



**C O N T E N T S**

	Page
Agenda item 45:	
Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi ( <i>continued</i> )	
General debate ( <i>continued</i> ).....	241

**Chairman:** Mr. Adnan M. PACHACHI (Iraq).

**AGENDA ITEM 45**

**Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi (A/4689-A/4692, A/4694, A/4706 and Add.1, A/C.4/471, A/C.4/476, A/C.4/477, A/C.4/L.678) (*continued*)**

**GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)**

1. Mr. CHATTI (Tunisia) (*translated from French*):<sup>1</sup> Here we are once again applying our minds to this arduous and exasperating affair of Ruanda-Urundi. At the beginning of this session there were prolonged and heated discussions in an atmosphere at times charged with passion. We listened to petitioners, we heard an uninterrupted stream of discussions and finally we approved two resolutions bearing the numbers 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV) respectively.

2. Although the practical and positive results that we achieved as a result of these discussions have not solved the problem, the fact remains that our efforts have not been in vain. Those discussions will at least have had the advantage of bringing out the two following points. The first, which is regrettable but at the same time revealing, was the speed with which the Administering Authority set about committing acts which have unmasked its real intentions. The second—which my delegation regards as particularly useful—was the dispatch of a Commission to the scene and the report which its visit to Ruanda-Urundi produced.

3. First of all, I should like to pay a warm tribute to Ambassador Dorsinville and to the two other members of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, Mr. Rahnama and Mr. Gassou, for the magnificent work they accomplished. Despite the material difficulties, the obstacles placed in their path by the Administering Authority, the annoyances to which they were subjected and the attacks on the Organization which they represent and to which they are very deeply attached, the members of the Commission have been able to present a report [A/4706 and Add.1] which is very clear and which describes, often in detail, the development of the situation, gives an objective analysis of events, thus casting a powerful light on this unfortunate affair, and presents to our Committee, to the General Assembly and to public opinion throughout the world

<sup>1</sup> The Committee decided, on the proposal of the representatives of Venezuela and the United States and in accordance with its decision at the 1117th meeting, that the text of this statement should be reproduced in full.

the true facts of a problem which up to now it had seemed impossible to unravel. Thanks to this magnificent work, which bears the mark of those outstanding qualities of honesty, truthfulness, impartiality and courage which distinguish Mr. Dorsinville—qualities that had already been displayed in Togo, that young State which from its inception has shown itself to be one of the most stable and peaceful States in Africa—the Commission has rendered inestimable services to the United Nations, to Africa and to the cause of peace. Let us rise above our personal feelings and resentments in order to derive the greatest possible advantage from this important document and make use of it to save Ruanda-Urundi from the catastrophe which hovers over it and thus spare the world, which is already suffering from many painful crises, another tragedy similar to that of the Congo.

4. I hope that all the members of the Commission will take these words as an expression of gratitude on the part of my Government, whose keen interest in the liberation of Africa and the maintenance of world peace is well known. My delegation feels bound, however, to make the most explicit reservations with regard to the Commission's recommendations. The reasons which have led my delegation to adopt this attitude will be explained at the end of my statement.

5. The first impression to be derived from the Commission's report and from a careful examination of the timing of the events which have taken place since 20 December 1960, the date on which the General Assembly adopted resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV) is this: the Administering Authority was taken unawares by the unexpectedly firm attitude displayed by the United Nations and its unforeseen determination to play a direct part in solving the problem of Ruanda-Urundi. This impression becomes a fact when one takes into account the unco-operative attitude of the Administering Authority whenever the United Nations makes some recommendation or other with regard to this Trust Territory. This unco-operative attitude is so manifest that one sometimes ends by wondering whether the Administering Authority is aware of its duties towards the United Nations.

6. The almost systematic opposition of the Belgian Government to any decisions or recommendations of the United Nations has taken on the appearance of an open conflict, and we have been able to observe here, during the hearings of the petitioners, that the latter did not hesitate to denounce this state of affairs and to voice their fear of becoming the victims of this quarrel. Truth compels us to say that the petitioners are right. The more the United Nations, faced with Belgium's behaviour in Ruanda-Urundi, hardens its attitude and shows that it intends to have the Trusteeship Agreement respected, the more the Administering Authority stiffens its resistance to the United Nations and renders our decisions inoperative by taking action that runs

counter to those decisions and by confronting the United Nations with a *fait accompli*.

7. Suspicion with regard to the United Nations has reached such proportions, particularly among the senior local officials of the Administering Authority, that all its decisions are interpreted as hostile acts toward Belgium, all its undertakings are considered to be harmful to Ruanda-Urundi, and all the causes of past, present and future difficulties are held to have their origin on the banks of the East River. The hostility of senior Belgian officials to the United Nations has passed beyond the psychic stage and has become something metaphysical. It springs from that disease known to medicine as "allergy". We can state without risk of exaggerating—as will be seen further on in this statement—that the Belgian Administration has become allergic to any action, whatever it may be, originating in the United Nations.

8. At the time our Committee was examining the question of Ruanda-Urundi, in November and December 1960, the situation was as follows: the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, had made a number of recommendations, to the most important of which I should like to draw your attention.

9. Firstly, the Mission recommended the holding of a round-table conference, with the object, first and foremost, of bringing about national reconciliation in Ruanda and then of studying all the questions concerning the Trust Territory as a whole. In making this recommendation, the Mission pointed out that this conference could be a success if it were organized with proper care and that it was difficult to imagine Urundi being dissociated from such a very special attempt at negotiation. I should like to draw the Committee's attention particularly to these two points: the special care to be taken in organizing the conference and the evident intention that Urundi should take part in it. As regards this matter, we should also remember that the Visiting Mission laid particular stress, in paragraph 446 of its report [T/1538], on the maintenance of the *de facto* community of Ruanda-Urundi.

10. Secondly, the Mission recommended that one of the essential conditions for the success of a round-table conference or of any other attempt at conciliation was to be quite certain that those taking part in such negotiations were genuine representatives of the political parties, even if it were a question of individuals who had taken refuge abroad or had been convicted in a court of law or were being prosecuted in connexion with the recent disturbances in Ruanda.

11. Thirdly, the Mission advised against the holding of communal elections before a general reconciliation had been announced. Here are the actual words used in paragraph 459 of the Mission's report:

"But while it is important not to disappoint the people by delaying the promised elections, it is even more important, in the Mission's opinion, that these elections should take place in an atmosphere of calm, freedom and confidence so that the results may not be contested. The Mission considers it desirable that the work of national reconciliation should be well advanced before the elections are held. It hopes that the pre-electoral meeting of national political leaders will herald the first signs of a relaxation of tensions and that all parties will agree on the timing of the

elections and the conditions under which they are to be held."

12. What has happened, then, to all these recommendations? Although they were accepted in principle by the Belgian Government, we all know what became of them. The round-table conference, which was to be prepared with care, to bring together the genuine representatives of the political parties and to encompass the whole Territory, did in fact take place at Brussels. It was indeed organized with the greatest care. The only way in which it departed from the United Nations recommendations was that this care—the whole of this care—was mobilized to counteract the General Assembly's recommendations on all points and to oppose the objectives that the Assembly had in view. Indeed, the Brussels Conference was organized in such a way as to eliminate the opposition parties, and particularly some of their leaders. Furthermore, the Conference dealt only with Ruanda and not, as the Visiting Mission had recommended, with the Trust Territory as a whole.

