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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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EDITORIAL NOTE

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook contains a review of the main developments and negotiations in the field of disarmament taking place each year, together with a brief history of the major aspects of the overall question. The series started with the 1976 edition.

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook makes no claim to present fully the views of States Members of the Organization, or even of the Powers directly concerned; for further information on the official positions of States, the reader should consult the Official Records of the General Assembly, referred to throughout the text and other sources. For the definitive text of General Assembly resolutions quoted in *The Yearbook*, the reader should consult the *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 47 (A/38/47)*.

For a more detailed account of the work of the Organization in previous years, the reader may consult *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1) and the previous volumes of *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, which are referred to in footnotes throughout the text simply as *The Yearbook*, together with the appropriate volume number. The complete references are: *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2); vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4); vol. 3: 1978 (United Nations publication, Sales Nos. E.79.IX.2 (clothbound) or E.79.IX.3 (paperbound)); vol. 4: 1979 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.80.IX.6 or 7); vol. 5: 1980 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.3 or 4); vol. 6: 1981 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.6 or 7); and vol. 7: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.7).

It should be noted that the Geneva based negotiating body, called the Committee on Disarmament throughout 1983, was designated the Conference on Disarmament as of the beginning of 1984. Accordingly, where the future status of the negotiating body is considered in this volume, the term "Conference on Disarmament" is used.

It should also be noted that in the preparation of this as well as all previous volumes of *The Yearbook* identified above, the Secretariat of the United Nations has taken into account General Assembly resolution 2758 (XXVI), of 25 October 1971, entitled "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations".

ABBREVIATIONS and ACRONYMS

ABM	anti-ballistic missile
ACC	Administrative Committee on Co-ordination
ASAT	anti-satellite
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CAS	Committee on Assurances of Supply
CCD	Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
CSSQ	Consultative Committee on Substantive Questions
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
EC	European Community (formerly the European Economic Community)
ECLA	Economic Commission for Latin America
ENDC	Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GNP	gross national product
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
ICDSI	Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDFD	international disarmament fund for development
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INF	intermediate-range nuclear forces
INFCE	International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
ISMA	International Satellite Monitoring Agency
LRINF	longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces
MIRV	multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM	submarine-launched ballistic missile
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
WFUNA	World Federation of United Nations Associations
WHO	World Health Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

INTRODUCTION

WHEN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DECIDED IN 1976 upon the publication of *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, it endorsed the recommendation that *The Yearbook* should contain “a descriptive review of the main developments and ongoing negotiations in the field of disarmament . . .” Accordingly, this eighth volume, like its predecessors, is aimed primarily at presenting a factual reflection of events during one calendar year, while keeping comment to a minimum. The introductions to the chapters provide brief résumés of major developments in the relevant subject areas leading to 1983—in order to make the volume self-contained—and the conclusions generally consist of straightforward comments on the direct, and sometimes obvious, consequences of the occurrences reported.

It has been suggested from time to time that *The Yearbook* could be more analytical and include evaluations of the events it records. However, the staff of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, which is responsible for its preparation, is of the view that its purpose is better served by continuing to record developments as they occur and subsequently unfold, often over a number of years. This Introduction, however, deliberately deviates slightly from that approach because no objective observer of the international stage can help but be struck by, and expect some observations on, the apparent contradiction between the quest of States for international security and well-being and their reluctance to promote those purposes by restricting their armaments.

Thus, *The Yearbook* once more covers a period of great international tension, deepening suspicion among nations, the development of increasingly sophisticated weaponry and its deployment by more and more States, all without significant progress in the efforts to arrest that trend. In virtually all areas where deliberations or negotiations on disarmament or arms limitation were undertaken in 1983, whether in the United Nations or in another multilateral, bilateral or regional framework, they were beset by acrimony and controversy and, despite many sincere proposals put forward, by a tendency to lay the blame for the lack of success on the bad intentions and negative actions of others.

Among the events or developments in 1983 that warrant special mention and were related in one way or another to the difficulty experienced by the disarmament effort were:

- The continuing acrimonious relations between the major Powers;
- The continuation of the nuclear arms race and the halting, near the

end of the year, of both sets of negotiations between the major Powers on nuclear forces;

– Mutual contentions of non-compliance with existing arms control agreements;

– The intensification of the technological arms race and expectation of its extension into outer space;

– The increasingly destructive character of local and regional conflicts, in which major Powers have been directly or indirectly involved;

– The growing capability of some States that are not party to any non-proliferation arrangement to develop nuclear weapons.

The foregoing occurred against a background of deepening economic difficulties in the developing world, increasing use and shortage of natural resources and disturbing new analyses about the probable consequences of nuclear war.

At the same time, there often appeared to be an increasing intransigence on the part of some States or alliances, which seemingly failed to recognize that meaningful compromise and concessions were necessary to prevent further deterioration of the international situation, perhaps to the point where no amount of arms, at no matter what level of sophistication, could be relied upon to preserve anyone's security. This led the Secretary-General to observe in his annual report,¹ "I have no doubt that the responsible leaders on both sides are aware of the ominous prospects . . . in this field there are no bargaining chips. Each side seems determined to respond to any advance by the other side by matching it rather than by making concessions."

There were also some modestly encouraging signs which deserve to be recognized, for instance:

– Some progress in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, particularly in the area of its negotiations on a chemical weapons ban;

– The Madrid follow-up of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which ended with agreement to proceed in 1984 with the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe;

– The adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions on disarmament and arms limitation initiated from all quarters and covering virtually all aspects of the question, representing many serious attempts to improve either the international situation or prospects for tangible disarmament measures;

– Intensified popular debate and grass-roots expression of both concern at the danger of major war and support for disarmament, which was in keeping with the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign being conducted under United Nations auspices;

– Institutional developments, including the creation of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, the designation of the

¹ A/38/1; also published as a booklet, No. DPI/785.

Committee on Disarmament, as from 1984, as the Conference on Disarmament, and the re-establishment of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies with increased functions.

Thus, despite the absence of enduring results, there was much activity. Most of the developments, including proposals renewed or initiated, were manifestations of growing concern about the current situation and consisted of appeals, rather than implementation of concrete steps for its improvement. That this issue of *The Yearbook* reveals little of the latter is not due to lack of effort or the inadequacy of the international machinery for disarmament; rather, it seems to be the result of mistrust and the absence of sufficient political will among Governments collectively to find compromise and reach agreements which would affirm that greater security can be found only at equitably lower levels of armaments.

While the Department for Disarmament Affairs is entirely responsible for production of *The Yearbook*, some specialized elements of it were contributed from outside the Department. Thus, as indicated in the text, chapter XII on nuclear safeguards was contributed by the International Atomic Energy Agency; some parts of chapter XI, on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, were also contributed by the Agency, while an annex dealing with preparations for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy was graciously provided by the Secretary-General of the Conference. Annex II to chapter XXII was contributed by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. As in previous years, five appendices—III through VII—were provided respectively by the United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Health Organization and the World Meteorological Organization.

Appendix I, an annual feature prepared by the Department on the basis of information provided by the respective depositaries, shows actions taken during the year on multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements and the status of the agreements as of the end of the year;² in 1983, for the first time, it includes the number of parties to each agreement in the basic data. Appendix IX, another annual feature, lists the resolutions and decisions on disarmament and related questions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, including the relevant voting patterns and an index showing where the texts of the resolutions appear in the various chapters.

The Yearbook is designed primarily as a comprehensive reference for a rather specialized readership, or at least one which has an active interest in the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. Re-

² More complete information is contained in *Status of Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

cent comment about *The Yearbook* confirms that such a constituency has become substantially larger over the past few years, mainly as a consequence of the spontaneous and widespread increase in public interest and concern surrounding the arms race and disarmament matters.

P A R T O N E

Comprehensive approaches to disarmament

Follow-up of the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

Introduction

AN EXAMINATION OF THE LIST OF ISSUES DEALT WITH IN 1983 in the context of follow-up of the two special sessions convened by the General Assembly on the question of disarmament, in 1978 and 1982 respectively, would clearly indicate the diversity of ideas and proposals generated by those sessions in the interest of promoting the implementation of specific disarmament measures and disarmament in general.

One or more of the proposals affected the work of each of the major international and multilateral bodies dealing with disarmament which met during the year — the Disarmament Commission, the Committee on Disarmament, and the General Assembly and its First Committee. Collectively, they also had an influence on the organization of the United Nations Secretariat and on other elements of the international Organization whose work touches on disarmament matters. Moreover, with regard to the General Assembly, the two pertinent items placed on its agenda in 1983 — one relating to each of the two special sessions — gave rise to so many draft resolutions as to be a significant factor in the further expansion of its disarmament activities and in the increase in the number of questions which the First Committee dealt with during the thirty-eighth session.

That large number of proposals, which were dealt with as sub-items of the two relevant agenda items, served to illustrate, first of all, the importance which the world community has attached to the comprehensive approach to disarmament through special sessions of the Assembly devoted entirely to the subject and, secondly, the need for constant, intensive follow-up of such sessions — a requirement which was recognized as crucial even before the first special session on disarmament, held in 1978 as the tenth special session.¹ Moreover, the variety of issues which the proposals covered showed that by 1983, in the aftermath of its second special session on disarmament, held in 1982 as the twelfth special

¹ The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly appears in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III. It is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I; it was also published as a pamphlet, No. DPI/679.

session,² the Assembly had established a policy of using the two collective agenda items as an effective management device to enable it to deal with additional current issues without a still further – and less wildy – increase in the number of items on its disarmament agenda.

The year 1983 saw proposals put forward covering, first of all, a number of questions of nuclear disarmament – the prevention of nuclear war, a nuclear arms freeze and bilateral negotiations, to name a few – and, secondly, other issues – the World Disarmament Campaign, a comprehensive programme of disarmament and the role of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies (a full listing appears on pages 21 and 22 below).

In fact many, if not most, of the proposals evolving from the two special sessions, like those put forward under the recurring agenda item entitled “General and complete disarmament”, come under other topical disarmament issues; when that is the case, they are discussed in the appropriate chapters of this volume. It is often the manner and timing of the origin of the sub-item, rather than its substance, that determines which collective item it appears under.

The following sections of this chapter describe the general discussions related to follow-up in the various disarmament bodies in 1983, as well as the General Assembly’s consideration of certain proposals submitted in that context dealing with broad or comprehensive questions, such as the review of the implementation of the Assembly’s recommendations and decisions taken at one or the other of the special sessions, confidence-building measures, disarmament and international security, and the convening of a third special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1983

The question of effective follow-up of the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as well as of specific issues deriving from those sessions, found a place in the general exchange of views of the Disarmament Commission in 1983 and in certain of the items on its agenda.

It should be recalled that the establishment of the Disarmament Commission as a deliberative body and subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, composed of all States Members of the United Nations, and as a successor to the original Disarmament Commission established in 1952 was itself the result of a decision taken by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, in 1978. The basic terms of the decision were set out at that time in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. Consequently, the main stream of the Commission’s work since its first substantive session in 1979 has

² The Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, also referred to as the “Concluding Document”, appears in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes*, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32; it is reproduced *in extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, appendix I.

been in effect closely related to the overall question of follow-up. It has met substantively, in accordance with the 1978 decision, for not more than four weeks each year, and its 1983 session was convened from 9 May to 3 June, during which period it held six plenary³ and seven informal meetings.

The specific, established items of the Commission's agenda, which were included in 1983 on the basis of follow-up of the Assembly's 1978 recommendations, had been reaffirmed for further consideration by Assembly resolutions 37/78 F and H and 37/95 A and appeared, as in previous years, as items 4 and 5, the leading items of the substantive part of its agenda. A new item, No. 8, was added on the basis of resolution 37/100 D, which had been proposed and adopted under the Assembly's agenda item entitled "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly", and dealt with the question of guidelines for the elaboration and implementation of confidence-building measures.

The other two substantive items of the Commission's agenda in 1983 were not included on the basis of follow-up of the special sessions devoted to disarmament, but none the less related closely to the general concept that issues or ideas under consideration require continual monitoring if they are to lead to constructive developments. The first, concerning South Africa's nuclear capability, had been included in various formulations on the agenda since the Commission's first substantive session in 1979; the second was included as a new item on the basis of resolution 37/99 B, adopted under the agenda item entitled "General and complete disarmament", which concerned the 1982 report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (ICDSI). Accordingly, all the substantive items on the Commission's agenda for 1983 were related in one way or another to established or new requirements for follow-up; the Disarmament Commission set them out as follows:

4. (a) Consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war;
- (b) Consideration of the agenda items contained in section II of resolution 33/71 H, with the aim of elaborating, within the framework and in accordance with the priorities established at the tenth special session, a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament.
5. Reduction of military budgets:
 - (a) Harmonization of views on concrete steps to be undertaken by States regarding a gradual, agreed reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, noting the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;
 - (b) Examination and identification of effective ways and means of achieving agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, taking into account the provisions of General

³ A/CN.10/PV.65-70 and A/CN.10/PV.65-72/Corrigendum.

Assembly resolutions 34/83 F, 35/142 A, 36/82 A and 37/95 A, with a view to identifying and elaborating the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles into a suitable document at an appropriate stage.

6. Substantive consideration of the question of South Africa's nuclear capability as requested by the General Assembly and the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (resolution 37/74 B and A/CN.10/4).
7. Consideration of recommendations and proposals contained in the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues entitled "Common Security" that relate to disarmament and arms limitation and to suggest, in a report to the General Assembly, how best to ensure an effective follow-up thereto within the United Nations system or otherwise.
8. Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level.⁴

With regard to the organization of its work for 1983, the Disarmament Commission decided to establish a committee of the whole to deal with agenda item 4 (which subsequently established a contact group on the same item to report back to it) and four informal, open-ended working groups to deal respectively with items 5 to 8. On 2 June, at its 69th meeting, the Commission considered the deliberations of the Committee of the Whole and the reports of the Working Groups.

The Chairman, at the opening plenary meeting, observed that despite the various interpretations of political reality and the different weights that might be attributed to some key factors, all delegations still held to the basic beliefs set forth in the Final Document of the Assembly's tenth special session. He added that the only cause for optimism ensuing from the twelfth special session, in 1982, was the reaffirmation of the validity of that Final Document and the pledge to respect its priorities in disarmament negotiations. There had been no progress so far, however, and the threat of nuclear war was foremost in the preoccupations of a large part of mankind. Moreover, he noted that the multilateral negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament, in its five-year history had not yet produced a single disarmament agreement, and he expressed the hope that no more time would be lost. As for the Commission, which, as a deliberative body, was required only to make recommendations, it had in the same period carried over most of its agenda from one session to the next, but had been able to make valuable contributions when given specific tasks. Thus the Chairman believed some current items might be reformulated in more concrete terms, and he encouraged the Commission, in accordance with the guidelines contained in resolution 37/78 H, to put its recommendations to the General Assembly in a more action-oriented form; accordingly, he proposed that the work of the Commission be organized with that in mind.

During the general exchange of views in plenary meetings, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, speaking on behalf of the

⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42)*, para. 10.

ten member States of the European Community, observed that by resolution 37/78 H the Commission had been asked to direct its attention to specific subjects and to make concrete recommendations on them. The Ten expected that that approach would invigorate the work of the Commission, compelling it to move away from general pronouncements and to become increasingly specific in its implementation of paragraph 118 of the Final Document.

Argentina noted the General Assembly's reaffirmation at its twelfth special session of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, and stated that the contrast between the international reality of the arms race and the noble aspirations expressed in United Nations documents could hardly be more striking. Mexico referred to the origins of the Commission as set out in paragraph 118 of the Final Document and suggested how it could avoid paralysis and formulate recommendations to contribute to implementation of paragraph 17 of the Document, namely, "to translate into practical terms the provisions of this Final Document and to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament"; resolution 37/78 H had surely been adopted the previous year because the Assembly had been moved by a similar consideration. Cuba stressed that the principles and priorities contained in the Final Document were as valid as ever, and the Commission should work to implement the corresponding measures by examining and proposing ideas aimed at hastening negotiations, particularly those regarding nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war.

At the closing stage of the session, a number of members voiced disappointment in the follow-up context that the Commission had been unable to reach agreement on the kind of concrete recommendations it had hoped for on the substantive issues before it. India, on behalf of the non-aligned countries, observed that, after five years, the principles, priorities and provisions of the Final Document remained "paper hopes", and stated that efforts were still being made to repudiate the solemn commitments entered into by consensus in 1978, despite the 1982 reaffirmation, without reservation, of the Document. The non-aligned regretted what they saw as a total lack of interest on the part of some of the nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies in making serious efforts to achieve consensus, using as a basis the concrete measures for the prevention of nuclear war which the non-aligned had proposed in a working paper.⁵ Sweden, for its part, also regretted that no agreement had been reached on specific recommendations, particularly concerning nuclear disarmament; it stressed that it could not accept recommendations which represented a step backward from what had been agreed to in 1978 at the tenth special session. Yugoslavia felt that the Commission had deliberated in an environment similar to that which had resulted in failure at the Assembly's twelfth special session. It had not adopted recommendations which would contribute to disarmament negotiations. That inaction could not be ascribed to the Commission as a body which, along with the

⁵ *Ibid.*, annex V.

First Committee, had universal membership; both, however, suffered from the fact that those who bore the greatest responsibility lacked the will to enter into serious deliberations on substantive questions, and particularly on the question of nuclear disarmament, which was recognized as of the utmost importance.

France, regarding the overall results of the session as partial, observed that the Commission had adopted consensus texts on agenda item 4 in 1980, 1981 and 1982, which showed that all delegations had in fact acted in compliance with the Final Document. At the twelfth special session, however, ideas were put forward which affected the balance of that Document and even put into doubt the principle of equal security, which was essential to progress in disarmament. As such ideas were also among the recommendations just considered by the Commission, the outcome could not be otherwise. France hoped that a consensus could be reached the following year on item 4, as well as on others on the agenda.

In the "Conclusions and recommendations"⁶ of its report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, the Disarmament Commission included, *in extenso*, the reports of the Contact Group and of the four Working Groups.

In all cases except that of Working Group III, which dealt with agenda item 7 on the report of ICDSI (considered in chapter II below), the reports reflected the fact that the respective Groups were unable to reach agreement on recommendations to the General Assembly, although Working Group IV, on confidence-building measures, was expected to submit only a progress report in 1983. Consequently, the Contact Group and Working Groups I, II and IV recommended in their reports that the Commission resume its consideration of the relevant items at its substantive session in 1984.⁷ For instance, the Contact Group, in a brief report on its 10 meetings, stated:

3. The Contact Group was unable to achieve consensus on a set of recommendations for submission to the Committee of the Whole. It recommends, therefore, that item 4 of the Commission's agenda continue to be considered at the 1984 substantive session with a view to the formulation of concrete recommendations on that item.

Working Group IV, for its part, stated that it held 11 meetings between 13 and 27 May, as well as informal consultations through the Chairman. After listing the documents before it, which were subsequently annexed to the Commission's report,⁸ and referring to other relevant papers, it affirmed the understanding that its task, assigned by resolution 37/100 D, envisaged a two-year exercise; therefore in 1983 it had concentrated on the concept of confidence-building measures and the question of guidelines. In summarizing its work, the Group noted that all delegations participating in it recognized the importance of the Charter, of general principles of international law and of the Final Docu-

⁶ *Ibid.*, sect. IV.

⁷ *Ibid.*, paras. 22, 23, 24 and 26.

⁸ *Ibid.*, annexes XVII-XX.

ment, as well as of the confidence-building process itself. They further agreed that confidence-building measures should not be a substitute or pre-condition for disarmament or disarmament negotiations; at the same time, they pointed out that disarmament measures which limited or reduced military potential had a high confidence-building value. There were varying views in the Group about: the relative importance or effectiveness of various approaches and kinds of confidence-building measures; the focus of future guidelines and the usefulness of a precise definition of confidence-building measures; and the value of "openness" or "transparency" in the military sphere — such as availability of reliable information on military activities and expenditures. In closing, the Group stated:

20. In the light of its consideration of agenda item 8, reflected in the present report, the Disarmament Commission recommends that work to be accomplished under General Assembly resolution 37/100 D be continued by the Commission at its next substantive session in 1984 with a view to the elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level.

Further detail on the work of the Groups overall is provided in chapter II below and, with regard to the relevant specific subjects, in chapters V, X and XVIII.

On 2 June the Commission adopted the reports of its subsidiary bodies by consensus, including their recommendations regarding the substantive agenda items, and agreed to submit the full texts of those reports to the General Assembly.⁹ The Commission also included in its report listings of the letters and working papers it had before it in connection with all of its substantive items,¹⁰ and also annexed them to its report.¹¹

At the closing meeting of the session, the Chairman stated that he was gratified that the Commission had commenced the implementation of the new approach to its work called for in resolution 37/78 H. He felt that the next step might be to streamline the agenda so that it could direct its attention to specific subjects from among those under its consideration and perhaps narrow the focus of its attention with regard to item 4.

At the end of the year the Commission held two further organizational meetings¹² at which it reviewed the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, adopted a provisional agenda and elected a Chairman and other officers for its next substantive session, which was scheduled to take place from 7 May to 1 June 1984.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1983

As the multilateral negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament is not a subsidiary of the General Assembly, nor is its work related to that

⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 21.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, annexes I-XX.

¹² A/CN.10/PV.71 and 72.

of the Assembly and the follow-up of its deliberations in the same direct manner as is that of the Disarmament Commission. Although the general structure of the Committee on Disarmament and its basic method of operation were agreed to by the Assembly at its tenth special session, in 1978,¹³ the Committee adopts its agenda independently, while “taking into account” not only the recommendations made to it by the General Assembly but also the proposals presented to it by the Committee’s own members. It was further agreed by the General Assembly at the 1978 special session that the negotiating body would work on the basis of consensus, develop its own rules of procedure, report to the General Assembly at least annually, and provide its formal and other documents regularly to the States Members of the United Nations; it was also agreed, *inter alia*, that the membership of the Committee would be reviewed at regular intervals. The various issues on which the Committee on Disarmament has in actual practice conducted negotiations have all been among those set out in the 1978 Final Document.

The Committee on Disarmament in 1983¹⁴ held its session in two parts, from 1 February to 29 April and from 14 June to 30 August—a period of some 24 weeks—during which it held 50 formal plenary meetings and a further 27 informal meetings, as well as numerous formal and informal meetings and consultations in its subsidiary bodies, which included five working groups and a number of contact groups, and with experts. In 1983, the Committee had considerable difficulty in reaching agreement on its agenda and related matters, finally concluding the organizational and procedural aspects of its session late in March.¹⁵

The Committee again reaffirmed the 10 areas within which it had decided in 1979 to deal with the question of the cessation of the arms race and disarmament. In setting these out in paragraph 9 of its 1983 report, it stated, as in previous years:

The Committee on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The Committee, taking into account *inter alia* the relevant provisions of the documents of the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will deal with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

- I. Nuclear weapons in all aspects;
- II. Chemical weapons;

¹³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 120.

¹⁴ The 40 States represented in the Committee in 1983 were: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

¹⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, paras. 6-9 and 11-13.

- III. Other weapons of mass destruction;
- IV. Conventional weapons;
- V. Reduction of military budgets;
- VI. Reduction of armed forces;
- VII. Disarmament and development;
- VIII. Disarmament and international security;
- IX. Collateral measures; confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;
- X. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Within that framework, the Committee, for 1983, adopted the following agenda, which was the same as that for 1982 except for the reformulation of items 2 and 8:

- 1. Nuclear test ban.
- 2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
- 3. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
- 4. Chemical weapons.
- 5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
- 6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
- 7. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
- 8. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report as appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Committee also agreed on programmes of work or schedules for each part of its session to ensure that adequate time would be devoted to its consideration of all the items on its agenda.

The Committee also devoted considerable effort, in organizational and procedural matters, to the re-establishment of *ad hoc* working groups on various issues under continuing discussion.¹⁶ In accordance with a prior decision, taken during the second part of the 1982 session, to re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, that Group resumed its work on 16 February 1983 (see chapter III). The Committee decided at the 1983 session to re-establish, for the duration of the session, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons (see chapter VIII), the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban (see chapter IX), the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons (see chapter XIII), and the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons (see chapter XV). It was understood that the Groups would commence their work on the basis of their former mandates.

The States which were not members of the Committee but which

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 10.

were invited to participate, in conformity with the rules of procedure, in the discussions on the substantive agenda items in the plenary and informal meetings and in the *Ad Hoc Working Groups*¹⁷ were: Austria, Burundi, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Senegal and Spain. On the same basis, Portugal, Switzerland and Turkey participated in plenary and informal meetings and in the work of particular Working Groups: Tunisia participated in particular Working Groups only, Viet Nam made a statement at a plenary meeting concerning chemical weapons (see chapter XIII), and Austria, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland participated in work on the question of the seabed Treaty at an informal meeting (see chapter XX). In addition, the Holy See, New Zealand, the Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia attended plenary meetings.

Another organizational and procedural question considered in the Committee was that of the review of its membership.¹⁸ In that connection, the Committee took into account resolution 37/99 K and the interest expressed by some States Members of the United Nations to become members of the Committee, as well as paragraph 120 of the 1978 Final Document and a working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany.¹⁹ The Committee, noting, *inter alia*, the need to ensure its effective functioning as expressed in the Final Document, agreed in principle to a limited expansion, taking into account the necessity of maintaining balance, and agreed that the increase would not exceed four States and that, after appropriate consultations, it would inform the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session of the agreement reached.

In order to ensure its improved and effective functioning, the Committee established a contact group which produced an informal working paper on the subject, and it expressed its intention to continue consideration of the matter at its 1984 session. The Committee also decided, taking into account resolution 37/99 K, that it would designate itself as the "Conference on Disarmament" with effect from the beginning of its 1984 session.

Finally, as in other years and in accordance with the rules of procedure, lists of all communications received from non-governmental organizations and individuals were circulated to the Committee.

References to the question of follow-up of the two special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were heard in the Committee mainly in the course of statements in plenary meetings,²⁰ particularly during the early phases of each part of the session and in the final stages of the session; many of them were in the context of the question of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, personally addressed the Committee on 15 February. In his message he observed that in the field of disarmament, as in other United

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, paras. 14-15.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, paras. 16-19.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, appendix II (CD/421), document CD/404.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, appendix III (CD/421), vols. I-V.

Nations endeavours, a crisis was facing the multilateral approach and the instruments created to pursue it. Although multilateral disarmament negotiations had been going on since 1962, they had yielded useful, but only partial, measures and had not stopped the arms race. At its first special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly had recognized that the removal of the threat of a world war—a nuclear war—was the most urgent task. Yet little, if any, progress had been achieved on that question, which was of concern to all. The Secretary-General could see no body other than the Committee where a balanced and representative membership could thoroughly discuss that important issue. Also, the frequent outbreaks of conventional war in the preceding four and a half years, with untold human suffering, loss of life and destruction, had shown that disarmament could not be restricted to nuclear arms, but measures to promote conventional disarmament were also essential. The Secretary-General referred to the relationship between the climate for negotiations and their results, and called for perseverance in the Committee to promote a better climate to re-establish the momentum for progress that had been fleetingly achieved in 1978.

In his first address at the session, the representative of Mexico noted some of the main declarations which had been approved by the General Assembly at its special session in 1978, and their unanimous and categorical reaffirmation at the 1982 session. In that context, he regarded certain requests which the Assembly had made in 1982 as being fully justified, in particular those concerning the submission, by the Committee on Disarmament, of a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament and, by the super-Powers, of a report or reports on the state of their bilateral negotiations to the Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

Sweden observed that at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the nations of the world had agreed to seek security in disarmament, with reductions to be carried out on the basis of the principle of undiminished security; in the same vein, the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues had concluded that common security rather than deterrence based on armaments should be the prime basis for security and, importantly, that in the long-term the two major power blocs could only survive together. Sweden felt that 1983 was, therefore, crucial in the history of disarmament.

France similarly stressed that the 1978 Final Document had clearly set out the concept of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments. It added that security depended on certain conditions relating to the state of international relations, the maintenance of balance and international verification. The disappointment and impatience provoked by the slowness or absence of negotiations had been noticeable both at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly and in the Committee and had led to the idea that, if there was no hope of the rapid reduction of nuclear arsenals, then nuclear war could be prevented by the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In France's view, however, the problem of nuclear war could not be separated from the problem of war in general, and placing emphasis on undertakings

which were theoretically binding would not have any real effect in reducing the danger threatening humanity. The prevention of war, aside from respect for the conditions it had mentioned, also required respect for the principles of the Charter.

Among a number of States of the group of 21,²¹ Algeria stressed that the disarmament process advocated in the Final Document of 1978 was still far from having begun. It was also on the basis of the provisions of the Final Document and out of concern for the growing accumulation and qualitative improvement in nuclear weapons that the group of 21 had proposed the incorporation of an item on the prevention of nuclear war in the Committee's agenda. In the same tenor, Cuba noted that the theme of the prevention or elimination of the danger of nuclear war was repeated throughout the Final Document, and that all States had recently reaffirmed the validity of that Document in the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session; thus it found it difficult to understand why there were members of the Committee which did not want such an item on the agenda. The German Democratic Republic, which is one of the group of socialist States in the Committee,²² placed emphasis on the priority accorded to nuclear disarmament in the Final Document and the lack of achievement in that area. Among others, Kenya and Pakistan made similar comments, although ascribing different causes to the problem.

At the end of the session, India dwelt on the same theme, noting the five-year interval since the General Assembly had held its first special session devoted to disarmament, and stating that the outcome of the 1983 session of the Committee would show that it had failed to devote serious attention to the item "Prevention of nuclear war". Brazil hoped that the 1984 session would fulfil the expression of commitment to negotiations on priority issues, provided in the Final Document, by finding a way to deal realistically with the question of the prevention of nuclear war without self-defeating recriminations.

Australia viewed the Committee's achievements more generally, stating that it should not spend its energies on debating on essentially worthless procedural objectives; rather, it should negotiate in the broad sense of paragraph 120 of the Final Document. While there would sometimes be texts or elements of treaties to negotiate, at other times the exercise would be at a prior stage, meaning that the issues to be dealt with would require defining through their substantive examination. Australia therefore urged that the negotiating body—to be renamed the Con-

²¹ The term "the group of 21" refers to the non-aligned and neutral non-nuclear-weapon States members of the Committee not associated with the major blocs, namely, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

²² The term "the group of socialist States", as the "Eastern European States" which are members of the Committee on Disarmament are referred to in the Committee, refers to: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and USSR.

ference on Disarmament—mark a new departure, by becoming a working, negotiating Conference rather than a desultory debating body.

The representative of Hungary, in a concluding statement near the end of the session, referred to the profound hopes and expectations he had had in 1979 for the newly reconstituted negotiating body. However, after only a few months he had made known his disappointment at the effect of the changes that had taken place, and four years later that feeling had not been relieved by any satisfaction. The lack of progress, he stated, was unfortunately the hallmark of the times.

France referred to its participation, along with that of Argentina, China and Hungary, in the informal group which had considered the Committee's methods with a view to improving its functioning and expressed the hope that necessary recommendations could be adopted at the beginning of the 1984 session. Welcoming the Committee's agreement regarding the admission of new members, thus fulfilling the provisions of the Final Document relating to the review of its membership, France hoped that new members would also be able to take their seats at the beginning of the next session.

The Chairman, in his closing remarks for the session, observed that the most obvious consensus to emerge in 1983 was the general acknowledgement that the results of the session had not been satisfactory. Furthermore, since its inception in 1979 as well as in its evolution, the Committee on Disarmament had displayed certain constants that did not create optimism. First of all, no definite advances had been made in the items already on the agenda, nor had the new items been brought to operationally effective levels; moreover, an unsatisfactory state of affairs was evident with regard to certain of the Working Groups. However, the Chairman added, the lack of advance should not be regarded as a step backwards or, even less, as frustration of the Committee's task, but rather an indication that the time had arrived for crucial decisions aimed at moving ahead efficiently and making sustained achievements. That would require a convergence of wills, a spirit of conciliation and joint effort.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

Two collective items dealing with the overall question of follow-up of its special sessions on disarmament were placed on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1983, at its thirty-eighth regular session. The first, which has appeared on the agenda since 1978, was entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session"; the second, which was added in 1982, was entitled "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly". Member States used the two items to cover many and varied proposals related to matters which had been initiated at one or the other of the special sessions and submitted a large number of documents and draft

resolutions in that context; this led to the adoption by the Assembly of 26 resolutions out of the overall total of 62 disarmament resolutions adopted at its thirty-eighth session.

Apart from their consideration of the relevant individual questions put forward under the items, a number of participants in the general debates in both plenary and First Committee meetings²³ made observations about the importance of follow-up of the General Assembly's recommendations and the urgent need to build upon the expectations which evolved from the agreement reached at the first special session on disarmament and reaffirmed at the second, in 1982.

For example, the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Jorge Illueca of Panama, stressed in his opening address at the first plenary meeting that, in the light of the costs of the arms race, it was not mere rhetoric to attach importance to the real implementation of the resolutions on disarmament identified under the item on the recommendations made by the General Assembly at its first special session. Later in the plenary debate, Democratic Yemen explicitly called for the implementation of the documents which had evolved from the two special sessions devoted to disarmament because of its conviction that there was a need for a continuous struggle for peace and economic development. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya observed that none of the measures set out in the 1978 Final Document had been implemented, and attributed that to the lack of political will among the large Powers, which were continuing their arms race.

In the First Committee, Kuwait, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Tunisia contrasted the hope and optimism which had emerged from the 1978 special session with their disappointment and concern at the subsequent lack of progress and the failure of the Assembly's 1982 special session. Similarly, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, speaking on behalf of the Asian Group of States on the occasion of Disarmament Week, noted that the international community, with regret and bitterness, saw that no progress had been achieved nor any worthwhile measures taken since the tenth special session, although at the twelfth special session, itself a failure, the Assembly had stressed anew the continuing importance of the subject in a worsening international situation.

Portugal, for its part, pointed out that despite the efforts to create conditions conducive to disarmament—notably the two special sessions of the General Assembly and the creation or improvement of the relevant bodies—the goals were no closer than they had been five years earlier. That was because of heightened confrontation between divergent political interests, more numerous acts of military aggression, interventions in the internal affairs of States and human rights violations. Such acts, Portugal added, had led to recourse to the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and that, in turn,

²³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 97th and 103rd meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 41st and 46th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

to the intensification of the arms race. In its view, only the raising of the level of confidence among States could provide hope of achieving disarmament objectives. Cyprus commented on the discrepancy between the Charter and the absence of enforcement ability in the Security Council. In that context it noted the emphasis in the documents of both of the Assembly's special sessions on the "central role" and "primary responsibility" of the United Nations in disarmament, and saw no validity in those notions if the decisions of the Security Council were repeatedly ignored. In its view, the Secretary-General had initiated a significant move by placing the matter before the Council, but up to that time there had been no concrete results.

Cuba and Mongolia, among others, pointed to the priority accorded in the 1978 Final Document to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, subjects whose importance had been repeatedly stressed since that time in various forums, notably those of the non-aligned countries. Their priority was again reaffirmed by the Assembly in the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session, where it specifically recognized prevention of nuclear war as the most urgent and immediate task.

The proposals leading to the adoption of the large number and variety of Assembly resolutions mentioned above were submitted in the First Committee by various sponsors and introduced on their behalf by a representative of one of the States in each case of multiple sponsorship. Under the agenda item pertaining to the Assembly's tenth special session, 18 draft resolutions were introduced, of which 16 were adopted, as resolutions 38/183 A to 38/183 P; and under the item concerning the twelfth special session, a further 11 were presented, of which 10 were adopted, as resolutions 38/73 A to 38/73 J. In both cases, those not adopted were withdrawn before being put to a final vote. Of the 26 resolutions adopted under the two items, 8 are discussed in this chapter, and 18 are dealt with in later subject chapters, as follows:

- (a) In this chapter, beginning on the page shown—
 - (i) 38/183 E (Report of the Disarmament Commission), page 22;
 - (ii) 38/183 F (International co-operation for disarmament), page 23;
 - (iii) 38/183 H (Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session), page 26;
 - (iv) 38/183 I (Report of the Committee on Disarmament), page 29;
 - (v) 38/73 A (Confidence-building measures), page 32;
 - (vi) 38/73 C (United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament), page 34;
 - (vii) 38/73 H (Disarmament and international security), page 36;
 - (viii) 38/73 I (Convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament), page 38; and
- (b) In later chapters (chapter number shown)—
 - (i) 38/183 A (Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations), chapter V;
 - (ii) 38/183 B (Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war), chapter VI;
 - (iii) 38/183 C (Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon), chapter V;

- (iv) 38/183 D (Nuclear weapons in all aspects), chapter V;
- (v) 38/183 G (Prevention of nuclear war), chapter VI;
- (vi) 38/183 J (Unilateral nuclear disarmament measures), chapter XXIII;
- (vii) 38/183 K (Comprehensive programme of disarmament), chapter III;
- (viii) 38/183 L (Disarmament Week), chapter XXI;
- (ix) 38/183 M (Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session (reports by nuclear-weapon States on measures taken)), chapter V;
- (x) 38/183 N (Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations), chapter V;
- (xi) 38/183 O (Advisory Board on disarmament studies), chapter XXII;
- (xii) 38/183 P (Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations), chapter V;
- (xiii) 38/73 B (Freeze on nuclear weapons), chapter VII;
- (xiv) 38/73 D (World Disarmament Campaign), chapter XXI;
- (xv) 38/73 E (Nuclear-arms freeze), chapter VII;
- (xvi) 38/73 F (World Disarmament Campaign: actions and activities), chapter XXI;
- (xvii) 38/73 G (Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons), chapter VI;
- (xviii) 38/73 J (Regional disarmament), chapter XVII.

Additionally, one of the three draft resolutions which were withdrawn—which dealt with the obligation of States in negotiations—is discussed briefly in this chapter (page 26), and the others—on bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and on peace and disarmament movements—are covered in chapters V and XXI respectively.

The draft resolution entitled “Report of the Disarmament Commission” was submitted in the First Committee on 8 November by Bangladesh, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sweden, the Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia, and was introduced by the representative of Brazil on 9 November in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission. In the introduction, he recalled resolution 37/78 H by which the General Assembly had requested the Commission to direct its attention to specific subjects and to make concrete recommendations on them, a request that was, moreover, in accordance with paragraph 118 of the Final Document. In also introducing the report of the Commission, discussed above, he stated that in 1983 it had fulfilled the Assembly’s guidelines, devoting most of its time to substantive deliberations. The specific recommendations contained in the report, which were those of the four Working Groups and the Contact Group which had handled the substantive items, had been adopted by consensus. During the past five years, the Chairman added, the Commission had performed invaluable service, particularly when it had dealt with specific questions, among them the guidelines for a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Efforts to improve its capacity could be further pursued so that it might become an increasingly effective body. It was with that in mind that his delegation had consulted with others in submitting the draft resolution. On behalf of the members of the Bureau of the Disarmament Commission, acting as co-sponsors, the Chairman

expressed the hope that the First Committee would approve the text by consensus.

Earlier in the debate, Greece, speaking on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community, observed that even though the Disarmament Commission had not been able to reach conclusions on certain of its agenda items, there should not be undue pessimism because its work had reached a level which held promise for future discussions and which could lead, the Ten hoped, to the submission of concrete recommendations on a limited number of important, specific subjects each year.

The First Committee approved the draft resolution on 21 November without a vote, and the General Assembly adopted it on 20 December, also without a vote, as resolution 38/183 E. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission,

Emphasizing again the importance of an effective follow-up to the relevant recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Taking into account the relevant sections of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Considering the important role that the Disarmament Commission has played and the significant contribution that it has made in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions of the tenth special session,

Desirous of strengthening the effectiveness of the Disarmament Commission as the deliberative body in the field of disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, 34/83 H of 11 December 1979, 35/152 F of 12 December 1980, 36/92 B of 9 December 1981 and 37/78 H of 9 December 1982,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Disarmament Commission;

2. *Notes* that the Disarmament Commission has yet to conclude its consideration of some items on its agenda;

3. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and with paragraph 3 of resolution 37/78 H, and to that end to make every effort to achieve specific recommendations, at its 1984 substantive session, on the outstanding items on its agenda, taking into account the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly as well as the results of its 1983 substantive session;

4. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1984 and to submit a substantive report, containing specific recommendations on the items inscribed on its agenda, to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the report of the Committee on Disarmament on the work of its 1983 session, together with all the official records of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that the Commission may require for implementing the present resolution;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission".

The draft resolution entitled "International co-operation for disarmament" was submitted on 11 November by 22 States: Afghanistan,

Angola, Benin, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian SSR, Viet Nam and Yemen. It was introduced in the First Committee on the same date by the representative of Czechoslovakia, who emphasized the sponsors' aim of lending new impetus to disarmament negotiations in the light of the heightened danger of nuclear war and the worsening international atmosphere.

He referred to the Assembly's 1979 Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament,²⁴ embodied in resolution 34/88, which had been adopted on the basis of a Czechoslovakian initiative, recalling that its basic purpose was to promote the implementation of the decisions of the Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament. The current initiative was intended to update and further develop the ideas contained in the Declaration. After highlighting the substance of the resolution, both its preambular and operative parts, the representative emphasized that his delegation was convinced that concrete results could be achieved only through constructive negotiations which recognized the principles of equality and equal security; such results could prevent the outbreak of military conflict. Accordingly, Czechoslovakia hoped that the overwhelming majority of Member States would again support the idea of co-operation for disarmament.

On 25 November, before the First Committee proceeded to vote on the draft resolution, Czechoslovakia, on behalf of the sponsors, announced a minor amendment to the text whereby the words "or political" would be deleted from the first line of its operative paragraph 5, thus leaving the words "members of military groupings" (see below). The Committee then approved the draft resolution as orally amended by a recorded vote of 84 to 15 (Western countries, Australia, Japan and New Zealand), with 18 abstentions. On 20 December, the General Assembly adopted it as resolution 38/183 F by a recorded vote of 109 to 15, with 15 abstentions; it reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Stressing again the urgent need for an active and sustained effort to intensify the implementation of the recommendations and decisions unanimously adopted at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, as contained in the Final Document of that session and confirmed in the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament of 11 December 1979 and General Assembly resolutions 36/92 D of 9 December 1981 and 37/78 B of 9 December 1982,

Deeply concerned over the growing danger of nuclear war, the continued arms race and the danger of a further, qualitatively new round of the arms race, all of which will have a very negative impact on the international situation,

Stressing the vital importance of eliminating the danger of nuclear war, halting the

²⁴ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, chap. IV.

nuclear-arms race and attaining disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, for the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security,

Bearing in mind the vital interest of all nations in the attainment of effective disarmament measures, which would release considerable financial and material resources to be used for the economic and social development of all States, in particular developing countries,

Considering the increased activity of peace and anti-war movements against the arms race and the escalation of the danger of nuclear war,

Convinced of the need to strengthen constructive international co-operation based on the political goodwill of States for successful negotiations on disarmament, in accordance with the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Emphasizing the duty of States to co-operate for the preservation of international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as confirmed in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, of 24 October 1970, the obligation to co-operate actively and constructively for the attainment of the aims of disarmament being an indispensable part of that duty,

Expressing the conviction that concrete manifestations of political goodwill, including unilateral measures, such as an obligation not to make first use of nuclear weapons, improve conditions for resolving disarmament issues in a spirit of co-operation among States,

Stressing that proposals, relatively simple in their execution and at the same time effective, such as the proposals aimed at eliminating the use of force, be it on a world-wide or regional scale, contribute considerably to that end,

Bearing in mind that the United Nations bears primary responsibility and plays a central role in unifying efforts to maintain and to develop active co-operation among States in order to resolve the issues of disarmament,

1. *Calls upon* all States, in implementing the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, to make active use of the principles and ideas contained in the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament by actively participating in disarmament negotiations, with a view to achieving concrete results, and by conducting them on the basis of equality and undiminished security and the non-use of force in international relations, and to refrain at the same time from developing new directions and channels of the arms race;

2. *Stresses* the importance of strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

3. *Declares* in this context that the elaboration and dissemination of any doctrines and concepts justifying the unleashing of nuclear war endanger world peace, lead to deterioration of the international situation and further intensification of the arms race and are detrimental to the generally recognized necessity of international co-operation for disarmament;

4. *Declares* that the use of force in international relations as well as in attempts to prevent the full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples is a phenomenon incompatible with the ideas of international co-operation for disarmament;

5. *Appeals* to States which are members of military groupings to promote, on the basis of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, in the spirit of international co-operation for disarmament, the gradual mutual limitation of military activities of these groupings, thus creating conditions for their dissolution;

6. *Calls upon* all Member States to cultivate and disseminate, particularly in connection with the World Disarmament Campaign launched by the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the ideas of international co-operation for disarmament, *inter alia*, through their educational systems, mass media and cultural policies;

7. *Calls upon* the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to continue to consider, in order further to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of

disarmament, measures aimed at strengthening the ideas of international co-operation for disarmament through research, education, information, communication and culture;

8. *Calls upon* the Governments of all States to contribute substantially, while observing the principle of undiminished security, to halting and reversing the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and thus to reducing the danger of nuclear war.

On 11 November, 24 Member States, joined, following its revision, by 6 additional States,²⁵ submitted the draft resolution entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session", and the representative of Yugoslavia introduced it in the First Committee on 15 November. In that initial introduction, Yugoslavia emphasized that in the five years since the tenth special session, numerous substantial disarmament measures could have been initiated. There had been no lack of guidelines or machinery, since they had been clearly delineated in the Final Document. What had been lacking was the political will and resolve of the countries with the most significant nuclear arsenals to halt the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race. Moreover, since 1978, resources continued to be exhausted in a direction contrary to that agreed upon and adopted as the international community's general disarmament strategy, numerous alarming aspects of the international situation had been referred to in the First Committee, the threat or use of force had become more frequent and, finally, the negotiations on disarmament had yielded no tangible results and those on some major, priority issues had not even begun. It was, however, encouraging that the majority strongly rejected options which were not complementary to the principles and goals of the Final Document, whose value had been unequivocally reaffirmed in 1982 at the Assembly's twelfth special session. The sponsors of the draft steadfastly believed that the greatest effort should be made to implement the decisions of the tenth special session, and hoped that their proposal would stimulate that effort, especially on the part of countries with particular responsibilities and more significant military potentials, and that it would meet with wide support.

Under the title "Obligation of States to contribute to effective disarmament negotiations", the German Democratic Republic, on 10 November, submitted a draft resolution, which it introduced in the First Committee on 15 November. By that proposal, the General Assembly, *inter alia*:²⁶ would express the conviction that it was the foremost obligation of all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon and other militarily significant States, to live up to their commitments, including the recommendations and decisions of the General Assembly at its tenth special session, and thus to conduct disarmament negotiations in good faith; would urge States to intensify their existing negotiations in accordance with the pri-

²⁵ Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Burma, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Madagascar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sudan, United Republic of Cameroon, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

²⁶ For the complete text, see A/38/628, para. 19.

orities established in the Final Document; would invite States engaged in negotiations outside the United Nations framework to keep the United Nations informed thereon; and would recommend that the Assembly attach special attention to the continuous review of the status of disarmament negotiations.

Yugoslavia, on 17 November, announced that as a result of consultations between the sponsors of the proposal it had introduced and the German Democratic Republic, agreement had been reached on revision of the initial 24-State text so that one draft resolution could be adopted. It then introduced and elaborated upon the revisions of the original text (incorporated as the resolution appears below), and expressed its gratitude to the sponsors of both proposals, especially the German Democratic Republic. The latter, for its part, expressed satisfaction at the merging of the two proposals, noting that they had the common aim of directing the attention of States to the urgent need to negotiate and conclude agreements ending and reversing the arms race, and that adoption of the revised, jointly sponsored draft resolution would make it unnecessary to bring its proposal to the vote.

