United Nations
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION
Official Records

FIFTH COMMITTEE, 1320th MEETING

Tuesday, 4 November 1969, at 10.50 a.m.

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

Chairman: Mr. David SILVEIRA DA MOTA (Brazil).

AGENDA ITEM 78

Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the United Nations expenses: Report of the Committee on Contributions *(continued)* (A/7611 and Corr.1 and Add.1, A/C.5/L.994, A/C.5/L.995, A/C.5/L.997)

1. The CHAIRMAN observed that the Committee had before it a draft paragraph proposed by the delegation of the United States of America (see A/C.5/L.994) for inclusion in the Committee's report, a draft text submitted by the Italian delegation (see A/C.5/L.995) to replace the last sentence in the paragraph proposed by the United States, and a draft text submitted by 12 countries (see A/C.5/L.997).

2. Mr. GINDEEL (Sudan) commended the Committee on Contributions for the care with which it had carried out the arduous task entrusted to it by the General Assembly.

3. Turning to the report of the Committee on Contributions (A/7611 and Corr.1 and Add.1), he said that the basic problem was how to establish an equitable scale of assessments based on the paramount criterion of capacity to pay while continuing to apply the floor and ceiling principles. Those two principles had inflicted hardships on the poor countries. The imposition of an arbitrary ceiling on the assessment of the largest contributor automatically shifted the burden to the other Member States; the application of the criterion of capacity to pay was thus upset and inevitably the pressure on the poor countries became more pronounced. On the other hand, the application of the floor principle meant that, irrespective of economic circumstances and hence capacity to pay, no country might be assessed at less than 0.04 per cent.

4. However valid the arguments for the maintenance of the floor and ceiling principles, the fact remained that, generally speaking, the poor and developing countries were contributing to the United Nations budget more than their capacity to pay warranted. Of course, the present terms of reference of the Committee on Contributions gave it powers of discretion by which it granted an allowance to Member States with a *per capita* income below $1,000; its discretion was ultimately the only guarantee against the application of unjust assessments. The question then was whether the maximum allowance currently applied went far enough. The economic realities of developing countries suggested that it did not. Cognizant of that fact, the majority of the members of the Committee on Contributions had advocated a modest increase in the maximum allowance granted to countries with a low *per capita* income. Such action would clearly help to improve the discount system by making it fairer to the countries concerned. It would also reduce substantially the need for the practice of making small downward adjustments in the assessments of countries with a *per capita* income below $300.

5. If, however, a higher allowance was adopted while the assessment of the highest contributor was still kept at its current level, the resulting additional burden would automatically be transferred to countries with a *per capita* income above $1,000, excluding of course the largest contributor. The only way to avoid such anomalies was to revise the ceiling principle so that the largest contributor could pay its share of the new burden. The Committee on Contributions had not deemed it appropriate to take a decision on that question because it considered it to be within the competence of the General Assembly, and had indicated, in paragraph 38 of its report, that further reductions in the assessment of the largest contributor from 31.57 per cent to reach the level of 30 per cent prescribed under its current terms of reference might not be appropriate in the existing circumstances.

6. With regard to the development of a formula for making systematic allowance for the ability of Member States to secure foreign currency, his delegation saw the practical difficulties involved and understood the views expressed by the Committee on Contributions in paragraphs 32 and 33 of its report. Since, however, that factor affected the developing countries' capacity to pay, the Committee on Contributions should continue to take it into account in calculating assessments. In that connexion he was glad to note that the Committee had requested the Secretariat to prepare a study exploring the relevance of international terms of trade for the establishment of improved comparative data on the national economies of Member States, taking into account changes in export prices in relation to changes in import prices. The study should be supplemented by information on the size of the external debt of developing countries, which had risen by

about 14 per cent in the 1960s and which stood at $47,500 million in June 1968 in the public sector alone. The study should also deal with the magnitude of debt service payments, which had amounted to more than $5,000 million on the same date. Clearly that was a problem which would have more pronounced effects on the developing countries' capacity to pay during the coming decade.

