



CONTENTS

*Agenda item 23:*

<i>Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Aden (continued)</i>	
<i>Statement by the representative of the United Kingdom . . . . .</i>	195

*Agenda item 23:*

<i>Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Southern Rhodesia (continued)</i>	
<i>Consideration of draft resolution A/C.4/L.836 and Add.1 and 2 (continued) . . . . .</i>	199

*Chairman:* Mr. FAKHREDDINE Mohamed (Sudan).

AGENDA ITEM 23

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Aden (continued) (A/6274, A/6276, A/6300/Rev.1, chap. VI; A/6317, A/6374, A/6478, A/C.4/672 and Add.1-3)

STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

1. Mr. F. D. W. BROWN (United Kingdom) said that his delegation would very shortly make a general statement on the important and difficult constitutional and political issues in South Arabia and would try to show the great advances that had been made during the past year and the opportunities for a settlement leading to real independence by 1968. That statement would show that many of the hopes which had been expressed by Mr. Al-Gifri at the previous meeting would be met and that many of the fears which had been expressed by Mr. Mackawee were unfounded.

2. At the present stage he wished merely to put in their right perspective the emergency regulations and the reasons for them and the question of the detainees

and the allegations of their ill-treatment. Since 1963 there had been a deliberate campaign of violence and subversion in South Arabia, inspired, financed, organized and sustained from outside the Territory. Those concerned did not deny it; on the contrary, the representative of the United Arab Republic had said at the previous session that his country was proud of the part it had played, and Mr. Mackawee had made a similar statement at the Committee's previous meeting. It was a vile campaign of indiscriminate violence, particularly in Aden itself, and of cold, premeditated murder. Innocent men, women and children of all races had been killed or maimed, but it was the local population which had suffered more than the British. In the previous year, about twenty-seven Arabs had been killed and about 175 wounded in Aden State alone. It was not surprising that petitions were received so frequently from respectable citizens urging that the campaign should be stopped and that peace should be restored. The allegations which had been made that British troops and security forces were in some way responsible for the indiscriminate violence in Aden and South Arabia in recent months were a hateful perversion of the truth: the prime object of the British security forces was to protect the law-abiding people of Aden in the violent conditions which had been described by some of the petitioners.

3. The violence was instigated above all by the discredited and divided leaders of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) from outside the Territory. The radio stations of certain Arab countries were constantly urging intimidation and violence. The campaign was represented as a national liberation struggle, backed by the people of South Arabia and directed purely at the achievement of independence from United Kingdom rule. That was not true. The struggle was not supported by the mass of the ordinary people and it served no good purpose. Genuine independence would be achieved, whatever happened, by 1968. The violence and subversion were quite clearly directed towards establishing a particular political pressure group and interest in a position of domination at the time of independence.

4. In the circumstances, the authorities could not shirk their responsibilities for protecting the great majority of peace-loving and law-abiding citizens and were obliged to adopt measures which they abhorred as much as anyone. It was illogical and untrue to suggest that the violence was stimulated by the measures necessary to deal with it. Many of those who had been loudest in condemning the security measures in Aden represented countries where normal political freedoms had had to be abolished or curtailed, rightly or wrongly, because of threats to security and possible violence. The first to mention

the matter during the current debate had been the representative of Yemen, where, according to reliable reports, some 2,000 people had recently been arrested and such trials as had been held had been followed by brutal executions.

5. Mr. TARCICI (Yemen) pointed out that the United Kingdom representative was interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign State.

6. Mr. F. D. W. BROWN (United Kingdom) said that he had merely wished to point to the contrast between the reports he had mentioned and the situation in Aden, where there were only 115 detainees and where there had been no death sentences of any sort during the previous year and none ever for any offence even remotely associated with politics since the beginning of the emergency in Aden.

7. The important thing, however, was to consider how the emergency regulations could be lifted. They could not be relaxed as long as the campaign of violence continued, nor could those known to have been implicated in that campaign be released until it had ceased. Both the United Kingdom Government and the Government of the Federation of South Arabia had declared repeatedly that the state of emergency would be ended and the detainees released as soon as there was satisfactory evidence that terrorism in Aden had ceased, and during the previous session of the General Assembly he himself had said in the Fourth Committee (1547th meeting) that the United Kingdom would consider any reasonable proposals to secure that end. The solution to the problem was in the hands of those who instigated, supported and carried out the campaign of violence. It was also, to some extent, in the hands of the Committee and of the United Nations mission which it was to be hoped would be sent to the Territory; if they could prevail upon those concerned to stop the campaign, the emergency regulations could be lifted.

