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Chairman: Mr. Milton Fowler GREGG (Canada).

## AGENDA ITEM 19

United Nations Emergency Force (*continued*):  
(b) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force (A/5495, A/5642, A/C.5/1001, A/C.5/L.818/Rev.1) (*continued*)

1. Mr. S. K. SINGH (India) recalled that UNEF had been established in 1956 at the first emergency special session of the General Assembly to meet an emergency situation which had arisen in that year in the Middle East, the results of which had been felt throughout the world. Since then, the United Nations force which had remained in that disturbed area had helped to safeguard peace and had made any new crisis unlikely. Despite its success, however, to repeat the words used by the Secretary-General in his report (A/C.5/1001), UNEF was "clearly indispensable at the present time to the maintenance of quiet along the Gaza-Sinai line". The Secretary-General also felt that any reduction in the size of the Force or any change in its composition would entail unadvisable risks. Several delegations which had already spoken on the question had, with greater or lesser reluctance, reached the same conclusion, namely, that in the foreseeable future it appeared very unlikely that the elimination of the United Nations Force from the Middle East could be envisaged.

2. Since the crisis which had occurred in the Middle East, other events in the Congo had made the intervention of the United Nations Force necessary. In any event, the Organization had come a long way since, in resolution 1090 (XI), the General Assembly had invited Member States to make voluntary contributions so as to meet the expenditure in excess of the amount originally fixed for the United Nations Emergency Force Special Account. At the twelfth and thirteenth sessions, the Secretary-General, the General Assembly and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions had striven to solve the problems connected with the steadily increasing expenditure of the Force. At the fourteenth session, the General Assembly had recognized in resolution 1441

(XIV) that it was "desirable to apply voluntary contributions of special financial assistance in such a manner as to reduce the financial burden on those Governments which [had] the least capacity . . . to contribute towards the expenditures for maintaining the Force". The reduction had been 50 per cent. The same principles had been maintained at the fifteenth session and reaffirmed in General Assembly resolution 1575 (XV). At the same session, by its resolution 1620 (XV) the General Assembly had established the Working Group of Fifteen on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations to study the long-term aspects of the problem. By the sixteenth session, however, the General Assembly had been faced with the mounting costs of two peace-keeping operations, one in the Middle East and the other in the Congo. That had led it to authorize the Secretary-General to issue United Nations bonds and to grant certain countries a relief of 80 per cent on their UNEF assessments. At the same session, the General Assembly had decided to refer to the International Court of Justice the question whether or not the costs of peace-keeping operations constituted "expenses of the Organization". A dispute on that point had arisen in the Working Group of Fifteen, which had found itself unable to solve the financial, legal and political aspects of the problem. In the meantime the operations had continued to be financed through the United Nations bond issue. At its seventeenth session, the General Assembly had continued that method of financing but it had asked the Working Group, the membership of which it had increased to twenty-one, to study special methods for financing peace-keeping operations of the United Nations, including a possible special scale of assessments. The Working Group had brought the General Assembly to realize that the United Nations peace-keeping operations had attained the status of a permanent fixture in the political landscape, and that, therefore, the practical and financial implications of those operations had to be tackled on a permanent or long-term basis. It had also made it clear that the developing nations were justified in claiming that their capacity to pay decreased as peace-keeping expenditure increased. Although the divergences within the Assembly had tended to diminish, the Working Group had not been able to agree on a special scale of assessments, for the proposed criteria and formulae submitted in the seven-Power memorandum dated 15 March 1963 <sup>1/</sup> still caused some apprehension. The general view had been that for the second half of 1963 the operations should be financed on an *ad hoc* basis and that it would not be timely to reopen problems which the United Nations bond issue had failed to solve. It had therefore been in a conciliatory spirit that the less developed countries had accepted an *ad hoc* solution at that time and that those of them which, prior

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Special Session, Annexes, agenda item 7, document A/AC.113/18.

to the issue of the United Nations bonds, had been given the benefit of an 80 per cent rebate, had agreed to pay a share which was considerably above that percentage. In doing so, they had had the consolation of thinking that they were voting the Congo assessments for the last time and that the General Assembly had upheld certain principles to serve as guidelines for the sharing of the costs of future peace-keeping operations. That had been a major gain and it was to be hoped that those principles would be applied in the not-too-distant future. Unfortunately, early in the present session, because of the situation in the Congo, the General Assembly had accepted an assessment formula according to which the share of the developing countries had been increased and which did not pay much regard to the principles proclaimed in resolution 1874 (S-IV). In a statement, made at the 1015th meeting, the Indian delegation had made very clear that it did not consider that formula a substitute for the proposals in the resolution.

