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**FOURTH SPECIAL SESSION**

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*Chairman:* Mr. Jan Paul BANNIER  
(Netherlands).

**AGENDA ITEM 7**

Consideration of the financial situation of the Organization in the light of the report of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations (A/5187, A/5274, A/5407 and Corr.1, A/5416, A/5421, A/C.5/974, A/C.5/975, A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1, A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1, A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1, A/C.5/L.785 and Add.1, A/C.5/L.786, A/C.5/L.787/Rev.1, A/C.5/L.788, A/AC.113/1-27) (continued)

1. Mr. RAMANI (Federation of Malaya) introduced draft resolution A/C.5/L.788, submitted by Cyprus, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea and Uruguay. Like the other draft resolutions before the Committee, it was a corollary of General Assembly resolution 1854 (XVII). Although the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations had done valuable work, much remained to be done and the Working Group should be permitted to complete its task. Attention should be drawn to the fourth preambular paragraph, which said that "all Member States" should feel able to share in the costs of peace-keeping operations. Various proposals for the financing of future peace-keeping operations had been made and operative paragraph 2 (b), requested the Working Group to study other sources of financing, which would include the proposal for the establishment of a peace fund (A/C.5/L.787/Rev.1). He invited the socialist countries to co-operate in achieving a generally acceptable solution to the question of the financing of peace-keeping operations.

2. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia) said that his delegation maintained the position he had described at the 993rd meeting of the Committee and regretted that it had not been possible to produce draft resolutions in closer conformity with its views. However, the inclusion of the words "*inter alia*" in operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1 indicated that the list of principles which followed was not intended to be exhaustive. Other principles would no doubt be considered at a later stage, including the principle that Members providing troops for peace-keeping opera-

tions should make a smaller financial contribution to such operations. His delegation would vote for that draft resolution, since it was a member of the African-Asian group which, together with other States had sponsored the text. It would also support draft resolutions A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1, A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1, A/C.5/L.785 and Add.1 and A/C.5/L.786, not because it agreed with the cost-sharing methods they outlined but in order to provide the Secretary-General with the means he so desperately needed to conduct peace-keeping operations entrusted to him by the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Indonesian delegation would also vote for draft resolution A/C.5/L.787/Rev.1.

3. It must be emphasized, however, that the paramount task was to bridge the dangerous rift existing between certain great Powers regarding the basis on which peace-keeping operations were to be carried out. That task could not be achieved by the adoption of the draft resolutions before the Committee, since they laid down a procedure which was acceptable to one side only. The draft resolutions were mainly based on the principle of General Assembly resolution 377 (V) entitled "Uniting for Peace" and the opponents of the texts based their objections on Articles of the United Nations Charter which had at least equal legal force. By conferring the right of veto upon certain Members, the Charter had recognized the power of those Members to frustrate any action undertaken by the Security Council. It should not be forgotten that the strongest opponent of the terms of General Assembly resolution 377 (V) had grown considerably as a military Power since the Charter had been drawn up. However, operative paragraph 2 (c) of draft resolution A/C.5/L.788 might help to bridge the rift between the great Powers. But if that was not achieved, the Indonesian delegation would contemplate submitting a draft resolution on that aspect at the eighteenth session.

4. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq) said that his delegation had made no statement in the general debate because the question before the Committee did not lend itself to oratory and the positions of virtually all delegations were well known. He wished, however, to comment on the draft resolutions, which represented a serious effort to deal with the financial crisis facing the United Nations, although they were only a first step towards a final solution. The good will and sympathetic understanding of differing points of view displayed by all delegations during the discussions which had culminated in the submission of the present texts showed that the task had been approached with seriousness and a sense of responsibility.

5. Draft resolution A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1 reflected some of the fundamental principles of the Charter, one of the most important of which—that of the collective responsibility of all Member States for the financing of peace-keeping operations—was clearly set out in operative paragraph 1 (a). Sub-paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) recognized that that principle must be modified to

meet existing realities. He regretted that sub-paragraph (e), to which he attached special importance, was not sufficiently forceful or explicit; his delegation had always maintained that due consideration must be given to the victims of aggression and appropriate treatment reserved for the aggressors. The objections that had been made to any reference to victims and aggressors, namely, that aggression had not yet been defined and that the introduction of that idea might prevent the competent organs of the United Nations from taking prompt action, did not hold water. It was in cases where one party was obviously the victim and another the aggressor that it should be possible for those facts to be taken into account in determining the method of financing; in addition, it was inconceivable that the United Nations would take action without due consideration of all the issues involved. Although his delegation would have preferred a more positive wording for sub-paragraph (e), it would vote for the present text.

6. His delegation's position on the draft resolutions on the cost estimates and financing of UNEF (A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1) and ONUC (A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1) was dictated by the same considerations as its position on the draft resolution on general principles (A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1) although all Members bore collective responsibility for the financing of peace-keeping operations, it was obviously unjust to place the same financial burden on the victim as on the aggressor. That had been particularly clear in the case of UNEF, where there had never been any doubt about the identity of the victim or of the aggressors; yet all had been assessed for the cost on an equal footing, although the expense should have been borne exclusively by the aggressors. In the case of the Congo, the situation had been less clear. The Government of Iraq would have been willing to reconsider its position on the financing of ONUC had it not been for certain recent unilateral acts which had seriously undermined General Assembly resolution 1474 (ES-IV). In that resolution, a measure of agreement and a delicate balance had been achieved; to upset that balance now might impede the entire operation and even reopen the question of continuing military operations in the Congo.

7. Turning to the question of arrears, he said that his Government maintained its position on UNEF, for the reasons he had indicated, but it was reconsidering its position regarding the Congo, without yet having reached a final decision. His delegation would, therefore abstain on draft resolutions A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1, A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1 and A/C.5/L.785 and Add.1. It would vote for the draft resolutions on the issue of United Nations bonds (A/C.5/L.786) and the establishment of a peace fund (A/C.5/L.787/Rev.1). It would also vote for the draft resolution on the continuation of the Working Group (A/C.5/L.788), which would ensure that the first step towards the solution of the financial crisis which had been taken at the current session would be followed up.

