General Assembly

Seventieth session

Official Records

Fifth Committee

Summary record of the 16th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 19 November, 2015, at 10 a.m.

Chair: Mr. Bhattarai . . . . (Nepal)
*Chair of the Advisory Committee on Administrative
and Budgetary Questions*: Mr. Ruiz Massieu

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Agenda item 134: Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017 (*continued*)

Enterprise resource planning project (A/70/7/Add.19, A/70/158, A/70/369, A/70/369/Corr.1 and A/70/369/Corr.2)

1. **Mr. Takasu** (Under-Secretary-General for Management), introducing the seventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the enterprise resource planning project (A/70/369, A/70/369/Corr.1 and A/70/369/Corr.2), said that deployment of the Umoja Integration solution had been completed on schedule across the United Nations Secretariat before the end of 2015, as mandated by General Assembly resolution 67/246, in which connection he acknowledged the support of Member States and the unprecedented collaborative effort within the Secretariat. Umoja now represented a daily solution for some 31,000 end-users throughout the Secretariat.

2. The two most complex deployments so far had taken place in 2015: in June in the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials, the United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme and the United Nations Office at Nairobi; and in November in 71 entities, including Headquarters, offices in Geneva and Vienna and their client offices, and the remaining regional commissions, at which time Extension 1 had also been deployed in all peacekeeping and special political missions.

3. Such changes occurred only once in a generation. After decades of working in functional and organizational silos, different entities had begun to work closely together. Umoja was a fully integrated, enterprise-wide solution that required common practices and brought significant improvements in terms of efficiency, transparency and better informed decision-making.

4. Umoja project leadership and monitoring had been reinforced under the proactive leadership of the Secretary-General. Process ownership had been strengthened, and deployment groups organized to lead roll-outs for the respective entities and field missions and to stabilize adoption of the common operating model. Eight quality gates, or milestones, and a scorecard had been established to monitor the readiness of entities and deployment groups for the November roll-out. As recommended by the Board of Auditors, key stakeholders had confirmed to the Management Committee before the June and November roll-outs that all enablers were in place to ensure successful deployment.

5. Valuable recommendations had been made by oversight bodies; the Umoja team was working with those bodies for their implementation. Over the past year, the Board of Auditors and the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) had both reviewed the project. The Board had noted the improvement in the management of the project as well as the complexity and scale of the challenges posed by roll-out. The Administration had accepted the seven additional recommendations made by the Board to ensure successful completion of the project, as well as the Umoja-related recommendations made by OIOS.

6. Umoja implementation had proved more challenging than anticipated, with unforeseen contingencies. More had had to be done to meet targets: data accumulated over decades had needed to be cleansed, converted and validated, taking up significant staff resources, and user access mapped; post-deployment support for cluster 3 and 4 entities had proved more complicated than anticipated, and had drawn heavily on the Umoja team and process owners. The tight timeline for roll-outs, and the scale of the November roll-out, had required the adoption of a group approach, with responsibilities borne by a broader base of stakeholders.

7. Deployment groups in New York, Geneva and Vienna, and the Department of Field Support for field missions, had provided support for implementing entities, mobilized resources, organized data-cleansing, led the user-mapping exercise, established training programmes and fostered the cross-functional and cross-departmental teamwork required for successful deployment. The groups would continue to provide support until Umoja was stabilized and properly internalized by staff. It was also necessary to provide production support to entities, to train staff, particularly process experts, and to address issues identified by post-implementation review teams.

8. Much remained to be done: addressing emerging demands and business re-engineering, upgrading the system, implementing change requests, and improving

practice. Preparations must be made for deployment in 2016 in cluster 5, and also for reassessment of the functional content and timing of Extension 2 in the light of experience, emerging needs and strategic priorities. Work was under way on identifying the support model for mainstreaming, to be presented in the next progress report.

9. The Secretary-General was mindful of the significant financial and political investment of Member States in Umoja. Through the implementation of Umoja, the Organization was harmonizing business processes, redefining roles and responsibilities, and reducing duplication of work. The Secretary-General remained committed to realizing both qualitative and quantitative cumulative benefits, estimated at between $140 million and $220 million by 2019.

