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Chairman: Mr. Milton Fowler GREGG (Canada).

AGENDA ITEM 19

United Nations Emergency Force (continued):
(b) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force (A/5495, A/5642, A/C.5/1001, A/C.5/L.818/Rev.1) (continued)

1. Mr. LEONARD (Canada) introducing the revised text (A/C.5/L.818/Rev.1) of the joint draft resolution, said that his delegation had been one of the sponsors of the original version (A/C.5/L.818) in the belief that it was a reasonable proposal which would command considerable support from other members. However, while the same formula had gained wide support at the fourth special session and earlier in the present session and while support had been expressed for it on the present occasion, some members had wished to introduce modifications. In order to make their text as generally acceptable as possible, therefore, the sponsors had made certain revisions. It would be noted that Nigeria and Pakistan had joined the original sponsors.

2. A new third preambular paragraph had been added, stressing the desirability of reaching agreement as quickly as possible on a special method of financing future United Nations peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures. Such a method, which in his delegation's view should involve a special scale of assessments, might then be used as appropriate for any existing operation.

3. A new fourth preambular paragraph had also been inserted. It was taken from operative paragraph 1 b of General Assembly resolution 1874 (S-IV), which outlined certain general principles to be followed in apportioning the costs of future peace-keeping operations. The principle it stated was not new, since the criterion of capacity to pay had long been recognized by Canada and many other States.

4. The other changes related to the *ad hoc* financing formula itself. The first tranche had been reduced by \$500,000 and on the balance of \$15,750,000 the rate of assessment for the economically less developed countries had been reduced from 45 to 42.5 per cent. The effect was to reduce moderately the amount for which the developing countries were to be assessed and to request the countries named in operative paragraph 4 to make corresponding voluntary contributions as provided for in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7.

5. The fact that the reduction was moderate was no doubt the reason why it had been possible to reach agreement. But even by moderate steps there was a danger of erosion of the principle that the maintenance of international peace, the primary task of the United Nations, was the collective responsibility of all Members. To guard against that danger, he wished to emphasize that the formula was an *ad hoc* one, which set no precedent that would prevent any Member State, whether voting for it or not, from supporting a different formula at a later date for UNEF or any other peace-keeping operation. It was clear that the formula had a number of disadvantages and was somewhat unrealistic in that it grouped together in two categories countries whose capacity to pay varied widely. The Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations had accordingly been entrusted with the task of studying the possibility of adopting a different formula, to be considered at the nineteenth session. A much better method would be to adopt a special scale for large peace-keeping operations based on capacity to pay and *per caput* income. The Canadian position on the question of long-term financing remained as it had been stated in the Working Group and at the fourth special session: there should be a direct relationship between the total costs of peace-keeping in any one year and the rates of assessment for the economically less developed countries.

6. Although the Committee was concerned only with the financial aspects of UNEF, it was obvious that political considerations had a close bearing on the problem of the amount and the method of apportionment of the costs involved. It therefore seemed in order to suggest that at the political level there should be a continuing reassessment of the goals and methods of the operation. UNEF had been one of the great achievements of the United Nations, maintaining peace in the Middle East. If there were greater awareness of that fact at the political level, the Committee would find much less difficulty in agreeing on an equitable distribution of whatever costs might be incurred.

7. Mr. AHSON (Pakistan) said that from a study of the Secretary-General's reports (A/5495 and A/C.5/1001) and the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/5642) it was evident that UNEF must be kept in operation for some time. However desirable it was that the causes of dissension in the area should be removed, that did not seem to be immediately possible. The result of continuing the Force, however, was a growing financial burden on Member States, which aroused increasing concern in the Committee. Though there might be differences of view in detail, it was unanimously agreed that the financial burden must be kept to the absolute minimum and that a special scale was required for assessing the cost of peace-keeping operations. It had accordingly been decided that the matter should be referred to the Working Group so that it could recom-

