

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION

Official Records



**FOURTH COMMITTEE, 1835th
MEETING**

Monday, 20 October 1969,
at 3.20 p.m.

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	Page
Requests for hearings (<i>continued</i>)	
Request concerning Namibia (agenda item 64)	131
Agenda items 64, 65 and 102:	
Question of Namibia (<i>continued</i>)	
Question of Territories under Portuguese administration (<i>continued</i>)	
Question of Southern Rhodesia (<i>continued</i>)	
General debate (<i>continued</i>)	131

Chairman: Mr. Théodore IDZUMBUIR
(Democratic Republic of the Congo).

Requests for hearings (continued)

REQUEST CONCERNING NAMIBIA (AGENDA ITEM 64)
(A/C.4/721/ADD.3)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that, if he heard no objections, he would take it that the Committee decided to grant the request of Mr. Katuutire ua Kaura, representative of the South West Africa National Union (SWANU) for a hearing concerning Namibia (A/C.4/721/Add.3).

It was so agreed.

AGENDA ITEMS 64, 65 AND 102

Question of Namibia (*continued*)
(A/7623/Add.2 and Corr.1; A/C.4/L.934)

**Question of Territories under Portuguese administration
(*continued*) (A/7623/Add.3 and Corr.1, A/7694)**

**Question of Southern Rhodesia
(*continued*) (A/7623/Add.1)**

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

2. Mr. FOUM (United Republic of Tanzania), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the statement made by the United Kingdom representative (1833rd meeting) had disappointed him, since it reflected the attitude long maintained by the United Kingdom Government and regarded by most of the members of the Committee as a submission by the colonial Power to the whims of the racists in Southern Rhodesia. By his statement the United Kingdom representative had shown that his country was more concerned for the racist minority than for the interests of the majority.

3. The United Kingdom representative had stated that the decision of the United Kingdom Government to close down

its mission in Southern Rhodesia and to accept the resignation of the British Governor had been taken in order to dispel any illusion among the minority electorate that a settlement with the United Kingdom was possible while their leaders were committed to racist policies. On the surface, that might seem to be a forthright and favourable action, but ever since the white racists had unilaterally declared independence, and immediately after they had been declared traitors by the United Kingdom Government, that Government had gone out of its way to give the illegal régime an aura of authority by constant communication and consultations. Moreover, time and again the United Kingdom had made proposals for a settlement with the minority régime. The racists, for their part, had maintained their immoral position, were as recalcitrant as ever and had taken advantage of the passage of time to entrench their régime still further. In the face of that situation the United Kingdom Government had taken no action; it had merely submitted to the régime fresh proposals seeking to bridge the gap between itself and the régime.

4. It might be asked whether the problem in Southern Rhodesia consisted merely in dispelling or failing to dispel the illusions of the racist white minority, who had been heavily armed by the United Kingdom in the heyday of its empire in order to suppress African nationalism. To the Africans, and to all peace- and freedom-loving peoples, the answer was an emphatic "no". The problem in Zimbabwe lay in the exploitation of the Territory and of its people, in the denial of their legitimate rights and human dignity and in United Kingdom colonialism encouraged by the racist minority régime seeking to entrench and extend the system of *apartheid*. Hence any measure that was not firmly opposed to the illegal régime was an act against the interests of the people of Zimbabwe and therefore incompatible with the responsibilities of the United Kingdom as administering Power, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the relevant United Nations resolutions. It was also an abdication of authority by the United Kingdom, as was the withdrawal of the British Governor of Southern Rhodesia.

5. The United Kingdom representative had quoted the Manifesto on Southern Africa adopted at Lusaka¹ and it was encouraging to note the attention that he had given it. After observing that the United Kingdom Government had acknowledged the colonial status of Zimbabwe, the Manifesto stated in paragraph 16 that unfortunately "that Government has failed to take adequate measures to reassert its authority against the minority which has seized power with the declared intention of maintaining white domination". That was precisely the opinion of the United

¹ The text of the Manifesto was subsequently circulated as document A/7754.

Republic of Tanzania and his delegation drew the attention of the colonial Power to that declaration by Africa.

6. In his statement, the United Kingdom representative had said that it now appeared that the régime did not intend to declare Southern Rhodesia a republic before 1970. The Tanzanian delegation wondered whether that was meant to console those most concerned about the situation in Zimbabwe or whether it was an admission that the racist régime had not been cowed but rather encouraged by the withdrawal of the British Governor and the abdication of authority by the United Kingdom. He was sure that the members of the Committee would draw the obvious conclusion from those remarks.

7. His delegation had made it clear that it would welcome any move on the part of the United Kingdom designed to put an end to the illegal racist régime. He must submit, however, that that country had failed to take adequate action in the matter. That, basically, was the reason why the United Nations was still discussing the question of Southern Rhodesia, for which the United Kingdom was directly responsible.

8. In his statement the United Kingdom representative had sought to impress the Committee with the action taken by his Government to settle the question. A brief analysis of that action was imperative. When the racist minority régime had unilaterally declared independence, the United Kingdom Government had denounced its leaders as traitors. It could have been expected, in the light of the bitter experience of British colonial history, that those words would be followed by action, but it had not been so, for the United Kingdom had immediately set in motion a policy that so far had proved favourable only to the illegal Salisbury régime.

