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Chairman: Mr. Adnan M. PACHACHI (Iraq).

AGENDA ITEM 45

Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi (A/4404, part I, chap. VI, sect. G and part II, chap. II; A/C.4/455, 456, 457 and Add.1, A/C.4/L.664 and Corr.1 and Add.1, A/C.4/L.666, L.667) (continued)

REQUEST FOR A SUPPLEMENTARY HEARING

1. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that two petitioners representing the Front commun, Mr. Biri hanyuna and Mr. Burarame, whom the Committee had already heard, had requested a second hearing. If there were no objections, he would take it that the Committee was agreeable to hearing them at the same time as the three petitioners whom it was to hear that morning.

It was so decided.

HEARING OF PETITIONERS (continued)

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Jean Biri hanyuna and Mr. Pierre Burarame, representatives of the Front Commun, Mr. Michel Rwagasana, representative of the Union nationale ruandaise (UNAR), and Mr. Léon Christian Mushatsi-Kareba and Mr. Apollinaire Siniremera, representatives of the Unité et progrès national (UPRONA), took places at the Committee table.

2. Mr. MUSHATSI-KAREBA (Unité et progrès national) said that UPRONA, which had several hundred thousand followers, was an African nationalist party, it was not imbued with alien political ideologies, although it had been accused by its political opponents and the Administering Authority of being communist and feudal. Its programme called for the liberation of Urundi in the near future, the promotion of social and economic welfare, the setting up of a constitutional monarchy, improvement in educational facilities, the democratization of institutions and an economic and political union with Ruanda.

3. The Belgian authorities, realizing that UPRONA was a thorn in the flesh of the colonial régime, had encouraged the setting up in Urundi of a number of political parties, most of which had a minute following but nevertheless received financial and other assistance from the Belgian authorities. It should be pointed out that the leaders of the Parti démocrate chrétien, the largest of the parties in question, were not the champions of the Hutu cause and that the party was headed by a prince of the royal blood who had always dreamt of overthrowing the reigning Mwami with the help of the Administering Authority.

4. Despite the imprisonment of several of its leaders and the various obstacles placed in its way by the Belgian authorities, UPRONA had sent its representatives to inform the United Nations that the people of Urundi wished to be free and independent, that they wanted to exploit the wealth of their soil, trade freely with other countries and enter into such alliances as they wished, without taking sides with East or West.

5. The United Nations should put an end to the activities of the colonial Administration in Ruanda-Urundi, which was promoting solely the interests of the capitalists and those of the handful of feudal lords in its pay.

6. The Belgian armed forces were oppressing the indigenous inhabitants and preventing them from expressing their aspirations freely. The Belgian Administration had imposed a military régime in Urundi, where there had been no disorders for twenty-five years, where the political parties were not based on ethnic groups and where the relations between Hutu and Tutsi were far better than in Ruanda. Mixed marriages had always been a feature of the social scene in Urundi and numerous Hutu had risen to chieftdom because of the great social mobility in the State.

7. Military equipment was being stockpiled in the Territory and he feared that it might be used one day against another African State.

8. His party was therefore appealing for the immediate termination of the military régime, the withdrawal of the Belgian forces and their replacement by United Nations forces drawn from the African States; the postponement of the legislative elections and their proper organization and supervision by the United Nations; and urgent financial and economic assistance.

9. Mr. RWAGASANA (Union nationale ruandaise) wished to protest against the Belgian representative's statement at the previous meeting that a representative of UNAR had subscribed to the recommendations made on the conclusion of the talks at Kisenyi. He had received a cable from Mr. Kabagema expressing his astonishment at having heard over Radio Usumbura that the talks at Kisenyi had recommended that the legislative elections should be held on 15 January 1961 despite the protests by Mr. Ndazaro and Mr. Rwaga-

sore, representing the Rassemblement démocratique ruandais (RADER) and UNAR respectively, who had suggested that the elections should be postponed until peace had returned to the country and the refugees had been resettled. It was clear from Mr. Kabagema's cable that Mr. Rwagasore, far from having signed the recommendations in the cable which the Belgian representative had read to the Committee (A/C.4/466), had in fact protested against them and that his attitude had been shared by Mr. Ndazaro of RADER.