mend a solution to the General Assembly at the nineteenth session. His delegation did not wish to prejudice the deliberations of the Working Group, in which it was represented, but it wished to make it clear that it expected the present occasion to be the last on which the Committee would be asked to approve an *ad hoc* formula. Other developing countries had stated their views on the financing problem, with which Pakistan agreed. They were not in favour of one country or group of countries financing peace-keeping or other operations beyond the point that was necessary, but wished all countries to play their rightful role. Harsh realities, however, obliged them to advocate that as developing countries they should bear a proportionately smaller burden, since they needed all the foreign exchange they could get for purposes of national development. The large and developed countries were in a position to pay a higher rate and could also make voluntary contributions. Recognition of those facts had led to the adoption of a lower rate of assessment for the developing countries in the case of the Congo operation and they had nurtured similar hopes with respect to UNEF. The Secretariat study on which the Secretary-General reported in document A/C.5/1001 had not fully met their expectations; it should be possible to maintain a highly flexible and mobile force at less than the current cost. But on the assumption that there would be a large reduction in the near future and that the Force would not be maintained any longer than was strictly necessary, Pakistan was ready to pay its share.

8. The original draft resolution (A/C.5/L.818) had adopted the same financing formula as had been approved at the fourth special session. At that session it had been stipulated that the formula was not to constitute a precedent, but it now appeared to be acquiring that character. The Committee had been urged to approve it once again on the ground that little time remained for reconsideration. But if a better *ad hoc* formula could be found there was no reason not to take advantage of it. With that idea in mind his delegation had taken part in the negotiations leading to the submission of the revised draft resolution, which contained just such an improved formula and which his delegation was happy to co-sponsor.

Mr. Ahson (Pakistan), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

9. Mr. KYLLINGMARK (Norway) said that the reports of the Secretary-General and of the Advisory Committee showed that the continued presence of UNEF was essential to the peace and prosperity of the Middle East. In his delegation's view, therefore, nothing should be done for the time being to limit the functions of the Force or reduce its area of operation. His delegation had, however, noted with interest the suggestions made regarding possible changes in the deployment of the Force and its method of operation.

10. As a sponsor of the original draft resolution, it supported the statements made earlier by the other sponsors. That draft resolution had been based on the principle of the collective responsibility of all Member States for the cost of peace-keeping operations, a principle endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 1854 (XVII), accepting the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice^{1/} on the financial

obligations of Member States, and in resolution 1874 (S-IV), on general principles for the sharing of the costs of peace-keeping operations. The intention of the sponsors had been to find an *ad hoc* arrangement for financing UNEF for the year 1964, pending agreement on long-term arrangements for financing expensive peace-keeping operations. The adoption of the draft resolution, which was based on a formula already approved for ONUC and UNEF at the fourth special session and again for ONUC at the present session, would in no way have constituted a precedent for the discussions of the Working Group on the problem, as was clearly indicated in operative paragraph 3 b. Since, however, certain Member States had found it difficult to accept that formula, the sponsors had reluctantly agreed to amend it, in the hope of avoiding a prolonged debate, which might adversely affect the Working Group's discussions. His delegation was fully aware of the great financial difficulties which the developing countries faced; those difficulties were the reason why their share of peace-keeping costs had been reduced at the fourth special session. Peace-keeping operations, however, were now largely paid for by voluntary contributions from a very limited number of States, including some that were small and not very prosperous. The Norwegian Government, for its part, was prepared to recommend to the Norwegian Parliament that Norway should accept a reasonable share of the expenditure for UNEF, including voluntary contributions, as it had done for ONUC. But the small group of countries concerned could not continue indefinitely to bear a larger and larger share of the cost of peace-keeping operations; otherwise, the principle of collective responsibility would be no more than a sham. The formula contained in the revised draft resolution, must therefore not be interpreted as committing Norway or any other Member State to a position inconsistent with its views on what represented an equitable long-term arrangement.