The First Committee approved the revised draft resolution on 25 November by a recorded vote of 107 to 11 (Western States), with 7 abstentions.

In connection with the vote, the United Kingdom, voting negatively, stressed its regret that the sponsors had not negotiated on the language in the draft to arrive at a more generally acceptable formulation; rather than a consensus view, they had, even more than in the past, expressed their own partisan opinions. Australia, which abstained in the voting, explained its position on the grounds that the text called for a nuclear-weapon test ban, which was a concept far more limited in scope than it favoured.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution on 20 December by a recorded vote of 132 to 9, with 8 abstentions, as resolution 38/183 H, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having reviewed the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, as well as the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 34/83 C of 11 December 1979, 35/46 of 3 December 1980, 35/152 E of 12 December 1980, 36/92 M of 9 December 1981 and 37/78 F of 9 December 1982 and its decision S-12/24 of 10 July 1982,

Deeply concerned that no concrete results regarding the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session have been realized in the course of more than five years since that session, that in the meantime the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, has gained in intensity, that urgent measures to prevent nuclear war and for disarmament have not been adopted and that continued colonial domination and foreign occupation, open threats, pressures and military intervention against independent States and violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations have taken place, posing the most serious threat to international peace and security,

Convinced that the renewed escalation of the nuclear-arms race, in both the quan-

titative and the qualitative dimensions, as well as reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence and of use of nuclear weapons, has heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations,

Further convinced that international peace and security can only be ensured through general and complete disarmament under effective international control and that one of the most urgent tasks is to halt and reverse the arms race and to undertake concrete measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and that, in this respect, the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States have the primary responsibility,

Noting with great concern that no real progress in disarmament negotiations has been achieved for several years, which has rendered the current international situation even more dangerous and insecure, and that negotiations on disarmament issues are lagging far behind the rapid technological development in the field of armaments and the relentless growth of military arsenals, particularly nuclear arsenals,

Recalling the commitment of States undertaken in various international agreements to negotiate on disarmament measures, in particular on nuclear disarmament,

Considering that it is more than ever imperative in the present circumstances to give a new impetus to negotiations in good faith on disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, at all levels and to achieve genuine progress in the immediate future,

Convinced that the success of disarmament negotiations, in which all the people of the world have a vital interest, can be achieved through the active participation of Member States in such negotiations, contributing thereby to the maintenance of international peace and security,

Reaffirming that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament,

Stressing that the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which was unanimously and categorically reaffirmed by all Member States at the twelfth special session as the comprehensive basis for efforts towards halting and reversing the arms race, has retained all its validity and that the objectives and measures contained therein still represent one of the most important and urgent goals to be achieved,

1. *Expresses its grave concern* over the acceleration and intensification of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, as well as the new, very serious deterioration of relations in the world, and the intensification of focal points of aggression and hotbeds of tension in different regions of the world, which threaten international peace and security and increase the danger of outbreak of nuclear war;

2. *Calls upon* all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, to take urgent measures in order to put an end to the serious aggravation of the international situation, to promote international security on the basis of disarmament, to halt and reverse the arms race and to launch a process of genuine disarmament;

3. *Invites* all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States and especially those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, to take urgent measures with a view to implementing the recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, as well as to fulfilling the priority tasks set forth in the Programme of Action contained in section III of the Final Document;

4. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from any actions which have or may have negative effects on the outcome of disarmament negotiations;

5. *Once again calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to concentrate its work on the substantive and priority items on its agenda, to proceed to negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on the prevention of nuclear war without further delay and to elaborate drafts of treaties on a nuclear-weapon test ban and on a complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

6. *Calls upon* the Disarmament Commission to intensify its work in accordance with its mandate and to continue improving its work with a view to making concrete recommendations on specific items on its agenda;

7. *Calls upon* nuclear-weapon States engaged in separate negotiations on issues of nuclear disarmament to exert the utmost effort with a view to achieving concrete results in

those negotiations and thus contribute to the success of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament;

8. *Invites* all States engaged in disarmament and arms limitation negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations to keep the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament informed on the status or results of such negotiations, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session".

The 1983 draft resolution entitled "Report of the Committee on Disarmament" was sponsored by 27 Member States.²⁷ It was submitted on 11 November and introduced in the First Committee on 15 November by Yugoslavia, which observed that the past year had seen a further dangerous deterioration in international relations and the unabated continuation of the arms race in all its aspects. Never had concern over such developments been greater, since in the course of the past year mankind had become more aware of the danger of the outbreak and devastating consequences of nuclear war. Once again, neither the negotiations between the leading nuclear Powers nor those in the Committee on Disarmament had brought any improvement. The report of the Committee (discussed above) again showed that that body had been unable to launch negotiations on some substantive issues which had been given priority at the Assembly's first special session on disarmament – first of all, halting the nuclear arms race and proceeding to nuclear disarmament and, secondly, the prevention of nuclear war. Accordingly, Yugoslavia had to state that some members of the Committee, among them some nuclear Powers, continued to oppose the Committee's negotiating on those issues. The sponsors of the draft resolution, deeply convinced of the need for such negotiations to begin without delay, wished to point to the absolute unacceptability of that opposition, which was preventing the Committee on Disarmament from conducting them. At the same time, they were convinced of the Committee's ability and competence to be the multilateral negotiating body and, in submitting the draft resolution, they had been guided by the wish to render to it their greatest support and to help it most effectively to fulfil its mandate.

On 25 November, before the First Committee proceeded to vote on the draft resolution, the United Kingdom and the United States explained their intention to vote against it. The United Kingdom, mentioning that it had long regretted being unable to support such draft resolutions and had abstained on the corresponding one the previous year, expressed particular regret that the sponsors had made no attempt to negotiate on the language, which it regarded as highly partisan, more extreme and even more objectionable than in the past. Thus its negative vote would be for the same reasons that it had voted against the draft leading to resolution 38/183 H (see above). It hoped that in future years early consultations

²⁷ Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Congo, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Madagascar, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

could be held—particularly with regard to the proposal dealing with the report of the negotiating body—to find a more generally acceptable formulation. The United States felt that the draft resolution, instead of reflecting the consensus on the report within the Committee on Disarmament, attempted to rewrite it, thus distorting the true picture of the work of the Committee in a manner which it had difficulty imagining any Committee member could accept. It noted that the Committee, by paragraph 120 of the Final Document, was mandated to conduct its work by consensus—the only basis which could lead to disarmament measures which would ensure undiminished security for all States. While reaching a consensus on the report had been difficult in 1983, it had been achieved. The United States expressed grave concern at the move away from the search for consensus in the First Committee, resulting in a draft resolution which should be non-controversial becoming contentious and potentially counter-productive. It hoped the sponsors would, in the future, employ a more constructive approach to what should be one of the more important draft resolutions placed annually before it.

Australia, Belgium and the Netherlands, which would abstain, expressed similar objections. Australia, regretting its abstention, specifically urged that the sponsors the following year consider using the terminology of the Committee on Disarmament itself regarding the prohibition of nuclear testing. The Netherlands held that whenever the General Assembly dealt with the work of the Committee on Disarmament, it must do so in terms acceptable to all members of that Committee—a requirement which the draft resolution failed to meet, for example, by using the words “nuclear-weapon test ban” instead of “nuclear-test ban”. Belgium associated itself with the observations made by the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States regarding the breakdown of the consensus that the Committee on Disarmament had achieved in its report, and felt that the draft resolution conveyed the impression that the Assembly need only give majority instructions to such a Committee in order to produce results.

Following the explanations, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 104 to 2, with 19 abstentions. On 20 December, the General Assembly adopted it by a recorded vote of 129 to 2, with 18 abstentions, as resolution 38/183 I; it reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/83 B of 11 December 1979, 35/152 J of 12 December 1980, 36/92 F of 9 December 1981 and 37/78 G of 9 December 1982,

Recalling also the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, and the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Having considered the report of the Committee on Disarmament,

Convinced that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, should play the central role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament and on the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Reaffirming that the establishment of *ad hoc* working groups offers the best available machinery for the conduct of multilateral negotiations on items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament and contributes to the strengthening of the negotiating role of the Conference,

Deploring the fact that, despite repeated requests by the General Assembly and the express wish of the great majority of members of the Committee on Disarmament, the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group to undertake multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament was once again prevented during the session of the Committee in 1983,

Regretting that the Committee on Disarmament has also not been enabled to set up *ad hoc* working groups for negotiations on the prevention of nuclear war and on the prevention of the arms race in outer space, nor to entrust its *Ad Hoc* Working Group under item 1 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear-test ban", with a new mandate enabling it to undertake substantive negotiations on this question as soon as possible,

Stressing that negotiations on specific disarmament issues conducted outside the Conference on Disarmament should in no way serve as a pretext for preventing the conduct of multilateral negotiations on such questions in the Conference,

1. *Expresses its deep concern and disappointment* that the Committee on Disarmament has not been enabled, this year either, to reach concrete agreements on disarmament issues to which the United Nations has assigned greatest priority and urgency and which have been under consideration for a number of years;

2. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its work, so as to make the utmost effort to achieve concrete results in the shortest possible period of time on the specific priority issues of disarmament on its agenda;

3. *Once again urges* the Conference on Disarmament to continue or to undertake, during its session to be held in 1984, substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and other relevant resolutions of the Assembly on those questions, and, in order to reach that goal, to provide the existing *ad hoc* working groups with appropriate negotiating mandates and to establish, as a matter of urgency, the *ad hoc* working groups on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, on the prevention of nuclear war and on the prevention of an arms race in outer space;

4. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, without further delay, the elaboration of a draft international treaty on a nuclear-weapon test ban and to submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

5. *Also urges* the Conference on Disarmament to accelerate its work on the elaboration of a draft international convention on the complete and effective prohibition of all chemical weapons and on their destruction and to submit the preliminary draft of such a convention to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

6. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to organize its work in such a way as to concentrate most of its attention and time on substantive negotiations on priority issues of disarmament;

7. *Calls upon* the members of the Conference on Disarmament that have opposed the negotiation on some substantive issues of disarmament to enable the Conference, by adopting a positive stand, to fulfil effectively the mandate that the international community has entrusted to it in the field of negotiations on disarmament;

8. *Invites* the members of the Conference on Disarmament involved in separate negotiations on specific priority questions of disarmament to intensify their efforts in order to achieve a positive conclusion of those negotiations without further delay and to submit to the Conference a full report on their separate negotiations and the results achieved in order to contribute most directly to the negotiations in the Conference, in accordance with paragraph 3 above;

9. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

10. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament".

Forty-two States²⁸ sponsored the draft resolution entitled "Confidence-building measures", which was both submitted and introduced in the First Committee on 3 November. In the introduction, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany expressed his delegation's gratitude to the large number of sponsors and their positive response to the text as presented, and hoped that it would, accordingly, be adopted by consensus.

Referring to the high-quality, substantive discussion in the Disarmament Commission on guidelines for confidence-building measures, he observed that there had been complete and widespread agreement on their growing importance in the current international situation, the positive potential of confidence-building for creating favourable conditions for agreement on disarmament measures and the contribution which confidence-building measures could make to the reduction of fear and mistrust and thereby to the prevention of war. There had emerged a feeling that the Commission, having laid a solid groundwork for the elaboration of the guidelines being sought, could complete its work on resolution 37/100 D in 1984, as had been mandated and as was indicated in its report (see page 12 above). Accordingly, by the central operative paragraph of the draft resolution, the Assembly would request the Disarmament Commission to continue and conclude its consideration of the item at its 1984 session. Otherwise, the text mainly reaffirmed and consolidated that resolution, adopted by consensus in 1982, but additionally made note, in positive terms, of the convening in Stockholm of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

In connection with the First Committee's action on the proposal, a number of States explained their positions. The Soviet Union, while not objecting to the adoption of the draft resolution without a vote or to the continued consideration of the question in the Disarmament Commission, expressed disquiet that recent talks on confidence-building were being used to create the illusion that such measures could be achieved at the same time as an arms buildup, provided they were accompanied by, among other things, measures to establish transparency and predictability. Currently, however, confidence-building measures had to be established along with concrete measures for military détente, arms limitation and disarmament, rather than in isolation from them. That requirement, which was not reflected adequately in the text, must be taken into account in the future work of the Disarmament Commission, it concluded.

²⁸ Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mali, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Samoa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Yemen and Zaire.

The Philippines, referring to its sponsorship of the proposal, drew attention to the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a group that encompassed a region which was not a stranger to inter-State rivalries, but that was currently regarded as one of the more successful regional organizations, one which had shown the way—through a series of confidence-building steps—by which regional stability and security might be achieved. That had been effected by recognition of shared cultural and economic interests, constant communication, creation of regional understanding and conclusion of agreements on regional co-operation. Nigeria pointed to its general belief that confidence-building could provide a climate of trust in inter-State relations and facilitate disarmament, but observed that if there had been a separate vote on paragraph 5 (see below), it would have found it necessary to abstain, in that the inclusion of a reference to confidence-building measures in joint statements or declarations would raise their status to that of an article of faith. Mexico, for its part, similarly regarded the wording of paragraph 5 to be very broad, probably beyond what the sponsors intended, and felt that such a paragraph, should a corresponding draft resolution be tabled in the future, would warrant careful drafting. Albania, too, wished to record that it had difficulty with that paragraph, and also with the final preambular paragraph.

The First Committee approved the draft resolution on 21 November without a vote and the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, on 15 December, as resolution 38/73 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 37/100 D of 13 December 1982, in which it requested the Disarmament Commission to consider the elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level and to submit a progress report on its deliberations on this item to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session,

Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission on the work accomplished during its session in 1983 on the item “Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level”,

Expressing its concern about the deterioration of the international situation and the further escalation of the arms race, which both reflect and aggravate the unsatisfactory international political climate, tension and mistrust,

Desirous of strengthening international peace and security and, at the same time, creating and improving conditions conducive to further measures of disarmament,

Noting again the findings of the *Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures* and in particular the important role that confidence-building measures can play with regard to regional and world-wide stability as well as to progress in disarmament,

Mindful of the fact that, while confidence-building measures cannot serve as a substitute for concrete disarmament measures, they play a very significant role in achieving disarmament, whether they are taken unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally,

Convinced of the usefulness of confidence-building measures freely arrived at by the States concerned and agreed upon, taking into account the particular conditions and requirements of the regions concerned,

Convinced of the need to reduce mistrust and fear among States through the realization of confidence-building measures, such as those recommended by consensus in the

Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures, including pertinent and timely information on military activities and other matters pertaining to mutual security, and measures concerning the peacetime military conduct of States, as well as through progress on concrete measures of disarmament,

Recalling that confidence reflects a set of interrelated factors of a military as well as of a non-military character and that plurality of approaches is needed to overcome fear, apprehension and mistrust between States and to replace them by confidence,

Welcoming the convening at Stockholm on 17 January 1984 of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, of which the first stage will be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe as characterized in the Concluding Document of the Madrid meeting of representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, held from 11 November 1980 to 9 September 1983,

1. *Urges* all States to encourage and assist all efforts designed to explore further the ways in which confidence-building measures can strengthen international peace and security;

2. *Invites* all States to consider the possible introduction unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally of confidence-building measures in their particular regions and, where possible, to negotiate on them in keeping with the conditions and requirements prevailing in their respective regions;

3. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue and conclude at its 1984 session the consideration of the item entitled "Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level";

4. *Further requests* the Disarmament Commission to submit a report on its deliberations on this item, containing such guidelines, to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

5. *Recommends* that all States consider the inclusion of a reference to, or an agreement on, confidence-building measures, as appropriate, in any joint statements or declarations of a political nature;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures".

On 11 November, the draft resolution entitled "United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament" (sponsored originally by 19 States and subsequently by an additional 7)²⁹ was submitted in the First Committee, and Nigeria introduced it on 15 November. Also in connection with the sub-item, the Assembly had before it the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the programme in 1983.³⁰

In the report, the Secretary-General referred to resolution 37/100 G of 13 December 1982, by which the General Assembly recalled its decision, taken at its twelfth special session, to increase the number of fellowships awarded from 20, as it had been from the programme's inception in 1979, to 25 as from 1983.³¹ The report also reiterated that its

²⁹ Algeria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Greece, Indonesia, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

³⁰ A/38/533.

³¹ The 25 fellows in 1983 came from: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Burma, Central African Republic, Cuba, Ethiopia, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Madagascar, Mexico, Poland, Spain, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Uganda, Yemen and Zambia.

primary objective was to promote expertise on disarmament, and that it was particularly for candidates who were involved in or earmarked for work on disarmament and related matters.

The report went on to review the content of the 1983 programme, noting that it took place from 29 June to 30 November 1983 and included, apart from following the proceedings of relevant United Nations disarmament bodies, lectures, seminars, study visits to the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Sweden, the USSR, the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, and research projects. The report noted that during its first five years, the programme had trained 104 public officials from 67 countries.

In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of Nigeria mentioned, in addition, that highly placed personalities in Government and industry had addressed the participants. He also welcomed the decision to centre the future operation of the programme in Geneva. Furthermore, he suggested that consideration be given to the inclusion of some of the fellows' papers in the periodical *Disarmament*, which is published by the Department for Disarmament Affairs. In conclusion, he expressed appreciation to the Governments which had invited the participants for study visits and looked forward to a continued productive programme in the future. In the debate, two additional African States, Sierra Leone and Uganda, referred favourably to the programme, both stressing that they had benefited from it.

On 21 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote, and the General Assembly adopted it on 15 December, also without a vote, as resolution 38/73 C, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision, contained in paragraph 108 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament, as well as its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it, *inter alia*, decided to continue the programme and to increase the number of fellowships from twenty to twenty-five as from 1983,

Noting with satisfaction that the programme has already trained one hundred and four public officials from sixty-seven countries, most of whom are now in positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament affairs within their Governments or Permanent Missions to the United Nations, or representing their Governments at international disarmament meetings,

Bearing in mind the growing interest which continues to be manifested in the programme by an ever-increasing number of States,

Recognizing the fact that the programme of studies and activities as outlined in the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament has continued to expand,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Decides* to continue the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to apply the same criteria of objectivity and balance in drawing up the future programme of activities as he has done so far, in accordance with the guidelines established by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session;

3. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Governments of Germany, the Federal Republic of, Japan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America for inviting the fellows to their countries in 1983 to study selected activities in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the overall objectives of the programme, as well as providing additional information sources and practical knowledge for the fellows, and, in this connection, expresses the hope that other Member States will extend similar support to the programme;

4. *Takes note* of the decision of the Secretary-General to relocate the fellowship programme and its staff at Geneva as from 1 May 1983;

5. *Notes* that the expansion of the programme has led to an increase in the level of its activities;

6. *Commends* the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme has continued to be carried out;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the implementation of the programme for 1984, in accordance with the guidelines established for it;

8. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session on the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution.

The Bahamas, Cyprus, Egypt and Malta submitted the initial draft resolution entitled "Disarmament and International Security"³² on 11 November, and the same four States, joined at the time by Ecuador, Sri Lanka, the Sudan and Yugoslavia, and subsequently also by Colombia, Costa Rica, Greece and Panama, submitted a revised version of the draft on 18 November. The main change was to operative paragraph 1 (see resolution below) which, in the initial version, had read:

1. *Requests* the Security Council to expedite the conclusion of the agreements for a United Nations force, as is required by the Charter, to render operative the collective security system provided for in the Charter, and thereby facilitate productive negotiations for the cessation of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, and for progress in disarmament.

The representative of Cyprus, in addressing the question, stressed that an interdependent world composed of many sovereign States could not function towards peace without an effectively functioning organization. Therefore the United Nations must be effective, as required by its Charter, and, accordingly, the First Committee's efforts should centre on the functioning of the security system provided for in the Charter, along with disarmament efforts. He then cited from the Charter to underline that it called for the peaceful settlement of disputes through collective measures. In that context he felt that the main disarmament problems of the United Nations were, in the last analysis, the consequence of the ineffectiveness of Security Council decisions. Subsequently, he observed that paragraph 13 of the Final Document of 1978, too, had stated that "Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations" and pointed out that that consideration had been overlooked in the work done on the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament based on that Document. In concluding, he claimed that the concept of conducting the search for security through disarmament

³²See A/38/641, para. 19.

reflected a misunderstanding; rather, the reverse was true: it was security—effective, collective security in accordance with the Charter—that would make disarmament possible. To halt the arms race required co-operation in international security and the non-use of force in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. In the existing situation, only parity was preventing the use of force, but real parity could never be achieved because each side must protect itself from the other's acquiring superiority, and the arms race would go on. The world had seen that negotiations for direct disarmament measures were futile without concurrent efforts to create international security.

Later, Malta, in referring to the revised draft text, noted certain alternative wordings which it would have preferred in the preamble, but at the same time stated that its suggestions were only minor in view of the tremendous importance of the draft resolution.

On 25 November the First Committee approved the revised draft resolution by a recorded vote of 109 to none, with 14 abstentions (Western countries, Israel and New Zealand). The General Assembly adopted it on 15 December by a recorded vote of 133 to none, with 13 abstentions. The resolution, 38/73 H, reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/83 A of 11 December 1979, 35/156 J of 12 December 1980, 36/97 K of 9 December 1981 and 37/100 E of 13 December 1982,

Deeply concerned over the continuing stagnation in the disarmament negotiating efforts and the ever-escalating arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, which make the survival of mankind extremely precarious,

Gravely concerned over the present state of international affairs characterized by the continued resort to violence and the use of force, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations,

Firmly convinced that a closely interdependent world composed of many sovereign nations cannot possibly function towards peace, security and survival in a nuclear and space age without an effectively functioning organization,

Noting that the fundamental function of the United Nations in its primary purpose is the security system provided for in the Charter and that the principles of disarmament embodied in Article 11 of the Charter and flowing from it are an integral part of the system of security,

Convinced that restoring to the United Nations its essential function in accordance with the provisions of the Charter would be a significant factor in creating the conditions conducive to the cessation of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, and for productive negotiations on disarmament measures,

Bearing in mind that recent events have brought into sharp focus the reality that consecutive decisions of the Security Council, adopted unanimously, were ignored and bypassed by those required to comply with them and in consequence the chain of events that followed further aggravated the situation,

Determined to avert the danger of an approaching nuclear war in a world of insecurity and anarchy in which the continuing lack of collective security through the United Nations is an essential factor,

Having regard to the warning in the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, that "it was the lack of an effective system of collective security through the League of Nations that . . . led to the Second World War",

1. *Requests* the Security Council to expedite the conclusion of the agreements mak-

ing armed forces available to the Security Council, as required by the Charter of the United Nations, to render operative the collective security system provided for in the Charter and thereby facilitate productive negotiations for the cessation of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, and for progress on disarmament;

2. *Further requests* the Security Council to submit a report, through the Secretary-General, to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

Twenty-five Member States³³ became sponsors of the draft resolution entitled "Convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament", which was submitted on 11 November and introduced in the First Committee by Yugoslavia on 17 November. The representative of Yugoslavia stated that the sponsors attached particular importance to the preparations for and holding of special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Those held so far had shown that the United Nations was an irreplaceable forum and that the sessions provided a unique opportunity for the Member States to participate most directly in the efforts aimed towards the achievement of the proclaimed goal of general and complete disarmament. Such gatherings, Yugoslavia added, were important for the analysis of the implementation of previously adopted recommendations and decisions and to determine the guidelines for future efforts of the international community. Accordingly, the sponsors were proposing that a third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament be convened not later than 1988, and that the date of its convening be determined not later than at the fortieth regular session of the Assembly. They hoped that the proposal would be adopted by consensus.

The First Committee approved the draft resolution on 21 November without a vote and the General Assembly adopted it on 15 December, also without a vote. Resolution 38/73 I reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the decision adopted at its twelfth special session to set, during its thirty-eighth session, the date of the third special session devoted to disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the furthering and broadening of positive processes initiated through the laying down of the foundations of an international disarmament strategy at its tenth special session,

1. *Decides* that the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be held not later than 1988;

2. *Decides also* to set, not later than at its fortieth session, the date of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and to make appropriate arrangements concerning the establishment of a preparatory committee for that third special session.

Under the two collective items on follow-up of the special sessions devoted to disarmament, the First Committee had before it a large number of documents relating to the various sub-items they covered or to conferences, administrative requirements or ideas for action in the interest of disarmament. Some were circulated under both of the items and

³³ Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

also under the collective item entitled "General and complete disarmament", which is the subject of chapter II below, as well as under some of the specific items dealt with in later chapters. The following have not been referred to in this chapter:

(a) Report of the Secretary-General on the proposal for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency;³⁴

(b) Report of the Secretary-General on the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies;³⁵

(c) Report of the Secretary-General on the status of multilateral disarmament agreements;³⁶

(d) Note by the Secretary-General containing a communication from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dated 26 October 1983 on disarmament negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations;³⁷

(e) Letter dated 30 March 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the Final Documents of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983;³⁸

(f) Report of the Secretary-General on Disarmament Week;³⁹

(g) Letter dated 31 August 1983 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Romania to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, conveying messages from President Ceausescu to the USSR and the United States on the bilateral negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons;⁴⁰

(h) Letter dated 14 September 1983 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic to the Secretary-General, conveying a statement on its 10-year record of membership in the United Nations;⁴¹

(i) Letter dated 10 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the Communiqué adopted by the Meeting of Ministers and Heads of Delegations of the Non-Aligned Countries to the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, held in New York from 4 to 7 October 1983;⁴²

(j) Letter dated 24 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the resolutions adopted by the Seventieth Inter-Parliamentary Conference, held at Seoul on 12 October 1983;⁴³

(k) Letter dated 28 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, conveying its Government's appeal to the parties to the negotiations in Geneva;⁴⁴

(l) Three letters dated 22 and 29 November and 5 December 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, two of them dealing with the situation and bilateral negotiations in Europe and the third conveying a letter to the Secretary-General from a meeting of Romanian young people;⁴⁵

³⁴ A/38/404.

³⁵ A/38/467.

³⁶ A/38/524.

³⁷ A/38/562.

³⁸ A/38/132-S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2.

³⁹ A/38/144.

⁴⁰ A/38/375.

⁴¹ A/38/425.

⁴² A/38/495-S/16035.

⁴³ A/38/529.

⁴⁴ A/C.1/38/7.

⁴⁵ A/C.1/38/12, A/C.1/38/14 and A/C.1/38/15.

(m) Letter dated 28 November 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, conveying a declaration of its Government on the situation in Europe;⁴⁶

(n) Report of the Secretary-General on the World Disarmament Campaign;⁴⁷

(o) Report of the Secretary-General on regional disarmament;⁴⁸

(p) Letter dated 6 June 1983 from the Acting Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, conveying a reply sent to Mexico on the Chinese position on disarmament and co-operation;⁴⁹

(q) Letter dated 3 November 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General on the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);⁵⁰

(r) Letter dated 14 October 1983 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, conveying the appeal of the World Assembly For Peace and Life, against Nuclear War.⁵¹

Conclusion

It is obvious that the effective implementation of measures recognized as necessary at special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament would mean that important steps to curb, halt and reverse the arms race on a comprehensive basis were being achieved in accordance with the expressed desire of the vast majority of Member States. Nevertheless, no more during 1983 than during any other year since 1978, when the first such special session was held, was any significant beginning made towards such a process.

In fact, even more than in other years, the generally expressed desire for reduced tensions, peace and disarmament seemed to be accompanied, paradoxically, by an increasingly grave international situation, continued military confrontation and intervention, an absence of tangible progress in any of the disarmament forums and the breakdown of some of them.

As to items directly related to follow-up, except for some progress on the question of guidelines for confidence-building which was achieved by the Disarmament Commission, any other positive signs were reflected mainly in the administrative and procedural areas, for instance: the consolidation of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, which came into being at the beginning of the year; the completion of the Committee on Disarmament's first review of its membership, resulting in its agreement to a limited expansion and its redesignation as the Conference on Disarmament; and the decision by the General Assembly to set a date at its fortieth regular session, in 1985, for the convening of its third special session on disarmament. Otherwise, only the ever-increasing intensity of ex-

⁴⁶ A/C.1/38/13.

⁴⁷ A/38/349.

⁴⁸ A/38/376 and Add.1 and 2.

⁴⁹ A/38/261.

⁵⁰ A/38/567-S/16125.

⁵¹ A/C.1/38/5.

pressions of concern about the continuing grave international situation and the danger of war, particularly nuclear war, and the consequent increased activity in all aspects of the field of disarmament might be construed as positive.

Whether such a bleak situation will prevail in the future will depend on the effects of this growing concern and expansion of activity on the actions of Governments and on their will to find solutions to international problems in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

The question of general and complete disarmament

Introduction

THE QUESTION OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT has been on the agenda of international deliberative and negotiating bodies within or outside the United Nations almost since the end of the Second World War. Although the provisions of the United Nations Charter dealing with disarmament and the regulation of armaments are not elaborated in detail and do not refer to nuclear weapons—which the Charter predated—the first resolution adopted by the General Assembly, resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946, established the Atomic Energy Commission and stated, in the Commission's terms of reference, *inter alia*, that it "shall make specific proposals for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction". A year later, on 13 February 1947, the Security Council established a second body, the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

At the outset, the scope of disarmament negotiations was very broad. The terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments taken together called for immediate plans to ensure that atomic energy would be used only for peaceful purposes, and that armaments and armed forces would be generally regulated and reduced under an international system of control and inspection.

During the subsequent 25 or more years, the emphasis in disarmament negotiations may be regarded as shifting between long- and short-term objectives and between comprehensive and partial measures for achieving the ultimate goal of general disarmament, or at least the reduction of armaments to the lowest levels possible to maintain international peace and security.¹

Until 1950, separate negotiations were held in the Atomic Energy Commission and in the Commission for Conventional Armaments. Between 1951 and the mid-1960s the shifting in emphasis became apparent. During the 1951-1959 period, the basic objective was the regulation,

¹ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chaps. 3-6, and *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), chap. 1.

limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments, by stages, in a co-ordinated, comprehensive programme. Beginning as early as 1955, however, contradictions developed between that long-range objective and proposals that were put forward for immediate, partial measures to be implemented without agreement on a comprehensive plan. The partial approach was commended to the negotiators by the General Assembly in the hope that some limited first steps would increase confidence and thereby create a more favourable atmosphere for comprehensive agreements.

In 1959, with the General Assembly's adoption of resolution 1378 (XIV), "General and complete disarmament under effective international control" became a goal to be actually sought. An international instrument leading to that goal was to be worked out and agreed upon in the shortest possible time — which again broadened the scope of the negotiations. However, work towards agreement on partial disarmament or collateral measures continued to be pursued concurrently with the elaboration of plans for general and complete disarmament, since it was soon sensed that devoting parallel and, at times, even primary attention to measures designed to reduce tension and build confidence through positive achievements in the near-term might actually facilitate and hasten the complex task of achieving general and complete disarmament.

Further impetus was given to the comprehensive approach, however, when the General Assembly endorsed, by resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations worked out and issued earlier in the year by the Soviet Union and the United States, and recommended that negotiations on general and complete disarmament be based upon those principles.²

The most elaborate proposals based on that approach were the Soviet "Draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control"³ and the American "Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world",⁴ which were submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) in 1962, on 15 March and 18 April respectively. Those proposals and revisions to them were discussed during the following few years, but no agreement was reached due to various differences which arose between the two groups of States most centrally concerned, particularly in the area of stages of implementation, nuclear issues and control.

By 1965 it became clear that, because of the difficult political climate, the goal of general and complete disarmament was unattainable in the near future. Thereafter, attention became increasingly directed towards reaching agreement on partial measures, some of which were: a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the non-proliferation of nuclear weap-

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

³ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962*, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. C (ENDC/2).

⁴ *Ibid.*, sect. F (ENDC/30 and Corr.1).

ons, the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons and the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed.

Meagre results and continuing difficulties in ongoing disarmament negotiations, among other things, led in 1969 to the General Assembly's adoption of resolution 2602 E (XXIV), by which it declared the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade. By that resolution, the Assembly requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), as the negotiating body was then known, while continuing its negotiations on collateral measures, to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, in order to provide a guideline for the CCD's further work.

In subsequent years, the question of a comprehensive programme was considered in the CCD and, more recently, the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament, as well as in the General Assembly, and several resolutions have been adopted and numerous proposals have been considered in the various bodies on that question. It received further impetus at the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Although the Disarmament Commission achieved consensus on the "elements" of such a programme in 1979, agreement on a draft programme itself had not been possible by the end of 1983. The subject is considered separately in chapter III below.

No substantive or tangible progress towards general and complete disarmament *per se* was in fact made during the period between 1969 and 1983, and prospects for the achievement of that goal in any foreseeable future became widely considered as bleak. Although the term has continued to be heard constantly *en passant* in the statements of members in United Nations bodies and in other conferences and negotiating forums, it is widely considered to have little real substance that could be translated into action. General and complete disarmament has also been reaffirmed as an ultimate goal in numerous resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at successive sessions, but again without real analysis in recent years as to how it might be attained. On the other hand, the term itself provides the Assembly with a very useful agenda item under which a variety of matters—often proposals which are new or do not fit elsewhere—may appropriately be considered, such as initiatives concerning nuclear weapons, studies on various subjects and proposals concerning international conferences or the international machinery for disarmament. Due to a rather pervasive unfavourable political atmosphere and deteriorating international relations, there is no doubt that the United Nations has a long way to go to achieve its ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1983

The Disarmament Commission met at United Nations Headquarters from 9 May to 3 June 1983 under the chairmanship of Mr. Celso Antônio de Souza e Silva of Brazil.

Three of the items on the agenda were substantively identical with items on the agenda of the 1982 session, namely, items 4, 5 and 6. They dealt respectively with various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at the elimination of the danger of nuclear war and the elaboration of a general approach to disarmament negotiations; the reduction of military budgets; and the question of South Africa's nuclear capability. The Commission also considered two new items, Nos. 7 and 8, concerning, first, the report of ICDSI entitled "Common Security", which was distributed as a document of the Disarmament Commission,⁵ in order to suggest to the General Assembly how best to ensure an effective follow-up thereto and secondly, the elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and their implementation. The above-mentioned agenda items are set out *in extenso* in chapter I, on pages 9 and 10 of this volume.

The Commission established a number of subsidiary bodies to facilitate its programme of work. It set up a committee of the whole to consider the agenda item on the arms race, particularly its nuclear aspects, and a general approach to negotiations — the Committee later established a contact group to deal with the item and report back to it, and four working groups: Working Group I on the reduction of military budgets, Working Group II on South Africa's nuclear capability, Working Group III on the report of the Independent Commission and Working Group IV on confidence-building measures. All the Working Groups were informal and open-ended.

As at previous sessions, the question of general and complete disarmament was not considered as a separate item by the Commission in 1983. Moreover, few references were made on the subject during the general exchange of views on all agenda items or in the concluding comments of the members of the Commission.⁶ As in the preceding few years, member States were clearly more concerned about the growing danger of nuclear war and how to prevent it than with the vague and distant goal of general and complete disarmament. However, a few delegations mentioned it in their statements.

The representative of Cuba referred to general and complete disarmament in connection with the reduction of military budgets, stressing that that subject could not be separated from the arms race and general and complete disarmament. Similarly, India stressed that the adoption of measures for the freezing and reduction of military expenditures must be interrelated with other measures of disarmament within the context of

⁵ A/CN.10/38.

⁶ A/CN.10/PV.66-70 and A/CN.10/PV.65-72/Corrigendum.

progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Egypt referred to the question in the broader context of security for all as well as in that of South Africa's nuclear capability; at the same time Egypt stressed what it saw as a linkage between such matters as regional security, confidence-building measures and the reduction of military budgets on the one hand, and general and complete disarmament on the other. Japan, later in the session, expressed its willingness to work towards the ideal world of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, but cautioned that the road to such an ideal state was to be found only through gradual and steady improvement.

The results of the deliberations of the Contact Group and the four Working Groups were included in the "Conclusions and recommendations" of the Commission's report to the General Assembly.⁷

The Contact Group, dealing with item 4 of the agenda, was unable to achieve consensus on a set of recommendations for submission to the Committee of the Whole, but suggested that the Committee include in its report to the Commission an annex entitled "Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4"; the Committee and, subsequently, the Commission agreed to that suggestion. The compilation contained two recommendations which referred explicitly to general and complete disarmament.⁸ Its recommendation 2, concerning conventional weapons and the arms race, stipulated that "conventional disarmament should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament". Its recommendation 6, concerning the World Disarmament Campaign, contained two alternative texts, the first of which stressed that the Campaign should promote public interest and support for "the reaching of agreements on measures of arms limitation and disarmament with a view to achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control", while the second stated:

Member States should be encouraged to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments, and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the armaments race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Working Group I, dealing with the reduction of military budgets, did not reach a consensus on a set of recommendations. In two working papers submitted to it, however, the question of general and complete disarmament was mentioned. In that which India presented,⁹ it stressed that "the freezing and reduction of military expenditures must be conceived in the context of a global approach to disarmament" and "the adoption of measures for the freezing and reduction of military expendi-

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42)*; sect. IV sets out the reports of the Groups.

⁸ *Ibid.*, annex VIII, sect. II.

⁹ *Ibid.*, annex XII (originally distributed on 20 May 1982 as document A/CN.10/35).

tures must be interrelated with other measures of disarmament within the context of progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control". The Chairman's working paper¹⁰ concerning principles and ideas which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures also noted the interrelationship of agreements on the subject and progress towards general disarmament.

In the absence of an agreed text or recommendation in Working Group II regarding the nuclear capability of South Africa, the Commission recommended further discussion at its next session on the basis of two working papers, one of which was later revised, which were annexed to the report of the Group.¹¹

With regard to agenda item 7, Working Group III in its report briefly described the report of ICDSI and its consideration of the report during 11 meetings and a number of informal consultations with the Chairman. In 1983, only Working Group III, whose aim, as stated in the agenda item, was to suggest how best to ensure an effective follow-up of the report, was able to achieve conclusive results. While its discussions were not without controversy—particularly with regard to the Independent Commission's recommendation for the establishment of a tactical or battlefield nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe—the Disarmament Commission found the report to be noteworthy in that it reflected agreement among prominent personalities of different political convictions on a concrete programme aimed at halting the arms race and creating a downward spiral in armaments. The Commission also regarded the report as a timely and constructive contribution to international efforts to strengthen peace and security, and set out the following paragraph as its recommendation:

13. The Disarmament Commission noted that in many cases the proposals of ICDSI dealt with ongoing efforts, *inter alia*, in the Commission itself, whereas in other cases new measures were proposed. The Commission recommended that the report of ICDSI be duly taken into account in ongoing and future disarmament efforts.¹²

Working Group IV, which considered the item entitled "Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level", understood that its task, assigned to the Disarmament Commission by resolution 37/100 D, envisaged a two-year exercise, and therefore concentrated in 1983 on an exchange of views and the question of guidelines for confidence-building measures (its report is considered in chapter I above). During its discussions, all delegations stressed the overriding importance, in a world characterized by political tensions and the escalation of the arms race, of strict adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and to the provisions set out in the Final Document of the Tenth

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, annex XIII.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 24 and annexes XIV-XVI.

¹² *Ibid.*, para. 25.

Special Session of the General Assembly¹³ for the preservation of peace and the eventual realization of general and complete disarmament. Further, in a working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany,¹⁴ under the subheading "Objectives and purposes of confidence-building measures", a number of possibilities were put forward. Among them, in the context of the importance of enhancing communication and information in order to achieve better understanding of mutual concerns, the following point was made:

Confidence-building measures can thus help to create a political and psychological climate in which the tendency towards a competitive arms buildup will be reduced and the importance of the military element will gradually diminish. This can greatly facilitate genuine progress in arms control and disarmament negotiations ultimately aimed at general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

At the last two plenary meetings of the Commission, a number of delegations, in their concluding statements, expressed opinions on the usefulness of the Commission and generally reaffirmed their faith in it as an authoritative, multilateral, deliberative forum for recommending disarmament measures to the General Assembly. However, India, in evaluating the Commission's work on behalf of the non-aligned countries, voiced their disappointment at the paucity of results due, among other things, to a lack of political will. To their regret, that had been the problem particularly during the consideration of the question of the prevention of nuclear war. They had presented a working paper on that issue which contained concrete proposals;¹⁵ however, some of the nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies had shown a total lack of interest in reaching agreement on that basis. Further, the non-aligned countries were greatly disappointed at the lack of consensus on the item dealing with the nuclear capability of South Africa, which, they held, had been due to the obstructionist attitude of some countries.

Speaking on behalf of the members of the European Community, the Federal Republic of Germany stressed that the Disarmament Commission had only partially fulfilled the hope that at its 1983 session it would be able to move closer to the model of a deliberative body which, in substantive support of the General Assembly itself, would contribute concrete and operational recommendations each year on a limited number of important and topical disarmament items. In the view of the Ten, the work of the Commission could be substantially facilitated if delegations would seek to promote a spirit of mutual understanding, develop areas of agreement and strive for common positions. They also emphasized the importance of an appropriately balanced approach towards nuclear and conventional disarmament, and regretted the lack of consensus on that question. Concerned about the arms race and the growth of military expenditures, the Ten reiterated the urgent need for all States to continue consideration of those items. They also expressed their dis-

¹³ *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4), sect. III.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42), annex XVII.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, annex V.

appointment that Working Group II did not succeed in reaching consensus formulations on South Africa's nuclear capability in spite of a common rejection of racism, colonialism and *apartheid*. Finally, they expressed their satisfaction that it had been possible to arrive at a shared view on the significance of the report of ICDSI and welcomed the interim results regarding confidence-building measures.

China regretted that no progress had been made on substantive issues during the session. Stressing the special responsibility of the two major nuclear Powers, it referred to the justified expectations of other countries that those Powers should take the first steps towards nuclear disarmament, although without neglecting the conventional component. Deploring the lack of agreement on a text regarding South Africa's nuclear capability, China expressed its firm support of African States in their just struggle to oppose the racist régime's acquisition of nuclear weapons. With regard to the reduction of military budgets, it considered that it was fundamental that the super-Powers take the lead in making drastic cuts. It observed that meaningful deliberations had been conducted on confidence-building measures, and that both convergent and divergent views had emerged. In its opinion, a major requirement was the resolution of differences on certain matters of principle, such as respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States, non-interference by States in the internal affairs of other countries and respect of the principle of non-intervention.

A number of Eastern European States expressed regret that it had not been possible for the Commission to conclude its work with substantive progress. The Soviet Union stressed that the political will of States was the essential prerequisite for progress in any of the international forums dealing with arms limitation, including the Disarmament Commission, and stated further that some countries had obstructed the negotiations on many issues, particularly on the most important ones, such as nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. In Bulgaria's view, the lack of agreement on recommendations on most of the issues had been due to confrontation between two completely opposite tendencies: on the one hand, the desire of the vast majority of the Commission's members to formulate genuine measures for halting the arms race and for disarmament and, on the other, a policy of outright rejection of such measures and renunciation of the very need for disarmament. Romania, for its part, considered that the Commission's contribution towards establishing the climate necessary for genuine disarmament measures had been modest.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1983

The Committee on Disarmament, the multilateral negotiating body, in 1983 followed its established practices, in accordance with its rules of procedure, of rotating its chairmanship alphabetically on a monthly basis and holding its session in two parts, from 1 February to 29 April

and from 14 June to 30 August.¹⁶ During that period, it held 50 formal plenary meetings and 27 informal meetings on its agenda for the session, its programme of work, organization and procedures and other matters, as well as on the substantive items of the agenda adopted. Also in conformity with the rules of procedure, a number of States not members of the Committee attended plenary meetings and several of them, upon request, were invited to participate in discussion on various agenda items and in the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Working Groups dealing with items of particular concern to them. For details on this aspect of its work, see chapter I. As in previous years, communications received from non-governmental organizations and individuals were circulated to the Committee under the relevant rules.

In adopting the agenda and programme of work for the session, the Committee reiterated its previous statement: "The Committee on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control". However, the question of general and complete disarmament was not dealt with as a separate item at the Committee's 1983 session. References to it were made mainly in statements in plenary meetings,¹⁷ especially in those concerning two of its agenda items: "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters" and "Comprehensive programme of disarmament".

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, in his personal address to the Committee on 15 February, drew the attention of the members to the crucial stage reached in the history of mankind's efforts at disarmament in which the preservation of human life and values had become of supreme importance. Stressing the great responsibility conferred on the Committee as the world's sole multilateral body for negotiations on disarmament, the Secretary-General pleaded for greater vigour and determination in reaching agreement on effective measures. He further urged the Committee to make every effort to achieve consensus on some key questions, such as a nuclear-test ban and nuclear disarmament. After touching upon some of the issues on its agenda, such as the nuclear arms race, conventional disarmament, the relationship between disarmament and security and the question of verification, the Secretary-General concluded his statement by stressing the exceptional possibilities lying before the Committee and the fact that it was, as a multilateral organ, uniquely qualified to forge a consensus on such important disarmament issues; that, however, would require political courage and vision. Moreover, in his view, progress in the negotiations in the Committee could have a significance that would go beyond the confines of its own agenda and encourage Governments to tackle other aspects of disarmament with greater confidence and determination.

Other statements in the Committee which referred to the question of

¹⁶ See *ibid.*, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1), paras. 2-22, for details.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, appendix III (CD/421), vols. I-V.

general and complete disarmament reflected a spectrum of opinions regarding the causes of the arms race, the danger of nuclear war, the concepts of security and confidence-building measures and further concerns of importance from the standpoint of the country being represented.

China's representative stated that the people of the world had long hoped that the work of the Committee would promote the cause of disarmament and help maintain world peace and security. However, much to their disappointment, no substantive progress had been achieved on any of the important disarmament items before it and a genuine reduction of armaments remained a distant objective. China reiterated its consistent view that the rivalry between the super-Powers constituted the root cause of the tense and turbulent international situation and the absence of progress in disarmament. The grave military confrontation in Europe, the continued occupation of Afghanistan and Kampuchea, both non-aligned Asian countries, the turmoil and conflicts in the Middle East and the stormy situation in Africa were all related, directly or indirectly, to super-Power rivalry for world domination. After referring to some of the issues on the agenda, China expressed the hope that the Committee would live up to the aspirations of people everywhere and try to overcome various difficulties and obstacles in the way of genuine disarmament, thereby contributing to the maintenance of world peace.

Among the group of 21, a number of States referred to the question of general and complete disarmament in the context of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. Expressing its disappointment at the lack of progress in those areas between the super-Powers and within the Committee, the representative of Sri Lanka observed that nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war were not the sole responsibility of nuclear-weapon States, nor were those States the eternal trustees of world peace and security merely because they possessed nuclear weapons. He thus stressed that the goal of the non-aligned countries was not a series of arms control agreements between the nuclear-weapon States or their groups. Arms control measures so far had not halted the arms race or reversed trends in the accumulation of nuclear weapons and, despite them, both nuclear and conventional weapons had been revolutionized by new technology and had acquired unprecedented levels of sophistication and destructive capacity. The situation in armaments, far from improving, had seriously deteriorated. While recognizing the usefulness of arms control agreements, Sri Lanka pleaded that they should not be confused with disarmament or used to postpone or avoid genuine disarmament negotiations in the Committee. In its view, limited agreements could not become a substitute for general and complete disarmament.

