

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

FIFTEENTH SESSION

Official Records



**FOURTH COMMITTEE, 1070th
MEETING**

Thursday, 1 December 1960,
at 3.20 p.m.

NEW YORK

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Chairman: Mr. Adnan M. PACHACHI (Iraq).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Ortiz de Rozas (Argentina), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 45

Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi (A/4404, part I, chap. VI, sect. G and part II, chap. II; A/C.4/455-457) (continued)

HEARING OF PETITIONERS (continued)

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Aloys Munyangaju, representative of the Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse (APROSOMA), Mr. Jean Birihanyuna, Mr. Joseph Biroli, Mr. Pierre Burarambe and Mr. Pascal Mbuziyonja, representatives of the Front commun, Mr. Anastase Makuza, representative of the Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu (PARMEHUTU), Mr. Prosper Bwanakweri, representative of the Rassemblement démocratique ruandais (RADER), Mr. Michel Kayihura, Mr. Barnabas Nkikabahizi, Mr. Cosmos Rebero, Mr. Joseph Rutshintwarane and Mr. Michel Rwagasana, representatives of the Union nationale ruandaise (UNAR) and Mr. Alexandre Rutera took places at the Committee table.

1. The CHAIRMAN invited the petitioners to reply to the question concerning national reconciliation which the Pakistan representative had asked at the previous meeting.

2. Mr. BIROLI (Front commun) thanked the Pakistan representative for having brought the discussion to bear upon the most serious problem, that of national reconciliation. In Urundi a peaceful and harmonious reconciliation had been brought about because basic reforms had been carried out and the country had adopted democratic ways before a revolution had become inevitable. The Front commun combined all the parties which would be in the majority in the future Government, which was to be a government of national union. His party could serve as an example to the various delegates from Ruanda. He deplored the fact that neither of the two large political groups opposing each other in Ruanda had shown the slightest desire to reach a compromise solution, although that was the only possible way of bringing the tragic situation to an end. If there could be a "rapprochement", there

would be hope for an independent and peaceful Ruanda in the near future. He suggested that the opposing political parties might meet at the close of the meeting in order to begin negotiations for a nationwide solution. An African or European delegation might also attend the meeting and give them the benefit of its objectivity.

Mr. Pachachi (Iraq) took the Chair.

3. Mr. KAYIHURA (Union nationale ruandaise), explaining his party's position, said that if Belgium, which was the prime cause of the disturbances, withdrew from the country, the people of Ruanda would soon come to an agreement. Care must be taken, however, to eliminate the strong influence which Belgium might exert in the country, so that discussions could take place in an atmosphere of complete neutrality; so far the Belgian Government had reduced every effort at conciliation to failure, so much so that the parties enjoying the Administration's protection had on every occasion been able to resort to arson and pillage again. Reconciliation was possible in theory, therefore, provided that all Belgian influence was eliminated and that United Nations arbitration was ensured.

4. Mr. RWAGASANA (Union nationale ruandaise) received the statements of the representative of the Front commun of Urundi with some reservations. In Urundi, the national party which was the counterpart of UNAR was as much out of favour as UNAR was in Ruanda: some of its members were in prison, in exile or had been placed in assigned residence. The Front commun had claimed victory in the elections although the voting was only half completed. Moreover, the elections had been fraudulent. Reconciliation, while not easy, was of course possible, but a private meeting like that proposed by Mr. Biroli could not take place until representatives of the Unité et progrès national (UPRONA) were heard by the Committee and could attend the meeting.

5. Mr. MAKUZA (Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu) pointed out that in his party's opinion the main cause of the conflict was the fact that there was a basic opposition between the Hutu and the Tutsi in Ruanda. In that connexion, he reiterated a statement he had made in 1958 before the High Council of Ruanda, which had at that time been dealing with the problem—whose existence the Mwami reigning at that time had denied. The problem did exist, however, for a large part of the population considered itself oppressed by another part. There was a caste system, rooted in inequality, in Ruanda, and that system, whose existence was confirmed by the testimony of ethnologists, had given rise to a veritable system of "apartheid". The PARMEHUTU party maintained that it was only the theory of racial inequality which divided the country and that neither the Germans nor the Belgians who had followed them had created the feudal régime. The system of indirect administration

had done nothing to diminish the conflict. The real cause, which must be eliminated, lay in the fact that only a privileged caste was called upon to appoint the Head of State. The only solution, therefore, was to do away with the monarchy.