3. The Indian delegation welcomed the fact that the recent informal discussions among representatives of developing countries had led to the presentation in the revised draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.5/L.818/Rev.1) of a formula which was slightly different from the one previously adopted for the ONUC assessments. The parties concerned had striven to achieve the same results as could have been obtained if the formula put forward in the seven-Power memorandum had been applied. Now that the developed countries had gone a certain way towards accepting the principles set out in that document and in General Assembly resolution 1874 (S-IV), there were grounds for hoping that agreement could shortly be reached on a special scale of assessment for peace-keeping operations. To those delegations which felt that the cost of peace-keeping operations should be apportioned by the Security Council, he could say that it would indeed be difficult for the 100 countries which were not members of the Council to accept an assessment in which they would have had no say. Should the members of the Security Council agree to share the financial burden among themselves, the other Member States would no doubt be very happy, but it must be acknowledged that as the costs had to be shared among all the Members of the Organization, it was for all Member States to decide how they should be apportioned.

4. In conclusion, he recalled the role his country had played in peace-keeping operations. Besides supplying the largest contingent of troops, it had so far paid almost \$2.1 million towards the maintenance of UNEF and bought United Nations bonds to the amount of \$2 million; in addition, it had agreed to rotate its troops annually only, thus further reducing the cost of the operation. In the light of those comments, the Indian delegation would vote for the revised draft resolution.

5. Mr. YOKOTA (Japan) said that his Government supported the continuation of UNEF, although it did not wish to see it become a permanent institution of the United Nations.

6. As the Secretary-General had said, the Force was indispensable to the maintenance of quiet along the Gaza-Sinai line. Indeed, the quiet of the whole world was at stake, for a small brush fire, however limited, might at any time grow into a world conflagration. The maintenance of UNEF was therefore the concern of all Member States, large or small,

rich or poor. The principle of the collective responsibility of Member States had been firmly established at past sessions of the General Assembly. The only problem which remained to be solved was the method of apportioning the costs of peace-keeping operations. It had emerged that special consideration must be given to the limited capacity to pay of developing countries. The difficulty was to determine the extent of the reduction for those countries. That question should be referred to the Working Group, which would be meeting shortly. Pending a solution, the initial draft resolution (A/C.5/L.818) based on resolution 1875 (S-IV) of 27 June 1963, had seemed a very prudent measure. The Japanese delegation had been prepared to support it, even though the June formula was not entirely satisfactory to the Japanese Government since it would have increased the share of certain Member States and was therefore questionable from the point of view of the principle of collective responsibility. The revised draft resolution (A/C.5/L.818/Rev.1) sought to alleviate still further the burden of the less developed countries, but the Japanese delegation would support it in a spirit of accommodation and compromise, as an *ad hoc* and interim measure.

7. Mr. CALEVRAS (Greece) said that the maintenance of peace was one of the principal functions of the Organization. Morally, therefore, all Member States were collectively responsible for carrying out a task which was so vital for humanity. They were likewise bound to contribute to its financing, within the limits of their means, particularly when the situation called for a peace-keeping operation. It was in that spirit that the report of the Secretary-General (A/C.5/1001) must be regarded, especially when he stressed that the Force was at present indispensable for the maintenance of order. He wished to take the opportunity to express his gratitude to all the countries which had made contingents available to UNEF.

8. Regarding the financial aspect of the maintenance of the Force, it was encouraging to see that the Secretary-General was continuing his efforts to find a solution. His delegation shared the views expressed in the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/5642) and was ready to support any equitable financing formula. It would vote for the revised draft resolution, although it did not in its view represent the ideal solution, on the understanding that it was an *ad hoc* arrangement and that the proposed apportionment did not constitute a precedent.