8. He wished to make four points in reply to the allegations of ill-treatment and torture of the detainees which had been made during the discussion. First, there were 115 detainees, held at one interrogation centre at Fort Marbut and one detention centre at Mansura. Their cases were reviewed regularly by an impartial tribunal with Arab membership and fifty had been released during the year ending 31 August 1966. Regular visits by their families and contact with their local lawyers were allowed; there was a sick bay; an Arab doctor visited the detention centre daily; the detainees had radio, television and recreational equipment; and generous subsistence was paid to their families. They were detained, not for their political views, but because against each single one there was evidence of complicity in, if not actual responsibility for, acts of violence. It had been suggested that, in addition, there were about 200 political prisoners in Aden; that was not true.

9. Secondly, both the local authorities and the United Kingdom Government treated all allegations of ill-treatment seriously. The rules and regulations were very stringent and were in accordance with international law, and obedience to those rules was strictly supervised.

10. Thirdly, whenever allegations were sufficiently specific, a full investigation was carried out. Following complaints, an impartial judicial inquiry had been carried out in 1964 and a second full inquiry had been made by the medical authorities in the spring of 1966. No shred of evidence had been discovered to support any of the allegations. In addition, arrangements had been made for regular visits to the detainees by a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross, who had expressed his satisfaction with the unrestricted nature of the facilities given to him. He had visited the detainees both in the detention centre and in the interrogation centre at intervals of about six or seven weeks, and had interviewed them without restrictions both singly and in groups. Furthermore, before the publication of the Amnesty International report, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had announced his decision to send a special representative to the Territory to examine the procedures for arrest, interrogation and detention, and, having regard both to the rights of the individual and to the Government's duty to assure the security and well-being of the community, and taking into account the allegations that had been made, to advise whether there were ways in which the procedures could be improved. At the same time, it had been made clear that the appointment of the special representative did not imply any lack of confidence in the local authorities in Aden. On the contrary, it was considered that all those involved, both civilian and military, had been carrying out a difficult and unwelcome task in a most commendable manner. It was clear, therefore, that allegations of ill-treatment had not been brushed aside; the strictest measures had been taken to ensure that torture and ill-treatment did not occur.

11. Fourthly, the Committee should consider the latest series of allegations against that background. He did not wish to imply any criticism of Amnesty International as an organization; it had done much good work in many parts of the world. The United Kingdom Government had not, however, agreed to the representative of that organization visiting the detainees, for two reasons: one was that Amnesty International was an organization concerned with those imprisoned on account of their political opinions whereas all those detained in Aden under the security regulations had been implicated in, or responsible for, violence and murder; the second was that another impartial international observer, the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross, was already paying regular visits to the detainees. The representative of Amnesty International had visited Aden, where he had met the High Commissioner and others, and he had apparently had every opportunity to see anyone, apart from the detainees. But it also appeared that he had visited Cairo and had spoken to representatives of Aden political parties which were to a large extent subservient to the policies and ambitions of foreign Governments and had an interest in making and publicizing allegations against the United Kingdom Government and the Aden authorities. It was important to remember that much of the information in the report of the Amnesty International representative had been provided by the political groups he had met in Cairo, and that all the evidence

appeared to be second-hand. The full report of the representative of Amnesty International was not yet available; only advance extracts had so far been circulated. In view of that, and of all that he had said, he asked the Committee to treat the latest allegations with considerable reserve and not to jump to hasty conclusions that there was any truth in them.

12. His Government would certainly like to see the emergency ended, the detainees released and the restrictions lifted and it agreed with all those who found the measures repugnant. The Committee and the General Assembly could exercise a strong and valuable influence, but not by endorsing and supporting pointless violence or suggesting that the administering Power's response to violence was the cause of that violence. At a time when there was evidence that those behind the campaign were now but a discredited few in voluntary exile, and when there were signs that representatives of the various groups in South Arabia were at last beginning to come together, the Committee should rather urge those concerned to ensure that the campaign of violence was stopped, so that the emergency could be lifted and normal conditions restored and the procedures of the United Nations resolutions could be carried through in an atmosphere of peace and freedom.