9. In resolution 2379 (XXIII) of 25 October 1968 the General Assembly had called upon the United Kingdom Government not to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia unless it was preceded by the establishment of a government based on free elections by universal adult suffrage and on majority rule. The United Kingdom had tried to convince the United Nations that it was committed to the ideal of independence for the people of Zimbabwe, yet it had been one of the small minority of States that had opposed that resolution, which reiterated the basic principles set forth in the Charter. The action of the United Kingdom from then onwards, as also its inaction in other vital areas, could not but be considered suspect, because such an attitude reflected a refusal on the part of the United Kingdom Government to fulfil its obligations under the Charter. It was therefore imperative that any proposals for action should take into full consideration that refusal by the colonial Power to uphold, by action, the principle of majority rule for the people of Zimbabwe.

10. The United Kingdom representative had informed the Committee that his Government had set the six principles as the guideline for its policy with regard to Southern Rhodesia (see A/7623/Add.1, annex I, para. 71). Those principles had been shown to be not only unrealistic but potentially dangerous. The United Kingdom Government declared that it would seek a solution to the problem of Southern Rhodesia. Yet the first principle alone was highly

suspect, since it advanced the proposition that the minority régime would be given legality in order to maintain and guarantee the principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule. Perhaps, however, it was to be understood that the United Kingdom would after all act to ensure the furtherance of the objective of that first principle. If that was so, he wondered why the United Kingdom was not taking action now and had not taken action before to crush the illegal minority régime and to ensure, by deeds rather than words, majority rule in Zimbabwe. His delegation thought that that principle was unsound and was a proposal for legalizing the continuation of minority rule, with majority rule as only a distant ideal. It therefore rejected that proposal, which had already been rightly rejected by the African people of Zimbabwe. The same could be said of the second principle, which, like the first, presupposed the good faith of the racist minority. Once that minority had been crowned with legality and given full powers, there was nothing to prevent it from taking whatever action it pleased to change the constitution and to continue its repression of the African people. He wondered who would ensure that the guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the constitution were observed and whether the United Kingdom would do so. That country had emphasized that it would not use force against the racists and its was obvious that the second principle would be no guarantee whatever. The United Republic of Tanzania could not regard that principle as an acceptable move towards solving the problem of colonialism and racism in Zimbabwe; if it was any guarantee at all, it was a guarantee of the continuation of the suppressive rule of the racist white minority. The remaining principles were equally unacceptable and should not be considered in a debate on the question of colonialism in Zimbabwe, since they presupposed the good faith of the racist minority.

11. It had shown that, while the United Kingdom Government was trying to gain acceptance of the idea of negotiations with the minority régime, the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia was frantically seeking to consolidate its machinery for the enslavement of the African people of Zimbabwe. If anyone had had any doubt about that, he had only to study the various reports available and the working papers prepared by the Secretariat to help the Committee in its discussions.

12. The racist minority régime, encouraged by the negative attitude of the United Kingdom Government and supported by the lackeys of international imperialism, the fascist régime of South Africa and the Portuguese colonialists, had shown that its aim was to continue the suppression and exploitation of the African people of Zimbabwe. To that end it had devised ways and means of ensuring the failure of the so-called economic sanctions.

13. In view of the form in which they were applied and the forces of exploitation involved, the sanctions were a measure of doubtful value. There was profit to be made by undermining them, and those most active in that respect were the capitalist monopolies of such countries as France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Japan and financial interests in the United Kingdom. He quoted from reports according to which products from Southern Rhodesia were transported from Lourenço Marques to various European ports in vessels registered in Trieste, Hamburg

and Palermo. That showed that those who were evading the sanctions and those who said that sanctions were the way to put an end to the illegal régime were one and the same.

14. It must be recognized that, in view of the repressive action which the illegal racist régime was taking against the African freedom fighters, the continuation of the colonial situation in Southern Rhodesia was a threat to the inhabitants of the Territory and to international peace and security; in that connexion, he referred to a communiqué issued by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of East and Central African countries, in which they had said that the United Kingdom Government was responsible for the lives and security of Africans in Southern Rhodesia.

15. While his delegation held the United Kingdom responsible for the colonial situation obtaining in Zimbabwe, it rejected the United Kingdom's insistence that the "six principles" should form a basis for a settlement, since that course of action would merely result in the continued suppression of the African people and the perpetuation of colonialism and *apartheid*.

16. There were certainly other means by which the United Kingdom, acting alone or in co-operation with the United Nations, could bring about the elimination of the racist and unjust régime in Southern Rhodesia. Just as it had used force in other situations, the United Kingdom could use force to defend the universally accepted principle of majority rule and to cut the supply lines established by the illegal régime and its Western collaborators. Moreover, the United Nations should extend and intensify economic sanctions to the extent that was necessary to bring down the racist régime; in view of the deliberate sabotage of the sanctions by Portugal, South Africa and capitalist interests, piecemeal efforts should be abandoned and mandatory sanctions should be imposed on South Africa and Portugal also and should be applied more strictly, using all the provisions of the Charter.

17. The United Nations should call on the colonial Power to take the correct course of action immediately; the illegal régime relied heavily on the support it received from the forces of imperialism and it was useless to expect it to relinquish its hold on Zimbabwe of its own accord.

18. The struggle which the people of Zimbabwe were obliged to wage in order to achieve their liberation, and which had been recognized as legitimate in United Nations resolutions, would receive the support of the African countries as long as the racist régime persisted in its intransigence. His delegation would co-operate with all Member States which were sincerely trying to bring about the speedy and complete elimination of the colonial situation in Southern Rhodesia.