10. No member of UNAR could have approved those recommendations. The members of his party had proved incorruptible, although the Administering Authority had always sought to subvert them. While UNAR had never refused its collaboration with a view to achieving the political evolution of the Territory, it had not taken part in the talks at Kisenyi—to which it had not been invited—just as it had not participated in the communal elections, the Provisional Special Council or any other prefabricated institutions imposed by the Administering Authority.

11. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) asked Mr. Mushatsi-Kareba whether he thought that the existence of the military régime to which he had alluded in his statement was an obstacle to the unification of Ruanda-Urundi.

12. Mr. MUSHATSI-KAREBA (Unité et progrès national) replied that it did not constitute an obstacle because the people realized that they had to join together in order to free themselves from Belgian oppression. The presence of the military forces did, however, prevent the people from freely expressing their views.

13. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) asked the representative of Belgium whether he could give him any information concerning the military régime in Urundi and the size of the security forces stationed there.

14. Mr. CLAEYS BOUUAERT (Belgium) replied that a military régime had never been proclaimed in Urundi. It had been enforced in Ruanda during the period of troubles between November 1959 and 15 January 1960. The Belgian security forces in Urundi amounted to approximately two companies; they were replacing the Congolese "gendarmerie" who had been withdrawn in July 1960.

15. Mr. RWAGASANA (Union nationale ruandaise) retorted that the military régime which had been introduced in Ruanda in November 1959 had been extended to the whole Territory of Ruanda-Urundi following the outbreak of disturbances in the Congo.

16. Mr. MUSHATSI-KAREBA (Unité et progrès national) said that it had been rumoured in August 1960 that at least 10,000 Belgian parachutists, who had been withdrawn from the bases in the Republic of the Congo, had been stationed in Ruanda-Urundi.

17. Mr. SINIREMERA (Unité et progrès national) said that Urundi was overrun by Belgian parachutists, who were intimidating the people and preventing them from finding out how to participate in the elections and how to put forward candidatures.

18. In reply to a question from Mr. RASGOTRA (India), Mr. MUSHATSI-KAREBA (Unité et progrès national) said that his last visit to Urundi had been in September, when he had arrived from Belgium in the company

of a number of indigenous students. At the Usumbura airport all the Africans had been searched by Belgian parachutists and some had been arrested and interned. He had no exact figures concerning the number of Belgian soldiers in Urundi but had been told that they numbered 8,000 to 10,000. To the best of his recollection, the state of emergency had been proclaimed in Urundi by a decree dated 27 July 1960; he would try to provide a copy of the decree if the Committee so wished.

19. Mr. GUARDADO (El Salvador) said that, in view of the information the Belgian representative had given the Committee, the petitioner's statement that UNAR had not participated in the talks at Kisenyi was a serious matter. He would like to hear the comments of the representative of Belgium and any additional information which the representative of UNAR might be able to supply.

20. Mr. CLAEYS BOUUAERT (Belgium) said that he preferred to reply after the Committee had concluded the questioning of the petitioners.

21. Mr. RWAGASANA (Union nationale ruandaise) said that on a previous occasion, in the Trusteeship Council, the Belgian representative had produced a cable alleging that UNAR had participated in the communal elections. He had protested against that allegation and was doing the same now. All the seven members of the party's Committee were at present in New York and no other person was authorized to commit UNAR unless the party congress met and decided otherwise. He had no information about what had occurred at the talks at Kisenyi other than what he had learnt from Mr. Kabagema's cable.

22. Mr. CABA (Guinea) said that, according to the petitioners, some of the political parties in the Territory had protested against the holding of the elections of 15 January 1961. He asked the representative of Belgium to inform the Committee, after the petitioners had withdrawn, whether the Belgian Government persisted in its determination to hold the elections on that date, despite the fact that the proposed United Nations commission would not have had time to arrange for proper supervision.

23. Mr. BURARAME (Front commun) observed that there was no need to delay the legislative elections in Urundi, where the situation remained perfectly calm. The people wanted legislative elections under United Nations supervision. At present they had no governmental institutions of their own and he feared that if elections were not held soon there might be disturbances in Urundi as there had been in Ruanda.

24. One of the petitioners had asserted that there were specifically Hutu parties in Urundi. There was no foundation for that statement.

25. Mr. MUSHATSI-KAREBA (Unité et progrès national) pointed out that under the Trusteeship Agreement Ruanda and Urundi had been administered as a single Territory. The same problems were common to both States ("pays"); disturbances in one led to disturbances in the other.