*Mr. Morris (Liberia), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

8. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary) said that the current debate had not persuaded his delegation to change its position on the financial difficulties of the United Nations. It still maintained that the Powers responsible for the events leading to peace-keeping operations should bear the costs of those operations. His delegation could not support any of the draft resolutions before the Committee, because their adoption would have dangerous consequences arising from the circumven-

tion and restriction of the Security Council. Draft resolution A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1 was particularly unacceptable because it sought a solution outside the political and legal framework of the United Nations. Moreover, its text was inconsistent, since the financial responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council were mentioned without reference to their concomitant legal and political responsibilities. Operative paragraph 1 (e) appeared to exempt aggressors from special responsibilities; however, aggressors who had derived considerable economic and political advantages from a situation leading to a peace-keeping operation should bear the main responsibility for the costs of that operation. Countries which condemned aggression but accepted the unprincipled compromise embodied in the draft resolutions were displaying inconsistency. It was illogical to condemn ONUC but agree to pay the costs of that operation. Despite the United Kingdom representative's remarks on the subject at the 999th meeting, the socialist countries were not alarmed by the attempts to invoke Article 19 of the Charter. Such attempts were doomed to failure, since the application of Article 19 would lead to the collapse of the United Nations. His delegation rejected any responsibility for the future practical consequences of measures based on further violations of the Charter which would follow from the adoption of the draft resolutions before the Committee.

9. Mr. KOIRALA (Nepal) said that, as it was the first occasion on which he had spoken in the debate, he would like first to associate his delegation with the sentiments that had been expressed in the Committee upon the death of His Holiness Pope John XXIII. He would also like to express his delegation's sorrow at the deaths of Mr. Omar Loutfi, the distinguished Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, and Mr. José Félix de Lequerica, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations.

10. He recalled that his delegation had abstained from voting on General Assembly resolution 1731 (XVI), which had referred the question of the costs of UNEF and ONUC to the International Court of Justice, because it had felt that that procedure would not solve the problem to the satisfaction of all Members. It had voted in favour of resolution 1854 A (XVII), accepting the Court's opinion,<sup>1/</sup> because it had always considered that all expenses of the Organization, including the costs of peace-keeping operations, should be paid by all Members. It now appeared that even the acceptance of the Court's opinion had not solved the problem for all Members.

11. He did not propose to discuss the question whether the issue of the financing of peace-keeping operations was a purely legal, financial or political question. The Secretary-General had stressed the gravity of the Organization's financial situation and it should be the duty of all responsible Members to come to its assistance. It was primarily that consideration, namely the importance of preserving the integrity and effectiveness of the United Nations, that had always prompted his delegation to vote in favour of financial resolutions or of measures with financial implications like the United Nations bond issue and the acceptance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. At the same time his delegation was fully aware of the

<sup>1/</sup> Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962; I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151, transmitted to Members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/5161 and Corr.1).

grave consequences of a political and constitutional nature with which the United Nations would be faced if a large group of States were to place undue insistence on the legal nature of the present crisis. The United Nations could best solve its problems by diplomatic negotiations, and not by the direct confrontation of powerful groups of States holding opposite views. It should be borne in mind that Members were sovereign States which had to be persuaded rather than commanded—a point which should be remembered also in connexion with the argument that Members could be asked to pay for peace-keeping operations decided upon by the Security Council when they had had no word in the decisions regarding the apportionment of the costs of those operations.

12. The principle of collective responsibility was apparently accepted by all Members: the differences of opinion concerned the implementation of that principle and its financial implications. There appeared to be two main controversial issues. The first was whether the Security Council, upon which the Charter had conferred primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, was also the appropriate organ for apportioning the costs of peace-keeping operations among Members. It should be borne in mind that Article 24 spoke of "primary", but not exclusive, responsibility and that in exercising that responsibility the Security Council was acting on behalf of all the Members of the United Nations. His delegation held the view that it would be a denial of the legitimate interests and sovereign rights of the general membership of the United Nations to deny the General Assembly, where all Members were represented, the right to apportion expenses as a general principle. To expect those States which were not members of the Security Council to agree to pay the costs of peace-keeping operations without having a word in the determination of the magnitude of those costs or the methods of apportionment would be tantamount to taxation without representation. His delegation therefore subscribed to the principle that the costs of peace-keeping operations were governed by Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter, subject, as recognized in General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII), to the application of a special scale of assessments for such costs, different from the scale for the regular budget. The special scale should be based on a number of principles, some of which had been formulated in the seven-Power memorandum (A/AC.113/18) submitted to the Working Group, to whose good work under the able chairmanship of Mr. Adebo, representative of Nigeria, he would like to pay a tribute.

13. The second main issue seemed to be that of determining who should pay the costs of peace-keeping operations, even within the framework of collective financial responsibility. One view was that the State of States whose action had led to the necessity of launching peace-keeping operations should be called upon to pay the costs, as in the case of war reparations. His delegation had always considered that acceptance of the basic principle of collective financial responsibility need not necessarily conflict with the principle that the aggressor States should pay a larger proportion or even the whole of the costs of peace-keeping operations. In the formulation of a special scale of assessments for a given peace-keeping operation, consideration should be given to the assessments of the "aggressor" and the "victim" States, in so far as it might be possible formally to identify such States in a Security Council or General Assembly resolution.

Inasmuch as some Members felt that to expect all Members to contribute to the financing of peace-keeping operations would be tantamount to encouraging an aggressor to commit further aggression, his delegation had already endorsed the view that States responsible for aggressive acts should be assessed at a punitive rate. The contributions of such States would be twofold: they would pay a special quota on the basis of their aggression, plus the normal quota arising out of their obligations under the principle of collective financial responsibility, while the other Members would contribute under the latter principle only. Thus it should be possible for all Members which claimed to support the principle of collective responsibility to pay their dues for peace-keeping operations.