19. Mr. PENCHEV (Bulgaria) said that previous speakers had singled out those responsible for the deterioration of the situation in southern Africa, whose actions had made it possible to put up a stubborn resistance in the face of the legitimate struggle of the peoples of Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau). In addition, the *representatives of the liberation movements* had referred in some detail to the alliance between the racists in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colo-

nialists. That alliance was based on the community of interests of the three régimes, which sought to maintain their control over the region in order to continue the economic exploitation of the African peoples by inhuman means that constituted a threat to the security, territorial integrity and independence of the free countries of Africa.

20. Previous speakers had also furnished proof of the extensive political, economic, military and other assistance which was being extended to the unholy alliance by the Western Powers, especially the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). That assistance enabled the racist régimes of Pretoria, Salisbury and Lisbon to maintain their domination by the use of force, to suppress the liberation movements and to defy the decisions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and other United Nations bodies. The ramifications of that very real conspiracy led directly to the great capitals of the Western world. Since the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and some other countries were supplying capital and arms to the racist régimes, it was not surprising that the broad lines of colonialist policy in southern Africa were determined by those very Powers. The colonialist, imperialist and racist forces were associated with the operation of the great monopolies, which were stubbornly defending their positions in southern Africa. For the moment, they were confining themselves to short raids beyond the neighbouring frontiers, but they were also formulating much more ambitious plans, since it was their objective to reconquer Africa, either directly or by the use of various neo-colonialist methods.

21. If further proof was required, it could be found in the replies to the following questions: Who was supplying arms, credit and all possible support to the racist régimes? Who possessed the largest investments in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies? Who cast negative votes or abstained in votes on draft resolutions concerning decolonization? Who failed to implement the decisions taken by the United Nations, although they had been adopted unanimously in the Security Council? Who was violating the sanctions imposed on the illegal Ian Smith régime, thereby rendering them ineffective? Who was attempting to enforce the view that anti-colonialist resolutions adopted by an overwhelming majority in the General Assembly were unrealistic and that it was also unrealistic to demand that the Security Council should extend sanctions to include South Africa and the Portuguese colonies?

22. When the Western Powers withdrew their support from the colonialist and racist régimes in southern Africa, those régimes would collapse. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria had stated in the General Assembly (1772nd plenary meeting) that, if decolonization was to continue, the major Western Powers, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, must end their direct and indirect support of the reactionary régimes in South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia.

23. His delegation would make suggestions and recommendations when the draft resolutions were considered. He drew attention to the proposal which had been made by the Soviet Union in the First Committee (see A/C.1/L.468) with a view to strengthening international security, since

certain provisions of that draft were related to the work of the Fourth Committee. One of the measures proposed was the immediate cessation of any act of repression against the liberation movements of the peoples under colonial domination and the immediate granting of independence to those peoples. His delegation considered that the adoption of the Soviet Union proposal by the General Assembly would greatly assist in completing the process of decolonization and in fully implementing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples without delay. If all action against the African liberation movements was stopped and if assistance to the racist régimes in southern Africa was suspended, there would be nothing to prevent those peoples from regaining their freedom and independence immediately.

24. He drew attention to the efforts of certain specialized agencies and other international organizations to implement the General Assembly resolutions on decolonization and said that the General Assembly should make more specific recommendations to assist some of those organizations in implementing the resolutions.

25. His delegation had always held the view that the international community should adopt effective measures to put an end to the racist and colonialist régimes in southern Africa and to assist the African peoples to establish majority Governments in their Territories, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the United Nations. The People's Republic of Bulgaria would continue to extend all possible assistance to the revolutionary movements of the African peoples who were fighting for their freedom and national independence.

26. Mr. LOUAH (Guinea) referred to the statement made in the General Assembly (1776th plenary meeting) by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of his country to the effect that the twenty-fourth session would be remembered for its discussion of the problem of how national sovereignty was to be exercised effectively by Africans for the benefit of their peoples, without any foreign interference. In its death throes, colonialism was trying to cling to life, to work out fresh strategies for a counter-attack and even to take the offensive.

27. The Permanent Representative of Guinea had already stated before the Security Council on 17 June 1969 that, despite the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly, and despite the Commonwealth conferences and the economic sanctions, the colonization of the African continent still went on. Certain Powers, in spite of having adopted all the United Nations resolutions, had betrayed the Organization, since they had supported the colonial régimes and the system of *apartheid*. The unspoken complicity over the question of opposition to the liberation movements between the former colonialists and the champions of international imperialism on the one hand, and the Pretoria-Salisbury axis and the colonialism of Portugal on the other, was designed to keep southern Africa under the domination of the latter.

28. The *apartheid* system was assuming alarming proportions with respect to world peace. It was deplorable that the Pretoria Government, with the support of its NATO

allies, was trying to maintain that criminal system and continuing to ignore United Nations appeals and resolutions. He hoped that the report of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa would be studied with the attention it deserved and that practical measures would be adopted on the basis of its recommendations.

29. South Africa had not changed its position on Namibia and was apparently planning to annex it and extend the system of *apartheid* to that Territory. Namibia would be divided into a white central section and ten sub-Territories assigned to Africans, who, although they constituted 85 per cent of the total population, would be allotted only 40 per cent of the land.