9. Mr. NOGUEIRA BATISTA (Brazil) said that since his delegation had set forth its position regarding the financing of peace-keeping operations in detail during the debate on the financing of ONUC (1014th meeting), he would confine himself to considering the revised draft resolution, which was the fruit of long and delicate negotiations between the developed and the developing countries. Brazil had taken part in those negotiations, but could not approve the formula in which they had resulted, for it differed very little from the one adopted in June 1963. While it fully appreciated the effort at compromise which the draft resolution represented, Brazil felt that it would compel the under-developed countries to depart too far from their original position to the effect that a special scale of assessments should be set up for the costs of peace-keeping operations, such costs being essentially the responsibility of the most developed countries, and in particular of the permanent members of the Security Council.

10. Although it had placed funds and even troops at the disposal of the Force from the very start, Brazil could thus not approve the revised draft resolution, which was incompatible with the position it had always upheld in the Working Group and in the Fifth Committee.

11. Mr. SANU (Nigeria) regretted to say that the Secretary-General's report (A/C.5/1001) had fallen a little below his delegation's expectation, for instead of proposing a radical reduction in the costs of UNEF, the Secretary-General concluded that the Force was indispensable at the present time and that there was no workable method of reducing substantially the number of troops involved. In other words, the Committee was asked to accept the maintenance of UNEF on a permanent or semi-permanent basis.

12. It might at least have been expected that the Secretary-General would attempt to lower the cost of the operation as much as possible; but there again his delegation believed that the cost estimates he had submitted were rather high and the reductions suggested by the Advisory Committee rather modest. While accepting the fact that the maintenance of UNEF was essential for the preservation of peace and security in the Middle East, Nigeria believed that there were two ways of reducing the cost of the operation: first, to reduce the burden on the United Nations constituted by reimbursement of extra and extraordinary costs relating to the pay and allowances of contingents, which represented almost half the total cost of the Force; secondly, by lengthening the term of duty beyond the six-month period at present applicable to certain contingents. Efforts must be made to achieve economies in those two areas, and his delegation unreservedly supported the view expressed in that regard by the Advisory Committee in paragraphs 17 and 18 of its report (A/5642).

13. He was happy to note that the Secretary-General intended to continue his negotiations with the countries which had troops in the Gaza Strip, and hoped that he would include in his negotiations all other countries which were directly or indirectly associated with the operations of UNEF. The reservations which his delegation had just expressed should not be taken as a sign of ingratitude to all those who had been helping out in the operation. Nigeria, which had participated and continued to participate in the Congo operation, knew that no amount of reimbursement could compensate for the lives of individuals who took upon themselves the task of maintaining international peace and security; it therefore joined the United States representative (1056th meeting) in paying homage to all the countries which in the past seven years had made troops available to UNEF. But the Committee must never lose sight of the Organization's financial difficulties, and must spare no effort to reduce expenditure wherever possible.

14. If, despite those reservations, Nigeria was one of the sponsors of the revised draft resolution, the first and most important reason was that it had always accepted the principle of collective responsibility so far as peace-keeping operations were concerned. Secondly, the draft resolution had not departed substantially from the assessment formula appearing in the memorandum of 15 March 1963, which had been drawn up by the African-Asian and Latin American countries in the Working Group. The advisory opinion

of the International Court of Justice<sup>2/</sup> had made it quite clear that although peace-keeping expenses were the collective responsibility of all Member States, that did not in any way mean that a special scale of assessments should not be adopted for the apportionment of those expenses.

15. His delegation had taken part in the work of the Working Group because it was convinced that the provisionally adopted system of financing should not constitute a precedent for the future. It was therefore particularly happy to note the contents of the third and fourth preambular paragraphs of the revised draft resolution.

16. Although the revised draft resolution appeared to be very close to the seven-Power memorandum, the latter text had contained certain principles that the developing countries considered basic to any discussion of the financing of peace-keeping operations; for that reason the formula contained in the draft resolution now before the Committee could only be regarded as a provisional compromise. His delegation had none the less chosen to co-sponsor the draft in order to express its confidence in the United Nations, which had a significant role to play in the maintenance of international peace and security. He paid tribute to the spirit of compromise displayed by the delegations of Canada, Denmark, Norway and Sweden and hoped that they did not regard the draft resolution as a victory for any one group of countries, but rather as a victory for common sense and the ideals which all peoples held dear.