13. As for the elections, they were held not as the United Nations had recommended, i.e., in an atmosphere of calm, peace and confidence, under United Nations supervision and in such a way that the results could not be called in question, but in conditions which offered no guarantee whatever to the opposition and cast doubt on the legality of the elections. Since these elections were the outcome of a conference which had brought together only the parties holding the same political views and as they had taken place as the result of an agreement between those parties and the Administration, they could only lead to a complete victory on the part of the political movement supported by the Administering Authority.

14. My delegation wishes to lay particular emphasis on the importance of the facts to which I have just drawn attention. They form the basis of a whole series of developments upon which Belgium has embarked and in which it has involved Ruanda-Urundi and the United Nations. This process has been going on ever since that date and, having brought us to the serious situation in which we find ourselves today, is likely to have some tragic surprises in store for us.

15. Indeed, since that time all the actions of the Administering Authority have been distinguished by the following characteristics: hostility to the United Nations and suspicion with regard to its decisions and recommendations; determination to eliminate the nationalist political parties of the so-called Opposition; determination to support the parties that were successful in the communal elections and to exploit those elections to ensure that those parties have the country completely under their control; division of the Territory into two separate parts—Ruanda and Burundi.

16. The disquieting nature of this situation was, moreover, certainly not lost on the Trusteeship Council, which, at its twenty-sixth session, had noted the assurance given by Belgium that the sole object of the communal elections in Ruanda was the selection of burgo-masters and members of the communal councils and that these elections were regarded as being administrative and not political in character. The Council had been of the opinion that the communal elections should not be used as a basis for future elections to the national assemblies [A/4404, p. 68].

17. We all know how the Administering Authority has kept its word, and how the cantonal elections,

instead of providing the country with municipal councils, gave rise to a constituent assembly with powers to change the country's institutions. That, however, is another problem with which I shall deal later on. For the time being, I shall merely point out that, after having reassured the United Nations as to the non-political character of the elections, the Belgian Government did not hesitate to declare publicly—on 17 October and thus only two months after the elections—through its Minister for African Affairs, that the composition of the government and the provisional assembly to be set up before the holding of legislative elections would be largely determined by the election results of July 1960. We shall also see how, subsequently, the Administering Authority has never departed from the principle that the cantonal elections of 1960 were the sole valid means for determining the will of the people of Ruanda.

18. The long and heated discussions which were devoted by this Committee to the question of Ruanda-Urundi during the first part of the fifteenth session resulted in the adoption of General Assembly resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV). The fate of these two resolutions at the hands of the Administering Authority was no better than that of the Visiting Mission's recommendations.

19. In resolution 1579 (XV) the General Assembly:

"7. *Recommends* that the elections scheduled to be held in January 1961 should be postponed to a date to be decided on at the resumed fifteenth session of the General Assembly in the light of the recommendations of the Commission . . . so that . . . the arrangements for the elections can be completed under the supervision of the United Nations;

"8. *Decides* to set up a United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, composed of three members, who will be assisted by observers and staff to be appointed by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Commission."

20. The first concrete result of that resolution was the visit to Ruanda-Urundi by the Commission provided for in its paragraph 8. A point to be noted first of all was the barely veiled hostility with which the Commission was received. By such a reception, the Administering Authority hoped, through the persons delegated by the United Nations, to strike a blow at the Organization itself and thus demonstrate to public opinion in the Trust Territory what little attention it pays to the United Nations. I shall be told that this interpretation is a personal one of mine and that there is nothing to prove that that was in fact the intention of the Belgian authorities. That is true, but I see no other way of explaining the singular behaviour of the Belgian authorities towards a mission representing the General Assembly of the United Nations. Thus, for example, the first act on the part of the Administering Authority was to deny the Commission's right to take part in the Ostend Conference and to consider that the members of the Commission who were present at that Conference were merely individual observers and did not constitute a commission. When, later on, this situation was rectified, the Commission found that the hostility of the members of the Conference towards it was such that its position seemed to be more that of a prisoner at the bar. The Chairman of the Commission had to get up and refute in the strongest terms the accusations and slander levelled against the United Nations. We need only read the statement by Mr.

Dorsinville [*A/4706/Add.1, annex IX*] to realize the full scope of the campaign to bring discredit on this Organization.

21. With regard to the Ostend Conference, which seemed to have conformed with paragraph 4 of resolution 1579 (XV), the following observations are called for. Firstly, as in the case of the earlier talks, the number of seats reserved for each party was based on the results of the communal elections. This system of representation, which was fraudulent at its very base, was further vitiated by the fact that some people were present at the Conference otherwise than as representatives of their party and thus increased the number of seats reserved for their particular political movement. On this point, paragraph 69 of the Commission's report is particularly illuminating. We note, secondly, the reservations made by the nationalist parties and their eventual withdrawal from the Conference; thirdly, the attitude imposed by the Administering Authority on the work of the Conference, namely, that Belgium was not obliged to carry out the decisions of the General Assembly, and that it was for the Conference to decide whether these recommendations were in accordance with the desires of the people of the Trust Territory; fourthly, the Belgian Government's insistence on the need for holding legislative elections in January 1961, despite the fact that this was contrary to the recommendations contained in paragraph 7 of resolution 1579 (XV); and fifthly, the hostility shown by the members of the Conference towards the United Nations, about which the Commission has this to say in its report [*para. 77*]:

"It was clear that many participants misunderstood the motives underlying the adoption of the General Assembly resolutions, and that they had arrived for the Conference in a spirit of defiance towards the United Nations."

22. Thus neither by its composition, nor by the atmosphere in which it was held, nor by the divisions existing between its members did that Conference reflect the spirit of the recommendations embodied in paragraph 4 of resolution 1579 (XV). On the contrary, everything seemed to point to the fact that it had been called for the purpose of making that resolution a dead letter. This is certainly the opinion of the Commission, which in its report [*para. 146*] says:

"The Commission is forced to the conclusion that in the minds of its organizers the Conference was primarily intended to convince the Commission that the great majority of the people were opposed to the postponement of legislative elections both in Rwanda and in Burundi and also to give the impression, in regard to Rwanda, that the Commission insisted on the definitive elimination of the Mwami and ruled out any compromise in the matter."

Such was the fate reserved by the Administering Authority to paragraph 4 of resolution 1579 (XV).

23. Let us see now what has happened to paragraphs 2 and 3 of that resolution. On this subject I can say, without running the risk of being mistaken or being gainsaid, that the Administering Authority never intended to give serious consideration to these recommendations of the General Assembly. One might even say that Belgium's attitude and the attitude of the United Nations on this matter could best be described as a "dialogue between the deaf". Whereas the General Assembly, in clear and precise terms leaving no chance

for ambiguity, urged the Administering Authority "to implement immediately measures of full and unconditional amnesty", the Administering Authority has never at any time considered the matter in that light. Whether at the Ostend Conference—where the amnesty granted on the occasion of the marriage of His Majesty King Baudoin was talked about—or in the letter of 25 January from the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs [A/4706/Add.1, annex XIII], or in the Belgian Government's communication of 3 March [*ibid.*, annex XXVII] or finally in the statement made here on 20 March [1108th meeting] by the representative of Belgium, the Brussels Government has always regarded the amnesty in the following light: Firstly, the amnesty will apply only to political offences. We are not told, however, what constitutes a political offence, nor what is meant by a criminal offence in the case of acts committed as the result of disturbances of a political nature. Secondly, the urgent need for an amnesty is not recognized by the Belgian authorities. On the contrary, they consider that, for reasons to do with law and order, immediate amnesty measures are not desirable. A third argument, which is not without a certain ironical flavour of its own, is that for their own safety the prisoners will be better off in their prisons than in their homes. However strange this may appear, the concern shown by the colonialists for the welfare of the nationalists is unlimited and goes even so far as to transform prisons into refuges wherein patriots may dwell safely out of range of popular vengeance.