13. Mr. KHALAF (Iraq) said that he hoped that the United Kingdom representative would soon be able to inform the Committee that his Government would withdraw its reservations to the sending of a United Nations mission and would agree to, and co-operate in, the implementation of United Nations resolutions in the area. Short of that, his delegation would continue to consider that the United Kingdom was not taking the situation as seriously as it should and that it did not have the interests of the people of the Territory at heart.

14. The Committee was quite accustomed to hearing the colonial Powers speak about alleged acts of violence committed by so-called terrorists. The leaders of many of the countries represented in the Committee had at one time been called terrorists by the United Kingdom representatives, and many of those leaders were now Presidents or Prime Ministers of their countries. There had never been any quarrel with the United Kingdom's claim that it was responsible for security in the Territory; what had been said was that it was responsible for torturing the nationalists in the Territory. Instead of complying with United Nations resolutions, the United Kingdom continued to use the full weight of its army and security forces in Aden. The report of Amnesty International stated that there were 300 detainees in Aden and Mr. Mackawee had claimed that there were thousands, not just the 115 mentioned by the United Kingdom representative. Even if there were only ten, however, the United Kingdom had no right to torture the inhabitants of an area which did not belong to it. Details of the methods of torture used were given in the Amnesty International report, and that report had been supported by the President and members of the Aden Municipal Council in a cable addressed to the Secretary-General and by Mr. Mackawee and other petitioners. They had all confirmed the allegations of torture, yet the United Kingdom had denied them.

The Committee should decide whether it believed the administering Power which was responsible for the alleged acts of torture, or an independent body which had been conducting an investigation in the area.

15. The United Kingdom representative had said that the representative of Amnesty International had been given all the help he needed other than being allowed to visit the detainees. Yet the report of Amnesty International stated that organizations like Amnesty International or the International Committee of the Red Cross were powerless against the emergency laws in Aden. There was little point in the United Kingdom Government sending one of its own people as a special representative to Aden to investigate the situation while at the same time announcing that it had full confidence in the authorities there. Even the United Kingdom Press had agreed. He wondered whether the United Kingdom would allow a representative of the Fourth Committee to visit the area in order to investigate allegations of torture.

16. The United Kingdom representative had claimed that the detainees in Aden were no concern of Amnesty International since they had not been detained because of their political opinions. He himself was convinced that they were indeed political prisoners, since they had been detained because they were fighting foreign domination and wished to lead their own country and people. In any event, according to the press release issued by Amnesty International on 17 October 1966, the organization had confirmed at its International Assembly in Copenhagen in September 1966 that it was interested in the treatment of all political prisoners and in particular with reports of torture, even if those persons concerned allegedly were involved in violence. The detainees were therefore the concern of Amnesty International.

17. United Kingdom representatives had stated on many occasions that their country had been instrumental in granting independence to 700 or 800 million people in the world. He wished to make it clear that no Arab country had obtained independence without a struggle and the people of Aden were now engaged in a similar struggle. Economic considerations had been at least partly responsible for the United Kingdom's decision to grant independence to Aden by 1968.

18. The United Kingdom representative had claimed that there was a campaign of violence directed from outside the Territory by a few exiles who had no influence. If that was so, it was curious that those uninfluential exiles had been able to challenge the United Kingdom forces. Mr. Mackawee had spoken at the previous meeting of the support which his organization enjoyed in the Territory. He had chosen exile, not because he was afraid of being tortured, but in order to lead his people to independence.

19. Mr. TARCICI (Yemen) said that the United Kingdom representative had tried to represent his country as one which was devoted to peace, justice and tolerance; he appeared to forget that there were at least twenty-five countries represented in the Committee which knew United Kingdom colonial rule from their own experience.

20. The statements of the petitioners could not be ignored. They had all confirmed that torture was used

in occupied South Yemen. Even the petitioners who represented collaborationist elements had reported that more bombs were thrown in the streets of Aden by the United Kingdom authorities than by patriots. If the United Kingdom was innocent, why had it not acceded to Amnesty International's request to be allowed to carry out an investigation? To entrust such an investigation to a United Kingdom official was to make oneself judge in one's own cause.

21. Further evidence that the United Kingdom was not the peace-loving country that it professed to be was provided by events on the artificial borders between independent Yemen and the occupied South. Numerous acts of aggression against independent Yemen and violations of its air space had been brought to the attention of the United Nations. Only a few days previously, the United Kingdom forces occupying South Yemen had opened fire on a school in the town of Kaatabah in independent Yemen, killing eight pupils and wounding eight more. The incident had been reported in a letter which he had addressed to the President of the Security Council on 7 November 1966,<sup>1/</sup> in which he had referred also to the violation of the air space of the Yemen Arab Republic by ten United Kingdom warplanes in Gebal Muris.