17. Mr. KOURANY (Panama) said that he could not support the revised draft resolution because Panama, which did not maintain an army, felt that the financial burden imposed on it by its contribution to UNEF over the past seven years would henceforth be too heavy. Such financial obligations must not be prolonged indefinitely; moreover, Panama needed all its resources for its own economic development and basic social development programmes.

18. Mr. GANEM (France) agreed with the Secretary-General that the presence of the Emergency Force along the Gaza-Sinai line still remained an important factor in the maintenance of peace in the Middle East. That was why the French Government had recently elected to make a sizable voluntary contribution to the cost of the Force in 1963, over and above its regular assessment.

19. However, at the fourth special session, France had been unable to support resolution 1875 (S-IV), since operative paragraphs 4 and 5 of that resolution had contained provisional arrangements of an arbitrary nature. Draft resolution A/C.5/L.818/Rev.1 repeated the same provisions in even worse form, and therefore gave rise to the same reservations. Despite the excellent intentions of its sponsors, that text did not in any way constitute progress towards a lasting solution of the financial difficulties which had faced the United Nations since 1958, the year in which the Secretary-General had first had to seek authority to resort to borrowing and to the various funds in his care in order to enable the Organization to meet its financial obligations. The French delegation could not, therefore, support the revised draft resolution.

<sup>2/</sup> Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962; I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151.

20. Mr. ALLENDE (Chile) recalled that in 1956 his country had favoured the creation of UNEF, which had represented the best means of preserving peace in the Middle East, and that it had never ceased to support the Force since that time. As far as the financing of that operation was concerned, his delegation, while fully recognizing the validity of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 20 July 1962, considered that a more equitable formula from the standpoint of the developing countries should be worked out in the near future. His delegation would vote for the revised draft resolution, which represented a compromise and took into account the principles upheld by many of the developing countries, as had already been pointed out by the Argentine representative at the 1056th meeting.

21. Mr. MARTINEZ (Venezuela) said that at the fourth special session (993rd meeting) his delegation had expressed a strong desire to work out a definitive formula for financing the peace-keeping operations in the Middle East. Despite the progress made, however, the Organization was still at the stage of *ad hoc* formulas. His delegation would support the revised draft resolution because it was based on acceptable principles and formulae, but it hoped that the present occasion was the last time that the General Assembly would be asked to approve the *ad hoc* formula and that the Working Group would be able to recommend to the Assembly, at its nineteenth session, an equitable special scale for the apportionment of peace-keeping costs.

22. His delegation wished to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee for their reports on the matter.

23. Mr. ALVAREZ TABIO (Cuba) said that since his Government's position on the question of the financing of peace-keeping operations was well known, he would merely state briefly once again that, from a legal standpoint, his delegation could not support the revised draft resolution. The issue was not the continuation or withdrawal of UNEF, the total cost of the operation or the manner of apportioning the cost, but a matter of principle. The Charter clearly provided that the Security Council had exclusive responsibility for all decisions concerning the maintenance of peace and for the financial implications of those decisions. Article 43 was quite unequivocal in that respect. Consequently, his delegation could not support a draft resolution which would transfer prerogatives of the Security Council to the General Assembly and would not consider itself bound by any decision that might be taken regarding the illegal financing of such operations.

24. Mr. ZALAMEA (Colombia) said that he would vote in favour of the revised draft resolution in a spirit of conciliation and of solidarity with other Member States, having in mind, also, the long negotiations of which it was the outcome. Nevertheless, the formula provided for in the text did not fully satisfy his delegation, for two reasons: firstly, the rate of 42.5 per cent applicable to the assessment rate for the economically less developed States under operative paragraph 3 (b) was too high, if allowance was made not only for the burden on those countries of their own economic and social development, but also for their unfavourable balance-of-payments position; secondly, an emergency force must by definition be of a temporary nature. While recognizing the practical reasons why the Force had been transformed into a quasi-permanent organ, and without wishing to go into

political considerations, his delegation considered that the Secretary-General should, from a purely administrative point of view, consider how UNEF might be reduced to a mere token force. Like the United States representative, he considered that the \$150 million already spent on UNEF could have been invested in a manner more to the benefit of the world community. Colombia hoped that the parties concerned, showing a spirit of solidarity and conciliation equal to that which had reigned during the working out of the *ad hoc* financing formula at present before the Committee, would arrive at an agreement on the political level which would make it possible radically to reduce the strength of the Emergency Force.