24. Furthermore, this concern is not felt solely for prisoners but extends also to refugees. In the case of the latter, the only thing that prevents their return is a fear of the rough handling to which they might be subjected on the part of the people. Moreover, the return of the refugees from abroad does not imply that they would be exempt from legal proceedings, and this, in black and white, means that the refugees also run the risk—if only to ensure their own protection in the depths of a prison—of falling into the hands of their opponents who, as a result of the Gitarama *coup d'état*, are now in power.

25. In brief, both in the matter of the general amnesty and in that of the return of the refugees, we meet with a systematic lack of co-operation on the part of the trusteeship Power.

26. There is, however, one matter in which the Belgian Government seems to have carried out the General Assembly's recommendations, namely, the emergency régime whose abolition had been asked for in operative paragraph 2 of resolution 1579 (XV). The emergency régime was, to be sure, rescinded on 14 November 1960, but as the Commission noted in its report, extremely wide powers had been given to the trusteeship Administration beforehand by virtue of the Legislative Ordinance of 25 October 1960 [A/4706/Add.1, annex XXIX]. I should like to draw the Committee's attention particularly to that date of 25 October 1960 and to the date on which the emergency régime was abolished. A comparison between these two dates shows that the Administration had already taken precautionary measures by granting itself still wider powers twenty days before the emergency régime was ended. This was a crude manoeuvre and does not call for any comment. However, my delegation wishes in this matter to express its agreement with the Commission, namely, that there are better ways of keeping the peace than by giving government officials unlimited and arbitrary powers.

27. We now come to the last item of resolution 1579 (XV), that is to say, the paragraph recommending that the elections scheduled for January 1961 should be put off until a later date. The Administering Authority, after having strongly opposed this recommendation and, especially during the Ostend Conference, stirred up anger against the United Nations for having proposed that the elections should be postponed, finally agreed to carry out the wishes of the General Assembly. As a matter of fact, both its refusal and its acceptance were designed to draw attention to the so-called will of the representatives of the people that elections should be held quickly, and in that way to justify the Gitarama *coup d'état*. At the same time, the Administering Authority would appear in the eyes of the public as having been foresighted in advising against a postponement of the elections, and the United Nations would be blamed for bringing about a calamitous situation by disregarding that advice.

28. As it was, the scene for that tragi-comic meeting of Gitarama was carefully prepared beforehand. We need only examine the information given by the Commission to realize that Belgian policy was carried out according to a very carefully prepared plan, which consisted in placing the United Nations before a *fait accompli*, for which it was to be held responsible, by aligning a part of public opinion against its decisions and recommendations and, when necessary, by stirring up public opinion to commit acts hostile to the United Nations. The Gitarama *coup d'état* is a clear instance of that procedure.

29. Thus, while at Ostend the Belgian authorities and the PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA political parties were unanimously proclaiming that they were against postponement of the elections and, in support of their argument, were citing public opinion, the atmosphere of tension, the danger of provoking disappointment and so on, the Administering Authority was taking measures which were made to appear as being in accordance with the wishes of the members of the Conference.

30. While the Commission was wasting time at Brussels waiting for a reply from the Belgian Government on the question of postponing the date of the elections, that same Government was putting the last touches to the measures which were to provide the Trust Territory with new institutions. Thus, whereas the Ostend Conference had ended on 12 January, and the Resident-General, on 15 January, had already signed Legislative Orders No. 02/16 and No. 02/18 [A/4706/Add.1, annexes XXX and XXXII], concerning the institutions of Ruanda and Burundi respectively, and Ordinances No. 02/17 and No. 02/19 [*ibid.*, annexes XXXI and XXXIII], laying down the procedure for the legislative elections in both parts of the Trust Territory, the Commission, which had been denied all knowledge of these preparations, had to wait until 21 January before being notified of the Belgian Government's agreement to the postponement of the elections. Furthermore, the Commission had been asked to put off its departure for Ruanda-Urundi until 30 January. When it is remembered that the Gitarama *coup d'état* took place on 28 January, it is not difficult to understand why the Commission was not wanted in the Territory before that date. No doubt this was meant to be a tactful device for preventing it from witnessing the Gitarama *coup d'état*. Despite the Commission's decision to go to the Trust Territory before 30 January and despite its actual presence there on 28 January, this device proved its worth, since the Commission had been kept in ignorance

of what was going on around it. In this way internal self-government was granted to both parts of the Territory, executive and legislative powers were conferred on the Government and Council of Ruanda, Governments were set up in Ruanda and Burundi and two-stage elections to the Legislative Council held. In short, the Commission was made to look—if I may be allowed the expression—like the village cuckold, whose unfortunate situation is known to everybody except himself. In addition to this, a truly royal present was kept in reserve for the Commission, for by the proclamation of the Republic, it was given the Mwami. This last gesture was the final touch to the over-all plan for upsetting all the decisions and recommendations embodied in resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV).

31. Needless to say, all these acts were committed in the name of the people, in accordance with the desires of the masses and for the purpose of avoiding disturbances. It would also seem that the Gitarama *coup d'état* had been partly due to a feeling among the political leaders that they had been betrayed by the Administering Authority and to their conviction that the United Nations was hostile towards them. Thus the Administering Authority had itself become the victim of what was called the blindness of the United Nations, and it would have been regarded with suspicion by the people if it had conformed with the views of the United Nations. In all this dismal affair, everybody, the Administering Authority and the political factions, gave themselves the appearance of guardian angels of the public interest—all except for the United Nations, which was made out to be a reactionary body, taking no account of the popular will and acting in defiance of the national aspirations of the Trust Territory. Thus the United Nations was represented as incarnating the spirit of evil, while opposing it stood the Administering Authority in the garb of a saviour and guardian angel.

32. Emphasis has often been laid on the insubordination of local Belgian officials and on their high degree of responsibility for the present situation. To a large extent, this is true, but I feel that this aspect of the matter should not be over-stressed. No one is better placed than we are to be experts on this question, in view of our long and still recent experience. There have, of course, always been residents-general and colonial administrators who plume themselves on being "specialists" and disregard their Government's instructions. In the words of Mr. Robert Schuman, the former French Minister for Foreign Affairs and a person who knew what he was talking about, "the *fait accompli* is a major temptation to residents-general". That is true of all countries which have had colonial administrators, but it does not mean that local officials are alone responsible for the actions which they perform in their official capacity. In many cases the central Government itself, either by remaining silent or by its weak reaction when faced with a *fait accompli*, encourages residents-general to persist in following such methods. In many cases too, the central Government has its representatives carry out "dirty work" which it could scarcely do itself. At all events, the residents-general derive their power from the nature of the régime under which the country is governed. If they feel strong enough to ignore the instructions of their Government, it is not because they are strong-willed or because of the power which their office gives them; it is because they are protected by powerful political parties or by the political or financial groups to which the Government itself is subject.