The representative of India stressed that mankind was faced with the imminent threat of nuclear war primarily because of the excessive accumulation of nuclear weapons. Referring to the arguments of the major nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies that peace had been maintained by the balance of terror, or the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, and nuclear war avoided by the deployment of massive nuclear arsenals,

India held that such doctrines were not only obsolete and outmoded but also dangerous, unacceptable, and precisely what had brought the world to the real possibility of a nuclear war. Regarding the relationship between disarmament and development, India pointed out that an attempt was being made, as in the debate on the need for nuclear disarmament, to divert attention from the main issues to such side issues of the subject as confidence-building measures. Security, in its view, was essentially a matter of perception, but could not be seen only in military terms. Rather, it also involved political, economic, social, cultural and environmental dimensions, and its military aspects could be pursued only in contradiction to and at the cost of such dimensions. In the ultimate analysis, just as global prosperity could be maintained only on the basis of development of all countries, particularly the developing ones, so security, India believed, could best be sought in general and complete disarmament.

Speaking as Chairman of the Committee for March, the representative of Morocco stated that in spite of the failure of the second special session on disarmament, the lack of any substantial results in the Committee and the generally unfavourable political climate and state of international relations, there were some reasons for optimism. Among them, he considered that the changes which had taken place in the Committee, the fact that no State wished to be held responsible for the lack of results or negative results, and the awakening of public opinion to the danger posed by the arms race gave cause for satisfaction and were having beneficial effects on the atmosphere in which the Committee had to work. Morocco felt that the new awareness of the entire international community meant that any disarmament measure, whatever its extent or the nature of the weapons to which it referred, would be significant in so far as it contributed to the goal of general and complete disarmament.

Addressing the Committee, the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia stated that the results that the Committee had achieved thus far were not proportionate to the challenges posed by the arms race and a deteriorating international situation. In his view, a particularly negative characteristic of the current state of international relations was the arms race, and especially the nuclear arms race, whose global dimensions and quality threatened the very survival of civilization. The arms race had called into question the modest results achieved in the post-war period in the field of disarmament. Thus, it was high time to arrest it and create political conditions that would enable the Committee and the international community to move in the direction of disarmament. In contrast to the bloc concept of security based on nuclear deterrence and balance of power, the non-aligned countries had developed a new concept which fundamentally proceeded from the belief that peace was the common heritage of mankind, for which all countries were responsible, but that the great Powers had special obligations in that respect. That idea implied, *inter alia*, the elimination of power politics, the need to overcome the present bloc division of the world, the pursuit of a policy of universal détente and the solution of controversies by

peaceful means. According to the concept, those objectives could be achieved only if there were substantial reductions in armed forces and armaments in the world, which was why disarmament constituted one of the key elements of the non-aligned countries' concept of security.

Sweden referred to the strong call for peace and disarmament that was being heard as a reflection of the deep concern of many millions of people, and was convinced that the peace movement was emerging as an important political factor in many countries. While regarding the arms race as the result of tensions, suspicion, injustice and the quest for power, it also stressed that the arms race was, in turn, a cause of the world economic crisis, the widening gap between rich and poor countries and the abuse of vast economic and intellectual resources which were desperately needed for human development. In advocating a new approach, it stressed that disarmament and peace must be seen not only in the East-West perspective but also in a North-South dimension, and that they were not an exclusive affair for the two super-Powers or military blocs. Sweden supported the conclusions of ICDSI, reiterating that common security sought through disarmament, rather than mutual deterrence based on armaments, should be the prime basis for security in the world.

The representative of the USSR stated that the consistent policy of the Soviet Union aimed at curbing the arms race had been reaffirmed at the recently held session of the Supreme Soviet. He pointed out that his country had put forward a whole range of proposals in the field of disarmament, including the most radical proposal—that on complete and general disarmament combined with complete and general control—and he added, as had also been stressed at the Supreme Soviet session, that in the current situation it was useless for anyone to count on achieving military superiority. The USSR had not sought and did not seek it, but neither did it recognize the right of anyone else to military superiority nor would it allow that. The representative then cited from a statement of Mr. A. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, to the effect that the most important thing was to conduct honest negotiations, and that agreements must be based on the principle of equality and equal security. The Soviet Union believed the world was passing through a critical historical phase in which the major problem in international politics was, in its view, the need to preserve peace and to prevent a nuclear catastrophe; in that respect the Committee bore a heavy responsibility.

In holding that prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament were matters of utmost priority, the representative of Czechoslovakia referred to the Political Declaration which the Warsaw Treaty countries had adopted in Prague and to statements made later in Moscow, observing that those documents put forward a number of concrete proposals aimed at preventing war, especially nuclear war, and the promotion of disarmament. By their proposals, the socialist countries were trying, in Czechoslovakia's view, not only to create the appropriate atmosphere for disarmament, but also to achieve the adoption of concrete measures. Such a process was in accordance with the will of all peoples, as ex-

pressed in the Final Document of the Assembly's first special session on disarmament, in 1978, and the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament adopted, as resolution 34/88, in 1979. Czechoslovakia noted that that Declaration, among other things, stated that a special responsibility for achieving general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and for averting nuclear war lay with the nuclear-weapon and other militarily significant States.

The Vice-President of the United States addressed the Committee near the beginning of its 1983 session and elaborated his country's views on the state of its efforts—both bilateral and multilateral—to advance the cause of peace through effective arms control measures. He stressed that the Reagan Administration believed that arms control measures could be a vital part of national security, and that equitable and effectively verifiable agreements could increase that security. He restated the general principles which guided the American arms control efforts, namely: substantial reduction of the number and destructive potential of nuclear weapons, not just a freeze at high levels; mutual reductions to equal levels of both sides' forces; agreements that would enhance the security of the United States and its allies and reduce the risk of war; and carefully designed provisions of arms control agreements and insistence on their verifiability to ensure compliance by all parties. He concluded his message by stressing that the achievement of effective arms control agreements was a difficult task which required dedication, persistence, tolerance, a respect for the views of others and, above all, a faith that conflict could be prevented and that, no matter how difficult it was, solutions could be found.

Some members of the Committee elaborated their arms control and disarmament policies in rather more general terms. Thus, France stated that it fully recognized the priority attached to the problem of disarmament, as well as the responsibilities of the international community in that connection. In its view, the questions of disarmament and of development constituted the two main objectives of co-operation among nations. It considered disarmament in itself as one of the most desirable goals; it would contribute greatly to the stability of international relations, eliminate formidable destructive capabilities and result in the saving of enormous resources. Its principal merit would be the contribution it could make to the two priority needs of security and development. At the same time, France stressed, it attached special importance to security and considered the relationship between disarmament and security as being at the heart of the entire disarmament endeavour. That had been clearly stated in the Final Document: undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments. However, security was a complex notion, France held, and depended in the first instance on the state of international relations. Thus, disarmament could not be an autonomous process independent of tensions, threats and crises. The French representative continued by claiming that the problem of nuclear war could not be separated from the problem of war in general. Moreover, nuclear weapons along with conventional weapons constituted the two components of the

balance necessary for security in the European region. Thus, in the current circumstances and for some time to come, the means of stable deterrence—at the lowest possible level of armaments—were essential for the prevention of war, and thus for prevention of nuclear war, in the region where France was situated.

The Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, in addressing the Committee, stated that disarmament and arms control were integral parts of his country's security policy. Its aim was stability both in Europe and worldwide at the lowest possible level of armaments, and it considered that arms control and disarmament were the means of achieving that aim. The prohibition of the threat or use of force was the guiding principle of the Federal Republic's foreign policy, he added, and expressed deep concern that, especially in the past few years, that principle had been seriously violated. While discussing the significance of the ongoing negotiations between the super-Powers and the two military alliances, he also stressed the importance of the Committee on Disarmament as a body in which nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, industrial and developing countries, members of the world's two large military alliances and non-aligned countries were all sitting at the same table. In that body they were sharing the joint responsibility for averting the danger posed by the arms buildup, for eliminating confrontation and for reconciling opposing interests by showing a mutual readiness for compromise in the endeavour to create peace with fewer weapons.

Towards the end of the session, the representative of Ethiopia stated that the growing public awareness of the danger of nuclear war, together with the movement in support of measures to prevent it, curb the arms race and bring about disarmament, gave evidence of the enormous concern for disarmament throughout the world. The main cause of lack of progress, particularly in nuclear disarmament, according to Ethiopia, was the militaristic policies of some nuclear-weapon States and their unwillingness to muster the necessary political will and the commitment to the objectives of disarmament. Thus the basic problem in the field of disarmament was much less one of the inadequacy of international machinery than one of a lack of political will. There was an increasing tendency in international relations to use or threaten to use military force. The policy of force, threat and interference in the internal affairs of other States would have to be firmly renounced by all States, and every effort must be made to counter the notion of force as a means of resolving differences. Ethiopia considered also that it was imperative that effective steps be taken to eliminate oppression and social injustice, without which the building and maintaining of peace and progress towards general and complete disarmament would remain elusive.

In his closing statement, the Chairman for August, who was the representative of Peru, stated that when a dependable spirit of joint effort and conciliation arose within the Committee, it would be possible to have simplified procedures. For example, he felt that the general establishment of working groups to deal with all the various items assigned to the Com-

mittee would be a move in the right direction. Noting the proposals which were emerging, particularly those made in areas outside European forums, the Chairman observed that when the wills of the nuclear-weapon and other militarily significant States converged, the mediating role of countries which were not significant in military terms grew stronger.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

General and complete disarmament continued to be referred to as the ultimate goal of all disarmament efforts by a number of Member States during the General Assembly's thirty-eighth session, in either plenary or First Committee meetings.¹⁸ Once again, the agenda item bearing the title "General and complete disarmament" encompassed different subjects, such as a review conference concerning the sea-bed Treaty,¹⁹ curbing the naval arms race, institutional arrangements for disarmament, prohibition of radiological weapons, prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, and certain disarmament studies. References to the concept of general and complete disarmament, however, were made in a wide variety of contexts.

Generally speaking, the views expressed by particular countries or groups of countries were similar to those heard in other bodies earlier in the year and, compared to previous years, were somewhat more pessimistic or critical due to the lack of progress in ongoing disarmament negotiations.

A number of countries, among them Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Ecuador, Ethiopia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, the United Republic of Cameroon and Zambia, mentioned general and complete disarmament in the context of statements on such items as the comprehensive programme of disarmament, the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, confidence-building measures and other more specific topics.

Many non-aligned countries referred to general and complete disarmament in their general statements, particularly in the First Committee debate. Thus, Egypt recalled that in 1959 the General Assembly had declared the question of general and complete disarmament the most important question facing the world; it observed that that was also the situation at the current time but that the danger was many times clearer and more frightening and, as a result, international society could not leave its survival or destruction to the mercy or actions and judgement of fallible individuals in a small number of countries. In its view, the estab-

¹⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 103rd meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 41st and 43rd, 47th and 54th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

¹⁹ For the text of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, see resolution 2660 (XXV), annex; the text is also reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

lishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones would constitute an important contribution to general and complete disarmament. Nigeria, in speaking of international peace and security and disarmament and development, stressed that the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, which bore special responsibility for the arms race, should also accept the primary duty and obligation to achieve substantial reductions in their military arsenals as a first step towards general and complete disarmament. It expressed the hope that the enhanced status of the Committee on Disarmament as the Conference on Disarmament in 1984 would entail a consequent commitment on the part of its members to fruitful debate and the preparation of binding instruments leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Sudan observed that the accelerated arms race, together with the dangers inherent in the deterioration of political relations and the greater risk of nuclear or conventional war, had made the world more aware than ever before that international peace could be guaranteed only through general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, under effective international control. That could come about only through an effective international institution in which the political will of States could be expressed and whose basis lay in the principle of equality among States. At a time when the process of disarmament seemed to be halted while the arms race was proceeding, the Sudan added, particular attention should be given to confidence-building measures because they could further the cause of general and complete disarmament.

China, for its part, reiterated its established proposals for disarmament and the basic principles underlying them, among which were: disarmament could not be separated from the struggle to safeguard international security and oppose hegemonism; the two super-Powers should take the lead in disarmament; nuclear disarmament should go hand in hand with conventional disarmament; small and medium-size States were entitled to maintain their necessary forces for national defence; the disarmament process should in no way jeopardize the independence, sovereignty and security of any State; disarmament agreements should include strict and effective measures for international verification; and all States should participate on an equal footing in the discussion, negotiation and supervision of the implementation of disarmament agreements.

The representative of Algeria stated that his country had always worked towards the achievement of disarmament through concrete measures implemented within a global framework, in which the United Nations would play a central role, in order to attain the major objective of general and complete disarmament. Accordingly, expressing certain doubts about partial measures, Algeria emphasized the importance of the overall approach because it was profoundly convinced that a world-wide threat needed a world-wide response.

In the context of the item concerning the observance of Disarmament Week, El Salvador, on behalf of the Latin American Group of States, stressed that the world had become more insecure because of the

arms race. Pleading for détente, El Salvador added that a greater degree of co-operation among States could bring about a reduction in armaments and thus a situation closer to the concept of general and complete disarmament. While agreeing that general and complete disarmament must be the final objective, Uruguay stressed that it could not be pursued in a vacuum, disregarding tensions and conflicts. The accumulation of weapons could not be dissociated from the consideration of political conditions even though their accumulation, in turn, aggravated tensions. Uruguay therefore felt that progress in the disarmament process was dependent upon realistic negotiations conducted in good faith and in parallel in various forums, which would complement each other and lead finally to the goal of general and complete disarmament. It hoped to see that objective achieved or consolidated through the United Nations and enshrined in an international instrument. Recognizing the difficulties that existed in attaining it, however, Uruguay resolutely supported measures leading towards it, even if they were only partial.

Speaking on behalf of the Group of Western European and Other States on the occasion of Disarmament Week, France, while recognizing the difficulty of the endeavour, reaffirmed the Group's support for all efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament in a more harmonious and united international community. Denmark, for its part, recalled that paragraph 8 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session restated that the final goal was general and complete disarmament under effective international control. However, the immediate goal was that of the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race and clear a path towards lasting peace. With regard to the conventional arms race, Denmark added that paragraph 81 of the Final Document stipulated that, "together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament".

The representative of Bulgaria stated that the Eastern European countries had always supported efforts of the international community towards the attainment of the ultimate goal of disarmament, namely, general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It added that it had supported as early as 1962 the initiative of the Soviet Union for the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union, for its part, stated that while it attached primary importance to urgent measures to avert the danger of nuclear war and to halt the arms race, it also persistently advocated preparations for and the implementation of decidedly more far-reaching steps in the sphere of the limitation of armaments and disarmament, up to and including general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. After reminding the members of the Committee that his country had, a quarter of a century earlier, proposed such a treaty, the representative of the Soviet Union stated that that proposal was still valid.

A few delegations expressed some scepticism regarding the effectiveness of the work of the First Committee in view of the lack of results in the disarmament field. Thus, in the context of the need for a recommitment to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the representative of Belgium observed that the Charter established a universal framework within which harmonious international relations were to develop, thereby making a high level of armaments unnecessary; however, all knew what had been the result, and that it was not because States lacked the means to achieve at least a progressive elimination of some kinds of weapons, if not general and complete disarmament, but because they were not making good use of the means available. It seemed, in Belgium's view, that the search for what was possible, which was the very crux of any negotiations, was increasingly being sacrificed to mere rhetoric. The representative of Trinidad and Tobago stressed that the world was on the brink of a nuclear holocaust primarily because negotiations and discussion on disarmament were characterized by short-sightedness. Within the United Nations, the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament had become obscured by short-term aims and objectives and the creation of organs and sub-committees whose tasks became ends in themselves, while resolutions adopted were unenforceable or had little real impact on the fundamental problem. He added that it should be patently obvious that what was needed was not a proliferation of resolutions designed primarily to score points over the other side, but a consensus on a policy through which to achieve general and complete disarmament and establish and maintain international peace and security. Similarly, speaking about a steadily growing "avalanche" of draft resolutions in the First Committee, Malta expressed its concern that the Committee was merely substituting an accumulation of paper for the far more elusive and demanding, but much more rewarding, agreement necessary for substantive, "implementable" ideas that could truly contribute to the cause of disarmament. In its view, the proliferation of draft resolutions should be stopped and efforts should be made to select only those which were fully responsive to current needs and were designed to promote positive areas for concentrated attention.

In 1983, 12 draft resolutions were submitted to the First Committee under the agenda item entitled "General and complete disarmament" between 28 October and 11 November and introduced in the First Committee at its 21st, 26th, 28th and 33rd meetings, from 2 to 17 November. Ten of them were approved by the Committee and recommended for adoption by the General Assembly. All of the draft resolutions recommended—some following substantive revision—by the First Committee were adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December as resolutions 38/188 A to 38/188 J.

Of the 10 resolutions adopted, 2 are discussed in this chapter and 8 are dealt with in later subject chapters, as follows:

- (a) In this chapter, beginning on the page shown—
 - (i) 38/188 F (Curbing the naval arms race: limitation and reduction of naval

armaments and extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans), page 60;

- (ii) 38/188 J (Institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament), page 62; and

(b) In later chapters (chapter number shown)—

- (i) 38/188 A (Study on conventional disarmament), chapter XXIII;
- (ii) 38/188 B (Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof), chapter XX;
- (iii) 38/188 C (Measures to provide objective information on military capabilities), chapter XXI;
- (iv) 38/188 D (Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons), chapter XV;
- (v) 38/188 E (Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes), chapter V;
- (vi) 38/188 G (Study on the naval arms race), chapter XXIII;
- (vii) 38/188 H (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (Study of concepts of security)), chapter XXIII;
- (viii) 38/188 I (Review of and supplement to the *Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects*), chapter XXIII.

With regard to the remaining two draft resolutions submitted, the sponsors of the draft entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space and prohibition of anti-satellite systems”—one of three submitted in that general subject area— withdrew it and those of the draft concerning the statute of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research decided not to seek action on it at the current session. Those draft resolutions are discussed in chapters XVI and XXII respectively.

The draft resolution entitled “Limitation of naval activities: limitation and reduction of naval armaments, extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans” was submitted in the First Committee on 11 November by Bulgaria, Democratic Yemen, the German Democratic Republic, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Poland and Viet Nam. On 23 November, the same sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution in which the first part of the title was changed to “Curbing the naval arms race:” and a number of textual changes were made placing greater emphasis on the nuclear aspects of the naval arms race and the need for negotiations to include the nuclear-weapon States but, at the same time, deleting a reference in the earlier version to the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea as zones of peace. The revised draft was later also sponsored by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Syrian Arab Republic. On 17 November, in introducing the initial draft on behalf of the sponsors, the representative of Bulgaria stated that they felt that the international community could no longer remain indifferent to the serious threat to international peace and security posed by the continuing escalation of the naval arms race. Further, he stressed that the sophistication of naval armaments and naval warfare had a destabilizing effect on the international situation and increased the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences for all mankind. Historical

experience showed that the growing military presence and naval activities in the world's oceans adversely affected the security of international sea lanes, increased their vulnerability and impeded peaceful maritime activities. In the current strained international situation, Bulgaria went on, it was especially necessary to adopt urgent measures aimed at substantially limiting naval activities, reducing naval armaments and extending confidence-building measures to seas and oceans. Aware that reaching agreement on those points would be a complex, multilateral process, the sponsors believed it was time to begin — which was the idea behind the operative part of the draft — by appealing to States to refrain from enlarging their naval activities in areas of conflict or tension or far from their shores, and to recognize the urgent need to start negotiations on the limitation and reduction of naval armaments and the extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans.

On 25 November in the First Committee, the representative of Bulgaria explained that the revisions made in the original draft, which were the result of later consultations, emphasized further the necessity of ending the naval arms race while omitting some provisions dealing with regional aspects of the problem of peace and security of seas and oceans, and were aimed at strengthening the basic thrust of the text.

Several delegations explained their position before or after the voting in the First Committee. Somalia said it would abstain because it found the draft to be highly selective by implying that international peace and security were endangered solely by the escalation of the naval arms race. Somalia believed that other serious developments such as the introduction of massive foreign forces into the territories of non-aligned States and the use of extra-regional surrogate troops for the purpose of destabilizing the territorial integrity and national independence of militarily weak countries should also have been taken into consideration. Costa Rica abstained for similar reasons to those put forward by Somalia, and was especially concerned about the wording of the preambular paragraph which referred to extending confidence-building measures to seas and oceans. It pointed out that that was a question about which one could not easily be specific, as that which inspired confidence in some might decrease it in others; it all depended on which Power was deploying its military forces and where. Oman, too, abstained because it found the draft to be unbalanced and highly selective and to contain unhelpful wording which could not be considered as providing a step towards achieving disarmament. India also explained its abstention on the grounds that it did not feel that the singling out of naval activities from amongst weapons systems in general was the right approach to take for progress in the field of disarmament.

The Congo, which voted affirmatively, stated that it shared the concerns of the sponsors since the world was witnessing in all its oceans not merely an increase in naval forces, but also many military manoeuvres carried out by air and sea forces. Argentina, also voting in favour, considered that the draft resolution referred to very timely issues such as the recent buildup in naval deployments and their consequences, and that it

was highly appropriate for the United Nations to concern itself with that disturbing question.

The First Committee approved the revised draft resolution on 25 November by a recorded vote of 57 to 20 (mostly Western countries), with 35 abstentions, and the General Assembly adopted it on 20 December by a recorded vote of 73 to 19, with 44 abstentions, as resolution 38/188 F. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Convinced that all channels of the arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race, should be effectively covered by the efforts to halt and reverse it,

Disturbed by the growing threat to international peace and security posed by the continuing escalation of the naval arms race, especially in its nuclear aspects,

Aware that the growing military presence and naval activities of some States in conflict areas or far from their own shores increase the tension in these regions and could adversely affect the security of the international sea lanes through these areas and the exploitation of marine resources,

Alarmed by the ever more frequent use of naval formations (units, fleets, forces) for the demonstration of force and as an instrument of pressure against sovereign States or of interference in their internal affairs, thus threatening their vital security interests, independence and territorial integrity,

Firmly convinced that the undertaking of urgent practical steps to curb military confrontation at sea would serve the interests of international peace, security and prevention of nuclear war,

Convinced that the progress at the ongoing bilateral negotiations on limitation and reduction of strategic armaments could, *inter alia*, facilitate the efforts to restrict dangerous destabilizing naval activities and the naval arms race,

Aware of the numerous initiatives and concrete proposals to undertake agreed measures aimed at limiting naval activities, limiting and reducing naval armaments and extending confidence-building measures to seas and oceans,

Believing that measures in this field would be a significant contribution to the efforts to strengthen international security and prevent war, especially nuclear war,

Reaffirming that seas and oceans, being of vital importance for mankind, should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes,

1. *Appeals* to all Member States, in particular the major naval Powers, to refrain from enlarging their naval activities in areas of conflict or tension, or far from their own shores;

2. *Recognizes* the urgent need to start negotiations with the participation of the major naval Powers, the nuclear-weapon States in particular, and other interested States on the limitation of naval activities, the limitation and reduction of naval armaments, taking into due account the nuclear aspect of the naval arms race, and the extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans, especially to regions with the busiest sea lanes or regions where the probability of conflict situations is high;

3. *Invites* the Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than June 1984, their views concerning modalities for holding such negotiations;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session a report based on the replies of Member States called for under paragraph 3 above;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session an item entitled "Curbing the naval arms race: limitation and reduction of naval armaments and extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans".

The draft resolution entitled "Institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament" was submitted in the First Committee on

11 November by Cuba and Czechoslovakia, which were later joined as sponsors by the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia. In introducing the draft in the First Committee, the representative of Czechoslovakia stated that its overall objective was to enhance the efficient utilization of the existing international disarmament machinery by ensuring that the specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system were involved in various aspects of disarmament and related international security issues. He believed that the Department for Disarmament Affairs should take full account of the possibilities they offered with regard to studies and information on disarmament. Further, he stressed that all the efforts within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign could hardly be complete without the full, active participation of the specialized agencies, while broadening their contribution to disarmament would enhance their importance. In closing, he expressed the hope that the draft would be adopted by consensus.

On 21 November, before the First Committee proceeded to vote on the proposition, Czechoslovakia announced orally certain revisions which had been suggested by a number of delegations, including the addition of a new third preambular paragraph and some other drafting changes in the text. Hungary thereafter stated that it attached very great importance to co-operation between the various agencies and institutions and commended the excellent co-operation and co-ordination manifested between the different units of the Secretariat dealing with the vital issues of disarmament and international security. It accordingly supported the draft resolution and expressed the hope that it would be adopted by consensus. Pakistan stated that while the decisive factor for achieving real progress in disarmament was the political will of States, institutional arrangements and their effective utilization could also play an important supportive role. Pointing out that a number of resolutions on organizational matters had been adopted since 1978 to help the United Nations fulfil its responsibilities in disarmament, Pakistan referred in detail to the five parts of resolution 37/99 K of 13 December 1982 and the related report of the Secretary-General²⁰ on the transformation of the former Centre for Disarmament into the Department for Disarmament Affairs, and he noted that nearly all the resolution's provisions had been implemented.

In connection with the vote on the draft resolution, the representative of the United States declared that his Government would oppose it because its negative effects would be twofold: first, it would hamper progress on important work being undertaken in specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system by detracting from the focus of those bodies; and, secondly, it would impede progress towards the adoption of concrete, effective and verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament in the agencies and institutions which had competence in that field. Discussion of non-germane dis-

²⁰ A/38/401.

armament matters, in the United States view, could cause the noble work of the specialized agencies to be held in abeyance, and the agencies to become over-politicized. The American representative added that the shared objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control was paramount and necessitated serious consideration in the most appropriate and competent bodies, namely, the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament. Canada, in expressing its intention to vote against the draft resolution, also stated that arms control and disarmament matters should be discussed in those bodies and IAEA which were specifically mandated to deal with disarmament and to which properly accredited experts were able to bring the necessary knowledge for consideration. Canada felt strongly that it was ill-advised to introduce political issues into United Nations functional bodies, such as the World Health Organization (WHO).

Although it viewed very favourably the consideration of concrete, case-by-case studies by the specialized agencies, such as those on the effects of nuclear war on the environment or on health by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) or WHO, Sweden abstained in the voting on the draft resolution because it had reservations regarding what constituted a general recommendation in the text to the specialized agencies to broaden further their contribution, within their areas of competence, to the cause of arms limitation and disarmament. It further added that unqualified recommendations to international organizations to broaden their activities on political issues, no matter how important those issues might be, would open them up to insecurity and the potential politicization of their normal operations.

Speaking on behalf of the ten members of the European Community, Greece observed that it was the view of the Ten—one which was widely shared—that the Department for Disarmament Affairs should provide the central guidance in co-ordinating disarmament activities within the United Nations system and in maintaining liaison with other organizations and research institutes; at the same time, the Department should take into account the possibilities offered by the specialized agencies with regard to disarmament. During the general debate the Ten had expressed their view that, while the work of those agencies involved certain aspects of disarmament within their specific areas of responsibility, it was desirable to make better use of available resources in areas in which the United Nations and, in particular, the Committee on Disarmament were already working. They considered that there was a danger that the central role and primary responsibility of the Organization in the sphere of disarmament would be diluted if the proposed draft resolution were adopted as it stood, and that it would detract from the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the Under-Secretary-General in charge of the Department for Disarmament Affairs. For those reasons the Ten believed that the draft did not facilitate or further effective co-ordination to the benefit of the United Nations and they could not vote in favour of it.

The First Committee approved the draft resolution, as orally amended, on 21 November by a recorded vote of 80 to 16 (Western countries), with 15 abstentions, and the General Assembly adopted it on 20 December by a recorded vote of 114 to 17, with 12 abstentions, as resolution 38/188 J. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Convinced that the United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament and should, accordingly, play a more active role in this field,

Reaffirming that the international machinery should be utilized more effectively to promote the cause of disarmament,

Reaffirming also the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum,

Stressing that the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat should take full account of the possibilities offered by specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system with regard to studies and information on disarmament,

Stressing again the close relationship between matters concerning international security and disarmament and the interest in close co-operation between the units in the Secretariat dealing with them,

Convinced that all possible avenues should be effectively utilized for the cause of preventing war, in particular nuclear war, and achieving disarmament,

Reaffirming further the close link existing between disarmament and development,

Convinced that disarmament would contribute over the long term to the effective economic and social development of all States, in particular developing countries, by contributing to reducing the economic disparities between developed and developing countries and establishing the new international economic order on the basis of justice, equity and co-operation, and towards solving other global problems,

Convinced also that there is a close relationship between the development of international co-operation in various fields, such as trade, economic development, environmental protection and health and the prevention of war, in particular nuclear war, and the achievement of arms limitation and disarmament,

Reaffirming its invitation to the relevant specialized agencies to intensify activities within their areas of competence to disseminate information on the consequences of the arms race,

Taking note with appreciation of various activities carried out by United Nations organizations and agencies within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign,

Commending the report of the World Health Organization entitled "Effects of nuclear war on health and health services", as well as appropriate efforts undertaken by other specialized agencies,

1. *Invites* the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to broaden further their contribution, within their areas of competence, to the cause of arms limitation and disarmament;

2. *Reaffirms* the necessity of ensuring constant co-ordination of activities carried out in the field of disarmament by various entities of the United Nations;

3. *Invites* the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session on the activities carried out by them in implementation of the present resolution;

4. *Recommends* to the Secretary-General that, in the agenda of his periodic meetings with the executive heads of the specialized agencies, he include an item relative to disarmament, in the consideration of which the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs would participate;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session an item entitled "Contribution of the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to the cause of arms limitation and disarmament".

Some other draft resolutions were introduced in the Committee under certain agenda items which, although not dealing primarily with disarmament, covered related security issues and contained aspects relevant to disarmament questions.

Those resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly as resolutions 38/77 (Question of Antarctica), 38/189 (Strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region), 38/190 (Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security) and 38/191 (Implementation of the collective security provisions of the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security). Under the last-mentioned item a second resolution, which was not put to the vote, was submitted and introduced by Cyprus on 5 December, and revised on 7 December.²¹ In introducing the proposal, Cyprus stated that in the light of the unprecedented crisis there was a need for a meeting to establish understanding and co-operation between the two super-Powers, not in disarmament or the reduction of armaments—on which they could never agree, as had been proved—but in international security, which was a consideration that had been ignored and bypassed. Under the revised text, the Assembly would, *inter alia*, have called on "the two major Powers, now in process of confrontation, to hold a high level meeting in an effort to overcome the present tension and move in a positive spirit towards mutual understanding and co-operation on the global issues of peace and survival, through a duly strengthened United Nations", and upon all other Member States, particularly those of the two major military alliances, to support the holding of such a meeting. On 9 December Cyprus withdrew the draft resolution, since it felt that at that time the two major Powers were unfortunately not prepared to meet or exercise the co-operation required for implementation of the proposal.

Resolution 38/77, on the question of Antarctica, was sponsored in draft form by Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey and Uganda and was adopted by both the First Committee and the Assembly without a vote. By the resolution, the General Assembly, affirming that Antarctica should continue for ever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, requested the Secretary-General, in paragraphs 1 and 2, to prepare a comprehensive, factual and objective study on all aspects of Antarctica, taking fully into account the Antarctic Treaty²² system and other relevant factors, and to seek the views of all Member States in its preparation.

The draft resolution concerning security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region, which led to resolution 38/189, underwent three

²¹ See A/38/644, paras. 6, 11 and 14, which include the draft texts.

²² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402, No. 5778, p. 72; the text is also found in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*.

revisions and was ultimately sponsored by Algeria, the Bahamas, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malta, Romania, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. It was introduced by the representative of Malta on 9 December. The draft resolution was approved by the Committee on 9 December without a vote and adopted by the Assembly on 20 December, also without a vote. By the resolution, the General Assembly stressed the importance of the strengthening of peace and security in the Mediterranean region and its impact on international peace and security and called for strengthening co-operation among the States of the region and between them and all other States. The measures which relate most closely to disarmament matters appear in paragraphs 1 to 4 of resolution 38/189, as follows:

The General Assembly,

. . .

1. *Recognizes:*

(a) That the security of the Mediterranean is closely linked with international peace and security;

(b) That further efforts are necessary for the reduction of tension and of armaments and for the creation of conditions of security and fruitful co-operation in all fields for all countries and peoples of the Mediterranean, on the basis of the principles of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, security, non-intervention and non-interference, non-violation of international borders, non-use of force or threat of use of force, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, the peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for sovereignty over natural resources;

(c) The need for just and viable solutions to existing problems and crises in the area, on the basis of the provisions of the Charter and of relevant resolutions of the United Nations, the withdrawal of foreign forces of occupation and the right of peoples under colonial or foreign domination to self-determination and independence;

2. *Encourages* efforts to intensify existing and promote new forms of co-operation in various fields, particularly those aimed at reducing tension and strengthening confidence and security in the region;

3. *Urges* Mediterranean States to inform the Secretary-General of any concerted efforts aimed at promoting and strengthening security and co-operation in the Mediterranean;

4. *Urges* all States to co-operate with Mediterranean States in efforts to enhance security and co-operation in the Mediterranean;

. . .

The draft resolution entitled "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security" was sponsored by 23 non-aligned States and Romania and submitted in the First Committee on 5 December. After a revised draft was submitted on 8 December, the Committee approved the draft resolution, as orally revised, on 9 December, by a roll-call vote of 108 to none, with 12 abstentions (Belgium, Canada, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States). The Assembly adopted the draft resolution on 20 December, as resolution 38/190, by a recorded vote of 135 to none, with 12 abstentions. The resolution called, as had the similar one of the previous year, for certain measures to be adopted with the purpose of implementing the Declaration on the Strengthening of International

Security embodied in resolution 2734 (XXV) of 16 December 1970. Those which relate most closely to disarmament matters are the following:

The General Assembly,

...

2. *Again calls upon* all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, to take immediate steps aimed at promoting and using effectively the system of collective security as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations, together with measures for the effective halting of the arms race and for the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

3. *Reiterates* that the current deterioration of the international situation requires an effective Security Council and, to that end, emphasizes the great urgency of examining all existing mechanisms and working methods in order to enhance the authority and enforcement capacity of the Council, in accordance with the Charter;

...

7. *Invites* all States, in particular the major military Powers and States members of military alliances, to refrain, especially in critical situations and in crisis areas, from actions, including military activities and manoeuvres, conceived within the context of big-Power confrontation and used as a means of pressure on, threat to and destabilization of other States and regions;

...

11. *Calls upon* all States, particularly the members of the Security Council, to take appropriate and effective measures to promote the fulfilment of the objective of the denuclearization of Africa in order to avert the serious danger which the nuclear capability of South Africa constitutes to the African States, in particular the front-line States, as well as to international peace and security;

12. *Welcomes* the successful conclusion of the Madrid meeting of representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, held from 11 November 1980 to 9 September 1983, which has demonstrated that political will to negotiate is necessary as a contribution to the strengthening of peace and security not only in Europe but also internationally, and expresses the hope that the conference to be held at Stockholm, beginning on 17 January 1984, the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the continent with the greatest concentration of armaments and military forces, will achieve significant and positive results;

...

14. *Calls upon* the great Powers to engage in constructive negotiations in good faith and to abandon policies of confrontation which have hitherto given rise to tension and mistrust;

...

By the fourth resolution, 38/191, which was ultimately sponsored by 20 mostly non-aligned States²³ and adopted by a recorded vote of 109 to 20, with 18 abstentions, the Assembly decided "to establish an *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Implementation of the Collective Security Provisions of the Charter of the United Nations for the purpose of exploring ways and means of implementing the said provisions"; requested the Secretary-General urgently to invite the views and comments of Member States on the matter and requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee to submit a progress report to the Security Council and to the Assembly, and a final report to

²³ Bahamas, Bangladesh, Cyprus, Ecuador, Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Nigeria, Qatar, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Uruguay and Zambia.

the General Assembly at its fortieth session, in 1985. As a procedural resolution, it must be regarded as not having direct or immediate relevance to disarmament.

The documents placed before the Assembly or its First Committee under the agenda item "General and complete disarmament" and not already mentioned in this chapter or in chapter I²⁴ were:

(a) Twelfth report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions concerning the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research;²⁵

(b) Report of the Secretary-General on measures to provide objective information on military capabilities;²⁶

(c) Report of the Secretary-General on the study on conventional disarmament;²⁷

(d) Note by the Secretary-General, transmitting the report of the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research;²⁸

(e) Letter dated 30 December 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a report of President Ceausescu on Romania's foreign policy;²⁹

(f) Letter dated 24 December 1982 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting an Appeal from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Parliaments, Governments, Political Parties and Peoples of the World;³⁰

(g) Letter dated 7 January 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a Political Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty;³¹

(h) Letter dated 5 April 1983 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a transcript of the press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists by Mr. A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR;³²

(i) Letter dated 8 April 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the Final Communiqué of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, adopted at Prague on 7 April 1983;³³

(j) Letter dated 27 April 1983 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the text of an interview by General Secretary Y. V. Andropov to *Der Spiegel*;³⁴

(k) Note verbale dated 19 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the text of an appeal for peace by the Bishops of Austria;³⁵

(l) Note verbale dated 7 June 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to

²⁴ It should be noted that documents are frequently placed before the General Assembly and relevant committees under two or more agenda items. Accordingly, see chapter I above, footnotes 35, 38, 40-43, 45, and 46, for additional documents presented under the item entitled "General and complete disarmament".

²⁵ A/38/7/Add.11.

²⁶ A/38/368 and Add.1 and 2.

²⁷ A/38/437.

²⁸ A/38/475.

²⁹ A/38/57.

³⁰ A/38/59.

³¹ A/38/67-S/15556 and Corr.1.

³² A/38/139.

³³ A/38/151-S/15696.

³⁴ A/38/171.

³⁵ A/38/237.

the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a letter from the Swedish Ecumenical Council, containing an appeal for peace and disarmament;³⁶

(m) Letter dated 20 June 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, refuting various references to Israel in document A/CN.10/43/Rev.1;³⁷

(n) Letter dated 8 July 1983 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a report on a meeting of leading Party and State figures from the Warsaw Treaty countries, held at Moscow on 28 June 1983;³⁸

(o) Letter dated 29 September 1983 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a statement by President Y. V. Andropov;³⁹

(p) Letter dated 27 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the Communiqué of the Thirty-seventh Session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, held at Berlin from 18 to 20 October 1983, and the statement by the Prime Ministers of the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance;⁴⁰

(q) Letter dated 25 November 1983 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a statement of President Y. V. Andropov;⁴¹

(r) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the communiqué of the meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held at Sofia on 13 and 14 October 1983;⁴²

(s) Letter dated 28 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the text of the replies by President Y. V. Andropov to questions from *Pravda*.⁴³

Conclusion

In 1983, general and complete disarmament under effective international control continued to be regarded as the ultimate objective of all disarmament efforts. Member States often referred to the objective by expressing their support of it but, at the same time, frequently acknowledged that it was an objective which could not be achieved in the near future. General and complete disarmament was also reaffirmed as an ultimate goal in a number of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session. However, due to the unfavourable political atmosphere and difficult international relations during the year, particularly between the two super-Powers, the Member States were more critical of and more sceptical about the ongoing efforts in disarmament. The lack of results in the various forums, including the failure of the General Assembly to make tangible progress on the major established items on its disarmament agenda, caused growing concern among Member States. Critical

³⁶ A/38/266.

³⁷ A/38/279.

³⁸ A/38/292-S/15862.

³⁹ A/38/459-S/16017.

⁴⁰ A/38/537.

⁴¹ A/38/607-S/16182.

⁴² A/C.1/38/6.

⁴³ A/C.1/38/8.

remarks were voiced especially about the impasse in the Committee on Disarmament during the five-year period of its existence and the ever-increasing number of resolutions before the General Assembly which seemingly have little or no impact on the arms race.

While Member States continued to support a broad approach to disarmament through their consideration of general and complete disarmament and the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, they recognized more clearly that urgent, partial measures were required in addition, especially steps to halt the nuclear arms race and begin nuclear disarmament.

However, they also understood that it was necessary to create an international climate in which confrontation and tension would be replaced by co-operation and mutual and increased confidence, in order to overcome the impasse and create conditions favourable for partial and gradual arms control and disarmament measures which would, in turn, lead at some later stage to a situation closer to the goal of general and complete disarmament.

Comprehensive programme of disarmament

Introduction

AS THE UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP BECAME AWARE that the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament was unattainable in the near future, the emphasis in their disarmament efforts after the mid-1960s focused more and more on partial measures. However, the interest in a comprehensive approach was not abandoned and in the late 1960s it received a new impetus. In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization for 1968-1969,¹ the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, included a proposal for the designation of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade and, in that context, expressed the view that, utilizing the provisional agenda agreed upon for the newly expanded CCD, the General Assembly could establish a specific programme and timetable for dealing with all aspects of arms limitation and disarmament. The Assembly considered that idea and, disappointed with the meagre results in the ongoing disarmament negotiations due, at least in part, to the continuing unfavourable political climate, it adopted resolution 2602 E (XXIV) on 16 December 1969. By that resolution, it declared the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade and, *inter alia*, requested the CCD, while continuing intensive negotiations with a view to reaching the widest possible agreement on collateral measures, to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which, in the words of the resolution, "would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations".

Consequently, the CCD debated the question at its sessions in the period between 1970 and 1978 and a number of specific proposals were submitted, including, for instance, a 1970 joint draft comprehensive programme of disarmament by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia,² as well as suggestions contained in working papers presented that same year by Italy³ and the Netherlands.⁴ In the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/7601/Add.1)*.

² *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970, Annex C, document CCD/313*.

³ *Ibid.*, document CCD/309.

⁴ *Ibid.*, document CCD/276.

session, in 1970, Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia proposed a comprehensive programme of disarmament⁵ similar to that submitted earlier by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia to the CCD. At that session, the Assembly considered the various proposals and, by its resolution 2661 C (XXV), recommended that the CCD take them into account in its further work and its negotiations.

The efforts in the CCD culminated in the spring session in 1978 with the establishment of a Working Group to elaborate a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament. Parallel to the developments in the CCD, the question of a comprehensive programme was further discussed in the General Assembly, first under the item on general and complete disarmament which appeared each year on the agenda and then, starting in 1975, under the item concerning the implementation of the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade.

In 1978, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly provided a new impetus to efforts for the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In the Programme of Action of the Final Document of that session,⁶ the Assembly stated:

109. Implementation of these priorities should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the field of disarmament. Negotiations on general and complete disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. With this purpose in mind, the Committee on Disarmament will undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. The comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures for ensuring that the General Assembly is kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations including an appraisal of the situation when appropriate and, in particular, a continuing review of the implementation of the programme.

To provide further guidelines, the Assembly entrusted the Disarmament Commission, in paragraph 118 of the Final Document, with the task of considering the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament to be submitted as recommendations to the Assembly and, through it, to the further enlarged negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament. The Assembly reaffirmed that task for the Disarmament Commission with its adoption of resolution 33/71 H on 14 December 1978, at its thirty-third session.

The Disarmament Commission in 1979 successfully fulfilled its mandate by adopting by consensus the "Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament"⁷ which, after examination by the General

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, agenda item 27, document A/8191.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*, para. 19; the "Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament", as agreed upon and recommended by the Disarmament Commission, is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, appendix II.

Assembly, was transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament. The “Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament” contained the following parts: “I. Introduction”; “II. Objectives, principles and priorities”; “III. Measures”; “IV. Machinery and procedures”; and “V. General”. By resolution 34/83 B, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to initiate, at its following session, negotiations on the comprehensive programme, with a view to completing its elaboration before the second special session on disarmament, to be held in 1982, and, in doing so, to take as a basis the recommendations adopted by the Disarmament Commission.

The comprehensive programme was considered by the Committee on Disarmament at its 1980, 1981 and 1982 sessions. In the course of the discussions on the relevant agenda items in plenary meetings, as well as in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which the Committee first established in 1980, many ideas were expressed on the form and content of the programme and were reflected in numerous working papers, which dealt either with the programme as a whole or with particular aspects of it. While agreement was achieved in certain areas — specifically, in chapters on objectives, principles and priorities — fundamental differences emerged with respect to the main elements of the programme, that is, measures and stages of implementation, including the question of time phases. Differences also arose regarding the chapter on machinery and procedures. In addition to those substantive matters, the “nature” of the programme gave rise to divergent views; the basic question at issue was what kind of commitment the programme would entail.

The draft comprehensive programme of disarmament prepared by the Committee on Disarmament and submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session⁸ comprised six main parts: “I. Introduction or Preamble (to be elaborated subsequently)”; “II. Objectives”; “III. Principles”; “IV. Priorities”; “V. Measures and stages of implementation”; and “VI. Machinery and procedures”. The text constituted an assemblage of the divergent views of individual States or groups of States in one complex working document. In parts II to VI of the draft, formulations reflecting all the differing positions and possible alternative texts were placed in square brackets. With the exception of the brief section on priorities, all sections showed many points of disagreement. Of these, the most significant were those that had already arisen in areas where the main, fundamental questions were at issue, that is, those related to measures and stages of implementation, time-frames and the nature of the programme.

In 1982, at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament had been given a prominent place on the agenda. Many comments had been made on the programme in plenary meetings, and its elaboration had been entrusted

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-12/2)*, appendix I.

by the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Twelfth Special Session to Working Group I which, for its part, established four open-ended drafting groups to negotiate and finalize various parts of the draft submitted by the Committee on Disarmament. The four groups made intensive efforts to achieve agreement on their assigned parts of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, but none of them succeeded in completing its task.

Thus at the special session it did not prove possible to resolve the numerous disagreements among Member States, many of which concerned such fundamental questions as: what the starting point for negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms should be and which measures could best bring about the cessation of the nuclear arms race; whether or not the conclusion of a nuclear-test-ban treaty was a matter of urgency; which nuclear weapons should be subject to limitations and reductions in Europe; in what way non-nuclear-weapon States could be involved in nuclear disarmament negotiations; how further proliferation of nuclear weapons could be prevented; whether nuclear-weapon-free zones could be established outside the framework of a nuclear disarmament process; which countries should be the first to negotiate conventional arms reductions and disarmament; which conventional weapons should be dealt with first and how to limit international transfers of such weapons; what steps should be taken to prevent an arms race on the seabed and in outer space; and what the role of the United Nations in monitoring compliance with disarmament agreements might be.

The sections of the programme which were agreed upon were, in many cases, taken from the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session and were related to the objectives and principles of a comprehensive programme of disarmament rather than to concrete measures. Given that agreement appeared possible only on what were essentially non-controversial propositions, it became clear as the discussion progressed that there would not be sufficient time to benefit from debating the time-frame for a comprehensive programme or its legal implications.

In the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session, the Assembly, with regard to future action on the comprehensive programme, stated:

63. To this end, the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament is hereby referred back to the Committee on Disarmament, together with the views expressed and the progress achieved on the subject at the special session. The Committee on Disarmament is requested to submit a revised draft comprehensive programme of disarmament to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.⁹

After the second special session on disarmament, the Committee decided, on 5 August 1982, to re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to submitting a revised draft programme to the Assem-

⁹ *Ibid.*, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32.

bly at its thirty-eighth session. At the same meeting, the Committee reappointed Ambassador Alfonso García Robles of Mexico as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group; it did not resume substantive work in 1982.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1983

Having been re-established by the Committee on Disarmament on 5 August 1982, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament in 1983 held 12 meetings between 16 February and 19 August under the chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico. As the basis for its work, and in accordance with its mandate, the Group took the texts that resulted from the negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, which reflected the persistence of differences of opinion on various aspects of the programme.¹⁰ In addition, the Group had before it the relevant documents submitted during previous sessions of the Committee on Disarmament. At plenary meetings on 31 March and 14 April it decided to invite the following States not members of the Committee, upon their request, to participate in the meetings of the Group: Austria, Burundi, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey.