11. Mr. KRAFT (Denmark) said that his delegation had agreed to co-sponsor the original draft resolution because it was convinced that UNEF must be continued for the sake of peace in the world. The objections to the draft resolution had related primarily to the problem of the apportionment of the costs, a problem which had not yet been solved. He trusted that it would be possible in the near future to arrive at a solution which would preclude any further need for *ad hoc* arrangements such as the one proposed in the draft resolution.

12. In the course of informal discussions, agreement had been reached on certain amendments, which had been included in the revised text. Although his delegation would have preferred the financing formula contained in the original draft resolution, it was willing to accept the amendments. It accepted its financial obligations under the new text subject to appropriation of funds for its voluntary contribution by the Danish Parliament.

13. Mr. QUIJANO (Argentina) said that the present item presented serious difficulties for his delegation, which felt that the decision to be taken involved other than purely budgetary considerations. It fully endorsed the Secretary-General's comment in paragraph 5 of his report on the Force (A/5494) that UNEF was well into its seventh year of deployment in Gaza and the Sinai at a substantial annual expenditure, and that that assumed increasing importance in the present period of financial crisis for the Organization. It also agreed with the Secretary-General that UNEF had not been

^{1/} Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962; I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151.

established as a permanent institution and that consideration might be given to reducing both its size and cost without unduly increasing the risk of a resumption of warfare. The report on the Force (A/5494) had been submitted for consideration to the General Assembly in plenary meeting and was not before the Fifth Committee. However, in document A/C.5/1001 the Secretary-General took account both of the results of the study and of the size and cost of UNEF mentioned in document A/5494 and of the strictly budgetary aspect of the question, a combination which was at the root of the difficulties experienced by his delegation, for in taking a decision on the estimates for the maintenance of the Force, the Committee would also be expressing a view on the Secretary-General's conclusions regarding the size and cost of the Force. His delegation did not feel that it was the best solution to discuss both aspects of the problem together, but it agreed to do so for practical reasons, despite its serious reservations regarding that procedure.

14. His Government considered that the Force had been most effective in maintaining peace in the Middle East. It wished to congratulate the Secretary-General on his direction of the operation and to express its appreciation to those Member States which had provided contingents for the Force. It had hoped that UNEF could be progressively reduced until it became a supervisory mission or some other form of United Nations "presence", the expenses for which could be included in the regular budget; however, the Secretary-General's study revealed that that was not yet possible and that the Force should continue with very little change. His delegation was disappointed at such a conclusion but it bowed to the Secretary-General's appraisal of the situation. It therefore supported the continuation of the Force in 1964, but hoped that the Secretary-General would keep its size and functions under continuing study.

15. His delegation endorsed the recommendation made by the Advisory Committee in paragraph 20 of its report (A/5642) that the UNEF estimates for 1964 be reduced to \$17,750,000, for it was sure that some savings could be effected, even if the Force was maintained at a complement of 4,600 men. The reduction in the size of the Force and the changes in the method of operations might lead to a complete review of the operation as far as the use of equipment, particularly vehicles, and civilian personnel were concerned. It should be possible to achieve a greater rationalization of operational costs and a complete reorganization of the present system of rotating contingents. For those reasons he could not agree with the somewhat pessimistic view expressed by the Controller at the 1052nd meeting; he trusted that \$17,750,000 would be more than enough to cover all the expenses of the Force in 1964 and that it would not be necessary to ask the General Assembly at its nineteenth session for additional funds for the maintenance of the Force.

16. Turning to the question of financing and of the apportionment of the costs, he said that the Assembly had been considering the financing of peace-keeping operations ever since 1956, when UNEF had been established. From the outset, it had been clear that many delegations could not accept an apportionment of costs on the basis of the regular scale of assessments. Very little progress had been made until the seventeenth session, when the General Assembly, in resolution 1854 (XVII), had accepted the opinion of the International Court of Justice that peace-keeping expenses constituted "expenses of the Organization"

within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter, and had recognized that in order to meet the expenditures caused by such operations a different procedure was required from that applied to the regular budget of the United Nations. However, despite the efforts of the Working Group and the debate at the fourth special session, no such procedure had yet been decided upon.