30. South Africa was defying the United Nations as well as international law and morality. It was essential that General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 and Security Council resolution 269 (1969) of 12 August 1969 should be implemented. The Pretoria Government's stubborn determination to keep Namibia under its rule placed it in an illegal position in face of international law and the United Nations.

31. In the General Assembly (1776th plenary meeting), the head of his delegation had suggested the following practical steps to put an end to the present situation in Namibia: first, sovereignty over the Territory of Namibia should be transferred immediately to its people; secondly, responsibility for Namibian affairs should be entrusted immediately to a Government in exile recognized by the United Nations and by the Organization of African Unity (OAU); thirdly, States Members of the United Nations and of the OAU, and all progressive States, should independently give Namibia every possible material and moral assistance.

32. In Southern Rhodesia the Zimbabwe people were living under the racist domination of the white settlers, who were supported by the passive complicity of the United Kingdom. When Smith had submitted the so-called constitutional amendments to an alleged referendum, the Permanent Representative of Guinea had declared in the Security Council on 17 June 1969 that it was becoming increasingly obvious that attempts were being made to establish white minority colonies south of the Zambezi which would enforce the policy of *apartheid* throughout the region. Southern Rhodesia, with the aid of South Africa and the United Kingdom, was trying to flout international public opinion. The situation was explosive because a minority was oppressing the large African majority by repressive measures worthy of Hitler's Third Reich. He recalled President Sékou Touré's message to the Secretary-General five years earlier, to the effect that the situation in Southern Rhodesia should awaken African States to their responsibility to defend the freedom and sovereignty of African peoples and to the dangerous implications of the supremacy of a foreign minority over the interests and legitimate rights of the inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia. In his message, President Touré had added that all the forces of the continent should unite to take up the challenge hurled at Africa and at the Organization of African Unity.

33. The so-called new constitution of Southern Rhodesia provided a flexible framework for suppressing the political activities of the Africans.

34. Although repeatedly called upon by the United Nations to fulfil its responsibilities as administering Power, the United Kingdom had claimed that it was powerless to do so and Smith had had no difficulty in declaring independence. Colonialist duplicity, embodying the use of delaying tactics in the Security Council and harmless economic sanctions, enabled the racists of Southern Rhodesia to survive. The Salisbury-Pretoria axis was a threat to the security of all African States and the question should be considered in connexion with the item relating to the strengthening of international security proposed by the Soviet Union (agenda item 103), which the General Assembly had allocated to the First Committee.

35. The Zimbabwe people and other peoples of southern Africa had already considered means of escaping from their present wretched situation, and if the United Kingdom failed to find an equitable solution, their struggle would be further exacerbated. His delegation appealed to all Powers that maintained consular services in Southern Rhodesia to withdraw them in a gesture of solidarity with the oppressed majority. It also appealed to the United Nations to give closer consideration to the problem.

36. He drew attention to Portugal's refusal to accept the 1960 decision of the General Assembly to consider the situation of so-called Portuguese Territories. It was obvious that Portugal, an under-developed country, would not be able to carry on several colonial wars and commit a series of criminal acts incompatible with its position as a Member of the United Nations unless it had the financial and material help of the Western Powers.

37. Under Portuguese colonialism political oppression was compounded by economic misery, since metropolitan Portugal was one of the most severely under-developed countries of Western Europe. Yet, as the head of his delegation had stated at a plenary meeting, Portugal was even committing acts of provocation against independent African States, as in the case of a Guinean transport vessel which had been attacked by six Portuguese patrol boats in Guinean territorial waters.

38. Portugal would have to resign itself to controlling only its own territory and living on memories of past greatness that had not always been honourably won.

39. Mr. VALENZUELA (Chile) said that his delegation had listened with great interest to the general debate and to the statements in the General Assembly by the President of the Republic of Botswana (1764th plenary meeting) and the President of the Federal Republic of Cameroon (1780th plenary meeting). His country was interested in such problems because no one, as a member of the human family, could still the voice of his conscience when an international body condemned colonialism in words but permitted the continued subjection of peoples and the denial of their right to self-determination, freedom and control over their own future. At the present time, in spite of the advances made in the conquest of space, millions of men and women in a vast region of the earth were fighting and dying to regain their dignity as human beings.

40. That statement did not originate with the Chilean delegation. The Lusaka Manifesto, in the section dealing with the problems of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau), denounced Portugal's refusal to give the inhabitants of those Territories any opportunity to negotiate for their freedom; with regard to the situation in Southern Rhodesia it unmasked the minority which had seized power with the obvious intention of maintaining white domination; and with regard to the situation in Namibia it condemned the policy of *apartheid* adopted by the Government of South Africa. Moreover, the President of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, speaking on behalf of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, had said during the current session of the General Assembly (1780th plenary meeting) that United Nations resolutions were being disregarded in Namibia, the Territories under Portuguese administration, Zimbabwe and South Africa and such an attitude obviously posed a real threat to international peace and security.

41. The question of the Territories under Portuguese administration was now being taken up in the General Assembly for the ninth time. Hundreds of statements had been made, many condemnatory resolutions had been adopted and frequent appeals had been made to the Government of Portugal, but the situation of the peoples in those Territories had not changed in the slightest. Portugal insisted that the Territories were overseas provinces of Portugal, to which it would grant a gradually increasing degree of self-government. His delegation did not consider that that was enough; it was convinced that sooner or later the independence of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) would have to be recognized and their right to self-determination guaranteed. The longer that was delayed, the greater would be the risk of a bloody confrontation, which not only would cost many lives but would leave scars that would be difficult to heal.