7. Since the recommendations proposed by the Committee on Contributions had not obtained the approval of all members of the Fifth Committee, his delegation and others had felt that, instead of directing a draft resolution on the item to the Committee on Contributions, it would be preferable to include in the Fifth Committee's report to the General Assembly a paragraph reflecting the views of the developing countries. That was the purpose of the draft text contained in document A/C.5/L.997, and the sponsors hoped the Committee on Contributions would take it into consideration in establishing the next scale of assessments.

8. Although the text reflected the views of the developing countries of Africa, Latin America and Asia, and not any consensus reached in the Fifth Committee, it was reasonable to assume that it could be adopted by the Committee if it were pressed to a vote. On the other hand, consultations with a number of delegations of developed countries had failed to yield any agreement, and assurances had been given that, in the interval between the current session and the twenty-fifth, the major contributors intended to make a determined and sustained effort to find a remedy for the Organization's financial situation. It had been pointed out that the confrontations which might result if the paragraph were pressed to a vote might jeopardize the chances of success of that crucial endeavour. In that context he had noted with appreciation the statement made by the representative of the United States of America at the 1309th meeting that in the coming year serious efforts should be made to remedy the Organization's financial situation and that the Secretary-General should attempt to negotiate a *modus vivendi* which would put the United Nations back on a sound financial basis.

9. Mr. SEISAY (Sierra Leone) said that his delegation was deeply concerned about an idea which had been expressed in the Committee in a very diplomatic manner, but which was none the less unacceptable to the developing countries, namely the idea that industrialized nations, which made large contributions to the United Nations budget, should have more to say in matters of expenditure than countries making smaller contributions. To allow the rich countries to have the deciding voice in deliberations on economic issues would be an injustice. The same industrialized nations that already exercised great power in the world would then also control the United Nations. Consequently, it was absolutely necessary that the position of the United Nations on that matter should be clarified and restated.

10. Finally, he expressed agreement with the suggestion that the time had come to stop the surveys being made in Africa and instead to urge the practical application and implementation of the findings of the surveys already made.

11. Mr. DAMAR (Indonesia) stressed that the scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations was particularly important to the developing countries which, as in the case of Indonesia, had limited foreign exchange earnings. His delegation commended the Committee on Contributions on its report and said he was glad to see that in considering a just apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations the Committee had taken into account the three main factors of capacity to pay, the ability of Member States to obtain foreign currency and comparative *per capita* income.

12. He agreed with the Uruguayan representative that a more detailed study of the scale of assessments should be undertaken to see whether the scale was adjusted to the economic realities of countries. Like all other countries with a low *per capita* income, Indonesia would like to see an increase in the upper limit for the application of an allowance to such countries. The current ceiling of $1,000 established many years earlier, was becoming more and more unrealistic. The same was true of the current *per capita* relief formula, which should be adapted to the real economic position of each country. The gap between developed and developing countries continued to widen and in current circumstances the maximum allowance should be raised from 50 to 60 per cent.

13. His delegation supported the inclusion of the draft text contained in document A/C.5/L.997 in the Fifth Committee's report on the question.

14. Mr. PETHERBRIDGE (Australia) said he thought that the report which the Committee was to submit to the General Assembly on the question of the scale of assessments should, like the report of the Committee on Contributions, faithfully reflect the points on which there had been agreement or disagreement which had emerged from the discussions. The Rapporteur should be sure to note that there had been unanimity on some questions, while others, such as that of the maximum allowance, had given rise to differences of opinion.

15. At the current stage, however, the Fifth Committee was called upon to take a decision not on the report itself but on a number of draft texts which their sponsors wished to see included in the report. His delegation could accept the draft paragraph proposed by the United States delegation with or without the amendment submitted by the Italian delegation.