33. In this connexion, the case of the Resident-General of Ruanda-Urundi is particularly revealing. The astonishing statements made by this senior official to the periodical *Pourquoi Pas?*, the effect of which will not be diminished by the belated denial that we have heard here, are an excellent illustration of the political thinking of these last remnants of the colonial era, who are just like petty kings whose strength is derived from hidden sources.

34. For these reasons, my delegation considers that such administrators should in no case be held solely responsible for the situation in Ruanda-Urundi.

35. The consequences of this state of affairs are nevertheless extremely serious. In paragraph 222 of its report, the Commission has the following to say:

"So long as the Administration in the Territory does not accept the policy of the Belgian Government as laid down in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, there is a danger of independent plans of action being pursued which would jeopardize the implementation of the general policy. The Commission considers it one of the indispensable conditions for the performance of its duties that the agents of the Administration in the Territory should sincerely carry out and respect at all levels any policy drawn up with a view to the achievement of the common aims of Belgium and the United Nations in preparing the independence of the Territory."

36. In paragraph 184, which I shall read to you, the Commission sounds a note of real alarm:

"In an atmosphere apparently characterized, on the one hand, by what certain official explanations have indicated to be a crisis in the authority of the administering Power and, on the other, by systematic vilification of the United Nations, with the open or tacit support of the Administration, it is greatly to be feared that the more intransigent of the parties in power may be encouraged in their design to place the Organization before a fresh series of accomplished facts and be tempted to confront it with decisions yet more serious, constituting actual defiance and violation of the provisions of the Trusteeship Agreement."

37. The Commission's misgivings become still more marked when we come to paragraph 200, which says:

"However, the Commission desires to emphasize the need for ensuring that the Belgian troops which are there to keep order and protect the country's frontiers are not used for intimidating the local population and that the Native police forces now being created are not employed as a political weapon."

38. It so happens that the information which we have on this point is alarming. The police force in question is already under political influence. Its members were and still are recruited from among the supporters of PARMEHUTU. It is, in fact, nothing less than a team of PARMEHUTU supporters, who have been politically indoctrinated and turned into fanatics by the leaders of that party. I leave it to the Committee to judge for itself what serious dangers are latent in such a situation.

39. Thus, a State Member of the United Nations, and a signatory to the San Francisco Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement of 13 December 1946, presumes to introduce changes in the Trust Territory's institutions without prior consultation, to recognize the authority of a Government resulting from a *coup d'état* and to refuse to implement the decisions and recommendations

of the United Nations. It then appears before this Committee in the guise of an upholder of the principles of the Charter while at the same time opposing virtually everyone whose duty it is to ensure that the provisions of that same Charter are carried out.

40. The deplorable outcome of this tragic adventure is that a large number of prisoners are rotting in jail, where, so we are told, they are away from danger; that thousands of refugees live under inhumane conditions; that one Mwami has been dethroned while the other has been rendered powerless; that certain political factions have been brought to power illegally and are determined to remain in power; that some political leaders have been denied their rights and threaten to resort to force in self-defence; and that a Territory which, by the unanimous recommendation of the Members of this Assembly, was to have been united has been split into two States.

41. A further sorry result is to be found in the spectacle provided for us in this very room by the petitioners who, forgetting that they are the children of the same mother country, have inveighed against one another, threatened one another, or clung obstinately to extremist points of view. The most sorry result of all is that the possibility of achieving national reconciliation has now been gravely impaired. Knowing as we do that the Congo tragedy began with less, we realize how great are the dangers which threaten Ruanda-Urundi, Africa and world peace.

42. My delegation cannot understand how it is that the Administering Authority, despite the lesson so tragically taught by the Congo, stubbornly pursues a policy of division and factionalism in Ruanda-Urundi. There was indeed a time when the motto "Divide and rule" enabled the colonialists to keep whole continents under their domination. Experience has proved, however, that that time has passed and that, even if a few political leaders are still to be found who belong to the "loyalist" persuasion and are ever ready to serve their masters, the people for their part are no longer prepared to let themselves be led like sheep by such poor shepherds. It is true that the secession of Katanga, which was fostered by the Belgian authorities, has shown that newly emancipated peoples can still be divided. But has the success which the colonialists achieved there—an ephemeral success, as the future will show—really been of advantage to them? Will it ensure that their interests are safeguarded? We beg leave to doubt it, and events will show that we are right. There is of course a danger that the secession of Katanga will bring about the dismemberment of the Congo. Today in that country we are confronted by attempts to set up a whole series of states, like the one which calls itself the Mining State of Kivu, and we shall perhaps witness attempts to create a Coffee State in Burundi (we heard all about the coffee season which allegedly prevented the election from taking place in June) or even a Hutu State in Ruanda. All these attempts are nevertheless bound to fail, for the spirit of the Tananarive Conference will not prevail. The peoples of Africa are animated by a desire for unity that nothing can repress. Just as their ardent zeal in winning their liberty carried all before it, so too will their determination to be united be irresistible.

43. My delegation also cannot understand why the Administering Authority persists in giving its support to political parties that favour its ideas, why it does all it can to suppress any political movement which shows

signs of adopting a more independent attitude towards it, why it refuses to grant a total and unconditional amnesty, or why it opposes the return of the Mwami of Ruanda and alienates the Mwami of Burundi. There was, of course, a time when the colonial Powers administered the peoples under their authority through indigenous persons or groups who were in favour of their presence in the country, and when exile and imprisonment were the means whereby they ensured law and order and the protection of their interests. Here again, however, the events of the past few years have proved that such methods have ceased altogether to be effective. Men like Bourguiba, Nehru, Sukarno and Nkrumah, to quote but a few examples, after having been long regarded as the worst adversaries, not to say the enemies, of the colonial Powers, became authoritative spokesmen with whom those Powers could deal. They were released from prison in order to discuss ways and means whereby the independence of their countries could be brought about. In Morocco, the late King Mohamed V was brought back from exile in Madagascar to sign the instrument of independence of his kingdom. Neither France nor the United Kingdom has had any reason to regret that it was obliged to come to terms with its former adversaries, for friendly relations and fruitful co-operation between newly emancipated States and the colonial countries have taken the place of the former mistrust and discord. What is more, security and law and order again prevail in those countries, and world peace has been strengthened by their presence in the United Nations.

44. The achievement of independence by a former colony always marks the beginning of a new era for both the colonized and the colonizer and also for world peace. Such a new era can be one of friendship, co-operation and peace if the colonial Power displays understanding and a sense of realism, as was the case in India, Ghana, Morocco, Tunisia and other countries, but it can also be a signal for anarchy and hatred and be a threat to peace, as is the case today in the Congo.

45. Therefore, despite the increasing amount of evidence that Belgium still persists in following a reactionary and outmoded policy where Ruanda-Urundi is concerned, my delegation continues to hope—faint though that hope may be—that reason will prevail over emotion, realism over Utopian desires, and understanding over obstinacy.

46. The logical conclusion to which the first part of my statement, so damning where Belgium is concerned, should be expected to lead is that the trusteeship should be terminated and that some alternative solution should be found to cover the transitional period, particularly during the time preceding the elections and the few months that will follow them. In this way it would be possible for the new institutions to be established and the transfer of sovereignty to be arranged. I will be told that once there is clear evidence that no trust can be placed in the Administering Authority the inevitable conclusions should be drawn, the most obvious of which is that that Authority should no longer have a hand in carrying out so important a mission.