42. In his opinion, it was still not too late for a peaceful solution, and in support of that view he quoted the Lusaka Manifesto, which stated in paragraph 14 that

“Even now, if Portugal should change her policy and accept the principle of self-determination, we would urge the liberation movements to desist from their armed struggle and to co-operate in the mechanics of a peaceful transfer of power from Portugal to the people of the African territories”.

His delegation therefore appealed once again to the Portuguese Government to understand that it alone could bring about a peaceful solution of the problem. If Portugal did not take action soon, it would find itself in a more and more hopeless impasse and it was not hard to predict what course events would take then, for the young and idealistic forces of the region would overcome every obstacle and open the way to freedom.

43. The situation in Southern Rhodesia had not improved during the current year either. On the contrary, the latest events showed that the illegal minority régime was using ever-increasing force to repress a majority which was deprived of its fundamental rights. The Chilean delegation had always vigorously condemned the Ian Smith régime; it held the right of peoples to determine their own destiny to

be sacred and found it intolerable that a minority should arrogate to itself the right to decide irrevocably the fate of the African population of Southern Rhodesia. Moreover, it was alarmed by the constant violation of the human rights of the people of Zimbabwe. So far as the Zimbabwe people were concerned, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a dead letter, and it only applied to persons who held political and economic power and had access to education and the benefits of civilization.

44. The referendum carried out in June of the current year by the Ian Smith régime showed conclusively that the people of Zimbabwe were still the victims of gross injustice. The result of that plebiscite had been to approve an iniquitous constitution, the provisions of which made it impossible in practice for the majority ever fully to enjoy the political rights to which it was entitled.

45. His delegation would support any effective proposal likely to lead to a solution of the present situation in Southern Rhodesia. It was unable to reconcile itself to the fact that some States were still not fully applying resolution 253 (1968), adopted by the Security Council on 29 May 1968. It was imperative to realize that only the compliance of all countries, and particularly of those which still maintained substantial trade relations with Southern Rhodesia, could force the minority régime to abandon its arbitrary attitude. Furthermore, all Member States were bound by the Charter to comply faithfully with the resolutions of the Security Council.

46. The United Kingdom should know that it could count on the support of the international community in regard to the measures which it was obliged to take. The majority of the States Members of the United Nations considered that negotiations with the illegal régime must be avoided. No significant progress had been discernible in that regard thus far, and there was no doubt that the conditions which would lead to a just and satisfactory solution of the problem would have to be forced upon the minority régime.

47. With regard to Namibia, the General Assembly had dealt with the question for the first time in 1946; since then, almost a quarter century had elapsed, and injustice continued to prevail in that Territory. It was clear that the continuance of such a situation created an increasing threat to the peace and security of the region. The time would thus come when the patience of the oppressed people would be exhausted, and the Territory would find itself in the midst of a bloody conflict. Only then would some people realize how serious a risk was being run as the world witnessed, unmoved, the perpetration of the worst kind of atrocities and injustices against an innocent people.

48. His delegation considered that the situation had deteriorated alarmingly in the past few months. The South African Government had not only reaffirmed its attitude of insolent contempt for the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, but had also taken steps to strengthen its illegal position in Namibia, particularly by the passage of the South West Africa Affairs Act, 1969. It had also continued its policy of establishing and developing the so-called "homelands" in an attempt to split up the Territory, reinforce Pretoria's control over it and in

the most flagrant manner consolidate the position of the privileged white minorities. That had been the South African Government's reply to the numerous resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Chilean Government wished to lodge a strong protest regarding the Pretoria Government's total failure to comply with the resolutions of those United Nations organs. The Chilean Government would strive unceasingly to bring about the self-determination of the Namibian people and to ensure that the observance of the fundamental rights of its inhabitants would bring justice and freedom to the Territory. It was to achieve those objectives that Chile had acted with particular determination, firstly in the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and now in the Council for Namibia, and it would continue to do so in future with similar vigour and dedication.

49. While his delegation considered it important to adopt condemnatory and punitive resolutions, that in itself was not enough, since to be effective such resolutions must be accompanied by the will to implement them through action. If such a course was not followed, whatever was said in the United Nations would be of very relative and even academic value. Nevertheless, Chile wished to assist in drafting resolutions which would stand a chance of being implemented. In that connexion, the permanent members of the Security Council were the ones to persuade the South African Government to comply fully with the resolutions of the United Nations.

50. More than thirty countries had achieved their independence through the efforts of the United Nations, and in particular of the Trusteeship Council. Chile had consistently maintained that the full application of the right to self-determination was indispensable to the maintenance of world peace. It considered that until such time as all peoples had attained a degree of economic and social development which would enable them to uphold a respectable position in the international community, and until disarmament and complete decolonization had been achieved, there would continue to be centres of poverty, hatred, violence and injustice in the world. If the United Nations had been effective at all, it had been so precisely in the sphere of decolonization. In order to complete its work in that area, and thus be able to turn to other important tasks, it must take particular care to prevent its prestige from being diminished by a proliferation of resolutions which everybody knew in advance could not be fulfilled.

51. It should be emphasized that Chile had always been on the side of those who were struggling to achieve independence and national sovereignty and that in consequence it vigorously condemned all those who attempted to subjugate other peoples and to exploit them for their own ends. His delegation wished to reaffirm its faith in the principles proclaimed in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and it would support every effective means for rapidly and unconditionally bringing colonialism in all its forms and manifestations to an end.

