



# General Assembly

Seventieth session

Official Records

Distr.: General  
24 November 2015

Original: English

## Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee)

### Summary record (partial)\* of the 16th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 30 October 2015, at 10 a.m.

*Chair:* Mr. Bowler ..... (Malawi)

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\* No summary record was prepared for the informal part of the meeting.

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*The meeting was called to order at 10 a.m.*

**Agenda item 56: Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects** (A/70/95-S/2015/446 and A/70/357-S/2015/682)

**Agenda item 57: Comprehensive review of special political missions** (A/70/95-S/2015/446, A/70/357-S/2015/682 and A/70/400)

1. **The Chair** said that, in response to the overarching recommendation that the United Nations could not continue to address matters relating to peace and security in separate, unrelated silos, the Committee had decided, in the first part of the meeting, to address the questions of peacekeeping and special political missions jointly.

2. **Mr. Lykketoft** (Denmark), President of the General Assembly, said that it was the first time the Fourth Committee was holding a joint debate on peacekeeping operations and special political missions. It had been prompted to do so following the Secretary-General's commissioning of a comprehensive review of peace operations, and the recent plenary debate he himself had chaired on both the commissioned report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (A/70/95-S/2015/446) and the subsequent report of the Secretary-General entitled "The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (A/70/357-S/2015/682). Based on that debate and later consultations, he intended to submit a General Assembly resolution conveying the commitment of Member States to assess those recommendations.

3. While peace operations had contributed greatly to peace and security in the world over the past 70 years, it was crucial for the United Nations approach to keep pace with evolving challenges and new threats. The continued escalation of violence in Syria and the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in the region tragically illustrated the consequences of a lack of international unity and effective action from the United Nations. The spread of violent extremism, the proliferation of weapons, asymmetric warfare, cyberspace attacks and epidemics like Ebola also demonstrated that threats to global peace and security were constantly changing. In an increasingly complex and interconnected world, United Nations peace operations required steady refinement based on

adequate analytical and operational capabilities. Special attention needed to be given, for example, to preventive diplomacy, political settlements, comprehensive approaches and greater budgetary and management flexibility. It was important also to consider the relation between peacekeeping operations and special political missions, their common dimensions and how best to transcend silos and adopt a more holistic approach to such complex issues.

4. A comprehensive approach required the consideration, in tandem with High-level Panel's and the Secretary-General's reviews, also of the report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968-S/2015/490) and the independently-published global study on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), concerning women and peace and security. Although those processes were separate, they had been inspired by the same sense of urgency and the need to strengthen the role, capacity and efficiency of United Nations peace operations.

5. With that in mind, he intended to hold a high-level thematic debate in May 2016 to provide Member States and others with a platform to identify common themes and synergies from all those reviews and to enable the United Nations system to deal more consistently with peace and security.

6. **Mr. Eliasson** (Deputy Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) said that he welcomed the interactive dialogue with the Committee under the two agenda items on special political missions and peacekeeping operations, reflecting the broad holistic approach needed in the current international environment.

7. The Secretary-General had asked members of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations to consult with Member States and regional partners, and the results were reflected in the Panel's report and recommendations. The Secretary-General had also asked former Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette — with the help of Norway and Ethiopia — to consult with Member States on how to implement the recommendations. In addition, consultations had been organized with the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

8. Introducing the report of the Secretary-General on the future of United Nations peace operations

(A/70/357-S/2015/682), he said that it offered a road map for implementing the Panel's far-reaching recommendations and identified priorities for Member States, the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretariat. The core message was that contemporary conflicts were outpacing efforts to address them. Such efforts needed to be global to tackle the spread and intensity of the conflicts, and the instruments used had to be strengthened or adapted for an effective response.

9. While there was consensus on the need for change, it was more difficult to find agreement on how to change. The reports of the Panel and of the Advisory Group of Experts and the global study had all noted that peace and security, development and human rights were interdependent, such that one aspect could not be improved without progress in the others. Sustainable Development Goal 16 as well held that peaceful and inclusive societies promoted people's security, development and rights. Successful crisis response depended on prevention and peacebuilding. Effective peace operations required complex cooperation between the Security Council, Member States, mission personnel contributors and the Secretariat. That meant working horizontally across pillars and structures; setting priorities and sequencing activities; pooling efforts; and harnessing each other's comparative advantages.

10. The High-level Panel had emphasized the primacy of political strategies and solutions to guide the strengthening of peace operations. In his report on the implementation of the Panel's recommendations, the Secretary-General had noted that a negotiated political settlement was the fundamental objective of every United Nations peace operation. Determining the best political process and then supporting it had to be the basis for deployments in the field. The Secretary-General had also highlighted the link between a negotiated political settlement and the protection of civilians, which must be an integral part of United Nations peace operations.

11. In response to the Panel's call for the full range of United Nations peace and security instruments to be used in the search for political solutions to conflict, the Secretary-General's report had set out an action plan. First, there should be greater emphasis on prevention. Secondly, there needed to be changes to the way operations were planned and conducted. Thirdly,

partnerships with regional organizations had to be reinforced.