14. Turning to the question of the arrears in respect of contributions to UNEF and ONUC, he recalled that his delegation had on various occasions expressed its dissatisfaction with the way the Congo operation had dragged on. It felt that there were lessons to be learned from the two peace-keeping operations and that steps should be taken to ensure that in the future such operations were carried out with a maximum consensus of opinion and to the greatest possible satisfaction of all Members. There had been faults of omission and commission in the two operations, but such faults should not lead to the destruction of the United Nations or be allowed to reduce its effectiveness. Grave as was the financial crisis in the United Nations, such a constitutional crisis would represent a far more serious danger. He therefore appealed to Members which were in arrears in their contributions to UNEF and ONUC to enter into negotiations with the Secretary-General with a view to deciding upon a satisfactory basis for the payment of their arrears in reasonable instalments, as proposed in the seven-Power memorandum. As the United Nations would be faced with deficits until the arrears were paid up, his delegation would agree to the extension of the time-limit for the sale of United Nations bonds to 31 December 1963, up to the limit of \$200 million authorized by the General Assembly at its sixteenth session (resolution 1739 (XVI)).

15. The concept of a special scale of assessments for the financing of peace-keeping operations had been approved by the General Assembly in resolution 1854 B (XVII). The basic principle underlying that concept was the principle of capacity to pay, which had been recognized on an *ad hoc* basis in the financing of peace-keeping operations so far. The capacity of the developing countries to pay for operations involving heavy expenditure must be judged in the context of their total foreign exchange commitments at home and abroad. Since their contributions would be over and above their contributions to the United Nations regular budget and the voluntary programmes, their capacity to pay was bound to be limited. That fact seemed often to be misunderstood, the more so when the special scale of assessments was linked with the regular scale by a system of rebates in the assessments of the developing countries. Such a scheme not only seemed to imply that the developing countries were unwilling to shoulder their fair share of the costs of peace-keeping operations but also laid those countries open to the charge that they were susceptible of casting their votes for the financing of ONUC and UNEF in exchange for what had been referred to as almost full exemption from factual participation in the financing of peace-keeping operations. It was unfair that the developing countries should be exposed to such charges. As far as his own country was concerned, he would point out that although

the total amount of Nepal's contribution to the regular budget and the peace-keeping operations might seem small, its burden on the public budget was much greater than that of the developed countries on their budgets. The attempts often made to compare the burdens of individual Members' contributions to the United Nations in terms of their gross national product could be misleading. Percentages based on per caput income might provide a better basis for comparison, or it might be more rational to relate total contributions of Members to their annual defence expenditures.

16. His delegation would like to see a completely separate scale of assessments for future peace-keeping operations on the basis of the principles enunciated in draft resolution A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1. Unfortunately the draft resolution did not give the outline of such a scale, but his delegation, recognizing that the draft resolution was the result of prolonged negotiations between various groups of Members, would support it. At the same time it would suggest that the endeavour to formulate a special scale of assessments for financing peace-keeping operations, which was the real task assigned to the Working Group in General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII), should not be abandoned. It might therefore be desirable to continue the Working Group, as proposed in draft resolution A/C.5/L.788, in order that it might fulfil that task.

17. With regard to the draft resolutions on the financing of UNEF (A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1) and ONUC (A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1) his delegation would point out that the total reduction in the case of the assessments of developing countries amounted to about 48 per cent of their regular assessments for those two operations taken together, compared to the past level of 80 per cent for the same operations. The fact that the developing countries had voted for the payment of their share of the \$200 million bond issue on the basis of their regular scale of assessments showed that they were willing to assume, if necessary, a greater share of the costs of peace-keeping operations than their capacity to pay would warrant, for they placed a higher value on preserving the integrity of the United Nations than on the financial burden that they assumed. Hitherto such payments had been made on an *ad hoc* basis, but the time had come to agree upon a special scale of assessments for all future operations. It was with a view to such agreement and in the expectation that UNEF and ONUC could be terminated by the end of 1963 that his delegation would be willing to vote in favour of draft resolutions A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1 and A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1; it was glad to note that operative paragraph 4 of those resolutions made it clear that the new apportionment formula was not to constitute a precedent for the future.

18. He would like to commend the suggestion that the Jamaican representative had made at the 1000th meeting, that appropriations for ONUC and UNEF should be made for the period 1 July 1962 to the end of 1963 instead of for the last six months of 1963 only. If that suggestion were accepted, the United Nations bond issue could be repaid out of those appropriations and the regular budget would no longer have to provide annually for the repayment of the principal of the issue.

19. His delegation agreed in principle with the appeal made in draft resolution A/C.5/L.785 and Add.1 regarding arrears of payments. His Government had made great efforts in the past few months to pay its share of the UNEF and ONUC costs and hoped to pay up all its arrears as soon as possible.

20. With regard to draft resolution A/C.5/L.787/Rev.1, on the establishment of a peace fund, his delegation would point out that the principle of receiving voluntary contributions to such a fund from private organizations and individuals might have to be discussed and approved. As, however, the draft resolution was directed only towards an exploration of the desirability of establishing such a fund his delegation would be able to support it.

21. Mr. SIDI BABA (Morocco) associated himself with the tribute paid to the memory of His Holiness Pope John XXIII, and with the condolences expressed on the deaths of Mr. Loutfi and Mr. de Lequerica.

22. The five draft resolutions introduced by the representative of Nigeria at the 999th meeting represented a compromise achieved after considerable effort and discussion. The Working Group was to be congratulated on the results it had accomplished, which were now crystallized in those draft resolutions. Those results were not only the outcome of the Working Group's efforts, but also reflected a change in the thinking of the Organization itself, due to the growth of its membership, which could be summed up as a desire to give greater importance to the General Assembly. His delegation felt that that should be done, although it gave some weight to the arguments against such a step based on the Charter and to the criticisms made of past budget management. It was obvious that the problem involved was one of the major obstacles to the solution of the United Nations financial crisis. It was not enough for the Committee to adopt the draft resolutions in question by the required majority; yet their adoption might well facilitate the search for the solution desired. His delegation would support the draft resolutions not only because it could not disregard the appeals of their sponsors but also because it felt that the fourth special session must not be allowed to close without their adoption, since they would at least enable the Organization to face up to the increasing threat of paralysis.