26. The atmosphere at the present time was not propitious for the holding of elections. The Belgian authorities had already drawn up lists of candidates and votes cast for other candidates would not be counted. People had been imprisoned because they had not voted for Administration candidates in the municipi-

pal elections. Others had been prevented from taking part in political life and even exiled without justification. Some six weeks earlier the son of the Mwami of Urundi had been removed from his house by armed Belgian parachutists and taken away to the bush. Members of the royal family of Ruanda were allowed to engage in politics, but not those of Urundi. Those who wished the elections to be held without delay were afraid of the real verdict of the people.

27. Mr. SINIREMERA (Unité et progrès national) stated that the postponement of the elections was a pretext for delaying the Territory's attainment of independence. Nevertheless, since elections without United Nations supervision would undoubtedly be fraudulent, as the communal elections had been, the legislative elections should be postponed at least until April 1961, so as to allow the United Nations commission time to reach the Territory and to organize them.

28. Mr. BURARAME (Front commun) endorsed the views of the previous speaker.

29. Mr. BIRIHANYUNA (Front commun) stated that it had been the representatives of the political parties rather than the Administering Authority who had decided that the son of the Mwami should withdraw from political life. The decision had been taken at the Brussels conference in August 1960. None of the political parties represented at the conference had voted against the proposal. It had been left to the Administering Authority to put it into effect.

30. Mr. SINIREMERA (Unité et progrès national) said that the reason for that decision had been that the Prince had been in favour of immediate independence. Since, however, there was at present no true representation of the political parties in Urundi, UPRONA felt that no one should be denied the right to participate in political life. The Prince himself had said that he would be willing to renounce his right to the succession.

31. Mr. RASGOTRA (India) recalled that one of the petitioners had stated that a recommendation that the elections should be postponed was an attempt to delay the attainment of independence by the Territory. That was a complete misrepresentation of the position. Ever since 1958 the General Assembly had been pressing for the early granting of independence to Ruanda-Urundi and both the Fourth Committee and the Trusteeship Council had urged that elections should be held. The Administering Authority had made no attempt to comply with that recommendation until quite recently. Now that elections were to be held, it was the responsibility of the United Nations to ensure that they should take place in proper conditions. The petitioners had informed the Committee that there was a military régime in Urundi, that people had been prevented from taking part in political life in that State and that lists of candidates had been drawn up by the Administering Authority. He would like to know how those lists were prepared and circulated, and whether it was true that the national elections were to be held on the basis of proportional representation and that voting would be with the help of scribes. His delegation would strongly object to such a method, as had the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, and also the Trusteeship Council. It would be the duty of the United Nations commission to see that the electoral procedures were revised.

32. Mr. MUSHATSI-KAREBA (Unité et progrès national) replied that the electoral lists for the municipal elections had been circulated some two weeks before the elections by the Administration in co-operation with certain political parties which were in favour of the continuation of the colonial régime.

Mr. Jean Birihanyuna and Mr. Pierre Burarame, representatives of the Front commun, Mr. Michel Rwagasana, representative of the Union nationale ruandaise (UNAR), and Mr. Léon Christian Mushatsi-Kareba and Mr. Apollinaire Siniremera, representatives of the Unité et progrès national (UPRONA), withdrew.

REQUEST FOR A SUPPLEMENTARY HEARING

33. The CHAIRMAN announced that he had received a request for a further hearing from Mr. Aloys Munyangaju, representing the Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse (APROSOMA). If there were no objections, the request would be granted.

It was so decided.

HEARING OF PETITIONERS (continued)

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Aloys Munyangaju, representative of the Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse (APROSOMA), took a place at the Committee table.

34. Mr. MUNYANGAJU (Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse) said that his party had learned with great concern of the statement by Mr. Rwagasana to the effect that UNAR had not participated in the talks at Kisenyi. According to the Belgian representative, UNAR had participated. It was clear that if the leaders of a party denied its members the right to participate in any consultations a serious problem was created. The question was whether or not UNAR wished to reach agreement with the other parties. APROSOMA had participated in the talks and had been assured that all the political parties wished to reach agreement. He had said before that measures should not be imposed on the Territory from outside with regard to such questions as a general amnesty or the return of the Mwami. Arbitrary measures would lead to no good results. It would of course be for the United Nations to decide what steps to take, but he appealed to the members of the Committee not to recommend the holding of a round-table conference, since such a recommendation would not be understood by the people.

35. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) asked whether the petitioner did not consider that when negotiations had taken place between a political party and other parties in the Territory it would be more natural for the results of those negotiations to be communicated direct to the party's representative in New York, or to the General Assembly, rather than to any other person.

36. Mr. MUNYANGAJU (Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse) replied that in his view that would be the correct procedure. If, however, the party in question was not well organized, members might perhaps participate in negotiations without the knowledge of their leaders.

37. In any event he understood that the telegram to Mr. Rwagasana had been dispatched from outside the Territory and had not been sent by the people who had participated in the talks.

Mr. Aloys Munyangaju, representative of the Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse (APROSOMA), withdrew.

REQUEST FOR A SUPPLEMENTARY HEARING

38. The CHAIRMAN announced that he had received a request for a further hearing from Mr. Anastase Makuza, representing the Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu (PARMEHUTU). If there were no objections, the request would be granted.

It was so decided.

HEARING OF PETITIONERS (continued)

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Anastase Makuza, representative of the Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu (PARMEHUTU), took a place at the Committee table.

39. Mr. MAKUZA (Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu) said that reconciliation was not something which could be imposed by one side or by a third party; it must be the fruit of negotiation. The measures that were being proposed, such as an immediate and unconditional amnesty, the return of the refugees, the postponement of the elections and the restoration of the Mwami, would represent defeat for one party and victory for another; they would not therefore promote reconciliation, much as PARMEHUTU desired it. Exchanges of views between the petitioners while in New York had suggested that reconciliation was a definite possibility, but he feared that that prospect would be wrecked if the views of only one party were reflected in the action taken by the Committee.

40. Then there was the question of the Mwami, which in his view was one of monarchy versus republicanism. The vacuum left by the Mwami's departure had been filled by the establishment of a Provisional Government, by a procedure as legal as that by which the Mwami had been appointed. Where both the Belgian Administration and the Mwami had failed, the Provisional Government had succeeded in reducing the tension and it had hoped, given goodwill, to restore normal political life. The restoration to power of the Mwami would bring those efforts to naught. He did not see how the Mwami was to return as a constitutional monarch when there was no constitution. If the General Assembly imposed that course, it would be acting against the opinion of the vast majority of the people in Ruanda, and the parties who represented that majority would be bound to boycott the Mwami after his return.

41. His party was not in principle opposed to an amnesty if it was likely to lead to reconciliation, but an immediate, full and unconditional amnesty would not achieve that objective and it might well have results contrary to those sought by the persons who decreed it.

42. PARMEHUTU was in favour of a conference before the elections, provided that it was attended by representatives of the Provisional Government, the political parties and the Administering Authority, and by the United Nations commissioner for the elections. Such a conference should proceed by negotiation and should not be subjected to outside pressure: it should discuss the peaceful resettlement of the refugees, measures for a gradual amnesty, the electoral law, the date of the elections and the provisional status to be accorded to the Mwami Kigeli V. The final decision

with regard to Kigeli V would be taken by the constitutional convention.

43. After considering the statements made by the representatives of the other parties, PARMEHUTU saw no objection to the postponement of the elections for a month or so on condition that it was agreed in advance that the date finally chosen would be established by the pre-election conference in consultation with the United Nations commissioner.

Mr. Anastase Makuza, representative of the Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu (PARMEHUTU), withdrew.

44. Mr. CLAEYS BOUUAERT (Belgium), replying to the questions put to him, said that the total number of Belgian troops in the Territory had never exceeded 1,200, a small enough figure for maintaining order in a population of 5 million.

45. The telegram appearing in document A/C.4/466 had come from his Government. None of the signatories had disclaimed its authenticity. The representative of Liberia had expressed surprise that it had not been communicated to the General Assembly or to the representatives of the political parties. That was clearly a question for the parties, in which the Administering Authority was not concerned; any person in Ruanda was free to send telegrams to whomsoever he chose.

46. The decision concerning the son of the Mwami of Urundi had been taken by 15 votes to none, with 3 abstentions, at the conference which had been held at Brussels in August 1960 and attended by representatives of the parties, including UPRONA.