25. Mr. CICANOVIC (Yugoslavia) said that his delegation's position was, above all, that the Organization's role in the maintenance of international peace and security should be established as firmly as possible. It was for that reason that Yugoslavia had supported UNEF, not merely by paying contributions, but also by providing troops and equipment. It had done so, because it was convinced that the Force helped to keep the peace in the Middle East. For those same reasons, it would support draft resolution A/C.5/L.818/Rev.1.

26. Mr. SCHAAPVELD (Netherlands) said that in his country's view, the continuation of UNEF was essential to peace in the unstable Middle East region. His Government was ready to pay its share of the costs of that necessary operation, as it always had done. However, the practical application of principles, even such important ones as collective responsibility and capacity to pay, remained extremely difficult. The Netherlands hoped that the Working Group would succeed in devising a formula which would be equitable for both the developing and the developed countries and would make it possible to do without voluntary contributions by establishing a very refined special scale.

27. Pending the existence of such a formula, it had proved possible, in June 1963, after six weeks of negotiations, to arrive at an *ad hoc* compromise formula, which was undoubtedly the best one possible. His delegation did not resent the fact that the formula now submitted to the Committee, by reducing somewhat the share of the under-developed countries, increased that of the developed countries, but it was concerned at the fact that it had been thought possible to improve in a matter of days and in an arbitrary manner a formula that had been so carefully worked out and it feared that such a procedure might complicate the task of the Working Group. However, it welcomed the presence of an African country and an Asian country among the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.5/L.818/Rev.1, despite the fact that it did not entirely meet their hopes, and it would vote in favour of it, in the hope that the moderation which most delegations had shown would facilitate the work of the Working Group.

28. Mr. WEI (China) said that, at the 1053rd meeting, he had stated his delegation's position on the question of principle. It appreciated the efforts of those representatives who had sought to work out a solution that would satisfy most Member States. It also wished to pay a tribute to the developed countries which had agreed to pay a larger contribution in order to lighten the financial burden on the economically less developed countries. The formula put forward in the revised draft resolution did not exactly fulfill the expectations of the Chinese delegation, but it was closer to what it

had had in mind. His delegation would therefore vote in favour of the revised draft resolution.

29. Mr. EBAKISSE (Cameroon) said that his delegation's position on the problem of the method of financing peace-keeping operations, which was well known, remained unchanged. It had, however, been disappointed to find that the cost of the peace-keeping operations in the Middle East had not been reduced as much as it had hoped. It had no doubt about the need to continue the Force, but it hoped that the parties concerned would co-operate with UNEF so that lasting peace could be established in the Gaza strip.

30. He also wished to congratulate the sponsors of the revised draft resolution on their efforts to reach a compromise. That text only partly satisfied the Cameroonian delegation, but in the present circumstances it was the only solution which would have the support of a large majority. Furthermore, it embodied two principles in which Cameroon believed, namely the principle of collective responsibility for peace-keeping operations and the principle that the economically developed countries were able to pay relatively larger contributions and that the economically less developed countries had a relatively smaller capacity to contribute to the cost of such operations. He also noted with satisfaction that the sponsors of the draft resolution expressed the hope that the present *ad hoc* assessment would be the last one to be presented to the General Assembly. Like them, it hoped that the Working Group would be able to work out a special method for the equitable sharing of the costs of peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditure. Consequently, despite certain sizable reservations concerning the assessment formula contained in the draft resolution, his delegation would vote in favour of the latter.

31. Mr. ZELKO (Hungary) observed that the establishment of UNEF had been an emergency measure necessitated by acts of aggression. Seven years after its establishment, UNEF continued to be a source of financial difficulty for the United Nations and a means for certain States to violate the basic provisions of the Charter. It should not be forgotten that the Charter conferred on the Security Council the exclusive power to make arrangements concerning the maintenance of international peace and security.

