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CONTENTS

Agenda item 49:

Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi:
report of the United Nations Commission
for Ruanda-Urundi (continued)

General debate (continued) 781

Chairman: Miss Angie BROOKS (Liberia).

AGENDA ITEM 49

Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi: report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (A/4856, A/4865 and Corr.1, A/4970, A/4994 and Add.1 and Corr.1, A/5086; A/C.4/516 and Add.1, 517 and Corr.1, 518, 519, 521, 522 and Add.1-4, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529 and Corr.1, 530) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. NABAVI (Iran) complimented the Chairman and members of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi on the way in which they had accomplished a difficult task, thus showing themselves fully worthy of the confidence which the General Assembly had placed in them.

2. The Committee had to deal with several major issues in connexion with the future of Ruanda-Urundi, the first and most difficult of which was unquestionably that of the legislative elections held in Rwanda in September 1961. While there was no doubt about the legality of the elections which had been held in Burundi and about the representative and nationalist character of the Government which had been established as a result of those elections, the position was quite different where Rwanda was concerned. The provisions of General Assembly resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1605 (XV) had not been fully implemented and the conditions necessary for the proper conduct of the elections had not been established in Rwanda either before or during the electoral operations. The pre-electoral situation was analysed in detail in chapter III of the report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (A/4994 and Corr.1), and its abnormal nature was established clearly and unequivocally in the conclusions of that report, in particular, in the last sentences of paragraphs 449 and 450. The view set out in those two sentences also coincided with the personal opinion expressed by the Chairman of the United Nations Commission in the first two lines of paragraph 469. The statements of Mr. Gassou and Mr. Rahnema, United Nations Commissioners, had shed further light on the situation by providing new and important information. In particular, at the 1265th meeting, Mr. Rahnema had described the policy followed in Rwanda since 1949 by the Administering Authority which, by exploiting the antagonism between Batutsi and Bahutu for political

purposes, had almost succeeded in eliminating the opposition and in barring the Batutsi from any posts at the various levels of the administrative structure. Mr. Rahnema had also said that the burgomasters, who were almost all members of the Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu (PARMEHUTU), were laying down the law in all the communes. The accuracy of that observation had been acknowledged by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium.

3. However, although there was general agreement that the atmosphere and conditions in which the elections had been held in Rwanda had been abnormal, opinions varied on the question of whether those conditions had decisively influenced the elections and their validity. In passing judgement on that point, the Committee should be mindful of its heavy responsibility and should constantly keep the interests of the people of Rwanda in view; it should avoid taking measures which might aggravate the situation or give rise to fresh disturbances.

4. If the validity of the elections in Rwanda was considered from the standpoint of strict legality, the answer could only be in the negative, since it was obvious that the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1605 (XV) had not been fully observed. However, the Committee should bear in mind the possible consequences of its conclusions regarding the validity of the elections and should choose, not the solution which seemed theoretically the best, but the one which would ensure the maintenance of order and security in the Territory and hence be the least detrimental to the population.

5. There was unanimous agreement that the conditions in which the elections had been held had stemmed from the policy followed by the Administering Authority for a number of years and that that policy could not be changed in a few months. The members of the United Nations Commission had confirmed that it would not be possible to hold new elections in the near future in order to obtain more satisfactory results. Although the Iranian delegation was still convinced that the pre-electoral conditions had placed the Opposition parties at a considerable disadvantage, it thought that there were two points which should be taken into account, the first being the fact that the United Nations Commission had felt that election day had passed satisfactorily, and the second, the heavy poll.

6. In the statement he had made at the 1264th meeting, Mr. Gassou, after examining the two extreme positions which the General Assembly could take concerning the elections in Rwanda, namely, approval or unqualified rejection, had suggested a third possibility: the General Assembly could regard the result of the elections in Rwanda as a *de facto* situation, but the United Nations, the Administering Authority and the parties concerned in Rwanda would seek a solution which would improve the present situation and would

guarantee the freedom and security of all the political groupings and ensure the protection of the minorities in the country. That had also been the conclusion reached by Mr. Rahnema at the end of a very detailed analysis, which had shown that, in view of the pattern of political life established in the past and of the prevailing conditions, it would not be possible to alter the situation in the near future.