16. He thought that the twelve-Power draft should be submitted as a statement of the views of certain delegations only, not of the Committee. His delegation objected to that text, first because it referred only to selected paragraphs of the report of the Committee on Contributions–whereas there were others which dealt with questions on which there had or had not been unanimity–and secondly, because it used the word "desirability", in sub-paragraphs *(a)* and *(b)*, with reference to the raising of the maximum allowance and the raising of the limit for the concession of allowance for low *per capita* income.

17. His delegation felt it would not be accurate to say that the Fifth Committee regarded those changes as desirable. It was true that several members of the Committee on Contributions had been in favour of the increases–although with reservations–but the Committee as a whole had made

no recommendation to that effect. It had acknowledged that the terms of reference and the criteria observed by the Committee were a coherent set of rules and that any change in the existing system should be considered in conjunction with those rules. The Committee noted that the majority of its members had been of the opinion that it would not be appropriate at the current time to raise beyond $1,000 the limit for the concession of allowance for low *per capita* income, because such a change would involve serious problems, such as introducing radical shifts in the scale of assessments, and would give rise to questions as to whether $1,500 would not be too high an upper limit for the concession of relief. He pointed out that if the maximum allowance was raised to 60 per cent, or if that change was combined with an increase in the upper limit for concession of allowance to, say, $1,500, a country might stand to obtain a substantial reduction in its assessment. If such a change in the current system of allowance could mean a gain for one Member State, it could obviously mean a similar gain for other States; thus, each country's gain would necessarily be reduced, since each would have to pay something towards relieving the burden on the others. That was probably how the Committee on Contributions had reasoned in considering the risks involved in changing the allowance formula. His delegation could not agree to the "desirability" of altering the system. If the text proposed in document A/C.5/L.997 was included in the Committee's report, his delegation would see it as meaning, not that the Fifth Committee judged those changes to be desirable, but that the Committee on Contributions would consider the questions involved and then decide whether they were desirable or not.

18. His delegation felt it would be best if the report of the Fifth Committee was limited to a summary of the debates. If a specific paragraph was to be included, it would prefer the text proposed by the delegation of the United States of America, with or without the amendment submitted by the Italian delegation. If it was decided to include the text contained in document A/C.5/L.997 as well, the Rapporteur should indicate in some way that that text did not represent the views of certain delegations.

19. Mr. YUNUS (Pakistan) congratulated the Committee on Contributions on the candid approach it had taken in its report to the problems involved in working out an equitable scale of assessments which would be acceptable to all Member States. The unresolved issues must not, however, be allowed to blur the points on which that Committee had reached agreement, for example those dealt with in paragraphs 30, 31, 33 and 38 of its report.

20. Since the conclusion recorded by the Committee on Contributions in paragraph 31 with regard to the temporary dislocation of national economies arising out of the Second World War had been endorsed by the General Assembly, the terms of reference of the Committee might be assumed to be amended accordingly. In paragraph 33 of its report the Committee stated that it would continue to take into account the ability of Member States to secure foreign currency. In paragraph 38 the Committee expressed its view that it should not pronounce itself on the appropriateness of the ceiling principle, because that was a matter for decision by the General Assembly. The Committee wished to note, however, that in the light of other directives of the Assembly, further reductions in the assessment of the largest contributor from 31.57 per cent to reach the level of 30 per cent prescribed under its current terms of reference might not be appropriate in the current circumstances. That conclusion, reached unanimously by the Committee on Contributions, was particularly important, because it proved that the Committee was aware of the economic realities of the present-day world.

21. The point of view of the developing countries regarding relief for low *per capita* income was neither unjustified nor difficult to understand. All that the developing countries wanted was that the realities of the existing economic situation should be taken into account as fully as possible in the establishment of the scale of assessments. If the gap between the rich and the poor countries increased, in all justice the gap between their respective contributions to the budget of the United Nations should increase proportionately. In the current state of international trade, most of the benefit accruing from development and increased production went to the developed countries. The differences between the *per capita* income figures for the two groups of countries clearly reflected that anomaly and should be taken into account. It could be argued, as indeed it had been by some delegations, that in that situation *per capita* income was the fairest guide, or, in other words, that whoever earned less should naturally pay less. That approach, however, conflicted with the ceiling principle, without which the scale of assessments would have accurately reflected relative capacities to pay, despite the growing gap between rich and poor countries. The ceiling principle, which limited the maximum contribution of any one country to 30 per cent, had however been established by a General Assembly resolution. It substantially modified the basic principle of capacity to pay, and the question of the degree of relief to be given to low *per capita* income countries thus assumed partic 'ar importance.

