its internal affairs. All the hostile statements which had been made in the Committee had been based on the sophism that Belgium was guilty, that the guilty should pay and that Belgium should therefore pay. As the premise was false, the inferences were also false.

34. Other delegations had contended that Belgium should continue to take a special interest in the new Congolese State. The Nigerian representative had asked Belgium not to forget that the Congo had been its child. Belgium had not, of course, forgotten that fact; in transferring its powers to the new State, it had made provision for the grant of extensive aid, including the assistance of trained personnel, who were to have worked under the exclusive direction of the Congolese authorities and who would have been gradually replaced as trained Congolese personnel became available. Belgium had not left the Congo without making any provision for the future.

35. The question now at issue was not whether Belgium would or would not contribute, but on what basis it could co-operate with the United Nations in restoring Congolese prosperity in the manner desired by the Congolese authorities themselves.

36. The Secretary-General had submitted supplementary estimates to cover the cost of the action taken by the United Nations in the Congo. The second progress report from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo and its annexes (A/4557) had contained criticism of his country, to which

reference had been made in the debate. His Government's reply to those criticisms was contained in document A/4629, which indicated that Belgium, which had always loyally supported the United Nations, was dissatisfied with the latter's action in the Congo. His Government had made a number of suggestions and had indicated the basis upon which it appeared possible for it to resume useful co-operation with representatives of the United Nations. In those circumstances, his delegation would have to abstain in the vote on the supplementary estimates. When satisfactory relations between his country and the United Nations were resumed, his Government would be prepared to reconsider the question of contributing towards the 1960 supplementary estimates, particularly in respect of the civil aspect of the operation in the Congo.

37. Mr. KITTANI (Iraq) said that his delegation intended to comment on the political aspects of the United Nations activities in the Congo under agenda item 85. However, political and constitutional considerations could not be entirely excluded from the examination of the budgetary aspects of that question.

38. The machinery for the maintenance of peace and security, which had been provided for in the Charter, had been based on the assumption that the great Powers which had formed the victorious alliance in the Second World War would remain allied. The whole structure of the United Nations had in fact been based on that assumption. It had been assumed that the alliance would guarantee the maintenance of peace and security. The five permanent members of the Security Council had been given special privileges on that account, but those privileges entailed special responsibilities, as the Canadian representative had pointed out at the 808th meeting.

39. Contrary to the expectations of the founders of the United Nations, it had proved impossible in practice to implement Chapter VII of the Charter. That did not, however, mean that the permanent members of the Security Council had been divested of the responsibilities that were the concomitant of their special privileges. The provisions of Chapter VII and of Article 106 of the Charter could not be interpreted to mean that the permanent members of the Security Council had no responsibility for the financial implications of their decisions relating to international peace and security. His delegation could not agree, therefore, that the cost of the Congo action was simply an "expense of the Organization".

40. The present financial crisis had merely highlighted a long-standing constitutional problem. During the Suez crisis, the Security Council had been unable, owing to the lack of unanimity, to take any decision and had left it to the General Assembly and to the Secretary-General to take action. In the present Congo crisis, it had taken decisions, but had left questions of implementation and financing to the General Assembly and to the Secretariat. The latter organs of the United Nations had therefore had to undertake functions which belonged legally to the Security Council.

41. If the present system continued, it was quite conceivable that the United Nations would be faced with much larger bills than the one submitted for the Congo operation. Future decisions of the Security Council might conceivably entail expenditure of the order of \$1,000 million. Such costs could not be apportioned in accordance with the scale of assessments. A serious reappraisal of the situation was therefore necessary

in the light of the altered constitutional position. The problem was not an easy one and his delegation did not as yet have any specific solution to propose.

42. When the Security Council had authorized the Secretary-General, by its resolution of 14 July 1960,^{2/} to take certain measures in the Congo, it had not been anticipated that the cost of those measures would rise to its present level. A task had been thrust on the Secretary-General and he had had no choice but to carry it out; so far as costs were concerned, he had had no option but to avail himself of the authorization granted under General Assembly resolution 1444 (XIV) to enter into commitments to meet unforeseen and extraordinary expenses. It was important to note, moreover, in that connexion, that that resolution established no ceiling on the commitments which could be entered into with the sole concurrence of the Advisory Committee. Expenditure on such a scale was clearly a matter for the Security Council.

