

United Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SIXTEENTH SESSION

Official Records



FOURTH COMMITTEE, 1298th
MEETING

Tuesday, 20 February 1962,
at 3.40 p.m.

NEW YORK

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Chairman: Miss Angie BROOKS (Liberia).

AGENDA ITEM 49

Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi: report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (A/4856, A/4865 and Corr.1, A/4970, A/4994 and Add.1 and Corr.1, A/5086; A/C.4/516 and Add.1 and 2, 517 and Corr.1, 522 and Add.1-4, 532 and Corr.1, 533-535, 537; A/C.4/L.730 and Add.1 and 2, A/C.4/L.735) (continued)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/C.4/L.730 AND ADD.1 AND 2, A/C.4/L.735) (continued)

1. Mr. BOEG (Denmark) expressed his delegation's appreciation of the strenuous efforts made by the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.730 and Add.1 and 2. His delegation basically agreed with most of it and noted with satisfaction that it faced the problems of the future rather than reopening those of the past. Moreover it was in accordance with the principle of self-determination, as laid down in the United Nations Charter, and with the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)—the two fundamental considerations on which the Danish delegation based its position. He felt, however, that some parts of the draft resolution needed more precise wording. For instance, with regard to operative paragraph 7 he agreed with those delegations which considered that it would promote a peaceful solution to the problem of Ruanda-Urundi if, instead of merely "envisaging" the granting of independence on 1 July 1962, that date was firmly established as the date for independence—provided, of course, that there was no disagreement on it at the resumed session in June.

2. The co-operation of the Administering Authority was of particular importance in the final process of leading the Trust Territory to independence. Since no one disputed the full responsibility of the Administering Authority until independence was proclaimed, it would be logical to express that principle more clearly in operative paragraph 3. For the same reason, it would be desirable for the Administering Authority to participate in the conference proposed in operative paragraph 4. It would indeed seem inappropriate for the responsible authority not to be represented at such a crucial conference, to which, with its wide experience of the problems of the Territory, it could undoubtedly

make an important contribution. Although the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had not insisted on the point, he hoped that in practice the Administering Authority would be invited to participate.

3. The debate on the draft resolution had centred round operative paragraph 3 (e). If it came to a choice between two wordings, his delegation would vote in favour of the amendment proposed by Ireland and Sweden (A/C.4/L.733). Cogent arguments in favour of the amendment had been put forward by the representative of Ireland at the previous meeting. Moreover, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had pointed out at the 1296th meeting that the original wording might lead to undesirable results, such as the exodus of the Belgian personnel whose technical services would be needed in the Territory for some time to come. Furthermore, none of those who favoured the original wording seemed to be fully convinced that the measures contemplated could in practice be carried out. The sponsors had stated that it was a matter of principle. There was, however, no disagreement with the principle which the sponsors had in mind: the issue was how that principle was to be implemented. Many delegations, including his own, had misgivings about the possibility of carrying out the proposed measures in view of the short time remaining and the difficulties of financing and staff that would have to be overcome. If those fears were to prove groundless, so much the better, but unfortunately, the text as it stood made no provision for the opposite case. The Irish and Swedish amendment did not contradict the original aim but was more flexibly worded in that it related the withdrawal of Belgian forces to the training of indigenous police forces to replace them. He hoped that, even if the sponsors could not accept the amendment, they would take the views he had expressed into account and agree on a compromise formula acceptable to all. He had in mind the idea the United States representative had put forward at the previous meeting, namely that the draft resolution might include a provision to the effect that different arrangements could be made if the local Government or Governments expressed a desire for them.

4. His delegation fully supported the proposal in operative paragraph 2 that a commission should be sent to the Territory. The idea had originally been suggested at the 1274th meeting by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was to be congratulated upon the liberal spirit he had thus demonstrated. The tasks envisaged could not be undertaken by any more competent body than the existing Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, which was already familiar with the problem. In any case, in view of the vast amount of work to be completed in a very short time, the members would need to be chosen with great care. If the new commission was to consist of five members, he would urge that the existing Commission should form the nucleus of it. If that were done, he was confident that the skilful diplomacy demonstrated by the present

Commission and the co-operation of the Administering Authority would constitute the foundation for constructive solutions enabling the Territory to achieve independence in satisfactory conditions on 1 July 1962.