23. Morocco sincerely supported the principles of the United Nations Charter and was anxious to see the Organization's resolutions implemented. It had made its position clear by its support of the Congo operation; during the first phase it had sent a contingent of troops which had at one time been the largest sent by any country and it had continued to supply military equipment and matériel after the withdrawal of its troops. That had represented a considerable effort for an under-developed country.

24. Unfortunately, some aspects of the Congo operation gave grounds for serious criticism. Certain interests, intent only on their own gain, had done their best to thwart the operation when they had discovered that they could not use the United Nations flag to cover activities for their own advantage. No one could forget the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and his colleagues and the death of Dag Hammarskjöld and those who had accompanied him. At least for a while, the United Nations had been unable to protect the Congolese people from the hostile and destructive forces of colonialism and neo-colonialism. The remarks he had just made should not be interpreted as a desire to throw past errors in the face of the Organization, still less as criticism of the Secretary-General; his delegation strongly supported all the efforts now being made to rescue the Organization from the present impasse.

25. Morocco had taken up \$280,000 worth of United Nations bonds. Although the amount was small, it reflected his Government's determination to join with other States in supporting the Organization. Morocco had always tried to pay its contributions to the regular budget and its share of the supplementary estimates as soon as possible; he believed that his Government had already taken steps to see that its 1963 contributions were up to date. Nevertheless, it would have liked new criteria to be adopted so that the scales of assessment could be established in accordance with the wishes expressed by all the developing countries. It also hoped that in the future the steps taken with regard to voluntary contributions would fully accord with the views expressed by many representatives. As had already been pointed out, the under-developed state of certain countries and their present economic, scientific and technical relations with the advanced countries should logically be taken into account.

26. It was the duty of the General Assembly at the current special session to define its functions realistically, on the basis of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and of the general principles put forward by a large number of delegations, and also to find a solution to the problems created by certain specific situations which had involved the Organization in heavy expenditures. His delegation felt that it could not do otherwise than vote for the draft resolutions before the Committee, except for that in document A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1, which it could not support for reasons he need not enlarge upon. Although he had not yet had time to study the draft resolutions on the peace fund (A/C.5/L.787/Rev.1) and the continuation of the Working Group (A/C.5/L.788) he did not foresee any difficulty in voting for them.

27. Mr. LUQMAN (Mauritania) expressed his delegation's condolences to the Secretary-General and to the United Arab Republic on the death of Mr. Loutfi.

28. His delegation refused to believe that any Member objected to helping the United Nations to overcome its financial difficulties and thus to survive, despite differences in the criteria on which delegations based their approach to the problem. A solution could stem only from the collective moral responsibility of all Members to maintain the integrity of the Organization, and the economically more advanced countries in particular must act urgently to that end. The Secretary-General's task in the modern world was arduous and delicate, and the extent of his success or failure depended on the extent to which Members supported him and co-operated with him; the attitude of the permanent members of the Security Council was equally important in that connexion.

29. On the question who had caused the situation giving rise to the present financial crisis, his delegation shared the view that Members were not equally guilty. Africa had suffered relatively greater damage, including the invisible damage to its growth and progress. Nevertheless, any attempt to place the whole burden of responsibility on certain States at the present stage would merely complicate the problem and delay an effective and prompt solution.

30. Mauritania, like most Member States, had a very limited capacity to contribute to the costs of peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures; that was the main reason why his delegation believed that all Members had a duty to work together and to contribute, each according to its capacity. He hoped that all the

permanent members of the Security Council and all the highly developed countries would not only support the draft resolutions before the Committee but also follow the example of Canada, Japan and other countries in making increased voluntary contributions. Mauritania had purchased a modest amount of United Nations bonds, and he would therefore vote for draft resolution A/C.5/L.786. He wished to make it clear that his delegation's sponsorship of and support for the draft resolutions in no way meant that Mauritania approved of whatever political motivations or other illegal outside interventions had given rise to the unhappy situations in Africa.

31. The time when the Security Council could work alone was gone for ever. The concept of peace had not changed, but the concept of world opinion, which in the past had been voiced by only a few strong Powers, had changed. Might must give way to reason, and reason must be expressed by the cardinal democratic principle of the voice and will of the majority. Unless the majority was recognized as the constitutional authority by all, and not only by the small countries, the United Nations Charter would be an empty document. It would be out of place to discuss in the present context the unsatisfactory composition of the important organs of the United Nations, but he wished to emphasize the necessity of co-operation by all Members in supporting the Organization and upholding its integrity.

32. His delegation would vote for the draft resolution on the establishment of peace fund (A/C.5/L.787/Rev.1).

*Mr. Bannier (Netherlands) resumed the Chair.*

33. Mr. DE PINIES (Spain) thanked all delegations which had expressed their condolences on the death of Mr. de Lequerica.

34. The delegation of Spain had stated its position in December 1956 on the financing of the costs arising from the establishment of UNEF. While it must be recognized that considerable progress had been made since that time with respect to the acceptance of the principles on which the apportionment of those costs should be based, it must also be recognized that the magnitude of the operations in which the United Nations had become involved had caused a financial crisis, owing basically to the fact that it had been impossible for most Members to meet their financial responsibilities—responsibilities, moreover, which had not been imposed on them in accordance with just and equitable principles. Had it been otherwise, none could have refused to share in financing the costs of operations which had contributed so greatly to the maintenance of peace.