43. He had been surprised at the French delegation's statement at the 813th meeting that, because it had not supported the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the emergency special session of the General Assembly, it could not approve the supplementary estimates submitted by the Secretary-General. In the circumstances, that delegation should surely have opposed the resolutions. Such an attitude on the part of a great Power did not set a very good example to the smaller nations.

44. In his delegation's view, Belgium's intervention in the Congo clearly constituted armed aggression. The three-Power action which had precipitated the Suez Crisis had likewise constituted armed aggression, but the General Assembly had not deemed it necessary to record the fact in its resolutions. The fact that aggression had been committed was equally irrelevant in the present case. The Belgian representative's version of events, however, was not in accord with the picture presented by the Secretary-General and by the executive heads of the specialized agencies. That representative claimed that Belgium had brought health to the Congo; but there was as yet not a single indigenous physician in that country. That representative claimed that Belgium had brought education to the Congo; but the estimated number of college graduates among the indigenous population up to the date of independence varied from less than ten to a maximum of nineteen. That representative claimed that Belgium had brought order to the Congo; the United Nations had seen the result.

45. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had told the Security Council at its 877th meeting on 20/21 July 1960 that the sole purpose of his country's intervention in the Congo had been to protect the lives of Belgian nationals and the honour of Belgian women. Since the United Nations had moved into the Congo, there had been no complaints of injury to Belgians or damage to Belgian property; he wondered how much it would have cost Belgium to achieve that result for itself. Belgium's refusal to channel its action in the Congo through the United Nations ran counter to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and to General Assembly resolution 1474 (ES-IV). That Power's continued and many-sided intervention in the Congo constituted the greatest problem confronting the Secretary-General in that country. The United Nations

could not compel Belgium to pay the expenses of ONUC, but any apportionment of those expenses which failed to take that country's heavy responsibility into account would be unacceptable to many delegations, including his own.

46. It was clear from the foregoing that the ONUC expenses should not be included in the regular budget.

47. It might assist the Committee to compare the action taken by the United Nations in two different crises: that of Suez and that of the Congo. In 1956 the Security Council had been prevented by the veto from deciding upon United Nations intervention in the Suez conflict. Its burden of decision had thus been shifted to the General Assembly, whose rules of procedure ensured that provision would be made to meet the financial implications of every decision; a special account had accordingly been set up to finance UNEF. In the case of the Congo, the Security Council had taken the initial decision; the matter had not been laid before the General Assembly until over two months later, by which time most of the expenditure now under discussion had already been incurred or committed.

48. It had been argued that the inclusion of the ONUC expenses in the regular budget would facilitate the collection of contributions. His delegation was not convinced that that was the case. Even if it was, however, there were several objections to such a step. Firstly, it would set a dangerous precedent: the United Nations would be free to engage at any time in operations involving vast expenditure without prior authorization from the General Assembly. Secondly, the proposal in draft resolution A/C.5/L.639, operative paragraph 1, to establish a new section in the 1960 budget estimates for the ONUC expenses instead of apportioning those expenses among the appropriate chapters showed the artificiality of the idea. Thirdly, the adoption of that course side by side with the principle suggested by the United States—namely, that voluntary contributions to the ONUC expenses should be used to provide a reduction of up to 50 per cent in the contributions of Member States with a limited capacity to pay—would mean using two separate scales of assessments in one and the same budget.

49. His delegation would oppose draft resolution A/C.5/L.639 for the reasons already stated and because the effect of its operative paragraphs 3 and 4 would be to give the five permanent members of the Security Council over 65 per cent of the relief provided by voluntary contributions and waivers of claims to reimbursement; that arrangement would leave little to be shared among the approximately seventy Member States which the United States had intended to benefit from its voluntary contribution and the waiver of its claim to reimbursement.

50. The adoption of the third preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.5/L.638 would have the same effect as operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.5/L.639 and was likewise unacceptable to his delegation.

51. Mr. KIM KHUOAN (Cambodia) thanked the sponsors of the two draft resolutions for their endeavours to solve a difficult problem. Either proposal, however, would impose on his country a financial burden far in excess of its capacity. As he had indicated at the Committee's 805th meeting, Cambodia would therefore have to limit itself to a voluntary contribution to the expenses of ONUC.