7. After carefully weighing all the facts in its possession, the Iranian delegation supported a solution similar to the third possibility suggested by Mr. Gassou. In its opinion, in order to avoid the worst, the General Assembly should first recognize the fact of the elections in Rwanda. On that basis, the United Nations would set out to restore peace, harmony and national unity in the country in close co-operation with the Administering Authority and the political parties of Rwanda. The responsibility for the achievement of those objectives would lie mainly with the Administering Authority, but PARMEHUTU, which was in power, would also bear a large share of the responsibility for improving the situation. By showing intelligence and wisdom, the Government of Rwanda could, at least in part, remedy the injustices of which a large section of the population, and in particular the Union nationale rwandaise (UNAR), had been the victim. First, it would have to restore an atmosphere of peace and security and allow the refugees to return to their homes; in addition to those measures, a Government of national union would have to be established in which the Opposition parties would participate in proportion to their importance. For their part, the Opposition parties would have to show tolerance and make certain concessions in the best interests of the Rwandese people. In that connexion, the Iranian delegation sincerely hoped that the efforts of the conciliation group to bring about a reconciliation between the representatives of the Government and the leaders of the Opposition parties would prove successful.

8. With regard to the preparation of Ruanda-Urundi for independence and the responsibility of the United Nations during the months preceding independence, the situation was highly complex and the people of the Territory would confront enormous difficulties in preparing, in a very short period of time, for self-government in one or in two truly independent States. The people of the Territory must be in a position to maintain their independence and survive economically after the trusteeship had been terminated and independence had been attained. The Iranian delegation, like many other delegations, therefore considered it essential for the United Nations to establish a presence in the Territory and to provide it with assistance. The commission which would be responsible for establishing the United Nations presence should be given as wide a mandate as possible and, as the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had emphasized at the 1274th meeting, should be given political and economic powers as well as powers for the maintenance of order.

9. In his opinion, the commission should have the following political tasks: first, to achieve national reconciliation in Rwanda, using every means to bring together the different political parties and the different sectors of opinion, in order to create the atmosphere of peace and harmony essential to the Territory during the difficult period of transition from colonialism to independence; secondly, to explore all the possibilities of a political and economic unification of Rwanda and Burundi and to persuade the

parties concerned to make all the necessary efforts to comply with the wish expressed by the General Assembly; and lastly, to help the authorities of Rwanda and Burundi to draw up their constitutions and to help them, if necessary, to co-operate in drawing up a single constitution.

10. Economically, Rwanda and Burundi were poor and needed considerable technical and economic assistance. United Nations aid should supplement the aid which the Government of Belgium had stated that it was prepared to provide in order to enable those countries to survive after their accession to independence. Details of the assistance which Ruanda-Urundi had received under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance for 1960 and for 1961-1962 were given in the Annual Report of the Technical Assistance Board^{1/} and in document E/TAC/L.225. A United Nations Technical Assistance mission had gone to the Territory in July 1960 and had submitted a report to the Secretary-General in September of the same year. The investigations carried out by the mission could provide guidance regarding the measures the United Nations commission should take in order to assist the Territory both technically and economically. In view of the technical character of some of the work to be done, the United Nations commission should be assisted by a team of experts.

11. Like every country on the point of achieving independence, Ruanda-Urundi lacked administrative personnel. The United Nations commission should therefore take steps to increase the present number of such personnel in order to enable Rwanda and Burundi to administer their own affairs without having recourse to foreign personnel.

12. With regard to the maintenance of order, the commission's task would be particularly delicate and would consist mainly in helping the Governments of Burundi and Rwanda to organize a national army so that they could maintain order and security on achieving independence and dispense completely with Belgian armed forces. That was a point of obvious importance.

13. It was only after considering the commission's report that the General Assembly would be able to fix the date for the termination of trusteeship and for the Territory's accession to independence, which should not be later than 1 January 1963. Any date fixed without regard to the importance of the tasks entrusted to the commission and the time necessary to complete them would be arbitrary and hence illogical.

14. The Deputy Prime Minister of Burundi had told the Committee at the Committee at the 1261st meeting that his Government wanted Burundi to achieve independence as rapidly as possible and at the latest by 15 May 1962. Though it understood the concern of the Burundi Government and the reasons underlying its request, the Iranian delegation felt it would be difficult to grant independence to Burundi while keeping Rwanda under trusteeship. It therefore hoped that a solution would be found that would meet the wishes of the Burundi Government and at the same time safeguard the interests of the Trust Territory as a whole which the Fourth Committee was seeking to protect.