12. In terms of prevention, the Secretary-General was calling for a significant strengthening of the Secretariat's capacities for prevention and mediation, along with an expansion of United Nations regional offices to assist Member States and regional partners. He agreed with the Panel that United Nations development actors had a role to play in assisting national actors in prevention, and he pledged to expand their capacity to do so. The Secretary-General had made a commitment to use the Human Rights Up Front initiative to enhance the United Nations capacity to take early action to prevent abuses of human rights that could escalate into violence and mass atrocities. Prevention was not a duty of the United Nations alone, however, but needed to be nationally anchored and driven, with consent, cooperation and transparency at the core. Member States and regional partners were being asked by the Secretary-General to provide the political backing for a reinvigorated international engagement in prevention, and the Security Council was being asked to turn its attention resolutely to prevention early on.

13. There had to be changes in how both peacekeeping operations and special political missions were planned and conducted. Some were already under way, like the initiatives to strengthen the capabilities and performance of contributors to peace operations; the respective Under-Secretaries-General would elaborate on those later. One aim of change was make peace operations more effective in order to limit lives lost and to exit sooner. The proposals for more tailored peace operations, better analysis and planning and sequenced mandates were intended to match peace operations more closely to the specific conditions in which they took place. Another objective was to make peace operations more agile by using rapid deployment, fast and responsive logistics and more efficient administrative systems to stem violence and engage national and regional partners. A further aim was to make peace operations more responsive to people's needs. To ensure that the people receiving assistance had confidence in the role of the United Nations, it was vital to involve them in defining strategies. Outreach, protection work and general conduct were critical parts of such a responsive and responsible approach. The personnel contributed by Member States, whose welfare was crucial to success,

also had a legitimate need for greater safety and security.

14. The long-standing principles of peacekeeping — consent, impartiality and non-use of force — remained the bedrock of all the proposed changes. However, those principles could not be used as an excuse for non-engagement in dangerous environments, but had to serve as guarantors of fragile political processes. While the United Nations could not lead military counter-terrorism operations, peace operations with a mandate to protect had an obligation not to stand by in the face of attacks against innocent civilians.

15. As far as partnerships were concerned, the High-level Panel had affirmed that current conflicts went beyond any one actor. The Charter provided a firm basis for the essential United Nations engagement with regional organizations. Both the Panel and the Secretary-General had called attention to the key strategic partnership with the African Union, which spanned the conflict spectrum and the continent of Africa, which was the setting for 80 per cent of United Nations peace operations. The Secretary-General envisaged a deep and institutionalized partnership involving consultation and collaboration for prevention, mediation, crisis response and action to sustain peace. The predictable, sustainable financing of African Union operations authorized by the Security Council was a key international responsibility, and the United Nations was committed to working with the African Union to achieve its goals of self-reliance and capacity to plan, support and conduct peace operations.

16. Despite differing views on the recommendations at hand, it should be remembered that the lives and welfare of millions of people were at stake. Public confidence in multilateral responses also hung in the balance, particularly if the United Nations failed or was seen to fail to resolve current conflicts. Since the future of the United Nations peace operations — and of the Organization itself — was at stake, all had a duty to tackle the challenge seriously, urgently and holistically.

17. **The Chair** opened the floor for questions and comments from Committee members.

18. **Mr. Maleki** (Islamic Republic of Iran), noting that United Nations peacekeeping missions had a history of some success and some failure, said that the failures had been in large part due to divergent interests among Member States that had prevented the United Nations from taking decisive timely action.

However, as pointed out in a 2011 article in *The New York Times*, the United Nations itself was also partly to blame, beset as it was by outdated or duplicated missions and mandates, poor management practices, ineffectual oversight and a general lack of accountability. The article had quoted former Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown as describing the lack of efficiency and the redundancy in the United Nations system, with a budget that was utterly opaque and non-transparent. His delegation would like to know whether those issues remained a problem.

19. **Mr. Kandeel** (Egypt) said that his delegation agreed that the best investment for the Organization was in preventing conflicts rather than resolving them. However, his Government wanted clarification on the components of prevention. Prevention could be made a pretext for premature intervention, and could be open to abuse from some of parties to a conflict. Effective prevention involved tackling the root causes, which in most cases were a combination of poverty, violent ideas and weapons. Prevention would not succeed unless all three elements were addressed by development policies to combat them.

20. **Mr. Eliasson** (Deputy Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) said that he was not familiar with the article in question, although he did find it useful to learn from his predecessors. He conceded that there was room for improvement within the Organization, and that was why he and the Secretary-General had wanted to convene the High-level Panel. The points raised by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran were, in fact, part of the recommendations of the Panel and the Secretary-General, and it would be up to Members to respond to those recommendations.

21. A decade or two earlier, there had been no doubt about the United Nations being impartial in peacekeeping, but the huge challenges now included asymmetrical threats and terrorist movements. He agreed with the representative of Egypt that the success of future peace operations depended on effective political strategies in parallel to peacekeeping. It was also vital to ensure that huge operations did not continue indefinitely; States hosting peacekeeping operations needed to understand that an exit strategy was essential, not only for financial reasons but also because every situation had its own dynamic. That was the challenge facing Member States, and the United

Nations was open to healthy criticism that would lead to the right kind of reform.