17. He welcomed the fact that several of the previous speakers had supported the establishment of a special scale for the financing of peace-keeping operations, which his delegation regarded as essential, and had expressed the hope that the Working Group would be able to agree on a suitable formula. Seven countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America members of the Working Group had expressed themselves unequivocally in favour of a special scale in the memorandum^{2/} that they had submitted on 15 March 1963 and which had had wide support at the fourth special session. It was hard to understand why in that case, that solution had not been adopted. In any event, his delegation would continue to co-operate in seeking an acceptable solution.

18. As there was still no agreement on a suitable formula, the Organization would have once again to adopt an *ad hoc* solution. Some of the previous speakers had maintained that as the formula contained in General Assembly resolutions 1875 (S-IV) and 1876 (S-IV) had commanded very wide support, it should be used again the present instance. His delegation entirely disagreed with that view. At the fourth special session, agreement had not been reached on a formula for 1963 only; there had been a whole series of resolutions on the financing of peace-keeping operations, which introduced other principles.

19. At the 1052nd meeting the USSR representative had insinuated that the African, Asian and Latin American countries had been "induced" to participate in the financing of peace-keeping operations by the offer of substantial reductions in their contributions. He wished to make the position quite clear. The developing countries had not been "induced" to participate. On the contrary, they had accepted the principle of collective responsibility for the financing of such operations long before there had been any question of reducing their contributions, and the fact that they had provided military contingents was evidence of their support for the operations and of their desire to share in the collective effort for the preservation of peace. In some cases the contingents had been small—Argentina had sent only 150 airmen to ONUC—but other countries, such as India, had sent thousands of men to both UNEF and ONUC, at small cost to the United Nations, because India had not asked for full reimbursement of the additional costs. There had been no question of the developing countries being "induced" to do anything. They had accepted a responsibility which they believed to be the responsibility of all Member States, even before the international Court of Justice had rendered its advisory opinion of 20 July 1962.

20. However, they had always firmly maintained that peace-keeping costs should be apportioned according to quite different criteria from those used for the scale of assessments for the regular budget. They did not wish to obtain reductions of their contributions; what they wanted was an equitable apportion-

^{2/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Special Session, Annexes, agenda item 7, document A/AC.113/18.

ment of costs which would take into account such considerations as capacity to pay, with no ceiling and no floor, the political obligations of Member States under the Charter, and the problems of economic development. Resolution 1874 (S-IV) was very clear on that point; the seven-Power memorandum, which he had already mentioned, was even more so.

21. In the absence of an agreed formula, the General Assembly must adopt a temporary solution for the financing of UNEF in 1964. A commendable effort had been made in that direction by the sponsors of the revised draft resolution, who were to be congratulated on the success of their patient efforts. Commenting on the draft resolution, he welcomed the inclusion of the new third paragraph of the preamble and endorsed the hope expressed in it that the present *ad hoc* assessment would be the last one to be presented to the General Assembly. His delegation supported the financing formula set out in operative paragraph 3 as an *ad hoc* solution reached on the basis of mutual concessions between the developed and the developing countries. The formula was open to criticism—the proposed percentages might be called arbitrary, for instance—but it had applied to the financing of all United Nations peace-keeping operations to date. The arbitrariness of the percentages was one of the reasons why the less developed countries considered a special scale of assessment for peace-keeping operations absolutely essential.

22. Mr. CUTLER (Australia) commended the Secretary-General on his helpful response to the request made by the Fifth Committee at its 1019th meeting for a study of possible ways of redefining and limiting the functions of UNEF with a view to reducing its size and cost. His delegation fully shared the Secretary-General's opinion that UNEF was still clearly indispensable, and wished to express its appreciation of the way in which the Force had helped maintain the peace in that long-troubled part of the world. Given the fact that any change in UNEF must be made without jeopardizing that peace, his delegation was not surprised that the estimated cost of UNEF had not been halved; on the contrary, it was gratified that the 1964 estimates showed such a substantial decrease over the previous year, and trusted that future costs would be still further reduced as a result of proposals at present being put to Governments providing forces for UNEF. His delegation had been impressed by the efficiency of UNEF's operation, and by the way in which the Secretary-General had always managed to achieve the maximum of economy consistent with maximum effectiveness. It noted that the Secretary-General had been able to accept the Advisory Committee's recommendation that the 1964 cost of the Force should be \$17,750,000.