6. Mr. RUTERA thought that it was incorrect to say that the divisions which afflicted the country derived exclusively from its monarchical institutions. The fact that the Belgian authorities had exiled the father and the brother of the present Mwami proved that the monarchical system was not exempt from Belgian oppression, which was the sole cause of all the dissensions. The conflict could be settled only by the intervention of the United Nations.

7. Mr. MUNYANGAJU (Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse) observed that the two opposing views seemed at first sight to be irreconcilable: one side maintained that there was no Ruandese problem, while the other contended that the only dispute concerned the Ruandese exclusively and had arisen inside the country itself. He himself thought that foreign intervention had not created the dispute, but it had certainly helped to bring it to the surface. The problem might perhaps be solved by the establishment of a joint arbitral commission, upon which African States would be represented and which would at least find out whether order could be restored merely by the elimination of Belgian influence. If internal dissension persisted, it might then be possible to convene a round-table conference of the leaders of the political parties together with observers from the United Nations, as UNAR had proposed.

8. Mr. BURARAME (Front commun) protested against the calumnious statements the UNAR representatives had made about Urundi. After discussions in which UPRONA had taken part, all the political parties had together decided to pension off the sub-chiefs. There were no Urundian refugees or exiles: the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and the Secretary of UPRONA were all at liberty. He knew of only two or three persons who had left Urundi, one of whom, moreover, had been provided with a travelling warrant issued by the Administration. Urundi was at the present time going to the polls in an atmosphere of tranquillity and UPRONA had not objected to the method of balloting which the political parties had chosen by common agreement.

9. Mr. BWANAKWERI (Rassemblement démocratique ruandais) described the nature of the alleged Hutu-Tutsi conflict. He had taken part in all the Ruanda councils since 1945 and had closely followed the political development of the country. It was true that in 1958 a Hutu group had sent petitions concerning the racial question to the High Council; a joint committee, of which he had been a member, had studied the problem. After an exchange of views with the Hutu, who, moreover, disagreed among themselves on the manner of effecting a solution, the Mwami had concluded that there was no racial problem, which meant that the only problem to settle was that of the institutions of the State: it was, in fact, a matter of deciding whether the Mwami was to retain the exclusive right to appoint chiefs and sub-chiefs. Since the monarchy had finally accepted the principle that all were eligible for public office, it seemed that a complete democratic victory had been gained. It was therefore illogical to speak of feudal oppression, as did PARMEHUTU; in order to justify arson and murder, for the reforms were now complete and the only

problem remaining, that of land reform, was being studied. There was therefore no longer any excuse for violence.

10. Replying more specifically to the Pakistan representative, he said that there had been several attempts at national reconciliation, among them the meeting at Kigali. Unfortunately, on each occasion there had been disturbances, instigated by PARMEHUTU. He would be perfectly willing to explore possible areas of agreement with all the other petitioners but as he had misgivings about the sincerity of PARMEHUTU he did not think that reconciliation was possible unless the representative of PARMEHUTU solemnly undertook to prevent his party from resorting to violence.

11. The CHAIRMAN gave the floor to Mr. Makuza, the representative of PARMEHUTU, but reminded him that the petitioners must not start arguing among themselves but must confine themselves to replying to the questions put by various representatives.