35. His delegation had emphasized in 1956 that the situation which had led to the establishment of UNEF was without precedent, and that no fundamental juridical norms existed for dealing with it. Consequently, the criteria which governed the financing of the regular expenses of the Organization could not apply. In noting that considerable progress had been made, he was referring to the many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly which had laid down a number of rules for the apportionment, at least temporarily, of the costs. The efforts of the Working Group were most laudable in that connexion.

36. The draft resolution on general principles (A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1) was satisfactory, in that it embodied the principle of collective responsibility which his



delegation had always advocated, not as the only principle, but as the first among several. It also embodied the principles of the responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security, the desirability of encouraging voluntary contributions, and the reduced capacity of the economically less developed countries. His delegation had always maintained that the following principles were fundamental, but not exclusive, in the matter of financing peace-keeping operations: firstly, the maintenance of peace and security was of concern to the Organization as such, and therefore to each of its Members; secondly, certain Powers had reserved to themselves a preponderant role in the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with Articles 23 and 24 of the Charter; thirdly, some countries had been connected with the origin and development of the situation which had led to the peace-keeping operations. That last principle should have been reflected in the draft resolution as a counterpart to the principle that special consideration should be given to the situation of victims. A further point which should be taken into account on future occasions was the difference between UNEF, which had been mounted in order to halt an action that had jeopardized peace and security, and ONUC, which had been undertaken in response to a request. In a spirit of co-operation, his delegation would vote for draft resolution A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1.

37. Turning to draft resolutions A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1 and A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1, he noted that, paradoxically, the principles set forth in draft resolution A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1 were not reflected in those relating to the financing of the two operations up to 31 December 1963. The reduction of only 55 per cent, as against 80 per cent on previous occasions, in the assessments of the less developed countries was a backward step, and the clause stating that the apportionment would not constitute a precedent for the future was unconvincing, since any future working group considering the question would inevitably take previous resolutions into account, just as the Working Group had done. Nor did he see how the "present phase" of the operations differed from any other phase, and he feared that those words might be used as an excuse for apportioning in accordance with the regular scale of assessments the smaller, but perhaps still quite heavy, expenses incurred at a later stage. His delegation therefore reserved its position with regard to the two draft resolutions.

38. He wondered what would have happened if, after the Korean conflict, the United States, whose generosity had been unprecedented, had decided to submit the bill for the operations to the United Nations and an attempt had been made to apply the regular scale of assessments, even with reductions of not 55 or 80 per cent, but 90 per cent. That would surely have been unacceptable to delegations, and it constituted the best precedent for acknowledging that, where peace-keeping expenses were heavy, just and equitable apportionment formulas must be found.

39. The most important point, in his delegation's view, was that despite the difficulty of foreseeing the eventual costs when such situations arose, it should at least be known with certainty that the permanent members of the Security Council, which had the major responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, would not take refuge in a refusal to pay, thus jeopardizing the future of the United Nations as a

centre for the hopes of all Members that the scourge of war would not again afflict mankind.

40. Mr. DIALLO TELLI (Guinea) said that his delegation had refrained from engaging in polemics with regard to the current financial crisis because it was convinced that to do so would be to embitter the debate and frustrate the search for a solution. The Government and people of Guinea needed peace and international stability for their country's economic and cultural development and would spare no effort to assist those who were working towards those objectives. As its Head of State had said at an earlier session of the General Assembly, Guinea regarded the United Nations as the most effective instrument for the maintenance of peace and for awakening the sense of responsibility of all peoples: its dissolution would be a catastrophe for the whole world.

41. His delegation would vote in favour of all the draft resolutions before the Committee. It would support the five basic proposals designed to achieve a temporary solution of the financial crisis because they stated principles which had not been questioned by any African delegation and had been endorsed by the Asian and Latin American States; indeed, the overwhelming majority of Members supported them in essence. It would also vote for them in order to give further encouragement to the Secretary-General in his efforts to re-unify the Congo. Guinea reaffirmed its confidence in the Congolese people and hoped that they would use their sovereignty to achieve genuine political stability. Finally, his delegation would support the draft resolutions because they did not close the door to future negotiations aimed at reaching full agreement with respect to the financing of peace-keeping operations. He hoped that Guinea's position would demonstrate its desire to co-operate with all men of good will to improve the work of the United Nations so that it might become a decisive factor in maintaining peace and creating friendly relations among nations.

42. Mr. COLLIER (Sierra Leone) said that his delegation would also support all the draft resolutions before the Committee because it believed in the United Nations as the best force for peace and realized that the Organization could survive only if it met its financial obligations. Although Members might not always agree concerning the conditions in which those obligations were incurred, it was their duty to see that they were discharged in full. Sierra Leone had met all its financial commitments to the United Nations as a demonstration of its confidence in the Organization.

43. He would vote for the draft resolution outlining guiding principles (A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1) because, while it did not go far enough, it was a step in the right direction. He hoped that its ambiguities would be clarified in future, particularly those concerning the special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council. Capacity to pay should be the decisive factor in determining assessments and a Member which embarked on aggression should be made to pay for the consequences of its action.

44. He would support the two draft resolutions concerning the financing of the Congo (A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1) and Middle East operations (A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1) because they were the result of a compromise and because the proviso in operative paragraph 4 (b) made it possible for him to accept the procedure outlined in the previous operative paragraphs. However, no effort should be spared to find a simpler method of

financing future peace-keeping costs. He hoped that ONUC could be terminated by the end of 1963 and that UNEF would be dissolved at the earliest possible opportunity.

45. He would vote for the proposal concerning the payment of arrears (A/C.5/L.785 and Add.1) because it made it possible for Members which might have legitimate political objections to UNEF and ONUC to contribute to the cost of those operations without prejudice to their positions.

46. Lastly, he endorsed the proposal regarding the bond issue (A/C.5/L.786) and hoped that more States would subscribe; he would also vote for the two draft resolutions introduced by Ghana and Malaya respectively (A/C.5/L.787/Rev.1 and A/C.5/L.788).