52. Mr. ABDULGANI (Indonesia), after expressing the condolences of his delegation and of the Japanese delega-

tion to the Somali representative on the death of the President of Somalia, said that the decision to hold a joint debate on the three subjects at issue constituted a clear recognition that the tragic situation of all southern Africa had common roots and could be solved only by action on all aspects of the problem. His delegation was convinced that there was clear evidence of collusion among South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia on political, economic and military matters as exemplified by their common policy on racism, the establishment of settlers and the measures taken to counter liberation movements in the whole area. While that intolerable situation implied a direct conflict with the United Nations, all the Member States, with the exception of the minority régimes themselves, agreed that *apartheid*, racial segregation, minority rule and other abuses of power were evils which should be totally rejected by civilized society. Consequently, the only matter to be discussed was the means of putting an end to that state of affairs, although those means had already been specified in the various General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, which had unfortunately been defied by South Africa and the colonial Powers and sabotaged by their trading partners.

53. In view of the need to adopt realistic measures, his delegation wished to refer firstly to the action which could be taken in connexion with public information. The fact was that a state of war existed in southern Africa between the repressed majority and the minority régimes, which were attempting to re-enact the nazi terror. It was therefore most unfortunate that the world Press, particularly the Western Press, had not seen fit to publicize the dimensions of the conflict. When there was any reference to it, it was presented solely as a struggle between terrorists and the supposedly legitimate Governments which were trying to preserve their civilization against the forces of tribalism and barbarism. Indonesia was well aware of all that, since its own struggle against colonialism had come to the world's attention only after a stage of open warfare had been reached which had threatened to involve other nations and areas. Moreover, the statement of the President of the Republic of Botswana to the General Assembly (1764th plenary meeting) and the contents of the Lusaka Manifesto also illustrated the danger of the recent situation in southern Africa.

54. The fact that other independent African countries could survive in the face of such odds certainly testified to their courage. Some of those countries had complied with the letter and the spirit of the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations more stringently than the richer trading partners of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portugal, and there could be little doubt that if those wealthier countries were willing to make comparable sacrifices, the measures would have a noticeable effect. After referring to the information and recommendations contained in the documents of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa,² he stressed that the United Nations should increase its active support for the liberation movements in all spheres, since that would be a concrete way of demonstrating to the peoples concerned that the United Nations, despite its present inability to persuade the

colonial Powers to change their policies, could at least help those who were trying to achieve freedom themselves.

55. Turning to the situation in Southern Rhodesia, which had deteriorated as a result of the continued acts of repression by the minority régime and the introduction of new measures denying the people of Zimbabwe their legitimate political rights, he said that his delegation still considered the administering Power to be responsible for the Territory and that it should take all measures necessary, including the use of force, to bring an end to the illegal racist régime and prevent a racial war. If the administering Power persisted in refraining from the use of force, the United Nations should take strong action against the Smith régime, including all the measures provided for in Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter.

56. His country continued to support the struggle for freedom and independence of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). Having touched upon the relevant parts of the Lusaka Manifesto and paid a tribute to the memory of Mr. Mondlane, he said that it was important for the Western Powers to put pressure on the Portuguese Government, to convince it that Africa was not part of Portugal and to ensure that no military equipment that could be used in the Territories under Portuguese administration was made available to Portugal.

57. The history of the Republic of South Africa was well known to Indonesians, who abhorred the policies and tactics which the South African Government was using in Namibia, a Territory which it was occupying illegally. South Africa was the most powerful country south of the line separating independent Africa from racist Africa and therefore bore a special responsibility. Although South Africa had developed its material and intellectual resources to a very high level, it had denied a place in its society to its most valuable resources—the majority of its people.

58. Indonesia considered that the interests of the peoples of southern Africa were paramount and that they must not be abandoned. It therefore believed that the Members of the United Nations must use persuasion and pressure to bring peace to the region. However, whatever the United Nations did would merely be in addition to forces that were already in motion. The United Nations could not grant independence, for freedom and justice were forces emanating from the hearts of men and, combined with other external forces, were the source of the liberation movements. The process was slow, but the United Nations could give encouragement to those who were fighting for freedom; his delegation would accordingly support any resolution which would promote those ends.

59. Mr. MONGUNO (Nigeria) observed that, although the decision to combine the Committee's discussion of the questions of Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese administration into one general debate had much to commend it in the interests of speeding up work and in helping the Committee better to analyse the situation, it also had some drawbacks. In future, some arrangement should be made for consultation and collaboration between the Fourth Committee and the Special Political Committee when the situation in southern Africa came up for consideration. It would have been especially

² Documents A/AC.115/L.267 and A/AC.115/L.268.

useful for the Fourth Committee to have been able to examine the report of the United Nations Council for Namibia, the body responsible for administering the Territory—even though the Government of South Africa had prevented the Council from taking possession of the Territory and even though there were signs of increasing violence and racial war there. With regard to the reports of the Special Committee dealing with Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese administration, he stressed the need for co-ordinating the work of the various bodies in the United Nations family and for bringing their reports into relation with one another to make a composite whole.

60. In southern Africa, as in the rest of the continent, the people were yearning to be free and were demanding their political, economic and cultural rights and their freedom from subversion and neo-colonialist exploitation. Furthermore, they were all, in their different ways, trying to change human nature so as to improve the lot of man and so that men might live together in peace and harmony. The need was for mutual respect and tolerance and that, indeed, was the message of the Lusaka Manifesto.