5. Mr. KIANG (China) praised the efforts made by all concerned to find a solution to the problem. It was encouraging to note the Agreement (see A/C.4/532 and Corr.1) reached, with the help of the Conciliation Group, between the representatives of the Government of Rwanda and the Union nationale rwandaise (UNAR). The steps already taken encouraged the belief that national reconciliation was within reach.

6. His delegation shared the concern of New Zealand, Ireland and the United States (1297th meeting) regarding certain provisions of draft resolution A/C.4/L.730 and Add.1 and 2. In particular, the reluctance to fix a definite date for independence would create a feeling of insecurity among the people of the Territory and would not encourage the co-operation and tolerance which were essential for the consolidation of political stability. He considered that the date for independence should be established forthwith and not left in abeyance until the resumed session in June.

7. His delegation also had difficulty in reconciling the implications of operative paragraph 3 (e) with the reality of the situation in the Territory. The wording left the commission no discretion to decide whether, in the interests of peace and order, the assistance of Belgian security forces might be essential after the Territory attained independence and it precluded the possibility that either Government might ask for Belgian troops to remain until the indigenous forces were capable of maintaining law and order. It would therefore be preferable for operative paragraph 3 (e) to refer to the replacement of Belgian forces by progressive stages as soon as possible. As the paragraph stood, it might deter Members who would otherwise be willing to serve on the commission but would be reluctant to accept such a responsibility.

8. His interpretation of operative paragraph 4 was that the United Nations intended to use the art of persuasion to show that the best future for the Territory lay in the evolution of some form of political and economic union. The United Nations could not, of course, impose political unification against the people's wishes, but it would clearly be desirable for some common services to be set up. In view of the many economic problems common to both countries, close economic co-ordination could bring lasting benefit. Some day the countries might wish to join a larger entity of East Africa. Since the Administering Authority had contributed so much and had expressed willingness to continue to do so, it would be only natural to invite it to participate in the conference.

9. Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France), commenting on the amendments, said that the United States amendment (A/C.4/L.732) merely concerned the procedure of the General Assembly and did not affect the substance of the draft resolution. The sponsors had agreed to it in principle and no objection had been raised.

10. With regard to the amendments of substance, he had been surprised to hear the representatives of Guinea (1295th meeting) and Nigeria (1297th meeting) say in effect that there were two kinds of amendments: those that appeared to be acceptable because they corresponded to the sponsors' ideas, and those that were unacceptable because they distorted the draft resolution,

but that they rejected them all. Their argument had been that the draft resolution was the fruit of a compromise laboriously achieved and that if anything in it was changed the whole edifice might collapse. He hoped that there was no need for such pessimism regarding the fragility of the compromise. In any case it had been made among the group of sponsors and bound only them; a compromise had yet to be made in the Fourth Committee. The only valid decision would be the decision of the Committee. That being so, he felt that the sponsors might well have accepted some of the amendments. As the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had shown a spirit of conciliation, it would surely have been desirable to give him satisfaction concerning operative paragraph 4 by agreeing that the Administering Authority should participate in the conference, or to adopt his formula for operative paragraph 7. The amendment submitted by Ireland and Sweden (A/C.4/L.733) did not run counter to the ideas of the sponsors of the draft resolution. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had made it clear at the 1296th meeting that his Government had no intention of keeping Belgian troops in the Territory indefinitely but that it was necessary to provide for their replacement by indigenous troops. Everyone was in agreement with that and on the need to train and equip indigenous troops. He agreed with the representative of Nigeria (1297th meeting) that it was a matter for the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi. Since the amendment reflected those considerations, he would have hoped that the sponsors could accept it. His own delegation would vote in favour of the amendment.

11. With regard to the USSR amendments (A/C.4/L.734), the first was covered by the amendment of Ireland and Sweden and hence was unnecessary. His delegation would vote against the second and fourth amendments, which introduced a reference to the Security Council, since the Security Council had no competence in the issue. It would vote in favour of the third USSR amendment.

12. He agreed with the sponsors that the Camerounian amendments (A/C.4/L.731) changed the substance of the draft resolution. There were two ideas concerning the date for independence: the establishment of a final, immutable date, and the establishment of a conditional date to be confirmed subsequently by the General Assembly. His delegation was in favour of a firm date and would therefore vote in favour of the third Camerounian amendment. In the matter of granting independence to the Trust Territory under its administration his Government had consistently followed the policy of acceding to the wishes of the duly elected Governments. The wishes of the people must always be borne in mind; in the case of Ruanda-Urundi those wishes were known. He would therefore vote in favour of the first Camerounian amendment. He would abstain on the second amendment, which did not appear to be essential. He would not make the adoption of the Camerounian amendments a *sine qua non*, but he felt that the amendments submitted by the United States and by Sweden and Ireland were essential to the resolution.