47. Mr. THORS (Iceland), after reviewing the events which had led to the convening of the fourth special session, pointed out that while the ultimate objective, namely, the placing of the United Nations on a permanent and sound financial basis, had not been achieved, at least bankruptcy had been averted and certain temporary, intermediate solutions were now before the Assembly. Iceland had co-sponsored four of the basic proposals under consideration (A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1, A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1, A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1 and A/C.5/L.785 and Add.1) and would also vote in favour of the fifth (A/C.5/L.786).

48. His delegation strongly supported the view that the costs of peace-keeping operations were the collective responsibility of all Members and should be borne by them as expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter, as apportioned by the General Assembly. Since the majority of the Assembly had accepted the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice that assessments for UNEF and ONUC, like those for the regular budget, were mandatory, it was difficult to see how States in default in their payments could escape the consequences stated in Article 19. Indeed, it was inconceivable that the United Nations could survive without collective financial support and the Icelandic delegation felt that the Organization's very existence was jeopardized by the refusal of France and the Soviet Union, two great Powers which had done much to build it, to recognize its financial vulnerability.

49. The proposals relating to the assessment of Members' contributions in documents A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1, A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1 and A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1 were clearly based chiefly on capacity to pay and indicated that due consideration had been given to the financial circumstances of individual States. However, the formula for the assessment of contributions to the cost of the Congo operation (A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1), had been devised under the pressure of circumstances and could not be regarded as a precedent for the future. While his delegation hoped that all United Nations military operations would cease by the end of the year, Iceland would pay its full share of the ONUC and UNEF costs, and hoped that the provision for proportionate voluntary contributions would further reduce the payments required of all States.

50. He urged all Members to heed the appeal in draft resolution A/C.5/L.785 and Add.1 for the payment of arrears in respect of assessed contributions. They should lay aside their political and legal objections and reconsider the position in the interest of preventing the dissolution of the United Nations, which they did not want. His delegation would also support the proposal for

the extension of the period for the sale of United Nations bonds (A/C.5/L.786) in the hope that the target would be reached by 31 December 1963.

51. Drawing attention to operative paragraph 2 and 3 of the draft resolution on guiding principles (A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1), he pointed out that delegations still had time to reach agreement regarding the financing of future peace-keeping operations in the interval before the eighteenth session of the General Assembly. They should never again permit the possibility of a financial veto being exercised in respect of such operations.

52. Mr. AHMED (Sudan) emphasized that the draft resolutions before the Committee represented an interim or stopgap measure pending a permanent solution of the problem of financing peace-keeping operations and ensuring the solvency of the United Nations. While it was generally agreed that decisions of the General Assembly should, as a rule, be upheld by all Members without prejudice to their individual convictions, it was also recognized that the United Nations was not a super-Government and that the Assembly was not a world parliament. Consequently, a distinction should be made among the various types of decisions taken by majority vote in the Assembly: some were so contrary to the fundamental convictions of certain States as to make it impossible for the latter to comply with them. In particular, in the case of major decisions such as those the Committee was now being asked to take, unanimous agreement was essential.

53. For its part, Sudan would support the draft resolution on guiding principles (A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1), although it was dissatisfied with the ambiguous wording of operative paragraph 1 (d) and (e). The special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council should not merely be "borne in mind", and the victims of aggression should be totally exempt from the payment of contributions. Sudan would also support the proposal relating to the Congo operation (A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1), although it considered that the developing countries were being assessed at more than their fair share; the fact that the total amount of their assessment was lower than it had been in the past was no justification for assessing them at a higher rate. However, the arrangement was *ad hoc* in nature and subject to review if ONUC should have to be continued. On the other hand, Sudan could not support the proposal relating to the financing of UNEF: its position on that question was unchanged. It would vote in favour of draft resolutions A/C.5/L.787/Rev.1 and A/C.5/L.788 and wished to draw particular attention to the new terms of reference of the Working Group under operative paragraph 2 (c) of the latter text. Indeed, no solution to the problem of financing future peace-keeping operations could be effective unless it obtained the widest possible agreement among all Members.

54. Mr. Mahmoud RIAD (United Arab Republic) recalled that his delegation's position had been made perfectly clear in the past. It was based on the principles that expenses occasioned by the formation of emergency forces differed by their nature and by the reasons for which they were incurred from the regular expenses of the Organization; that a country or countries victims of the acts which necessitated the dispatch of United Nations forces should be exempt from contributing to the costs; that a State or States whose actions made a peace-keeping operation necessary should be held responsible for it; that the benefits which certain States derived from an operation should be taken into consid-

ration; that the responsibility of the permanent members of the Security Council should be borne in mind; and that a special fund should be established as a standby arrangement. He was gratified that many delegations shared those views, which were expressed in the seven-Power memorandum (A/AC.113/18) submitted to the Working Group and in the draft resolution on general principles (A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1). Paragraph 2 of part A of the seven-Power memorandum made it quite clear that whenever the Security Council, which had primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter, decided to exercise its prerogatives in respect of a certain peace-keeping operation, the principles set out in the memorandum ceased to apply unless the Council recommended the General Assembly to apply them. It followed that the Security Council should be the first organ to discuss such situations, but if it was unable to adopt a decision, the Assembly should take account of the principles in the memorandum in apportioning the expenses.

55. It had been argued that the General Assembly could not legally adopt the criteria set out in paragraphs 10 and 11 of part A of the memorandum, and also that their application would be impracticable; yet it was patently in accordance with the dictates of common sense and natural justice that the victims of acts of aggression should not have to contribute to the costs of the resulting peace-keeping operations. The argument that it would be difficult to name the Member or Members responsible could not be sustained, for the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly with regard to UNEF and ONUC indicated beyond doubt which States had been behind the acts of aggression. Since the principles contained in the seven-Power memorandum were incorporated in the draft resolution on general principles his delegation would support it.

56. The adoption of the draft resolutions before the Committee would not end the problem facing the United Nations. His delegation considered it imperative that all Members should explore ways and means for bringing about the widest possible measure of agreement, for in the matter of safeguarding world peace and security the interest of the United Nations as a whole should be the paramount concern. For that reason, his delegation welcomed draft resolution A/C.5/L.788, and in particular operative paragraph 2 (c).