47. We shall not go so far as that. We want to give the Administering Authority a last chance. We want to have faith in the Belgian people, whose belief in peace, democracy and human values is well known to us. We should like to believe that its Government, after the tragic experiences of the Congo, the solemn warnings uttered in this Committee, and the moving appeals

which will be made to it by the United Nations, will revert to a sounder conception of its mission of trusteeship in the Territory, one which will be more realistic and more consonant with its own interests.

48. We do not ask for Belgium's mandate to be brought to an end, but we shall call for substantial safeguards if it is to be continued. We shall do so in the interests of our Organization, which, as a result of the Congo affair, has experienced and continues to experience the most critical hours that it has known since it was founded; we do so in the interests of Africa which, on the very morrow of the emancipation of a large number of its peoples and even before the illuminations of their independence days had been extinguished, found itself precipitated into the dramatic events in the Congo by which it has been so tragically divided and rent in twain.

49. We shall call for such safeguards in order to protect the African States, whose welfare can be assured only if they remain aloof from the cold war. Non-alignment and non-engagement constitute the only course for young States which not only need the support of all if they are to achieve economic and social development but must also devote all their effort and their potential to that task without being plagued by either East or West. The welfare of Africa does not lie in making that continent a scene of strife between ideologies, a breeding ground for Communism, or a stronghold or bastion against Communism, but rather in turning it into a neutral area in which all can work in friendly collaboration for the good of its inhabitants. We all know what the Congo affair has done to Africa: it has dragged that continent into the cold war.

50. We shall ask for such safeguards in the interest of peace, which would be threatened if a situation similar to that in the Congo were to develop in Ruanda-Urundi and thus make it an easy prey to the cold war. We shall also do so in the interests of Belgium, which will continue to have many opportunities for fruitful co-operation with Ruanda-Urundi provided that we succeed in saving the Territory from the catastrophe which threatens it.

51. We shall also call for such guarantees because the Administering Authority, quite apart from its activities in Ruanda-Urundi to which reference was made in the first part of my statement, is not a stranger in our midst; we have seen it at work in the Congo. The reports by the Secretary-General and his representatives with regard to Belgium's actions in that unhappy country are familiar to us all. We all know that, as a result of the behaviour of its representatives, Belgium has been asked several times, notably by the Security Council, to withdraw its officials and its technicians from the Congo. That being so, we are justified in having no great confidence in it in so far as the holding of elections in Ruanda-Urundi is concerned.

52. The safeguards which we demand are provided for in the draft resolution [A/C.4/L.678] which my delegation has the honour to submit to the Committee on behalf of the co-sponsors. The Committee will note that the United States is one of the sponsors. In drawing attention to this, my delegation wishes to express its gratification at the spirit of understanding, co-operation and realism that was shown by all the sponsors, without exception, when the resolution was being drafted. My delegation feels sure that the same spirit will be evidenced by the entire General Assembly and

that, by an overwhelming vote, all delegations will contribute to what I might call the last opportunity of avoiding in Ruanda-Urundi a crisis similar to that in the Congo.

53. In this draft resolution, the desire to achieve something effective and to be realistic has prevailed over sentiment and emotion. We condemn no one, and we make no attempt to cast slurs on anyone's dignity. What we set out to do was to promote action which, while remaining within the framework of the principles of the Charter, the General Assembly's earlier recommendations and decisions, and the provisions of the Trusteeship Agreement between Belgium and the United Nations, would, with due regard to the actual situation in the Territory and the aspirations of its people, permit the formation of democratic institutions capable of exercising national sovereignty when the country becomes independent. The draft resolution is moderate in form. With regard to its substance, it has been inspired by principles that the United Nations is bound to defend, and it takes the realities of the situation duly into account.

54. The preamble, after recalling resolution 1579 (XV), expresses regret at: the failure of the Administering Authority to implement fully and effectively the terms of resolution 1579 (XV); the *de facto* recognition by the Administering Authority of a Government in Ruanda which was established by irregular and unlawful means and which cannot be regarded as fully representative of all segments of public opinion in the absence of any free and normal elections on the basis of direct universal suffrage; and the setting-up of a Government in Burundi on the basis of the results of the communal elections, contrary to the assurances given by the Administering Authority itself that those elections would be purely administrative and would not have a political character. Further on, the preamble notes the statement made to the Assembly by the representative of the Belgian Government that his Government intends to co-operate fully with the United Nations in Ruanda-Urundi. The preamble is thus seen to do no more than set out indisputable facts.

55. In its operative part, the draft resolution, after expressing the General Assembly's appreciation to the members of the Commission for the work it has done, reaffirms resolution 1579 (XV) and calls upon the Administering Authority to ensure that the provisions of that resolution are implemented by its local representatives before the legislative elections are held.

56. In paragraph 3, the General Assembly recognizes that the Government of Belgium is alone accountable to the United Nations for the administration of the trusteeship in Ruanda-Urundi and that that responsibility cannot in any way be entrusted to local administrators or leaders until appropriate democratic institutions have been set up with the approval of the United Nations, and the Trusteeship Agreement has been terminated. In this paragraph, the sponsors had a precise objective in view, namely, that the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement should be strictly carried out. Under that Agreement, the Administering Authority is solely responsible for the administration of the Territory, and no attempt to divide that responsibility with local individuals or bodies can be countenanced. Since the whole purpose of the legislative elections was to set up institutions to which the responsibilities now held by Belgium could be transferred, those responsibilities can at present be exercised only the Administering Author-

ity. Here again we have a point on which, in the sponsors' view, there can be no controversy.

57. In paragraph 4, the General Assembly considers it necessary that, pending the establishment of a government on the basis of the legislative elections, broad-based caretaker governments should be constituted in both parts of the Trust Territory with a view to attending to current affairs of administration in conformity with the decisions taken by the Administering Authority for the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly. In this paragraph, the sponsors merely take into account the realities of the situation. Although the institutions themselves came into being in regrettable circumstances and were set up in conditions unacceptable to the United Nations, we have agreed to their being maintained. Since what we are aiming at is to do something effective rather than to satisfy one or the other of the various political parties involved, we thought that the best way of ensuring the avoidance of conflicts between them, and of preventing the Government's action from becoming the subject of dispute in a critical period like that preceding an election, would be for them all to share in the responsibilities which come with power. In recommending the formation of a new government in which the opposition parties would be represented, the sponsors are in no way seeking to attack the present Government, which in any case they do not recognize. What they are here recommending is current practice in certain democratic countries—the formation of a national coalition government during the transitional election period. By placing all the parties in power, each of them is given every guarantee that the government will not act irregularly during that critical period. On this issue, too, the sponsors hope that the General Assembly will agree with them unanimously, thus providing a basis for what might be called the first step towards a final reconciliation between the different political parties.

58. Paragraph 5 of the draft resolution draws attention to the fact that it is the Administering Authority's responsibility to create the conditions and the necessary favourable atmosphere for the conduct of the legislative elections and that it must not permit the local authorities to impede the implementation of resolution 1579 (XV).