12. Mr. MAKUZA (Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu) said that he for his part doubted the sincerity of the opponents of PARMEHUTU, since those who upheld the feudal régime had always refused to open negotiations. For example, UNAR had refused to participate in the conference at Brussels, and a meeting which he had tried to arrange at Kigali on 11 August 1960 had failed. At that time, he had hoped to bring all the political parties together, free from any foreign intervention. UNAR had stated that it thought the presence of representatives of the Administration, and especially of the Resident-General, to be essential, because it was doubtful whether the Provisional Special Council would be able to deal objectively with a question submitted to the Resident-General. RADER, too, had stated somewhat later that it would make the same conditions as UNAR for the calling of the meeting. That attitude was the more incomprehensible to him in that UNAR and RADER had suffered under the Belgian Administration and there was no reason to insist that the Administration should be represented during an examination of the grievances between the feudal bloc and the Administration. In view of those repeated failures, he doubted whether any other attempts could succeed.

13. Mr. HUSAIN (Pakistan) thanked the petitioners for their replies to his questions.

14. Mr. Najmuddine RIFAI (United Arab Republic) referred to the statements of the representatives of PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA that they were in favour of a union of Ruanda and Urundi and envisaged the establishment of a republican régime and the removal of the Mwami. In view of the fact that in Urundi, unlike Ruanda, there did not seem to be any difference of opinion between the Mwami and the people, he would like to know whether PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA considered that the union of Ruanda and Urundi should be conditional upon the abolition of the monarchy in both States ("pays").

15. Mr. MAKUZA (Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu) expressed the view that the unification of Ruanda and Urundi did not necessarily depend upon that. If the Mwami of Ruanda had shown the same spirit of understanding and the same adaptability as had the Mwami of Urundi and had agreed to the same concessions, a compromise would have been possible; as things were, however, it was essential that the monarchy should be abolished in Ruanda before the

State could be united with Urundi. With regard to the Mwami of Urundi, it was for the people to decide his future.

16. Mr. MUNYANGAJU (Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse) added that the practical value of political institutions always depended on circumstances; whatever form of government was in operation at a given time, it was not final to the point of having to remain immutable. It lay with the people, through their elected representatives, to decide in a constituent assembly on the form to be taken by a future federal system. It would undoubtedly be possible to find a flexible solution in the event of Ruanda's becoming a republic while Urundi preserved a monarchic system; the simultaneous existence of the two systems would not prevent the union of the two States.

17. Mr. BURARAME (Front commun) said that the people of Urundi had confidence in their Mwami. As a representative of the Front commun, however, he could not tell the Committee whether Urundi would adopt a republican system or keep the monarchy; that could be decided only by the parliament which was shortly to be elected.

18. Mr. Najmuddine RIFAI (United Arab Republic) asked what were the reasons for the Administering Authority's opposition to the present Mwami of Ruanda.

19. Mr. MUNYANGAJU (Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse) observed that that question directly concerned the Administering Authority, which should answer it.

20. Mr. KAYIHURA (Union nationale ruandaise) said that, among the main reasons for the conflict between the Mwami of Ruanda and the Belgian Administration, the first was that the Mwami's accession had come about independently of the authority and patronage of the Administration, which had seen in that event a manifestation of the popular will—before which, indeed, it had bowed—and had considered itself slighted. Secondly, shortly after he had acceded to the throne the Mwami had had to face certain fundamental problems regarding the future of the Territory: having to choose between immediate independence and the continuation of the trusteeship, he had opted for the former. A further reason was that at the time of the disturbances of November 1959 the Mwami had dared to criticize the Administration for its partiality.

21. Mr. BWANAKWERI (Rassemblement démocratique ruandais) added that the Administration should be able to tell the representative of the United Arab Republic why it opposed the Mwami's return to Ruanda. Of all the political parties, only PARMEHUTU opposed the Mwami's return; PARMEHUTU was the party most favourable to the Administration and most favoured by it. All other parties wished to leave the constitutional future of their country to the decision of the people. It should be noted that until March 1960 all parties had favoured a popular referendum on the question; when the Administration had refused to organize such a referendum, PARMEHUTU had changed its attitude.