57. In conclusion, he thanked all those who had expressed condolences to his delegation on the death of Mr. Loutfi.

58. Mr. SEYDOUX (France) noted that although his statement at the 998th meeting had been criticized on various grounds, the main question raised by his delegation concerning the perils of a doctrine claiming that mere recommendations adopted by a majority vote made it obligatory for States which disapproved of a given peace-keeping operation to contribute to the costs had not been answered. The considerations mentioned in his earlier statement explained why he would vote against draft resolutions A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1 and A/C.5/L.785 and Add.1, as well as against the draft resolution on general principles (A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1), several clauses of which had been criticized by other delegations and which also erred in seeking to establish absolute rules at a time when conflicting views were far from reconciled in an area where it would be much wiser to deal with each particular case according to its nature and circumstances.

59. In view of its attitude towards the draft resolution on general principles, his delegation must also vote against draft resolution A/C.5/L.788, which referred expressly to the first-named resolution and would thus deprive the Working Group of any freedom of judgement. He recalled that the Group had already been fettered by the criteria mentioned in General Assembly resolution 1854 B (XVII), which had prejudged the issue.

60. His delegation had already stated at the 979th meeting of the Fifth Committee at the seventeenth session that it considered it unwise to finance peace-keeping operations by borrowing, and that it could not approve of extraordinary expenses being included in the regular budget by financial stratagem. It would therefore vote against draft resolution A/C.5/L.786. Nor could his delegation support draft resolution A/C.5/L.787/Rev.1, the fourth preambular paragraph of which, in particular, appeared to attribute to the Secretary-General considerably greater responsibilities with respect to the maintenance of peace than were conferred on him by Article 99 of the Charter.

61. In connexion with draft resolution A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1, he recalled that his delegation had abstained in the vote on General Assembly resolution 1733 (XVI) because of what it considered an arbitrary modification of the regular scale of assessments in operative paragraph 6. His delegation would similarly abstain on the draft resolution now before the Committee. He recalled, however, that France had paid its assessment for UNEF costs in 1962, and he was authorized to state that it would do so again in 1963. Moreover, France fully appreciated the difficulties caused to the developing countries by the increasing burden of United Nations expenditures, and he could therefore state that when his Government was in possession of all the facts of the matter, it would be prepared to study the possibility of making a voluntary contribution to the UNEF Special Account, in the spirit of draft resolution A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1.

62. Mr. TARAZI (Syria) said that the United Nations and the principles on which it was based must be maintained, despite the current financial difficulties. The Organization should therefore not be led, as a result of the financial situation, into a position which might later be regretted. His delegation would vote for draft resolution A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1, which was a reasonable compromise between the various positions, and would abstain in the vote on draft resolutions A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1, A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1 and A/C.5/L.785 and Add.1. Syria would support draft resolution A/C.5/L.787/Rev.1 and draft resolution A/C.5/L.788. It welcomed the submission of the latter text, which took a broad approach to the financing of peace-keeping operations and acknowledged the fact that a final solution to the question would be impossible without further research to reconcile the differing positions.

63. Mr. MESTIRI (Tunisia) said that he was glad that good will and a desire for compromise had prevailed and welcomed the success achieved in the laborious negotiations between representatives of different regional groups. However, the possibilities of such contacts had perhaps not been fully exploited. Many ideas embodied in the draft resolutions before the Committee should have been stated more explicitly in order to preclude the possibility of differing interpretations and to define clearly the basis for future peace-keeping operations. For instance, the concept of the special



responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council, which was expressed in operative paragraph 1 (d) of draft resolution A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1, should have been stated in a more definite form which would compel the great Powers to assume their responsibilities. Sub-paragraph (e) of the same text, which was the subject of such controversy, also seemed to be somewhat ambiguous. The concept of victim was very restricted in the sub-paragraph and the concept of aggressor could be widely interpreted.

64. Reference had been made to the possible occurrence of serious events on the African continent and the United Nations should therefore be prepared to act in any situation with a clearly defined mandate and means of financing. Members which benefited from peace-keeping operations should bear a greater share and Members contributing troops a smaller share of the costs. However, since the list of principles in draft resolution A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1 was not intended to be exhaustive, those points could be considered later and, in a spirit of compromise, his delegation would support the draft resolution.

65. His delegation would have preferred the economically less developed countries to be assessed at less than 45 per cent of the regular scale of assessments. With that reservation, it would vote for draft resolutions A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1 and A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1. It would also support draft resolutions A/C.5/L.785 and Add.1, A/C.5/L.786, A/C.5/L.787/Rev.1 and A/C.5/L.788. It was to be hoped that the adoption of the draft resolutions would end the financial crisis of the Organization. It would also be desirable if the United Nations Operation in the Congo could be terminated by 31 December 1963.

66. The Tunisian delegation was convinced that contacts between the great Powers would help to overcome the obstacles which prevented the General Assembly from reaching a complete and definitive solution of the Organization's financial problems.

67. Mr. KURAL (Turkey) said that it was gratifying to note the wide support for the draft resolutions before the Committee which were the results of compromise in the interest of the United Nations. His delegation was glad that draft resolution A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1 established the principle of the collective responsibility of all Members for the financing of peace-keeping operations. The objections to that principle were based on an interpretation of the Charter according to which, since the Security Council had been entrusted with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace, decisions of the General Assembly in peace-keeping matters were not valid and any expenses incurred as a result of such decisions did not constitute obligations. However, discussions on the interpretation of the Charter had been in progress for the past fifteen years, and many delegations, including his own, had pointed out that, although the Charter invested the Security Council with the "primary" responsibility for the maintenance of peace, it did not make it exclusively responsible for that task. Although the objections to that interpretation of the Charter put forward by the French delegation contained elements which deserved consideration, they did not cover the possibility of the Security Council being prevented from acting in the event of a threat to peace. In such a case, the General Assembly would have to act, as it had done in the past; by a kind of natural law of compensation, the Assembly had realized that it also had a share of responsibility when the peace of the world was at stake.