23. The issue now under discussion was not the continued existence of the Force, the need for which was generally accepted; what mattered now was to arrive at a formula for the apportionment of the 1964 costs. His delegation appreciated the efforts of the representatives who had been engaged in negotiations to that end, for it was their patience that had made a decision possible; acceptance of the proposed formula by the less developed countries had been a co-operative gesture in the interests of peace. His delegation would support the agreed formula, although with some misgivings, in a spirit of compromise. But it must be clearly understood that his country had considerable difficulty in meeting increasing shares of peace-keeping costs. Neither must it be automatically

assumed that Australia could go on increasing its voluntary contributions; such contributions had to be viewed in the light of a total pattern of commitments whose scope and cost were keeping pace with Australia's widening international responsibilities.

24. The most important of the guidelines for the equitable sharing of peace-keeping expenses, established by experience and supported by the overwhelming majority of Member States, was the principle of collective responsibility; that principle had been clearly confirmed by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion of 20 July 1962 and had then been accepted by almost all Members. That principle was accordingly no longer open to question. The same was true of another major principle laid down in General Assembly resolution 1874 (S-IV) to the effect that the capacity of the less developed countries to contribute toward peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures was relatively limited by comparison with that of the more developed countries. The formula evolved at the fourth special session had represented an eminently fair embodiment of the principle that the less developed countries should be assisted with the framework of collective responsibility; that formula, a compromise solution worked out between the developed and the less developed States, had been a concession from the original western position. The Working Group, which had painstakingly negotiated that formula earlier in the year in lieu of a permanent solution, was to meet again in 1964; as a member of the Group, Australia would do its utmost to help it achieve a long-term solution satisfactory to all Member States. His delegation therefore considered the present proposal as an interim solution, and not to be regarded as a precedent of any kind; it in no way prejudged the efforts of the Working Group to find a permanent solution.

25. Despite the substantial reduction in the peace-keeping budget for 1964, due in part to the fact that ONUC would continue only for the first six months of that year and in part to measures of economy, the developed countries had agreed, by supporting the present draft resolution, to allow the less developed States a higher reduction than they had when the peace-keeping budget had been considerably heavier. The implication was that there should be some sort of sliding scale: the heavier the peace-keeping costs, the greater the proportionate contribution by the more advanced States. That was a point which had been made by some of the less developed States in the Working Group earlier in the year. To his delegation, the converse seemed equally clear: the lower the budget, the greater was the ability of the less developed States to contribute a larger proportion of the costs. However, in the interests of maximum agreement, his delegation would accept the present formula as an interim solution.

26. Mr. KARHILO (Finland) once again reminded the Committee of the importance his delegation attached to the principle of collective responsibility in the financing of the peace-keeping costs of the United Nations. As the Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated in the general debate in the General Assembly (1225th plenary meeting), his country regarded the establishment and operation of United Nations forces as a joint undertaking for the maintenance of international peace and security, which was the main task of the Organization; accordingly, his Government regarded its share of the resulting expenses as part of

the responsibilities it had assumed in accepting the Charter.

27. His delegation shared the Secretary-General's views regarding the continued indispensability of UNEF at the present time. While the Secretary-General had noted that in his view its functions could not be limited within the existing mandate, his delegation was glad to observe that he had found it possible, on the basis of the requested study, to indicate some reductions in the cost of UNEF through certain modifications in its operation and composition. His delegation hoped that further reductions could be made in the future.