10. In close cooperation with the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) team, Umoja performance metrics had been aligned across six categories of qualitative benefits, with drivers and indicators to be presented to Umoja governance bodies. The Umoja director, process owners and the Chief Information Technology Officer were reassessing how benefits realization targets would be achieved, and elaborating benefits realization plans. The results would be reflected in subsequent progress reports.

11. Resource requirements for the biennium 2014-2015 had been estimated in the sixth progress report (A/69/385) at $129.4 million. Based on actual expenditure since then and updated projections for 2015, total direct project expenditure for the biennium 2014-2015 remained unchanged, as did projected direct resource requirements of $385 million for the period 2008-2015.

12. Resource requirements for 2016-2017 also remained unchanged at $54.3 million. However, the complexity of the November roll-out, and support required, meant that work on cluster 5 and design of Extension 2 had been delayed. The Umoja team would be in a better position to make a more precise estimate of the resource requirements for 2016-2017 by the end of the year. The Secretary-General would submit revised estimates for 2016-2017 at the first part of the resumed seventieth session.

13. While great progress had been made, challenges remained. The effort required went far beyond the work of the core project team, process owners and the Chief Information Technology Officer, and of staff

around the world — Umoja could only succeed with the support and engagement of all stakeholders. The Administration counted on the ongoing support of Member States, and called on senior management to ensure that there was a collaborative commitment to fully reap the benefits of Umoja.

14. **Mr. Mkumba** (Chair of the Audit Operations Committee of the Board of Auditors), introducing the fourth annual progress report of the Board of Auditors on the implementation of the United Nations enterprise resource planning system (A/70/158), said that Umoja was a complex, global, high-value project intended to modernize United Nations core business processes and systems, spanning most of the Organization's administrative and support functions, as the key to efficient and effective functioning.

15. The report focused on project management, deployment strategy and organizational readiness, support arrangements, risks attending the current deployment schedule, and the costs and benefits of Umoja, and reflected the position ahead of the cluster 3 deployment in entities around the world and the cluster 4 deployment in the remaining United Nations entities. The scale of the challenges in implementing Umoja could not be overestimated.

16. If implemented successfully, and notwithstanding the attendant risks, Umoja would drive more cost-effective delivery of mandates by increasing the effectiveness of administrative functions and by providing improved management information to support decision-making. It was essential for reliance on the Umoja project team to be reduced and for heads of business units to assume responsibility for successful deployment and effective use of the system.

17. Weaknesses in preparing staff for the changes introduced by Umoja, and gaps in post-implementation support arrangements, had introduced further risks in the implementation strategy. The Administration had not developed adequate contingency plans to mitigate those risks. Significant challenges had been encountered with previous deployments of Umoja owing to the lack of organizational readiness.

18. There had now been a sustained improvement in Umoja project management, with senior ownership by the Under-Secretary-General for Management and improvements in management of strategic issues. The role of process owners had matured and the Administration had started to apply the concept of

process management. However, the Administration continued to be driven by the published project schedule in determining its roll-out plans rather than by objective assessments of organizational readiness or the ability to manage business change to generate the expected benefits.

19. Although the Secretary-General had indicated his recognition of the problems experienced with previous deployments and his commitment to a pace of implementation in accordance with the ability of the Organization to adopt the new system and processes, the current project schedule remained optimistic and high risk rather than being founded on realistic planning assumptions.

20. The Administration had been aware of the challenge posed by the roll-out of Umoja in 2015 but had considered that delaying deployment beyond 2015 posed a greater risk than proceeding in the face of known weaknesses, as it would have led to increased project costs, overstretched the project team, and created a range of practical problems arising from having to maintain legacy systems alongside Umoja for an extended period. The Administration had also considered that the Organization was primed for the Umoja roll-out and that delay would have led to a loss of momentum and impacted adversely on morale.

21. However, the risks associated with implementation had not been adequately assessed and contingency planning had been poorly developed. The Administration had assumed that it would be able to deploy additional resources to address any problems, as it had with the roll-out in clusters 1 and 2. But the scale of the challenge attending clusters 3 and 4 had been of a different order of magnitude due to the more complex functionality involved and the geographically spread locations. The Board had identified a number of gaps in the Administration's preparations for the implementation of Umoja in the areas of training, user testing, data conversion, and post-production support following go-live.