22. Mr. EL KONY (United Arab Republic) said that the United Kingdom representative apparently felt that attack was the best means of defence. His country, as a Member of the United Nations, as a member of the Afro-Asian group and as an Arab country, was bound to support the freedom struggle in another Arab country. The United Arab Republic would continue to lend its support to its brothers in South Arabia until they obtained independence. If there was terrorism in South Arabia, it was not the people's struggle for freedom but the United Kingdom's reign of terror there. Such behaviour by the United Kingdom was nothing new; it was but a repetition of what had occurred in many countries of Africa and Asia, and even in Ireland.

23. Mr. JOUEJATI (Syria) said that the United Kingdom representative had unfortunately had no new information to bring the Committee, nor had he provided evidence of any intention on the part of his country to implement the provisions of the United Nations resolutions. He had dwelt on the question of "terrorism", yet even Mr. Bayoomi had confirmed that it was often the United Kingdom authorities that instigated the violence in Aden. The United Kingdom representative categorically denied that charge, but the petitioners, after all, had come direct from the Territory. In any case, if the United Kingdom denied the accusations of the petitioners and of Amnesty International, would it consent to an international investigation into those accusations? It was hard to see how an investigation by United Kingdom officials could be regarded as impartial. It was also ironical that, after denying Amnesty International access to the Territory, it should now criticize that organization's evidence as not being first-hand.

24. Meanwhile, in spite of the protests of the people, the resolutions of the United Nations, the appeals of

the non-aligned countries and world opinion, the United Kingdom was continuing to build up its military forces in Aden.

25. The best course would be for the United Kingdom to withdraw from the Territory. The South Arabian people could ensure their own security; it was the presence of the colonial Power and its military forces and intelligence services which was giving rise to bloodshed and insecurity.

26. Mr. F. D. W. BROWN (United Kingdom) regretted that none of the representatives who had just spoken had taken up the important point which he had raised regarding ways of putting a stop to the campaign of violence so that the emergency regulations in the Territory could be lifted. He also regretted that the representative of Yemen had seen fit to raise a matter dealt with in a letter which had been circulated in the Security Council the previous day at Yemen's request. Allegations of the kind made in that letter were always investigated immediately and painstakingly. Investigations were particularly justified in the case of alleged overflights, because pilot error was always possible. In the present case, investigations had revealed that neither United Kingdom nor Federation forces had undertaken any action against Qataba and that the allegations of overflights were without foundation. Although the United Kingdom could only rely on reports from local sources, the incident at Qataba was apparently the result of fighting between different Yemeni factions. For about ten days in October, fighting had been observed from the South Arabian side of the border. The conflict had apparently been between republican forces and dissident republicans. Reports had been received that a school at Qataba had been hit and that seven people had been killed. There were also reports of demonstrations in Qataba, protesting against the Egyptian presence there, so the local people evidently regarded the Egyptians as responsible for the trouble. It was reported that part of the fort at Qataba was used during the daytime as a school, but the attack in which the fort had been hit was reported to have begun at 10 p.m.

27. With regard to the Syrian representative's remarks, he would stress once again his delegation's desire that the Committee should direct its attention to bringing the campaign of terrorism to a halt so that the procedures envisaged in the United Nations resolutions could be carried out in an atmosphere of peace and freedom.

28. Mr. TARCICI (Yemen) said that it was not surprising that the United Kingdom should deny its acts of aggression against independent Yemen, since it even denied the acts of violence which it was committing in Aden itself. It was remarkable, however, that the United Kingdom representative should expect the Committee to believe that it was Yemenites who had fired on a Yemeni school and killed Yemeni children.

29. Mr. JOUEJATI (Syria) said that he regretted that the United Kingdom delegation could not yet state that its Government was ready to call off its campaign of terrorism in Aden and South Arabia and to begin to implement the resolutions of the United Nations, without laying down any artificial conditions.

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1966, document S/7579.