22. It had been said that the reason for the adoption of the ceiling principle had been that in an organization of sovereign equals, no State should be able to exercise too great an influence, which would be the inevitable result if its financial contribution to the United Nations budget were disproportionate to that of other States. That idea, which seemed sound in the abstract, could hardly be translated into statistical terms. It was difficult, not to say impossible, to say precisely at what level of contribution the influence of a given State might become too great; it was difficult to see why its influence should become intolerable if its contribution exceeded the limit of 30 per cent of total contributions. There was no doubt that the General Assembly had given an indication of the maximum percentage which should not be exceeded by the contribution of any one State. The Assembly had, however, left the Committee on Contributions some scope for the exercise of discretion, which should be used to ensure that the scale of assessments corresponded as closely as possible to the realities of the economic situation. His delegation therefore considered paragraph 38 of the report of the Committee on Contributions to be particularly important, especially as it reflected the unanimous opinion of that Committee.

23. He had hoped that, in its review of the report of the Committee on Contributions, the Fifth Committee would have been able to consider whether the terms of reference

of the Committee on Contributions were still sufficiently precise or whether the time had come to amend them. However, since wide differences of opinion had become apparent, it now seemed that the General Assembly might not be able to give any new guidelines to the Committee on Contributions, although that Committee's report contained a certain number of unanimous conclusions which could have been used as a basis for adjusting the existing terms of reference.

24. The delegation of the United States of America had proposed that at the current session the Fifth Committee should confine itself to including in its report a paragraph (see A/C.5/L.994) which would have the effect of maintaining the *status quo.* After the failure of the consultations between the delegations of the developing countries and the United States and other delegations, a number of developing countries had submitted a draft text in which they outlined their views (see A/C.5/L.997). Those countries had agreed not to press for a vote on their text, on the understanding that the United States text would not be put to the vote either. His delegation could therefore only appeal to the Committee on Contributions to do its utmost to take into account the views of the developing countries as expressed in document A/C.5/L.997.

25. Like the representative of the United Kingdom, he felt that the Committee on Contributions should be left to get on with its job and that it should concentrate on removing anomalies in the scale of assessments. In the general conclusions in paragraphs 47 to 50 of its report, that Committee itself had drawn attention to similar considerations, and the Fifth Committee, having been unable to formulate new guidelines, had no alternative but to rely on the discretion of the Committee on Contributions.

26. Mr. VIAUD (France) said that, of the two drafts now before the Committee, he preferred the text of the United States of America, as amended by the Italian delegation. The text submitted by the twelve Powers had little chance of adoption, because the solution proposed in it had given rise to objections by several delegations both in the Committee on Contributions and in the Fifth Committee.

27. In paragraph 23, sub-paragraphs *(a), (b), (c)* and *(d),* of its report the Committee on Contributions had set out various views and stated that the position set forth in the last two sub-paragraphs had been held by more members than any of the others. The draft text issued in document A/C.5/L.997 advocated the solution proposed in sub-paragraph *(c),* but it took no account of the view expressed in sub-paragraph *(d),* which deserved the greatest attention. Consequently, his delegation was unable to support that text.