59. Paragraphs 6 and 7 deal with the Mwami and the legislative elections. They provide for the holding of a referendum concerning the continuance of the monarchy and, if the reply is in the affirmative, concerning the retention of Kigeli V as Mwami. They specify the questions to be asked, which would correspond to the provisions of resolution 1580 (XV) and the recommendations of the United Nations Commission. Under these paragraphs, the responsibility for organizing the referendum, at a date to be determined by the Administering Authority in agreement with the Commission, is entrusted to the Administering Authority. It is further laid down that the legislative elections and the referendum are to be held in August. With regard to the choice of the month of August, the sponsors wish to point out that it was made after consulting all the political parties without exception and after the sponsors had satisfied themselves that that month would be suitable from every point of view for the elections. We also wished to give our Commission a reasonable amount of time in which to make preparations for the elections. With regard to the date of the referendum, the sponsors considered that, in view of the delicacy of

the matter, it would be wiser if the decision was made by agreement between the Administering Authority and the Commission in the light of the situation prevailing in the Territory.

60. Paragraph 9 of the draft resolution confirms the provisions of resolution 1579 (XV) concerning the need for a full and unconditional amnesty. On that issue, however, the sponsors have made an important concession to the Administering Authority. Taking into account its wish that cases regarded as very grave should be submitted to a commission, they have recommended that a commission of three members, representing three States to be designated by the General Assembly, should be set up to rule on such cases.

61. In paragraph 10, the Administering Authority is asked to ensure that the material conditions essential to the successful discharge of the Commission's responsibilities, such as housing, office space, travel facilities, information, broadcasting facilities and so on, should be provided. These are practical steps which, we feel sure, will meet with general approval.

62. Paragraph 12 contains a request that the Administering Authority should amend the Legislative Order of 25 October 1960 under which it was granted extended powers in connexion with such matters as personal freedom. Here again everyone, we are convinced, will agree that in an election as important as the one contemplated, there should be no restriction, and above all no arbitrary administrative restriction, on freedoms.

63. The draft resolution ends by reiterating the General Assembly's conviction that the best future for the Trust Territory lies in its accession to independence as a united and composite State.

64. As you will have seen, there is nothing in this draft resolution which might be unacceptable to the Members of the United Nations, the Administering Authority or the national political parties of Ruanda-Urundi. All the recommendations which it contains, and all the measures which it advocates, are in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the provisions of the Trusteeship Agreement, and take into account the facts of the present situation.

65. Nevertheless, I feel it necessary to point out that the effectiveness of the resolution will depend to a very great extent on the goodwill and sincerity of those responsible for applying its provisions. No resolution, no law, no institution can achieve its destined purpose unless those responsible for carrying it out themselves believe in the spirit of their mission and respect the letter of the law. This makes it clear to what an extent the solution of the problem of Ruanda-Urundi is dependent on the good faith and sincerity of all concerned, Administering Authority and national political parties alike.

66. For these reasons, the sponsors address an urgent appeal to all, be they Belgian officials or national political parties, to forget the past, to regard the United Nations as a body whose sole desire is to help them, to place the interests of Ruanda-Urundi above their own interests or disputes, and in their every act to consider nothing but the future of the peoples concerned, the future of peace, and the future relations of friendship and co-operation between the coming new State, its former Administering Authority and the countries of Africa in particular and of the world in general.

67. In conclusion, the sponsors regard it as their urgent duty to sound the alarm and to draw the Com-



mittee's attention to the seriousness of the situation and to the incalculable consequences to which it might lead. They ask everyone to bear in mind the Congo affair and its aftermath. They urge all Members of our Organization to realize that Africa is in danger and that it would be a catastrophe imperilling peace if tragic events similar to those in the Congo were to occur in Ruanda-Urundi. They beg them to think of the sufferings that these newly-born States would have to endure and of the sacrifices that would be entailed for the United Nations if the worst came to pass. They urge on all members of the Committee not to think of their feelings of friendship and sympathy for Belgium or of their alliance with that country, but to consider only the future of Ruanda-Urundi, of the United Nations and of peace in Africa and in the world.

68. I may perhaps be criticized for having laid too much stress on the Congo and for having expressed the fear that the situation in Ruanda-Urundi could lead to a crisis similar to the one involving that unhappy country. I hope with all my heart that events will prove me wrong and that no one here, whether it be my delegation or any other, will have to remind this Committee of these misgivings and these warnings. I trust that our Commissioners will be as successful in their task as one of them already was in Togoland. Lastly, I hope that we shall soon see in this room the representatives of a united Ruanda-Urundi, a nation marked by peace, concord and prosperity.

69. Mr. CERNIK (Czechoslovakia) said that the General Assembly's important decisions of December 1960 concerning Ruanda-Urundi were not being implemented because of the policy of the Administering Authority, which had set up serious obstacles in order to make Ruanda-Urundi and Katanga into a puppet State which would serve Belgian colonialism and be a base for further Belgian interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of the Congo. Thus, early in January 1961, in contravention of General Assembly resolution 1579 (XV), which had called upon the Administering Authority "to refrain from using the Territory as a base, whether for internal or for external purposes", Mobutu troops had landed near Usumbura and had been transported by Belgian personnel to the Congolese frontier, whence they had penetrated into Congolese territory. That aggressive action, committed under Belgian auspices, was a flagrant violation of the Trusteeship Agreement and of the General Assembly resolution, and showed that Belgium had no intention of complying with its obligations towards the United Nations. The question therefore arose whether Belgium should continue to administer Ruanda-Urundi even during the short period until the Territory's accession to independence. The Committee's discussions also revealed that Belgium had not merely failed to give effect to the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV) aimed at ensuring favourable conditions for legislative elections, but had, on the contrary, taken measures for permanently maintaining its influence in the Territory. Having been unable to organize elections before the resumption of the General Assembly's fifteenth session—a step which would have enabled it to confront the United Nations with a *fait accompli*—Belgium had changed its tactics and had allowed the proclamation on 30 January 1961 of a so-called republic, which was designed to eliminate an anti-colonialist Mwami, to place the power in the hands of indigenous persons collaborating with the Administering Authority, and, in contravention of operative

paragraph 11 of resolution 1579 (XV), to separate Ruanda permanently from Urundi. In so acting, Belgium was simply applying the old imperialist principle of "divide and rule".

70. The Czechoslovak delegation's views on the situation in Ruanda-Urundi followed the same lines as those of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, as set forth in the Commission's interim report (A/4706 and Add.1). In order to avoid any charge of partiality, he quoted an article in the *New York Times* of 17 March 1961, in which reference was made to the United Nations Commission's sharp criticism of the Belgian authorities. Citing the Commission's conclusions as contained in paragraph 162 of its report, he expressed the opinion that the Administering Authority was violating Article 76 of the Charter, as well as the Trusteeship Agreement. The General Assembly should accordingly divest Belgium of all its rights in Ruanda-Urundi, and Belgian troops and administrative staff should be immediately withdrawn from the Territory, which should be granted independence without delay in accordance with the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples that had been adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 1514 (XV).

71. During the debate, certain members of the Committee had voiced the fear that Ruanda-Urundi might become a second Congo. In the circumstances, it was essential that independent African States should immediately take over all powers in the Trust Territory, so that the necessary conditions might be created for the holding of democratic elections in which all political parties would participate under the supervision of a commission on which those African States would be represented. The dates for the elections and for independence should be determined without delay. The country should attain to independence in 1961. He said that while he had not yet been able to make a thorough study of draft resolution A/C.4/L.678, that draft should be more explicit with regard to the date for the Territory's independence and should specify clearly that the legislative elections should be so organized as to prevent the Belgian colonialists from interfering.