22. Longer-term support and mainstreaming of Umoja were to be delivered by the Office of Information and Communications Technology. Although the Office was providing help desk facilities and other support, detailed plans for the transition from the project team had not been prepared and the feasibility and costs of the transition were uncertain. Additionally, the Organization had yet to define a clear target operating model within which Umoja would operate. That had been noted as a key risk mitigation factor in relation to business transformation, in which connection proposals for a global service delivery model were to be presented at the current session. Umoja implementation had been used to improve a range of administrative processes, but further optimization of business processes and systems was possible.

23. The Administration expected Umoja costs to reach approximately $439.4 million in 2016-2017. However, the likelihood that the cost of stabilizing the system in clusters 3 and 4 would exceed current estimates and the work remaining on Extension 2 meant that the Board could give no assurance that the full scope of Umoja could be delivered within the current cost estimate. The financial benefits case for Umoja was heavily dependent on assumptions made several years previously, and the forecast of overall benefits did not enjoy high confidence among managers.

24. The Administration was committed to the delivery of cumulative quantitative benefits of $140 million to $220 million by 2019. Estimated quantitative benefits of $81.4 million were envisaged in 2017, comprising $30 million under the regular budget and $51.4 million in peacekeeping operations. Yet no credible support for the estimated benefits expected from 2017 onwards had been presented to the Board.

25. In order to maximize the chances of successfully completing the project, the Board recommended increasing the level of ownership by heads of business units; reducing the level of risk in the current deployment approach; improving the readiness of the Office of Information and Communications Technology to take over management of and support for Umoja; and increasing the certainty of benefits to be brought by Umoja.

26. Of the 21 outstanding recommendations previously made by the Board, all accepted by the Administration, three had been fully implemented, six were being implemented, three had not been implemented and nine had been closed by the Board. Overall, the Board judged management to be committed to implementing its recommendations.

27. **Mr. Ruiz Massieu** (Chair of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary

Questions), introducing the related report of the Advisory Committee (A/70/7/Add.19), said that the Advisory Committee welcomed the deployment of the Umoja Integration solution in cluster 3 entities in June 2015, and that deployment in cluster 4 entities was under way in accordance with established target dates. Nevertheless, the Advisory Committee was concerned that the significant problems encountered during deployment in clusters 3 and 4 might have an impact on implementation and cost projections.

28. The Advisory Committee reiterated the need for implementation of the full scope of the project, as approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 67/246, in particular, Umoja Extension 2, comprising processes for budget formulation, supply chain management, grant management, programme management, and conference and event management. It was for the General Assembly to decide on a course of action regarding implementation of Extension 2, in which regard the Secretary-General should submit proposals for full implementation of Umoja.

29. The Advisory Committee emphasized the need for transition plans pending transfer of responsibility to the Office of Information and Communications Technology, currently planned for January 2017. It was essential for the Umoja Integration solution to be maintained and updated centrally for the entire Secretariat, and to avoid establishment of ad hoc departmental teams for supporting, maintaining, upgrading, or further enhancing Umoja. The Advisory Committee recommended that any proposals for Umoja maintenance, upgrade and enhancements should be submitted for consideration by the General Assembly in the Umoja progress reports, after central review.

30. The Advisory Committee also recommended that the General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to avoid further delays in the preparation of benefits realization plans, and to include information on such plans in his next progress report.

31. With regard to project staffing, the Advisory Committee was concerned by the ongoing loss of skilled personnel. As the lack of relevant skills posed one of the biggest risks to successful completion of the project, the Advisory Committee recommended that the General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to submit a detailed action plan for ensuring that the knowledge base acquired was maintained within the Organization. In the interim, the Advisory

Committee recommended that the General Assembly should authorize the Secretary-General, as an exceptional, temporary measure, to postpone the downsizing of the Umoja project team planned for 2016.