## AGENDA ITEM 23

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Southern Rhodesia (continued)\* (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III; A/C.4/671, A/C.4/L.836 and Add.1 and 2, A/C.4/L.837)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION A/C.4/L.836 AND ADD.1 AND 2 (continued)

30. Mr. PEON DEL VALLE (Mexico) said that he wished to point out that the discussion of the draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.4/L.836 and Add.1 and 2) was not yet over. He realized that the purpose of the draft resolution was to promote the agreed goal of allowing genuine self-determination to take place in Southern Rhodesia as soon as possible. The Mexican delegation would therefore like to be able to support the draft resolution, but at present it could do so only in general terms.

31. In his view, operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution was in one respect too broad, and in another respect too narrow. It was too broad because it seemed to imply a condemnation of the Governments of Portugal and South Africa as such rather than condemning particular acts which came within the purview of the agenda item. Moreover, the term "condemns" seemed unduly harsh. As could be seen from the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III), the Portuguese Government had offered some explanations and given certain guarantees regarding the transit of goods to Southern Rhodesia. The General Assembly might not be satisfied with those explanations, but he thought that some other wording which merely censured or deplored the acts in question would be preferable, without increasing international tension, and might facilitate wider support for the draft resolution and thus help it to achieve its purposes.

32. On the other hand, the wording seemed too narrow in that it limited itself to criticizing two Governments which were mentioned by name. He was aware that the Governments mentioned were those responsible for the areas from which supplies had entered Southern Rhodesia, thus undermining, to a considerable extent, the administering Power's efforts to bring down the régime in Salisbury. Moreover, the two Governments had dissociated themselves from the decisions of the United Nations. Nevertheless, it would surely be wiser to condemn in general all who were sending supplies to the Salisbury régime or who might do so in the future. It seemed to him that some formula censuring any act, by any Government or authority, likely to help to consolidate the Salisbury régime would enable the draft resolution to obtain greater support and be more representative of the position of the Committee. If, however, the sponsors wished to retain the paragraph as it stood, and if the paragraph were put to the vote separately, his delegation would be unable to support it.

\*Resumed from the 1621st meeting.

33. With regard to operative paragraph 7, his delegation considered that any call for the use of force, particularly giving it priority over other means, was a cause for serious concern and serious questions. From a humanitarian point of view, such a recommendation raised the question of the value of human life and of who would be the victims; from a specifically political standpoint, the question whether it was admissible to propose a measure which entailed violence and whether there could be any guarantee concerning the consequences of an outbreak of hostilities between the two sides; and from a primarily legal point of view, the question whether there were reasonable grounds for thinking that there had been a violation of one principle of the United Nations Charter which should prevail, in the present case, over another principle of the same Charter. There were also the questions of the extent of the responsibilities contracted by Member States administering Non-Self-Governing Territories and of which national authority or international organ was called upon to put the machinery of military action into motion.

34. In the light of those questions, it was not surprising that during the discussion at the previous session on the draft resolution on Southern Rhodesia which had led to the adoption of resolution 2022 (XX), his delegation had proposed the deletion of the phrase "including military force" in the paragraph calling upon the Government of the United Kingdom to employ all necessary measures and, that proposal not being adopted, had been obliged to vote against the paragraph in question. His delegation did not think that it was the only one to consider that recourse to armed force was the most extreme instrument of political action and that it therefore occupied the last place among the measures that might be adopted by the United Nations. The use of force was a final and desperate recourse that often had serious and unforeseeable consequences.

35. Ten months had elapsed since then and, despite the General Assembly's call, the administering Power had not employed armed force. Economic, migratory and politico-diplomatic sanctions had been imposed against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, but those measures had not solved the problem. As could be seen from the report of the Special Committee, since December 1965 the economy of Southern Rhodesia had improved in certain fundamental aspects.

36. From the legal point of view, he noted that the General Assembly had decided that in the case of Southern Rhodesia it was competent to call upon the administering Power to employ armed force, since that would be a police action and not a conflict between States. A conflict between States was of course possible and might prove inevitable if any independent nation decided to send military contingents to support the people of Zimbabwe.

37. With regard to the general political aspect, his delegation considered that the continuation of the alarming situation was increasing tension between two great political trends in Africa. That tension was a potential source of racial antagonism in a part of the world where racial harmony would provide the key to peace.

38. In the light of those considerations, his delegation would prefer operative paragraph 7 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.836 and Add.1 and 2 to be so worded as not to recommend the premature use of armed force. That did not mean that his delegation was seeking to delay the settlement of that dangerous situation but that it felt that all other means had not yet been exhausted. If the sponsors of the draft resolution preferred to retain the text as it stood, and if operative paragraph 7 was voted upon separately, his delegation would be unable to support it.