22. On the specific question of prevention, it was vital to flesh out the concept in terms of the United Nations involvement in conflict. The media and international organizations became involved in mid-course of a conflict. The United Nations had the comparative advantage of becoming involved much earlier, at the prevention stage, and also afterwards in the post-conflict period. Prevention was written into Chapter I, Article 1, and Chapter VI, Article 33, of the Charter. The latter Article stated that parties to any dispute should seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. That provision should be truly implemented, as those mechanisms were not always applied.

23. It was vital to be alert to early warning signs of impending conflict, at the core stage when root problems flared up; when difficult developmental or environmental conditions sparked social unrest; when human rights violations began to be committed and before they led to mass atrocities. The current migration crisis, for instance, would not have reached such proportions if the Syrian war had been brought to an end and if enough resources had been made available to deal with the humanitarian situation at the start. In any case, at every stage it was important to keep a transparent dialogue open with the Member States involved, and any action taken to restore security should not be imposed but should come from them. The basic principles of peacekeeping would remain unchanged. Prevention had to be made a tangible concept and it should be done cooperatively and with full respect for sovereignty.

24. **Mr. Sætre** (Norway) said that the welcome opportunity for a holistic debate on peacekeeping operations was testament to the added value brought by the Secretary-General's initiative to reassess the Organization's peace operations. He wanted to know how the synergies between the three reviews would be handled, and how Member States would be helped to best make the recommended changes.

25. **Mr. Toro-Carnevali** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) said that the report of the High-level Panel had called for peace operations to move beyond the culture of armoured vehicles and be more people-

centred by interacting with local communities; but had also pointed out that 90 per cent of personnel in political missions and two thirds of peacekeepers were deployed in high-risk situations of ongoing conflict and grave security concerns. He wanted to know how the United Nations could reconcile the wish to get closer to people with the security situation.

26. **Mr. Munir** (Pakistan), welcoming the Deputy Secretary-General's remarks about the safety and security of peacekeeping troops, said that his delegation saw no conflict between the principles of peacekeeping and the mandate for the protection of civilians. However, it would like to know whether the concept of proactive defence referred to in the High-level Panel's report would have an impact on the protection of civilians or on the safety and security of peacekeepers.

27. **Mr. Eliasson** (Deputy Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations), agreeing with the representative of Norway on the need for a holistic approach, said that it was important to see how the different parts of the United Nations connected, if one was to live up to the old slogan of no peace without development and no development without peace. That was the thinking behind the three reviews, which should not be seen as sitting in their own silos but rather as helping to encourage horizontal ways of working even while maintaining the quality of the vertical approaches. It was a major challenge for the Organization because its structures had been based on silos for many years. The Secretary-General's report had deliberately incorporated input from both the Panel's report and the 2015 review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture. The peacebuilding review had galvanized some very important collaborative work with the Peacebuilding Commission on, for instance, the importance of post-conflict efforts involving recovery, reconciliation and institution-building to break the cycle of conflict. The Peacebuilding Commission had its own links with the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. The Sustainable Development Goals were also relevant, as they included the objectives of peaceful societies, access to justice, and strong institutions as the basis for development.

28. 2015 might be a turning point for the United Nations, as it used the reviews and related international meetings and conferences to assess whether it was

ready to face the coming challenges to its peace operations. It was vital to make multilateralism work, for there were many inward-looking forces that saw the outside world as a problem. Good international solutions to issues such as climate and migration were in the national interests of countries. Convincing the general public, parliaments and the media would help in the endeavour.

29. In response to the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, he said that although he had always advised peacekeepers to assist the local community with practical matters such as repair work at close quarters, he would hesitate to advocate that today because of the security risks. It was indeed a difficult dilemma for troops to be a positive force while being realistic about protecting their own security.

30. He welcomed the recognition by the representative of Pakistan that there was a correspondence between the mandate to protect civilians and the principles of peacekeeping. As for proactive defence, he recalled extremely difficult meetings about whether to implement a “muscular” approach to situations in countries like Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Although the end result had been a classic peacekeeping operation in Mali, he was nonetheless proud to have been involved in such brave thinking. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the proposed Intervention Brigade had been a more proactive step. One worrying situation among several that could soon go out of control was in South Sudan. The Panel’s review and the Secretary-General’s report on its implementation provided a useful analysis of the use of force. The United Nations wanted to work transparently and be guided by Member States on such matters.

31. **Mr. Nyakarundi** (Rwanda) said that principles must be respected, but that could not be an excuse for inaction. When lives were at stake, nothing else should matter. Recommendations were important but implementation was more so. Some recommendations were priorities, such as decisions on predictable funding for African Union-led, Security Council-authorized peace operations. He would be interested to know what Member States could do to help with the problem situations currently under discussion.