The *Ad Hoc* Working Group decided to establish contact groups to proceed with the elaboration of the various sections of the programme as follows: Contact Group on Objectives, Contact Group on Principles, Contact Group on Priorities, Contact Group on Measures and Stages of Implementation and Contact Group on Machinery and Procedures. Although efforts were made in the Contact Groups to achieve agreement on the sections assigned to them, differences of view persisted. Further efforts to reconcile those differences were made in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group. In addition, informal consultations were held during June, July and August under the guidance of its Chairman.

In the time available, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group was not able to consider the introduction and agreed to include in the annex to its report the draft "Introduction" prepared by its Chairman during the twelfth special session of the General Assembly when he had been Chairman of the relevant Working Group, it being understood that the draft would be revised in the light of the overall content of the programme. Similarly, the Group was unable to deal with the questions of stages of implementation, time-frames and the nature of the programme.

In a number of areas where it was not possible to agree on new formulations, language similar to that of relevant paragraphs of the 1978 Final Document was used. The resulting texts were annexed to the Group's report, with those of a number of paragraphs left pending and the inclusion or placement of others to be decided at a later stage.

On 23 August, in submitting the report to the Committee together

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

with its annex entitled "Texts for the comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Working Group", the Chairman reviewed briefly the work of the Group as described above and emphasized that the proposed programme was much less ambitious than the draft submitted in 1982 to the Assembly at its twelfth special session (discussed above). He pointed out that, among other things, agreement had not yet been reached on the important question of stages of implementation, and he noted that all delegations, explicitly or tacitly, had reserved their final positions until their Governments had had time to study the programme as a whole. However, he considered that the draft programme might be of great value in enabling Governments to gain a clear idea, from a text entirely free of brackets, of the most that could be aspired to at the moment if it was desired that the comprehensive programme of disarmament receive the unanimous approval of all States Members of the United Nations. He noted that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group had decided that the programme should not "retreat" in any way, however minor, from the 1978 Final Document. Accordingly, the Chairman suggested that the General Assembly would have to choose between two alternatives: either to adopt the draft, despite its slimness, at its thirty-eighth session, after resolving the pending problems, or to return it to the Committee on Disarmament. In the latter case, he stated, it would be unrealistic to think that the multilateral negotiating body would be able to take up the matter again with any reasonable prospect of success within less than three years. The "Texts for the comprehensive programme of disarmament" is reproduced in appendix II of this volume.

At the same plenary meeting, on 23 August 1983, the Committee adopted the report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, which became an integral part of the Committee's report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.¹¹

Within the period during which the *Ad Hoc* Working Group was carrying out its work and primarily during the Committee's discussions on the item, from 1 February to 31 March and from 1 to 5 August,¹² many delegations referred in their statements to the comprehensive programme of disarmament, but none of them elaborated its position in detail.

A number of delegations expressed their disappointment that no agreement on a comprehensive programme had been reached at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, among them Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Many of the group of 21 specifically attached great importance to the elaboration of a comprehensive pro-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27)*, paras. 87 and 88; paragraph 88 embodies the report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group in 12 integral paragraphs and the "Texts for the comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Working Group" in an annex consisting of six chapters entitled: "I. Introduction", "II. Objectives", "III. Principles", "IV. Priorities", "V. Measures and stages of implementation" and "VI. Machinery and procedures".

¹² *Ibid.*, appendix III (CD/421), vols. I-V.

gramme of disarmament. In voicing its support of the efforts of the non-aligned countries in that regard, China pointed out near the end of the session that the text adopted still did not fully reflect the aspirations of those countries to promote disarmament through the conclusion of a comprehensive programme and, indicating that some of the deletions diminished its value, stressed that there was a need for its further improvement and consolidation. According to Pakistan, the draft programme fell far short of the requirements of a genuine disarmament process with the immediate goal, as agreed upon in paragraph 8 of the Final Document, of the elimination of the danger of nuclear war and the halting and reversing of the arms race to clear the path towards lasting peace; furthermore, it did not decisively provide for the implementation of specific measures which would firmly launch the Member States on the path towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Differences of opinion also remained evident on the substantive content of the draft programme and the procedure which should be followed by the General Assembly with regard to it.

Thus France, in its closing statement, stressed the belief that the document, as it stood, could not form the subject of agreement, even (for further consideration) *ad referendum*; despite that, it afforded a much improved basis compared with the version submitted to the General Assembly at the twelfth special session. The Federal Republic of Germany expressed various reservations concerning the proposed programme and agreed with the statement of the Chairman of the Working Group to the effect that acceptance of parts of the programme could not be expected until all the outstanding questions had been resolved. Similarly, the United States observed that the Committee on Disarmament had moved a step closer to the conclusion of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, but that some provisions of the proposed text required further negotiation.

In commenting upon the new shorter and simpler texts, the United Kingdom stressed that although many parts that it had objected to earlier were removed, much that it had considered important was also lost. In many cases the new text relied word for word, or with only very slight adaptation, on the text of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It questioned what those texts added to the programme of action already set out in the Final Document and whether selective quotations from that Document preserved its existing balance.

Two different opinions were expressed as to possible action by the Assembly regarding its request to the Committee on Disarmament to submit a revised draft comprehensive programme to it at its thirty-eighth session. A number of delegations expressed doubt that the Assembly would be able to deal with the item due to its complexity and the discussion already going on about the effectiveness of the work of the First Committee. Belgium questioned whether the introduction of such a complex topic — which in itself would merit very arduous negotiations —

would be in keeping with the wishes of the Member States about the organization of work in the First Committee. Similarly, the Federal Republic of Germany doubted whether a more substantial negotiating process could be undertaken by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session in view of the work-load before it. On the other hand, Pakistan regretted statements made by some delegations concerning their doubts about the possibility of completing and adopting the programme because of the General Assembly's heavy agenda, and expressed the hope that the Assembly would be able to find the time and appropriate ways and means to proceed to the adoption of the programme.

The delegations which commented on the Committee's handling of the item on the comprehensive programme following the adoption of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group's report, however, were virtually unanimous in commending the Group's Chairman for the manner in which he had handled a difficult task.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

At the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament was discussed mainly under the item entitled "Review of the implementation of recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session" and was commented upon by various delegations in the general debate either in plenary meetings or in the First Committee.¹³ All those who referred to the subject in the First Committee expressed their commitment to the continuation and completion of the elaboration of the programme; different views were expressed, however, on how to proceed with that work. The differences related to the method, place and timing.

The representative of Mexico, as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament in the Committee on Disarmament, reiterated his statement made in that body that: the proposed programme was much less ambitious than that submitted in 1982 to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session; the text of some paragraphs was still outstanding; no agreement had as yet been reached on the important question of the stages of implementation; and there had not been enough time to consider the draft introduction which had been prepared by him as Chairman of Working Group I of the special session of the General Assembly in 1982. He also repeated his observation, made in the Committee, to the effect that the General Assembly, at its current session, would have to choose between two courses of action. It could adopt the draft programme in spite of its modest nature, after resolving the outstanding problems through whatever procedure it deemed most appropriate, such as the creation of an open-ended working group to work simultaneously with the First Committee, or it could

¹³ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 103rd meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 41st meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

return the draft to the Committee on Disarmament, but in that case it should fully realize that it would be an illusion to believe that the Committee could consider it once again with any chance of success before at least three years had elapsed.

After referring to the two alternatives proposed by the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, Brazil suggested a third solution, namely, to consider the possibility of sending the draft programme to the Disarmament Commission. In suggesting that course of action, the representative had two reasons in mind: first, it should be recognized that the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva had failed in its endeavours and secondly, it was the United Nations Disarmament Commission which had established the guidelines for the elaboration of the programme and the whole membership of the United Nations was represented in that body. In Brazil's view, it was up to the whole membership of the United Nations to analyse and review the draft programme of disarmament.

Some representatives supported the proposal to consider and adopt the programme at the thirty-eighth session, while others preferred sending the draft back to the Committee on Disarmament. Thus, Egypt stressed that to overcome the current difficulties, negotiations should take place during the ongoing session on the parts of the programme not agreed upon in Geneva. It supported the proposal for the establishment of an open-ended working group to consider the matter during the following weeks and to present to the First Committee a report which would make it possible to judge the situation on the spot, as it were. Egypt attached special importance to the question of measures that would build the kind of confidence among States necessary to establish an atmosphere favourable to the achievement of real progress on disarmament.

Pakistan would have liked to see the work on the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament completed in the Committee on Disarmament, but unfortunately a number of important sections in the document had not been elaborated by the end of its 1983 session. According to Pakistan, the draft programme fell far short of the requirement of a genuine disarmament process with the immediate goal of eliminating the danger of a nuclear war and halting and reversing the arms race, nor did it provide for the implementation of specific measures, within an agreed timetable. However, it expressed a hope that the General Assembly would adopt the programme at the session in progress.

While Nigeria expressed its satisfaction that the Committee on Disarmament had been able to present a modified text of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, the Sudan regretted that, despite the efforts made by the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, the difficulties that had prevented the full establishment of that programme in its final version had not been resolved. It supported the proposal to smooth out differences and reconcile views on those questions on which there was as yet no agreement and to submit to the General Assembly at its current session a revised comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Contrary to those suggestions, Australia supported the idea of referring the comprehensive programme back to the Committee on Disarmament for further work when circumstances would be more promising and when a programme could be produced which would more nearly meet the aspirations of the international community. Similarly, France, supporting the proposal to continue the work on the programme in the Committee in Geneva, stated that the new draft prepared by the Chairman of the Working Group provided a very suitable basis for negotiations, but a certain number of questions would have to be resolved, particularly in the parts of the text related to the current bilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons. Argentina observed that the comprehensive programme of disarmament seemed to be turning into an increasingly remote goal. In spite of the fact that the draft had become more modest in its scope and provisions, it had been impossible thus far, in the existing international situation, to arrive at the essential consensus. However, it also supported the proposal to refer the subject back to the Committee on Disarmament.

A large number of delegations, while voicing various opinions on arrangements for future work on the programme, also referred to its substance. The most sceptical views on the draft were expressed by representatives of some non-aligned countries. Thus Algeria considered that although it had originally been conceived as a concrete framework for the implementation of the Programme of Action in the 1978 Final Document, the draft text currently before the Committee — a year and a half after the second special session on disarmament — looked more like a reprint of that Document than a set of concrete measures for its implementation. The reaffirmation of the substance of the Final Document in itself was important in the existing world situation, yet it was none the less true that all the important questions—such as the legal status of the programme, the definition of phases and the setting of a timetable for its implementation—remained, according to Algeria, untouched.

Cyprus stressed that the programme that had been prepared ignored the fundamental basis of the Final Document, namely, the question of security. According to Cyprus, security—effective collective security in accordance with the Charter—would have to be taken into account and would make disarmament possible. In its view, there was no possibility of reaching an agreement on disarmament negotiations straightaway without concurrent efforts, which were basic to any comprehensive programme of disarmament, to create international security.

Yugoslavia considered that there had been no progress in the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament because some of the participants in the negotiations were attempting to question certain crucial positions and conclusions contained in the unanimously adopted Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The comprehensive programme, according to Yugoslavia, should be an important element in the elaboration of the international strategy for disarmament and should offer a framework for substantive negotiations. Further, it should be a carefully worked-out

package of interrelated measures which would lead the international community towards general and complete disarmament. The programme should specify concrete action, encourage negotiations and formulate the goals and principles on which it was to be based, as well as the priorities. It should determine the measures whose implementation would lead to the achievement of its goals and certain mechanisms which would ensure consistent adherence to the obligations assumed, with its priorities being supplemented at subsequent stages. In that context, Yugoslavia considered that the Committee on Disarmament was the appropriate and competent body to conduct further negotiations on the matter.

China felt that the new draft provided a good foundation for further negotiations. However, there was still room for improvement, in particular, the provisions concerning the specific responsibilities of the States with the largest arsenals had yet to be formulated. Supporting the non-aligned countries' hope to promote disarmament through the preparation of a package of interrelated disarmament measures that would lessen and eliminate the danger of war and safeguard international peace and security, China believed that the key to the success of the endeavour still lay in the political will of those countries with the largest arsenals.

The Soviet Union stressed that from the beginning of work on the programme it was apparent that a group of States was unwilling to agree to the inclusion of highly important practical measures to halt the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and wished, in effect, to revise the priorities set out in the Final Document. Although it had been possible to bring the positions of the sides closer together in 1983, serious difficulties still existed with regard to a number of cardinal provisions of the programme. In its view, the reason for all the difficulties was the lack of political will on the part of those States. The Soviet Union was ready to participate in the work on the text of a comprehensive programme either during the ongoing session of the General Assembly or within the Committee on Disarmament. Czechoslovakia pointed out that the Committee had held useful discussions on the whole range of the substantive elements of the programme, including its objectives, principles and priorities, as well as matters relating to the implementation of agreed measures. However, a number of important questions bearing on the content of the programme and on ways to ensure its effectiveness remained unresolved, such as the limitation of the nuclear arms race, the prevention of nuclear war and the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Czechoslovakia hoped that the Committee would achieve the necessary positive results on the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament in the near future. Bulgaria reiterated its commitment to the concept of a comprehensive programme, but considered that some issues were inadequately reflected in the draft, such as the immediate cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and the prevention of nuclear war, while others were missing entirely, such as the establishment of zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and in the Mediterranean region. It shared the position of the overwhelming majority of Member States that the international community urgently needed a clear-cut, meaningful and effective programme

for the adoption of resolute and urgent measures to check the arms race, and was ready to participate in efforts towards its further elaboration.

The United States once again reiterated its support for a realistic programme that could provide the necessary framework to guide disarmament efforts, and stressed that its delegations in both Geneva and New York had worked in good faith towards that end. It believed that the Committee on Disarmament in 1983 had moved in the right direction, that is, a step closer to the conclusion of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In its view, resolution of the remaining problems would not be easy but, on the other hand, was certainly not beyond reach. Any solution, however, would have to meet the security needs of all countries concerned, and future efforts should be directed to that end rather than to counter-productive attempts to place blame for slow progress. It added that such a flexible approach, taking those security concerns into account, had not been adopted by all States. Further, while the United States was committed to the pursuit of realistic arms control agreements that could be made on specific issues, it nevertheless had supported the broad approach underlying the negotiations on a comprehensive programme, believing it could provide both a general guide for action towards disarmament and a means of measuring progress.

The United Kingdom stressed that although the negotiations in Geneva had provided a text which was shorter and simpler and free of brackets, it was not entirely free of reservations, and there remained gaps in it on a number of key issues. It reiterated the view it had expressed in the Committee on Disarmament that, while much of what the United Kingdom had previously found objectionable had been removed, it was equally true that much that it had considered valuable had been lost. After expressing some doubts about reaching agreement in the immediate future, the United Kingdom considered that it might be better to remit the programme to the Committee on Disarmament.

The Federal Republic of Germany regarded the new draft as better geared to the needs of final consensus; it illustrated the move away from over-complicated, all too ambitious texts and offered room for flexibility and a new and promising starting point for its ultimate completion. In its view, future negotiation should be firmly based upon the existing consensus texts designed to govern the work on the draft, such as the "Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament", discussed above, that had been laid down by the Disarmament Commission in 1979 and was the most specific characterization of the comprehensive programme and its contents contained in a multilateral, consensus document. In closing, the Federal Republic of Germany expressed its readiness to continue to try to reach agreement on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, in whatever format might appear most appropriate, in a spirit of openness and co-operation.

On 11 November, Algeria, Bangladesh, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". In in-

troducing the draft resolution on 15 November, the representative of Mexico stated that the text was self-explanatory. In the course of summarizing the three preambular paragraphs, he observed that basic elements of the provisions of the 1978 Final Document had guided the *Ad Hoc* Working Group in 1983 in arriving at its report, which was before the Assembly as an integral part of the report of the Committee on Disarmament. He went on to recall that at the meetings devoted to consideration of the item, it had become clear that there were still several differences of opinion which made it impossible to reach complete agreement at the ongoing session. As a result, the resolution urged the Committee on Disarmament to renew its work on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme as soon as it considered that the circumstances were propitious for that purpose, and to complete the draft programme and submit it to the General Assembly not later than at its forty-first session. In addition, Mexico stressed that the sponsors of the draft resolution felt that, although modest, it faithfully reflected the situation which had existed in the debate in the First Committee, and expressed a hope that it would be adopted by consensus.

On 18 November, Brazil submitted an amendment to the draft resolution, adding a new operative paragraph 2 which would read as follows:

2. *Requests also* the Disarmament Commission, without prejudice to paragraph 1 above, to examine at its 1984 session possible approaches that could facilitate progress towards the elaboration by the Conference on Disarmament of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The sponsors of the draft resolution, joined by Brazil, submitted on 21 November a revised draft resolution incorporating, along with a request for a progress report to the Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, a somewhat revised version of the amendment proposed by Brazil, in the sense that the General Assembly would consider at its thirty-ninth session the advisability of requesting the Disarmament Commission to examine the question. Brazil accordingly withdrew its amendment.

The revised draft resolution was approved by the First Committee on 25 November 1983 without a vote and adopted by the General Assembly, as resolution 38/183 K, on 20 December 1983, also without a vote. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having examined the report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which is an integral part of the report of the Committee on Disarmament on its 1983 session,

Welcoming the progress achieved in the preparation of the programme during the period covered by the report,

Noting, however, that it has not yet been possible to complete the elaboration of a comprehensive programme which, as provided for in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, should encompass all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated,

1. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament, as soon as it considers that the circumstances are propitious for that purpose, to renew its work on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament previously requested, to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session a progress report on the matter and to submit to the Assembly, not later than at its forty-first session, a complete draft of such a programme;

2. *Decides* to consider at its thirty-ninth session, in the light of the above-mentioned progress report, the advisability of requesting the Disarmament Commission to examine the question further and to make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly.

Conclusion

After the failure of the twelfth special session of the General Assembly to achieve consensus on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, in 1983 the Committee on Disarmament succeeded in reaching agreement on a considerably more modest and shorter programme than had been envisaged at the outset of the current endeavours, in 1979. Even the shorter programme was incomplete, reflecting reservations by some delegations in a number of areas. That limitation on what was accomplished was due to the persistence of differences among States on various questions of long-standing difficulty such as priorities, measures to be undertaken, a timetable for implementation, machinery for implementation and the legal character of the document.

The negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament and the later debate in the First Committee of the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session once again illustrated that a meaningful and truly comprehensive programme could become a reality only in a better international political climate than the prevailing one; also required—as indeed evidenced in the discussions—is the existence of a strong political will among virtually all States to negotiate and to implement a comprehensive programme. In the absence of those two conditions, the elaboration of such a programme and the beginning of a real disarmament process based upon it may well become an even more remote possibility, difficult to realize in the near future as envisaged in the General Assembly's 1983 resolution on the matter.

CHAPTER IV

World disarmament conference

Introduction

THE CONCEPT OF A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, having been proposed by the non-aligned countries at their first Summit Conference in 1961¹ and reiterated at subsequent ones, and endorsed by the General Assembly with its adoption of resolution 2030 (XX) in 1965, was revived on the initiative of the Soviet Union in 1971. That year the Assembly, by resolution 2833 (XXVI), stated that consideration should be given to the convening, following adequate preparation, of a world disarmament conference open to all States. Since then, the item has appeared on the agenda of the Assembly each year.

In 1972, by resolution 2930 (XXVII), the Assembly set up a special committee on the question and in 1973, by resolution 3183 (XXVIII), it established the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, which has submitted annual reports to the Assembly² since that time. Those reports have stated that notwithstanding differences of viewpoint hindering progress towards the convening of a world disarmament conference, there has been a widespread feeling that such a conference could be a useful forum for disarmament efforts.

At its tenth special session, in 1978, the General Assembly included a paragraph in its Final Document, stating that "at the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation".³ At its twelfth special session, in 1982, the General Assembly included the question of a world disarmament conference on its agenda under a broader item concerning the international machinery in the field of disarmament, but did not make any recommendation concerning its convening, except in the general context of reaffirming the 1978 Final Document and referring

¹ For the relevant excerpt from the Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries adopted at the First Non-Aligned Summit Conference, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vol. III, document A/AC.187/30.

² *Ibid.*, *Twenty-ninth Session through Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement(s) No.(s) 28 (A/9628 and A/10028 and Corr.1, and A/31/28 through A/38/28)*; in addition the *Ad Hoc* Committee submitted special reports to the Assembly at its tenth special session, in 1978 (*ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-10/3 and Corr.1)*, vols. I and II), and at its twelfth special session, in 1982 (*ibid.*, *Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-12/4)*).

³ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 122.

items on which decisions had not been reached to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

Since the establishment of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, the basic positions of countries or groups concerning the convening of the conference remained largely unchanged. The Eastern European countries, as well as those among the group of non-aligned States who have referred to the issue, have continued to call for such a conference, noting the importance of universal participation and adequate preparation. China, in recent years, besides requiring certain pre-conditions, has doubted whether the convening of such a conference under prevailing circumstances would be of any practical significance. The United States and other Western countries, while not questioning the concept in principle, have, especially in recent years, indicated some scepticism as to the value of an additional forum and emphasized that the international situation has not been conducive to the undertaking of preparations for such a conference. A survey of the evolution of the positions of the various States is found in previous issues of the *The Yearbook*.⁴

***Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, 1983**

In pursuance of resolution 37/97 of 13 December 1982, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference held two sessions in 1983. Forty non-nuclear-weapon States continued to be represented on the Committee.⁵

Under the provisions of paragraph 3 of resolution 3183 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, the USSR participated in the work of the Committee and China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States maintained their contacts with it through its Chairman. The German Democratic Republic, the Holy See, the Syrian Arab Republic and Viet Nam attended meetings of the Committee as observers. The Working Group, first established in 1974 to draft the Committee's report, continued to function.⁶

During its first session, the Committee held three meetings, between 4 and 7 April. During its second session, it held four further meetings, from 5 to 8 July, and decided, as in previous years, that its Working Group should prepare its draft report for consideration and adoption by the whole Committee in plenary meetings at the end of the session. At the

⁴ *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976, chap. III; vol. 2: 1977, chap. IV; vol. 3: 1978, chap. VI; vol. 4: 1979, chap. V; vol. 5: 1980, chap. IV; vol. 6: 1981, chap. V; and vol. 7: 1982, chap. VI. See also *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), chap. II.

⁵ Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia.

⁶ Burundi, Egypt, Hungary, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Spain (Chairman) and Sri Lanka. Colombia, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Japan and the USSR participated in the Working Group as observers.

closing meeting, the Committee unanimously adopted its report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session,⁷ as submitted by the Working Group.

In its report, the Committee stated that its members were fully aware of the positions previously expressed by the Governments of other States on the convening of a world disarmament conference. The Committee also reported that in accordance with its mandate, it had maintained close contact, through its Chairman, with the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States in order to remain currently informed of their attitudes, and had obtained the following updated indications of their positions.

China reported that its basic position remained unchanged;⁸ it thus continued to hold that the convening of a world disarmament conference, or preparation for it, could only be acceptable if all the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the two major ones, undertook obligations (a) not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, particularly against the non-nuclear-weapon States, and (b) to end all forms of military presence on the territory of other countries. It added that the absence of progress on disarmament was not due to any lack of conferences, but to the continuing hegemonistic policies of the super-Powers. Consequently, China stated that the time was obviously not ripe for the convening of a world disarmament conference.

France also advised that its position concerning a world disarmament conference had not changed since the previous year, when it had stated that, having previously adopted a favourable attitude towards the idea, the then-existing international situation was not conducive to the pursuit of such an endeavour. It observed, additionally, that there was no consensus on such an undertaking in the current circumstances and that it would, therefore, have no objection to the *Ad Hoc* Committee's studying the possibility of spacing its meetings so as to take into account the continuing deadlock.

The Soviet Union stated that the most important task in the current international situation was the adoption of urgent measures to end the arms race and to make a transition to genuine measures of arms reduction. It regarded the convening of a world disarmament conference as an important step towards combining the efforts of all States to attain such a goal. In its view, a conference based on a comprehensive discussion of disarmament problems could work out effective ways to curb the arms race and to bring about practical disarmament. The great value of such a forum was that its results would be not merely recommendations, but specific decisions which States would undertake to carry out.

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/38/28)*.

⁸ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/33/28)*; for intervening reports until those for the twelfth special session (*ibid.*, *Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-12/4)*) and the thirty-seventh session (*ibid.*, *Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/37/28)*), China simply indicated that its position remained unchanged while, for the latter two, it also included ideas similar to those referred to above with regard to disarmament conferences, the super-Powers' policies and conditions not being "ripe".

The idea, the USSR added, would win widespread international support. While some nuclear-weapon States attempted to justify their unconstructive position by references to the worsening of the international situation, that was precisely the reason it was essential to take advantage of every possible opportunity, including those that would be afforded by a world disarmament conference. The General Assembly had repeatedly referred to the possibility of holding such a conference after its second special session and should, therefore, be able to express its view concerning its timing. The Soviet Union was convinced that the adoption of a decision concerning specific preparatory measures for a conference would be welcomed by the world community as a demonstration of the determination of Member States to devote special attention to the study and solution of disarmament problems.

The United Kingdom continued to hold the view it had expressed in previous years that, given the existing international climate, it was not useful to consider holding a world disarmament conference. Therefore, it continued to doubt the value of further meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee and thought it would be inappropriate for the Committee to undertake any substantive work at the current stage.

The United States believed that to be successful a world disarmament conference would have to take place in a propitious international environment. In its view, an unsuccessful or inconclusive conference would serve no useful purpose but could create impediments to future efforts towards concrete and verifiable measures. As had been noted in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament,⁹ the United States believed that at the current time there was insufficient political agreement on the fundamental disarmament issues which would be central to such a conference and, therefore, it was premature to contemplate its convening.

In the "Conclusions and recommendations" of the report, the *Ad Hoc* Committee reiterated that the idea of a world disarmament conference had received wide support by the membership of the United Nations with, however, varying degrees of emphasis on and differences concerning conditions and certain aspects related to the question of its convening, including the deteriorating international situation. It was also evident from the updated indications of positions of the nuclear-weapon States, whose participation had been deemed essential by most States Members of the Organization, that no consensus had been reached among them with respect to holding a conference under the existing conditions.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee stated that the General Assembly should take up the matter at its thirty-eighth session for further consideration, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of earlier consensus resolutions on the question. The *Ad Hoc* Committee also suggested that the Assembly might wish to renew its mandate and request it to continue to maintain close contact with representatives of the nuclear-weapon States as

⁹ *Ibid.*, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-12/4).

well as with all other States, and to consider any relevant comments and observations which might be made to the Committee.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

At the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the few delegations which made reference to a world disarmament conference did so in the debate in the First Committee.¹⁰

The representative of El Salvador in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of Latin American States expressed those States' support of the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee; such a conference was regarded by those States as among the forums where all the peoples of the world should be able to voice their concern over the existing international situation. He observed — as had the *Ad Hoc* Committee — that the conference would have to be the result of consensus, bearing in mind the appropriate conditions, and should be preceded by proper preparation and commitment to universal goals and universal participation. Israel, in voicing its support for regional disarmament, stated that it believed such an approach could make a vital contribution to advancing the objective of a world disarmament conference.

In introducing the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference in the First Committee, the representative of Sri Lanka, in his capacity as its Chairman, drew attention to the respective positions of the nuclear-weapon States as reflected in the report, and to the Committee's conclusions and recommendations.

In conjunction with his introduction of the report, he also introduced the draft resolution entitled "World Disarmament Conference", which had been submitted on 10 November 1983 by Burundi, Peru, Poland, Spain and Sri Lanka, and subsequently also sponsored by the Congo, Mali and Mongolia. He stated that the draft was essentially similar to resolution 37/97, adopted at the thirty-seventh session, with some differences in operative paragraphs 1 and 3 (see below) which reflected the conclusions and recommendations contained in the Committee's 1983 report. He also noted that although no consensus with respect to the convening of a world disarmament conference under current conditions had been reached, in general no Member State had opposed the idea of convening it under appropriate circumstances. In his opinion, the concept of a world disarmament conference belonged to that category of approaches and proposals which held out hope for a fruitful dialogue on advancing the goals of disarmament.

On 21 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. In explanation of its position after approval of the draft, the United States emphasized its particular interest in the understanding,

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, First Committee, 3rd to 34th meetings, and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.*

reflected in the resolution, that a world disarmament conference should be adequately prepared and convened at an appropriate time. It believed that to be successful, such a conference would have to take place in a propitious international environment and that a premature one would not serve to enhance the efforts to achieve concrete and verifiable disarmament measures.

The General Assembly, on 20 December, adopted the draft without a vote as resolution 38/186. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2833 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2930 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3183 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3260 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3469 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/190 of 21 December 1976, 32/89 of 12 December 1977, 33/69 of 14 December 1978, 34/81 of 11 December 1979, 35/151 of 12 December 1980, 36/91 of 9 December 1981 and 37/97 of 13 December 1982,

Reiterating its conviction that all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations and that all States should be in a position to contribute to the adoption of measures for the achievement of this goal,

Stressing anew its conviction that a world disarmament conference, adequately prepared and convened at an appropriate time, could provide the realization of such an aim and that the co-operation of all nuclear-weapon Powers would considerably facilitate its attainment,

Taking note of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference,

Recalling that, in paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it decided that, at the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation,

Recalling also that, in paragraph 23 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, the General Assembly considered it pertinent also to recall that in paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session it had stated that at the earliest appropriate time a world disarmament conference should be convened, with universal participation and with adequate preparation,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* that in its report to the General Assembly the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference stated, *inter alia*, the following:

“Having regard for the important requirements of a world disarmament conference to be convened at the earliest appropriate time, with universal participation and with adequate preparation, the General Assembly should take up the question at its thirty-eighth regular session for further consideration, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of resolution 36/91, adopted by consensus, in particular paragraph 1 of that resolution, and resolution 37/97, also adopted by consensus”;

2. *Renews* the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee;

3. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to continue to maintain close contact with the representatives of the States possessing nuclear weapons, in order to remain currently informed of their attitudes, as well as with all other States, and to consider any relevant comments and observations which might be made to the Committee, especially having in mind paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

4. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled “World Disarmament Conference”.

Conclusion

After the second special session of the General Assembly, the interest in a world disarmament conference seemed to be gradually lessening. That trend also prevailed in 1983.

While in the course of the debates in the *Ad Hoc* Committee, the USSR and Eastern European States, as well as some non-aligned States, continued to voice support for the idea of convening a world disarmament conference, none of them referred to the subject during the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly. Accordingly, in comparison with previous years, consideration of the question by the Assembly was of a more limited nature, perhaps as a result of the continuing lack of progress on the matter.

At its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly retained the question of the convening of a world disarmament conference as a recurring item on its agenda by renewing the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. None the less, it would seem that, in the near future, the *Ad Hoc* Committee will continue only to keep abreast of the prospects for convening such a conference, as determined by the international situation and the attitudes of the nuclear-weapon States, since it is a concept which could, in propitious circumstances, provide a useful forum.

PART TWO

Nuclear disarmament

CHAPTER V

Nuclear arms limitation and disarmament

Introduction

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, stated that its ultimate goal regarding nuclear weapons was their complete elimination.¹

That goal has been pursued since the dawn of the atomic age. In fact, the Assembly's first resolution, resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946, called, *inter alia*, for the "elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons" and the "control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes". Both the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons continued, however, leading to an accumulation of some 50,000 nuclear warheads in the world at the end of 1983. While there are only five nuclear weapon States, China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, the capability to develop a rudimentary nuclear weapon is thought to be within the reach of 15 to 25 non-nuclear-weapon States.² The General Assembly has repeatedly emphasized that the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the two major ones, have the primary responsibility for taking effective steps towards nuclear disarmament.³ Moreover, concerned about the grave danger posed by the existing situation, many States have criticized any tendency to direct international disarmament efforts towards issues other than those relating to nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament.

A broad range of approaches and measures for nuclear disarmament have been put forward. The resultant deliberations and negotiations have concentrated on various specific questions, which are examined in topical chapters of *The Yearbook*, such as the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and, more recently, the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war and, for the first

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 47. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I.

² See *Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.11), chap. VI; the study was initially transmitted to the General Assembly as document A/35/392.

³ See, for instance, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 48.

time in 1983, a nuclear arms freeze. Although the two last-mentioned approaches are in fact not of recent origin, they have been the subject of such renewed attention and so many new proposals as to warrant separate consideration in 1983. This chapter provides an overview of the question of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament, including an examination of certain approaches and specific measures which are not covered in other chapters.

Over the years, a very wide spectrum of measures have been proposed in the United Nations and multilateral forums covering limitations, reductions and the elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; the cessation of production of nuclear weapons; the cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and the restriction or prohibition of the deployment by nuclear-weapon States of nuclear weapons in the territories of other States.

There have also been bilateral negotiations on these and related matters, and through the years a number of agreements have been reached — particularly between the Soviet Union and the United States, but also between France and the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. The bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which the Soviet Union and the United States first entered into in 1969, must, in particular, be recognized. The first phase of the negotiations (SALT I) ended with the signing of two agreements in Moscow on 26 May 1972: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), subsequently amended by a Protocol of 3 July 1974, and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with a Protocol attached.⁴ Both agreements entered into force on 3 October 1972. The second phase of the negotiations (SALT II) formally began in November 1972. Their primary goal was to replace the Interim Agreement with a more comprehensive one, providing broad limits on strategic offensive weapons systems. They were concluded on 18 June 1979 in Vienna with the signing of a Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, a Protocol to be considered as an integral part of the Treaty, and a Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms.⁵ By the end of 1983, the SALT II Treaty had not yet entered into force, although each party had agreed to adhere to its substantive provisions as long as the other did likewise.

In the meanwhile, two further sets of bilateral negotiations had been undertaken between the Soviet Union and the United States: first, on strategic arms, referred to by the USSR as negotiations on the limitation

⁴ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 944, No. 13446, p. 13 (ABM Treaty); vol. 1042, No. 13446 (Protocol of 3 July 1974); and vol. 944, No. 13445, p. 3 (Interim Agreement).

⁵ For the texts of the Treaty, the Protocol and the Joint Statement of Principles, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), vol. 1, document CD/28. Detailed discussion of the texts is contained in *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, chap. VIII, and the texts are reproduced in appendix IX thereof. For further details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. VI, p. 90.

and reduction of strategic arms and by the United States as the strategic arms reduction talks (START), which began on 29 June 1982 and, secondly, those on intermediate-range systems, called, by the USSR, negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe and, by the United States, negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), which commenced on 30 November 1981. Both were conducted separately at Geneva in several sittings or "rounds" and both were suspended towards the end of 1983, as discussed below.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1983

As recorded in its report to the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission had, on the agenda of its 1983 substantive session, an item comprising two sub-items covering various aspects of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war and also conventional disarmament.⁶ Under sub-item 4(a), the Disarmament Commission was to consider various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and nuclear disarmament in order to expedite negotiations aimed at the effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war. Under sub-item 4(b), the Commission was called upon to elaborate, within the framework of and in accordance with the priorities established at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament.

At the beginning of the session, the Disarmament Commission held a general exchange of views during which the many aspects of those questions were extensively discussed.

Egypt, recalling the Political Declaration of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi earlier in the year, quoted from that document⁷ to the effect that disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, was no longer a moral issue, but one of "human survival"; and that the non-aligned found it unacceptable "that the security of all States and the very survival of mankind should be held hostage to the security interests of a handful of nuclear-weapon States". The meaning of that Conference's warning, Yugoslavia stated, should be fully understood and urgent measures taken in order to eliminate the threat that faced every country, without exception.

The Soviet Union emphasized that the time left to resolve problems of disarmament and international security was getting short. Repeatedly, it stressed, calls were heard to increase preparations for nuclear war, a war which, it was alleged, could be both "limited" and "protracted". The right to a pre-emptive nuclear strike was also being defended. In a

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42)*, para. 10; the relevant part of the agenda is reproduced on page 9 above. For records of the debate, see A/CN.10/PV.66-70 and A/CN.10/PV.65-72/Corrigendum.

⁷ A/38/132-S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, p. 14.

nuclear war, however, there could be no victors. Hence, the USSR saw the necessity of preventing that mortal danger by reducing international tensions and intensifying efforts to reverse the arms race before it got out of control, once and for all. Among other measures, it advocated a complete and general cessation and prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons on the basis of its 1982 draft treaty, annexed to resolution 37/85.⁸ Although it had unilaterally undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the USSR stated, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was continuing to rely on its first use rather than follow the Soviet example. NATO's argument that there was a threat from the predominance in conventional weapons of the USSR and its allies did not tally with the facts, it stated.

The United States declared that it was unwaveringly committed to the objective of preventing war — not just nuclear war, but any conflict which had the potential to expand and to raise the spectre of the use of nuclear weapons. The United States sought a stable international climate in which all nations could live in peace with their neighbours, free from the threat of aggression. Committed to the Charter of the United Nations, it considered proposals such as that for a separate treaty on the non-use of force as superfluous. Then, after outlining its own views and proposals for verifiable arms control, it stated that aggressive behaviour, which was evident, must be taken into account. The existence of nuclear weapons did not cause aggression, it concluded.

China stated that the threat of war was on the rise and that the root cause for the lack of progress in disarmament lay in the super-Powers' struggle for hegemony. Among the items on the agenda of the Commission, it continued, the question of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, in the view of many non-aligned countries and non-nuclear-weapon States, called for particular discussion and, because of the stepping-up of the nuclear arms race between the super-Powers, China supported that position.

India, Nigeria, Romania and Sweden addressed themselves to the question of the relationship between nuclear disarmament and the security of States. In that connection, India argued that nuclear weapons were more than weapons of war; they were instruments of mass annihilation. The Disarmament Commission should, therefore, recommend specific courses of action not only for dealing with the threat of nuclear war, but also for giving impetus to negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Progress towards nuclear disarmament, Nigeria held, must take into account various approaches: a nuclear freeze, a moratorium on the further development and deployment of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test ban and significant reductions in nuclear weapons. Romania shared the evaluations and conclusions of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries mentioned above, and fully supported the proposals it had put forward, believing they were important to the attainment of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarma-

⁸ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. X.

ment. Sweden argued that nuclear weapons had created a situation in which the nations of the world could no longer afford to gain security at the expense of others. A new, constructive approach to security — an approach to be based on co-operation — must be developed. Although all possibilities must be explored to eliminate the nuclear threat, the Swedish Government supported the proposal for a nuclear-weapon freeze, as a first step.

Algeria, Bulgaria, Romania, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia also spoke in favour of the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. In particular, the Soviet Union reaffirmed that it looked favourably upon the idea of a nuclear freeze as an initial measure, which could be agreed upon by all nuclear-weapon States or, as a start, by the Soviet Union and the United States alone. Several additional countries, — among them Argentina, Cuba, Egypt and Mongolia — supported a freeze on nuclear weapons, often regarding it as a step towards their elimination.

Attention was also given to other nuclear questions, such as the bilateral negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range weapons, the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon, the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, nuclear non-proliferation, various concepts of nuclear-weapon-free zones — questions which were dealt with also by the General Assembly and are discussed below or in other chapters.

Following the general exchange, and in considering item 4 of the Commission's agenda, the Committee of the Whole decided to establish a contact group under the chairmanship of Mr. Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil to deal with that item. The Contact Group held 10 meetings between 24 May and 1 June and examined all the relevant documents and heard the individual positions of its members, but was unable to achieve consensus on a set of recommendations. It therefore suggested, in its report to the Committee of the Whole,⁹ that item 4 of the agenda be taken up again at the Commission's substantive session in 1984. The work of the Contact Group is discussed further in chapter VI below.

Before adjourning, the Commission considered the results of the deliberations of the Committee of the Whole. The Federal Republic of Germany, speaking on behalf of the ten member countries of the European Community, indicated that the Ten, regarding nuclear disarmament as one of the highest priorities, were committed to continue efforts to achieve that goal with the participation of the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which had the largest arsenals. At the same time, they attached equal importance to the question of conventional weapons and wished to emphasize the balanced approach towards nuclear and conventional disarmament which was reflected in the wording of the Commission's agenda item 4. France added that it hoped the Commission, in 1984, would be able to arrive at a consensus on a set of recommendations

⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42), para. 22.*

and conclusions consistent with the comprehensive and balanced approach embodied in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. In its view, that approach had been disregarded at the 1983 session, and thus no compromise had been possible.

Japan felt that progress in disarmament could be made only through the all-out efforts of the international community to improve the atmosphere in a step-by-step manner, and expressed the view that agreement on a verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty was a matter of urgent priority. A similar view was expressed by Spain.

India, speaking on behalf of the non-aligned, stated that the Commission had witnessed unproductive polemics and some of the nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies had to bear the burden for the lack of results on compromise proposals which the non-aligned group had presented on the prevention of nuclear war.¹⁰ Obsessed by their own security concerns, they had adopted a negative attitude, tended to block agreement and played up collateral and peripheral issues. The non-aligned were disappointed, India stressed, but would continue their endeavour "to arouse the collective conscience" of the Commission.

Mexico affirmed the need to take seriously the provisions on nuclear disarmament contained in the 1978 Final Document. It also recalled some concluding statements from the 1980 *Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons*¹¹ to the effect that: it was inadmissible that the prospect of the total destruction of human civilization be used by some States to promote their security; reliance on mutual nuclear deterrence must be renounced if nuclear disarmament was to become a reality; and the concept of the maintenance of world stability and peace through deterrence was perhaps the greatest current fallacy. Sweden spoke on the concept of common security, noting the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (ICDSI),¹² and particularly supporting that report's recognition that "international peace must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than on a threat of mutual destruction". The German Democratic Republic emphasized that the work of the session had confirmed that further discussions on doctrines of nuclear warfare were imperative and should be part of the future work of the Commission.

China noted that the non-aligned and other small and medium-sized countries had made efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and pointed out that the two super-Powers had a special responsibility in that respect. Those efforts had, however, remained unfulfilled because each of the super-Powers sought to achieve superiority. China also emphasized that, while nuclear disarmament was being promoted, the threat of conventional war must not be overlooked, as there was the possibility that such a conflict might escalate into a nuclear war. Although some countries held that stressing conventional disarmament would divert attention

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, annex V.

¹¹ United Nations publication, Sales No.E.81.I.11, paras. 497 and 519.

¹² A/CN.10/38.

from nuclear disarmament, in China's view, only by enabling nuclear and conventional disarmament to move forward simultaneously, thus eliminating the threat of nuclear war and all wars of aggression, could world peace be effectively safeguarded.

The USSR stated that there had been a lack of progress in the nuclear field because the Western countries, without proposing any specific steps, rejected the suggestions of others. Measures such as a comprehensive treaty on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, a prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (and, as an initial step, a nuclear non-first-use commitment) and a nuclear-weapon freeze would foster progress towards nuclear disarmament, the Soviet Union believed. But the Western countries, it noted, had put forward reservations regarding all such measures, and their own working paper,¹³ submitted late in the session, had contained only vague ideas hedged with various conditions.

The United States described, from its perspective, developments in the nuclear arms race over a decade and a half. It again referred to its own proposals in the nuclear field, notably on strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons, to which, it stated, it had received no positive response. It further emphasized that the Western States had declared at their most recent meeting (Williamsburg, May 1983) that they had committed themselves to devote their "full political resources to reducing the threat of war", their vision was one of "a world in which the shadow of war has been lifted from all mankind" and they were determined to pursue that vision.¹⁴

Brazil, despite the limited and disappointing results of the Commission's deliberations on item 4, was convinced that the effort to break away from the excessively broad scope under which the Commission had worked in the past represented, at the 1983 session, a promising avenue, and that it should, therefore, strive in the future to devote its attention to specific questions and to make concrete recommendations within the framework of the item. Similarly, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission stressed the advisability of narrowing the focus of its attention at future sessions and perhaps even concentrating on a single issue under the item in 1984.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1983

Questions relating to nuclear arms limitation and disarmament were discussed extensively in the Committee on Disarmament in 1983 in the context of its agenda item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". While the first and more general parts of the item are dealt with in this chapter, the questions of the prevention of nuclear war

¹³ A/CN.10/54/Rev.1.

¹⁴ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 19, No. 22 (29 May 1983), p. 805, para. 7.

and of a freeze on nuclear weapons are covered in chapters VI and VII respectively.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, in addressing the Committee on 15 February 1983, referred to nuclear disarmament as an especially high priority question. It was his hope that the Committee would look closely at the various proposals made, with a view to devising appropriate procedures for a sustained consideration of the issue. He drew particular attention to the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States and to the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

Following considerable and often difficult discussion, which took place from the outset of the session, the Committee on 25 April held an informal meeting to consider the question of the establishment of one or more *ad hoc* working groups on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The group of 21 and the group of socialist States, and some States individually, proposed the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group to carry out such negotiations. A group of socialist States also proposed the setting up of an *ad hoc* working group on the nuclear neutron weapon. Western delegations, however, continued to hold the view that it was preferable, in the existing circumstances, to have substantive discussions on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in informal meetings of the Committee, and no consensus could be reached during the session. In practice, therefore, the delegations addressed those issues at plenary meetings of the Committee, as indicated in its report to the General Assembly and the records of the session.¹⁵

Ten documents on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament issues dealt with in this chapter¹⁶ were submitted in the course of the Committee's session. Both in scope and contents, they fell far short of reflecting any common denominator, even a limited one, on the subject.

A number of delegations deplored the fact that it was not possible for the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament to establish an *ad hoc* working group to initiate negotiations on a subject of the highest priority because of the opposition of certain nuclear-weapon States and their allies whose security policy was based on the possible use of nuclear weapons. Those delegations believed that exchanges of views in plenary or informal meetings could not, as past experience in the Committee had demonstrated, promote the search for a common approach that would enable it to fulfil its negotiating role.

¹⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, and *ibid.*, appendix III (CD/421), vols. I-V.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, para. 34. The documents themselves are contained in *ibid.*, appendix II (CD/421), documents CD/340 (USSR), CD/344 (German Democratic Republic on behalf of a group of socialist States), CD/345 (the Group of socialist States), CD/347 (France), CD/351 (German Democratic Republic), CD/352 (Federal Republic of Germany), CD/385 (USSR), CD/386 (USSR), CD/394 (France), CD/409 (USSR).

The members of the group of 21 generally reaffirmed their conviction that there was an urgent need for multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, leading to the adoption of concrete measures. They stressed that the nuclear arms race, far from contributing to the strengthening of international security, on the contrary, weakened it and increased the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. Furthermore, they believed that all nations, whether or not they possessed nuclear weapons, had a vital interest in nuclear disarmament measures, because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of Powers threatened the security of the entire world. In that connection, India stated that there was something inherently wrong with the logic that major nuclear-weapon Powers could base their security on weapons capable of destroying the whole world, including their own peoples. Those Powers, moreover, seemingly had ignored three fourths of mankind in their equation. Even though security was a matter of perception, India added, however it was looked at, the nuclear arms race was irrational, immoral and unjustified. Hence, the group believed that the urgent need for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament flowed from the very nature of the weapons, and was not contingent upon any other factors like international stability and security or rules of international behaviour.

While acknowledging the usefulness of negotiations among nuclear-weapon States, the group of 21 also stressed that the Committee on Disarmament, whose members included all the nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States, should search intensively for a common approach which would enable it to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it by the United Nations General Assembly. On that theme, Indonesia noted that peoples all over the world were becoming impatient for concrete results from the negotiations between the super-Powers, and that the Final Document had unambiguously stated that bilateral and multilateral negotiations were complementary. It was therefore inconceivable that the two sides should fail to agree to the demand of the majority of the Committee for "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" to be given treatment commensurate with its importance.