28. With regard to the apportionment of the UNEF costs in 1964, his delegation had seriously hoped that the co-sponsors' original cost-sharing formula would be approved by the Committee. While it expected the Working Group to find a long-range solution during the coming year, the arrangement arrived at during the fourth special session would have offered the simplest and least controversial temporary basis for sharing the costs now involved. However, in the interests of collective responsibility and strictly on an *ad hoc* basis, his delegation would support the revised draft resolution, even though that text had made it more burdensome to his Government. As to his Government's voluntary contribution, that would be determined in due course through parliamentary processes.

29. Mr. MAILLIARD (United States of America) said that although the revised draft resolution now before the Committee was concerned with the technicalities of financing, his delegation tried never to lose sight of the larger purpose, which was not money but peace—both in the Middle East and throughout the world. His delegation reminded itself constantly that experience with the machinery of peace-keeping, the only institutional alternative to war, held out the most realistic hope of bringing the arms race under control. It was therefore fitting to pay tribute to the officers and men who kept watch over peace in the Middle East; his delegation also wished to pay tribute to all nations which had made their forces available to UNEF, and in particular to the seven Member States currently supplying troops. It was fitting that several of those States were sponsors of the draft resolution before the Committee.

30. The plain fact was, however, that the maintenance of the Force placed a burden on all Member States, or at least on those which had met their obligations under the Charter. The Force, which had been intended to be a temporary operation, had now been on duty for seven consecutive years and had cost over \$150 million—a sizable sum for which there could be many more constructive uses. The United Nations had a right to expect that both sides would scrupulously observe the general armistice agreement, for only then would it be possible to reduce the size and cost of the Force.

31. Like many others, his delegation would have preferred to vote for the original text of the draft resolution. At the same time, it had become clear early in the proceedings that many other delegations would prefer a text imposing a smaller financial burden on the developing countries than did even the revised draft. The ensuing negotiations had shown that the cash differences involved were very small and could be bridged by goodwill and by the overriding concern of both groups to assure the continued financing of UNEF. As a result, what had emerged was an *ad hoc* solution essentially unrelated to past pre-

cedents and itself constituting no precedent for the future financing of peace-keeping operations.

32. The dollar amounts which developing countries were required to pay under the terms of the revised draft resolution were very close to those which they would pay had the General Assembly approved the financing formula which a number of those countries had submitted to the Working Group in the memorandum of 15 March 1963. His delegation did not consider that fact to represent any approval or endorsement of the formula contained in the memorandum as applied to the financing of future peace-keeping expenses; the financing formula now under discussion related to a particular operation costing a particular sum of money for a particular year; it did not accord fully with the views of any member of the Committee and was a compromise worked out to meet the needs of today for today alone.

33. The United States would support the revised draft resolution and, subject to its constitutional procedures, would also make an appropriate voluntary contribution in order to assist in the financing outlined in the resolution. He hoped it would receive the overwhelming endorsement of the Committee.

34. Mr. MACLEAN (Peru) said that his delegation supported the continuation of UNEF operations in the Gaza-Sinai area for an adequate period, which would include 1964. UNEF was a decisive influence in the maintenance of peace in that area. Although Peru was geographically far distant from the Middle East, it wished to participate in the collective effort of all Member States to achieve the fundamental objective of maintaining peace. His delegation had therefore been ready to support and even to co-sponsor a draft resolution, but it had not been possible to agree on a text. However, many of the preambular and operative paragraphs had been supported by a large number of delegations during informal discussions. That text placed side by side the two main objectives of the Organization, the maintenance of peace and concern for the present and future development of the less developed countries. The two objectives were closely inter-related, for the future of the whole world, even of the richer countries, depended on peace and on the future of the less developed countries, which formed the majority of all countries in a socially underprivileged world.

35. His delegation could not accept the rigid financing formula contained in the revised draft resolution, which completely ignored the appeals for understanding made, not only by newly independent countries but by countries which had been independent for more than 150 years but were still under-developed. The lack of understanding was perfectly clear from the apportionment formula, which still placed a disproportionate burden on the under-developed countries. Some might think it petty to haggle over a few dollars more or less for UNEF; but if the reduction of their contributions which some countries, including his own, wished to obtain was not very large, neither was the extra amount to be paid by the developed countries as a result of such reductions. Such an arrangement, moreover, would not conflict with the principle of collective responsibility, to which his country fully subscribed.