^{2/} Ibid., document S/4387.

AGENDA ITEMS 49 AND 50

Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1960 (A/4492, A/4507, A/4508, A/4580, A/4632, A/C.5/816, A/C.5/836, A/C.5/849, A/C.5/L.638, A/C.5/L.639) (continued)

Budget estimates for the financial year 1961 (A/4370, A/4408, A/4523, A/4562, A/4584, A/4588, A/4603, A/4632, A/C.5/815, A/C.5/819 and Corr.1, A/C.5/828 and Corr.1, A/C.5/829, A/C.5/831/Rev.1, A/C.5/838, A/C.5/839, A/C.5/842, A/C.5/843, A/C.5/844, A/C.5/849, A/C.5/852, A/C.5/L.611, A/C.5/L.637) (continued)

Salary scales for the General Service staff at Headquarters and at the European Office, Geneva (A/4632, A/C.5/849)

52. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to the revised estimates for 1960 and 1961 submitted by the Secretary-General (A/C.5/849) in consequence of his action under annex I, paragraph 7, of the Staff Regulations in approving an increase of 5 per cent, effective 1 October 1960, in the salary scales for General Service staff at Headquarters. The Committee had already approved supplementary estimates (A/4492) covering the 1960 requirements for a 5 per cent increase in the corresponding scales for staff at the European Office, Geneva, effective 1 May 1960, but a consequential adjustment was required in the 1961 estimates.

53. The Advisory Committee, in paragraph 5 of its report (A/4632), recommended additional appropriations in the amounts proposed by the Secretary-General.

54. Mr. CUTTS (Australia) said that his delegation would vote in favour of the supplementary estimates, in the amounts recommended by the Advisory Committee, as a measure of justice to a relatively low-paid category of Secretariat staff. The Secretary-General's proposals were based on due consideration and reliable information, and were endorsed by the Advisory Committee.

55. His delegation was nevertheless disturbed that financial proposals amounting to approximately \$55,000 for 1960 and over \$500,000 for 1961 should come before the Fifth Committee and the General Assembly so late in the session. Whatever the reasons for such a practice, it placed the Committee and the Assembly at a considerable disadvantage and would not, he hoped, recur at future sessions.

56. Mr. TURNER (Controller) pointed out that the General Assembly had delegated to the Secretary-

General, under annex I, paragraph 7, of the Staff Regulations, the responsibility for determining when and if an adjustment was warranted in the salary scales of locally recruited staff, and that the Fifth Committee and the Advisory Committee had expressed the hope that the Secretary-General would inform them of his decisions on the subject. In past years, the Secretary-General had taken such decisions relatively early in the year. However, in the past two years, the annual survey conducted by the Commerce and Industry Association had not become available until October. The survey, once received, required detailed analysis, and the Secretary-General found it necessary to check all relevant evidence in order to satisfy himself that a salary adjustment was indicated. If hasty decisions were to be avoided, that could not be done overnight. Moreover, unless the General Assembly wished the staff to be kept waiting eighteen months for a salary adjustment, he could see no alternative to the submission of the relevant estimates late in the session. However, if the Committee would accept his assurance that the Secretary-General had conducted thorough and conscientious inquiries and that the result of those inquiries had been carefully reviewed by the Advisory Committee, it should have no great difficulty in taking the appropriate budgetary action.

57. Mr. CUTTS (Australia) said that he had intended no reflexion on the Secretary-General or the Advisory Committee. Nevertheless, his delegation hoped that in the future the Committee and the Assembly would be given more time to consider proposals of such magnitude. Australia would vote in favour of the proposals in the current instance because it was confident that they had been properly prepared; but the Committee would have to act on them without due reflexion.

58. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation was disturbed to find that the Secretary-General, having quite properly adjusted General Service salaries to the rising cost of living in New York, automatically proposed increased estimates without seeking to meet part of the cost through economies in the existing budget.

59. Mr. TURNER (Controller) pointed out that additional expenses of \$117,500 under section 6 for 1960 had been reduced by saving \$75,000 within existing resources. Thus the Secretary-General had already taken the action urged by the USSR representative.

The recommendation of the Advisory Committee as set forth in paragraph 5 of its report (A/4632) was approved.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.