39. With regard to the competence of the General Assembly, a question which had been decided at the twentieth session by the adoption of resolution 2022 (XX), his delegation would welcome any formula that would help to dispel doubts and which was likely to obtain as representative a vote of the Fourth Committee as possible.

40. Mr. MOUNGUENGUI (Gabon) said that the fact that his delegation had not expressed its views in the general debate on the question of Southern Rhodesia should not be interpreted as any lack of interest in a problem that was so serious that no African State could remain indifferent. The sole concern of his delegation had been to avoid repeating the comments made by other African and Asian delegations. The statements of those delegations reflected his Government's position on the question and his delegation associated itself with the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.836 and Add.1 and 2, the text of which in no way differed from previous resolutions which had been adopted on the question and which his delegation had supported.

41. The delegation of Gabon fully supported the eighth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, for it considered that if the illegal régime of Ian Smith had not been supported by certain Governments, the situation in Southern Rhodesia would be quite different. There was no doubt that without such support Ian Smith would not dare to persist in his senseless course and the doors of liberty and political independence would be opened wide to the Zimbabwe people. That was why it was essential that the great Powers and commercial partners of Southern Rhodesia should realize the full extent of the responsibility which they bore in assisting a racist régime and thus sacrificing, for the sake of one man, 4 million Africans whose sole desire was to live as free men in their own country.

42. Mr. UOMOTO (Japan) recalled that his delegation had repeatedly stated that Japan opposed the unilateral declaration of independence by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and refused to recognize that régime. In conformity with that position, his country had faithfully carried out the economic and other measures called for in Security Council resolutions, regardless of the strain that those measures placed on its national economy. For example, in addition to taking steps to halt imports of tobacco and sugar, including even those which had been contracted for before the unilateral declaration of independence, the Japanese Government had adopted measures to ensure that such vital commodities as pig-iron, asbestos and chrome were not imported from Southern Rhodesia.

As a result of those measures, imports from Southern Rhodesia had been reduced to practically nil. Furthermore, Japan had imposed an embargo on the export of arms and ammunition, oil and petroleum products, and had strictly adhered to that policy. It was his Government's sincere wish that all countries concerned should do their utmost to bring the unsatisfactory situation in Southern Rhodesia to a speedy end.

43. Although his country had kept the Secretary-General informed of the measures which it had undertaken, the information in the report of the Special Committee (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III, annex) was not quite up to date and accordingly did not always accurately reflect his Government's position. The statement in paragraph 96 that Japanese interests were importing asbestos no longer reflected his Government's position. It was stated in paragraph 259 (*ibid.*, annex, appendix I) that a mission from a Japanese steel company had recently visited Southern Rhodesia to study the feasibility of building new steel mills. The fact was that the mission had visited Southern Rhodesia during February-March 1965, i.e., before the unilateral declaration of independence, and that since then the study in question had not been pursued, in accordance with his Government's policy of refraining from any action that would assist in any manner the illegal minority régime in the Territory.

44. His delegation categorically denied the statement made to the Special Committee by Mr. Silundika, representative of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), that a Japanese company had recently sold tear-gas to the Smith régime for use against Africans (*ibid.*, chap. III, para. 749). That statement was not only unfounded in fact, but grossly misrepresented the earnest efforts which his Government was making to achieve the common objectives of Member States.

45. His delegation understood and sympathized with the intent, objectives and spirit of the draft resolution, which it regarded as the expression of a deep sense of disappointment over the grave situation still prevailing in Southern Rhodesia. It fully shared the concern of most members of the Committee that the effects of various measures adopted thus far were slow, that the minority régime was still in power and that the people of Zimbabwe were still denied their fundamental human rights, including their inalienable right to freedom and independence.

46. The Japanese delegation fully shared the objective of bringing the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia to a speedy end and would accordingly vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole. It had certain reservations, however, on some of the paragraphs. With regard to the reference in operative paragraph 7 to the use of force, his delegation considered that the ultimate decision should be left to the administering Power and it hoped that all possible avenues would be explored in order to avoid violence. With regard to economic measures, his delegation thought that measures of a mandatory nature should be practical and feasible, based on a realistic appraisal of the situation, and that they should be discussed in and decided upon by the Security Council within the whole context of the various measures that could be envisaged as being effective. As in the past, Japan was prepared to give full support to such economic

measures as might be decided upon by the Security Council.