32. **Mr. Eliasson** (Deputy Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) said that the United Nations

had learned lessons from the tragedy in Rwanda in 1994, and had tried to apply them when it acted in the Central African Republic. The United Nations had been in the process of leaving Rwanda despite its better judgement when the horrors had begun to unfold; at which point, seeking to avert a worst-case scenario, it had called on Governments in Africa and Europe for assistance, so that they could act as crucial international eyes and ears on the ground.

33. Operations in Somalia were run by Africans and funded by the European Union, and such cooperation had to be put on a firm footing. The Secretariat had wished to expand the force and train Somali forces, although that had not been done for lack of Security Council agreement. Creating national capacity was also important for sovereignty. Financing was a sensitive issue that gave rise to varying views. There were ongoing discussions, strategic reviews and a joint operations unit shared with the African Union. When the Security Council did give its blessing to operations, then there must be a serious discussion about how to pay and ensure that troop-contributing countries were compensated. That would have to be decided by Member States.

34. He applauded Member States for their peacekeeping efforts despite the strain of financing and of dealing with sexual abuse and corruption. The majority of peacekeepers were hardworking people representing the United Nations in a wonderful way, and that was a source of pride. The main thing was to build operations suited to the conditions of the day, and to decide on mandates and financing in cooperation with the host countries.

35. **The Chair** said that for the rest of the meeting, the Committee would turn its attention specifically to peacekeeping operations under agenda item 56.

36. **Mr. Ladsous** (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) said that the review of peace operations commissioned by the Secretary-General had generated wide-ranging recommendations. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support had embraced the report of the High-level Panel, as well as the agenda for action on the Panel’s recommendations set out in the Secretary-General’s report. The Departments had also heeded the relevant recommendations in the report of the Secretary-General on women, peace and security (S/2015/716), incorporating results of the global study

on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) commissioned at the request of the Council, and had carefully studied the report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture.

37. In March 2015, the Secretary-General had hosted the Chiefs of Defence of 105 Member States for the first time to discuss the challenges of peacekeeping. Based on that and four regional preparatory conferences, the Secretary-General had then co-hosted the Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping, where many pledges of capabilities had been made by a group of 53 geographically diverse national leaders, including 37 Heads of State or Government. That robust international commitment must now be turned into tangible action. As they set out to implement their ambitious agenda for change, the two Departments were counting on continued engagement and support from Member States, including through the Fourth Committee and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, to keep the political momentum alive.

38. New peacekeeping contexts were more challenging than ever before. Casualties as a result of hostile acts involving light weapons, ambush or sophisticated improvised explosive devices in the least permissive peacekeeping environments — especially in Mali, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo — had more than doubled each year for the previous three years, and homage was due to those who had died in such terrible circumstances. Those figures reflected a sobering reality. Missions were deployed into theatres where armed groups proliferated — some with extremist worldviews, others with links to transnational organized crime. Many such non-State actors were not readily drawn into negotiations, and pockets of fighting could be ongoing. Political processes were incipient or faltering at times, with a State and its institutions perceived as partial, non-representative and weak. Consent for the presence of a peacekeeping operation could be uneven among the parties and shift over time. Missions must help the main parties advance to political solutions, with Member State and regional support, yet be ready to face such heightened challenges.

39. In such environments, the safety and security of peacekeepers and their ability to implement their mandates would be compromised without protection measures. The considerable increase in injuries

compared to fatalities was probably a result of the robust mitigation measures that had been put in place, but clearly more must be done in terms of adapting capabilities and field support to allow missions to act in an agile, mobile, robust and pre-emptive manner.

40. In terms of robust and effective capabilities for better performance, the review by the High-level Panel and the Secretary-General's reports on that report and the global study had made a series of recommendations to improve the speed, capability and performance of peacekeeping operations. Efforts were already under way in the two Departments to establish a single capability and performance framework for uniformed personnel, and they were in line with the Panel's recommendations to link the ongoing development of capabilities to a strategic approach to performance management. The goal was to better support troop and police contributors by clearly defining the Organization's expectations of the skills, capabilities and specialised capacities required while helping the States to achieve defined standards. To improve military unit performance, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations had produced guidance and military standards outlining the baseline requirements on matters ranging from infantry battalion functions to the implementation of protection of civilian mandates. An operational readiness assurance policy was being finalized, setting out clear procedures for military units, from pre-deployment preparation to the delivery of mandated tasks and lessons learned. The aim was to better define the respective responsibilities of troop contributors, the Secretariat and field missions. That policy would be accompanied by a series of standard operating procedures to ensure a systematic, evidence-based and transparent approach to performance evaluation. Similarly, in order to streamline procedures and guidelines for police selection and deployment, there was a review under way of standard operating procedures for assessing the operational capability of police units and selecting and assessing police with specialized skills.