15. With regard to the political unity of Rwanda and Burundi, he associated himself with those who felt that the two countries had every interest in forming

^{1/} Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 5, annex VI.

only a single State. The economic arguments which had been advanced in support of that point of view were particularly convincing at a time when the economically and industrially advanced States were finding themselves compelled to unite in order to maintain their position in world affairs. There were other valid reasons for maintaining the political unity of Ruanda-Urundi; one of the most important was the fact that, under the Trusteeship System, the two countries had always been treated as a single Territory. Political unity was also in accordance with the wish expressed by the General Assembly in its resolutions, particularly in operative paragraph 15 of resolution 1605 (XV).

16. Admittedly the political unity of Rwanda and Burundi appeared difficult, if not impossible, to attain at the present time. The representatives of the Governments of the two countries had told the Committee that the peoples of Rwanda and Burundi were not yet ready to accept political unity and attempts to achieve it would meet with resolute opposition from the bulk of the population in the two countries. The representatives of the two Governments had not, however, denied either the need for close co-operation between the two countries or the possibility of a political union in the future. Moreover, Mr. Cassou and Mr. Rahnama had expressed the view that the political unity of Rwanda and Burundi could not be achieved in the immediate future. Similar opinions had been expressed in paragraphs 412 and 413 of the report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960^{2/} and in the memorandum addressed to the General Assembly by the Burundi Government (T/PET.3/L.149).

17. While convinced that political unity was important for the two countries, his delegation felt that the United Nations should reach its decision with scrupulous regard for the desires of the populations of Rwanda and Burundi, even at the risk of producing results that would be contrary to those sought by the committee. In no case should the Committee's decision be such as to prejudice the interests which the Government of Burundi considered as basic. If the political unity of Rwanda and Burundi was feasible, it should be the culmination rather than the point of departure of the Committee's efforts. The commission which would constitute the United Nations presence in the Territory might be instructed to explore all the possibilities of achieving that aim.

18. Finally, his delegation was extremely gratified that at the 1274th meeting, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, with his usual political wisdom and profound realism, had given an assurance that the Belgian Government would co-operate unreservedly in guiding the Territory of Ruanda-Urundi towards independence in the best possible conditions.

Mr. Lulo (Albania), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

19. Mr. GHAUS (Afghanistan) commended the Chairman and members of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi on their excellent report and their objective approach and expressed appreciation of the co-operation given by the Belgian Government. He also wished to thank the petitioners for the information they had supplied the committee. In the great venture of liquidating colonialism, the honest application of the right of self-determination, which had

already yielded positive results, would always contribute to the emancipation of peoples. However, the Assembly should be careful not to replace the former colonial system by other evils. In the particular case of Ruanda-Urundi it was regrettable that the General Assembly's role had been reduced to a minimum and that it had been confronted with a fait accompli.

20. In its resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1605 (XV) the General Assembly had emphasized two important aspects of the problem: the elections and the question of unity. The elections in Burundi had apparently taken place in an atmosphere of peace and harmony since, according to the Commission's report (A/4994 and Corr.1, para. 442), all the political parties had been able "to organize their election campaigns under conditions of law and order" and each had had an equal chance. On the other hand, in Rwanda the Opposition parties had been overtly oppressed since the coup d'état at Gitarama, particularly by the burgo-masters, most of whom supported PARMEHUTU. Hatred and violence had forced thousands of people, mostly belonging to Opposition parties, to flee their homes and seek refuge in neighbouring territories. Clearly, therefore, the Opposition parties had been in a less favourable position regarding the elections than PARMEHUTU. Even the physical conduct of the elections, according to the petitioners, had not been entirely free of irregularities. In spite of some reservations, his delegation was, however, ready to validate the elections held in Rwanda for the sake of preserving stability in the area and avoiding further repressive measures against the Opposition parties. But in order to restore the political situation in Rwanda to normal, all interested parties should, in his view, be invited to participate in a new broad-based Government of national reconciliation.

21. With regard to the question of unity, it was necessary to bear in mind that the administration of Ruanda-Urundi had been entrusted to Belgium by virtue of a single Trusteeship Agreement applicable to the whole of the Territory. The successive United Nations visiting missions, the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly, particularly in its resolution 1605 (XV), had expressed the conviction that "the best future for Ruanda-Urundi lies in the accession of that Territory to independence as a single, united and composite State". Therefore, it seemed desirable that Rwanda and Burundi should accede to independence as a single, united and composite State. However, there was nothing, even in the electoral programmes of the political parties, to indicate whether the people of Rwanda and Burundi themselves wanted a single political entity or not. In the opinion of the Afghan delegation, it was of paramount importance that the people of Burundi and Rwanda should make known their opinion on that point. Hence, a plebiscite or a referendum should be organized which would not exclude any alternative. Any other arrangement made by the Administering Authority or by the United Nations without the full consent of the people should be avoided. The Territory should accede to independence not later than the end of 1962, but before that date the General Assembly must ascertain the wishes of the people with regard to their future.