72. Mr. MIYAZAKI (Japan) said that his delegation had based its position on the fact that the Administering Authority had so far agreed to co-operate in principle with the United Nations and had recognized that the time had come to grant independence to Ruanda-Urundi very shortly. After some hesitation, Belgium had agreed to postpone the date of the legislative elections as the General Assembly had requested it to do in resolution 1579 (XV). That decision, which had been taken despite strong opposition from some parties in Ruanda-Urundi, was evidence of co-operation with the United Nations.

73. Unfortunately, Belgium had prevented the postponement of the elections from being used to effect a reconciliation of the parties before the installation of a legislative assembly and a central government in Ruanda-Urundi, because by not dissuading the political leaders of Ruanda from unexpectedly proclaiming the republic and by quickly recognizing their régime, Belgium had given grounds for being regarded as their accomplice. It was true that Belgium had been in a difficult position because the APROSOMA and PARMEHUTU parties had accused it of betraying them by agreeing to postpone the elections. Since, however, those elections had been scheduled to take

place within a few months, there had been no need to grant autonomy to the Provisional Council and Government of Ruanda or to install an autonomous régime in Urundi. As Belgium called those régimes provisional, they ought to be prevented from taking steps which would set a precedent for the future and, *a fortiori*, from abolishing the monarchy or proclaiming the republic. While it might perhaps be unwise to abolish them, it should be understood that their functions would only last until the elections. They might perhaps be regarded, on condition that all parties were represented, as institutions for enabling the political leaders to undergo a political apprenticeship. It should nevertheless be remembered that the responsibilities and obligations of Belgium as set out in Chapter XII of the Charter and in the Trusteeship Agreement remained in full force despite the existence of provisional and autonomous local Governments in Ruanda and Urundi.

74. Turning to the political situation in the Territory, he deplored the excessive number of parties, a situation which had made the Administering Authority's task more difficult. The problems of Ruanda-Urundi seemed to derive more from differences among the political parties than from conflict between the Administering Authority and the population as a whole. Nevertheless, the United Nations must in no way favour any particular party, whatever the Administering Authority or a foreign Power or group of Powers might do. Political differences were a normal occurrence. What was not so normal was that the political parties of Ruanda-Urundi did not seem to be capable of coexisting. In many countries the parties managed both to retain their principles and to arrange compromises or to leave matters to the majority as expressed by its vote. Majority rule was one of the elementary principles of democracy. However, minorities or opposition parties played a useful function by helping to maintain a balance. One of the chief preoccupations of the General Assembly should therefore be to ensure that the security and freedom of members of minority parties was safeguarded. It should also make sure that, before the elections and the establishment of a lawful Government, the political party in power did not, in agreement with the Administering Authority, depart from the idea of true and complete independence for the Territory. It was likewise important for the future constitution of Ruanda-Urundi to guarantee the orderly transfer of political power from one party to another, since that was a necessary condition of any democracy. In that respect, it was encouraging to note that the rivalry between the parties was less and less a function of the tribal affiliation of their members.

75. With regard to the amnesty, his delegation did not think either that a political prisoner should be ruled out on the pretext that he was charged with a criminal offence or that a person guilty of a criminal offence should be pardoned because he was regarded as a political prisoner. Where the same person had been guilty of political and criminal offences, it might be difficult to determine their respective gravity; it was, however, important to do so, and a special body might perhaps be set up for that purpose.

76. His delegation had voted against resolution 1580 (XV) because it had not wished to influence the people of the Territory and had preferred to let them settle the problem of the Mwami by themselves. As, however, that resolution had been adopted, his delegation was willing to support a draft resolution embodying the

same terms on condition that the wording of the paragraphs on the referendum question did not compromise a free choice by the people between a republic and a monarchy.

77. His delegation also wished to stress that the chief objective was the complete independence of Ruanda-Urundi at the earliest possible date, as the Administering Authority had itself recognized. His delegation trusted the Belgian Government and hoped that the progress made would enable Ruanda and Urundi to accede to complete independence.

78. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.678 had made an impartial study of the situation, and his delegation endorsed all the operative paragraphs of that text. Having no preconceived notions as to the date of the legislative elections, his delegation was willing to agree to the elections being held in the month of August. As the situation in the Territory was extremely fluid, it hoped that changed circumstances would not be made a pretext for refusing to implement some of the operative paragraphs, and it hoped in particular that the elections would really take place on the date stipulated so that Ruanda-Urundi could finally become independent. His delegation supported the draft resolution as a whole, but urged that it should be adopted in its present form, with no addition, omission or change that would upset its balance.

79. Miss ASAMANY (Ghana) said that in her view the United Nations had a double task in Ruanda-Urundi. It must ensure, on the one hand, that the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement would not involve any friction and, on the other hand, that the inhabitants decided on their constitution and their future political institutions. She recalled, first of all, that the States which were parties to the Conference of Casablanca had protested in January 1961 against the Belgian policy of organized repression of the nationalist elements in the country, which tended to bring about the creation of two pseudo-independent states, that they had called for the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions, that they had denounced the use of the Territory as a base for aggression against the African peoples in general and the Congolese people in particular, and that they had called for the immediate withdrawal of all the Belgian forces. Subsequent events had made it plain that the conclusions of that Conference and the decisions of the General Assembly had been justified.

80. Belgium was spreading discord, conflict and mistrust in the Territory, and its only purpose seemed to be, as in the Congo, to Balkanize Africa so as to make the young African nations as weak as possible both politically and economically. According to an Associated Press dispatch appearing in the *New York Times* of 1 February 1961, the Belgian Administration of the Territory had pressed the Belgian Government to recognize the republican Government set up in Ruanda after a tribal *coup d'état* because it had felt that the Government was friendly to Belgium. Faced with that official recognition, foreign diplomats had been inclined to think that although the Belgian Administration had not perhaps actively encouraged the *coup*, it had done nothing to prevent it. Did Belgium suppose that if those measures were advantageous to it, they therefore became constitutional? As had been pointed out in the same dispatch, the Government of Ruanda had not been chosen in democratic elections, but by 3,000 burgo-

masters and communal councillors who had met to free the Bahutu from the domination of the Batutsi.

81. After half a century of administration, Belgium had to rely on a considerable armed force to protect itself against the understandable dissatisfaction of the people. According to an Associated Press dispatch, reproduced in the *New York Herald Tribune* of 30 January, the inhabitants of the Territory were concerned about the presence of Belgian troops because they thought that those troops might be used in the neighbouring territory of the Congo. Ghana deplored the maintenance of those armed forces and the use of Ruanda-Urundi as a military base and it earnestly requested the members of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi to examine the question in detail and report to the General Assembly. It considered that, if there was instability in the Territory, it was mainly due to the absence of representative political institutions, to the establishment of illegal organs and to the promulgation of arbitrary decrees.

82. The petitioners had shown that the people eagerly desired national independence. They did not all agree that Ruanda-Urundi should form a single State but they all envisaged various forms of association between Ruanda and Urundi. The Ghanaian delegation, for its part, thought that the Territory would have a better future if it formed a single, united and composite State. It therefore appealed to the petitioners to rise above their political or tribal disputes in order to work together in creating one single State, which alone would be able to ensure their progress and prosperity. Disregarding the colonialists and imperialists who were trying to divide them, they should agree to forget their past quarrels.

83. The report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi confirmed the accusations levelled against Belgium. That country should no longer merely state that it accepted the General Assembly resolutions; it should ensure that they were applied fully, impartially and without delay. It was essential that Belgium should order its local administrators to conform to the provisions of the Trusteeship Agreement and the Charter. Learning from the lesson of events in the Congo, it should give all the political leaders the political instruction and opportunities for action which alone would enable them subsequently to attain independence free of hatred.