41. His Department was committed to stamping out sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers and had made that a key criterion within the overall operational readiness policy. In recent months, renewed attention had focused on the totally unacceptable number of such cases in peacekeeping operations. Just one case was enough to undermine the Organization's efforts to protect and assist conflict-torn communities. He and

his entire Department were committed to working rigorously to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy, and troop- and police-contributing States must do the same because it was a shared responsibility. Throughout, the victims had to be made more confident that justice would be served by enforcing accountability. Member States must be counted on to conduct the necessary investigations and apply due process within their domestic jurisdiction. He pledged to spare no effort in carrying out remedial actions, including the repatriation of units when necessary.

42. Efforts to ensure the best possible peacekeeping capabilities had been boosted when the recent Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping had pledged over 40,000 police and military personnel, as well as critical enablers including helicopters, engineering, logistics and transport units, hospitals, and specialized police teams. Those would help to fill gaps and create a reserve pool of contributions, thus enhancing high readiness and mobility, while pursuing consistently high standards of performance and conduct. The Secretariat — through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support — would support troop and police contributors as coherently and transparently as possible in order to help them raise the quality of the personnel they contributed to peacekeeping operations.

43. A Strategic Force Generation and Capabilities Planning Cell had recently been created to engage with troop and police contributors more coherently and strategically. The new Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System had replaced the Standby Arrangements System as a comprehensive platform for collaborating with Member States on their commitments. He urged all troop and police contributors to register their contributions on the new system as soon as possible.

44. There were plans to hold a United Nations Chiefs of Police Summit in spring 2016 to advance common understanding of police peacekeeping challenges and opportunities and the steps required to participate in operations, while helping to broaden the base of police contributors. A follow up meeting to the Leaders' Summit would be hosted by the United Kingdom to track commitments made, review new pledges or shortfalls and assess progress on strategic force generation.

45. Technology was a tool that had great potential for saving resources, simplifying work processes and enabling a deeper grasp of the operational environments — a point made also in the Panel's review of peace operations and the Secretary-General's reports. In addition to improving safety and security, new technologies were able to facilitate substantive mandate areas such as early warning, the protection of civilians, human rights and humanitarian work. As peacekeeping faced new threats posed by transnational organized crime and violent extremism, technological tools had to be used to improve situational awareness and analysis. There was a need for reliable, actionable intelligence to guide actions and inform decisions at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Without it, it was impossible to protect troops and civilians or keep the peace. Exploratory steps in that direction had been taken in Mali with the introduction of an information fusion unit, and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the use of unarmed, unmanned aerial systems. There was a moral responsibility to use technologies that could save lives, and also to use them ethically by observing human rights and United Nations principles. That had been taken very much into consideration in the strategy on technology and innovation developed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, and they would seek to involve Member States in work in that area.

46. As the Deputy Secretary-General had said, peacekeeping was first and foremost a political instrument. Peacekeeping missions had the greatest impact when deployed in support of a political road map that enjoyed broad international support, shaped their mandate and informed their exit strategy. A central challenge was defining a viable political strategy when missions were being created or were winding down. Deployment was occasionally required for humanitarian or security reasons before a negotiated settlement had been reached, or when political institutions were fragile. At the same time, missions involved in stabilization or peacebuilding tasks beyond the conclusion of peace agreements lost their political direction and the leverage they had.

47. Although devising viable political strategies and implementing them was never straightforward, the Security Council played the central role in ensuring that peacekeeping operations had firm political backing and in supporting them when they struggled. Where



political processes were faltering or agreements unravelling, or when peacekeeping operations had stayed beyond the peace settlement, the Council needed to step up its political engagement and speak with a strong and unified voice. The High-level Panel's review of peace operations had provided some pointers. The sequencing of mandates would help prioritize actions and maintain focus on the political track. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations had begun developing proposals for realistic, streamlined and prioritized mandates based on a thorough conflict analysis and responding to specific needs on the ground. That approach had been taken with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and there would be further opportunities to apply it in other missions that were transiting or drawing down, including those in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Haiti.

48. Political compacts between the United Nations and host Governments, whose potential had been recognized by both the High-level Panel and the Advisory Group of Experts, were a promising tool that could bolster national ownership and consent, particularly in missions whose primary focus was facilitating stabilization or extending State authority. A compact could serve three primary purposes: it could strengthen the mutual responsibility of host Governments and the international community, including peacekeeping operations, to deliver on early peacebuilding commitments; it could serve as a platform for coherent international support; and it could leverage the political influence of the Security Council and/or the Peacebuilding Commission. Compacts could also reflect the expectations of the populations in question by integrating a civil society oversight role. His Department had begun to explore such compacts, specifically in the context of the Central African Republic once election preparations were in place.

49. Peacekeeping operations played a key role in shoring up the early peacebuilding tasks that built confidence, engaged communities and strengthened trust in effective institutions providing security and the rule of law. The missions helped national counterparts by articulating peacebuilding priorities. They provided a security umbrella enabling national and international actors to implement peacebuilding tasks, monitored commitments, and performing certain early peacebuilding tasks themselves. The Global Focal Point for the Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in

the Rule of Law in Post-conflict and Other Crisis Situations, established with the United Nations Development Programme two years earlier, served an important function through joint programme implementation. Also, the High-level Panel had made important recommendations on the financing of key peacebuilding activities, including a more strategic use of assessed funds for programmatic activities.