22. Mr. MAKUZA (Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu) disputed Mr. Bwanakweri's allegations. It was not true that PARMEHUTU was the only party opposed to the Mwami: RADER had been the first to attack him during the Brussels conference and to

call for his deposition. RADER's change of attitude was due to its fear of reprisals in the event of a refusal by the Administering Authority to depose the Mwami and of the Mwami's continuing to reign after the trusteeship ended. A leaflet distributed by RADER on 27 April 1960 showed clearly that at that time it had still been opposed to the Mwami's return and had been demanding his dethronement. Mr. Bwanakweri had become a partisan of monarchy for reasons which he did not admit. It was not, as he claimed, an expression of the popular will which had forced the Administration to accept the Mwami, but a "coup d'état" by UNAR, which had proposed his candidature in violation of the customary rules and had caused him to be accepted and placed in power by only seven members of the Council of the Abiru.

23. As to the conflict between the Mwami and the Administration, one reason was the voluntary exile of the Mwami since 27 July. The various political parties having then demanded the appointment of a supreme head, the Administration had been led to establish a provisional government. Mr. Bwanakweri was wrong in saying that PARMEHUTU was favoured by the Administration: PARMEHUTU had always had to endure the *de facto* monopoly exercised by the alliance between the feudal imperialists and the Administration. It was truly remarkable that the feudal front had felt it necessary to enter into conflict with the Administering Authority at the very moment when that Authority, by promising democracy and independence, had foreshadowed the end of its privileges.

24. Mr. Najmuddine RIFAI (United Arab Republic) asked why and how a general amnesty decree might provoke new disturbances and cause bloodshed.

25. Mr. MUNYANGAJU (Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse) said that his party had reservations about the advisability of a complete and unconditional amnesty. The tragic events of November 1959 were still too recent to have been forgotten. If, with the aid of foreign troops and with the support of the United Nations, the prisoners were to be released and the Mwami to return to the throne, UNAR and the Tutsi would have the last word. In that case, the liberation of the November 1959 murderers would be sure to call forth an immediate reaction on the part of the population, which, being still primitive, was always inclined to take justice into its own hands. It was important that the Committee should bear in mind that situation, which could lead to tragedy.

26. Mr. MAKUZA (Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu) said that when pacification and reconciliation were desired it was important not to adopt measures which might have a contrary effect. To leave crime unpunished would not help to reconcile the people, who would interpret an amnesty as giving everyone the right to rid himself of his adversaries by murdering them. It was not a matter of political prisoners but of murderers and incendiaries, whose victims would still be too eager for vengeance. It would therefore be an ill service to the Ruandese people to decree a general amnesty for criminals. It would be preferable to leave it to the Government to be set up as a result of the forthcoming elections to consider an amnesty in stages, for only thus would it be possible to avoid a fresh explosion of popular fury.

27. Mr. RWAGASANA (Union nationale ruandais) recalled that, in a hearing before the Trusteeship

Council at its twenty-sixth session, he had already denounced the complicity of the Administration, which allowed a political party to use force and remove its adversaries by every possible means. For the future of Ruanda, amnesty was essential. The United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, had proposed an immediate amnesty to avoid civil war. The Committee should consider the question in an objective and humanitarian spirit. Since Mr. Makuza held that he had the support of the people, why did he object to the active members of UNAR standing as candidates against him?

28. Mr. MUNYANGAJU (Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse) stated that he was not opposed to an amnesty and had merely expressed reservations regarding the advisability of a general amnesty. When he said that the criminals should be well and truly hanged, he was not referring to UNAR members, but to the callous perpetrators of the massacres of November 1959.

29. Mr. Najmuddine RIFAI (United Arab Republic) asked the petitioners whether they would agree to the postponement of the elections arranged for January 1961, thus enabling a round-table conference to be held first, as the Visiting Mission had recommended.