Some delegations, notably of non-nuclear, non-aligned countries, including those of Burma and India, emphasized that nuclear weapons, as weapons of mass destruction of a global character, should not be regarded in the same context as conventional weapons, nor nuclear war compared with conventional war. Therefore, they held, the adoption of measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament should not be dependent on concurrent progress in the field of conventional disarmament. Peru and Yugoslavia, among others, referring to the priorities set out by the General Assembly in its Final Document and to those of other forums, acknowledged the obvious relationship between the international situation and disarmament negotiations, and pointed out that the continuation of the arms race ran counter to efforts to ease tensions and promote international co-operation. On the other hand, progress in disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament,

would contribute significantly to improvement of the international situation and the strengthening of peace and security.

The representative of the USSR stated that, in spite of its own efforts and those of other socialist countries, the international situation remained tense, and the Committee on Disarmament had made no headway; that was not because of any absence of initiatives and proposals. One key prerequisite for success, however, was that international agreements be based on the principle of the undiminished security of States — a principle of particular importance in relations between itself and the United States and between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries. Unfortunately, he went on, the current United States Administration had refused to deal with the USSR on that basis. There existed an anti-Soviet bloc, he stated, and the United States was attempting to obtain unilateral advantages, while in fact there was an “approximate equilibrium”. That was the root of the difficulties facing disarmament talks, including the bilateral ones. In that context, the United States had singled out ballistic missiles, primarily ground-based, from other strategic systems as the basis for negotiations, and its proposal would greatly reduce the Soviet strategic nuclear potential, thus disturbing the existing balance and damaging the Soviet side’s security interests. Similarly, the USSR’s position in the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe was based on the principle of equality and equal security, as had been evidenced by the proposal put forward, he stated, by General Secretary Yuri Andropov on 21 December 1982.

Speaking for the United States, Vice-President George Bush, stressing the Administration’s support of equitable and effectively verifiable agreements, particularly in the nuclear area, stated that his country sought to reduce substantially the number and destructive potential of nuclear weapons and not just to freeze them at high levels, as had been the case with previous agreements. He added that achieving such a reduction in the world’s nuclear arsenals was his country’s most important challenge, and that it was being met by what President Reagan had called the “most comprehensive programme of nuclear arms control ever proposed” by the United States. Those initiatives, he stated, were “on the negotiating table” in the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces and on reducing strategic nuclear forces. Moreover, the proposals met the criteria for effectiveness: balance, reducing the nuclear threat to both sides, enhancing stability and lessening the risk of conflict. Up until that point, he stated, the proposals advanced by the USSR would leave its side with advantages or even a monopoly, they did not call for sufficiently deep reductions in ballistic missiles and did not focus on the destabilizing elements of strategic forces. He was pleased, however, that the Soviet Union was negotiating seriously and said that the United States intended to explore all avenues.

A group of socialist countries reiterated their proposal for negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they had been completely destroyed. The existing balance in the nuclear field should remain undisturbed at all

stages of the reduction process. As a first step, the nuclear-weapon Powers should freeze all the nuclear weapons at their disposal, perhaps initially with respect to the Soviet Union and the United States, on the understanding that the other nuclear-weapon States would join later. Speaking in detail about possibilities in those areas, the German Democratic Republic noted the importance and broad acceptance of the idea of step-by-step nuclear disarmament, which would require that the nuclear-weapon States — particularly those with the largest arsenals — live up to their special responsibilities; that, unfortunately, still met with resistance, it stated. As a group, the socialist States held that efforts should be exerted in several areas simultaneously. In particular, they favoured the holding of multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in addition to bilateral talks between the two major Powers. Poland, for instance, associated itself with the Soviet representative's appeal for negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and stressed the importance of proceeding towards complete nuclear disarmament through substantial negotiations with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in an *ad hoc* working group created for that purpose.

A number of Western delegations, including those of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, maintained that the bilateral talks between the two major Powers on strategic arms reduction and intermediate-range nuclear forces offered the best framework for achieving progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament at that time. Accordingly, they felt that the Committee should continue to consider those subjects in plenary and informal meetings. They further held that nuclear disarmament should not be considered independently from conventional arms control and disarmament, and should be pursued in such a way as to enhance international stability and security. Also, nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements must necessarily be based on certain fundamental principles of international behaviour, particularly the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. With regard to the proposal for a nuclear-weapon freeze, they felt that it would detract from efforts already under way, perpetuate dangerous asymmetries in the strategic balance and involve major verification problems. France stated further that its nuclear potential was limited to the minimum level necessary to guarantee its security and independence. Therefore, once the nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear-weapon States had been reduced, with verification, to such levels that the gap between potentials had also changed substantially, and if significant progress were made in the reduction of conventional imbalances and towards the elimination of chemical weapons, it would be ready to join in efforts aimed at the limitation and reduction of nuclear arsenals.

China, noting that it had been compelled to maintain a small number of nuclear weapons, reaffirmed its support for the complete prohibition and total destruction of such weapons. In that connection, it stressed particularly the need for the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals to halt their arms race and substantially reduce their arsenals. It

further reiterated its statement, made at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, that if those two States took the lead in halting the testing, improvement and production of nuclear weapons and reduced by 50 per cent all types of weapons and means of delivery, China would be prepared to assume similar obligations through negotiations with all other nuclear-weapon States and to reduce its weapons proportionally until all were destroyed. It also held that, notwithstanding the ongoing bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States, the Committee on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral negotiating body, should play its role in promoting nuclear disarmament. Therefore, it supported the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group on the question.

In closing remarks at the last four plenary meetings of the session, some members of the Committee voiced their concern at the impasse on nuclear disarmament. The USSR, speaking on behalf of the socialist countries, noted that the position of those States on a wide range of questions, for example, the limitation of the nuclear arms race, had been close to that of the group of 21. It added that it was difficult to expect progress while there was the possibility of deployment of United States medium-range missiles in Western Europe and new long-term military programmes were being announced.

The Federal Republic of Germany commented upon the extensive Soviet buildup of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, particularly in Europe, citing statistics on the numbers of missiles and warheads deployed since 1977. In the absence of an explanation, it stated, the Western alliance had to assume that the USSR, while accepting the principle of parity with the United States, wished to bring about a disequilibrium by establishing its own superiority in sensitive adjacent regions, such as Western Europe. NATO's response to that threat in December 1979 had been both transparent and moderate, the Federal Republic added, and there should be no misconception but that the Western alliance was determined to meet its responsibility for security. It placed its hope on peaceful East-West co-operation rather than on further confrontation.

Yugoslavia expressed particular discontent at the stagnation and lack of negotiating spirit in the Committee, whose performance was not commensurate with the challenges before it and illustrated the prevailing negative atmosphere among the big Powers. It stressed that, despite the efforts by most of its members, the Committee had again been prevented from engaging in genuine negotiations on priority issues, among them the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

The General Assembly had a wide-ranging debate on nuclear arms limitation and disarmament, in both its plenary meetings and the First

Committee.¹⁷ It covered practically every aspect of the question, from bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on strategic arms reductions and intermediate-range nuclear forces to a freeze on nuclear weapons and the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. Although there were no significant changes in the positions taken earlier in the year in the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament, the First Committee addressed itself, more than had the other two bodies, to specific aspects of the question, leading to the adoption by the Assembly of numerous resolutions dealt with in this and subsequent chapters.

The two major nuclear-weapon Powers, among others, set out in some detail their respective general positions concerning the nuclear armaments situation and nuclear disarmament. Many States explained their positions with regard to nuclear disarmament mainly in connection with draft resolutions in the First Committee, especially at the time of voting, covering similar issues from different perspectives.

President Reagan of the United States, in addressing the General Assembly on 26 September 1983, outlined briefly the United States proposals advanced with regard to the negotiations referred to as START and INF and stated that, despite rebuffs, the United States had not altered its objective of substantial reduction and would continue to build upon its latest initiative in START, which had responded to a number of concerns raised by the USSR, and that it was determined to spare no effort to achieve a sound, equitable and verifiable agreement with regard to INF.

In the debate in the First Committee, the representative of the USSR stated that the elimination of the threat of nuclear war (see chapter VI below) and the limitation and halting of the nuclear arms race were the priority items on the Committee's agenda. The Soviet Union also viewed Europe as the nerve centre of international relations, and stated that the deployment of new United States missiles in Europe would greatly complicate the whole world situation, dramatically escalate nuclear confrontation and increase the threat of nuclear war. The advocacy of reliance on force, and particularly nuclear force, declared by some to be political realism, clearly was a form of "political nihilism", the Soviet Union held, because nuclear war was a road of no return. A truly realistic policy, it stressed, could not be based on the possibility of experimenting with the very survival of humanity. In its view, the key to peace and international security was the maintenance of the approximate strategic military equilibrium existing in Europe and on a global scale between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, as well as between the Soviet Union and the United States. That equilibrium made an objective contribution to the preservation of peace, it affirmed. The Soviet Union would continue to do its utmost to preserve that equilibrium and to seek the reduc-

¹⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings, 5th to 33rd and 97th and 103rd meetings; ibid., First Committee, 3rd to 39th meetings; and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.*

tion and limitation of armaments on that basis so that approximate parity at any given moment would be maintained, but at an increasingly lower level.

The USSR further recalled that it had assumed an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Also, in 1982 it had stopped any "further deployment of medium-range missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union" and, moreover, undertaken "the actual reduction of part of these armaments" and "the non-stationing of additional medium-range missiles beyond the Urals in an area where they would have Western Europe within their range". At the same time, observing that unilateral efforts alone were not enough, it stated that it had taken a properly responsible approach to the ongoing negotiations with the United States on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe and on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. The Soviet Union was firmly convinced that it was quite possible to reach a common position at those negotiations on the basis of strict compliance with the principle of equality and equal security. The USSR then went on to elaborate, from its perspective, the positions and proposals of the two sides in both sets of negotiations, stating that, in the former, the current stand of the United States precluded the possibility of reaching agreement and that, in the latter, the United States sought unilateral advantages rather than an honest agreement. The Soviet Union concluded by stating that it had put forward several proposals and was prepared to consider others without prejudice. Action was needed and, for its part, it would continue to work for the prevention of nuclear catastrophe, for détente and disarmament, but it expected other States to do likewise.

In the First Committee, the United States representative recalled that the President had stated in his address: "The United States seeks and will accept any equitable, verifiable agreement that stabilizes forces at lower levels than currently exist." Indeed, the goal of the United States, he went on, was to enhance stability by significant nuclear arms reductions. In START, its basic objective, which remained unchanged, was to seek a safer, more stable strategic balance at force levels much lower than existing ones. For its part, it could not be satisfied with merely capping the nuclear arms race at those very high levels. There had been some movement in the negotiations, but not nearly as much as the United States had hoped, he said, because the Soviet Union so far had failed to respond to American initiatives in a manner that would permit significant progress. Concerning INF, "the unprecedented and relentless Soviet buildup of triple-warhead SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles" threatened the allies of the United States in Europe and in Asia and heightened tensions around the globe. Thus, the United States and its NATO allies had been seeking a negotiated solution to achieve a balance in such longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces, sometimes referred to as LRINF. The United States had first proposed the elimination of that entire category of nuclear weapons on both sides, and when the USSR had found it impossible to accept that solution, the United States had proposed other steps to try to meet stated Soviet concerns. The

Soviet Union, however, had refused to negotiate on the basis of equality, in the United States view, and had sought a "half-zero" option, that is, "zero deployments" for the Western side and "substantial deployments" for its side, or, in effect, to perpetuate a complete monopoly in those missiles, with all the threats which that implied. Consequently, in both the strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms control negotiations, the United States looked to the Soviet Union to respond to its own flexible and constructive approach.

The United States stressed that it had no interest in an arms race with the Soviet Union. The President had made it clear that its goal was simply to restore a stable military balance, ensure deterrence and reduce the risk of war. The number of weapons in the United States nuclear stockpile, it stated, was currently at its lowest level in 20 years, actually some 8,000 fewer than in the late 1960s, while the total megatonnage (explosive power) was one fourth of what it had been in 1960. The United States policy, it concluded, was to reduce nuclear arms even further, and in an equal manner, in order to increase stability.

Altogether, 26 resolutions dealing with nuclear questions were adopted by the General Assembly, and eight of them are discussed in this chapter. Of the eight, three were on USSR/United States bilateral nuclear arms negotiations. In addition, a fourth draft resolution on the same subject was submitted and was approved by the First Committee by a recorded vote but, in accordance with a subsequent request of the sponsors, was not put to a vote in the General Assembly, as explained below.¹⁸

As to the remaining five resolutions discussed in this chapter, they deal respectively with: nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, nuclear weapons in all aspects, prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon, prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The first mentioned resolution, on nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, is closely related also to the subject of chapter VI below.

All four draft resolutions on bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States were entitled "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations", and all were submitted under the item "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session".

The first of the four proposals was submitted to the First Committee by Romania on 21 October. Subsequently, on 9 November and 14 November, Romania twice revised its draft resolution. First, it revised both the preambular and operative parts, but primarily the latter, by incorporating into operative paragraph 1 an urgent call for the parties to agree to postpone the deployment of intermediate-range missiles until late 1984 or early 1985 while the negotiations would continue. By the second revision, it further reformulated operative paragraph 1 so that the General

¹⁸ A/38/628, paras. 50-52.

Assembly would urge the Governments of the USSR and of the United States “to make every effort to reach an agreement at their bilateral negotiations in Geneva, or at least to agree on a provisional basis that no new medium-range missiles of any kind are deployed and the number of the existing ones is reduced, while the negotiations would continue in order to achieve positive results in conformity with the security interests of all States”.

In its second revision, the draft resolution was introduced on 17 November by the representative of Romania. In doing so, he stressed the importance of the questions that the draft addressed for peace and security in Europe and the whole world, and expressed the conviction that the appeal contained in the revised draft was fair and balanced, and that it met the urgent need to take concrete action to prevent a new escalation of the arms race. Subsequently, on 22 November, Romania orally amended the draft resolution by deleting the words “new” and “of any kind” in reference to the missiles mentioned in operative paragraph 1 (see above and below). On the same date, the First Committee approved the revised draft resolution, as orally amended, by a recorded vote of 64 to 31 (including France, USSR, United Kingdom and United States), with 21 abstentions.

In connection with the vote, 19 States which voted in favour — Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Egypt, Finland, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Rwanda, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire — indicated that their support for the draft resolution was mainly based on their belief in the need for the negotiations to continue, with a view to seeking meaningful agreement. Some of them, in particular Argentina, Finland and Sri Lanka, further made clear that their affirmative vote did not in any way imply taking a position with regard to specific stands on the substance of the bilateral negotiations. Similarly, Mexico stressed that its vote in favour should not be taken as total approval of the text of the draft resolution. Along with Sri Lanka, it took a similar position regarding the other draft resolutions on the subject. Venezuela thought that the Romanian draft resolution, as finally amended, took into consideration the security interests of all the parties concerned in a balanced manner. Peru also viewed it as being balanced, and Algeria thought that it responded to the desires expressed by nearly all delegations.

Australia, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal, which voted negatively, opposed the main provision of the draft resolution (operative paragraph 1), essentially because it contained the idea of a postponement of the deployment of missiles on the Western side while the existing Soviet SS-20 missiles would continue to be pointed at targets in Western Europe. That implied, as stated by the Federal Republic of Germany, that negotiations could go on for an indefinite time, with no incentive for the Soviet Union to alter the situation. Similarly, Italy stated that to advocate a moratorium was tantamount to rewarding the *fait accompli* of the Soviet nuclear buildup.

Austria, which abstained, explained its position by saying that while it believed that the international community should remind, with one voice, the United States and the Soviet Union of their special responsibility and urge them to do everything in their power to facilitate the successful conclusion of the Geneva talks, the basic political antagonisms between the two sides had overshadowed the business of drafting resolutions. India, which also abstained, felt that there was lack of clarity in the Romanian draft resolution. The Bahamas, commenting on its abstention on all four draft resolutions relating to bilateral nuclear arms negotiations, stressed that the failure to elaborate one single consensus text called into serious doubt the commitment of Member States regarding that question. Nepal also abstained and stated that, while supporting the call for unconditional, sustained and serious negotiations, it did not wish to align itself with any specific position. Similarly, Spain had doubts about the suitability of setting forth guidelines at the United Nations for the behaviour of the negotiating parties.

China explained that its decision not to participate in the vote did not mean that it was not interested in the negotiations. On the contrary, it viewed their outcome as being of the utmost importance, not only for Europe but for Asia and the world. However, after nearly two years they had not brought about reductions but had aggravated the nuclear arms race and increased tensions and were, themselves, in a state of crisis. That being the case, China considered that the Soviet Union and the United States, in view of their special responsibilities in nuclear disarmament and towards the people of Europe, should "proceed to negotiations" and come forth with results conducive to peace and security for all. Albania, which did not participate in the vote on any of the four draft resolutions on bilateral nuclear arms negotiations, also stressed that that was not a sign of its lack of interest, but a way to underscore the fact that while the super-Powers emphasized their "alleged concern over disarmament", to the peoples of the world it was deeds that mattered and not words.

On 20 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 88 to 31, with 24 abstentions, as resolution 38/183 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the possibility of deployment of new medium-range missiles in Europe and about the development of those already in existence on that continent,

Profoundly alarmed that the bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America commenced at Geneva on 30 November 1981 have not so far reached results to meet the expectations of peoples,

Deeply concerned that the failure of those negotiations could lead to a significant new escalation in the spiralling arms competition in Europe and in the world, thereby gravely endangering international peace and security,

Firmly convinced that an early successful conclusion of those negotiations by reaching an appropriate agreement, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armament and military forces, would have crucial importance for the strengthening of international peace and security and for the reduction of the risk of nuclear war,

Convinced also that through negotiations, pursued in a spirit of flexibility and responsibility for the security interests of all peoples, it is still possible to reach an agreement,

1. *Urges* the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to make every effort to reach an agreement at their bilateral negotiations at Geneva, or at least to agree on a provisional basis that no medium-range missiles be deployed and the number of the existing ones be reduced, while the negotiations would continue in order to achieve positive results in conformity with the security interests of all States;

2. *Calls upon* all European States as well as all interested States to do their utmost in order to assist the process of negotiation and promote its successful conclusion;

3. *Calls upon* all States to do their utmost in order to bring the arms race to a halt and to proceed to disarmament, and first of all to nuclear disarmament, as well as to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and to the resumption of the policy of détente, co-operation and respect for the national independence of all peoples;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to transmit the content of the present appeal to the Governments of all States.

On 11 November, Ecuador, Mexico, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia submitted a second draft resolution on bilateral nuclear arms negotiations, which was later also sponsored by Colombia and Venezuela. By operative paragraph 1 of the proposal, the General Assembly would urge the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the United States to examine, as a way out of the impasse, the possibility of combining into a single forum the two ongoing series of negotiations on strategic and on intermediate-range nuclear arms and of broadening them to embrace also "tactical" or "battlefield" nuclear weapons. The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Mexico in the First Committee, on 17 November. He pointed out that the first preambular paragraph referred to paragraph 114 of the Final Document, by which the General Assembly had declared that the Organization should be kept informed of all steps taken in negotiations, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to them, in order to discharge effectively its central role and primary responsibility in disarmament, in accordance with the Charter. He then referred to the second preambular paragraph, recalling that, at the twelfth special session, in 1982, Members had reiterated "their solemn commitment" to implement what had been agreed upon at the tenth special session.

On 22 November, the First Committee took separate recorded votes on the preambular part of the draft resolution and on each of its four operative paragraphs. No negative votes were cast against any of the five parts voted upon, except for two on operative paragraph 1 (United Kingdom and United States), although there were 33 abstentions on that same paragraph (including Eastern European and Western States), and 18 on the preambular part (mostly Western States). Thereafter, the draft resolution as a whole was approved by a recorded vote of 104 to 1 (United States), with 24 abstentions.

In connection with the voting, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Benin, Cyprus, Finland, India, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zaire, all of which voted in favour, indicated their support for the goal of the resolution. Cyprus, Pakistan, Trinidad and Tobago, and

Zaire emphasized their desire to facilitate progress in the negotiations. Algeria saw specifically in the approach of the draft resolution a way out of the existing impasse. Similarly, Peru, noting the constructive spirit of the text, saw in its positive aspects which should help overcome the stagnation in the negotiations, while Romania fully agreed with both the letter and spirit of the draft. Argentina stated that the text, in particular its operative paragraph 1, adequately reflected its own views as to how further progress might be made. Austria regarded the draft as being consistent with its belief in the comprehensive approach to disarmament problems. Bangladesh supported the draft because it felt that the bilateral negotiations were not only in the national interests of the two negotiators, but also in the vital interests of all the peoples of the world. India, although it abstained on the others, and would have preferred a single agreed text, found it possible to support the draft resolution introduced by Mexico, as being the clearest on the subject.

Belgium, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, which abstained in the vote, none the less expressed appreciation of the fact that the draft resolution had refrained from indicating a stand on the substance of the negotiations; they felt, however, that the technical arrangements put forward in the draft should be determined by the two negotiators themselves. Belgium further objected to the implication of operative paragraph 3 that reports from each of the negotiators should be submitted, feeling that only joint reporting at the opportune moment would allow them to conduct the negotiations freely.

On 20 December, the General Assembly took first a separate recorded vote on operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, which was adopted by 108 votes to 2 (United Kingdom and United States), with 37 abstentions. Then, the draft resolution as a whole was adopted by a recorded vote of 122 (including China and the USSR) to 1 (United States), with 25 abstentions (including France and United Kingdom), as resolution 38/183 N. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it approved by consensus a Declaration, contained in section II of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which, *inter alia*, it proclaimed that, in order effectively to discharge the central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament which belong to the United Nations in accordance with its Charter, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations,

Recalling also that at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, Member States reiterated their solemn commitment to implement the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, the validity of which received their unanimous and categorical reaffirmation,

Noting that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have been continuing at Geneva the two series of bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations begun on 30 November 1981 and 29 June 1982 respectively,

Noting with satisfaction that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has already submitted the report requested in General Assembly resolution 37/78 A of 9 December 1982,

Hoping that the other major nuclear-weapon State will find it possible to comply also with the request of the General Assembly before the closure of its thirty-eighth session,

Deploring that it has become evident that the bilateral negotiations have not yet produced the desired results,

1. *Urges* the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to examine immediately, as a way out of the present impasse, the possibility of combining into a single forum the two series of negotiations which they have been carrying out and of broadening their scope so as to embrace also the "tactical" or "battlefield" nuclear weapons;

2. *Reiterates its request* to the two negotiating parties that they bear constantly in mind that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world are at stake in this question;

3. *Requests* both parties to keep the United Nations appropriately informed of progress achieved in their negotiations;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations".

The third draft resolution on bilateral nuclear arms negotiations was submitted on 11 November by Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. It was subsequently also sponsored by Norway and Turkey. By the draft resolution, the General Assembly would urge the Governments of the USSR and the United States "to continue, without pre-conditions, their bilateral negotiations at Geneva so long as it is necessary in order to achieve positive results in accordance with the security interests of all States, and the universal desire for progress towards disarmament". In introducing the draft on 17 November, the representative of Canada stressed that the sponsors would have preferred that the bilateral talks, a matter of vital concern, be the subject of a single, consensus resolution. That having proved impossible, they had submitted their own draft, as they feared that their breakdown could impede efforts to strengthen peace and security and to achieve progress towards disarmament. They felt that the text and its intent reflected the shared concerns of all.

On 22 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 85 to 18 (including the Eastern European States), with 21 abstentions. In connection with the vote, 21 countries which voted in favour — Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Egypt, Finland, Ivory Coast, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Portugal, Rwanda, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia and Yugoslavia — explained their positions. Although their statements showed some differences in the degree of support for the draft resolution, they revealed an equal concern for the outcome of the negotiations. As stated by Yugoslavia, the failure of the Geneva talks would exacerbate the mistrust between the two sides. A dialogue, in its view, was the only alternative to the further buildup of nuclear arms in Europe. Australia, in particular, felt that the Western draft resolution, compared with the others on the same subject, was the least prejudicial to the success of the intermediate-range nuclear-force negotiations, and Portugal thought that the draft presented an equitable, non-discriminatory solution by recommending the continuation of the talks without pre-

conditions. Finland, like most of the other countries which explained their vote, made clear that it supported the main thrust of all the draft resolutions on bilateral talks before the Committee, without taking a stand with respect to the specific issues being debated in Geneva. Algeria stated that its support of the draft resolutions should be seen as an appeal to the negotiators to reach an agreement in the interests of all peoples.

Cuba, Democratic Yemen, the German Democratic Republic and Romania, which voted negatively, felt that the draft resolution was an attempt, as the German Democratic Republic stated, to give the deployment of new medium-range weapons in Western Europe the appearance of legitimacy. Cuba held that from the outset one group of countries had tried to prevent the negotiations from succeeding and, while Cuba supported the continuation of bilateral negotiations, it believed that they should lead to the dismantling of all nuclear weapons in Europe. Romania stressed that the approach of the draft resolution was unilateral and rigid; it also stated that some delegations had negotiated in bad faith during the consultations on its draft resolution on the subject.

Austria, the Bahamas, China, India, Nepal, Peru, Venezuela and Zaire, which abstained on the proposal introduced by Canada, explained that they did so because there were contradictions between the draft resolutions on bilateral talks before the Committee, especially between the third and the fourth, i.e., the Western and the Eastern proposals. Some of them explicitly stated that they did not want to endorse a particular approach.

On 20 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 99 to 18, with 24 abstentions, as resolution 38/183 P. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Deeply regretting that, in their bilateral negotiations, which commenced at Geneva on 30 November 1981, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have so far been unable to achieve positive results,

Firmly convinced that an early agreement in those negotiations, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces, would have crucial importance for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Deeply concerned that a breakdown of the negotiations could impede efforts to strengthen international peace and security and to achieve progress towards disarmament,

Convinced that, through negotiations pursued in a spirit of flexibility and responsibility for the security interests of all States, it is possible to reach an agreement,

1. *Urges* the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to continue, without pre-conditions, their bilateral negotiations at Geneva as long as is necessary in order to achieve positive results in accordance with the security interests of all States and the universal desire for progress towards disarmament;

2. *Calls upon* the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to spare no effort in seeking the attainment of the final objective of the negotiations;

3. *Invites* the Governments of the two States mentioned above to work actively towards the enhancement of mutual trust, in order to create an atmosphere more conducive to disarmament agreements;

4. *Expresses its firmest possible encouragement and support to the negotiating parties in their efforts to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.*

On 11 November, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and Poland submitted a fourth draft resolution. It was revised on 17 November and sponsored in the revised form by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland and Viet Nam. That same day, it was introduced by the representative of Czechoslovakia who, in reviewing its main provisions, drew attention, among others, to operative paragraph 2, by which the General Assembly would call upon the States parties to the bilateral talks "to achieve as soon as possible equitable agreement which would provide for the non-deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and for a drastic reduction in the existing nuclear systems of such range without prejudice to anybody's security".

On 22 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 65 to 19, with 40 abstentions. In connection with the vote, 17 States which voted in favour, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Egypt, Finland, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Somalia, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia and Yugoslavia, generally indicated that their support of the draft resolution was a sign of the importance they attached to the initiative, rather than their acceptance of its specific formulations or of the point of view reflected either in it or in the others on the same subject, particularly the Western initiative.

Australia, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal, which voted against the draft, saw in it an attempt to prejudice the outcome of the bilateral negotiations by imposing a renunciation of, or at least a moratorium on, the Western deployment which, in effect, would preserve the USSR's existing monopoly in the type of weapons in question. Romania also voted against because it found that both the Eastern and the Western draft resolutions embodied unilateral approaches, with each side attempting to gain the Assembly's approval of its rigid stance. Austria, the Bahamas, China, India, Nepal, Peru, Spain and Zaire, which abstained on the Eastern proposal, generally felt that the position it reflected — combined with that reflected in the others — would not lead to a clear pronouncement by the Assembly or facilitate the achievement of the desired goal.

On 20 December in the General Assembly, Bulgaria, on behalf of the sponsors of the draft resolution, formally proposed its withdrawal on the grounds that the conditions prevailing at the time the First Committee had approved it had changed radically, in that the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in some Western European countries had begun and the bilateral talks in Geneva had been suspended. The German Democratic Republic, in explaining its position regarding the situation, affirmed that the deployment of new United States missiles had taken away the basis for bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and had also affected other negotiations and the international situation.

The Soviet Union stated that it had done everything in its power to achieve a generally acceptable agreement by showing flexibility and frequently putting forward proposals which took into account the views of the other side. For instance, in October, it had stated its readiness — provided the United States refrained from deploying its missiles in Europe and equalized the level of its nuclear delivery planes — to take a major step, to leave only 140 missiles of the SS-20 type in the European part of its territory and to destroy those remaining. As a result, the Soviet Union would have fewer missiles than it had had in 1976, when it had been recognized that there was a parity of forces in that category of weapons between the USSR and NATO countries, and fewer than the total number available to France and the United Kingdom, which possessed 162 such missiles. The United States had ignored all responses made by the Soviet side, the Soviet Union stated, and had used the negotiations as a cover to implement its military programmes; with the emplacement of American missiles in Europe, the possibility of a mutually acceptable agreement at the Geneva talks no longer existed. Consequently, the Soviet Union supported the Bulgarian proposal that the draft resolution from the Eastern European side not be put to the vote.

The United Kingdom expressed some doubts about the procedural implications of the Bulgarian proposal and also stated that it did not understand what new development it was that was thought to make one of the four draft resolutions on bilateral nuclear arms talks inappropriate for adoption by the General Assembly. The only intervening event had been the withdrawal of one party from the bilateral negotiations, while the other party had made perfectly clear its willingness to continue. That position had been endorsed by the Western alliance which, in a NATO communiqué of 9 December, had stated:

The ultimate goal remains that there should be neither Soviet nor United States land-based, long-range INF missiles. The deployment of United States missiles can be halted or reversed by concrete results at the negotiating table. In this spirit we wish to see an early resumption of the INF negotiations which the Soviet Union has discontinued.

The United States regretted that the Soviet Union had broken off the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces and had not set a date for the resumption of those on reduction of strategic arms or on mutual and balanced force reductions. For its part, it remained at the table and stood ready to continue negotiations towards equitable agreements. It hoped that the Soviet Union would resume the talks at an early date as it would be in the interest of both parties to make early progress towards agreements to reduce arms and establish a more stable military balance; it was up to the USSR. The United States would not insist, however, on voting on the draft resolution, since the implicit point — the need for negotiation — was, in its view, better made in the other resolutions, and it did not consider the text in question to be particularly useful.

In response to the comments about its ceasing to participate in the talks on medium-range weapons, the Soviet Union stated that it had been negotiating honestly, but the United States deployments had made fur-

ther Soviet participation impossible: if the talks were to continue, the Soviet Union would be taking part in a deception, using the talks to camouflage the exacerbation of the arms race, started by NATO and the United States. The Soviet Union had clearly stated that restoration of the *status quo* would allow its previous proposals again to come into effect. For its part, it believed that Europe should be liberated from any missiles, of whatever range, whether tactical or medium-range.

The General Assembly decided not to put the draft resolution to a vote.

Dealing with a more general aspect of the question of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, Argentina, Brazil and Pakistan, on 11 November, submitted a draft resolution under the item "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session". Austria, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia and Uruguay subsequently co-sponsored it.

In introducing the draft resolution in the First Committee on 17 November, the representative of Brazil pointed out that, in its preambular paragraphs, it referred to provisions of the Final Document dealing with the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon Powers for nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, and expressed the Assembly's regret that the nuclear arms race had not been halted and the danger of nuclear war was increasing, and its concern over the risk of nuclear war inherent in the existing world situation. In its operative part, the text reaffirmed the special responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States, the vital interests of all mankind in disarmament negotiations and the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament.

On 23 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 109 to 1 (United States), with 15 abstentions (mainly Western States and China).

In connection with the vote, Australia, India, Mongolia and Oman, which voted in favour, explained their positions. Australia stated that it was concerned about the dangers of nuclear war and strongly supported the cause of nuclear disarmament. It was also concerned about the dangers of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and interpreted subparagraph (b) of the first preambular paragraph (see below), which affirmed the need to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race "in all its aspects", as pertaining to both vertical and horizontal proliferation. In that connection, Australia regretted that the text had selectively quoted paragraph 20 of the Final Document. It saw operative paragraph 3 as allowing States freely to negotiate between themselves, and paragraph 4 as merely requesting the international community to be kept broadly informed. India stated that it supported the draft resolution because, in operative paragraph 1, it placed the onus for nuclear disarmament where it belonged — on the nuclear-weapon States — and held them accountable for that purpose. India also shared the belief expressed in operative paragraphs 2 and 3 that all States had the duty to contribute to disarma-

ment efforts and the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. Mongolia viewed the result of the vote as an indication that the majority of Committee members were committed to the consideration of the question of preventing nuclear war and achieving nuclear disarmament and to drafting the necessary international legal instruments on those vital issues. Oman stated that it supported any efforts aimed at the prevention of nuclear war.

On 20 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 133 to 1, with 14 abstentions, as resolution 38/183 M. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, in particular the following:

(a) That nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

(b) That it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons,

(c) That removing the threat of a world war—a nuclear war—is the most acute and urgent task of the present day,

(d) That while disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament,

(e) That the most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

(f) That pending the achievement of this goal, the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war,

(g) That, in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility,

Deeply regretting that the nuclear-arms race has not yet been halted and that the danger of nuclear war has been increasing,

Gravely concerned over the risks of nuclear war inherent in the present world situation,

1. *Solemnly reaffirms* the special responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States for nuclear disarmament and for undertaking measures to prevent nuclear war and to halt the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects;

2. *Solemnly reaffirms* the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in the success of disarmament negotiations and the consequent duty of all States to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament;

3. *Solemnly reaffirms* the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament;

4. *Requests* the nuclear-weapon States to submit to the General Assembly annual reports on the measures and steps taken by them, jointly or individually, in the discharge of the special responsibilities incumbent upon them for the prevention of nuclear war and for halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race.

On 8 November, under the same item as the resolution discussed above, Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe submitted a draft

resolution entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects". It was introduced on 11 November by the representative of the German Democratic Republic. In his statement, he stressed that the adoption of nuclear disarmament measures was a matter of the highest priority and that the intensified nuclear arms buildup and concurrent war preparations, backed up by the espousal of doctrines and concepts proclaiming, in particular, the feasibility of fighting, limiting and winning a nuclear war, jeopardized peace, led to the escalation of the nuclear arms race and were major obstacles to effective negotiations. The draft resolution was based on General Assembly resolution 37/78 C of 1982,¹⁹ and aimed at ruling out forever the possibility of the outbreak of nuclear war through the elimination of all nuclear weapons. In particular, by its operative paragraph 1, the General Assembly would call on the Committee on Disarmament to proceed to negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document, to elaborate a disarmament programme and to establish a working group with a corresponding mandate. The question had been on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for years; extensive discussions had been held on an informal basis and concrete proposals had been submitted. The German Democratic Republic stated that the time had come for negotiations and there should be no further delay in launching them.

On 23 November, the Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 91 to 19 (mainly Western countries), with 8 abstentions. In connection with the vote, Austria, Brazil, Finland and Oman, which voted in favour, explained their positions. Both Austria and Finland, in spite of certain reservations on some of the preambular parts of the draft, stated that their affirmative vote should be understood as an expression of profound concern that the escalating nuclear arms race be halted and reversed. Austria also supported stronger involvement by the Committee on Disarmament in efforts to achieve progress towards nuclear disarmament and said it would welcome the establishment of a working group on the subject. Brazil emphasized its understanding, first, that the "nuclear disarmament programme" referred to in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution corresponded to the "comprehensive, phased programme" mentioned in paragraph 50 (c) of the Final Document and, secondly, that the elaboration of such a programme must not be considered as a substitute or condition for priority negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, which the Committee on Disarmament should act upon with the utmost urgency. Oman, on that resolution too, indicated that it supported all efforts aimed at the prevention of nuclear war. Australia, which voted against the proposal, regarded it as among those which were put forward for propagandistic purposes.

On 20 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 108 to 19, with 16 abstentions, as resolution 38/183 D. China did not participate in the vote. The resolution reads as follows:

¹⁹ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. VII, pp. 178-179.

The General Assembly,

Recalling that at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, it expressed its profound preoccupation over the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, the prevention of which remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day,

Reaffirming once again that nuclear weapons pose the most serious threat to mankind and its survival and that it is therefore essential to proceed with nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming also that all nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility for the fulfilment of the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament,

Stressing again that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on Earth, and bearing in mind the devastating results which nuclear war would have on belligerents and non-belligerents alike,

Recalling that at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it decided that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war had the highest priority and that it was essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons,

Stressing that any expectation of winning a nuclear war is senseless and that such a war would inevitably lead to the destruction of nations, to enormous devastation and to catastrophic consequences for civilization and life itself on Earth,

Recalling further that, in its resolution 35/152 B of 12 December 1980, it noted with alarm the increased risk of a nuclear catastrophe associated both with the intensification of the nuclear-arms race and with the adoption of the new doctrines of limited or partial use of nuclear weapons, which are incompatible with its resolution 110 (II) of 3 November 1947, entitled "Measures to be taken against propaganda and the inciters of a new war", and give rise to illusions of the admissibility and acceptability of a nuclear conflict,

Noting with alarm that to the doctrine of a limited nuclear war was later added the concept of a protracted nuclear war and that these dangerous doctrines lead to a new twist in the spiral of the arms race, which may seriously hamper the reaching of agreement on nuclear disarmament,

Gravely concerned about the renewed escalation of the nuclear-arms race, both in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, as well as reliance on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which in fact are heightening the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and lead to increased tensions and instability in international relations,

Taking note of the relevant deliberations of the Disarmament Commission in 1983 with regard to item 4 of its agenda, as contained in its report,

Stressing the urgent need for the cessation of the development and deployment of new types and systems of nuclear weapons as a step on the road to nuclear disarmament,

Stressing again that priority in disarmament negotiations should be given to nuclear weapons and referring to paragraphs 49 and 54 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, 34/83 J of 11 December 1979, 35/152 B and C of 12 December 1980, 36/92 E of 9 December 1981 and 37/78 C of 9 December 1982,

Noting that the Committee on Disarmament, at its session held in 1983, discussed the question of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and, in particular, the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group for negotiations on that question,

Regretting, however, that the Committee on Disarmament was unable to reach agreement on the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group for the purpose of undertaking multilateral negotiations on the question of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament,

Considering that efforts will continue to be made in order to enable the Conference on Disarmament to fulfil its negotiating role with regard to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, bearing in mind the high priority accorded to this question in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Convinced that the Conference on Disarmament is the most suitable forum for the preparation and conduct of negotiations on nuclear disarmament,

1. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to proceed without delay to negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and especially to elaborate a nuclear-disarmament programme, and to establish for this purpose an *ad hoc* working group on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament;

2. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament: report of the Conference on Disarmament".

On 8 November, Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Ukrainian SSR, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe submitted yet another draft resolution, on prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon, under the same agenda item. The representative of the German Democratic Republic introduced it on 11 November. In his statement he recalled earlier resolutions by which the General Assembly had sought the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon, and emphasized that so far there had been no concrete results. In the view of the sponsors, a further postponement of its prohibition might have serious consequences, as nuclear neutron warheads were already being produced and preparations being made for their deployment, not only in Europe but also in other regions. By the 1983 draft resolution, the General Assembly would call for immediate negotiations on its prohibition. In that respect, the text placed emphasis on the organic interrelationship of negotiations on the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon and the entire process of nuclear disarmament as envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, which had made the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapons systems the starting-point of such a process. The prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon would be a step towards that end.

On 23 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 56 to 12 (mainly Western States), with 47 abstentions. In connection with the vote, several States explained their positions.

India, which voted in favour, stated that the proposal was in line with its total opposition to all nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear neutron weapon was a manifestation of one of the particularly dangerous consequences of the nuclear arms race, whose reversal should be negotiated by the Committee on Disarmament without delay.

Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, Guyana, Ireland, the Netherlands, Oman, Pakistan, the Sudan, Sweden and Zaire, all of which abstained, generally condemned the development and production of nuclear neutron weapons, but at the same time had serious reserva-

tions about the idea of prohibiting only one specific nuclear weapon. In other words, they could not support a selective approach to the question of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Denmark further made clear that, while it would not accept nuclear neutron weapons on its territory, it could not go along with the draft resolution because it constituted an undisguised attempt to split the Western allies in an important area of defence policy; the Netherlands held a similar position.

On 20 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 74 to 12, with 57 abstentions, as resolution 38/183 C. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that the achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements, *inter alia*, for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, which is especially emphasized in paragraph 50 (a) of that Document,

Stressing that the nuclear neutron weapon represents a further step in the qualitative arms race in the field of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming its resolutions 36/92 K of 9 December 1981 and 37/78 E of 9 December 1982,

Sharing the world-wide concern expressed by Member States, as well as by non-governmental organizations, about the continued and expanded production and introduction of the nuclear neutron weapon in military arsenals, which escalates the nuclear-arms race and significantly lowers the threshold of nuclear war,

Aware of the inhuman effects of that weapon, which constitutes a grave threat, particularly to the unprotected civilian population,

Noting the consideration by the Committee on Disarmament at its 1983 session of issues connected with the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, as well as the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon,

Regretting that the Committee on Disarmament was not able to reach agreement on the commencement of negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament or on the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon in an appropriate organizational framework,

1. *Reaffirms its request* to the Conference on Disarmament to start without delay negotiations within an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons as an organic element of negotiations, as envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this question by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session;

3. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on this question to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon".

On 11 November, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Canada, Finland, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Romania and Sweden submitted, under the item "General and complete disarmament", a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons pur-

poses". Subsequently, Denmark, New Zealand, Singapore and Uruguay also sponsored it.

In introducing the draft resolution on 17 November, the representative of Canada recalled that similar procedural resolutions on the question of a cut-off of the production of fissionable material had been passed by the General Assembly since 1978. It was important, he stated, that the Committee on Disarmament pursue its consideration of the question of the cut-off at an appropriate stage of its work, and the purpose of the draft was to maintain the question on its agenda. That would ensure that, when conditions were right, the Committee on Disarmament could engage fully in negotiations leading to the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

On 22 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 106 to none, with 25 abstentions (including the five nuclear-weapon States).

In connection with the vote, Algeria, which voted in favour, made clear that although it wished to encourage all opportunities for dialogue and negotiation, it had some reservations about the draft resolution because it felt it was not entirely in conformity with the consensus established in the Final Document. Accordingly, its support for the initiative was limited to those aspects which were in keeping with that Document's provisions.

Argentina, India and the USSR explained their abstention. Argentina found that although some objectionable elements contained in previous draft resolutions on the same subject had been mitigated, it still had reservations about the scope of the proposal. India recalled that it had consistently abstained on proposals seeking to separate the question of the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes from other aspects of the nuclear disarmament process because, in its view, such a partial approach was inconsistent with that agreed upon by consensus in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. It felt that there should be a simultaneous cessation of the production of both nuclear weapons and fissionable materials for weapons purposes. That would facilitate acceptance, by all States, of equitable and non-discriminatory safeguards on all their nuclear facilities. The USSR observed that while the goal of the draft resolution was the prohibition of the production of fissionable material, it ignored the question of the implementation of a programme of nuclear disarmament leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The USSR considered that the question of the cessation of production of fissionable material should be examined, but as an early step within such a process.

On 20 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by 124 votes to none, with 23 abstentions, as resolution 38/188 E. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/91 H of 16 December 1978, 34/87 D of 11 December 1979, 35/156 H of 12 December 1980, 36/97 G of 9 December 1981 and 37/99 E of 13 December

1982, in which it requested the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to consider urgently the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration,

Noting that the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for 1983 included the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" and that the Committee's programme of work for both parts of the session held in 1983 contained this item,

Recalling the proposals and statements made in the Committee on Disarmament on that item,

Considering that the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the progressive conversion and transfer of stocks to peaceful uses would be a significant step towards halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race,

Considering that the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices also would be an important measure in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and explosive devices,

Requests the Conference on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

Finally, on 11 November, under the agenda item entitled "Implementation of the conclusions of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the Third Review Conference", a draft resolution of the same title was submitted by a widely representative group of 35 Member States, which were subsequently joined by 13 additional sponsors.²⁰ The draft resolution, which was introduced by the representative of the United Kingdom on 17 November, noted the agreement reached among the parties to the Treaty to hold the Third Review Conference in 1985 and to set up a preparatory committee for that purpose.

On 23 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 115 to none, with 6 abstentions. On 15 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 134 to none, with 7 abstentions (Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, India, Pakistan, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia). China and France did not participate in the vote. The resolution, 38/74, reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, the annex to which contains the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

²⁰ Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Samoa, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, USSR, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay.

Noting the provisions of article VIII, paragraph 3, of that Treaty concerning the holding of successive review conferences,

Noting that in the Final Document of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held at Geneva from 11 August to 7 September 1980, the Conference proposed to the Depository Governments that a third conference to review the operation of the Treaty be convened in 1985 and noting that there appears to be a consensus among the parties that the Third Review Conference should be held at Geneva in August/September of that year,

1. *Notes* that, following appropriate consultations, an open-ended preparatory committee was formed of parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons serving on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency or represented on the Committee on Disarmament as well as any party to the Treaty which may express its interest in participating in the work of the preparatory committee;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its preparation.

Conclusion

Throughout 1983, the question of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament was actively debated in the Disarmament Commission, the Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, as well as bilaterally between the USSR and the United States in their two separate negotiating forums — one on strategic and one on intermediate-range forces — in Geneva. No substantial progress was made, however, in solving any of the problems connected with the many aspects of the question.

At the thirty-eighth session of the Assembly, the question of the bilateral nuclear arms negotiations between the two major Powers was the subject of particularly intense consideration, as evidenced by the tenor of the debate and the submission of four distinct and, in some cases, competing draft resolutions on the subject. None of the four, however, was supported by consensus despite general recognition that it would have been not only preferable but also more meaningful and encouraging had the international community been able to speak with a common voice on such important aspects of the nuclear question. Such a common voice was not to be found, however, even though one of the four — that which led to the adoption of resolution 38/183 N, discussed above — was largely procedural.

Furthermore, it may be noted that, out of the 26 resolutions on primarily nuclear issues adopted by the Assembly in 1983, only one, that on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East (discussed in chapter X below), was adopted without a vote. Such an experience is not new, however: in 1982 the record had, in fact, been 22 to 1. The variety of positions thus reflected undoubtedly illustrates the complexities of the question of nuclear disarmament and also the dangers inherent in the international situation in the nuclear era, from which the United Nations cannot fundamentally isolate itself.

Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

Introduction

AS LONG AS THERE ARE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, the possibility of their use, either deliberately or by accident, will continue to represent an unprecedented threat to international peace and security and, ultimately, to the future of civilization. In paragraphs 18 and 32 of the Final Document of its tenth special session,¹ held in 1978, the General Assembly gave full recognition to the grave nature of that fact by declaring: "Removing the threat of a world war — a nuclear war — is the most acute and urgent task of the present day" and "All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war."