50. A common understanding of the purpose of peacekeeping operations would emerge only from a more meaningful dialogue between the Security Council, troop and police contributors and the Secretariat. He and his colleagues would continue to reach out to troop and police contributors, even before new missions were set up, in order to share their assessment of political and operational challenges, and the roles and capabilities required to address them. It was critical, however, to strengthen the dialogue between the Security Council and the Member States that contributed the personnel at the frontlines of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping was a common endeavour in increasingly dangerous theatres, and unity of vision and effort would be more important than ever.

51. There had been a remarkable shift in peacekeeping. Gone were the deep cleavages of the past between those paying the bill for peacekeeping and those providing the uniformed personnel paying the price in blood. The Leaders' Summit had been a heartening, geographically diverse and even global expression of a new consensus around the peacekeeping partnership. The review of peace operations had provided a renewed blueprint for United Nations peacekeeping. He hoped that the momentum would be maintained and strengthened.

52. **Mr. Khare** (Under-Secretary-General for Field Support) said that the Department of Field Support had been set up to assist 36 peacekeeping, special political and other missions in 30 countries, encompassing about 170,000 personnel and 15,000 support staff and costing US\$ 9 billion annually. That included supporting the largest United Nations-mandated, African Union-led peace operation to date, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the most dangerous of all operations.

53. The Department's staff handled some of the most complex administrative, logistical and operational problems faced by any entity. Sixty per cent of the people it served were in hard-to-reach areas and almost

half in highly insecure ones. Delivering fuel or providing water and sanitation posed enormous logistical challenges and great risk. Attacks and looting such as those that had occurred that week alone in South Sudan and the Central African Republic were commonplace, and they were part of the daily reality in Mali and Somalia. He paid tribute to the courage, dedication, and sacrifice of colleagues in the field, including international and national contractors, and to the commitment of those supporting them from Headquarters. Staff had used the global field support strategy to drive the reforms that had made field support leaner, faster and more integrated. While he welcomed the recognition received for these efforts from Member States and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, more remained to be done.

54. One of the key recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations was to establish more field-focused operations to respond to the interest in field support expressed by Member States and others. The Department of Field Support was working with the Department of Management to identify more agile, flexible measures that would fit in with emergency situations or mission start-up. Member States would be consulted on reforming policies and procedures to make field support units more mobile and responsive on the ground, for instance by updating standards of accommodation to reflect newly available technologies.

55. There were five crucial stepping-stones to achieving effective, agile and responsible field support. First, there was a need to work better together inside the United Nations and with partners. Internally, coherent mission planning and deployment of uniformed, substantive and support personnel was necessary. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support had already made significant strides in that regard through joint mission planning, joint mission concepts and concepts of operations, joint meetings with troop- or police-contributing countries, and joint client boards comprising also representatives from the Department of Political Affairs and uniformed and civilian field personnel. Outside the United Nations, there had to be the same resolve to address the operational challenges together with all peacekeeping partners, which had been so in evidence at the recent Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping. Shared responsibility was also essential to enhance performance and to update the Contingent-

Owned Equipment Manual, including new provisions for medical and casualty evacuation, new technologies and greater use of renewable energy, so as to enable more effective, efficient and safe implementation of mandates.

56. Secondly, there was a need to focus on performance. In line with the High-level Panel's recommendation, the accountability of United Nations managers was being strengthened by refocusing on performance and key performance indicators while investing in analytical capacity for better decision-making. All staff needed to be accountable for their performance to Member States, on whose behalf they acted.

57. Thirdly, it was necessary to align authority, responsibility and resources to enable the effective delivery of results on the ground. Administrative structures had to be fit for purpose for twenty-first-century threat environments, dynamic operating tempos and complex mandates. The High-level Panel had called for support structures that satisfied the needs of the field, and for policies and procedures to be amended accordingly. His Department had begun that work by realigning structures in field missions and at Headquarters. The Field Personnel and Field Budget and Finance Divisions had been reorganized, while the reorganization of logistics was being phased in.

58. Fourthly, it was imperative to build stronger partnerships within the United Nations system and outside. Triangular partnerships helped to build the capacities of troop- and police-contributing countries, recent examples being the Department's joint initiative with Japan to train engineering units of African troop contributors, or the work on specialist support packages. It was also possible to generate support capacities by engaging more creatively with Member States. Recently an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement had been concluded with the United States to give United Nations field missions access to material and logistics services available to its military personnel. Another example was the rapid deployment support arrangement with the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief.

59. Fifthly, immediate support priorities, such as improving supply chain management, promoting good conduct and discipline, reducing the environmental footprint, and making needed corporate reforms, must be attended to without delay.

60. There were key cross-cutting priorities that also informed the Department's work. One was the need to leverage the full potential of technology to improve the effectiveness of missions and the safety of peacekeepers. Technology could enhance situational awareness, security and force protection. The Department of Field Support and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations were implementing a strategy to augment the use of technology and new tools across peacekeeping missions while also adjusting organizational structures and processes. Member States would be consulted about the internal reorganization of the Information and Communications Technology Division to better reflect those priorities.