32. The Advisory Committee reiterated the need to provide the General Assembly with information on the indirect costs of preparatory activities borne by implementing offices, and recommended that the General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to ensure that, for the next phases of the project, a detailed accounting of such indirect costs was maintained, and that fully transparent information was provided in future progress reports.

33. **Ms. Lingenfelder** (South Africa), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said that the Group reaffirmed its support for management reform initiatives, including Umoja, aimed at increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the Organization in delivering mandates. She welcomed the roll-out of the Umoja real estate functionality in all Secretariat entities and the deployment of the Umoja Integration solution in cluster 3 and cluster 4 in June and November. The Group noted the improvement in the management of the project and the execution of the Umoja master project plan in accordance with target dates and functionalities.

34. Nevertheless, the Group remained concerned by the significant risks faced by the project, including organizational readiness, building the necessary in-house capacity for supporting core Umoja activities, cost escalation in the remaining phases of the project, delays in the project schedule, lack of transparency regarding the full cost, and lack of a coherent delivery and benefits plan. The Group was also concerned by post-deployment issues, including accountability, resources required, coordination, and the shortage of trained experts in many departments.

35. The Group had taken note of the establishment of the Umoja Business Intelligence Academy and the management dashboard by the steering committee to support decision-making in tackling emerging problems. Lessons learned from such initiatives were fundamental to implementation of the remaining elements of the project. The Group was interested in the post-implementation reviews of clusters 3 and 4 as well as preparedness for implementation of the remaining functional phase: Extension 2 and cluster 5.

36. Strong leadership and coordination were key to successfully delivering such a complex Organization-wide business transformation. The Group sought assurances that the project would continue to benefit from effective governance, oversight, accountability and management arrangements in order to achieve the desired objectives.

37. The Group of 77 and China stressed the importance of knowledge transfer to and the development of solid knowledge of Umoja within the Office of Information and Communications Technology, and the need for greater clarity regarding governance, management and operational arrangements for the maintenance, upgrade and continuous improvement of Umoja, in the interest of a coordinated transition process. The Group sought assurances that the transfer of responsibility to the Office would further enhance the Umoja Integration solution.

38. Regarding benefits realization, the Secretariat had not yet established a clear baseline from which achieved benefits could be measured. The formation of a dedicated team to determine how benefits realization targets would be achieved offered an opportunity to refresh the business case with a more current estimate, as the existing estimate dated back some six years. A benefits realization plan should clarify how data from Umoja would be used to deliver benefits and indicate the potential impact of more efficient and effective administrative processes.

39. Lastly, she emphasized the importance of providing Member States with comprehensive, high-quality, accurate and timely information to facilitate consideration of and decision-making on administrative and budgetary proposals.

40. **Mr. Dettling** (Switzerland), speaking also on behalf of Liechtenstein, said that the deployment of Umoja Integration in cluster 3 and cluster 4 entities, on schedule, had been a significant milestone, yet a training deficit and inadequate preparation in business units would impact on the project schedule: additional time might be required to stabilize the system in those clusters. The Secretary-General must balance the two imperatives of the implementation schedule and the need for organizational readiness, since failure to respect either entailed risks. Ultimately, the technical deployment of the system was less important than the successful re-engineering of business processes and the

realization of a lasting cultural change throughout the Organization.

41. Umoja Extension 2 was a necessary and worthwhile investment. Yet post-implementation support for earlier roll-outs had been more demanding than expected, a consideration to be factored into proposals for implementing the full scope of Umoja, which should be presented to the Committee at the first part of the resumed session.

42. There was a need to be more realistic about the benefits of Umoja. Most would be qualitative, such as more timely and improved data, faster processes, better internal control and therefore improved risk management and better informed and more accountable decision-making. Some benefits would also be quantitative and translate directly into net savings. However, it was clear from enterprise resource planning projects in the private sector that the impact of Umoja on the staff population in support functions would be moderate. Rather, first and foremost it should lead to staff working smarter and with better tools, thereby improving the Organization's overall performance.