28. The advantage of the text proposed by the United States delegation was that it was much more flexible; it did not exclude the possibility of granting reductions to countries with a low *per capita* income, but it implied that, if that were done, the reductions granted to certain countries with a higher income would have to be scaled down. That was the solution which had been adopted hitherto and which–although not everyone had found it satisfactory–had taken account of the difficult situation of certain countries. On the other hand, if the solution suggested in document A/C.5/L.997 was adopted, the reductions granted to the disadvantaged countries would operate automatically and entirely to the detriment of countries whose *per capita* income was greater than $1,000 and which were not protected by the assessment ceiling and *per capita* ceiling principles. That would be yet another exception to the principle of capacity to pay.

29. In adopting resolution 1137 (XII) in 1957, the General Assembly had made it clear that the percentage contribution of Member States would not in any case be increased as a consequence of that resolution. The proposal contained in document A/C.5/L.997 might have carried more weight if the sponsors had specified that the Committee on Contributions should ensure that the contribution of a Member State was not in consequence raised above the level it would have reached if the rules previously adopted by the General Assembly had been applied to the net national product. Although it might seem logical for a country with a high *per capita* income not to receive all the reductions it might otherwise claim, it did at the same time appear to be unfair to increase one State's contribution merely because another State's contribution had been reduced. Arbitrary increases were inadmissible. The solution proposed by the United States delegation, as amended by the Italian delegation, was therefore far more acceptable.

30. However, at the current stage and bearing in mind that the guidelines and resolutions on which the Committee on Contributions based its work together constituted a very fragile structure, it might be more advisable merely to invite that Committee to exercise its discretion to the best of its ability in order to take account of the difficult situation of certain countries more regularly than it had done in the past. By adopting that course it would be possible to achieve better results than by blindly applying a new rule which placed too much reliance on mathematical considerations.

31. Mr. AKYAMAC (Turkey) recalled that, in its general conclusions, the Committee on Contributions had said it was satisfied that the various guidelines laid down for it by the General Assembly had withstood the test of time. The Committee also believed that it could, by the judicious use of its discretion, establish a scale of assessments which both held an equitable balance between the interests of the Member States and reflected the realities of their economic situation. His delegation welcomed those conclusions and was pleased that the Committee intended to pursue the same course in the future. Nevertheless, he could hardly disregard the desire which had been expressed by the majority of previous speakers who had advocated the establishment of a more dependable formula which would enable the Committee on Contributions to rely on more precise criteria in the exercise of its discretion.

32. There could be no doubt that capacity to pay should be the essential criterion in determining the scale of assessments; and *per capita* income, gross national product, the balance of payments situation and the extent to which States were able to secure foreign exchange were factors which should be taken into consideration in determining capacity to pay. The relative weight to be given to each of those factors varied according to the conditions obtaining

in each individual country. In Turkey, for example, where the implementation of the development plan was dependent on the ability to secure foreign exchange, there was no doubt that the balance of payments situation was a vital factor. The servicing of the foreign debt, which represented a heavy burden, had absorbed 25.4 per cent of export earnings during the period 1966-1968. In those circumstance, it could hardly be said that a scale of assessments which did not give due regard to that factor in determining Turkey's contribution to the United Nations budget would be consistent with the principle of the capacity to pay.

33. Similarly, the need to secure currency had obliged a number of countries to adopt special control measures. The rates of exchange adopted for certain transactions sometimes differed substantially from the official rates of exchange, which in turn differed from the free market rates. That was a factor which should be taken into consideration in calculating gross national product and *per capita* income.

34. For all those reasons, the draft paragraph submitted by the United States delegation, as amended by the Italian delegation, and the draft text submitted by twelve Powers were both acceptable to his delegation.

35. Mr. KALINOWSKI (Poland) recalled that in his statement at the preceding meeting he had explained in detail his views on the guidelines and criteria now applied in establishing the scale of assessments. Many delegations had supported the conclusions of the Committee on Contributions and some of them had recommended that the maximum allowance granted to countries whose *per capita* income was below $1,000 should be increased from 50 to 60 per cent.