61. Another key cross-cutting priority was the collective responsibility to demonstrate zero tolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse during the implementation of mission mandates. It was vital to ensure that United Nations personnel and non-United Nations security forces supported by the Organization met the highest standards of integrity, conduct, and commitment to human rights in contexts such as AMISOM. When troops affixed the United Nations logo to their uniforms, they became part of a 60-year global campaign about sacrifice for the greater good. When troops violated the fundamental human rights of others, they defiled the precious legitimacy that was critical to United Nations effectiveness and for which a great many of their admirable comrades had laid down their lives. In the previous two years, policies had been introduced on clear, non-negotiable thresholds for the personal conduct of those who worked at the United Nations and those supported by the United Nations. Governments, especially those of the troop and police contributors, must undertake to implement and strengthen these policies and to fully discharge the shared responsibility towards victims and local communities. For its part, the Secretariat was striving to implement the programme of action outlined in the Secretary-General's most recent report on special measures for protection against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (A/69/779).

62. Lastly, it was necessary to reduce the environmental footprint of field missions for better protection of the environment, but also to reduce the security risks to all field personnel. Important recent strides had included the promotion of non-renewable sources of energy, the use of better waste management

and sustainable solutions to reduce, recover, recycle, and reuse resources.

63. In conclusion, he reiterated the importance of building a model for field support that was able to deliver the rapid, effective, efficient and responsible solutions that Member States as stakeholders expected, and to do so consistently.

64. **The Chair** said that the meeting would be suspended for an informal dialogue between Member States and the Under-Secretaries-General for Peacekeeping Operations and for Field Support.

*The discussion covered in the summary record was suspended at 11.55 a.m. and resumed at 12.20 p.m.*

65. **Mr. Hilale** (Morocco), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, said that the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations was the only United Nations forum mandated to review comprehensively the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects — including proposals for reform. The Special Committee would in its coming session have the arduous but engrossing task of deliberating on the range of recommendations for change that had come out of the several recent reviews. The Non-Aligned Movement, whose objective was more effective peacekeeping, believed that operations should not be used as an alternative to addressing root causes or managing conflicts, but should be based on a comprehensive vision to be realized through political, social and development tools, with exit strategies agreed upon in the early stages, in order to ensure smooth transitions to lasting peace and security and sustainable development.

66. The establishment or extension of any peacekeeping operation should strictly comply with the principles of the Charter and the three basic principles of United Nations peacekeeping; and should respect the further principles of sovereignty, equality, political independence, territorial integrity of States and non-intervention in matters of domestic jurisdiction.

67. The Movement, stressing the importance of reaching consensus among Member States on policy development, cautioned that only ideas and approaches adopted by Member States collectively should be implemented. The Secretariat must therefore refrain from working on streams of policy that had not been agreed in an intergovernmental process, in particular any recommendations from the Secretary-General's

report on the implementation of the High-level Panel's recommendations.

68. In order to enable peacekeeping missions to do their work with full respect for the host countries and their laws, it was essential to give them all necessary support, including both financial and human resources and both military and civilian capabilities. Furthermore, there needed to be a strong Security Council commitment to drafting clear and achievable mandates in consultation with potential troop- and police-contributing countries and based on objective assessments, rather than rushing to adopt mandates that lacked political support or sufficient resources; nor should mandates be changed in midstream without prior consultation with the countries whose troops were on the ground. Integrated planning and consistent approaches linking policy formulation and implementation on the ground were paramount in achieving success. The Movement also stressed the need for effective triangular cooperation between troop and police contributors, the Secretariat and the Security Council. The contributor countries should be full partners in policy formulation and decision-making if peace operations were to be effective.

69. The position of the Non-Aligned Movement on the use of force by peacekeeping operations had not changed. Further consultations were needed with Member States on how to keep from endangering the safety of peacekeeping personnel, while respecting the Charter and the basic principles of peacekeeping. The safety of personnel was becoming a major concern for the troop- and police-contributing countries, given the growing number of losses and casualties.

70. It was imperative to integrate peacekeeping and peacebuilding, by accompanying peacekeeping efforts with efforts to spur economic recovery and build capacity on the basis of national ownership. The Peacebuilding Commission and its country-specific configurations as well as the Peacebuilding Fund had a significant role to play in that regard by engaging at an early stage. The Movement hoped that the intergovernmental review of the peacebuilding architecture would give special attention to that aspect.

71. Peacekeepers, when mandated to do so, had to support national efforts for the protection of civilians, bearing in mind that it was the primary responsibility of States to protect their civilians. The duty to protect, however, should not be used as a ground for military

intervention by the United Nations in conflicts. The current lack of resources for peacekeeping operations and the difficulty of providing troops and equipment for military operations to carry out that extraordinarily difficult task needed to be addressed. In view of the growing role and increased responsibilities of the police in peacekeeping operations, their activities as well must be supported, but duplication of tasks between the military and the police components should be avoided.