43. **Mr. de Preter** (Observer for the European Union), speaking also on behalf of the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey; the stabilization and association process country Bosnia and Herzegovina; and, in addition, Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine, said that the European Union continued to be a strong supporter of Umoja, intended to modernize business processes and systems that were crucial to the efficient and effective management of the Organization. Umoja would allow the Organization to harmonize business processes, reduce duplication, and improve delivery of mandates.

44. He welcomed the deployment of the Umoja Integration solution in cluster 4 entities, including departments and offices at Headquarters, as a critical milestone. However, notwithstanding the significant progress, including the improvement in management of the project, challenges and risks remained and must be addressed if the system was to deliver full functionality and yield full benefits. Risks included further timeline slippage, with associated cost escalation.

45. He agreed with the Board of Auditors that there was a need to evaluate the case for an Umoja optimization project, and the comment in the progress

report that continuous improvements must be implemented in order to fully exploit Umoja and adopt industry best practices.

46. The European Union attached great importance to the implementation of Extension 2, including functionalities related to supply chain management, budget formulation, programme management, conference and event management, and force planning. The budget module would provide better granularity of data, enabling managers to see better the full cost of activities and improve the budget formulation process, which would aid Member States in decision-making. Implementation of the full scope of the project was necessary to protect the investment already made, as well as to fully realize all benefits of the project. To that end, it was essential for the Umoja Integration solution to be maintained and updated centrally in a coordinated manner.

47. He looked forward to discussion of the mainstreaming plan for Umoja, taking into account the comments of the Board of Auditors on transition planning, the transfer of knowledge and resourcing, as well as of ensuring that Umoja project expertise was retained going forward.

48. His delegation stressed the importance of the commitment of senior management and process owners to successful deployment, including their accountability for ensuring organizational readiness and adoption of standard business processes. Umoja was now the daily solution used by staff in United Nations offices around the world, including peacekeeping missions, and ensuring that those new ways of working were fully embedded was crucial for the success of the project.

49. **Mr. Upadhyay** (United States of America) said that Umoja was central to the ambitious, transformative reform agenda embarked on by the Organization. Paired with mobility and other reform initiatives, it would revitalize the Organization through the global service delivery model. After early delays and budget overruns, the successful go-live at duty stations away from Headquarters and now in New York was testament to the desire of Member States to see a more modern and effective Organization, and to the collective will of its staff and management. He was confident that the ongoing challenges would be overcome as the project progressed and lessons learned were applied.

50. His delegation was encouraged by the fact that the Secretary-General planned to bolster business re-engineering capacity to better leverage Umoja. Post implementation, focus must remain on streamlining and restructuring business processes. The Secretary-General must deliver qualitative and quantitative benefits that more than justified the time, effort and investment made.

51. **Mr. Kishimori** (Japan) said that his delegation had always supported initiatives to transform and modernize the business of the United Nations, including enterprise resource planning, the International Public Sector Accounting Standards, information and communications technology, and human resources reform. Such initiatives were essential if the Organization was to remain relevant in the face of new challenges. Accordingly, he welcomed the deployment of Umoja in clusters 3 and 4, notably the successfully roll-out in New York.

52. That was, however, only an initial step. Umoja would not be complete until Extension 2 was fully deployed. He was concerned by the delays with Extension 2; the Secretary-General should submit a comprehensive report on Umoja implementation, including a reassessment of Extension 2, at the first part of the resumed session.

53. Umoja was a long-term project yielding qualitative changes in the United Nations system. Member States had invested a great deal in the project, and deserved a return on their investment. With patience and continued support, Umoja would result in a better, modernized United Nations. In order to achieve success in a business transformation project of such magnitude, organizational readiness across the entire Secretariat was imperative.

54. **Mr. Alsurayye** (Kuwait) reiterated his Government's belief in the vital role of the United Nations and its mission of maintaining international peace and security, especially in view of the escalating challenges that required a redoubled effort on the part of the Organization.

55. His delegation welcomed the progress in the roll-out of Umoja, but was concerned by the challenges and risks identified by the Board of Auditors and the Advisory Committee. He noted the importance of the timelines for the implementation of Umoja, within budget, throughout the United Nations. Investment in information and communications technology enhanced

the Organization's capabilities and effectiveness in responding to international challenges.