Various initiatives have been taken concerning the limitation or prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. They were recorded at some length in the 1982 edition of *The Yearbook*.² Proposals discussed at different times and in different contexts have ranged from unconditional prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons to prohibition of first use and conditional bans.³ By its first resolution on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961,⁴ the General Assembly declared that the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would be a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations and that any State using such weapons would be considered as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization. In subsequent years, various countries, among them the Soviet Union, which put forward a draft convention, stressed anew the importance of banning the use of nuclear weapons.

At the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, in 1978, India initiated a draft resolution which was sponsored by 34 countries, mostly

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III.

² See *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. VIII, pp. 193-214.

³ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, chap. V, pp. 68-69.

⁴ In addition to resolution 1653 (XVI), the General Assembly adopted the following resolutions between 1962 and 1982 on various aspects of the non-use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war: 1801 (XVII) of 1962, 1909 (XVIII) of 1963, 2164 (XXI) of 1966, 2289 (XXII) of 1967, 2936 (XXVII) of 1972, 33/71 B of 1978, 34/83 G of 1979, 35/152 D of 1980, 36/81 B, 36/92 I and 36/100 of 1981, 37/78 I, 37/78 J, and 37/100 C of 1982.

non-aligned. India recalled that at its special session earlier that year the General Assembly had reiterated that nuclear weapons posed the greatest danger to mankind and that the Final Document had recognized that the most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war was their complete elimination. By the draft resolution, the Assembly would call upon all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to submit proposals on arrangements for the conclusion of a convention or any other agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons, so that it could discuss the subject at its thirty-fourth session. The draft was adopted as resolution 33/71 B by a vote of 103 to 18 (including France, the United Kingdom, the United States and other Western countries), with 18 abstentions (including the Soviet Union, Eastern European and various other countries). China did not participate in the vote. The issue was pursued, again at the initiative of India, at the thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth sessions of the General Assembly, in 1979 and 1980, (resolutions 34/83 G and 35/152 D). Starting in 1981, it assumed greater prominence in that the General Assembly adopted three resolutions on the issue — 36/100, 36/92 I and 36/81 B — entitled, respectively, “Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe”, “Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war” and “Prevention of nuclear war”.

The Declaration was adopted as the result of an initiative of the Soviet Union, which had requested that the item be put on the agenda of the Assembly at its thirty-sixth session. In the First Committee, the USSR stressed that the task of preventing a nuclear catastrophe should be given the highest priority in international relations. The problem had become particularly urgent, it held, because the United States was seeking a position of military supremacy and attempting to condition people to the idea that nuclear war could be limited and won, an idea that was both adventuristic and suicidal. By the Soviet proposal, the General Assembly would solemnly proclaim that there could never be any justification or pardon for statesmen who took a decision to be the first to use nuclear weapons and that any doctrine endorsing such use would be incompatible with the principles of human morality and the ideals of the United Nations.

Several States expressed strong support for the Soviet initiative, but some Western States questioned the value of such an approach. The Federal Republic of Germany, while agreeing that nuclear war should be made impossible, called attention to what it regarded as ambiguities and incompatibilities between the new initiative and earlier Soviet proposals and statements on military doctrine, inherent contradictions in the non-first-use idea and inconsistencies between the Soviet proposal and agreed principles of disarmament and provisions of the Charter. The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community, emphasized that the declarations by some States could do little to enhance international security if they were not accompanied by realistic, balanced and verifiable arms control agreements; accordingly, the Ten were unable to support proposals, such as those on non-first-use, which in their view were declaratory and unenforceable. The United

States questioned the aim and reliability of Soviet pledges. It held that meaningful arms control depended on strict adherence to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, by which States should refrain from the threat or use of force. In response, the Soviet Union stated: (a) all its proposals on prevention of nuclear war had the same goal, namely, the outlawing of nuclear war; (b) as the threat of nuclear war had increased and various doctrines had allowed it as a possibility, the United Nations should condemn the first use of nuclear weapons; (c) such a condemnation would improve prospects for the elaboration of specific agreements; (d) the proposal confirmed that the USSR would not use nuclear weapons first, and if other nuclear Powers did the same there would be no nuclear war; (e) measures to prevent nuclear war were complementary to measures of genuine nuclear disarmament; and (f) since general and complete disarmament was not currently possible, partial measures were necessary, first among them, the prevention of nuclear war and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 82 to 19 (France, United Kingdom, United States and other Western countries), with 41 abstentions, as resolution 36/100.

The second resolution, 36/92 I, sponsored by 30 countries, mainly non-aligned, on the basis of yet a further proposal of India, was adopted by a vote of 121 to 19, with 6 abstentions. By it, the General Assembly once again declared that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity and that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited, pending nuclear disarmament. It also urged consideration of the question of an international convention or some other agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war at its second special session on disarmament, to be held in 1982. In introducing the draft, India had emphasized that although the United Nations Charter permitted self-defence, it would be a mockery to suggest that, in the pursuit of its security concerns, one State might jeopardize the survival of all.

By the third resolution, 36/81 B, sponsored by 17 countries, mainly non-aligned, and adopted without a vote, the General Assembly urged all nuclear-weapon States, and other Member States that so desired, to submit to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war, for consideration at the second special session. In introducing the draft, Argentina had emphasized that its subject-matter was of interest to all States, even though the instruments for unleashing a nuclear war were in the hands of a small number of countries.

At the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1982, the need to avoid the outbreak of a nuclear exchange was stressed in many of the opening statements in plenary meetings as well as in the *Ad Hoc* Committee.⁵ The Secretary-General said that, by its very nature, nuclear war could not remain limited or con-

⁵ For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chaps. II and VIII.

tained within a predetermined framework; its prevention was not only a moral imperative, but also a question of survival.

China felt that all the nuclear States should agree not to use nuclear weapons. Pending such an agreement, each of them, unconditionally, should undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States and nuclear-weapon-free zones, and not to be the first to use such weapons against each other. France, on the other hand, believed that total nuclear disarmament or a universal commitment to non-first-use were Utopian or misleading solutions in the existing world situation and, as long as the imbalance in conventional arms persisted in Europe, would compound the threat of war. Moreover, the Charter of the United Nations already provided for the non-use of force. The Federal Republic of Germany similarly observed that the NATO countries had reaffirmed that none of their weapons would be used except in response to an attack, which was in keeping with the provisions of the Charter regarding the prohibition of the use or threat of use of force and the right to self-defence. Such arguments were also put forward by Canada and the United Kingdom. In India's view, nuclear war doctrines were, in essence, doctrines of terrorism practised by nation States. The first step should be a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and it was gratified that two nuclear-weapon States had accepted such a proposition. India held that an internationally binding instrument, on the model of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting use in war of biological and chemical weapons, was needed, and it proposed such an instrument with regard to nuclear weapons.⁶

The Soviet representative read a message from President L. I. Brezhnev by which the Soviet Union, with immediate effect, assumed an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. In taking that decision, the message continued, the Soviet Union proceeded from the indisputable fact that should a nuclear war start, it could mean the destruction of human civilization. The peoples of the world had a right to expect that the Soviet decision would be followed by reciprocal steps on the part of the other nuclear States which, if taken, would be tantamount to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons altogether. In the conduct of its policy the Soviet Union would continue to take into account how the other nuclear Powers acted and whether they followed its example.

That Soviet undertaking was welcomed by Eastern European States and others, including Cuba, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Guyana, Jamaica and Mexico. Ecuador, expressing support for the positions of China and the Soviet Union in the matter of the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, stated that if such a commitment became unanimous among the nuclear Powers, the special session would not have been in vain. The United States observed, however, that NATO policy went far beyond the Soviet Union's pledge, and the Federal Republic of Germany stressed that coun-

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes*, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32, para. 20; the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session is reproduced *in extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982.

tries and Governments must dedicate themselves to the prevention of war in all its aspects, both conventional and nuclear. In spite of many efforts, it was not possible to make further progress on the question at the 1982 special session on disarmament.

In paragraph 62 of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the following passage appears:

... the General Assembly expresses its profound preoccupation over the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, the prevention of which remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day. The General Assembly urges all Member States to consider as soon as possible relevant proposals designed to secure the avoidance of war, in particular nuclear war, thus ensuring that the survival of mankind is not endangered.

Subsequent debates in the Committee on Disarmament, during the summer of 1982, did not bring about any change in the situation.⁷ In its report to the General Assembly, the Committee stated:

The question of prevention of nuclear war has been the subject of earnest and intensive discussion, and its importance and urgency are readily acknowledged. No consensus was reached on a proposal to set up an *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Prevention of Nuclear War (CD/309) under item 2 of the Committee's agenda. The Committee agreed to hold further informal consultations on this topic.⁸

At the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, disappointment at the outcome of the twelfth special session was a recurring theme in many of the plenary and First Committee statements. Several States stressed that the prevention of nuclear war was a supreme objective and a most pressing issue.

In all, six draft resolutions on the subject were submitted to the First Committee, of which three were subsequently not pressed to a vote.

Of the three resolutions adopted, one, 37/100 C, entitled "Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons", was initiated by India and eventually sponsored by 21 States, mainly non-aligned. By it, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to undertake, on a priority basis, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the text of an annexed Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons.

By another resolution, 37/78 I, which was sponsored in draft form by 17 non-aligned countries, plus the German Democratic Republic and Romania, and introduced by Argentina, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war.

Finally, by resolution 37/78 J, initiated by Cuba and the German

⁷ For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. VIII.

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/37/27 and Corr.1)*, para. 49.

Democratic Republic and later also sponsored by Romania and Viet Nam, the General Assembly considered that “the solemn declarations by two nuclear-weapon States (China and the USSR) made or reiterated at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, concerning their respective obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons” offered an important way to decrease the danger of nuclear war, and expressed the hope that the other nuclear-weapon States would “consider making similar declarations with respect to not being the first to use nuclear weapons”.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1983

As indicated in the previous chapter, the Disarmament Commission,⁹ under item 4 of its agenda, was called upon to consider various aspects of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at the effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war and to elaborate a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament.

In opening the session of the Commission on 9 May 1983, the Chairman, Mr. Celso Antônio de Souza e Silva of Brazil, called attention to the fact that the threat of nuclear war was the dominant concern of the peoples of the world and that the United Nations had repeatedly underscored that concern in its deliberations. He also proposed that the relevant agenda item be considered in the Committee of the Whole, pending the setting up of a specific subsidiary body. During the general exchange of views in plenary meetings, some references were also made to the question. For details, refer to chapter V above.

Following a decision of the Committee of the Whole at its third meeting, on 20 May, a contact group open to all delegations was established, under the chairmanship of Mr. Sérgio de Quieroz Duarte of Brazil, with the task of dealing with the item and drafting specific recommendations for adoption by the Commission.

The Contact Group held 10 meetings between 24 May and 1 June and, in addition to a document by the Chairman on ways to deal with the item,¹⁰ examined six substantive documents — two by the German Democratic Republic, one each by the Federal Republic of Germany, Mexico, the USSR and the non-aligned countries.¹¹

The Contact Group decided that all the documents would be considered on an equal footing and further agreed, without prejudice to individual positions concerning the substance of the matter, to use the non-aligned document, which consisted of a working paper on measures for the prevention of nuclear war, as the basis for its drafting work. The Contact Group was unable, however, to achieve consensus on a set of

⁹ A/CN.10/PV.66-70 and A/CN.10/PV.65-72/Corrigendum.

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42)*, annex III.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, annexes I and IV, and II, VI, VII and V respectively.

recommendations for submission to the Committee of the Whole. It recommended, therefore, that item 4 of the agenda be considered again at the Commission's substantive session in 1984. It further suggested that the Committee of the Whole annex to its report to the Commission a "Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4", reflecting the state of the consideration of the matter in the Commission.¹² Before adjourning, the Commission considered the results of the deliberations of the Committee of the Whole on the item. Its views are outlined in chapter V above.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1983

The Committee on Disarmament, the multilateral negotiating body, convened in Geneva on 1 February and decided, after intensive negotiations, to include in its agenda an item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". During the 1983 session, the item was extensively debated¹³ and before the end of the session six working papers had been submitted on it by individual Committee members or groups.¹⁴

The paper submitted by the group of 21 called for the setting up of an *ad hoc* working group to undertake negotiations on practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. That submitted by a group of socialist States also called for the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group to negotiate concrete steps on the question, including the renunciation by all nuclear-weapon States of the first use of nuclear weapons and the conclusion of a world-wide treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. Subsequently, the German Democratic Republic put forward a paper containing a list of items which it suggested could be dealt with in the course of informal meetings of the Committee.

The Federal Republic of Germany submitted a working paper that sought as its objective the prevention of all armed conflict, beginning with the prohibition of the threat or use of force as embodied in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. Belgium's working paper was on confidence-building measures within the framework of the prevention of nuclear war. Finally, Australia, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands, in a joint paper, tentatively outlined how the subject "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters" might be explored in the course of a series of informal meetings.

Many members considered, however, that there was need for the urgent negotiation of appropriate and practical measures for the preven-

¹² *Ibid.*, annex VIII.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1), appendix III (CD/421), vols. I-V.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1), paras. 33 and 34. The documents themselves are contained in *ibid.*, appendix II (CD/421), documents CD/341 (group of 21), CD/355 (a group of socialist States), CD/357 (Federal Republic of Germany), CD/380 (Belgium), CD/406 (German Democratic Republic), CD/411 (Australia, Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan and Netherlands). In addition, the Committee had before it a compilation prepared by the secretariat (CD/398).

tion of nuclear war, and that informal meetings would not be able to provide the proper answer or to substitute for a working group. A number of delegations deplored that although the Committee on Disarmament was the single multilateral negotiating body and nuclear weapons were a subject of the highest priority, it was unable to establish a working group to initiate negotiations because of the opposition of certain nuclear-weapon States and their allies which based their security policy on the possibility of using nuclear weapons. Those delegations believed that exchanges of views in either informal or plenary meetings could not, as past experience had demonstrated, promote the search for a common approach that would enable the Committee to fulfil its negotiating role. Other delegations maintained, however, that informal meetings would be the most appropriate vehicle for determining such an approach and held that it was premature to consider establishing a working group. As a result of the disagreement, matters related to the prevention of nuclear war were in fact considered in plenary meetings of the Committee.

Concerning the substance of the question, the group of 21 largely reaffirmed the view that the greatest peril facing the world was that of nuclear war, which would have devastating effects on belligerents and non-belligerents alike. India, for instance, reflected that feeling when it reviewed the relevant aspects of the message of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March 1983. That Conference, Indonesia subsequently noted, had, *inter alia*, expressed a demand for "an immediate halt to the drift towards nuclear conflict which threatens not only the well-being of humanity in our times but of future generations as well".¹⁵ Among others, Mexico, speaking on its own behalf as well as on behalf of the members of the group, also stressed that they could not accept that the security of their countries and the survival of mankind should be in continual and increasing jeopardy as a result of the state of relations between or the consequent actions of two super-Powers or a handful of nuclear-weapon States. In their view, since a nuclear war would have catastrophic consequences for the whole of mankind, all nations had a vital interest in the urgent negotiation of appropriate and practical measures for its prevention.

Socialist countries also stressed the importance and urgency of concrete steps for the prevention of nuclear war. Several of them denounced certain strategic concepts or doctrines that were based on the assumption that it was possible to attain victory in a nuclear war, and pointed out that such doctrines also advocated the first use of nuclear weapons. In that respect they stressed the importance of the unilateral obligation the Soviet Union had taken upon itself never to be the first to use nuclear weapons and expressed the hope that other nuclear-weapon States, which had not yet assumed such an obligation, would eventually reconsider

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 27* (A/38/27 and Corr.1), appendix II (CD/421), vol. II, document CD/354. The final documents of the Conference were also circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council under the symbol A/38/132-S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2.

their positions. They further believed that it would be necessary to elaborate such practical measures as had already found broad international support. As set out in the paper by a group of socialist States, the following were among such priority measures: the renunciation by all nuclear-weapon States of the first use of nuclear weapons; a freeze by all nuclear-weapon States on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, as well as on the production of fissionable material, as first steps towards their reduction and eventual elimination; and the declaration by all nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions until such time as a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests was concluded.

Another step advocated in their paper and reaffirmed by the German Democratic Republic and the USSR during the debate was the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. It would be between States members of the two major military-political alliances and would contain as its core the mutual commitment not to be the first to use nuclear or conventional arms against one another. As noted on behalf of the group by the German Democratic Republic, they also supported the non-aligned proposal for the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and, in that context, expressed their readiness to discuss other multilateral steps aimed at the prevention of nuclear war, such as the prevention of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and avoidance of surprise attacks.

The USSR reviewed the major measures outlined in the socialist paper, emphasizing in particular the value and practicality of a nuclear freeze (see chapter VII) in reducing the danger of nuclear war, but also stressing that its unilateral non-first-use commitment reaffirmed that the main concern in its policy was the elimination of the threat of war. It would expect the other nuclear-weapon States to take a similar step because no pretexts or excuses could outweigh the need to prevent nuclear war. It rejected the contention that its undertaking left it free to use its allegedly superior conventional weapons and pointed to the Warsaw Treaty countries' proposal for conclusion of an agreement with NATO not to use any weapons against each other.

Western members of the Committee, including France, the United Kingdom and the United States, while sharing fully the concerns of other delegations about the need to prevent nuclear war, emphasized that the matter had to be considered in the broader context of the prevention of all wars. In that regard, they underscored the supreme importance of compliance by all States with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, especially the prohibition of use or threat of force under its Article 2. They also stressed the importance of establishing and maintaining a military balance and strategic stability between opposing sides and the consequent significance of disarmament negotiations leading to deep reductions in nuclear arsenals. They re-emphasized also that a nuclear freeze and non-first-use commitments limited to nuclear weapons would fail to prevent armed conflicts effectively. At the same time, they reaffirmed that none of their weapons, nuclear or conventional, would

ever be used except in response to armed attack. Nuclear arsenals, they made clear, had a single function, namely, the prevention of war and preservation of peace and security through the strategy of deterrence; the elements of deterrence and defence, together with arms control and disarmament, were integral parts of the system for the maintenance of peace and security. In that context the Federal Republic of Germany, gratified at the broad support of the topic, emphasized that the prevention of all war must not be lost from view, and that there should be a clearer grasp of the scope of the work under the item "Prevention of nuclear war"; accordingly it found great appeal in the formula "appropriate and practical measures". Later in the session it postulated that the main fear and risk in Western Europe, and in other regions, was that an accidental or surprise conventional attack could easily lead to nuclear conflict. It then noted that recent Soviet military doctrine emphasized the growing significance of surprise and, in that context, of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, it recommended the examination of that doctrine and priority consideration and elaboration of confidence-building measures against surprise attack. On the same basis, it questioned the credibility of the USSR's call for a widely-shared non-first-use commitment.

Several delegations, for their part, noted that there was a contradiction between expressing concern about the danger of nuclear war, on the one hand, and mixing that question with general issues, on the other. Moreover, as indicated by Kenya in speaking for the group of 21, the attempt to bring broader issues relating to the prevention of all wars into the consideration of the prevention of nuclear war amounted to disregarding the priority that the General Assembly had unanimously attached to that question. Morocco and Nigeria cited from the Final Document and other appeals to underline the same position. Some delegations further stressed that the situation called for measures for preventing the waging of nuclear war rather than for only avoiding the risk of the accidental use of nuclear weapons.

Other delegations, in particular those of Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany, rejected that position, and pointed to the necessary interrelationship of nuclear and conventional conflict, especially the risk that any conventional war might degenerate into nuclear war. The separation of various forms of conflict, they stressed, was difficult to maintain on logical as well as practical grounds. It was for that reason, they noted, that the Committee had decided to formulate its agenda item 2 in that way (see page 133 above). They also pointed out that Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations prohibited the threat or use of force in all its forms.

The group of 21 rejected that interpretation of item 2 and maintained that the item pertained especially to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. They recalled that they had always insisted on inclusion of that question as a separate item in the agenda. That view was shared by the socialist countries.

Some delegations, among them those of Algeria and Argentina, further held that any attempt to place the consideration of the prevention of

nuclear war in the context of the prevention of war in general was dangerous because it confused the fundamental difference between nuclear and conventional war inherent in the uniquely destructive power of nuclear weapons, and diluted what was set out in the Final Document as a matter of the most urgent priority. According to that viewpoint, as expressed by India, Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations could not be invoked to justify the use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of the right of self-defence against conventional armed attack, since it could lead to the annihilation of mankind. Other delegations noted that Article 51 did not limit the right of States, subject to existing international agreements, to make use of the means they deemed the most appropriate to self-defence. China observed, furthermore, that while working against the threat of nuclear war, they could not overlook the harsh fact of the real threat posed by conventional war to various countries.

At the end of the session, the United States observed that despite the many views advanced on the question of the prevention of nuclear war, the Committee had failed even to agree to a procedure by which it would address the issue in the future. The Chairman, noting that the item had been included on the 1983 agenda largely at the initiative of the group of 21, stated that it had not yet been subjected to systematic treatment and that it was thus imperative to deal with it as a matter of priority in 1984.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

At its thirty-eighth session, the question of prevention of nuclear war occupied an important place in the General Assembly's debates, in both plenary meetings and the First Committee.¹⁶

Addressing the General Assembly on 26 September 1983, President Reagan of the United States affirmed: "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." He also stated: "I believe that if Governments are determined to deter and prevent war, there will not be war."

Subsequently, the representative of the Soviet Union declared that the countries of the socialist community had made the prevention of nuclear war the centre-piece of their foreign policy and added that the degree of progress in limiting and reducing nuclear arms would largely determine the future development of the international situation. Also, at the initiative of the Soviet Union, a new item entitled "Condemnation of nuclear war" was included in the agenda (see below).

China recalled that upon successfully testing its atomic weapon in 1964, it had declared that it was developing nuclear weapons only for defensive purposes, and that at no time and in no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Finland stressed that nuclear war was nowhere professed to be an

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 97th and 103rd meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 39th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

element of rational policy, and to limit such a war would hardly be possible. Awareness of that fact, it believed, should be a strong incentive for seeking effective agreements on the prevention of nuclear war. The peoples of the world, it stated, were entitled to specific assurances against the use of nuclear weapons. Sweden held that no sensible military or political goals could be achieved by using nuclear weapons. Yet a dangerous ambiguity remained about their role in military planning. It wondered if their role was only to deter any use by the opponent or if they would be used in certain circumstances to redress a military situation. Their technological development, including delivery systems, their deployment in forward positions and the continuous modernization of nuclear forces in Europe and elsewhere gave the impression, Sweden stated, that limited nuclear warfare was considered a possibility. Japan thought it was virtually inconceivable that the super-Powers, possessing enormous destructive capabilities, would engage in a war of annihilation. Nevertheless, there was an extremely remote chance that such a war might be started and, therefore, every possible means must be employed to meet the challenge of the nuclear age and to prevent it. For Burma, because the factors influencing the likelihood of war were predominantly political in nature, removing the possibility of a nuclear clash required bringing about a lowering of the existing dangerously high tensions. Some countries, however, among them Romania and Sweden, referred to the possibility of accidental or unintentional war. Suspicion heightened the risk of the outbreak of such a war, and the risk was increased, Sweden stated, by rigid procedures automatically set in motion for protection against surprise nuclear attack.

In the First Committee, probably no other question received greater attention than the prevention of nuclear war. In addition to general aspects, including the work of the Committee on Disarmament on the subject, various specific aspects were considered, in particular, the non-use of nuclear weapons and the possibility of an international convention to that effect, the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of accidental nuclear war and the condemnation of nuclear war.

All five nuclear-weapon States spoke on the subject. China reaffirmed its opposition to nuclear war and its advocacy of the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. It also emphasized that the immediate threat of conventional wars must be removed, because a conventional war could escalate into a nuclear one. In other words, there was no unbridgeable gulf between conventional and nuclear war.

The Soviet Union put forward its view of the problem as follows: the nuclear-weapon Powers must strictly adhere to a defensive doctrine; the arms race had been imposed on the Soviet Union from the outside; and preventive wars of any type or scale and concepts of pre-emptive nuclear strikes were alien to the Soviet military doctrine. The USSR would continue to do its utmost to preserve the prevailing equilibrium, but at the same time would seek balanced reductions and limitations of armaments. The Soviet Union also maintained that its unilateral obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons was not a mere declaration.

In military terms, that meant the armed forces would be designed with the objective of preventing armed conflicts from becoming nuclear. The Soviet Union considered it necessary to strive to create reliable material, political, legal, moral, psychological and other guarantees for the prevention of nuclear war at every level — unilateral, bilateral and multi-lateral.

France focused on the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament which had led to the idea of a general ban on use or a ban on the first use of nuclear weapons. But such measures would not reduce the dangers threatening mankind. Intentions, France stated, could not be verified, and the degree of confidence required for their acceptance was too clearly lacking in the current state of international relations. Above all, the prohibition of the use or first use of nuclear weapons would destroy the conditions indispensable to security in Europe. In that region, it stated, nuclear weapons played an essential role in the prevention of war, including nuclear war.

The United Kingdom, similarly, emphasized that the essential elements of defence strategy in the nuclear age could not be lightly discarded, nor could declaratory postures be any substitute for the hard business of negotiating agreements acceptable to all sides. It was right to debate the prevention of nuclear war because, while there were differences over the practical means to ensure that end, there were none about the end itself. The current situation underlined, the United Kingdom held, the pressing need for new agreements which would promote arms control and point the way towards disarmament, and for greater confidence and more stable relations between nations.

The United States, also noting that no one wanted nuclear war, regarded its prevention as a moral and political imperative and made clear that it had no illusions about its catastrophic consequences. From the earliest days of the post-war era, the only strategy consistent with United States values and survival had been the dual-track policy of dialogue and deterrence. The massive destructive power of modern weapons precluded any other policy. Therefore, the deterrence of conflict was the highest objective of the United States and the maintenance of dialogue on nuclear weapons the only rational political strategy for the modern age. However, while deterrence was essential in the current unstable security climate, it did not view deterrence as an end in itself. The perpetuation of a situation in which the United States was compelled to maintain a large strategic arsenal was unacceptable. In its view, dependence on dangerous weapons must be reduced, and a more stable strategic balance must be sought at a much lower level of armaments.

Czechoslovakia stated that it was a universally held opinion that mankind had come one step closer to the “nuclear abyss” during the previous year, and the “central question” was to remove the threat of nuclear war. It observed, in that connection, that the Warsaw Treaty countries had proposed a treaty on the non-use of military force between the members of NATO and themselves, and that the former systemati-

cally favoured effective measures for the prevention of nuclear war and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In its view, one of the most important premises for co-ordinating such measures would be a clear, categorical condemnation by Governments of nuclear war and of doctrines which would allow it. The German Democratic Republic emphasized that a commitment by all five nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons would open the way to the prohibition of their use. It contended that attempts to misinterpret Article 51 of the Charter to justify even possible first use of nuclear weapons was a juridical perversion; equally wrong was the contention that the need to deal with the prevention of wars in general made it impossible for Governments to give a non-first-use pledge. Mongolia similarly felt that an unconditional and resolute condemnation of nuclear war by the General Assembly would help create a favourable climate for the attainment of concrete agreements on the limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Federal Republic of Germany stated that no Government represented in the United Nations would ever consider the launching of a nuclear war, and any imputation of such an intention to any Government was irresponsible and had no basis in fact. Least of all should such intention be attributed to the member countries of NATO, which had made it unambiguously clear that they rejected any nuclear war scenario or doctrine and that their defensive alliance was rigorously based on the prevention of war. Nuclear fears should not be generated, it added, as nuclear war was not imminent and none would be fought if the international community were to take realistic measures. But a comprehensive strategy was required which, in the view of the Federal Republic, must start from the Charter and its prohibition of the threat and use of force. In that context, the following were needed: a set of policies for the reduction of crises and tension; sensible crisis management; the observance of international law; the exercise of restraint by all countries, including the nuclear-weapon States; international efforts to enhance available procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes; wider use of regional security arrangements; and an improved non-proliferation régime. The key to the prevention of nuclear war and all armed conflict was a balance of forces at the lowest possible level, which implied undiminished security and adequate international verification.

Nigeria stressed that it was entirely realistic to suggest that the most urgent task facing humanity was the prevention of nuclear war. Dangerous doctrines of limited, "winnable" or "survivable" nuclear war, or of flexible response, not only had lowered the nuclear threshold but also had made the outbreak of nuclear war a threatening reality. Accordingly, Nigeria had noted with interest the views on nuclear war expressed by the President of the United States in the General Assembly on 26 September (see above). In his statement, he had endorsed some of the opinions held by the great majority of the countries of the international community, Nigeria stated, namely, the need to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war, which could not be won, and the fact that political will had a role in the prevention of war and in disarmament negotiations. Nigeria recog-

nized that it was legitimate for States to seek to provide, as a first duty, for their security, but also observed it was obvious that a situation in which global security was being held hostage to the security interests of a handful of States was unacceptable. Similarly, Indonesia emphasized that because all peoples were potential victims of any nuclear conflict, negotiations on preventing such a conflict should not be confined to nuclear-weapon States. In no area was the need for democratization of the decision-making process more acute than in the nuclear field. Therefore, multilateral negotiations, in parallel with bilateral ones, were indispensable. In that connection, Indonesia noted with satisfaction that the Committee on Disarmament, in 1983, had for the first time included an item on that issue in its agenda. However, it regretted that the lack of consensus on the establishment of machinery had so far prevented substantive examination of the subject. India saw the situation in the Committee on Disarmament as a dismal failure. The General Assembly, it stated, could not but take a very serious view of the impasse and give a political directive to the Committee to initiate negotiations early in 1984 on the prevention of nuclear war, an issue which affected the very fate of mankind.

In the course of the First Committee's work, proposals were submitted which led to the adoption by the General Assembly of four resolutions on the prevention of nuclear war. A fifth resolution, 38/183 M, dealing jointly with that question and with nuclear disarmament more generally, is considered in the previous chapter (page 118 above).

A draft resolution entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war" was submitted by Cuba and the German Democratic Republic on 7 November, and was subsequently also sponsored by Mongolia and Romania. In introducing the draft resolution on 10 November, the representative of the German Democratic Republic stated that an important practical step towards lessening the danger of nuclear war would be the commitment by all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union and China, it pointed out, had already done so and if the other three nuclear-weapon States undertook analogous commitments, that would be tantamount to the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. As a result, the goal of a convention on the question would be helped, confidence between States strengthened and the chances of negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons decisively improved. The operative part of the draft resolution underlined, therefore, the importance of the declarations made by the Soviet Union and China and further expressed the hope that the other nuclear-weapon States would make similar declarations.

On 23 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 87 to 19 (mainly Western States), with 8 abstentions, including China. In connection with the vote, Australia stated that it would cast a negative vote because the draft resolution attempted to "score points", rather than improve the atmosphere for negotiations. Belgium stated that its negative vote was motivated by the fact that the draft resolution proposed only that the nuclear-weapon States renounce

the first use of nuclear weapons while, in its view, States should ban all uses of force, as required by the Charter.

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Mongolia, on the other hand, expressed their full support for the draft resolution. In particular, Bulgaria, which rejected any allegation that the draft was propagandistic and deplored attempts to place nuclear war and other wars on an equal footing, viewed the draft resolution as a modest measure which was aimed, in the absence of nuclear disarmament, at preventing a nuclear first strike. Czechoslovakia felt that a commitment by States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons would be an important step towards the prevention of nuclear war; Hungary believed that the search for means of preventing the outbreak of nuclear war in no way impeded efforts to prevent any kind of war but, on the contrary, would create better conditions for reaching that goal; and Mongolia viewed the obligation of non-first-use as acquiring ever greater relevance and immediacy. The Soviet Union, with regard to the proposal under discussion and other related ones, called attention to the fact that it had taken several unilateral concrete actions, one of them being its commitment never to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Also Finland, India, Indonesia, the Sudan and Sweden explained their affirmative vote. Finland and India made clear that they agreed with the main thrust of the proposal. India added that, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the best course of action would be to completely forswear the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Similarly, Indonesia took the view that any use of nuclear weapons should be condemned. The Sudan stated that it welcomed any declaratory measure confirming non-recourse to the use of nuclear weapons, provided that was not construed to mean that declaratory measures were effective disarmament measures or that they could be viewed in isolation from the principle of the Charter of the United Nations on the inadmissibility of the use of force. Sweden, which viewed the concept of non-first-use of nuclear weapons as very important, stressed that a rough parity in both conventional and nuclear forces must be established at lower levels in order to facilitate undertakings by nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

On 20 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 110 to 19, with 15 abstentions, as resolution 38/183 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority,

Recalling also that this commitment was reaffirmed by the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Bearing in mind its resolutions 36/81 B, 36/92 I and 36/100 of 9 December 1981 and 37/78 J of 9 December 1982,

Reaffirming that the most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Recalling also paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, in which it is stated that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming also that the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war,

1. *Considers* that the solemn declarations by two nuclear-weapon States made or reiterated at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, concerning their respective obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons offer an important avenue to decrease the danger of nuclear war;

2. *Expresses the hope* that those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so would consider making similar declarations with respect to not being the first to use nuclear weapons.

A second draft resolution, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war", was submitted on 11 November by Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Romania, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. It was subsequently also sponsored by Colombia, the Congo, the German Democratic Republic and the Sudan. In introducing it, on 11 November, the representative of Argentina pointed out that the draft resolution followed the same lines as resolution 37/78 I of 1982, by which the General Assembly had requested the Committee on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. Among the new features of the 1983 text, Argentina pointed to the provision, in operative paragraph 2, by which the Assembly would request the Committee on Disarmament to establish an *ad hoc* working group for such negotiations. The proposal was designed to ensure that the Committee, which had been requested to start negotiations on the question in 1983, would indeed complete its task as a matter of urgency and priority.

The draft resolution was approved by the First Committee, on 23 November, by a recorded vote of 107 to none, with 18 abstentions (mainly Western States). In connection with the vote, Belgium, which abstained, stated that the language of the draft resolution prejudged what form the work of the Committee on Disarmament should take. Consensus might have been possible, it added, had the language been less confining. The United Kingdom, which also abstained, made clear that it continued to set the prevention of nuclear war firmly in the context of the prevention of war in general, because the causes of war, whether conventional or nuclear, were the same. It had been the unwillingness of certain delegations to accept that, it stressed, that had led to the long delay in reaching agreement on an agenda for the Committee on Disarmament in 1983, and to the Committee's failure to agree to a thorough discussion of the subject, as an essential first stage, in order to identify areas where negotiation might be possible.

Mongolia, which voted in favour, expressed the hope that, at the 1984 session of the Committee on Disarmament, the Western members would display a spirit of co-operation and a willingness to engage in genuine negotiations on the prevention of nuclear war and on nuclear disarmament.

On 20 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 128 to none, with 20 abstentions, as resolution 38/183 G. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race,

Recalling that removal of the threat of nuclear war is the most acute and urgent task of the present day,

Reiterating that it is the shared responsibility of all Member States to save succeeding generations from the scourge of another world war, which would inevitably be a nuclear war,

Recalling the provisions of paragraphs 47 to 50 and 56 to 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly regarding the procedures designed to secure the avoidance of nuclear war,

Recalling also its resolution 36/81 B of 9 December 1981 and, in particular, its resolution 37/78 I of 9 December 1982, in which it requested the Committee on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war,

Having considered the report of the Committee on Disarmament,

Noting with concern that the Committee on Disarmament was not able to start negotiations on the question during its 1983 session,

Taking into account the deliberations on this item at its thirty-eighth session,

Convinced that the prevention of nuclear war and the reduction of the risks of nuclear war are matters of the highest priority and of vital interest to all the peoples of the world,

1. *Again requests* the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, taking into account the documents referred to in General Assembly resolution 37/78 I as well as other existing proposals and future initiatives;

2. *Further requests* the Conference on Disarmament to establish for that purpose an *ad hoc* working group on the subject at the beginning of its 1984 session;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Prevention of nuclear war: report of the Conference on Disarmament".

A third draft resolution, entitled "Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons", was submitted on 11 November by Algeria, Argentina, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Romania and Yugoslavia, and was subsequently also sponsored by Viet Nam. The draft resolution was introduced, on 17 November, by the representative of India who outlined the main provisions of the draft, in particular, the request addressed to the Committee on Disarmament to undertake, on a priority basis, negotiations on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, using as a basis an annexed draft convention. In that connection, India pointed out that the provi-

sions of the draft resolution were along the lines of resolution 37/100 C of 1982, a resolution for which two nuclear-weapon States, namely, China and the Soviet Union, had cast positive votes. The draft resolution and annexed draft convention, India stated, reflected the concern of millions of people who had raised their voices against the imminent danger of a nuclear holocaust, and what it aimed at was "one of the few significant, viable and concrete measures for preventing the outbreak of nuclear war".

On 23 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 104 to 17 (mainly Western States), with 6 abstentions. In connection with the vote, Australia, which voted against, stated that a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons was an implausible way of seeking to prevent nuclear war. Under the existing circumstances, it argued, there was need for a stable, mutual deterrence, and a non-use convention would not necessarily add to the stability of deterrence and might, on the contrary, lull the international community into a false sense of security. In its view, efforts to achieve measures to prevent all war, including those involving greater communication and transparency, as well as verifiable, balanced reductions of nuclear weapons, leading to their elimination, would represent a more fruitful approach. Sweden, which voted in favour, made an explicit reservation on the sixth preambular paragraph which reaffirmed the declaration that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity. It believed that paragraph provided an interpretation of the Charter which could be contested from a legal standpoint. It also felt that more resolute efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament were urgently needed. A process of gradual and balanced reductions of nuclear-weapon arsenals, aimed at their elimination, would best promote the concept of non-use.

On 15 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 126 to 17, with 6 abstentions, as resolution 38/73 G. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind and to the life-sustaining system posed by nuclear weapons and by their use, inherent in concepts of deterrence,

Conscious of an increased danger of nuclear war as a result of the intensification of the nuclear-arms race and the serious deterioration of the international situation,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of nuclear war and for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Further convinced that a prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it is stated that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, as declared in its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of

24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 I of 9 December 1981,

Noting with regret that the Committee on Disarmament, during its session in 1983, was not able to undertake negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the text annexed to General Assembly resolution 37/100 C of 13 December 1982,

1. *Reiterates its request* to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to achieve agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the text of the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons annexed to the present resolution;

2. *Further requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session on the results of those negotiations.

ANNEX

Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The States Parties to this Convention,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that any use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity,

Convinced that this Convention would be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Determined to continue negotiations for the achievement of this goal,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The States Parties to this Convention solemnly undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

Article 2

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 3

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-five Governments, including the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, as well as of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 4

This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, opened for signature at _____, on the _____ day of _____ one thousand nine hundred and _____.

The remaining resolution was adopted on the basis of an initiative of the Soviet Union under the item entitled "Condemnation of nuclear war", an item included in the agenda at that country's request. In its request,¹⁷ the USSR made the following main points. Nuclear war, were it to erupt, would be the greatest tragedy for mankind, would result in the loss of billions of human lives and would turn the planet into a lifeless desert. As the most eminent scientists and authoritative military and civilian experts had confirmed, the accumulation of huge arsenals of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems meant that nuclear war could not be limited and would spare no country and no people. Therefore, there was no justification for any doctrines and plans based on the admissibility of unleashing a nuclear war and the possibility of "winning" it. Consequently, the Soviet Union proposed that the General Assembly adopt a resolution condemning unconditionally and for all time nuclear war "as the most monstrous of all crimes that can be committed against peoples and as a flagrant violation of the foremost human right — the right to life".

The draft resolution was submitted by the USSR on 17 October and was subsequently co-sponsored by the Ukrainian SSR. On 17 November, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR and Viet Nam submitted a revised draft resolution which the USSR introduced in the First Committee the same day. In the introduction, its representative noted with satisfaction that the basic ideas contained in the proposal, namely, the condemnation of nuclear war as being contrary to human conscience, a crime against peoples and a violation of the right to life, were being sympathetically received. Moreover, to find the most suitable expression for them, the delegation had listened to the views of others and was incorporating changes in wording in the revised version. By adopting the revised draft resolution, the representative emphasized, the United Nations would be making a major contribution to the creation of an international moral and political climate likely to reduce substantially the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war and to open up prospects for the solution of far-reaching tasks in the field. One such task, the Soviet Union held, would be the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States, as called for by many non-aligned countries.

¹⁷ A/38/243.

The draft resolution was widely supported. Some Member States, however, expressed reservations about the approach reflected in the initiative. For instance, the Federal Republic of Germany, in stating its general views on resolutions dealing with the prevention of nuclear war, contended that a declaration condemning nuclear war alone, instead of condemning all wars, had many serious implications and ultimately stood in sharp contrast to the right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, agreement that nuclear war must be condemned was so self-evident that no special resolution was needed to confirm such a shared belief. Specifically, the representative of the Federal Republic held, the proposal beclouded the necessity of preventing wars of all kinds. It was not acceptable to his country because its own security, given the overwhelming nuclear and conventional threat hanging over it, ultimately depended on the United States nuclear deterrent; if that deterrent could not operate, wars in Europe would again become possible.

On 23 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 72 to 19 (mainly Western States), with 23 abstentions, including China. Greece, India, Indonesia, Mongolia, Oman, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Sudan and Togo, which voted in favour, all stated that they supported the main thrust of the draft resolution, even though some of them qualified their support. Greece, for instance, held that the international community should not limit itself to condemning nuclear war, but should also condemn conventional war; a similar view was expressed by the Sudan. India and Indonesia, with regard to the reference in paragraph 2 of the draft to the first use of nuclear weapons, held that the best course of action for preventing the outbreak of nuclear war was to forswear completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. India, however, appreciated the fact that such a concept had been incorporated into the last preambular paragraph. Sri Lanka held that the condemnation of war by itself was totally inadequate to ensure its prevention, and stressed that some of the language in paragraphs 1 and 2 did not help towards the realization of an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States. Togo, like India and Indonesia, had some reservations on paragraph 2 of the draft resolution.

Australia, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States explained their reasons for casting negative votes. Australia thought that the draft resolution, like certain others dealing with nuclear matters, promoted propagandistic aims. Belgium held that the draft, by condemning nuclear war alone, would legitimize other forms of war. The Federal Republic of Germany observed that the draft resolution constituted only a new version of the perennial Soviet proposal on nuclear non-first-use, a concept which, according to the Federal Republic and reiterated on many occasions, neither met the overriding obligations of the Charter nor provided effective means for preventing nuclear war. Indeed, in its view, by reinforcing existing imbalances, the nuclear non-first-use concept made the outbreak of war

more probable and disregarded both the inherent dangers of escalation and the devastating effects of modern conventional weapons. The United Kingdom considered the draft resolution as a simplistic and propagandistic document, designed to divert attention from practical measures of arms control and other real — not potential — dangers to human life that arose every day from conventional war. That was particularly true of paragraph 1 of the text, and equally objectionable was paragraph 2, with its unwarranted implications that those who did not agree with the Soviet Union were seeking to justify the unleashing of a nuclear war. In that connection, the United Kingdom recalled the NATO declaration, made in Bonn in 1982, that no NATO weapons, nuclear or conventional, would ever be used except in response to attack — a declaration which, it stressed, remained valid.

The United States pointed out that paragraph 2 of the draft resolution clearly reflected the sponsoring States' aversion to free and unfettered public discussion of questions surrounding nuclear and other military issues within their own borders, and their desire to extend that control of free information to other countries. Moreover, Soviet leaders had been seeking to convince world public opinion that they viewed nuclear war as unthinkable, but official Soviet documents cast serious doubts on such assertions. Official writings of high-level Soviet military planners made abundantly clear that Soviet policy did not exclude the use of nuclear weapons. In fact, the United States held, Soviet policy was oriented towards attaining a nuclear-winning capability, which would include resort to nuclear weapons. After citing Soviet statements which appeared to confirm such a policy, it added that their military considerations were accompanied by efforts to provide for the safety of the population in the event of a nuclear war. Given that, the United States observed, it was difficult to conclude that the Soviet leadership regarded a nuclear exchange as unthinkable, or that it saw its goal in such an exchange as anything other than victory. For its part, the United States would continue to negotiate seriously in order to achieve a world where nuclear war and, indeed, all wars would be banished through concrete and verifiable measures, an objective which could not be achieved through unenforceable, condemnatory resolutions.

China, which abstained in the voting, pointed out that the root cause of the danger of nuclear war was the rivalry and arms race between the two major nuclear-weapon Powers. In order to prevent nuclear war, it was imperative that the two Powers curb the arms race and reduce their nuclear arsenals. The peoples of the world, China stated, expected the two super-Powers to take practical action instead of condemning nuclear war in words only. Austria, in explaining its abstention, also emphasized the need for early agreement on significant limitations and reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two major Powers. It added that, while it shared the concern expressed in the preamble of the draft resolution, it felt that the scope of the condemnation should be extended to cover any kind of war. Ireland also abstained, although, as it stated, it found a number of ideas in the draft resolution with which it was in agreement,

including those expressed in the first three preambular paragraphs and in operative paragraph 3. None the less, it regarded the draft, particularly its operative paragraphs 1 and 2, as being essentially rhetorical and, in that sense, as ignoring fundamental questions related to nuclear deterrence as a means of maintaining international security. Malta, which did not participate in the vote, stated that its attitude was motivated by the fact that the draft resolution was divisive, even though its general objective was laudable. Referring in particular to operative paragraph 2, Malta recalled that when ideas were repressed they were not necessarily eliminated, but simply driven underground and could emerge in an even more sinister form. In its view, what should be proposed was the dissemination of positive, well-argued and thoroughly researched stances that would stand up to and demolish doctrines and concepts that sought to justify nuclear war.

On 15 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 95 to 19 (Western States), with 30 abstentions, as resolution 38/75. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Expressing its alarm at the growing threat of nuclear war, which can lead to the destruction of civilization on earth,

Drawing the attention of all States and peoples to the conclusions arrived at by the most eminent scientists and military and civilian experts to the effect that it is impossible to limit the deadly consequences of nuclear war if it is ever begun and that in a nuclear war there can be no victors,

Convinced that the prevention of nuclear catastrophe is the most profound aspiration of billions of people on earth,

Reaffirming its call for the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States,

1. *Resolutely, unconditionally and for all time condemns* nuclear war as being contrary to human conscience and reason, as the most monstrous crime against peoples and as a violation of the foremost human right—the right to life;

2. *Condemns* the formulation, propounding, dissemination and propaganda of political and military doctrines and concepts intended to provide “legitimacy” for the first use of nuclear weapons and in general to justify the “admissibility” of unleashing nuclear war;

3. *Calls upon* all States to unite and redouble their efforts aimed at removing the threat of nuclear war, halting the nuclear-arms race and reducing nuclear weapons until they are completely eliminated.

Conclusion

More than ever before, all Governments in 1983 seemed to be in agreement that there would be no winners in a nuclear war and that such a war must never be fought. Beyond that, there was very little reassurance or progress. As a result, the subject of the prevention of nuclear war remained in the forefront of the international agenda as a critical, unresolved issue.

As in recent years, the debate in 1983 centred on the question of whether a declaration on the non-use or non-first-use of nuclear weapons, or an international convention outlawing the use of nuclear

weapons, would provide an effective measure to reduce the threat of nuclear war. The two viewpoints on the question remained widely divergent. On the one hand, the Western States continued to hold that a declaration on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons would undermine the wider principle of the non-use of force — in any form — set out in the Charter of the United Nations. On the other hand, the supporters of a declaration maintained that such an obligation, undertaken by all nuclear-weapon States, would strengthen that principle of the Charter.

The issue is of too much importance to be left unresolved. Unremitting efforts and pressure can, therefore, be expected to continue in the deliberating and negotiating bodies within the United Nations framework, in particular in the Conference on Disarmament, to find some measure of agreement which may reduce the nuclear threat.