61. The white man in southern Africa, frightened of losing his privileged status, had lost the will to seek an understanding with the African. The financial and trade interests in Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese colonialism were in the service of military and ideological strategy and were reducing the African to the status of cheap labour; their only desire was to perpetuate the *status quo*. Such iniquitous acts, if not quickly corrected, could only lead to war.

62. Since the adoption of General Assembly resolutions 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 and 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, Namibia had been dismembered. First, there had been repression, leading to the murder of several Namibian nationalists. Then, there had been the implementation of the Odendaal recommendations, designed to divide Namibia up into enslavable tribal enclaves. The United Nations had reacted only with wordy resolutions.

63. The capacity for action of the United Nations had been proved in the Korean War and elsewhere when it had suited the Powers with vested interests in those regions to act. Today that will was lacking.

64. He pointed out that South Africa was determined to undermine and destroy the United Nations and that other countries could not be expected to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations while South Africa continued to defy them with impunity.

65. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, in a letter dated 26 September 1969 addressed to the Secretary-General³ had stated that his country had more than once indicated its intention to formulate a case for the incorporation of South West Africa into South Africa and that the United Nations had no say in what South Africa did with Namibia, since the League of Nations had left no will. In effect, South Africa was challenging the opinion of the International Court of Justice and the resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations. The Minister had also said that it was not possible

to allow the tribes of Namibia to co-exist in the same territory but that all was well with Namibia.

66. The annex to the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa was quite irrelevant. It made no mention, for example, of the fact that in 1967, when Namibia's gross domestic product had been 260 million rands, some 137 million rands had accrued from the Territory's export of minerals—principally diamonds, lead and copper. He asked whether a change in the Territory's *status quo* was in the interest of the mining companies and he pointed out that failures of the United Nations in Namibia reflected the Organization's struggle against the economic attitudes of its own Member States.

67. He expressed his dissatisfaction with the situation in Southern Rhodesia and with the solutions prescribed by the United Nations. He also stressed the responsibility of the administering Power, which had betrayed the trust of 4 million Africans in Rhodesia, many of whom were still dying in the cause of freedom, while their leaders were in gaol. Rhodesia, which was soon to become a republic, already had racial policies similar to those of South Africa. That Rhodesia had prospered in spite of the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations was shown by the fact that the figure for white immigration in 1968 was the highest in ten years.

68. The chapter of the report of the Special Committee dealing with Southern Rhodesia (see A/7623/Add.1), based as it was on forecasts and inferences, did not give much cause for hope. In any case, the Special Committee had had no means of policing the sanctions or of obtaining independent reports on Rhodesia's foreign trade and balance of payments. The key to the situation in Rhodesia lay with South Africa and Portugal, but vested interests were impeding the adoption of correct measures.

69. It would be interesting to know the extent to which the trading and investment partners of South Africa and Portugal had increased their profits since the imposition of mandatory sanctions. If everyone was reportedly anxious to crush the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, it was hard to understand why the Powers with influence over South Africa and Portugal always abstained on resolutions that were aimed at practical action either by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the General Assembly or the Security Council.

70. Without the support of NATO, Portugal would have granted independence to its colonies long ago. Portugal's colonial wars were also being financed by investors in oil prospecting and other projects, such as the Cabora Bassa dam.

71. There were three courses open to the United Nations. It could continue to pass rhetorical resolutions which would only make the peoples of Namibia, Rhodesia and Portuguese colonies lose faith in the Organization; it could squarely face the facts and realities in those Territories, and the Powers with vested interests in Africa would then realize that decolonization was not necessarily the same as disengagement; or it could advise the Africans to turn their backs on its resolutions and seek salvation through armed struggle, which sooner or later would lead to a major explosion.

³ See document S/9463, annex I.

72. He would like the United Nations to support those who sought nothing more than their legitimate right to freedom and independence. As a first step the United Nations should immediately institute a relief programme through the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Food Programme and other relief agencies, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, to bring help and assistance to the liberation movements. Furthermore, it should organize a programme of active co-operation with the OAU, regarding the activities of the United Nations Council for Namibia, and with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees so as to assist refugees from those Territories.

73. Mr. SANTAMARIA (Colombia) emphasized that the law should play a decisive role in the settlement of disputes between civilized nations and recalled that, in discussions concerning the problems of southern Africa, both in the Security Council and in the United Nations Council for Namibia, Colombia's position had been guided by that principle, in keeping with the traditions of an exceptionable international policy.

74. In July 1969, in his capacity as President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, for that month the Permanent Representative of Colombia had expressed concern over the unwillingness of the Government of South Africa to comply with Security Council resolution 264 (1969) of 20 March 1969;⁴ subsequently, on 30 July, he had drawn the Security Council's attention to the general anxiety about the lack of progress in that connexion.

75. He remarked on the anti-colonialist and anti-racist feeling characteristic of his own country, which well accorded with its origins and the intermingling of races among its population. With regard to South Africa, Colombia had insisted that the problem should be solved on the basis of understanding, and was distressed to find that not only had the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions been disregarded, but new measures had been adopted which further aggravated the situation in Namibia.

76. The situation in southern Africa and the failure to implement the decisions of the United Nations was detrimental to the Organization, and particularly to the Security Council, and it had now become necessary to amend the Charter by providing for effective machinery for the achievement of its primary objective of maintaining international peace and security. That necessity had already been indicated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia at the present session of the General Assembly (1768th plenary meeting).