32. His delegation was concerned to note that in paragraph 4 of the Secretary-General's report (A/C.5/1001) it was stated that UNEF "continues to provide valuable experience in the organization and conduct of all United Nations peace-keeping activities". If that was so, there was little hope that the military operations could be terminated in the near future; yet that was what the interests of the United Nations demanded.

33. As far as the financial consequences of UNEF were concerned, his delegation maintained the view that the expenses should be borne by those who had caused the conflict. In his view, the method of apportioning the costs which was proposed in the draft resolution before the Committee had been worked out arbitrarily and unscientifically. For all those reasons, his delegation would vote against the Advisory Committee's recommendation (A/5642, para. 20) for the appropriation of \$17,750,000 for the operations of the Force for 1964.

34. Mr. FERNANDEZ LONGORIA (Spain) said that his delegation approved the Secretary-General's suggested changes in the method of operations and composition of UNEF. However, it could not approve the draft resolution before the Committee because the text did not fully reflect the general principles contained in resolution 1874 (S-IV), which Spain had approved in June 1963.

35. Mr. BENDER (United States of America) proposed that the Committee should postpone voting on the draft resolution until the following meeting.

*It was so decided.*

#### FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF DRAFT RESOLUTION IV SUBMITTED BY THE FOURTH COMMITTEE IN DOCUMENT A/5673 ON AGENDA ITEMS 49, 50, 51, 52, 53 AND 54\* (A/C.5/1006)

36. The CHAIRMAN stated that according to the note by the Secretary-General (A/C.5/1006, para. 10) if the General Assembly adopted draft resolution IV recommended by the Fourth Committee in its report (A/5673, para. 28), it would have a choice of two methods of financing; either to make special provision under section 12—Special expenses of the budget or to authorize the Secretary-General to meet commitments under the terms of paragraph 1 of the General Assembly resolution relating to unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for the financial year 1964. The Secretary-General suggested that in either case the provision should not exceed a maximum of \$50,000.

37. Mr. AGHNIDES (Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) said that the Advisory Committee, having considered the Secretary-General's report, had concluded that no precise estimate of the financial implications of the Fourth Committee's draft resolution could be presented at that stage. In the circumstances, the Advisory Committee recommended that the Fifth Committee should inform the General Assembly that in the event of the adoption of the draft resolution, the Secretary-General should be requested to make use as fully as possible of the existing United Nations programmes of technical co-operation, in particular the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the United Nations Special Fund; on the other hand, to the extent that funds might be required for that programme from the regular budget, the Secretary-General should seek the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee to meet such commitments up to a maximum of \$50,000 under the terms of the resolution relating to unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for the financial year 1964.

38. Mr. LOURENÇO (Portugal) said that his delegation, in keeping with the position of principle it had adopted ever since the question had been placed on the Assembly's agenda, had voted against the draft resolution recommended by the Fourth Committee and would vote against any recommendation concerning the financial implications of that decision. Its attitude did not derogate from its respect for the members of the Fifth Committee, who had always shown complete objectivity. It was out of regard for that spirit of objectivity that his delegation felt it imperative to

\*Special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration: report of the Secretary-General.



place before the Committee certain facts which ought to be taken into account.

39. It was difficult to understand how the authors of the draft resolution had concluded that only few applicants from Territories under Portuguese administration had the necessary qualifications enabling them to enter institutions of higher education. It was certainly not as the result of visits to those Territories, for his Government had in vain, for over a year, been inviting qualified representatives of African and other States to ascertain on the spot what was the situation in those territories, particularly as regards the educational facilities available to the population. It was even more regrettable that the sponsors of the draft resolution had apparently ignored the evidence that had been published in recent years concerning living conditions in the Portuguese African provinces. Apart from the information provided by the Portuguese Government, many journalists and other impartial foreign observers had visited the Territories and had published their impressions in the Press. There were also reports from some of the specialized agencies of the United Nations. On the whole, those published findings did not justify the conclusions of the sponsors of the draft resolution recommended by the Fourth Committee.