That was only to be expected of an Organization whose declared aim was to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. If the Security Council was able in the future to take effective action on the problems which confronted it, all the current difficulties would solve themselves.

68. Some of the general principles enumerated in draft resolution A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1 could have been better formulated. Operative paragraph 1 (d) could be interpreted in several ways and sub-paragraph (e) seemed to regard as solved certain controversies which had been unresolved for over forty years and its application might give rise to political difficulties. In a spirit of compromise, however, the Turkish delegation would accept those provisions and would vote for all the draft resolutions before the Committee.

69. His delegation welcomed the distinction made in draft resolutions A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1 and A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1 between economically developed and economically less developed countries, although the treatment of developing countries was less favourable than in previous United Nations practice. Turkey, whose five-year economic development plan absorbed all its financial resources, would suffer from that change in the scale of assessments. It had, however, always fulfilled its obligations with regard to the financing of peace-keeping operations and would continue to do so in order that the operations in the Middle East and the Congo could be brought to a successful conclusion.

70. Mr. NDAWULA (Uganda) recalled his delegation's statement (989th meeting) concerning Uganda's financial commitments. Its assessment under draft resolutions A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1 and A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1 would amount to nearly \$9,000, which was about 0.64 per cent of the expenditure which Uganda had already incurred as a result of the influx of refugees into the country. What Uganda had already done and was doing from its slender resources was proof of its fulfilment of its international responsibilities. His Government felt that the refugees in Uganda should be cared for by an agency of the United Nations.

71. His delegation attached particular importance to the proposal in paragraph 11 of the seven-Power memorandum (A/AC.113/18). It would accordingly have preferred operative paragraph 1 (e) of draft resolution A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1 to be worded in clearer and more deliberate language, so as to serve as a warning to any potential aggressor. It was no secret that certain policies being pursued in Africa by one or two Members of the United Nations were creating a very ominous situation which could easily endanger the peace and security not only of the African continent but of the whole world; those Members should be severely cautioned about the dire consequences of their anachronistic policies. In connexion with sub-paragraph (d) of the same paragraph, his delegation, like many other African delegations, thought it imperative to amend the Charter so as to reflect the true situation in the United Nations. The composition of the Security Council and of many other organs was unrealistic.

72. His delegation would support all the draft resolutions before the Committee. It was a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.5/L.786 and the Government of Uganda had agreed to purchase United Nations bonds to the value of \$10,000.

73. Mr. BUDO (Albania), recalling the statement he had made at the 992nd meeting, said that his delegation's attitude was based on the principle that any valid solution to the problem under discussion must be in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter; in particular, it was essential, if the United Nations and international peace were to be strengthened, that the competence of the various organs, as prescribed by the Charter, should be respected and that the elementary principles of justice should be observed, so that aggressors paid for the consequences, including the financial consequences, of their acts. The provisions of the various draft resolutions before the Committee were flagrant violations of the Charter, and their adoption could not but have serious effects on the United Nations and the cause which it was called upon to serve. The length of time which had been required to produce the texts clearly indicated the great difficulties which the colonialist Powers had encountered in endeavouring to impose their own illegal position on others. As the voting stage approached, his delegation was in duty bound to make a final appeal to all who wished to see the United Nations strengthened and peace preserved. The draft resolutions could only undermine the United Nations, and his delegation would vote against them.

74. Mr. ILIC (Yugoslavia) said that his Government would continue to support all actions of the United Nations and its organs which were in accordance with the Organization's basic aim of serving the cause of peace. All Members and all organs and persons entrusted with the implementation of the decisions of the United Nations must respect that principle. Accordingly, his Government had supported and contributed to UNEF and had acted similarly at first with respect to ONUC. When the implementation of the Congo operation had taken a course which his delegation and a number of other delegations had considered to be contrary to the aims of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, the Yugoslav Government had withdrawn its personnel from ONUC and stated that it would not contribute to its financing unless the operation was made to conform with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and to serve the real purposes for which it had been mounted. In spite of its political reservations with regard to ONUC, his Government supported the efforts of the Secretary-General to solve the serious financial crisis

which had resulted from the political crisis created by those who had been guided by their own interests rather than the interests of the Organization in carrying out the Congo operation. His delegation had been a sponsor of General Assembly resolution 1739 (XVI) and had purchased United Nations bonds, considering it necessary to take steps to prevent the Organization's financial bankruptcy.

75. His delegation would have preferred draft resolution A/C.5/L.782 and Add.1 to adopt the formulation of principles contained in the seven-Power memorandum, particularly with regard to the principles concerning the victim of aggression and the responsibility of the aggressor. However, since the draft resolution was a compromise and the principles were neither final nor definite, his delegation would vote for that text, while maintaining its reservations with regard to the automaticity of the obligations resulting from acceptance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and from the principles based on that opinion. The Yugoslav delegation would vote for draft resolutions A/C.5/L.783 and Add.1 and A/C.5/L.786.

76. His Government considered the questions of the financing of ONUC and the payment of arrears to be closely linked. The situation with regard to ONUC had improved and the basic aims of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions—to end the secession of Katanga and preserve the territorial integrity of the Congo—had been achieved. Consequently the Yugoslav Government was now reconsidering its position with regard to the payment of its arrears. However, since a final decision had not yet been taken, his delegation would abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.5/L.785 and Add.1.

77. Since the basic tasks of the United Nations Operation in the Congo had been achieved, the size of the forces involved should be reduced more rapidly. His delegation had serious reservations about the size and continued presence of those forces in the Congo and was concerned about the course of events following the end of the secession of Katanga. It would therefore abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.5/L.784 and Add.1. It would support draft resolutions A/C.5/L.787/Rev.1 and A/C.5/L.788.

The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.