Possibly, progress could be achieved through several established approaches, including meaningful confidence-building measures and the consequent improvement of the political climate between the two major Powers, significant and equitable reductions of nuclear weapons on both sides and adherence to the provisions of the Charter on the non-use of force in international relations. All such approaches could lead progressively to reduced reliance on nuclear deterrence as a means of maintaining security.

The question of a freeze on nuclear weapons

Introduction

WHILE THE WORD "FREEZE" HAS BEEN POPULARIZED in the disarmament vocabulary only in recent years, the international community has been seeking effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament since the emergence of such weapons in 1945.

The question of freezing and reducing nuclear-weapon stockpiles arose, among other times and contexts, in 1962 with the submission of the "Draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control" by the Soviet Union,¹ and of the "Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world",² by the United States. By the proposed Soviet plan, disarmament would take place within a short period of time, with nuclear delivery vehicles being eliminated by the end of the first stage, so that there would be equality, and hence balance, as soon as possible. By the United States proposal, the relative military positions and pattern of armaments within each military establishment would be kept similar, as far as possible, to what they had been at the beginning of the process. To that end, disarmament, beginning with a freeze, would be gradual and, as confidence developed, the military establishment would be progressively reduced.

Two years later, in the absence of progress, the United States submitted a new proposal for a verified freeze on the number and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the immediate purpose of which (as to limit the quantities held by the East and the West to the levels existing at the time and to prevent the development and deployment of vehicles of a significantly newer type. The United States proposed³ that the freeze, in various ways, should apply to: (a) ground-based surface-to-surface missiles with ranges of 5,000 kilometres or more and between 1,000 and 5,000 kilometres, and sea-based ones with a range of 100 kilometres or more, and their launchers; (b) strategic bombers with empty weights of 40,000 kilograms or more and between 25,000 and 40,000 kilograms, and any associated air-to-

¹ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962*, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. C (ENDC/2).

² *Ibid.*, sect. F (ENDC/30 and Corr.1).

³ *Ibid.*, *Supplement for January to December 1964*, document DC/209, annex 1, ENDC/120; see also ENDC/PV.184 and 211.

surface missiles with a range of 100 kilometres or more; and (c) strategic anti-missile systems and associated launching facilities.

The Soviet Union opposed the proposal, arguing that it was not a disarmament measure, but provided control without disarmament and allowed the retention of all existing delivery means and the "overkill" capacity of the United States. Moreover, it would not prevent the establishment of the proposed NATO multilateral nuclear force nor halt all production of strategic missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, modern bombers, chemical and bacteriological weapons or conventional arms. As it would apply only to strategic weapons, it would allow the United States to perfect its tactical weapons, and as it would be bilateral, it would leave the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany free to continue the arms race. Among other things, it would allow the United States to complete announced plans to increase its strategic forces and its potential in short- and medium-range missiles, especially mobile rockets, which, together with the Polaris missile, could become the basis of United States strategy.

The non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) sought, without success, to reconcile differences in approach between the United States and the Soviet Union and to link the idea of a freeze with other proposed collateral measures, such as non-proliferation and a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

In the course of the general debate at the General Assembly's twentieth session, in 1965, the United States announced that if progress were made on a freeze, it would be willing to explore the possibility of significant reductions in the number of delivery vehicles. In the ENDC in 1966, it again urged, *inter alia*, a freeze on offensive and defensive strategic bombers and missiles designed to carry nuclear weapons, to be followed by a reduction in the number of such delivery vehicles. At the same session, the Soviet Union urged the destruction, under appropriate international control, of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons, the destruction of their delivery vehicles and a ban on the production of such weapons and vehicles. No specific proposals were put forward, however, with respect to such measures, and the question of a freeze on nuclear delivery vehicles evolved, in subsequent years, in the direction of proposals for bilateral strategic arms limitation talks (to become known as SALT) between the Soviet Union and the United States (see chapter V above).

In recent years, apart from the continuation of the search for partial solutions in such long-standing subject areas as the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing and the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the concept of a bilateral nuclear-weapon freeze has gained special momentum not only in the international community, but also among the public in various parts of the world. The so-called "freeze movement" has taken several different forms, such as town meetings, some of which have led to the adoption of pro-freeze resolutions, and public demonstrations in major cities. Representatives from various professions and walks of life, for

example, religious leaders, physicians, lawyers, businessmen and artists, who have organized themselves to work for disarmament have sometimes included the idea of a nuclear freeze — in diverse formulations — among their objectives; others have sought that objective alone.

At the twelfth special session, in 1982, two draft resolutions were placed before the General Assembly which, for the first time, referred specifically to a general freeze on nuclear weapons. Both of those proposals, among others, were set out *in extenso* in the Concluding Document⁴ of the session; they are discussed and reproduced in *The Yearbook* covering that year.⁵ By the first draft resolution, put forward by India, the General Assembly would call on all nuclear-weapon States to agree to a freeze on nuclear weapons, providing for a total stoppage of the further production of such weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. By the second draft resolution, sponsored by Mexico and Sweden, the Assembly would urge the two major nuclear-weapon States to proclaim, either through simultaneous unilateral declarations or through a joint declaration, an immediate nuclear arms freeze, embracing (a) a comprehensive test ban; (b) the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles; (c) a ban on further deployment of such weapons and vehicles; and (d) the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; the proclamation would be subject to the verification procedures already agreed to by the parties in the SALT I and SALT II Treaties and those accepted by them in principle during preparatory trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban.

Neither proposal gained the full support of the Assembly and it was decided that they should not be pressed to a vote because of the general agreement that the consensus rule should be maintained regarding such issues at the special session. At the request of the sponsors, the Secretary-General transmitted both draft resolutions to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, where both were introduced, the first by India on behalf also of the German Democratic Republic, Liberia and Mali, and the second by Mexico, with Colombia, Ecuador and Sweden as additional sponsors. Both proposals were adopted, by votes of 122 to 16, with 6 abstentions, and 119 to 17, with 5 abstentions, respectively, as resolutions 37/100 A and 37/100 B.

The negative votes were cast mainly by the Western countries, which objected to the concept under the existing circumstances, arguing that a freeze required a genuine balance. That did not obtain, they held, particularly because the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles in the preceding few years had created a serious imbalance, at least regionally, and they noted that the USSR had already acknowledged approximate parity in 1978. In addition, they felt that a freeze presented verification problems and could stand in the way of reductions. Proponents of the freeze, on the other hand, held that the USSR and the United States continued to be

⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes*, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32, paras. 17 and 19.

⁵ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chaps. II and VII and appendix I.

at an approximate parity in nuclear arms, although some wished there were greater openness in that connection. The USSR, supporting both proposals, stated that it did not have and did not seek military superiority, but neither should anyone else; moreover, it did not object to the fact that one of the appeals was addressed only to itself and the United States, because it presumed that the continuation of the freeze would take into account the actions of other nuclear-weapon States. Other States emphasized the overriding need to eliminate the threat posed by nuclear weapons.

Among other recent General Assembly resolutions relevant to the concept of a freeze are those concerning the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and some on the reduction of military budgets, although the latter concern armed forces in general. Since its 1978 special session devoted to disarmament, the Assembly has adopted several resolutions in both areas.⁶

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1983

The question of a nuclear-weapon freeze did not figure separately on the Disarmament Commission's agenda in 1983, but a number of members referred to it during the general exchange of views on item 4 dealing with the consideration of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and it was among the proposals submitted in various papers on that item, as discussed below.⁷

In the general exchange of views, Argentina stated that at least one encouraging sign had emerged out of the growing awareness by the public of the dangers emanating from the very existence of nuclear weapons: the widening support for adoption of measures leading to a nuclear-weapon freeze. Mongolia perceived the growing movement to bring about a freeze as a manifestation of the increasing salience of the anti-war movement, public concern about the threat of nuclear war and recognition of the need for concrete measures to halt the arms race and bring about disarmament.

Egypt stated that any recommendation made by the Commission on the question of nuclear disarmament should call for certain immediate measures, among them, a freeze on the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons. It noted that such a measure had been among those endorsed in the Declaration of the most recent Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March 1983.⁸ Sweden and Yugoslavia also supported the concept of a nuclear-weapon freeze. Like Egypt, Yugosla-

⁶ Regarding the cessation of production: resolutions 33/91 H, 34/87 D, 35/156 H, 36/97 G, 37/99 E and 38/188 E (see chapter V above), and regarding military budgets: resolutions 34/83 F, 35/142 A, 36/82 A, 37/95 A and 38/184 A (see chapter XVIII below).

⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42)*, para. 10; the agenda is reproduced in chapter I above. For records of the debate, refer to A/CN.10/PV.66-70 and A/CN.10/PV.65-72/Corrigendum.

⁸ A/38/132-S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2.

via felt it should embrace the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of weapons. In Sweden's view, such a measure would be a breakthrough, an important first step in a disarmament process, and would be consistent with the basic goal of abolishing all nuclear weapons. Its demand for a freeze followed by nuclear disarmament was, in the first instance, addressed with equal force to both super-Powers. Nigeria was of the opinion that progress towards nuclear disarmament ought to take into account the merit of a nuclear-weapon freeze, the option of a moratorium on the further development of nuclear weapons, the need for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and the necessity for significant reductions in such weapons.

The USSR, for its part, reiterated that it was prepared to seek an agreement on a mutual freeze of nuclear arsenals by all nuclear-weapon States or, as a start, by the Soviet Union and the United States alone. Believing that the prevention of nuclear war was the most urgent task facing the international community, Cuba stated it was in favour of seeking an initial freeze, to be followed by the gradual reduction of nuclear weapons, until their total elimination. At the end of the session, Bulgaria expressed a similar position, viewing the freezing of existing arsenals as an important first step.

As mentioned, the question was also referred to in some working papers submitted concerning agenda item 4. In its paper entitled "Doctrines of nuclear warfare",⁹ the German Democratic Republic observed that the majority of Member States of the United Nations attached great importance to measures which opposed the "main danger arising from preparations for nuclear war and related doctrines". Among such measures it included a freeze on nuclear weapons, and noted that General Assembly resolutions 37/100 A and 37/100 B, adopted in 1982, had reflected that position. In another working paper, the non-aligned States¹⁰ emphasized the importance of negotiating and adopting, as a matter of the highest priority, effective measures to prevent nuclear war and included, in a rather extensive list of specific considerations, a freeze on the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, in the working paper submitted later by the United Kingdom, which, it explained, was also presented on behalf of a number of the Group of Western European and Other States,¹¹ the importance of confidence-building measures was stressed, and it was advocated that appropriate negotiations should be concluded which would lead to "substantial, equitable and verifiable reductions in weapons, in particular nuclear weapons".

A "Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4",¹² which was prepared by the Contact Group on the item, was also annexed to the Commission's 1983 report to the General Assembly

⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42)*, annex IV.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, annex V.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, annex XXI.

¹² *Ibid.*, annex VIII.

to reflect the state of consideration of the matter. It included two alternative proposals concerning a nuclear-weapon freeze, and a third submitted as an alternative to the idea of a freeze.¹³ None of them, however, gained consensus and they were, therefore, set in square brackets. The three proposals read as follows:

Recommendation No. 7

(a) [A freeze on the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons should be immediately imposed, as a first step to the reduction and, eventually, the elimination of nuclear arsenals]

(b) [It is of paramount importance for the nuclear Powers which possess the largest nuclear arsenals to take the lead in halting and reversing the nuclear arms race between them and reducing drastically their existing nuclear arsenals so as to create propitious conditions for all the nuclear States to further adopt nuclear disarmament measures, including a freeze on the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons;]

(c) [Negotiations should be conducted and concluded which would lead to substantial reductions in nuclear weapons. These reductions must be mutual, balanced and verifiable.]

With regard to agenda item 4 as a whole, the Commission agreed by consensus with the recommendation of its subsidiary bodies that it should continue to be considered at the 1984 substantive session, with a view to the formulation of concrete recommendations.¹⁴

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1983

The question of a nuclear-weapon freeze was considered in the Committee on Disarmament in 1983 within the context of its agenda item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".¹⁵ Many delegations made references to the concept in their statements in plenary meetings¹⁶ and in the working papers and proposals submitted to the Committee concerning the agenda item.

The position of a group of socialist States was set forth in a working paper¹⁷ they submitted on the prevention of nuclear war. In it they advocated that an *ad hoc* working group consider in the first instance measures which were broadly supported internationally and included, in that context, a freeze by all nuclear-weapon States on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, as well as on the production of fissionable material for the purpose of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons, as a first step towards the reduction and, eventually, the elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

In a later statement in the Committee, the Soviet Union referred to that paper and to a subsequent formal proposal by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR addressed to each of the other nuclear-weapon States to freeze

¹³ *Ibid.*, annex VIII, sect. I.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, paras. 21 and 22.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, para. 9; the agenda is reproduced in chapter I above.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, appendix III (CD/421), vols. I-V.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, appendix II (CD/421), document CD/355.

all the nuclear weapons at their disposal, both quantitatively and qualitatively. While it believed a freeze would be most efficient if undertaken by all the nuclear-weapon Powers simultaneously, it had made clear in the proposal that it might be done initially by the Soviet Union and the United States, on the understanding that the other nuclear-weapon Powers would subsequently follow suit. Compliance with such a freeze, it stated, could be effectively verified by national technical means and, if necessary, additional measures could be worked out and agreed upon. The USSR stressed that it did not regard such a freeze as a goal in itself, but as an effective first step towards the reduction and, subsequently, the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, as envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. Referring to what it regarded as widespread international support for a freeze, including public support in NATO countries, and particularly the United States, the USSR dismissed, as artificial, the arguments advanced by the opponents of the idea. It rejected the arguments that a freeze could not be verified and that, by allegedly favouring the USSR, it would reduce that country's incentive to agree to large-scale reductions of nuclear weapons and thus hamper efforts towards that end. In elaborating its position against such arguments and allegations, the Soviet Union stated again that it did not have nuclear superiority and that it would be pointless for anyone to count on achieving it, and held that a freeze on nuclear weapons was a necessary prerequisite—the first step—for genuine reductions. With regard to verification, the USSR believed that the experience gained in previous strategic arms limitation agreements could be successfully applied to the verification of compliance with a freeze agreement. Moreover, additional measures could be agreed upon, it stated, and observed that verification was no less important for the USSR than for others. It also reminded the Committee that its proposals and the position of other socialist States on the prevention of war did not consist solely of the freeze proposal, and accordingly concluded by emphasizing its support for an informal meeting devoted to the overall discussion of that question.

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia and Poland supported the Soviet proposal and made similar arguments regarding the value and utility of a nuclear-weapon freeze as an urgent measure to prevent nuclear war and lead to nuclear disarmament. Poland, for example, believed that a freeze on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons would be one of the most important links in a chain of efforts leading to the halting of the arms race. Mongolia hoped that the other nuclear-weapon States, in response to the proposal of the Soviet Union and in recognition of their special responsibilities for the fate of the world, would consider a freeze seriously. In a broader context, several socialist States also drew attention to the Joint Statement adopted at the meeting of Party and State leaders of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR held in Moscow on 28 June 1983, which was issued as a Committee document.¹⁸ By that statement, they had, *inter*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, document CD/386.

alia, expressed their conviction that, in the interests of international peace and security, it was necessary “to implement without delay the freezing of the nuclear weapons of all the nuclear-weapon Powers, and first of all of the USSR and the United States”.

The Federal Republic of Germany, France and the United States were among several Western States which expressed a different assessment of the value of a freeze on nuclear weapons. The United States emphasized that American and Western strategy was obliged, however unfortunately, to regard nuclear weapons as having as their single function the prevention of war and preservation of peace. Accordingly, Western security policy was necessarily based on two tenets: deterrence and co-operation—a dual-track approach to peace. For its part, it did not believe that a freeze on the testing and deployment of new nuclear weapons and delivery systems, such as that proposed by the Soviet Union, would offer a sound basis for either major arms control reductions or a more stable balance in the strategic equation. Such a proposal, which ignored the basic differences between the various weapons systems, would risk perpetuating and accentuating dangerous asymmetries in the strategic balance, it stated, and, moreover, there were significant and real verification problems associated with the Soviet proposal. The United States believed also that negotiations on a nuclear-weapon freeze would divert both the USSR and the United States from ongoing efforts to achieve the goal which both had endorsed: the actual reduction of nuclear armaments rather than a mere freeze at existing levels. The United States attached the greatest priority to achieving substantial reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces to more stable and lower levels, and stressed that it had recently made new proposals towards that end in the Geneva negotiations.

The Federal Republic of Germany took issue with what it described as the Soviet Union’s attempts to refute the three main Western counter-arguments to a freeze on nuclear weapons—consolidation of Soviet superiority, reducing incentives for a deep reduction of nuclear armaments and problems of verification. In the course of setting out its arguments, the Federal Republic claimed, the USSR had, in effect, acknowledged that a freeze could only be justified if the participants would fully preserve their right to security, a view which corresponded to that of the West. Accordingly, it reiterated its warning that a freeze would have the consequence of codifying existing East-West imbalances and would generate dangerous instability. In addition, it questioned why the USSR had only recently become a proponent of a nuclear-weapon freeze; why, in 1978, when it had acknowledged that there was approximate parity in nuclear weapons between the great Powers, it had not proposed a freeze; and, finally, why it had since then continued to expand its nuclear arsenal, particularly in Europe.

France, for its part, registered its objections to the Soviet proposal in both a plenary meeting and a specific paper reproducing its Government’s comment.¹⁹ It too reiterated the view that a freeze would not con-

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, document CD/394.

tribute usefully to negotiations towards substantial, verifiable arms reduction between the two most heavily-armed nuclear-weapon Powers, since it would mean the confirmation of existing imbalances affecting security and would weaken the will to negotiate of those whose interests lay in the maintenance of the *status quo*. It felt that many aspects of an undifferentiated and global nuclear-weapon freeze would not be susceptible of verification by national means, while others would require complicated, and hence lengthy, negotiations. France, expressing the hope for success in the ongoing bilateral negotiations, did not see how the freeze proposed to the other nuclear-weapon Powers, whose nuclear forces bore no relation to those of the two major ones, could contribute to the progress of those negotiations. It stated that the only valid basis for a genuine process of disarmament lay in the adoption of agreements on limitations to specified levels, accompanied, where necessary, by appropriate reductions.

In response to the Western position, the USSR stressed that it had not originated the freeze proposal; rather, it had been “generated by life itself”, in public demonstrations. To the contention that the USSR had only recently favoured the freeze, it referred to its many proposals for nuclear disarmament, including the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, throughout the nuclear age; unfortunately, it stated, the Western countries had not heeded them or had called them “propagandistic”. Among other examples, it recalled that in November 1977, before it had started deploying SS-20 missiles, it had proposed a simultaneous cessation of the production of nuclear weapons. Thus, it stated, its latest proposal for a nuclear-weapon freeze was not an act of expediency, but the logical consequence of its consistent policy. It argued that the force and effectiveness of the freeze proposal derived from the fact that, by not differentiating between types of nuclear weapons, it did not give any advantage to any nuclear-weapon State. That was also one of the reasons why it enjoyed such wide support. Denying that a freeze would perpetuate a dangerous asymmetry and that the solution of verification problems would divert efforts from the Geneva talks, it repeated the statement of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR²⁰ that “a freeze would create a more favourable situation for the achievement of mutually acceptable arrangements at the current Soviet-United States talks . . . in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security”.

In the debate, Burma, Cuba, Ethiopia, India and Nigeria also indicated their support for a nuclear-weapon freeze. Burma felt that while attempts were being made to reduce nuclear weapons, it was also necessary to halt the arms race, which was continuing relentlessly; accordingly it supported a freeze and, referring to the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in 1982, stressed that the idea of a freeze was not to maintain the existing *status quo*, but to facilitate the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear armaments. Recalling what it saw as the unparalleled mass support for a nuclear freeze and noting the peace cam-

²⁰ *Ibid.*, document CD/385.

paign under way in many countries, Ethiopia stated that it attached great importance to the initiatives of such peace-loving forces. India pointed out to the Committee that the Political Declaration of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March 1983,²¹ had included a recommendation for a freeze on the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons.

At the closing plenary meeting of the session, the Federal Republic of Germany stated that it was only with the continuation of the buildup of Soviet nuclear weapons that NATO had made its decision in 1979 concerning the modernization of its forces and arms control negotiations; that buildup had continued even after the negotiations had started, and appeared to be aimed at creating a regional disequilibrium. The West, it stated, could not passively watch that situation, but wished to achieve a negotiated balance at the lowest possible level. The United States, too, emphasized that it was sparing no effort to arrive at a positive solution in both the strategic arms and intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations. The USSR, as co-ordinator of the socialist countries, stressed that all their initiatives featured a large-scale approach to the most acute question of the prevention of nuclear war and that their implementation would result in a range of concrete measures to reduce tension and strengthen peace and co-operation internationally.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

The discussion on a nuclear-weapon freeze was resumed at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, both in the plenary general debate and, more substantially, in the First Committee.²² With some exceptions, most delegations maintained the positions they had expressed before at the twelfth special and thirty-seventh sessions of the General Assembly, in 1982, and in the forums in the earlier part of 1983.

The Soviet Union stated that a freeze on nuclear armaments, in qualitative and quantitative terms, by all the nuclear-weapon States would be an extremely timely and feasible measure. Such a freeze, it believed, under appropriate verification and carried out simultaneously, would be most effective. Its duration could be negotiated, however, and possibly it could become effective initially for the two major Powers only. It would be relatively easy to achieve, in the Soviet view, and would contribute to the strengthening of strategic stability and greatly diminish the risk of the outbreak of nuclear conflict. However, the Soviet Union did not see a freeze as an end in itself, since the threat of nuclear war existed even at the current level of military confrontation. Rather, a freeze should be seen as a major step towards halting the nuclear arms race,

²¹ *Ibid.*, document CD/354.

²² See *ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 39th and 47th to 54th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons, and thereby making it possible to eliminate the threat of nuclear war.

According to Bulgaria, the Soviet initiative contained a clear-cut concept of how to end the nuclear arms race in all its manifestations. Its major merits were realism, practicality and comprehensiveness. The proposal did not envisage a selective approach towards the different types and systems of nuclear weapons, nor complex quantitative combinations which would virtually ensure a growth in military arsenals. Czechoslovakia stated that the merit of the freeze concept lay in the clarity of the objective and the fact that it would block further improvement, as well as the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and be very easy to implement. In Hungary's view, a freeze could serve as a comprehensive approach to the prevention of a new round of the nuclear arms race. Romania, for its part, stated that one could not over-emphasize the obvious benefits of a freeze on armaments, whether nuclear or conventional, for the improvement of the international climate, the reduction of tension and the resumption and consolidation of détente. It added that measures to halt the arms race and freeze the level of armaments should not be viewed as goals in themselves, but as a component of a coherent programme of disarmament, primarily nuclear disarmament. The other Eastern European States — including the Byelorussian SSR, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland and the Ukrainian SSR — also spoke in similar terms in support of the nuclear-freeze concept.

Nigeria emphasized that nuclear disarmament efforts must be geared towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. In that context, it reiterated its conviction that acceptance of such modalities as a nuclear freeze should imply a quantitative and qualitative freeze on nuclear weapons and systems and their means of delivery at current levels, a moratorium on weapon testing in all environments by all the nuclear-weapon States, a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and a gradual but substantial reduction in existing stockpiles. Uganda believed that a bilateral freeze by the super-Powers would build the trust necessary for genuine negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and that the other nuclear-weapon States should participate in those negotiations. Ghana felt that verification would not be as difficult to institute as was often asserted. Indeed, experts were of the view that a comprehensive freeze would be easier to verify than more limited arms control agreements. In any case, it said, it would be logical to expect that in such an exercise only verifiable missiles would be regarded as frozen. In that light, Ghana believed that opposition to the freeze proposal ought to be seriously reconsidered because such a measure offered the most hopeful beginning for controlling the nuclear arms race. Similarly, Sri Lanka, while recognizing that the freeze proposals made so far might not be perfect in every detail, felt that they provided for a positive step which could lead to the cessation of the arms race, and that the super-Powers should be able to overcome their apparent shortcomings.

Austria stated that the self-propelling momentum of the nuclear arms race would not be broken as long as the competitive development of

weapon technology continued. For that reason it saw merit in the freeze proposals, which also called for an end to development, testing, production and deployment. In Sweden's view a bilateral freeze would represent a strong gesture of confidence. It would stop increases in the number of nuclear weapons as well as attempts to modernize them and to develop new categories. It would provide a basis for proceeding to balanced and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons, Sweden added.

A large number of other countries also spoke in support of freeze proposals, including Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burma, Cuba, Cyprus, the Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Fiji, Kuwait, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Qatar, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, the United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam and Zambia.

China, for its part, expressed understanding of the desire of the non-aligned and neutral States to bring about a nuclear freeze in order to make the super-Powers stop their arms race. However, the fact that one nuclear Power which was intensifying its efforts to seek nuclear supremacy had also put forward such a proposal could not but make people ponder over its real motives. According to China, a freeze alone, if not accompanied by concrete measures for reducing and destroying nuclear weapons, would only legitimize and perpetuate the nuclear arsenals of the super-Powers, and thereby enable them to maintain their nuclear hegemony and pose a menace to other countries. That would be detrimental to genuine nuclear disarmament.

Denmark referred particularly to the proposals for a freeze as a first step which had been put forward and discussed, and it commented on the lack of agreement on the expediency of the measure, the possibilities of verifying it and its implications for the overall military balance between the major nuclear Powers. However, believing that all possibilities for agreements in the nuclear field should be explored, Denmark expressed its support for negotiations on a mutual freeze and reduction at the global level of all types of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

The United Kingdom spoke against the freeze concept, stating that it saw no contribution to stability in proposals which would make the existing imbalance permanent. A freeze, in its view, would reward the country which had made the most advances in updating its nuclear arsenal, and penalize those which had restrained the deployment of new weapons in the 1970s. The United Kingdom asked if the prospects of reaching agreement on balanced reductions would be improved if the Soviet Union achieved its foremost purpose of totally blocking the ability of NATO to modernize its deterrent forces, and what incentive there then would be for an agreement on balanced reductions. It felt that it was far better to set one's sights on the target of drastic reductions in nuclear weapons. The ongoing negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union were specifically aimed at achieving that. It would be folly to break off those talks in order to discuss a nuclear freeze agreement, the verification of which would take additional years to negotiate, the United Kingdom concluded.

France observed that the quest for balance at progressively reduced levels of armaments, which was the goal of the bilateral negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, excluded the notion of a freeze, since that would amount to the consolidation of the existing imbalances and reduce the incentive to negotiate for the party which was favoured by the freeze.

The question of a freeze on nuclear weapons was the subject of three separate proposals put forward in the First Committee. Two of them were submitted under the item entitled "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly", and the third under a new, separate item.

One of the two, entitled "Freeze on nuclear weapons", was submitted by India on 11 November and subsequently also sponsored by Mali. In introducing it in the First Committee on 17 November, India stated that the principal motivation behind the proposal was to put a stop to the escalation of the nuclear arms race and the growth of stockpiles of nuclear weapons. With that purpose in mind, the sponsors' immediate objective was to focus attention on two crucial elements, namely, the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable material for weapons purposes. In submitting the proposal, India was guided by the consideration that the freeze measures should be practical and of a kind on which there could be quick agreement. The emphasis on those key elements did not mean that a freeze on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons was less important or that it could be ignored. If a freeze were applied to the production of nuclear weapons and fissionable material for weapons purposes, India stated, then all nuclear-weapon laboratories, reprocessing plants, enrichment facilities and so forth would become peaceful, thus enabling non-discriminatory safeguards to be fully applied. At the same time it pointed out that it had no difficulty with other proposals before the Assembly for a freeze on nuclear arms, but believed it was extremely important that the appeal for a freeze be made to all nuclear-weapon States and not merely to those with the largest arsenals, and that they all should act simultaneously.

Also on 11 November, Ecuador, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Sweden and Uruguay submitted the second draft resolution on the freeze under the item concerning the Concluding Document, which was subsequently also sponsored by Colombia. In introducing the proposal in the First Committee, on 15 November, Mexico noted its similarity to resolution 37/100 B which had been adopted the previous year but remained unimplemented. The new draft, however, had some additions. Mexico stated that the current conditions were very favourable to a bilateral freeze, later expected to extend to all the nuclear-weapon States, since the United States and the Soviet Union were equal in military nuclear power and, generally speaking, there existed approximate parity between them. Mexico pointed out that various authorities agreed with that proposition. To allay any fears as to strict compliance with the commitments entailed by the freeze, the draft also specifically provided that it would be subject to all the relevant verification procedures and measures agreed to by the

parties in the context of the SALT I and SALT II agreements and to those which were agreed upon in principle by the parties themselves during the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, held at Geneva from 1977 to 1980.

The third draft resolution on a nuclear-weapon freeze was submitted by the USSR on 17 October under the separate item entitled "Nuclear-weapon freeze", which had been included on the Assembly's agenda as an additional item at its request.²³ The proposal was subsequently also sponsored by Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Ukrainian SSR. In introducing its proposal on 17 November, the Soviet Union stated that its basic feature was a pressing appeal for a freeze on nuclear armaments which would be in both quantitative and qualitative terms and generally all-inclusive. It would be most effective if it were carried out simultaneously by all nuclear Powers, the Soviet Union stated, but it considered that it could be effected, as a start, by the Soviet Union and the United States, to set an example for the other nuclear Powers. It noted with satisfaction that the idea of a freeze enjoyed broad support among States Members of the United Nations and in world public opinion as a whole. In the view of the Soviet Union, its proposal met the interests of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, and was likely to promote the establishment of favourable conditions for the solution of a wide range of questions concerning the limitation of the arms race.

A number of States explained their positions on the three freeze proposals in single statements at the time of voting in the First Committee, most of them choosing to speak before the vote.

In explaining its negative votes on all three draft resolutions, the United States noted that the nuclear-freeze idea had attracted undisputed attention, including open consideration in the United States itself, but expressed the view that nuclear-freeze proposals, most of them arising out of a profound concern over nuclear war which its Government shared, would decrease international stability and ultimately increase, not decrease, the danger of war, however well-intentioned they might be. According to the United States, first, a freeze was not good enough; the United States sought significant reductions in nuclear arms on both sides. Its proposals on strategic arms and intermediate-range nuclear forces offered an opportunity for substantial and verifiable nuclear arms reductions, for example, a 50 per cent reduction in the number of warheads on both sides, which had been countered with Soviet offers, and it would remain flexible in its approach in that regard. Secondly, a freeze would make significant arms control more difficult. The Soviet Union would have little or no incentive to agree to reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms, the United States held, if it could simply freeze the existing military situation. The Soviet Union, while deploying its SS-20 missiles, had only agreed to negotiate when it had become clear that the United States and its allies were prepared to counter that

²³ A/38/244.

deployment if the preferred course of arms reductions were to fail. Thirdly, a freeze at existing levels would back the United States and its allies into a position of destabilizing military vulnerability by preventing them from correcting existing deficiencies in their nuclear forces caused by the sustained Soviet buildup. Finally, a freeze on all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons would embrace important elements which could not be verified. In the light of the Soviet position in that area, arrangements for verification would probably take years to negotiate, the United States declared. For the promotion of equitable and verifiable arms control aimed at substantial reductions, to which it was committed, there would have to be something better than a freeze, it concluded.

Similarly, France, also voting against all three resolutions, stated that a freeze would, by definition, freeze the current situation and, therefore, the existing imbalances and consequent risks for the security of the States concerned. It would also confer upon any State that had made a significant effort to acquire nuclear weapons a lasting advantage over those that had limited such efforts. Furthermore, it would be very difficult to verify, and the relevant negotiations would be lengthy and complex. Finally, if a Power were to benefit from a freeze, then the freeze would risk having a negative effect on that Power's readiness seriously to negotiate towards reductions.

The Federal Republic of Germany, in explaining its votes against the three resolutions, reiterated the argument that it saw an inherent contradiction between the words and the deeds of the Soviet Union. It questioned, as it had in the Committee on Disarmament, why the USSR's appeals for a nuclear freeze were so recent in date. The Federal Republic asked why the USSR had not accepted the idea in the framework of the United States Baruch Plan,²⁴ which was coupled with a total renunciation of the national possession of nuclear weapons, and why it continued building nuclear weapons and new SS-20 missiles week after week, year after year. It maintained the view that a freeze could be justified only if the participants in it fully enjoyed and preserved their right to security; that is, if there was a genuine balance both in the global context and at relevant sub-global levels. Currently, it stated, a freeze proposal was tantamount to expecting the European countries to acquiesce in a codification of Soviet superiority and to live with that threat, unable to resort to adequate countermeasures, indefinitely.

Belgium, which did not support any of the freeze proposals, stated that it shared the concern of their non-nuclear sponsors about the situation resulting from the accumulation of nuclear weapons. However, to freeze the weapons at the current level would be to acquiesce in the existing disparity, which it could not do when there was a monopoly of weapons threatening it. Negotiations on a freeze, if felt, would add to the difficulties in the existing negotiations in the area of verification.

Norway, expressing its intention to vote against the draft resolutions

²⁴ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970*, chap. 1.

introduced by India and the USSR, stated that it was not opposed to the idea of a freeze but it did not consider a freeze to be an appropriate instrument if its application resulted in the preservation of serious military imbalances. The most pressing need was to attain agreed substantial reductions and reduce imbalances in nuclear arsenals, and ongoing efforts to that end should not be complicated by a call for a nuclear freeze.

Norway stated that it would abstain on the proposal introduced by Mexico because it found some positive elements in it; in particular, it made reference to verification, although somewhat insufficiently, and contained provisions on a comprehensive test ban, which Norway supported. The Netherlands, which also abstained on the proposal introduced by Mexico, while voting against the other two, did so although it felt that the text contained a number of shortcomings. First, it presupposed a global nuclear balance, when in reality no balance existed with regard to the intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, and thus a freeze would perpetuate the existing situation. Secondly, a declaratory type of freeze could undermine both of the current bilateral negotiations. Thirdly, the sponsors had grossly underestimated the verification problems involved. Finally, the Netherlands rejected the fourth preambular paragraph (see below, resolution 38/73 E) which contained language about the strategy of nuclear deterrence which was unwarranted. Notwithstanding those shortcomings, the Netherlands considered it important that the world community give a clear signal that the nuclear arsenals of both super-Powers were super-abundant and that the nuclear arms race should be ended.

Australia stated that in 1983 it would move from its previous negative votes to abstentions on the draft resolutions on a nuclear-weapon freeze in response to the growing public concern over the dangers of nuclear war and the need for urgent preventive action. However, it did not believe that any of the three draft resolutions before the First Committee provided the balance and verifiability crucial to maintaining stability and confidence, without which the world would not be a safer place. Australia urged that the sponsors of the proposals look seriously in 1984 to securing consensus support by adding the essential ingredient of strict and effective verification. Zaire, which also abstained in the voting on the three draft resolutions, observed that a freeze would seemingly consist of keeping the nuclear weapons ready for use, as there was an absence of measures for effective verification. Thus its abstentions did not reflect lack of interest, but a desire for the negotiators to provide evidence of greater flexibility.

Costa Rica expressed support of the draft resolutions introduced by India and Mexico because, among other things, they recognized the need for verification and control. In addition, that introduced by Mexico recognized that a nuclear arms freeze would constitute the most effective first step for stopping the nuclear arms race and encouraging negotiations for reductions. Costa Rica stated that it did not support the proposal introduced by the USSR because it offered no guarantees for verifi-

cation, an extremely important element for inspiring confidence in a proposal of the nature of a nuclear freeze.

In explaining its position on the two first-mentioned draft resolutions, the Soviet Union emphasized that establishing a nuclear-weapon freeze was, in its opinion, an important and urgent task in the struggle to prevent nuclear war and to achieve disarmament. The acceleration of the nuclear arms race, it went on, had in recent years increased the threat of nuclear war. Of particular concern was the fact that it had given rise to obstacles in the negotiations to curb it, leading them into a blind alley. A freeze could prevent that arms race and give additional impetus to efforts to achieve agreement on radical reductions in nuclear arsenals. The previous year's resolutions on the subject had responded to world public opinion, it stated. In a further response, on 16 June 1983, the USSR had proposed to all nuclear Powers a freeze on all their existing stockpiles, but, unfortunately, it had not yet received a positive reply. That meant it was necessary to strive even more actively to implement a freeze, a task in which the United Nations could play a major role. The freeze should be under appropriate controls and embrace all weapons, in their quantitative and qualitative aspects, a moratorium on testing and an end to the production of fissionable materials for weapons. The two countries which possessed the largest nuclear arsenals — the Soviet Union and the United States — must be the first simultaneously to implement a freeze as an example to other nuclear-weapon Powers, which they should follow as soon as possible. Since the two draft resolutions were along those lines the USSR supported them; it regarded the sixth preambular paragraph of that introduced by India (resolution 38/73 B below) as relating to nuclear-weapon States that, in addition to not taking initiatives, spoke against the measure.

Similarly, the German Democratic Republic, which supported all the draft resolutions and became a sponsor of the third one, stated that a freeze would have the following implications: the cessation of a buildup of all components of nuclear arsenals, including all kinds of nuclear delivery systems and all kinds of nuclear weapons — strategic, medium-range or tactical; the non-deployment of new types of nuclear weapons in any region of the world; the establishment of a moratorium on all nuclear-weapon tests and on new types and kinds of delivery systems; and the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of making nuclear weapons. It regarded allegations of a nuclear imbalance to the advantage of the USSR and of difficulties regarding verification as unfounded, and endorsed Mexico's position in that connection.

Greece, which voted in favour of the three draft resolutions, emphasized that its stand was in conformity with its support of any effort aimed at reducing nuclear weapons to the lowest possible level. It also felt that conventional weapons should be dealt with on an equal footing, since modern technology had made them weapons of mass destruction.

Indonesia, voting in favour of the three proposals, stated that it sup-

ported the major thrust of that initiated by the USSR and believed it contained positive elements. However, Indonesia believed that the importance of a freeze should be judged in accordance with the final paragraph of the text of that draft resolution, which stressed the urgent need to intensify efforts aimed at the speedy achievement of agreements on substantial limitations and radical reductions of nuclear weapons, with their complete elimination as the ultimate goal.

The three draft resolutions on a nuclear-weapon freeze were all approved by the First Committee at the same meeting, on 22 November, and subsequently adopted by the General Assembly at the same plenary meeting, on 15 December.

The First Committee approved the proposal introduced by India by a recorded vote of 101 to 15, with 7 abstentions. The General Assembly adopted it by a recorded vote of 124 (including Denmark and Greece) to 15 (mainly other Western States), with 7 abstentions, as resolution 38/73 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 37/100 A of 13 December 1982,

Convinced that in this nuclear age lasting world peace can be based only on the attainment of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Further convinced that the highest priority objectives in the field of disarmament have to be nuclear disarmament and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction,

Recognizing the urgent need to halt the arms race, particularly in nuclear weapons,

Recognizing further the urgent need for a negotiated reduction of nuclear-weapon stockpiles leading to their complete elimination,

Noting with deep concern that nuclear-weapon States have not so far taken any action in response to the call made in resolution 37/100 A,

1. *Once again calls upon* all nuclear-weapon States to agree to a freeze on nuclear weapons, which would, *inter alia*, provide for a simultaneous total stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

2. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Freeze on nuclear weapons".

The First Committee approved the draft introduced by Mexico by a recorded vote of 101 to 14, with 7 abstentions. The General Assembly adopted it by a recorded vote of 124 (again including Denmark and Greece) to 13 (other Western States, Israel, Japan and New Zealand), with 8 abstentions (including Iceland, Netherlands and Norway), as resolution 38/73 E. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, adopted in 1978 and unanimously and categorically reaffirmed in 1982 during the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, the Assembly expressed deep concern over the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race,

Recalling also that, on those occasions, it pointed out that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth and stressed that mankind is therefore confronted with a choice: halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament, or face annihilation,

Noting that the conditions prevailing today are a source of even more serious concern than those existing in 1978 because of several factors such as the deterioration of the international situation, the increase in the accuracy, speed and destructive power of nuclear weapons, the promotion of illusory doctrines of "limited" or "winnable" nuclear war and the many false alarms which have occurred owing to the malfunctioning of computers,

Noting also that at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, it was declared that the renewed escalation in the nuclear arms race, both in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, as well as reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence, has heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations,

Believing that it is a matter of the utmost urgency to stop any further increase in the awesome arsenals of the two major nuclear-weapon States, which already have ample retaliatory power and a frightening overkill capacity,

Believing also that it is equally urgent to activate negotiations for the substantial reduction and qualitative limitation of nuclear arms,

Considering that a nuclear arms freeze, while not an end in itself, would constitute the most effective first step for the achievement of the above-mentioned two objectives, since it would provide a favourable environment for the conduct of the reduction negotiations while, at the same time, preventing the continued increase and qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weaponry during the period when the negotiations would take place,

Firmly convinced that at present the conditions are most propitious for such a freeze, since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America are now equivalent in nuclear military power and it seems evident that there exists between them an overall rough parity,

Conscious that the mere application of the systems of surveillance, verification and control already agreed upon in some previous cases would be sufficient to provide a reasonable guarantee of faithful compliance with the undertakings derived from the freeze,

Convinced that it would be to the benefit of all other States possessing nuclear weapons to follow the example of the two major nuclear-weapon States as soon as positive results derived from the freeze agreed by them have been obtained,

1. *Urges once more* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, as the two major nuclear-weapon States, to proclaim, either through simultaneous unilateral declarations or through a joint declaration, an immediate nuclear-arms freeze, which would be a first step towards the comprehensive programme of disarmament and whose structure and scope would:

(a) Embrace:

- (i) A comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;
- (ii) The complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;
- (iii) A ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;
- (iv) The complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(b) Be subject to all the relevant measures and procedures of verification which have already been agreed by the parties in the case of the SALT I and SALT II treaties, as well as those agreed upon in principle by them during the preparatory trilateral negotiations on the comprehensive test ban held at Geneva;

(c) Be of an initial five-year duration subject to prolongation in the event of other nuclear-weapon States joining in such a freeze, as the General Assembly expects them to do;

2. *Requests* the above-mentioned two major nuclear-weapon States to submit a joint report or two separate reports to the General Assembly, prior to the opening of its thirty-ninth session, on the implementation of the present resolution;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 38/73 E on a nuclear-arms freeze".

The draft resolution initiated by the USSR was approved by the First Committee by a recorded vote of 84 to 19, with 17 abstentions. The General Assembly adopted it, as resolution 38/76, by a recorded vote of 108 (including Greece) to 18 (other Western States, Israel, Japan and New Zealand), with 20 abstentions. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Expressing its alarm that the continuing nuclear-arms race seriously increases the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war,

Taking into account the great responsibility of nuclear States for the preservation of universal peace and the prevention of nuclear war,

Recalling its resolution 37/100 B of 13 December 1982, in which it expressed the firm conviction that the existing conditions were most propitious for a nuclear-weapon freeze,

I. *Urges* all nuclear-weapon States to proceed to freeze, under appropriate verification, all nuclear weapons in their possession both in quantitative and qualitative terms, namely:

(a) To cease the buildup of all components of nuclear arsenals, including all kinds of nuclear-weapon delivery systems and all kinds of nuclear weapons;

(b) Not to deploy nuclear weapons of new kinds and types;

(c) To establish a moratorium on all tests of nuclear weapons and on tests of new kinds and types of their delivery systems;

(d) To stop the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of creating nuclear weapons;

2. *Calls upon* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which possess the largest nuclear arsenals, to freeze, in the first place and simultaneously, their nuclear weapons on a bilateral basis by way of example to the other nuclear States;

3. *Believes* that all the other nuclear-weapon States should subsequently and as soon as possible freeze their nuclear weapons;

4. *Stresses* the urgent need to intensify efforts aimed at the speedy achievement of agreements on substantial limitations and radical reductions of nuclear weapons with a view to their complete elimination as the ultimate goal.

Conclusion

As in 1982, the proponents of a freeze on nuclear weapons again in 1983 continued in the various forums to hold that the nuclear arms race must be brought to a halt, both in qualitative and quantitative terms, as well as in certain other of its aspects, such as the testing of nuclear weapons. In general, they saw a freeze as a first step towards the reduction and eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. They believed, in addition, that it would contribute to the improvement of the international political climate and the reduction of tensions, and thus diminish the risk of the outbreak of nuclear conflict and build confidence among the big Powers. Consequently, they felt that the measure would help, rather than hinder,

further negotiations on nuclear disarmament once it was implemented. Finally, the freeze supporters observed that the concept was in keeping with the opinion of a concerned public which was being voiced throughout the world.

A minority of delegations, mainly those of Western States, however, saw little or no merit in the freeze concept or in the three freeze proposals that were placed before the Assembly in 1983. According to the United States, for example, a freeze would indicate acceptance of certain imbalances which had built up in favour of the USSR and ultimately increase, not decrease, the danger of war by reducing the latter's incentive to negotiate. Thus it would make more difficult the achievement of agreements to correct an unstable situation. Those holding that view also felt that the endorsement of a freeze would upset the ongoing negotiations aimed at reductions, and create a requirement for difficult new negotiations, particularly in the area of verification.

Two of the three draft resolutions submitted to the General Assembly in 1983 were very similar to the two adopted at the thirty-seventh session, and all three were endorsed by large majorities, although against some considered opposition and a number of abstentions in the voting. With the additional emphasis on the question, however, the freeze clearly matured in 1983 as a current issue of nuclear disarmament, and one which saw a slight, but significant, moderation of position on the part of some, particularly Western, States since 1982. But, in the light of the continuing differences of perception regarding the measure and the international situation prevailing during the year, it would not appear to be an issue on which early compromise or agreement is likely.

Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States

Introduction

THE CONCERNS OF THE NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES for their security, which date back to the beginning of the nuclear-weapon era, have been further intensified by the unabated nuclear arms race. During the past several years, these concerns have become even stronger, not only because of the nuclear competition between the two great Powers, but also because that competition has led to new, more sophisticated weapons and resumed talk about dangerous strategic doctrines, particularly the possibility of limited nuclear war. Unable either to depend upon nuclear weapons for their defence or to join existing military alliances, most non-nuclear-weapon States have sought to reduce their concerns by supporting measures to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and by seeking reliable security assurances against any use or threat of use of such weapons against them.

The question of the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States has been primarily discussed at the United Nations and other international forums since 1968 in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (resolution 2373 (XXII), annex)¹ concluded that same year. The overall objective has been to redress the imbalance arising from what was referred to as “the basically unequal defensive capabilities of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States” at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, which was held in August-September 1968.² Since the opening for signature of the non-proliferation Treaty, many non-nuclear and, particularly, non-aligned States have argued that undertakings by non-nuclear-weapon States to forgo the acquisition of nuclear weapons should be accompanied by reliable security assurances to them that neither nuclear weapons, nor any threat thereof, would be used against them.

Immediately after the commendation of the non-proliferation Treaty by the General Assembly on 12 June 1968, the Security Council, on

¹ For details, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 13; *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), chap. IV. The text of the Treaty is also contained in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, 2nd edition: 1982* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session*, agenda item 96, Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (A/7277 and Corr.1 and 2); resolution A, fourth preambular paragraph refers.

19 June, adopted a draft resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States on security assurances. By resolution 255 (1968), the Security Council recognized that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat thereof, against non-nuclear-weapon States would call for immediate action by the Council, above all by its nuclear-weapon States permanent members. The Council also welcomed the intention expressed by certain States to assist any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the non-proliferation Treaty that was a victim of an act or threat of nuclear aggression and it reaffirmed the right of collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. The effectiveness of the security guarantees envisaged in the resolution were questioned, however, by a number of non-nuclear-weapon States. Some expressed misgivings because of the possibility of use of the veto in the Security Council, others because the guarantees involved "positive" rather than "negative assurances",³ and still others because they felt that the commitment to render assistance was already inherent in the Charter of the United Nations.