56. Implementation of such programmes was, however, contingent upon payment by Member States of their assessed contributions in full, on time, and without conditions so that the Organization could fulfil its mandate.

57. In that regard, he stressed the importance of oversight and risk management as being critical to the success of Umoja and to streamlined, transparent and robust delivery of the benefits of the project, including enhanced performance, greater transparency and more accurate data.

58. **Mr. Sánchez Azcuy** (Cuba) said that his delegation supported all measures intended to increase efficiency and effectiveness and judicious use of scarce resources. Accordingly, full account must be taken of the views and recommendations of the Board of Auditors and the Advisory Committee. As with any ongoing project, adjustments were necessary, and patience should be exercised pending implementation of Umoja for there to be proper analysis of the benefits and shortcomings; for the time being his delegation reserved its judgment.

59. Full development and successful implementation of Umoja necessitated firm commitment by senior management and promotion of a sense of ownership by the Secretariat as a whole, which must be guaranteed. His delegation agreed with the Advisory Committee on the pressing need for benefits realization plans. The lack of such plans made it difficult to understand any administrative measure or budget proposal involving cuts in staffing or expenditure.

60. From a medium- and long-term perspective, a successful transition phase was very important to the viability of the project. His delegation would pay close attention to the transfer of responsibilities to the Office of Information and Communications Technology, which would potentially assume overall responsibility for the functioning of Umoja.

61. The most difficult aspect of any project was the training of human resources — the key to the stability of the project. Accordingly, the strengthening of internal capacity in support of the Organization's activities and needs and the transfer of know-how for the institutionalization of Umoja support were very important, as was the retention of skilled personnel. He

looked forward to the Secretary-General's proposals in that regard.

62. He noted the increases in financial resources for the project, and trusted that they were being used effectively for its full implementation. He also noted that what was an administrative project was taking regular budget resources away from the three pillars of the substantive work of the Organization, which should constitute its primary focus.

63. **Mr. Takasu** (Under-Secretary-General for Management) said that Umoja was not simply an information technology program to replace the Integrated Management Information System (IMIS). Rather, it was a major transformation initiative. Organizational readiness — commitment of senior management, expertise, and staff familiarity with the system — was a key issue, and was fully understood throughout the Secretariat. Challenges remained, but the Secretariat was committed to reaching the final destination.

> *Review of the management and administration of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights* (A/70/68 and A/70/68/Add.1)

64. **Mr. Achamkulangare** (Joint Inspection Unit), introducing the report of the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) on the review of the management and administration of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (A/70/68 and A/70/68/Add.1), said that the report contained six formal recommendations covering governance and oversight by Member States, risk management, strategic planning, geographical distribution of staff, human resources management and mainstreaming of human rights across the United Nations system.

65. Recommendation 1, on governance-related issues, was addressed to the General Assembly; recommendation 6, on mainstreaming human rights across the United Nations system, was addressed to the Secretary-General; the remaining recommendations were addressed to the High Commissioner for Human Rights as the executive head of OHCHR. The six formal recommendations were complemented by a number of informal recommendations for strengthening management and related practices at OHCHR, with

reference to standards and good practices prevailing in the United Nations system.

66. JIU supported OHCHR in its ongoing reform and had identified areas for improvement, while taking account of the specificities of OHCHR, recognizing the role of the Office, and ensuring that nothing in the review impacted adversely on the High Commissioner's independence. The report, based on a consultative approach involving interaction with diverse stakeholders, had been prepared in conformity with JIU norms.

67. The overarching objective was to improve the working of the Office, enhance its effectiveness and efficiency, introduce greater transparency and accountability, and reinforce its strategic position as the leading United Nations entity in the area of human rights. JIU had analysed the growth of the Office from a primarily normative, headquarters-based organization into an operational, field-based one; indicated the need for the Office to update its organizational structure, rules, regulations and practices; and noted the challenges posed by dependence on extrabudgetary resources — there was a compelling case for substantially increasing the regular budget resources of the Office. While acknowledging the progress made by the Office, JIU had pointed out the scope for further improvement and enhanced accountability.