77. On the subject of Southern Rhodesia, Colombia had stated its position in the Security Council and had strictly complied with the pertinent resolutions. At the Security Council meeting of 13 June 1969, Colombia had emphatically condemned the present illegal régime and the terms of the proposed constitutional amendments.

78. With regard to the Territories under Portuguese administration, he emphasized that the diplomatic relations

which his country maintained with Portugal implied no change in its views, which were based on its convictions and conditioned by the legal instruments governing its international relations.

79. Mr. BOHIADI (Chad) remarked that it was unfortunate that, at a time when the United Nations was preparing to commemorate the twenty-first anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the tenth anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, a substantial part of the world's population should still be under alien rule. It would be noted that the information received from various sources indicated that the situation in Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies was not developing satisfactorily. Despite the decisions of the Security Council, the resolutions of the General Assembly and the recommendations of the Special Committee and of the Organization of African Unity, the colonialist régimes of Pretoria, Lisbon and Salisbury were continuing to oppress millions of Africans and to deny them their most fundamental rights.

80. In Southern Rhodesia the minority racist régime of Ian Smith was growing steadily stronger; the economic sanctions and other measures adopted had so far had no effect on that régime which, with the complicity of the United Kingdom Government, would be able by the end of 1969 to proclaim a so-called republic. The United Kingdom had not fulfilled its responsibilities as administering Power, despite the measures it had at its disposal for putting an end to the arrogant defiance of the rebel Ian Smith. His delegation felt that the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom in the Security Council on 19 June 1969, during its consideration of the problem of Southern Rhodesia, to the effect that his country was no better equipped to deal with military and economic wars than it had been in 1965, was an admission of the encouragement that the United Kingdom Government was giving to the minority régime. In view of that admission, Ian Smith had only to proclaim the so-called republic and, with the same complicity, Southern Rhodesia could even become a member of the United Nations.

81. The situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration, which was grave and fraught with danger, constituted a threat to international peace and security. The Portuguese Government, far from taking measures to grant the peoples of those Territories the right of self-determination, was continuing to conduct military operations against them. His delegation unequivocally condemned such practices. It was to be wondered how a country like Portugal, whose resources were meagre compared with those of other Western countries, could carry on its administrative and military activities in those Territories. The answer was to be found in the support it received from its Western allies, in its increasingly flourishing relations with all the capitalist monopolies and, especially in the large capital investments made by those allies in the Territories. He reiterated the appeal made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chad in the General Assembly (1781st plenary meeting) to Portugal's allies, who could be helpful in persuading Portugal to listen to reason before it was too late to initiate a dialogue in Africa.

82. The only reaction of the Government of South Africa to the resolutions of the General Assembly, to resolution

⁴ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fourth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1969*, document S/9352.

269 (1969) and other decisions of the Security Council, to the negotiations and other peaceful measures aimed at convincing it of the need to listen to reason, had been cynical words and acts. The many obstacles created by that Government, including its refusal to co-operate with the United Nations, had inhibited the activity of the United Nations Council for Namibia, preventing it from carrying out its task.

83. In view of that negative attitude, his delegation would ask the Powers that were allied with the Pretoria régime to assist the United Nations so that it could guarantee peace and security in accordance with the Charter and carry out its responsibilities to the Namibian people.

84. The Heads of State and Government of the Member countries of the Organization of African Unity, conscious of the deterioration of the situation in southern Africa and of their collective responsibilities, had adopted the Lusaka Manifesto, which some considered a moderate and realistic document; it was a warning to the colonial Powers and merited the Committee's full attention. His delegation trusted that the régimes in power in southern Africa would accept the Manifesto and support all measures aimed at liberating the Territories that were still under foreign domination.

85. Mr. FUENTES (Bolivia) said that in his country indigenous ancestry was a reality which constituted an essential part of the national identity; consequently Bolivia could not remain indifferent to the sufferings of those peoples who were still under foreign domination and suffered the evils of colonialism and racial discrimination. He affirmed the steadfast support of the people and Government of Bolivia for the peoples of Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), and

pointed out that the moving statements made by the petitioners who had been heard by the Committee bore eloquent testimony to the fact that, in the face of oppression, a liberation movement existed similar to that which had achieved the emancipation of the Latin American republics. To support colonialistic régimes and practices in the contemporary world was to go against the tide of history, and any measure designed to perpetuate such régimes and practices constituted a senseless provocation and an anachronism. The efforts made so far by the United Nations had largely been fruitless, as was abundantly proved by the draft resolution contained in document A/C.4/L.934, whose sponsors made a further appeal, couched in calm yet forceful terms, to a Member of the United Nations.

86. Some of the statements made in the Committee reflected pessimism and weariness. However, although he understood the reasons for that attitude, he did feel that the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly had strengthened the spirit of resistance among the oppressed peoples and heightened the awareness of the international community. Such a united will was bound to achieve success in the end. It was unbelievable that, at the height of the space age, so many human beings should still be deprived of the inalienable right to freedom. Lastly, his delegation, which supported draft resolution A/C.4/L.934, was convinced that the United Nations would not shirk the responsibility it had assumed and that the Committee would do its utmost to propose wise and prudent measures for preserving peace, while ensuring that it was not based on the exploitation of man by man or brought at the expense of the oppressed peoples.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.