22. The Afghan delegation would support any measures taken by the General Assembly to create a normal political climate in Rwanda and to give the people of Ruanda-Urundi an opportunity to express themselves. In order to achieve those aims, a United Nations commission should be sent to Ruanda-Urundi

^{2/} Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 3.

with a broad and clear mandate which would enable it to deal with the problem of reconciling the political parties in Rwanda as well as that of resettling refugees and, to ascertain the will of the people regarding the question of unity, and to that end, if necessary, arrange for popular consultations. The commission's success would to a large extent depend on the co-operation of the Administering Authority. He hoped that a just and fair solution would be found as soon as possible and that Ruanda-Urundi would accede to independence in understanding, peace, and harmony.

23. Mr. SUGAIR (Saudi Arabia) expressed appreciation to the members of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, the representatives of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, the petitioners and the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said that he was pleased to note that the Administering Authority had conducted elections in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1605 (XV). However, it was a matter for regret that the necessary conditions for democratic and free elections had not been met.

24. At the 1274th meeting, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had recommended that the General Assembly should accept the outcome of those elections as a prerequisite for the recognition of two separate sovereign States—Rwanda and Burundi. If the peoples concerned genuinely wished not to establish a single State, the Assembly could not compel them to adopt a different course. However, the Saudi Arabian delegation had certain reservations to make as to the absolute legality of the elections in Rwanda and as to whether two separate States would be preferable to a single State. It could not accept all the recommendations of the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, since the results of the elections in Rwanda had been contested both by the United Nations observers and by the leaders of the Opposition parties. In his view, Rwanda's first Government should be a coalition that would include the main political parties, pending such an improvement in the situation as would enable new elections, in keeping with the spirit of the Trusteeship Agreement and the General Assembly's resolutions, to be held.

25. The Saudi Arabian delegation also viewed with misgiving the signing of the Protocols at Brussels on 21 December 1961 (A/C.4/517 and Corr.1) between the Belgian Government and the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi without the prior approval of the United Nations. Those Protocols were in clear conflict with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1605 (XV), to the effect that "the best future for Ruanda-Urundi lies in the accession of that Territory to independence as a single, united and composite State", and with article 3 of the Trusteeship Agreement. The Belgian Government might have valid reasons; but since an economic and monetary union of the two Territories had been recommended, since their political unity had never been an issue and since the two peoples had many things in common, the United Nations, the Administering Authority and the leaders of Rwanda and Burundi must attempt all possible means of achieving such unity, if that could be done without the risk of further trouble in the future.

26. As for ending trusteeship, the Saudi Arabian delegation noted with satisfaction that the Belgian Government had expressed an eager desire to see the Trusteeship Agreement terminated within the next few months. But the main problem was not so much the

target date for the proclamation of independence as the political and economic conditions in which the Agreement would be terminated and independence proclaimed. It was for the peoples themselves to choose between unity and separation. As for the economic and financial implications of attaining independence, the United Nations should be able to make a contribution by means of technical assistance, as a supplement to the assistance provided by Belgium. Nevertheless, the problems facing a given country could not be solved entirely by others.

27. The Saudi Arabian delegation felt that the termination of trusteeship and the transfer of powers should be effected in the presence of a fully qualified United Nations commission.

28. In conclusion, he said that his delegation favoured the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement and the withdrawal of Belgian troops at the earliest possible date. It was in favour of the unity of the Territory and its people, but only if that unity were not imposed by force. Whether the Territory came to independence in the form of one or of two States, his delegation hoped that its sovereignty would become a reality at an early date. In voting on any draft resolution, Saudi Arabia would be guided by the principles which he had just set forth.

Miss Brooks (Liberia) resumed the Chair.

29. Mr. ASSELIN (Canada) first wished to give the Committee an account of the work accomplished by the Special Amnesty Commission which had been established under operative paragraph 9 (b) of General Assembly resolution 1605 (XV). Besides himself, the Commission had been composed of Mr. Houaiss, of Brazil, and Mr. Ben Arfa, of Tunisia. He paid a tribute to his two colleagues, whose devotion had contributed so greatly to the success of the Special Commission's activities. He briefly recalled the Commission's terms of reference.