13. Turning to the draft resolution on the question of the Mwami of Rwanda (A/C.4/L.735), he thought it regrettable that it had been submitted. The draft resolution was both unnecessary and inappropriate. In so far as it had a bearing on the problem of national reconciliation, the matter was covered by operative paragraphs 3 (a) and 3 (b) of draft resolution A/C.4/L.730 and Add.1 and 2. The question of the Mwami had

been decided by referendum: it was no longer an institutional question but a private and domestic one falling within the jurisdiction of the Government of Rwanda. The United Nations was not called upon to take any further decision on the question. He hoped that the draft resolution would be withdrawn by its sponsors, for otherwise it might revive a controversy which had more or less died down.

14. Mr. GRINBERG (Bulgaria) said that on the whole draft resolution A/C.4/L.730 and Add.1 and 2 met many of the points he had made in his statement (1279th meeting) during the general debate. It was the result of protracted negotiations between the various sponsoring delegations and was therefore in the nature of a compromise. In the circumstances nothing but a compromise resolution would secure enough votes for adoption. At the same time, his delegation failed to understand why the sponsors had gone so far as to place Rwanda and Burundi under the same denominator in many of the provisions of the resolution even where it seemed neither justified nor useful to do so. In particular he could not see why the draft resolution did not reflect the substantial difference in the appraisal of past events in the two States—a difference which had been strongly emphasized in the report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (A/4994 and Add.1 and Corr.1) and in almost all the statements made in the general debate. The report stated unequivocally that the elections and institutions in Burundi raised no doubts and no problems, but that the same did not apply to Rwanda. His delegation regretted that aspect of the draft resolution, which might encourage certain misinterpretations. For example, there was the question of the attitude of the United Nations towards the Agreement (see A/C.4/532 and Corr.1) reached on 8 February 1962 between the Government of Rwanda and UNAR: whether that Agreement was regarded by the United Nations as an act which validated everything that had happened in Rwanda up to the date of its signature, or whether it was only the beginning of the process which in a few months might bring about all the conditions essential for the validation of the present situation in that State. Of course it was not the mere signing of the Agreement that counted but the degree of its implementation during the coming months. That was one of the main reasons why the sponsoring delegations were not asking the General Assembly to give Belgium a blank cheque and why the General Assembly should resume its session in June before consenting to the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. It was in the light of those guarantees that the draft resolution should be interpreted.

15. Nevertheless no guarantees could be deemed adequate if the United Nations had no faith in the honesty, goodwill and common sense of the people of Rwanda. The UNAR representatives, for the sake of national reconciliation, had made a courageous gesture by forgetting past grievances and sacrificing their just claims. They had done so because they believed that if the presence of a United Nations commission was secured and the nefarious influence of Belgian colonialism was neutralized they would be able to come to a real and lasting understanding with the other parties for the good of their country. A Territory emerging from colonial status needed the energy, talents and loyalty of all its people in order to survive and to solve its problems. Despite certain disappointing developments, his delegation still believed that with the passage of time and the implementation of the measures en-

visaged in the draft resolution the idea that only true reconciliation would solve the problems of Rwanda would prevail. That being so, his delegation felt able to close its eyes to the defect in the draft resolution to which he had drawn attention, i.e., the equation of Rwanda with Burundi.

16. With regard to operative paragraph 3 (e), he said that during the general debate the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had made several statements which had left a definite impression that Belgium was not contemplating the withdrawal of its military forces from the Territory. At the 1296th meeting he had stated that the only reason for keeping Belgian troops in Ruanda-Urundi after the achievement of independence was that the Belgian settlers there would immediately leave the country if they learned that the troops were to be withdrawn. While not belittling the importance of the Belgian technicians or of the human problems involved, he would nevertheless recall that the Committee was discussing the future of the people of Ruanda-Urundi, not that of the Belgian settlers in the country. The United Nations overriding concern was to ensure that the independence of the Territory should be real and not fictitious. That in itself was sufficient justification for insisting on the complete withdrawal of Belgian troops before the achievement of independence.