40. In July 1962, WHO had sent a commission of experts to visit the Territories under Portuguese administration; after investigations lasting some weeks, the commission had issued a comprehensive report on the medical services and educational facilities available there.<sup>3/</sup> The WHO experts had reported that in Portuguese Guinea there were 2 institutions providing secondary education—a lycée and a commercial and industrial school—for 544,690 inhabitants. During the school year 1960-1961, 378 students had completed their secondary studies in those two establishments. The experts had noted that students who obtained good marks in those schools could obtain scholarships for university studies in Portugal, and they had listed the bodies which granted those scholarships. In Angola, the WHO experts had found that there were 7 State lycées, 42 privately-run State-assisted secondary schools, and 15 technical and vocational schools. During the year 1961-1962, those schools had a total of 13,578 students. In 1962, the number of State lycées had increased to 9. As in the case of Portuguese Guinea, pupils from the secondary and technical schools could obtain scholarships for university studies in Portugal, and travel grants were available to them. In Mozambique, there were 29 secondary schools and 18 commercial schools and the students were provided, under similar conditions, with scholarships and travel facilities. The number of scholarships awarded to Mozambique students had been 104 in 1960-1961 and 110 in the following year. Since then, the situation had further improved: in October 1963, 2 universities had been opened, one in Angola and the other in Mozambique.

41. It was therefore clear how unrealistic were the demands made by the authors of the draft resolution recommended by the Fourth Committee. It was regrettable that they had taken no account of the strenuous efforts which the Portuguese people had made in the field of overseas education. His delegation would be unable to support any recommendation relating to the financial implications of the draft resolution proposed by the Fourth Committee and wished to enter a reser-

vation with regard to any additional appropriation which might be included in the Organization's 1964 budget.

42. Mr. AKUDE (Ghana) said that the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration was well-known to all Member States, since it had been the subject of discussion in both the Fourth Committee and the Security Council. Unfortunately, as evidenced by the information provided by refugees from those Territories, the reality was very different from the description that had just been given by the representative of Portugal. The latter's statements could not deceive Member States, and particularly the African States which were well aware that the level of education in the Territories under Portuguese administration was one of the lowest in Africa. Portugal should in fact be grateful to the United Nations, which was trying to do for the populations concerned what the Portuguese Government had failed to do. He was confident that the Fifth Committee, like the Fourth Committee and the Security Council before it, would be able to see the true situation behind the Portuguese delegation's statements.

43. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the Advisory Committee's recommendation was solely concerned with informing the General Assembly of the financial implications of a decision which another Committee had recommended the General Assembly to adopt. As was customary in such a case, the Fifth Committee should refrain from passing judgement on the substance of the decision.

44. Mr. SANU (Nigeria) was surprised that the Chairman had not interrupted the statement by the Portuguese representative, who had introduced points which were irrelevant to the discussion in the Fifth Committee, as the Chairman himself had rightly pointed out. The standard of living in Portugal was much too low for that country to be able properly to oppose the granting of technical assistance by the United Nations to under-developed countries or territories.

45. Mr. ULANCHEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) fully agreed with the remarks made by the representatives of Ghana and Nigeria. He wished to remind the Committee that the Fourth Committee and the Security Council had been able to examine thoroughly the detailed statistics which they had received on the situation in the Portuguese colonies. The USSR was one of the countries which was making scholarships available to indigenous inhabitants of the Territories under Portuguese administration. As regards assistance to refugees residing in countries or territories other than the Territories under Portuguese administration, his delegation approved the Advisory Committee's recommendation in principle. It considered, however, that such assistance should be provided under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund, and that no expenditure on that item should be included in the regular budget. Subject to that observation, his delegation would vote in favour of the Advisory Committee's recommendation.

46. Mr. LOURENÇO (Portugal), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that he understood the sentiments which prompted the representatives of Ghana and Nigeria. However, he wished to stress that the information he had given was taken from a report

<sup>3/</sup> See the statement made subsequently by the representative of WHO (1060th meeting, para. 12).

recently issued by WHO, which could not be suspected of political propaganda. As regards the Fourth Committee, it had its own methods of discussion, which he would leave the Committee to judge.

47. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Advisory Committee's recommendation, as stated in the course

of the meeting by the Chairman of the Advisory Committee.

*The Advisory Committee's recommendation (see para. 37 above) was adopted by 65 votes to 1, with 1 abstention.*

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.