68. Member States had primary responsibility for governance and oversight-related issues. A shared vision of OHCHR should help Member States to provide strategic guidance, exercise oversight and monitor performance, thereby enhancing effectiveness and efficiency. The review illustrated the complexity of the governance structure and practices of OHCHR, outlined aspects of the current governance arrangements and the resultant dynamics, and suggested the need for a dialogue among Member States.

69. Regarding recommendation 1, JIU acknowledged the initiatives undertaken by OHCHR in strategic planning, results-based management and human resources, and made a positive assessment of the internal reform process, including the organizational effectiveness programme and the functional review. JIU made suggestions for further improvement of the corporate culture in terms of operational procedures and working practices, including strategic planning, results-based management and increased attention to

risk management, and had identified the risk areas faced by the Office.

70. With respect to recommendation 2, the Unit had identified problems arising from the absence of full alignment between the Secretary-General's strategic framework, covering programmatic activities on a biennial basis and submitted to the Committee for Programme and Coordination and the General Assembly, and the OHCHR management plan, outlining the Office's priorities over a four-year period and including not only the activities mandated by decisions of legislative bodies but also activities undertaken at the initiative of the High Commissioner.

71. Having two different planning processes led to inconsistencies and incoherence. The rules, regulations and practices followed in the preparation of the Office's management plan, and whether they were in alignment with United Nations policies and practices, were not fully clear. Whereas the strategic framework was discussed and endorsed by the General Assembly, there was no such endorsement of the management plan by a legislative body. Member States were consulted only informally, and questions had been raised regarding the adequacy of such consultations, the lack of sufficient time to study the plan and offer comments, and the absence of any obligation on the part of the Office to take comments on board. Those concerns gave rise to issues relating to transparency, especially with regard to the setting of priorities, and the use and monitoring of extrabudgetary resources.

72. In connection with recommendation 3, the review acknowledged the significant efforts made regarding management of human resources — a critical area for OHCHR — and analysed human resources management within the Office, paying special attention to the request by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 22/2, on composition of the Office's staff, regarding geographical distribution and gender balance. JIU recognized that OHCHR, while a part of the United Nations Secretariat, faced the challenge of transforming itself from a headquarters-based organization to a field-based one: 40 per cent of its staff were now in the field, requiring adaptation of the rules and regulations.

73. With regard to recommendations 4 and 5, the report recommended increased efforts to mainstream human rights across the system and to improve coordination between OHCHR and other entities

having human rights mandates, in the context of the Secretary-General's Human Rights Up Front initiative.

74. With respect to recommendation 6, JIU had made an additional 35 informal recommendations for further improvements in management policies, structures and practices, including: optimizing the organizational structure, including field presences; strengthening results-based management; implementing the Secretariat's accountability framework; developing a resource mobilization, outreach and partnership strategy; enhancing the capacity of the Office for rapid response in emergency and crisis situations; addressing the challenges posed by dual reporting; enhancing transparency and accountability in the management of trust funds; improving information-sharing and knowledge management; and increasing transparency in the funding of special procedures mandate holders.

75. **Mr. Baez** (Chief, Policy and Oversight Coordination Service), introducing the related note by the Secretary-General (A/70/68/Add.1), said that the Human Rights Council, in its resolution 22/2, had requested the Joint Inspection Unit to undertake a comprehensive follow-up review of the management and administration of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in particular with regard to recruitment policies and the composition of the staff.

76. Some of the recommendations in the JIU report had been accepted and would be implemented by the Office, others required further consideration, bearing in mind that OHCHR was bound by the regulations, rules, policies and procedures governing the Secretariat, and that it was accountable to the same intergovernmental organs. The Administration welcomed the Unit's observations on the long-term challenges facing OHCHR, such as financial sustainability in a context of increasing mandates and demands in connection with Human Rights Up Front, mainstreaming human rights across the United Nations system, and the emphasis on human rights in the post-2015 development agenda, as contributing to the improved management of resources and increased efficiency of the Office.

Agenda item 142: Report on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (*continued*) (A/C.5/70/L.5)

Draft resolution A/C.5/70/L.5: *Report on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services*

77. *Draft resolution* A/C.5/70/L.5 *was adopted.*

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.