17. At the 1296th meeting, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sought to make his country's case more acceptable by promising to present a time-table for the gradual withdrawal of the Belgian troops before the attainment of independence. The fallaciousness of that proposal was evident. The Belgian settlers would not lose their fears six months or a year after the formal declaration of independence; indeed it was more likely that upon the expiration of the time-table they would again ask for the Belgian troops to remain and at that time the United Nations would no longer have the power to intervene. He agreed with the representatives of Burma, India, Guinea and many others that the United Nations should not be a party to any arrangement which would leave Belgian troops in Ruanda-Urundi after the Territory became independent. His delegation was not entirely satisfied with the use in operative paragraph 3 (e) of the word "replacement", which could lend itself to various interpretations. All the members of the Committee knew of cases of former colonial Territories where, although the foreign troops had been replaced by national forces, considerable contingents of those troops still remained in military bases against the will of the people and Governments concerned. He had listened with interest to the interpretation of paragraph 3 (e) given by the representative of Nigeria at the previous meeting, but apparently other delegations had understood his words differently. The Bulgarian delegation had therefore welcomed the unequivocal statement made by the representative of Ghana at the previous meeting, which left no doubt about the intentions of the sponsors.

18. Since it appeared that the present wording of paragraph 3 (e) was open to misinterpretation, his delegation would support the first USSR amendment (A/C.4/L.734). It would also support the other amendments proposed by the USSR, which, while not changing the substance of the draft resolution, removed any doubt on certain points of great importance.

19. His delegation would vote against the amendment proposed by Ireland and Sweden (A/C.4/L.733). It would vote on the other amendments and on the pro-

visions of the draft resolution itself in the light of the above considerations.

20. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) announced that the sponsors of the draft resolution had agreed to vote in favour of the United States amendment (A/C.4/L.732), on condition that the debate on the questions of Southern Rhodesia and British Guiana was concluded during the present part of the session. The sponsors regretted that they would be unable to vote in favour of any of the other proposed amendments.

21. Speaking in the name of his own delegation, he wished to make some comments in reply to statements made at the previous meeting. Much had been said on the subject of operative paragraph 3 (e); the sponsors had repeatedly explained the purpose of that subparagraph, but some doubt appeared to subsist. The scope of the question which had been raised was wider than the subject of Ruanda-Urundi; it was whether Africa was ready for independence without foreign supervision. To that question his delegation replied categorically in the affirmative; his own country was a case in point. It had been suggested that the developments in the Congo after that country had become independent had been due to the departure of the Belgian troops. His delegation protested against that interpretation of events. The situation in the Congo had been due not to the departure of the Belgian troops but to the fact that they had been there previously and that they had returned. It had been claimed that Belgian troops should remain in Ruanda-Urundi for the protection of Belgian technical personnel. The theory that foreigners could not rely on the security offered by the country in which they lived and needed the protection of the Power of which they were nationals might lead to very unfortunate consequences in Africa. The argument that the departure of the Belgian troops would precipitate the departure of the technicians was a form of blackmail. It was absolutely false to assert that the presence of Belgian troops was necessary in order to maintain order; in fact Belgian troops had been responsible for maintaining order at the time when thousands of refugees had been obliged to flee the country. The truth was that the local security forces would be far better able to maintain order in the Territory than foreign troops.

22. At the 1296th meeting the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had categorically stated that it was not his intention to retain Belgian troops in Ruanda-Urundi after the achievement of independence. In view of that statement there was no point in having a prolonged debate on the question whether those troops should remain in the Territory after independence had been achieved. On 8 February 1962 the Belgian delegation had circulated a document (A/C.4/533) which showed that in both the national guard and the police there were a number of indigenous officers and non-commissioned officers; thus the necessary cadres were already in existence. If the arguments advanced at the previous meeting were accepted, the door would be open to all kinds of interpretations. The matter of the Belgian troops was not the essential problem. At the resumed session in June the General Assembly would have the report of the commission and would be able to reach a decision. Before the first week of June most of the 1,300 Belgian troops in Ruanda-Urundi would have been withdrawn and between then and 1 July a time-table could be submitted covering the complete withdrawal of all Belgian troops.

23. With regard to the military experts to be provided, he had said before and would repeat that they should not perform any military functions. In accordance with operative paragraph 11 of the draft resolution, the experts would be provided by the Secretary-General; they would not be members of military missions or police forces which would be responsible to the Security Council. For that reason his delegation did not consider it necessary to refer to the Security Council in the draft resolution.