47. In reply to the question the representative of Guinea had asked regarding the elections, he said that he had already made his Government's position clear and had nothing to add to his previous statements.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

48. Mr. LOIZOU (Cyprus) said that the problem of Ruanda-Urundi could be solved in a manner which met the real wishes of the people if only those directly concerned would forget the past, abandon their designs for the future and turn to the United Nations as the only body that was able and willing to help them.

49. No one was better qualified, by its long experience of the problem and by its impartiality, than the Trusteeship Council, whose recommendations, though addressed to the Administering Authority, were in fact intended solely for the benefit of the Territory; they should have been carefully studied by the people and their leaders and should have been adopted as the basic principles guiding their actions. His delegation fully endorsed the conclusions and recommendations in the report of the Trusteeship Council (A/4404).

50. To judge from the attitude of some of the petitioners, they still had not realized what colonialism was and that throughout its long history it had adopted different attitudes to suit different occasions. It was alternately benevolent or brutal, according to the submissiveness of the people concerned, but its aim never varied: to prolong and if possible to perpetuate its grip on its victims. Its guiding motto was "divide and rule". The case of Ruanda-Urundi was no exception; his delegation deeply regretted the disunity among the people of Ruanda and wondered why they did not see

that they had fallen into a cleverly laid trap. His delegation appealed to them to bury their differences and to meet round a conference table in order, with the help of United Nations observers, to prepare a constitution whose democratic provisions would guarantee equality and safety to all parties and all peoples in the Territory.

51. Draft resolution A/C.4/L.664 and Corr.1 and Add.1 met his delegation's views; it approached the situation realistically by implementing the recommendations of the Trusteeship Council. His delegation would give it full support but ventured to make certain suggestions with a view to allaying any fear of reprisals consequent upon the immediate granting of an amnesty and to hastening the Territory's accession to independence. Speaking from experience, he would suggest that the amnesty could be carried out in progressive stages, beginning with the release of those detained without trial or convicted of less serious offences, the whole process to be completed some time before the date of the elections, so that political workers and leaders could resume their political activities. The proposed commission of observers could be given discretion to hold the elections earlier than May or June 1961 if all other prerequisites had been met; thus independence would not be unnecessarily delayed.

52. The question of the Mwami should be settled in connexion with other constitutional problems. It should be possible to modernize the monarchy; in any case, his delegation saw no reason why anyone should arbitrarily decide to abolish it in Ruanda. That was a question which should be settled solely by the people. The Mwami had signified his willingness to abide by the result of a referendum. His delegation favoured that course and would prefer the referendum to take place after the constitutional position of the Mwami had been agreed upon and under United Nations supervision.

53. The primary effect of draft resolution A/C.4/L.666 would be the immediate return of the Mwami. His delegation raised no objection to that; it was only natural that the Mwami should not be excluded from the

measures for an amnesty, for the return of the exiles and for the restoration of political freedom. Nevertheless, it had certain reservations about the wording of operative paragraphs 1 and 2. The phrase "constitutional monarch" had a technical meaning in constitutional law: a constitutional monarch was one who ruled but did not govern, and it was clear that the Mwami had never been a monarch in that sense. Moreover, some confusion might arise about how the Mwami could function as a constitutional monarch before any constitution had been formulated. Accordingly his delegation thought that the word "constitutional" in operative paragraph 1 should be either deleted or replaced by the word "traditional"; in operative paragraph 2 it should be deleted. If by the inclusion of the word "constitutional" the sponsors meant that the Mwami should not be an absolute monarch but the constitutional Head of a democratically-governed State, then they should insert a new paragraph or redraft the text to that effect. The Mwami himself had expressed his willingness to forego some of his privileges and to become a democratic ruler.

54. There were three alternatives before the Committee. It could recommend the return of the Mwami and the restoration of his traditional powers pending a decision on the future of his person and of the monarchy; it could recommend his return without the restoration of his powers and functions, other than his right to participate in conferences, until the final decision was taken; it could delay his return until the constitutional position had been agreed upon. His delegation favoured the second alternative, but it wished to hear the views of the sponsors before a vote was taken.

55. In conclusion, his delegation shared the conviction expressed on page 85 of the Trusteeship Council's report that the best future for Ruanda-Urundi lay in the evolution of a single, united and composite State.

56. U TIN MAUNG (Burma) said that, in order to clear up misunderstandings, the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.666 had agreed to submit a revised text of their draft (A/C.4/L.666/Rev.1).

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.