84. Draft resolution A/C.4/L.678, of which Ghana was a sponsor, represented the minimum that the Fourth Committee could request. Ghana considered that until the Trusteeship Agreement was terminated Belgium would remain solely responsible for the administration of the Territory and it alone would have to account for it to the United Nations. It could delegate its responsibilities only to local political organs which, unlike the existing institutions, had been established democratically with the approval of the United Nations. It was essential that elections should be held in 1961 with the participation of all sectors of the population, including women. Furthermore, an unconditional amnesty should be granted to all political prisoners and refugees so that they could take part in drawing up the future constitution; it was the duty of the Belgian Government to authorize Kigeli V to return to Ruanda before the referendum and the legislative elections were held. Finally, all the inhabitants of Ruanda-Urundi should forget their personal ambitions and unite, for when it became independent Ruanda-Urundi would need the

services of all its citizens. She hoped that the draft resolution would receive the overwhelming support of the Committee.

85. Mr. BINGHAM (United States of America):<sup>2</sup> The United States is gravely concerned with the course of developments in the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi during the recent past. We are even more concerned that if these developments continue—if for example there is no opportunity given the people of this Territory to express their will openly through democratic processes in the very near future—the same trends which disturb us so much today may continue until the point of no return has been reached. If this should happen, all of us will have been party to a failure by the United Nations and we shall not have discharged our duty in accordance with our stated views as contained in Chapter XII of the Charter.

86. At the first part of the session, when the General Assembly selected Ambassador Dorsinville as Chairman of the Commission on Ruanda-Urundi, my delegation applauded, confident that no finer choice could have been made. Here we have a man of unquestioned integrity and sensitivity, a man who visited Ruanda-Urundi with the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1957, a man who served for year on the Trusteeship Council—indeed a distinguished President of that Council. To serve with him, the Assembly, also with great wisdom, selected two other distinguished and eminently qualified persons, Mr. Rahnema of Iran and Mr. Gassou of Togo. One would have thought that such a commission would surely succeed in its mission, and yet the truth is that the Commission did not succeed. It did not because the illegal *coup d'état* that had taken place before its arrival presented it with an inflexible political situation and because it lacked the one essential ingredient without which success was impossible: full co-operation by the representatives of the Administering Authority in the Territory.

87. From the statements of Mr. Dorsinville and from the documents we have before us, we can readily, and I think logically, conclude that the Belgian Government has been prepared to extend the hand of co-operation, whereas the local administrators in Ruanda-Urundi have been more inclined to withdraw it. Unfortunately we are unable to read minds, and we therefore have no alternative but to reach conclusions based on actual events. The Government of Belgium cannot avoid full responsibility for the administration of the Territory, and if it is true that its local Administration is allowed to negate official Belgian policy, then the Belgian Government itself must bear responsibility and should, in our view, take immediate steps to ensure that its policy is carried out within this Territory until independence is achieved. We are confident that it can and will do so.

88. Mr. Dorsinville pointed out with considerable eloquence that the United Nations is today faced with a completely new situation. It is that situation to which we must now address ourselves. We cannot change what has happened in the past, but what we do here can have a vital effect on the future.

89. The draft resolution which is now before you is not in all respects as we would have preferred to see it.

<sup>2</sup> The Committee decided, on the proposal of the representative of Lebanon, and in accordance with its decision at the 1117th meeting, that the text of this statement should be reproduced in full.

But other co-sponsors no doubt feel the same way, for different reasons. In the drafting of this proposed resolution, there has been a spirit of mutual accommodation among the co-sponsors, and we believe it represents a reasonable compromise of several points of view.

90. This draft resolution has but one aim, that by 1962 Ruanda-Urundi should achieve full national independence in accordance with the freely expressed will of its people in that Territory. We do not have, nor should others have, any favoured political party within this Territory. All parties must be free to participate in elections without any pressure or fear obstructing either campaigning or balloting. The election procedures, including the method of balloting, must be satisfactory to the United Nations Commission, reconstituted as a group of three United Nations Commissioners.

91. Before these events can take place, however, there must be a general and complete amnesty of political prisoners, and return of the refugees. The representative of Belgium told us that the refugee problem was in the process of solution. It is our hope that the efforts of the Administering Authority in this respect will be intensified.

92. And what about the amnesty? It is clear to all of us, I am sure, that this above all other problems is the key to the holding of a fair referendum on the Mwami and fair legislative elections. In its resolution 1579 (XV), the General Assembly called for a "full and unconditional amnesty". This recommendation has not been fully carried out, in part, at least, because of a difference of opinion as to its meaning. Was it, for example, intended that the amnesty should be extended to those in prison for crimes not related to the 1959 troubles or to other essentially political activities? We think not. Or was it intended that this amnesty should be extended to persons who had been convicted of actual political killing? Again, we think not. It would be hard to argue that political assassins should be allowed to go scot free.

93. Building on a suggestion made in the original statement of the representative of Belgium [*1108th meeting*], the present draft resolution sets up a tripartite committee to review with the Administering Authority those cases in which the individuals concerned have been convicted or charged with serious crimes such as homicide. We understand that there are only about a dozen of these cases; about half of the individuals concerned are in prison and the rest out of the country. The committee is to consist of one person selected by three disinterested Governments to be designated by the General Assembly.

94. Except for the small group convicted of, or charged with, serious crimes, all others whose misdoings, if any, were connected with political activities should be amnestied automatically and immediately. Once this process has been completed, the basic hin-

drance to fair elections will have been removed. All political parties will then be able to campaign openly and actively under conditions of order and tranquillity. The United Nations Commissioners would be on the spot to supervise this process.

95. In suggesting the month of August for the referendum and the elections, we have set the dates as early as we believe is practicable in view of all that must be done beforehand, including the return of the refugees, the amnesty for political offenders, and the necessary preparations for the elections themselves.

96. My delegation believes it to be important that, in order to avoid confusion in the minds of the voters, all too many of whom are unfortunately illiterate, it is important that the referendum on the Mwami be held separately from the legislative elections, preferably a week or two later. But we have been willing to leave this matter open, to be determined on the spot by the Administering Authority and the United Nations Commissioners.

97. We realize that there exists today if not animosity, at least tension, between the members of the United Nations Commission and the local Administration in the Territory. We have no illusions whatsoever about the difficulty of eliminating these tensions, but we also know that the problem which is Ruanda-Urundi is of overriding importance. In all earnestness, we appeal to the Belgium Government and its officials to co-operate without reservation with the chosen representatives of the United Nations. One fact must be accepted, and this is that the United Nations, and by that I mean almost all of its Members, are interested in a just and lasting solution which can be achieved only through open and free democratic processes. We would also appeal to the members of the United Nations Commission to rise above an understandable feeling that their task in the future will be an impossible one. Lesser men could not do this. We appeal to all to co-operate in the true meaning of that word.

98. In conclusion, we appeal to all members of this Committee to base their judgement and their evaluation on what is practical and not on what may be theoretically desirable, on what is fact and not what we might wish fact to be.

99. We believe that the draft resolution is, in the main, constructive and that, if carried out, the people of Ruanda-Urundi will be able, fairly and freely, to express their views for the future, and will have taken a long step toward their independence.

100. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the list of speakers should be closed at noon on 11 April.

*It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.