24. All the provisions of the draft resolution referred to the period preceding independence. Once Ruanda-Urundi had achieved independence it would be free to act as it wished. Hence if the technical assistance asked for in the draft resolution were granted for the transitional period, the Government or Governments of Ruanda-Urundi should make fresh requests to the United Nations, stating in what fields they required assistance.

25. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) said that he declined to discuss the question of the Congo, which was quite unconnected with that of Ruanda-Urundi. He had not referred to it in any of his statements and he would not reply to the remarks on the subject made by the representative of Guinea.

26. The accusation of blackmail made by that representative was most unjust. He was confident that those who had heard his statement at the 1296th meeting would agree that it had been co-operative in tone and reasonable in substance. He had said nothing at any time which gave grounds for supposing that he did not consider the African peoples to be capable of maintaining order in their countries. On the contrary, he was convinced that they were capable of doing so and he hoped that one day order in Ruanda-Urundi would be maintained entirely by forces composed of inhabitants of the Territory.

27. If he had correctly understood the statement just made by the representative of Guinea, he had said that on 1 June 1962 the plan for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Territory would be placed before the General Assembly and that the Assembly would then come to a decision. That was not what the draft resolution said, but if that was what was intended the Belgian delegation and the sponsors were very near to agreement. The only point at issue was the date on which the troops should be replaced by indigenous forces. If the words "to be completed before independence" could be deleted from operative paragraph 3 (e) of the draft resolution, there would be no further difficulty in that respect.

28. In reply to the statement of the representative of Bulgaria, he said that he was not in favour of maintaining Belgian troops in Ruanda-Urundi after the Territory had become independent. What he proposed was that the Belgian troops should progressively and rapidly be replaced by indigenous troops, but he asked that the final departure of the Belgian troops should not take place before another force able to maintain order had been established. Anyone who questioned the manner in which order had been maintained in the Territory need only look at the report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (A/4994 and Add.1 and Corr.1), which did not contain a single criticism of the Belgian forces. It was impossible to state categorically at the present time that on a given date, say 1 June or 30 June, all the Belgian troops must have left the Territory. A plan should be drawn up in a agreement with the Governments of Burundi

and Rwanda; if either of those Governments, or a single Government if one were established, expressed the wish for the Belgian troops to be withdrawn, Belgium would regard that as a formal decision and would comply with it immediately. If, at the time of the resumed session, the situation did not appear satisfactory, the General Assembly would say so and would then come to a decision regarding the granting of independence. As long as any Belgian soldiers remained in the Territory, United Nations observers should be there. If the amendment proposed by Ireland and Sweden (A/C.4/L.733) were adopted, on 1 June 1962 a plan providing for the rapid and progressive withdrawal of the Belgian troops would be submitted to the General Assembly. If, contrary to his expectations, on 1 June the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, the United Nations commission and all concerned agreed that the Belgian troops could leave the Territory and that there were enough indigenous troops to maintain order, that fact would be mentioned in the commission's report and the General Assembly would have the opportunity to judge of Belgium's attitude. There was no disagreement on the question of principle.

29. The discussion was difficult for two reasons: one was that instead of dealing with facts the sponsors appeared to want to discuss a question of principle; the other was that the sponsors had refused to consider any amendments to the draft resolution. In his view that was not a good procedure. It was natural that the members of the African-Asian group, which was particularly concerned with the question of Ruanda-Urundi, should sponsor the basic draft resolution on the subject, but that did not entitle them to deny other members of the Assembly the right to speak or to propose amendments. He appealed to the sponsors to reconsider their attitude. He also urged them not to prejudice the findings of the proposed commission. The commission might recommend that the Belgian troops could be withdrawn immediately; it might recommend that some of them should remain for a time. Much would depend on whether there was political reconciliation in the Territory and on whether or not the refugees returned. In the face of a changing and fluid situation the Committee should not take a final decision on that single point when all the relevant factors were not known.

30. The future of Ruanda-Urundi was not the sole responsibility of Belgium; it was also the responsibility of the United Nations. He appealed to the sponsors to make a last step in order that agreement might be reached and that Rwanda and Burundi could be brought to independence in the best possible conditions.

31. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) said that in his previous statement he had been commenting on certain remarks made at the previous meeting which had greatly disturbed his delegation. It was at that meeting that the question of the Congo had been raised.

32. In connexion with operative paragraph 3 (e), the Committee had embarked on a debate which should have taken place at the resumed session; by that time the great majority of Belgian troops would have been withdrawn and a plan would be submitted for the withdrawal of the remainder between 1 June and 1 July 1962. It was not clear whether the Belgian proposal was that between the present time and the first week of June efforts would be concentrated on formulating the plan or whether they would be devoted to the actual withdrawal of most of the Belgian troops and that a time-table would be submitted for the withdrawal of

the remainder. The intentions of the sponsors were clear; they wished Ruanda-Urundi to be truly independent, and it would only be so when no foreign troops remained in the Territory. The sponsors considered that it would be possible to establish an African military force to replace the Belgian troops before 1 July 1962. If it proved impossible the question could be discussed at the resumed session.

33. He denied the assertion that the sponsors refused to accept any amendments; they had already accepted one, but there were others to which they could not agree. Naturally it would be for the Committee to decide upon them when the draft resolution and the amendments were put to the vote.

34. Mr. CASTAÑEDA (Mexico) noted that considerable importance was being attached to the question of the presence of Belgian troops in Ruanda-Urundi. In his opinion neither the wording of operative paragraph 3 (e) of draft resolution A/C.4/L.730 and Add.1 and 2 nor that of the Irish and Swedish amendment (A/C.4/L.733) was entirely satisfactory. The former failed to provide for the contingency that the withdrawal of the Belgian troops might not be completed by 1 July 1962, while the Irish and Swedish amendment failed to specify that the plan for the progressive replacement of the Belgian military and paramilitary forces should be submitted to the General Assembly for its approval or to establish a date for the completion of the withdrawal of the Belgian troops. In the circumstances, the delegations of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico ventured to suggest to the Irish and Swedish delegations that the words "as rapidly as possible" in their amendment should be replaced by "without delay" and that the phrase "to be worked out as a matter of urgency before independence" should be replaced by "which will be submitted to the General Assembly before independence and in which the arrangements and final date for the withdrawal of all Belgian forces shall be set out". The three Latin American delegations felt that acceptance of their suggestions would bring the position of the parties closer together, particularly in the light of the explanations given by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs and by some of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.730 and Add.1 and 2. They also thought that operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution might be amended to express appreciation also to the members of the United Nations Secretariat who had assisted the United Nations Commission in the performance of its tasks.

35. Mr. YOMEKPE (Ghana) said that he wished to reassure the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs and certain members of the Committee who had expressed fears that the African-Asian group was using its numerical strength in order to muzzle other groups in the Committee. The group in question had submitted a draft resolution after several days of difficult discussions, a number of amendments had been presented and the sponsors of the draft resolution had accepted one of them. They could not accept the others, since they were at variance with certain basic principles which the sponsors could not abandon. That did not mean that the amendments in question should not be put to the vote. The sponsors of the draft resolution strongly felt that no foreign troops should be stationed in the territory of a sovereign State without the consent of the Government in question. On the other hand, as he had indicated to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs in private conversation, if the Government of Governments of Ruanda-Urundi concluded an agree-

ment with Belgium, to take effect from 1 July 1962, providing for the continued presence of Belgian troops in Ruanda-Urundi, their sovereign right to conclude such an agreement could not be challenged by anyone.

36. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) expressed disappointment that the spirit of co-operation with which the debates had been imbued was beginning to give way to polemics. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had just expressed the view that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.730 and Add.1 and 2 were trying to impose their will and refusing to consider amendments to their text on the ground that that text had been agreed upon after a considerable amount of discussion and negotiation. His delegation was opposed to any attempt by any group to impose decisions by undemocratic means. Such a stricture, however, could not be made in the case before the Committee. The sponsors of the draft resolution had not tried to prevent a discussion of the amendments; they had merely stated—as they were fully entitled to do—that they could not accept them.

37. With reference to the point of substance he did not think that there was any disagreement between Belgium and the sponsors of the draft resolution. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had indicated that at that stage no date could be set for the complete withdrawal of the Belgian troops, since the expected reconciliation might not be achieved and the situation might not be as normal as was hoped. He did not think that that argument raised any difficulties, for if the United Nations commission reported that the situation in the Trust Territory was unsatisfactory the date for the termination of the trusteeship could be postponed. The Belgian troops would then be retained in the Trust Territory after 1 July 1962. Everything, therefore, depended on the report of the United Nations commission, as had been indicated both by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs and in operative paragraph 7 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.730 and Add.1 and 2.