30. Mr. KAYIHURA (Union nationale ruandaise) said that it was not merely a matter of postponing the legislative elections: the communal elections had been faked and should be held a second time. The reason why the Administering Authority was so bent on holding legislative elections at once was that it wished to confirm the mandate of those whom it had placed in power. It would be out of the question, however, to hold such elections, since the country was still under the military state of emergency set up in November 1959 and intensified since the communal elections which had put the finishing touch to the victory of PARMEHUTU. Moreover, there were still some 100,000 refugees outside the Territory, exclusive of all those who were in prison or in concentration camps. It was therefore essential that the legislative elections should be put off and that a round-table conference should first be held.

31. Mr. MUNYANGAJU (Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse) thought that it would be to the interest of all the parties to hold conversations or a round-table conference in order to find a basis for agreement. APROSOMA for its part had suggested certain steps likely to lead to a reconciliation. As for those who were asking for immediate and unconditional independence, it was surely a matter of common sense for them to press for an early round-table conference so that elections could be held after it.

32. Mr. MAKUZA (Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu) said he considered it impossible to postpone the elections, which were absolutely essential since UNAR was calling for the immediate abolition of the interim Council and the Provisional Government and for the immediate termination of the trusteeship; in other words it was calling for the removal of all authority in Ruanda, a step which would plunge the State into chaos. If UNAR were to agree that both Government and Council should remain in power during the transition period, it was possible that he might change his mind; but, as it was and in view of the fact that UNAR was making purely destructive proposals and was heedless of the need to build up

the country, he had no option but to reach the conclusion that it was essential that the provisional authorities should be replaced as soon as possible by authorities elected by the people. Since each party claimed to be the only true representative of the country, the best solution was to leave it to the people to decide.

33. The Visiting Mission had recommended that legislative elections should be held early in 1961; Belgium had decided that they should be held on 15 January and the political parties had drawn up their programmes accordingly. Were they supposed to change their plans? His party was all the more opposed to the elections being deferred because it feared that other postponements would follow. It had already been obliged to agree that the elections which it had wished to be held in August 1960, with a view to preparing for early independence, should be put off until the beginning of 1961. Furthermore, the existence of a military state of emergency could hardly be put forward as an excuse, since it had been brought to an end on or about 27 October 1960. The representative of UNAR seemed to be ill-informed on the subject, which was hardly surprising since he had not been back to the Territory for a year.

34. The Provisional Government had made every effort to put an end to the disturbances and no incidents had occurred since it had been set up. The refugees were returning to the country; if the Government had been allowed to carry out its programme of pacification and reconciliation, the corner-stone of which had been the return of the refugees to their homes, they could all have been resettled towards the end of 1960. The solution of that problem, however, would depend on the attitude of UNAR, which should refrain from urging its supporters to leave the country. It would have been possible for the Government to restore tranquillity, but there was reason to fear that UNAR was preparing to stir up fresh incidents in order to foster the belief that the Government was incapable of keeping order. It was clear from all that he had said that the one essential step was to ask the people for its verdict as soon as possible; moreover, the possibility of holding a round-table conference beforehand should not be ruled out.

35. Mr. BWANAKWERI (Rassemblement démocratique ruandais) observed that he had not left Ruanda and thus had been able to give close attention to the situation. It was incorrect to say that the opponents of PARMEHUTU had made no constructive suggestions. His party had no objection to there being a provisional government and council; what it did object to was that the existing Government and Council should remain in power, because the Administration was giving its support to one party only. The Provisional Government and Council should include representatives of every ethnic group belonging to all parties. It was indeed unfortunate that the Administration refused to recognize that the representatives of parties other than PARMEHUTU could be Hutu, thus overlooking the fact that there were Hutu among those who were being persecuted. Although RADER called for an immediate termination of the trusteeship as a step towards a return to normal conditions, it would like to see it replaced by a provisional trusteeship by the United Nations pending the attainment of independence.

36. The communal elections had been held in July 1960 after an electoral campaign lasting only ten days

and at a time when a military state of emergency dating from November 1959 had been in force. Elections could not be held in January 1961, without giving the parties time to make their programmes known, without setting free those who had been sentenced and without making arrangements for the return of the refugees; it was not a coincidence that all the refugees belonged to the same party. The legislative elections should be postponed until June 1961; that would give the United Nations time to make arrangements for communal and legislative elections, since Belgium had made it clear in the past that it was incapable of carrying out the task.