36. Peru was a country that honoured its commitments and it would meet its obligations, even though the apportionment formula contained in the draft resolution was far from palatable to his own and other

countries. Some of those countries were obliged to assume increasing financial burdens as a result of their membership in the Organization, while meeting with increasing obstacles to the solution of their grave economic and social problems. Although it appreciated the efforts towards a compromise made by the sponsors of the draft resolution, his delegation could not support in any way the formula contained in operative paragraph 3 *b*. In addition, the draft resolution was repeating an old formula, which, as many delegations had already pointed out, was in danger of becoming a precedent, and it did not prescribe what ought to be a mere token contribution by certain States, out of solidarity and for the sake of world peace, in a matter which properly affected other States more closely connected with the area.

37. However, his delegation welcomed the reduction of the amount of \$2.5 million to \$2 million in operative paragraph 3 *a* of the revised text. It also welcomed the third paragraph of the preamble. Nevertheless, it would be unable to vote for operative paragraph 3 *b* or for the draft resolution as a whole if the rate of assessment for each of the less developed countries was more than 30 per cent of its rate under the regular scale for 1964.

38. Mr. PRUSA (Czechoslovakia) said that as in the case of the United Nations operations in the Congo, the question of the financing of UNEF could not be detached from its political context. It was common knowledge that the events in the Middle East had been precipitated by certain colonialist Powers in an attempt to maintain by force their domination over formerly dependent territories; it was therefore logical and just that those Powers should bear the exclusive financial responsibility for the resulting United Nations operations. As his delegation had urged at the fourth special session of the General Assembly, the financing of peace-keeping operations lay within the exclusive competence of the Security Council, as clearly provided in Articles 43, 49 and 50 of the Charter. The conduct of such operations in the absence of specific decisions by the Council was thus a violation of the Charter. The United Nations operations in the Middle East could not, therefore, give rise to financial obligations for Member States, and all attempts to compel Members to accept such obligations despite their strong political and legal objections were inadmissible, as was any step aimed at destroying the principle of great-Power unanimity in the conduct of such operations.

39. Accordingly, while his delegation recognized the principle of common responsibility for the well-being of the United Nations, his Government could not under any circumstances be asked to pay for the misdeeds of others. As in the past, his delegation would insist that the problem of financing the Organization's peace-keeping operations could be resolved only in accordance with the Charter—in other words, by decision of the Security Council. The practice of by-passing the Council, which had been followed in the past as a result of pressure by the Western colonial Powers, was one of the direct causes of the existing situation. His delegation could not therefore support any proposal concerning the financing or maintenance of UNEF.

40. U BA THAUNG (Burma) recalled that Burma had voted for all the resolutions of the General Assembly relating to UNEF and had scrupulously discharged all its financial responsibilities to the United Nations despite the urgent need to mobilize all its resources for national development. Indeed, Burma had taken an active part in the initial establishment of the Force, and as a firm believer in the principle of collective responsibility had supported the principles set forth in General Assembly resolution 1854 A (XVII).

41. Nevertheless, his delegation was bound to point out that the revised draft resolution, although an improvement over the original text, was still far from ideal. The costs of peace-keeping operations should in principle be borne by all Member States, but certain States had substantial public and private interests in the areas concerned and should accordingly assume a greater share of the financial responsibility. While welcoming the introduction of the two new preambular paragraphs in the revised draft, his delegation was not satisfied that the cost-sharing formula in the operative part was either appropriate or equitable. Moreover, dependence on voluntary contributions from the economically developed countries was at best an uncertain remedy, and it was indeed to be hoped that the present formula would be the last *ad hoc* assessment to be presented to the General Assembly, pending agreement on some more appropriate permanent arrangement. With those reservations, and for the sake of peace and security in the Middle East, his delegation would vote for the revised draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.