30. The Commission had begun its work on 9 June 1961 at Brussels, where it had examined the text of Legislative Ordinance No. 01/188 of 31 May 1961 proclaiming an amnesty for political offences committed between 1 October 1959 and 1 April 1961 (A/4856, annex II), and also the figures estimated by the Belgian authorities in connexion with the implementation of that Ordinance (*ibid.*, annex III). The Commission had considered that the provisions of articles 2 and 10 of the Ordinance ran counter to the aims of General Assembly resolution 1605 (XV), which provided for a full and unconditional amnesty and requested the Commission to examine only the few remaining cases which, in the Administering Authority's view, were guilty of very grave crimes. The Special Commission had made known its reservations in a letter of 10 June 1961 to the Minister for Ruanda-Urundi (*ibid.*, annex IV). In his reply, dated 13 June 1961 (*ibid.*, annex V), the Minister for Ruanda-Urundi had stated that the Belgian Government was prepared to issue pardons to persons sentenced or prosecuted for political offences who were not covered by Legislative Ordinance No. 01/188, after a careful examination of their files by the United Nations Special Commission. That statement clearly indicated that the Belgian authorities wished to co-operate closely with the Special Commission in the full discharge of the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly.

31. As soon as the Commission had arrived in the Territory, it had been able to establish contact with

the representative of the Administering Authority at Usumbura and with the Belgian Political Amnesty Commission, composed of three judges and meeting at Astrida, which was to refer to the Special Commission all political cases which might eventually be recommended for amnesty. He recalled that the Special Commission's task was political rather than judicial. Accordingly the Commission had not attempted to justify its recommendations on legal grounds, lest such action might have been interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of a Member State. The Commission had also had to submit its recommendations to the Administering Authority within a fairly short time, since the amnesty had to be granted two months in advance of the national elections to be held in August 1961.

32. The members of the Special Commission had each studied carefully all the special court files transmitted to them. They had agreed as a general rule that an amnesty should be recommended in the case of all persons who, during the disturbances between October 1959 and April 1961, had committed crimes and offences from political motives. They had refused to recommend an amnesty in the case of persons who had taken advantage of the political situation in order to commit common law crimes or offences. The members of the Special Commission had compiled a list of persons to be amnestied (A/4856, annex VI A) and had sent it to the Administering Authority after having made clear, in a letter to the Resident-General (*ibid.*, annex VI), its understanding of the amnesty and the pardons.

33. The United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi had then had to supervise the application of the amnesty measures, and the Special Commission had intimated to Mr. Dorsinville, the Chairman of the United Nations Commission (*ibid.*, annex IX), that he could invoke operative paragraph 13 of General Assembly resolution 1605 (XV) should the Administering Authority refuse to enact the amnesty measures recommended.

34. The task of the Special Commission had been one of basic importance, since it was designed to improve the political atmosphere, enable the leaders of the different political parties to take part in the election campaign, and give the people the assurance that the voting would be really democratic. In the course of the debate, petitioners had pointed out that three political prisoners who had been pardoned by the Administering Authority had been elected to the national assemblies of the Territory. The Special Commission had, therefore, attained the aims assigned to it. Its work had been greatly facilitated by the spirit of comprehension and co-operation displayed by the Administering Authority, to which he paid a tribute.

35. Speaking as the representative of Canada, he said that he wished to discuss the substance of the problem, which was extremely complex and could not be solved easily. In any solution, the main consideration must be to reduce to a minimum the possibility of a recrudescence of terrorism and political agitation in Ruanda-Urundi.

36. The United Nations should work for the achievement of a number of objectives in the period preceding independence, in agreement with the Governments of Burundi and Rwanda, which had already attained internal self-government, and in a spirit of sincere co-operation with the Administering Authority. He felt that the question could not be left in suspense until

the seventeenth session of the General Assembly. He also felt that the United Nations must set up advisory machinery which would be available to Burundi and Rwanda after independence, if they so desired.