72. The Movement strongly believed that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rested with the United Nations, and that regional arrangements should be made in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. The United Nations should intensify its support for the African Union's operations by ensuring predictable and sustainable funding to African Union-led peacekeeping operations authorized by the Security Council.

73. Meeting the challenges of logistical and administrative support for peacekeeping operations required extensive consultation, and further modularization, human resource management, procurement and service centres would be required to provide missions with high-quality field support.

74. The Movement strongly condemned all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by United Nations personnel in peacekeeping operations, and reiterated its enthusiasm for the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy, while reaffirming that investigation and prosecution fell within the purview of the State concerned.

75. Most if not all of the top troop and police contributors were part of the Non-Aligned Movement, and the fact that they kept increasing their contributions of military and police personnel, as well as civilian experts, to United Nations peacekeeping missions was a clear sign of their commitment to maintaining international peace and security.

76. Tribute was due to the men and women of the United Nations who were engaged in peacekeeping activities, as well as to those who had lost their lives in field operations while defending the flag of the United Nations and upholding the positive image of the Organization.

77. **Mr. Amarachgul** (Thailand), speaking on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN)), said that peacekeeping was at the heart of the work of the United Nations, and therefore it was appropriate that during the seventieth anniversary year of its founding, the Organization was undertaking a number of important reviews to improve its peacekeeping operations. The ASEAN nations appreciated the way in which the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations had consulted extensively with the relevant stakeholders in preparing the substantive recommendations in its report. Combined with the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of the Panel's recommendations, it would offer a useful basis for discussion, particularly in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

78. It was a long-standing position of the Association that peacekeeping missions must continue to uphold the Charter of the United Nations, and the basic principles of United Nations peacekeeping, because, despite the changing contexts, those remained indispensable for their success. ASEAN endorsed the Panel's proposed shift towards placing political solutions at the centre when designing and deciding to deploy peacekeeping missions, for military action alone would not lead a country to lasting peace. In particular, it fully shared the Panel's assessment that preventive diplomacy and mediation, as well as peacebuilding efforts, should be reinforced.

79. ASEAN strongly condemned the rising number of deliberate attacks against United Nations peacekeepers, and expressed its deepest condolences to the bereaved families. In the interests of the best possible protection for all mission personnel, it called for urgent collective action to address such violence, with priority given to enhancing the situational awareness and response capabilities of the peacekeepers through pre-deployment training and adequate protection equipment. ASEAN also strongly endorsed the Panel's recommendation that United Nations peacekeeping missions should not be mandated to conduct counter-terrorism operations.

80. ASEAN shared the outrage and shame over allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse of civilians by United Nations peacekeepers. Such incidents not only tarnished the reputation of the United Nations, but also undermined the ability of the mission to implement its mandate. It echoed the high priority that the Secretary-General had given to the issue and especially the zero-tolerance policy, while reiterating that the primary responsibility of holding perpetrators

accountable rested with the troop- and police-contributing countries.

81. Peacekeeping being a collective endeavour, ASEAN recognized the value of strategic and operational partnerships among the United Nations, Member States and regional organizations. The Association encouraged early engagement and inclusive consultations between the Security Council, the Secretariat, relevant troop and police contributors and regional actors when drafting, reviewing and adjusting mission mandates.

82. Peacekeeping was a key element in ASEAN political and security cooperation, with almost 5,000 peacekeepers from ASEAN member nations serving in United Nations missions around the world. Several ASEAN leaders had participated in the Leader's Summit on Peacekeeping in September 2015, where they had pledged new commitments to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping capabilities in the form of additional troops and police officers, critical enablers such as demining and engineering companies, helicopter units, livelihood and medical support, and capacity-building and training. Progress had also been made in enhancing the region's peacekeeping capacity, and its future had been discussed at the third ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network meeting held recently. ASEAN had also continued collaboration on peacekeeping issues with external partners through the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting.

83. Speaking in his national capacity, he said that his Government took pride in its long contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Since 1950, over 20,000 Thai military and police personnel had proudly served in more than 20 peace operations worldwide, and were currently deployed in five United Nations peacekeeping missions in Haiti, Liberia, South Sudan, Kashmir and Darfur. Thailand planned to continue or step up its peacekeeping contributions in a sustainable way. The Thai military was also cooperating with ASEAN on regional peacekeeping training and capacity-building networks. At the Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping, his Government had pledged to contribute additional staff officers and engineering units, a groundwater well-drilling team and a level-2 hospital, and it would explore further collaboration on capacity-building and training.

84. The essential role of women in peacekeeping could not be stressed enough, and the ASEAN member States welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 2242 (2015), which reaffirmed the Council's resolve to mainstream and integrate the women, peace and security agenda into the peace and security architecture. They supported the United Nations goal of increasing the number of female peacekeepers and promoting more women to senior leadership positions. Member States as well must do their part to translate aspiration into action. ASEAN paid its respects to the men and women who had given their lives in the name of peace and pledged to help ensure that peace would be secured and sustained.

*The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.*