47. Mr. ADAN (Somalia) said that his delegation was not among the sponsors of the draft resolution because its concern for the fate of the Africans in Southern Rhodesia was so great that it found it difficult to sponsor a resolution that merely repeated the provisions of previous United Nations resolutions which had so far failed to achieve the desired results. The Somali delegation had wished to retain its freedom of action in order to be able to propose amendments designed to strengthen the draft.

48. It was most distressing that one year after the seizure of power by the Smith clique the problem of Southern Rhodesia was still before the United Nations because of the United Kingdom Government's failure to restore legality in the Territory. The reasons for that failure were clear. In his delegation's view, the United Kingdom had never sincerely sought to prepare the Territory for independence on the basis of majority rule. On the contrary, the history of the area since the advent of United Kingdom colonialism testified to the nefarious attempts of the United Kingdom Government to perpetuate white domination in central Africa. It would be recalled that forty years earlier the United Kingdom had granted virtual control of Southern Rhodesia to a small number of Whites, in violation of the rights of the African majority. In 1953, the United Kingdom Government had taken the ignoble step of extending the same white minority rule to neighbouring territories through the creation of the so-called Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, in defiance of the will of the African peoples concerned.

49. From 1962, when the question of Southern Rhodesia had first been brought before the United Nations, until the seizure of power by the Smith régime in November 1965, the United Kingdom Government had denied the competence of the United Nations to deal with the problem, despite the concern repeatedly voiced by various United Nations bodies at the alarming developments in the Territory. Nor had that Government's attitude since the unilateral declaration of independence been of any assistance. In November 1965 the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary had come to the Security Council ostensibly to seek the assistance of States Members of the United Nations in quelling the rebellion. It had soon become clear, however, that the Foreign Secretary had merely sought to seize the initiative and to set the tone for all subsequent deliberations and decisions on the question in the United Nations.

50. A close examination of the resolutions adopted on the problem, including the text under consideration, showed that beyond condemning the Smith régime and reaffirming the rights of the African majority in the Territory, beyond calling on all States not to recognize that régime and on the United Kingdom Government to bring it to an end, and beyond recommending the

unenforceable sanctions requested by the United Kingdom, the United Nations had shied away from any positive action in the matter and had allowed itself to be lulled into complacency by the United Kingdom Government.

51. It was clear to his delegation that the United Kingdom Government had no intention of putting an end to the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Wilson had said that the rebellion would be brought to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months. Unfortunately, the weeks had become months and the months a full year without the end of the illegal racist régime of Ian Smith being in sight. The so-called sanctions had had no effect. In any event, his delegation considered that economic sanctions were not the right answer, for in view of the defiant attitude of the Governments of South Africa and Portugal they were not enforceable. Moreover, the United Kingdom Government was confronted with high treason in Southern Rhodesia and the only way to deal with high treason was by the full application of the law. It was not the first time that the United Kingdom Government had faced a constitutional crisis in its colonies, where, unlike the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, there had often been legitimate grounds for crisis, but in those cases it had never hesitated to resort to military action to uphold law and order. It was sufficient to recall the cases of Guyana and Aden, where force had been used against the people simply because they had resisted United Kingdom aggression. It was argued that the United Kingdom could not use force against its own kith and kin. British history showed, however, that the United Kingdom resorted to force wherever and whenever it felt that its interests were at stake; it had done so in the United States in the eighteenth century and repeatedly in Ireland. The truth of the matter was that in Southern Rhodesia United Kingdom interests coincided with those of the white minority. His delegation was convinced that the United Kingdom was merely playing for time until the issue became one of those chronic problems about which the international community talked but did nothing.

52. His delegation could no longer tolerate the present state of affairs. It had therefore submitted the two amendments appearing in document A/C.4/L.837. With regard to the second amendment, he pointed out that paragraph 7 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.836 and Add.1 and 2 fell short of the provisions of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 217 (1965), which called on the United Kingdom Government to bring the minority régime to "an immediate end". His delegation therefore felt justified in calling for a time limit by which the United Kingdom must be required to restore legal government in Southern Rhodesia. Should that Government fail to take action, it would be for the Committee to bring the matter to the Security Council in order to see what measures could be adopted under the Charter.

*The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.*