37. Mr. RWAGASANA (Union nationale ruandais) observed that Mr. Makuza had said nothing about the need for national reconciliation prior to the legislative elections. He wondered why PARMEHUTU refused to agree to the holding of a round-table conference before the elections: if that party did not desire national reconciliation, what interests was it seeking to promote? Like the representatives of UNAR, some members of the Trusteeship Council had urged the Administering Authority not to hold any national consultation before reconciliation had been achieved but Belgium had taken no notice. Moreover, it was not enough to maintain that the military régime had been brought to an end; the text of the decree or ordinance establishing the truth of that claim should be produced. Furthermore, it was scarcely true to say that the refugees were returning to Ruanda, when new refugees were leaving the country every day.

38. PARMEHUTU had accused UNAR of putting forward nothing but negative suggestions. That was because no undertaking had been given to UNAR that it could join the other parties in building up the country through a round-table conference and the establishment of a national executive to organize political life. The aim of UNAR was not to destroy, but to oppose dictatorship and the monopoly of power by one race or one party, both of which were inconsistent with democracy. The Provisional Government did not enjoy the support of the people; otherwise there would have been no need for it to depend on the protection of a large number of Belgian troops.

39. It would be dishonest to hold elections without giving the members of the political parties a chance to discuss the date on which they would be held, the way in which they would be carried out or the course which the country was to follow. The United Nations should beware of endorsing decisions taken by the Belgian Administration; it was surely abnormal to prevent some party leaders from taking part in the elections. He himself, for example, would not be allowed to be a candidate.

40. On the other hand, he had noted with pleasure the conciliatory attitude of the APROSOMA representative, who, by expressing the wish that a round-table conference should be held before the elections, had shown his sincere desire for reconciliation.

That representative had apparently realized that the twelfth point made by UNAR in its proposals at the 1065th meeting was of the greatest importance.

41. Mr. MAKUZA (Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu) said that, while he did not wish to enter into an argument, he wondered how any agreement could be reached with a person like Mr. Rwagasana, who either did not listen to what his opponents were saying about their parties' doctrine or was guilty of bad faith.

42. Mr. REBERO (Union nationale ruandais) said that it was clear that three out of the four political parties whose representatives were present would be able to reach an agreement without much difficulty. PARMEHUTU alone was as obstinate as the existing Government of Ruanda-Urundi. After listening to the lying statements of that party's representative, he did not think it would be possible to achieve anything.

43. The CHAIRMAN appealed to the petitioner to answer the questions put to him and to refrain from recriminations about the other petitioners.

44. Mr. REBERO (Union nationale ruandais) said that his party's sole wish was to reach an agreement with the other parties, but the discussions which he had just heard did not seem to him to be a good augury for the future.

45. Mr. Najmuddine RIFAI (United Arab Republic) thanked the petitioners for their detailed replies to his questions.

46. Mr. RASGOTRA (India) noted that Belgium had chosen 15 January 1961 as the date for the legislative elections. Earlier the Visiting Mission had recommended that those elections should be supervised by the United Nations; Belgium had agreed to that; and the Trusteeship Council had reiterated the recommendation. It should be noted that all the petitioners agreed that the United Nations should be asked to supervise the elections instead of merely sending observers. The Assembly was unlikely to decide on the question of Ruanda-Urundi before the middle of December 1960. A commissioner or commissioners for the elections could hardly be expected to reach the Territory till after Christmas, or about the end of the first week of January. Their presence in the Territory for about a week before the elections would hardly make for effective supervision. Before forming a firm opinion on the date of the elections, his delegation would like to have the Under-Secretary give an estimate of the minimum period of time that would be necessary to organize an operation of effective supervision by the United Nations.

47. The CHAIRMAN said that the Secretariat would give the necessary information in due course.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.