36. However, his delegation considered that such a measure should not be applied in a manner which would increase the financial burden imposed on countries in the intermediate range, and together with the delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, it therefore proposed that the Committee's report should include a paragraph—as contained in document A/C.5/L.998—expressing the hope that the upper limit for the application of the low *per capita* income allowance would be raised to $1,500 if the maximum allowance was increased.

37. Mr. VIEIRA (Brazil) recalled that at the 1311th meeting his delegation had referred to the need to improve the guidelines used by the Committee on Contributions in establishing the scale of assessments. That view was shared by many delegations and it would have been desirable for the General Assembly to give the Committee on Contributions clear instructions for the establishment of a just scale of assessments, in a resolution based on the conclusions contained in that Committee's report. Since a concensus had not been reached on that subject, the delegation of the United States of America had proposed that instead of submitting the text of a resolution to the Assembly, the Fifth Committee should inlude in its report a paragraph which was aimed basically at maintaining the *status quo.* Twelve other Powers, including Brazil, had prepared another paragraph, which sought to reflect more accurately the views of the developing countries, although in his opinion it responded only partially to those countries' justified claims. He nevertheless hoped that the members of the Fifth Committee would support that text, which represented a compromise.

38. He recalled that in submitting the Twelve-Power draft text the representative of the Sudan had said that some delegations feared that the adoption of that text might jeopardize the forthcoming efforts to solve the Organization's financial problems. Although his delegation was not fully convinced that that fear was justified, it was ready, in a spirit of compromise, to refrain from pressing for a vote on the text proposed by the developing countries, provided that the United States delegation and those of Poland and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic did likewise.

39. Mr. KHALIL (United Arab Republic) said that the general conclusions formulated by the Committee on Contributions in its report were very pertinent, particularly with regard to the differences of opinion about the relative importance of the various factors to be taken into consideration in establishing an equitable scale of assessments and the impossibility of devising a scale that would meet completely all the views expressed by Member States. In view of the complexity of the task of establishing an equitable balance between the interests of Member States, it would seem wise to continue to refer to the basic principle of capacity to pay. Nobody wished to introduce radical changes in the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations, but owing to their difficult position the developing countries hoped that the financial burden imposed on them would be lightened. That had led twelve powers to propose the inclusion in the Committee's report of a paragraph inviting the Committee on Contributions, in establishing the scale of assessments, to give due attention to the desirability of raising to 60 per cent the maximum allowance for low *per capita* income granted to Member States with a *per capita* income below $1,000. That change, which was explained in detail in paragraph 23, subparagraph *(c)*, of the report of the Committee on Contributions, had the merit of being both easy to apply and consistent with the principle of capacity to pay.

40. His delegation, too, hoped that even if the Fifth Committee decided not to include in its report the paragraph in document A/C.5/L.997, the Committee on Contributions would pay due attention to the developing countries' wishes as expressed in that text.

41. Mr. RODIONOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that the number of paragraphs proposed for inclusion in the Committee's report was increasing and that each of them gave rise to objection from various delegations. In the circumstances, delegations should show proof of mutual understanding. In that spirit, his delegation thought that in its report the Committee should merely express its satisfaction with the information contained in the report of the Committee on Contributions. He urged the sponsors of the various proposals to agree either that those proposals should not be included in the Fifth Committee's report or that the report should specify that they expressed the views of some delegations and not those of the Fifth Committee as a whole.

42. He supported the procedure recommended by the representative of Brazil, which would expedite the debate on agenda item 78.

43. The CHAIRMAN suggested that if there were no objections the consideration of agenda item 78 should be suspended to permit consultations on that subject among delegations.

It was so decided.