37. The General Assembly's first task was to take action on the report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (A/4994 and Add.1 and Corr.1) regarding the results of the elections. As was clear from the report of the United Nations Commission, the Belgian Government had shown great understanding and co-operation with regard to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1605 (XV); in that connexion, he expressed his gratitude to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

38. In Burundi, there was no problem in connexion with the results of the elections. Whatever the shortcomings of the electoral law, they had not distorted the expression of the people's will, and the voters had been able to register their opinion freely and calmly. In Rwanda, on the other hand, the United Nations Commissioners themselves considered that the tension and insecurity of the pre-electoral period had had some effect on the elections. However, the United Nations Commission had been in a position to affirm that the popular consultations in Rwanda had not been falsified and that the people as a whole had been given the opportunity to register their views as they wished, with adequate material and legal safeguards. The Canadian delegation agreed that the situation preceding the elections did not invalidate the results of the elections themselves and that the General Assembly should endorse them, as recommended by Mr. Dorsinville, the Chairman of the United Nations Commission (1258th meeting). Any other decision would deal a crushing blow to the Government of Rwanda, which had obtained 77.7 per cent of the votes. Mr. Rahnama, one of the United Nations Commissioners, had also said at the 1265th meeting that it would be both absurd and dangerous to try to repeat the operation in the hope of a more successful outcome under better conditions. The General Assembly should therefore accept the results of the elections in both Rwanda and Burundi.

39. He went on to consider what steps the United Nations and the Administering Authority should take to bring about an early termination of trusteeship under the best possible conditions. There were a number of pressing problems, relating to political unification, the internal security of the Territory, national reconciliation, the strengthening of economic ties, technical assistance and the return of the refugees.

40. The Canadian delegation would have preferred the Territory to achieve independence as one State rather than as two separate units. That would encourage economic development and reduce administrative costs, while technical and financial assistance, including that from the United Nations, would be easier to channel. But the peoples of Rwanda and Burundi had always considered themselves as foreign to each other, and the feeling of being separate had recently been strengthened by the popular nationalist movements which had emerged. The Administering Authority had not felt that it should impose any measures for unification on the two territories. The 1960 Visiting Mission had also shared the Belgian view that the problem of the relations between the two countries should be settled by the representatives of Rwanda and Burundi, without outside pressure.

There were now two duly elected Governments, each of which maintained its desire for separate independence. As Commissioner Gassou had recalled at the 1259th meeting, the United Nations itself was partly responsible for that state of affairs, as it had approved the holding of separate elections and the creation of separate assemblies and Governments. He did not feel that the General Assembly had the power, competence or right to oppose that desire. It would be better to indicate to the two Governments the advantages of closer association in political and economic matters. The United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, perhaps with additional members, might be of assistance in encouraging consideration of a federal type of union. Such a union would in no way diminish the autonomy of the Government of each country. If Rwanda and Burundi adopted the formula of a confederation, they could set up a central organ that would be responsible for all decisions with regard to foreign policy, and each country could exercise full sovereignty with regard to the problems which were their individual concern. History showed that a confederated State usually became a federal State, and that association between a monarchy and a republic was far from incompatible with such a system; the German Confederation had been an example. Besides Rwanda and Burundi might evolve a new form of political union, better suited to their situation. A problem such as the unity of the Territory could not, of course, be solved overnight; but no time should be lost in trying to bring the two countries together.

41. One question of serious concern to the Canadian delegation was that of the maintenance of order. Local security forces would have to be trained, in both Rwanda and Burundi, to ensure national security and the maintenance of order after independence. The Committee had so far received very little information on that score. The Administering Authority, acting in co-operation with the local Governments, was

responsible for such matters; it was therefore urgently necessary to create the security force that was essential, in the short period which remained before independence. There again, the United Nations Commission might discuss the question with the local Governments and the Belgian Administration, and see whether a special United Nations technical assistance programme should be drawn up for that purpose.

42. The United Nations Commission might also render inestimable services in the technical and economic field and might help in drawing up the special United Nations technical assistance programme which many delegations felt that the Territory should have. The Commission might help the two local Governments with the application of the two Protocols signed at Brussels in December 1961. It might, furthermore, encourage reconciliation between the political parties of the two countries. Again, it might turn its attention to the problem of the refugees. International assistance might be enlisted to help Rwanda and Burundi with that problem and to supplement the efforts already being made by the Administering Authority, the Government of Rwanda and the religious missions.

43. Last but not least, the General Assembly must set a date for the Territory's independence. The Canadian delegation had no rigid views, but felt that the date of independence should be set for before the end of 1962 and even, perhaps, for before the seventeenth session of the General Assembly. If the people of Ruanda-Urundi were left in a state of uncertainty regarding their future, there might be fresh disturbances. The date must be acceptable to the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi and to the Administering Authority. With that prospect in mind, he expressed the hope that, after the Committee's debate had ended, Ruanda-Urundi would be able to take its national destiny in hand.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.