38. Mr. BINDZI (Cameroun) welcomed the wise statement by the Ghanaian representative that his delegation and others would see no objection to the continued presence of Belgian troops in Ruanda-Urundi after independence provided that was requested by the local Government. That was the crux of the matter. The Cameroun delegation felt that the will of the people and of their representative Governments was paramount. If, however, that principle was valid for the presence of foreign troops, he failed to see why it should not apply also to the date of independence or the question of unity. The Committee had heard the representatives of the two local Governments explain the feelings of the people. Yet the sponsors of the draft resolution had chosen to overrule those views in favour of making one more attempt at unification. In the circumstances he appealed to the sponsors to make further concessions and to accept amendments which were not at variance with the spirit of their text. They should remember that all members of the Committee would bear responsibility for the decision to be taken.

39. Mr. OBEREMKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) asked the Mexican representative whether, in submitting the oral sub-amendment to the effect that a plan setting out the arrangements and final date for the withdrawal of all Belgian forces from Ruanda-Urundi should be submitted to the General Assembly at its resumed session in June 1962, he was not casting doubts on the accession of the Trust Territory to in-

dependence on 1 July 1962. It was difficult to see how the sub-amendment could be accepted without changing that date. As the representative of Cyprus had said, the date of independence would depend on the report of the United Nations commission; a decision to terminate the trusteeship could not be taken while Belgian troops remained in Ruanda-Urundi since there could be no genuine independence as long as those forces were not withdrawn. In the circumstances he hoped that the Mexican representative would not press his sub-amendment.

40. Some of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.730 and Add.1 and 2 had explained the interpretation to be given to various provisions in their text. In view of the great importance of those statements, he proposed that the statements by the representatives of Ghana and Nigeria at the previous meeting and the one made by the Guinean representative at the current meeting should be circulated as Committee documents.

It was so decided.^{1/}

41. Mr. CASTAÑEDA (Mexico), replying to the USSR representative, said that there was no incompatibility between his suggestion and adherence to the date set for independence. Without altering the latter, the Committee might envisage the possibility of the continued presence of Belgian troops in Ruanda-Urundi for a specified period of time acceptable to the General Assembly. Even some of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.730 and Add.1 and 2 had taken into account the possibility that circumstances might make it necessary to postpone the total withdrawal of the Belgian troops until after independence. That would depend on a series of factors which could not be foreseen at the present juncture but which could be examined by the commission before submitting its plan. At the resumed session in June 1962 the General Assembly would have to reconsider the whole issue and might even have to alter the date for independence. Such a possibility was in fact envisaged in operative paragraph 7 of the draft resolution.

42. He proposed that the statement made by the representative of Belgium at the current meeting should be circulated as a Committee document.

It was so decided.^{2/}

43. Mrs. SKOTTSBERG-AHMAN (Sweden) said that her delegation and the delegation of Ireland accepted the Mexican representative's suggestions since they preserved the main purpose of the amendment, which was to eliminate the very rigid and categorical time-limit laid down in operative paragraph 3 (e) of draft resolution A/C.4/L.730 and Add.1 and 2. While it was desirable that the withdrawal of the Belgian troops should be completed before 1 July 1962, no one was in a position to know whether that would be feasible. Some degree of flexibility should therefore be preserved. The Mexican representative had also enunciated the useful principle that the General Assembly should have a plan before it at the resumed session in June 1962, by which time the training programmes would be under way and the United Nations would be better placed to take stock of available re-

^{1/} The complete text of the statements made by the representatives of Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria was circulated as document A/C.4/538 and Corr.1.

^{2/} The complete text of the statement made by the representative of Belgium was circulated as document A/C.4/539 and Corr.1.

sources. She felt that the date for the completion of the withdrawal of the Belgian forces and their replacement by indigenous forces could not properly be fixed until the resumed session in June.

44. Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Ireland) associated himself with the views expressed by the Swedish representative and thanked the Mexican representative for his

compromise wording, which might lead to a satisfactory solution of the difficult problem before the Committee. He urged the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.730 and Add.1 and 2 and the Administering Authority to give sympathetic consideration to the new suggestion.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.