AGENDA ITEM 74

Budget estimates for the financial year 1970 ***(continued)*** **(A/7606, A/7608, A/7710, A/7726, A/C.5/1230, A/C.5/1231 and Corr.1 and 2, A/C.5/1233, A/C.5/1234, A/C.5/1245, A/C.5/1248, A/C.5/1249, A/C.5/L.990, A/C.5/L.993)**

First reading (continued) *(A/C.5/L.990)*

SECTION 12. SPECIAL EXPENSES *(concluded)* (A/7606, A/7608)

44. Mr. GUPTA (India) said that India's position concerning section 12, chapter IV, relating to the United Nations bond issue, had always been consistent. The expenses incurred in connexion with ONUC and UNEF had never been charged to the regular budget. Since the special accounts opened to cover those expenses had been financed by income from the sale of bonds, the amounts needed to pay the interest charges and the instalments of principal due on the bonds should logically be obtained on the basis of a scale different from that applied for the regular budget. It was true that there was some inconsistency between resolutions 1739 (XVI) and 1874 (S-IV) of the General Assembly with regard to those payments, but his delegation believed that justice and logic dictated that the principles implicit in resolution 1874 (S-IV) should supersede resolution 1739 (XVI): the Organization's interests required it and he hoped that agreement would soon be reached on that matter. For that reason, he would abstain in the vote on the chapter in question.

45. Mr. MULONGO (Democratic Republic of the Congo) said he felt somewhat diffident about mentioning the question of the bonds, whose sale had served partially to finance the peace-keeping operations in the Congo. However, he wished to reaffirm that the operations undertaken by the United Nations had fully achieved their purpose by restoring political stability and maintaining the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo. His delegation therefore appealed once again to all Member States to reconsider their views, independently of their position of principle, and to let themselves be guided by a spirit of international solidarity.

46. Mr. PETHERBRIDGE (Australia) said that his delegation would vote for the appropriation requested under section 12, chapter IV, for two main reasons: first, the United Nations must recognize in good faith the debts it had contracted towards certain Member States and, secondly, if the Committee refused to approve the appropriation under that chapter, it might compromise the success of the consultations on ways of solving the financial problems of the Organization.

47. Mr. HENČIĆ (Yugoslavia) said that his delegation would abstain in the vote on section 12 because of its reservations concerning chapter I, relating to the United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Korea. If the section were voted on chapter by chapter, his delegation would vote against the appropriation requested under that chapter and for the appropriations asked for under all the other chapters.

48. Mr. MSELLE (United Republic of Tanzania) said that, for the reasons given at the twenty-third session, his delegation would vote against the appropriation under section 12, chapter I. He asked for a separate vote on that chapter. He added that his delegation would abstain in the vote on chapter IV.

49. The CHAIRMAN therefore invited the Committee to vote on the appropriation under section 12, chapter I.

The recommendation of the Advisory Committee (A/7608, paras. 261 and 268) for an appropriation of $82,800 under section 12, chapter I, was approved on first reading by 51 votes to 20, with 18 abstentions.

50. The CHAIRMAN in response to the request made by the Brazilian delegation at the preceeding meeting invited the Committee to vote on the appropriation under chapter IV.

51. Mr. TAITT (Barbados) said that his delegation would vote for the appropriation under that chapter since it thought that all Members of the Organization had a moral obligation to provide the Secretary-General with the funds he considered essential.

At the request of the representative of Belgium, a vote was taken by roll-call.

Turkey, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Chad, China, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sweden, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia.

Against: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sierra Leone, South Africa.

Abstaining: United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Zambia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Ecuador, France, Guatemala, India, Kenya, Maldives, Mali, Mexico, Nicaragua, Spain, Sudan.

The recommendation of the Advisory Committee (A/7608, paras. 263 and 268) for an appropriation of

$8,738,000 under section 12, chapter IV, was approved on first reading by 52 votes to 15, with 24 abstentions.

52. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote by roll-call on section 12 as a whole.

The vote was taken by roll-call.

Upper Volta, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Burma, Canada, Chad, China, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sweden, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America.

Against: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Abstaining: Yugoslavia, Zambia, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burundi, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, France, Guatemala, Kenya, Mexico, Nicaragua, Portugal, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda.

The recommendation of the Advisory Committee (A/7608, para. 268) for an appropriation of $9,287,400 under section 12 was approved on first reading by 61 votes to 10, with 18 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.