Such differences of view between the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States with regard to what constituted reliable assurances persisted. In 1975, the First Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons urged, in its Final Declaration, both groups of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in relations between States involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons, while in 1980 the corresponding Second Review Conference was unable to reach consensus on a substantive final document.⁴

The question was also considered at the two special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (its tenth and twelfth special sessions), in 1978 and 1982. At the tenth special session, the five nuclear-weapon States, China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, individually made declarations intended to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.⁵

Since the 1978 special session, two major approaches to the question have emerged, and the General Assembly has adopted resolutions on the basis of each by large majorities. According to one approach, the conclusion of an international convention on the subject would be the preferred solution, and the Soviet Union and Pakistan initiated draft resolutions on that basis in the Assembly in 1978, both with draft conventions annexed.⁶ After some revision, including the deletion of the annexed conventions, both proposals were adopted, as resolutions 33/72 A and 33/72 B. Further resolutions reflecting this basic approach were initiated by the USSR, together with other Eastern European States, and by Paki-

³ Under a "negative assurance", nuclear Powers would commit themselves not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. This is in contrast to a "positive assurance", whereby nuclear-weapon States would commit themselves, under specific circumstances, to come to the defence of non-nuclear-weapon States, as envisaged by Security Council resolution 255 (1968).

⁴ For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. VII.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. XI.

⁶ *Ibid.*

stan, and were adopted by the General Assembly between 1979 and 1981 (resolutions 34/84, 34/85, 35/154, 35/155, 36/94 and 36/95).

The second approach, advocated by the United States and other Western countries, has emphasized the diverse nature of the security requirements of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States which, in their view, would probably preclude conclusion of a generally acceptable world-wide treaty. As a main proponent of this approach, the United States submitted to the Assembly at its thirty-fourth session a draft resolution which noted the non-first-use pledges each of the nuclear Powers had made at the 1978 special session, and which was adopted as resolution 34/86.

In each of 1979, 1980 and 1981, the Committee on Disarmament established the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. The substantive discussion in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group in 1980 focused mainly on the scope and nature of possible arrangements, and in 1981 it concentrated on the examination of the substance of assurances, concerning which various views were expressed and proposals were submitted.

During 1982, the question of the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States was discussed in the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly at its twelfth special session and its thirty-seventh session. Although no tangible progress was made in either body, some clarification of positions and positive developments were discernible.

The *Ad Hoc* Working Group, which the Committee again re-established to continue negotiations, stressed in its report that its work on the substance of the effective arrangements had revealed specific difficulties relating not only to the differing perceptions of security interests of some nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, but also to the complex nature of the issues involved in developing a "common formula" acceptable to all, which could be included in a legally binding international instrument.

Differences of view of Member States were expressed also at the General Assembly's twelfth special session, but there were two noteworthy, positive developments. First, the Soviet Union assumed the unilateral obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, reiterated its support for the conclusion of an international convention on the subject of security assurances and offered, in addition, to conclude bilateral agreements with States which did not possess nuclear weapons and did not have them on their territories. Secondly, France modified its position, declaring that it "will not use nuclear arms against a State that does not have them and that has pledged not to seek them". In addition, China reaffirmed its established position that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons and would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States under any circumstances.

At the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, the positions

of States on the question of the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States remained unchanged. The Assembly adopted two resolutions on the subject. By resolution 37/80, on the basis of an Eastern European initiative, it welcomed the conclusion of the Committee on Disarmament that there was an urgent need to reach agreement on effective assurances; requested the Committee to continue negotiations on the question; called upon all nuclear-weapon States, as a first step towards the conclusion of an international convention, to make solemn declarations concerning non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States; and recommended that the Security Council examine such declarations and adopt an appropriate resolution approving them. By resolution 37/81, initiated by Pakistan, it reaffirmed the urgent need to reach agreement on security guarantees; appealed to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach a common formula which could be included in an international instrument; and recommended further intensive efforts to that end, particularly in the Committee on Disarmament.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1983

The question of the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States was not considered as a separate item at the substantive session of the Disarmament Commission in 1983. It was, however, considered during the general exchange of views or in concluding statements⁷ by Argentina, Bulgaria, China, Egypt, India and the USSR. China recalled its solemn declaration "that at no time and under no circumstances" would it be the first to use nuclear weapons and its unconditionally assumed obligation not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear State. Summarizing the content of paragraph 30 of the Declaration issued by the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries,⁸ Egypt mentioned, among other points, the necessity of confirming the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States not to threaten non-nuclear-weapon States with nuclear weapons and of formulating an international instrument in that regard. The Soviet Union, for its part, stressed again the view that the most effective way to resolve the problem would be to conclude an appropriate international convention. However, given the negative position of certain States towards that proposal, it was ready to examine other possible solutions, such as identical or nearly identical statements by nuclear-weapon States on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States having no such weapons on their territories. Such statements could be strengthened by an authoritative decision of the Security Council.

In addition, the Contact Group established by the Committee of the Whole to deal with agenda item 4, unable to achieve consensus on recommendations, suggested that the Committee's report to the Commission

⁷ A/CN.10/PV.66-70 and A/CN.10/PV.65-72/Corrigendum.

⁸ A/38/132-S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2.

include an annex entitled "Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4".⁹ In the compilation, recommendation 10, section I, whose text was proposed by the Chairman of the Contact Group, referred to the need for negotiations to proceed without delay "for the conclusion of an agreed international instrument of effective international arrangements to assure all non-nuclear-weapon States, without any discrimination, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1983

The Committee on Disarmament continued negotiations on the question of the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States during its 1983 session, as requested by the General Assembly in resolutions 37/80 and 37/81. As during the previous four years, the agenda item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"¹⁰ was considered in the plenary meetings of the Committee, from 4 to 8 April and from 11 to 15 July, but the substantive negotiations took place in closed meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on that item, which was re-established under the chairmanship of Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, representative of Pakistan.

In plenary meetings, a relatively smaller number of members of the Committee as well as non-members — in accordance with the Committee's rules of procedure — took part in the discussion of the issue as compared with previous years.¹¹ Moreover, there was hardly any substantive discussion in the Committee on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. Generally, they briefly reaffirmed the assurances given in their unilateral declarations.

China stressed again its long-held view that the fundamental measure for eliminating the threat of nuclear war was nuclear disarmament carried to the point of the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons, but before the attainment of that goal it was legitimate for the non-nuclear-weapon States to demand a legally binding commitment from the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. It also held that the States with the largest nuclear arsenals had not demonstrated recognition of their obligations towards non-nuclear-weapon States. On the contrary, they had set out various conditions and restrictions in their declarations. It then expressed a willingness to search for a common formula, which would conform to the interests of non-nuclear-weapon States and be acceptable to all.

France reminded the members of the Committee that its Government had redefined its position on negative security assurances in 1982, by moving closer to the form of guarantees already offered by others. It

⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42)*, annex VIII.

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, *Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, paras. 74-76.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, appendix III (CD/421), vols. I-V.

believed, moreover, "that a Security Council resolution giving the backing of the Council to the existing declarations would greatly strengthen their political and legal value and that together they would constitute a system of guarantees of undeniable significance". Furthermore, France stressed that the modification of its policy had been made exactly in response to the legitimate concerns expressed by many non-nuclear-weapon States.

Among non-nuclear-weapon States, both members and non-members of the Committee, there was unanimity as to the need for effective assurances of their security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. They also agreed that the inflexibility of some nuclear-weapon States to renounce the conditions and exceptions contained in their unilateral declarations had resulted in the impasse in the Committee. However, differences of view regarding the contents and character of the instrument, which States were entitled to guarantees, and the question of interim arrangements persisted among non-nuclear-weapon States during the 1983 session of the Committee, as they had during its other recent sessions.

A number of delegations, particularly those of some socialist and non-aligned countries in the Committee, supported the idea of the adoption of a legally binding international instrument, which might take the form of an international convention or agreement (Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco and Nigeria, as well as Finland, a non-member). Some of them — Finland, Kenya, Morocco and Pakistan — stressed that the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States were not enough and should be complemented through comprehensive, binding assurances.

However, there were also considerable differences of opinion regarding non-first-use pledges. Pending achievement of a permanent solution, some members, including Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic, suggested steps that they felt would contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for fruitful negotiations, such as the non-first-use obligation already assumed by certain nuclear-weapon States. Nigeria believed that all the remaining nuclear-weapon States should be urged to assume such guarantees. Algeria, pointing out that the negotiations on negative security assurances were at a standstill, considered that a solemn non-first-use declaration by the nuclear-weapon States would constitute an important step towards the conclusion of an international instrument satisfactory to the non-nuclear-weapon States. Morocco, among others, expressed readiness to support the adoption of a resolution of the Security Council, which, it felt, could constitute a valuable interim arrangement. The Netherlands reiterated its willingness to contribute to a possible harmonization of the existing unilateral assurances of the nuclear-weapon States in order to incorporate them into a common formula, to be embodied in a Security Council resolution.

Contrary to those opinions, Indonesia voiced its considerable difficulty with regard to an interim approach because, in its view, that

would impede the negotiation of a legally binding instrument giving assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States, which was the crux of the issue. It also considered that a Security Council resolution would not constitute an effective guarantee since it would not be legally binding. Some delegations, moreover, felt that neither Security Council resolution 255 (1968) nor the unilateral declarations offered credible assurances, and stressed that real assurances could come about only through a legally binding international instrument.

A number of delegations considered that the existing unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States were inadequate legally as well as substantively; from the legal point of view, they were not binding as they were unilateral and unverifiable. As to their substance, they contained conditions and restrictions, except in one case, and as a result were ineffective. Accordingly, several members, including Algeria, Argentina, Morocco and Pakistan, stressed the need for negative security assurances, without any conditions or restrictions, in the form of a legally binding international instrument. In that context, Argentina observed that while nuclear-weapon States were continuing with the imposition of conditions for granting negative security assurances and with relentless vertical proliferation, the non-nuclear-weapon States had not assented to any form of horizontal proliferation. Therefore, according to Argentina, the non-nuclear-weapon States merited no less credibility than the nuclear-weapon States. If, for the latter, a unilateral declaration should be considered sufficient as an assurance, then it should likewise be sufficient for non-nuclear-weapon States only to declare that they did not possess or intend to acquire nuclear weapons in order to benefit from those assurances. Brazil, in the light of recent events in the South Atlantic, raised also the question of the credibility of the commitments to negative assurances undertaken by the nuclear-weapon Powers pursuant to article 3 of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In its view, the interpretation was simple and unconditional, namely, "not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty". However, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States had given interpretative declarations which amounted to virtual reservations, in spite of the provision of the Treaty (article 27) that it should not be subject to reservations.

The German Democratic Republic stressed that any international agreement on security assurances should apply to those States which renounced the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and did not have them on their territories or under their jurisdiction or control, whether or not they were members of a military alliance. In its view, the non-stationing commitment constituted an essential current consideration. Bulgaria felt that no difference should be made between non-nuclear-weapon States which were or were not members of an alliance structure, presumably built to serve strictly defensive purposes. It further stressed that non-use undertakings should not be conditional formulations which were susceptible to various highly subjective interpretations or which might even provide for withdrawal from the obligations.

According to Nigeria, the issue of negative security assurances should be centred on two questions: which non-nuclear-weapon States should be eligible for them and under what circumstances nuclear-weapon States could withdraw them. In its opinion, unconditional assurances should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States that had undertaken firm commitments not to develop, produce or acquire nuclear weapons, while conditional assurances should be given to those which were outside the non-proliferation Treaty.

Several members of the Committee, especially non-aligned countries, expressed views on the obstacles preventing the Committee from reaching agreement on a common approach or formula. According to Kenya, the main one was the unwillingness of some of the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate the political will and firm commitment necessary to reach agreement on a formula which could be included in a legally binding international instrument. In Argentina's view, the situation of negative security assurances could not be changed without substantial changes in the positions of certain nuclear Powers.

Since the Committee, unable to find a formula acceptable to all, was facing an impasse, some delegations suggested other measures which, along with pledges of non-first-use, could increase the security of non-nuclear-weapon States or serve as interim arrangements. In that context, Romania suggested a set of measures ranging from the outlawing and destruction of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of their use or of their first use to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, against which the nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to use nuclear weapons. Romania believed that still other measures could be considered, such as some suggested in the ICDSI¹² report, among them, the establishment of a zone free of tactical nuclear weapons in Central Europe.

The *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the question, which was re-established as noted above, held nine meetings in all, in the periods from 26 to 29 April and from 16 June to 22 August. In the discussion, the views already expressed in previous years, either in the Working Group or plenary meetings, were reiterated and, due to continuing intractable differences, no tangible progress was achieved.

In reviewing developments on the item since the Group's 1982 meetings and, in particular, questions relating to its future work, members reaffirmed the importance of ensuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and expressed their readiness to continue searching for a solution. A number of delegations regretted that there had been little positive movement on the question and reiterated the previously expressed view of the group of 21¹³ that further negotiations in the *Ad Hoc* Group were unlikely to be fruitful as long as the nuclear-weapon States did not exhibit genuine political will to reach a satisfactory agreement. Australia suggested that the subject should be downgraded in the Com-

¹² The report entitled "Common Security" was transmitted to the Disarmament Commission by the Secretary-General as document A/CN.10/38.

¹³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/37/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/335), document CD/280.

mittee's programme of work because it had already been exhaustively discussed and there did not appear to be anything new for the *Ad Hoc* Working Group to consider. Yugoslavia, which also believed it was not necessary for the Group to hold further meetings in the absence of new, substantive initiatives on the question, proposed that the Chairman instead pursue informal consultations, in particular with delegations of the nuclear-weapon States. However, others considered that there was room for substantive work by the Group, in spite of the complex and difficult nature of the task, and therefore it should continue to explore all possibilities for progress.

During the proceedings of the Group, the Chairman suggested three approaches, which would not be mutually exclusive, for possible adoption by the Group in its consideration of the subject, namely: (a) to continue negotiations towards an agreement on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character; (b) to examine the relevance and direct implications of the non-first-use of nuclear weapons for the so-called negative security assurances; and (c) to adopt any other approach which might help in the resolution of some of the problems.

Regarding the method to be followed in the Group's future work, many delegations, while generally welcoming the Chairman's suggestions, indicated that they were flexible on the issue. Additionally, Romania specifically suggested the establishment of contact groups to consider each of the three subjects it had proposed for inclusion in the Group's future programme of work, namely, efforts to reach agreement on a common formula, examination of alternatives to such a formula, and consideration of means to increase the legal value of the unilateral declaration. India proposed a three-stage method of work involving consideration of new initiatives, including the change in the French position on security assurances and the Soviet Union's non-first-use declaration; the continuation of efforts to elaborate a common formula; and conclusions and assessments.

In the discussion, China reiterated that it undertook unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-free zones. The USSR stressed the importance of its unilateral obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and reconfirmed its unilateral commitment never to use or threaten to use them against those States which renounced the production and acquisition of such weapons and did not have them on their territories. France recalled the change in its unilateral position which it had announced during the twelfth special session. The United Kingdom and the United States pointed out that their unilateral assurances had been offered in response to, and given in recognition of, the security concerns expressed by the non-nuclear-weapon States, and that those assurances were credible and reliable, and represented firm declarations of policy.

A divergence of views emerged, principally between Western and socialist countries, on the relevance of the concept of the non-first-use of

nuclear weapons to the security assurances made to non-nuclear-weapon States. The socialist delegations emphasized that the USSR's non-first-use declaration, made during the twelfth special session, constituted an important measure aimed at strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. The Western countries argued that the non-first-use concept applied to relations among nuclear-weapon States, since it implied a possible "second use"; in addition, they felt that the question was not relevant to the Group's work in the light of the ban on the use of force already provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. China expressed the view that non-first-use, although it primarily concerned relations among nuclear-weapon States, indirectly affected the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Pakistan and Sweden shared the opinion that non-first-use was of direct relevance to the work of the Group.

Another question raised in the course of the discussion was that of categories of non-nuclear-weapon States which were covered or excluded in the five unilateral declarations by the nuclear-weapon States, or which should be covered by future arrangements on negative security assurances.

In that context, Brazil, on the basis of analysis of the existing unilateral declarations, placed the non-nuclear-weapon States in several categories, namely, those which: (a) did not possess nuclear weapons; (b) had renounced the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons; (c) had pledged not to seek nuclear weapons; (d) were not parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone agreement; (e) did not have nuclear weapons on their territories; (f) did not carry out an act of aggression against the guarantor or its allies in association or alliance with another nuclear-weapon Power; and (g) were parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or a similar binding instrument, provided that such unspecified instrument also forbade their acquiring nuclear explosive devices.

In its report¹⁴ to the Committee on Disarmament, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group summarized the organization of its work and documentation, and indicated briefly the different views that had been expressed concerning the various questions it had considered, including those involving the political will on the part of nuclear-weapon States; the validity of the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States and, in two cases, their compatibility with obligations under Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco; the relationship between non-first-use of nuclear weapons and security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States; and the categories of non-nuclear-weapon States implied by the unilateral declarations.

In its conclusions and recommendations, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending effective measures of nuclear disarmament. The substantive negotiations, however, had revealed that specific difficulties, related to the differing perceptions of security interests of

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, para. 76.

some nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, persisted. Moreover, the complex nature of the issues involved had continued to prevent agreement on a common formula or on an international convention.

In that light, the Group recommended to the Committee that ways and means be explored to overcome the difficulties in the negotiations. Accordingly, it recommended that a working group be re-established at the beginning of the Committee's 1984 session and that consultations be undertaken in order to determine the most appropriate course of action.

On 4 August the group of 21 submitted a statement to the Committee¹⁵ expressing its regret that the nuclear-weapon States had failed to meet, at the second special session, the group's concerns regarding a review of their policies and that, in the subsequent discussion in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, they had persistently upheld their existing unilateral declarations which reflected their own subjective approaches, with the result that the negotiations on the item could not be carried any further. The group of 21 reiterated its belief that the most effective assurances of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons were nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and reaffirmed its previously stated position¹⁶ regarding an agreement on the question. It held that the inflexibility of the nuclear-weapon States had resulted in the impasse, and therefore again urged them to display the understanding and political will necessary to reach agreement.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

Two items, "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament" and "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament", were included in the agenda of the thirty-eighth session pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 37/80 and 37/81 of the previous year.

The debates, both in plenary meetings and in the First Committee¹⁷ neither indicated nor led to any change in the established positions of the States concerned. A number of States reaffirmed their call for international legally binding assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, most of them expressing a preference for an international convention. Kenya, for example, in a plenary statement, expressed its conviction that the time had come for the adoption, by the Assembly, of a resolution on a con-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, appendix II (CD/421), document CD/407.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/37/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/335), document CD/280.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 38th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

vention that would guarantee the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Similar positions were taken by a number of other, mainly non-aligned, countries in their statements in the First Committee. Nigeria demanded that, as a minimum and as an earnest of their good intention and commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, the nuclear-weapon States should agree unconditionally and with the minimum of delay to conclude a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances. Uganda stressed that all nuclear-weapon States must pledge unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and that such pledges should be embodied in an international agreement of a legally binding nature. In the same vein, Madagascar felt that the nuclear-weapon States should give clear, categorical guarantees in a binding international instrument that non-nuclear-weapon States would not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons; that view was shared by Morocco. Zambia said that the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States through conclusion of an international convention was of paramount importance for it. For the United Republic of Cameroon, the unilateral declarations of certain nuclear Powers made no sense unless all other Powers undertook the same commitments and agreed to incorporate them in a binding international treaty. Indonesia felt that legal guarantees were needed to ensure the security of non-nuclear States pending complete nuclear disarmament, and Uruguay called for a system of guarantees for States which had voluntarily renounced nuclear weaponry.

Those positions of the non-aligned countries were generally supported by the socialist States from Eastern Europe, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic among them. Czechoslovakia, for example, assured the Committee of its readiness to work for the early adoption of an international convention of the type mentioned above. It continued to believe that identical statements by the five nuclear Powers, buttressed by an authoritative decision of the Security Council, could constitute the first step towards that goal. The Soviet Union also advocated the speedy solution of the question of strengthening the security guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States by the conclusion of an international convention.

The idea of an international convention was questioned, however, by a number of Western States, including Spain and, in explanations of vote that are discussed below, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands and Sweden. Spain, pointing out the complexity of the task, expressed the conviction that it was not possible to insist that those guarantees take the form of a treaty. It would consider satisfactory whatever arrangements would make it possible to reach the envisaged objectives.

Several States expressed their views on the security problems of non-nuclear-weapon States in the context of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament measures.

The Netherlands stressed the importance of agreeing on a common

formula for negative security assurances which would encompass all the assurances which each of the nuclear-weapon States had individually given to the non-nuclear-weapon States. Such a common formula would, in the Netherlands view, strengthen the non-proliferation régime. Portugal, as well as Indonesia, Nepal and the Syrian Arab Republic, also believed that the adoption of security measures for the benefit of non-nuclear-weapon States would, among other measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, contribute significantly to the efficacy of the current nuclear non-proliferation régime. Romania considered that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons required, *inter alia*, genuine and sustained measures aimed at nuclear disarmament and the granting of security guarantees to non-nuclear States. Venezuela pointed out that if the nuclear-weapon States were not genuinely prepared to negotiate verifiable and effective agreements leading to a significant quantitative and qualitative reduction in all nuclear weapons, one could not expect States that did not possess such weapons, but might see them as a means of gaining political or military advantage, to have a genuine interest in undertaking a legally binding commitment not to acquire, possess or use them. There was, in the opinion of Venezuela, no guarantee against the military use of nuclear energy or of nuclear weapons themselves, as long as they continued to exist and could be used as instruments of coercion.

A number of delegations regretted that the Committee on Disarmament made no progress on the question of negative security guarantees in 1983. Argentina felt that the Committee had reached a veritable deadlock and that it did not seem possible to emerge from the area of unilateral statements that were not legally binding. Unless there was a radical change in the position of nuclear-weapon States, Argentina foresaw that further efforts in that area would be futile. The United Republic of Cameroon did not think that the Committee on Disarmament was moving towards a constructive approach in the matter of concluding effective international arrangements to guarantee the security of non-nuclear States. It had expected that the Working Group would prepare a draft convention on the basis of the draft submitted in 1978. The First Committee should seek new initiatives leading to new approaches. Regrets about the lack of progress were also expressed by Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal, Togo and Venezuela. Nigeria said the conclusion of an instrument on security assurances should take place within the multilateral forum of the Committee on Disarmament. Also, Zambia said that it was anxious to see progress in the Committee on Disarmament in that field, which touched upon the security concerns of the overwhelming majority of the world's countries.

Several critical comments were made on the positions of nuclear-weapon States and their unilateral declarations not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Referring to the situation in Latin America, Cuba requested practical guarantees that there would be no threat or use of nuclear weapons against the Latin American countries. In the view of the Sudan, the stubbornness of the nuclear-weapon States in not eliminating the reservations and exceptions in their unilat-

eral declarations ran counter to their commitment to give sound guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States. Indonesia found that nuclear-weapon States had, in effect, created a commonality of attitudes, demonstrated by their lack of action in providing assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States. Indonesia foresaw two kinds of consequences: expansion of blocs because more States wanted protection under nuclear umbrellas, or nuclear proliferation in the search for independent means of ensuring security. Kenya was concerned that nuclear-weapon States might one day attempt nuclear blackmail and, in that connection, noted with appreciation the open declarations of two nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. According to Nigeria, non-nuclear-weapon States were constantly being reminded that unless they paid heed to the wishes of the nuclear-weapon States, their very security could not be assured. The conditions attached to some of the unilateral declarations, in the view of Nigeria, robbed them of their content, value and applicability.

Statements along similar lines were made by Brazil, Madagascar, Pakistan and the United Republic of Cameroon. Finland, although it welcomed the unilateral assurances given so far by the nuclear Powers, felt that the security needs of the non-nuclear-weapon States would best be served through negotiated arrangements, binding and comprehensive in nature. Spain also believed that the unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States were not enough and that it was important to speed up the negotiations for the adoption of measures on that matter.

Of the nuclear-weapon States, only China and the USSR referred to the subject of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. China once again reminded the Committee that on the very day when it first successfully conducted its nuclear test, it undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Soviet Union, for its part, reaffirmed the declaration that it would never and under no circumstances use nuclear weapons against countries that had neither nuclear weapons of their own nor foreign nuclear weapons on their territories, and it was prepared to conclude necessary agreements on guarantees with non-nuclear States.

Discussing the issue of nuclear-weapon-free zones, Argentina held that, in spite of committing themselves not to produce nuclear weapons, the States in the area covered by the Treaty of Tlatelolco had not received in exchange any real security in their relations with nuclear-weapon countries. Sri Lanka expressed full understanding for those who felt that a nuclear-weapon-free zone could not exist in a vacuum, and it called for an effective commitment from the nuclear-weapon States and States in areas contiguous to the zone not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against it. Iraq called on all States, and particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to respect the nuclear-weapon-free zones and to provide guarantees that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

Brazil was of the opinion that the whole question of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the extension of negative security assurances had to be reassessed in the light of the commitment by the nuclear-weapon Powers to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament. The position that nuclear disarmament was the most effective assurance against the threat or use of nuclear weapons was also shared by a number of States, including Bangladesh, Hungary, Indonesia, Mozambique, Pakistan and the Sudan. India particularly stressed the need to forswear completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances and, in this connection, referred to its proposal for a convention on their prohibition.

On 4 November, under the agenda item "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", a draft resolution was submitted by Pakistan. In introducing the proposal on 9 November, Pakistan reaffirmed its conviction that the most effective assurance against the nuclear threat remained the complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and their eventual elimination. However, interim arrangements could also play an important role in allaying the legitimate concern of the non-nuclear-weapon States as regards threats to their security. Such assurances had become all the more essential since meaningful progress on nuclear disarmament did not appear likely in the foreseeable future. Pakistan regretted that the negotiations undertaken in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament, after some forward movement during its 1979 and 1980 sessions, had not proved productive since 1981. The second special session, held in 1982, also failed to register any progress and there was no response to the concerns of the group of 21 in that regard from some of the nuclear-weapon States. Pakistan continued to believe that, in order to be effective, assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States must be unconditional and of a legally binding nature.

On 23 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 91 to none, with 5 abstentions (Argentina, Brazil, India, United Kingdom and United States). Following the vote, Japan expressed reservations about the references in three paragraphs to a specific modality of negative security assurances which would seem to prejudice the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Japan noted, however, that the resolution reflected the trend of the work of the Conference's Working Group, in particular the references to a common formula that had figured in its discussions. In the hope that the Conference on Disarmament would continue efforts in that direction, Japan had voted in favour of the draft resolution.

On 15 December, the draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by a recorded vote of 141 to none, with 6 abstentions, as resolution 38/68, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Deeply concerned at the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Taking into account the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Deeply concerned about the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolutions 3261 G (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 and 31/189 C of 21 December 1976,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Recalling its resolutions 33/72 of 14 December 1978, 34/85 of 11 December 1979, 35/155 of 12 December 1980, 36/95 of 9 December 1981 and 37/81 of 9 December 1982,

Further recalling paragraph 12 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, which states, *inter alia*, that all efforts should be exerted by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Committee on Disarmament and its *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, with a view to reaching agreement on this item,

Noting the proposals submitted under that item in the Committee on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention,

Taking note of the decision of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, as well as the relevant recommendations of the Organization of the Islamic Conference reiterated at the Thirteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Niamey from 22 to 26 August 1982, calling upon the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate and reach an agreement on an international basis to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Further noting the support expressed in the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the difficulties pointed out in evolving a common approach acceptable to all,

1. *Reaffirms* the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that in the Committee on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out;

3. *Appeals* to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;

4. *Recommends* that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered in the Committee on Disarmament, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties;

5. *Recommends* that the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

On 11 November, under the agenda item "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Mongolia, the USSR and Viet Nam submitted a draft resolution. In introducing the proposal on 15 November, Bulgaria expressed the opinion of its sponsors that nuclear disarmament and the elimination of all types of nuclear weapons would be the most effective and reliable measure to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. However, pending the attainment of that ultimate goal, the non-nuclear-weapon States were entitled to receive effective security guarantees. The sponsors believed that question had recently become even more important and urgent. In the existing circumstances, the international community had reason to demand that nuclear-weapon Powers which still abided by war doctrines providing for the possible use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States having no such weapons on their territories respond to the appeals of the overwhelming majority of States to strengthen their security in the most effective way. The sponsors regretted that the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament had not progressed in 1983. Bulgaria stated that despite the difficulties, there once again was no objection, in principle, in the Committee on Disarmament to the idea of an international convention on strengthening the security guarantees. Proceeding from that premise, the sponsors considered that the General Assembly should encourage the Committee to continue to explore ways and means for overcoming the difficulties and reaching an agreement.

Explaining, before the vote, its abstention on both the proposal introduced by Bulgaria and that introduced by Pakistan described above,

Brazil pointed out that over the past few years it had supported such initiatives, but the attitude of the nuclear-weapon Powers had compelled it to revise its position and to withdraw support.

On 23 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 70 to 16 (mainly Western States), with 15 abstentions.

Following the vote, Japan, which abstained, explained that it differed with the views expressed in some of the preambular paragraphs and also had reservations about the references in the operative part to a particular procedure of negative security assurances, since it would pre-judge the work of the Committee on Disarmament on that matter. Ireland, which abstained, felt that the draft resolution did not take into account the possibility of different approaches to the achievement of international arrangements and favoured the idea of an international convention which would seem to imply further obligations for non-nuclear-weapon States. Argentina said it had abstained in both proposals because it was necessary to find new ways to make progress towards a truly satisfactory solution. Sweden expressed strong reservations about certain aspects of concluding an international convention whereby nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States would enter into some kind of mutual obligation, as it felt that the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States had already made a full undertaking by adhering to the non-proliferation Treaty.

The Netherlands said it voted against the resolution because it could not condone the accusations against some countries of having prevented the Committee on Disarmament from making substantive progress towards an agreement. Referring to a NATO declaration to the effect that none of its weapons would ever be used except in response to attack, the Netherlands stressed that the non-first-use of weapons was the fundamental pledge, not the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. The prominent role of the latter concept in the draft resolution was one of the main reasons for its negative vote. The Netherlands also reiterated its reservations about a convention, although it did see some positive changes in the wording of the draft, compared with those of previous years.

On 15 December, the draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by a recorded vote of 108 to 17 (mainly Western States), with 18 abstentions, as resolution 38/67, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Convinced of the need to take effective measures for the strengthening of the security of States and prompted by the desire shared by all nations to eliminate war and prevent nuclear conflagration,

Taking into account the principle of non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed in a number of United Nations declarations and resolutions,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Noting with satisfaction the desire of States in various regions to prevent nuclear weapons from being introduced into their territories, including through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and being anxious to contribute to the attainment of this objective,

Concerned at the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and the increased danger of recourse to use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolutions on this subject as well as the relevant part of the special report of the Committee on Disarmament, submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Noting that the Committee on Disarmament considered in 1983 the item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and the work done by its *Ad Hoc* Working Group on this item, as reflected in the report of the Committee on Disarmament,

Noting the proposals submitted under that item in the Committee on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention, and the widespread international support for the conclusion of such a convention,

Wishing to promote an early and successful completion of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, aimed at the elaboration of a convention on the item,

Further noting that the idea of interim arrangements as a first step towards the conclusion of such a convention has also been considered in the Committee on Disarmament, particularly in the form of a Security Council resolution on this subject, and reaffirming the calls made in that respect in General Assembly resolutions 35/154 of 12 December 1980, 36/94 of 9 December 1981 and 37/80 of 9 December 1982,

Convinced that abandoning policies of first use of nuclear weapons would, *inter alia*, constitute a substantive contribution to the efforts to achieve progress towards effective strengthening of the security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States,

Welcoming once again the solemn declarations made by some nuclear-weapon States concerning non-first-use of nuclear weapons, in particular the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, assumed at the highest political level or confirmed at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly,

Convinced further that, if all nuclear-weapon States were to assume obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, that would be tantamount, in practice, to banning the use of nuclear weapons against all States, including all non-nuclear-weapon States,

Considering that, in the search for a solution to the problem of security assurances, priority should be given to the legitimate security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States which, by virtue of their forgoing the nuclear option and of not allowing nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territories, have every right to expect to be most effectively guaranteed against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

1. *Reaffirms once again* the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that in the Committee on Disarmament there is once again no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention on this subject, although the difficulties involved have also been pointed out;

3. *Expresses its regret* that the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all, related to differing perceptions of security interests of some nuclear-weapon

States and non-nuclear-weapon States, have once again prevented the Committee on Disarmament from making substantive progress towards the achievement of an agreement;

4. *Considers* that the Conference on Disarmament should continue to explore ways and means to overcome the difficulties encountered in the negotiations to reach an appropriate agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

5. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to continue the negotiations, as recommended in the report of the Committee on Disarmament on its 1983 session, with a view to concluding an international instrument of a legally binding character to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

Conclusion

There was again no substantive progress during 1983 towards effective international assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, either in the Committee on Disarmament or in the General Assembly.

Differing views persisted on the scope, nature and substance, as well as form, of possible arrangements. Although many States favoured the conclusion of an international convention, opposition to the practical implementation of that idea continued. In addition, there were divergent views on whether or not the nuclear-weapon States had exhibited genuine political will, on the value and application of their unilateral declarations regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, and on the relevance of pledges on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons to security assurances offered to non-nuclear-weapon States.

Without *rapprochement* between the basic views on security held by the non-nuclear-weapon States and the nuclear-weapon States, as well as within the group of nuclear-weapon States, the existing impasse seems likely to remain. In accordance with the two resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament will continue to explore ways and means to overcome the difficulties in the negotiations.

CHAPTER IX

Cessation of nuclear-weapon tests

Introduction

THE COMPLETE CESSATION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON TESTS is widely considered essential for curbing the qualitative nuclear arms race, but the prospect for early achievement of such a comprehensive ban remained unlikely as of the end of 1983. The General Assembly, in 1978, accorded the highest priority to nuclear disarmament in the Final Document¹ of its first special session devoted to disarmament, and regarded the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing as a most important initial measure. Similar priority was given to the subject outside the aegis of the United Nations, among others, by ICDSI,² which, in 1982, called for concentrated efforts to negotiate a treaty banning all nuclear tests and for a voluntary moratorium on all such tests pending the conclusion of the treaty. The subject has actually been on the agenda of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral negotiating forums since the early 1950s³ but, despite these efforts, only partial results have been achieved. First, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States signed on 5 August 1963 the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,⁴ known as the partial test-ban Treaty, which has been the most important achievement so far. Although some 110 States are parties to the Treaty, it has two main limitations: it does not limit testing underground and two nuclear-weapon States, China and France, are not parties. France, however, has not conducted tests in the three prohibited environments since 1974.

In spite of the aim of the original parties to the partial test-ban Treaty to seek, as stated in its preamble, "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time"—which was recalled in the preamble of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III.

² See "Common Security", a report of ICDSI, A/CN.10/38, pp. 153-154.

³ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), part four.

⁴ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43. The text is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

Weapons⁵ – negotiations between the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, which began in 1977 with a view to formulating a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty and protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, failed to produce such a treaty. The three States concerned submitted, on 30 July 1980, the latest in a series of reports to the Committee on Disarmament on their negotiations⁶ but, although it recorded considerable progress, the trilateral negotiations were suspended in 1980 and had not been resumed as of the end of 1983.

On the other hand, further bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States since the partial test-ban Treaty came into effect have resulted in further limitations in nuclear testing. Under the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests,⁷ also referred to as the threshold test-ban Treaty, which was signed on 3 July 1974, the two agreed not to carry out any tests of weapons having a yield in excess of 150 kilotons after 31 March 1976, and to keep their underground tests to a minimum. A Protocol to the Treaty provided for an extensive exchange of scientific data to increase the accuracy of verification measures. Two years later, on 28 May 1976, the two signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes,⁸ which prohibits any individual nuclear explosion having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons, any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 1,500 kilotons or any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons, unless the individual explosions in the group can be identified and measured by agreed verification procedures. The Protocol to the Treaty set forth specific arrangements for ensuring that no weapon-related benefits precluded by the threshold test-ban Treaty could be derived by carrying out a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes. As of the end of 1983, however, neither of the two Treaties had entered into force, but both parties were generally understood to be observing them.

As to multilateral negotiations, the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests has been discussed specifically in the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament and its predecessor bodies, but only in general terms in the Disarmament Commission. The General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions on the subject which may be classified in three main groups: those by which it has called for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty; those by which it has requested the Committee on Disarmament to initiate negotiations on such a treaty; and those by which it has called upon the nuclear-weapon States to refrain

⁵ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex. The text is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*.

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27)*, appendix II (CD/139), vol. II, document CD/130; see also *The Year-book*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. VIII.

⁷ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1042, No. 13446.

⁸ A/31/125.

from further testing pending the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty.

In 1982 the Committee on Disarmament discussed the question in detail, including the need for an *ad hoc* working group to deal with it and the mandate of such a group. The United States took the position that if consensus could be reached that such a group would deal with its foremost concerns of verification and compliance, it would join in that consensus. That modification of position was cautiously welcomed, and in April the Committee decided to establish the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear-Test Ban, with a compromise draft mandate “. . . to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress towards a nuclear test ban. . . .”⁹ During the second part of the Committee’s session, in July, the United States announced that it had come to a decision, in the existing international climate, not to resume trilateral negotiations or to ratify the threshold test-ban and peaceful nuclear explosions Treaties. In the meetings of the Group, which took place following the United States announcement, different opinions were expressed, primarily on the question of its mandate, and no substantive progress was made. Moreover, China and France did not participate in its proceedings.

In 1982 no tangible progress was made in the General Assembly during either its second special session devoted to disarmament or its thirty-seventh session. In addition to two items on the agenda pursuant to resolutions previously adopted on the subject, at the request of the Soviet Union a new agenda item entitled “Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests” was allocated to the First Committee; it included “Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests”. The Assembly accordingly adopted three resolutions on the subject:

(a) Resolution 37/72, by which, *inter alia*, it reaffirmed that a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-test explosions for all time was a matter of the highest priority; urged the three original parties to the partial test-ban Treaty to continue negotiations to that end; likewise urged all members of the Committee on Disarmament to assign to the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on item 1 of the Committee’s agenda (“Nuclear-test ban”) a mandate which should provide for the multilateral negotiation of such a treaty, which the Committee would try to submit to the Assembly in 1983; and called on the original three, as depositaries, to halt all nuclear-test explosions through either a trilateral moratorium or unilateral moratoria;

(b) Resolution 37/73, by which, *inter alia*, it reaffirmed its conviction that a treaty to achieve a comprehensive test ban was of the “greatest urgency and highest priority”; noted that in 1982, the Committee on Disarmament had established an *Ad Hoc* Working Group under item 1 of its agenda and had requested it to discuss and define issues relating to

⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/37/27 and Corr.1)*, para. 39.

verification and compliance with a view to making further progress, and that the Group had initiated its work; and requested the Committee to continue its consideration of those issues and to take the necessary steps to initiate substantive negotiations in order that the draft of a treaty might be submitted to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date;

(c) As a result of the Soviet initiative, resolution 37/85, by which, *inter alia*, it referred to the Committee on Disarmament, for its consideration, the basic provisions of a treaty, which were annexed to the resolution.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1983

The issue of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests was not considered as a separate item by the Disarmament Commission in 1983. It was, however, addressed by several members during the general exchange of views or in concluding statements¹⁰ and, in addition, in the context of item 4 of the Commission's agenda concerning the arms race, particularly its nuclear aspects, and a general approach to disarmament (see page 9 above).

Among the measures of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament which were singled out as being particularly important, the comprehensive banning of the testing of nuclear weapons was mentioned as being a high priority requirement by a number of States, including Bulgaria, Egypt, Nigeria, Spain, Sweden and Yugoslavia. Bulgaria, for instance, placed the item first in a list of fundamental questions of disarmament to which the Eastern European countries attached great importance, while Spain stated, in the context of agenda item 4, that a complete prohibition on nuclear tests was an objective of the greatest importance to all. Sweden, for its part, noted that a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be of great importance in stopping the qualitative arms race.

The Soviet Union stressed that a reliable barrier to the creation of new types and systems of nuclear weapons would be the prohibition of their testing, and that a good basis for speedy agreement on the question was found in the basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, which it had proposed to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. The USSR later related its proposal for the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests to its policy on the prevention of nuclear war.

Japan, noting that ideals and noble words were not the equivalent of real disarmament, emphasized the importance of making step-by-step efforts to establish a world-wide, interconnected seismological observatory network so that reliable verification mechanisms could enable a comprehensive nuclear test-ban convention to become reality. Regarding the matter as one of urgent priority, Japan felt that an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence would grow as such efforts proceeded.

¹⁰ See A/CN.10/PV.66-70 and A/CN.10/PV.65-72/Corrigendum.

Mexico observed that the item entitled "Nuclear-test ban" had been at the top of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament since 1979 and, given the lack of progress on that item and others, felt that two of the three depositaries of the partial test-ban and non-proliferation Treaties had maintained a stance which contradicted their undertakings.

As it was unable to achieve consensus on a set of recommendations for submission to the Commission's Committee of the Whole, the Contact Group which had been established to deal with item 4 suggested that the Committee include in its report to the Commission an annex entitled "Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4". Among them, it included a recommendation containing three alternative proposed texts,¹¹ shown as tentative by being placed almost entirely in brackets, all of them referring to negotiation and conclusion of a nuclear-test-ban treaty; it also included two bracketed texts, to be added at the end of the recommendation, which called for a moratorium on or stoppage of nuclear tests, pending the conclusion of a treaty. Due to the lack of agreement on a set of recommendations, the Disarmament Commission decided that item 4 of its agenda would be considered further at its 1984 substantive session.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1983

In 1983, the item on a nuclear-test ban was once again the lead item on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament.

In his statement before the Committee on 15 February, the Secretary-General noted that no issue in the history of nuclear arms limitation had been given more prominence and attention than that of the comprehensive test ban but, in spite of tremendous intellectual and technical efforts, including those by the Committee on Disarmament, it still remained unresolved. Recalling that his predecessors were unanimous in their strong support for a solution of the problem, which was long overdue, he urged the Committee to make every effort to reach agreement on that key question.

In their opening statements as well as during later stages of the Committee's session,¹² a large number of delegations associated themselves with the sentiments expressed by the Secretary-General. To Sweden, it appeared that no issue was blocking international disarmament as much as the absence of serious negotiations on a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons, and that the only reason for a country to refuse to negotiate such a ban seriously was its own desire to continue the testing and development of such weapons. Brazil stressed that the question of the nuclear-test ban was directly relevant to the prevention of nuclear war since, in its view, it constituted an essential step towards nuclear disarmament. Brazil

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42)*, annex VIII, sect. I, recommendation 3.

¹² *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1), appendix III (CD/421), vols. I-V.

was, however, pessimistic as to the prospects for its immediate solution, given the positions of four nuclear-weapon States.

Members of the group of 21 and the socialist States in the Committee generally reaffirmed the view that the Committee on Disarmament should proceed without further delay to negotiations on the text of a nuclear-test-ban treaty and that the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, first set up in 1982, should be broadened accordingly. Argentina felt that the efforts of a working group with a mandate so limited that there was room for doubt as to its actual usefulness were no substitute for negotiations. For many members, among them Algeria, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, India, Mexico, Mongolia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Sweden, problems of verification and compliance with a nuclear-test ban were either solved or very close to solution and should not, therefore, be used to delay negotiation of all other important aspects of a future treaty. Pakistan held that as long as verification issues were considered in isolation from the purpose and scope of a nuclear-test ban, the Working Group was destined to make little progress towards agreement on a treaty.

On the other hand, various Western and other members of the Committee, including Australia, Belgium, Italy and Japan, as well as Norway—a non-member—felt that the compromise mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, which had been agreed upon by consensus, provided a valuable area for discussion which was far from exhausted. It permitted consideration of a broad range of substantive questions which had long been stumbling blocks in the search for a comprehensive test ban and which should be clarified without further delay, they held. The United Kingdom and the United States, for instance, pointed, among other things, to the need to examine verification for the case of a total absence of nuclear explosions, including those described as peaceful, on a world-wide basis; the United States also identified two areas for further study: seismic means of verification and a régime to ensure compliance. It reiterated that while it was not at the time prepared to negotiate a treaty, it had no ulterior wish to avoid discussion of other aspects of a test ban. Therefore, it held, the mandate was sufficiently broad in all respects. Italy also felt that the 1982 mandate did not prevent the Working Group from taking up any question connected with a comprehensive test ban. Australia, while recognizing that the mandate—limited to issues of verification and compliance—had been perceived by all as only a beginning, thought that those issues required further attention. Japan also believed that unless they were given adequate consideration, the road to a truly meaningful draft treaty would be very difficult to find.

The Soviet Union noted that the question had been under discussion for nearly 30 years in various forums, with a view to arriving at an appropriate treaty, and that it and a majority of the Committee felt negotiations should be brought to the speediest possible conclusion. It considered that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group the previous year had had an exchange of views on verification and that it was regrettable that some States had argued abstractly about control. It held that the compromise

mandate had been agreed to on the understanding that it was provisional and would be reviewed in 1983. For the USSR, the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests by all States and in all environments would be a major step in the direction of lessening the nuclear threat and curbing the nuclear arms race. In order to contribute to an early solution of that problem, it was tabling for consideration by the Committee the "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests"¹³ which it had originally submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, as mentioned above, and it reviewed the highlights and main features of that proposal. The Soviet Union further reaffirmed its proposal that all nuclear-weapon States declare a moratorium on all nuclear explosions, including those conducted for peaceful purposes, pending the conclusion of a nuclear-test-ban treaty.

In his general statement to the Committee on Disarmament, Vice-President Bush of the United States noted that a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests was one of the major issues before the Committee. It also remained a long-term goal of his Government, which would continue to work towards its achievement. Referring to the work of the Group of Scientific Experts on a global monitoring system, he stressed that verification was one area, in particular, in which the United States believed greater progress had to be made in order to proceed towards a ban on nuclear tests. In that connection, he mentioned the instrumentality of the United States in forming the *Ad Hoc* Working Group in 1982, and expressed the hope that the Committee would continue its work in that area in 1983.

At an early stage France reiterated its decision not to participate in the proceedings of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group in 1983. It stated that its decision did not mean that it underestimated the importance of establishing an effective and non-discriminatory international verification system. China, also declining participation in the Group, maintained its long-standing position that if the United States and the Soviet Union took the lead in halting the testing, improvement and production of nuclear weapons and in reducing by 50 per cent all such weapons and means of delivery, it would then be prepared to assume similar obligations through negotiations with all other nuclear-weapon States and to reduce its nuclear weapons proportionally until all were destroyed.

On 29 March 1983, the Committee on Disarmament decided to re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear-Test Ban on the basis of its 1982 mandate¹⁴ and appointed Ambassador G. Herder, later succeeded by Ambassador H. Rose, both of the German Democratic Republic, as its Chairman. It also decided that the mandate might thereafter be revised by the Committee, and that it would consider that question with appropriate urgency. In that regard, the Chairman of the Committee set

¹³ *Ibid.*, appendix II (CD/421), document CD/346; the text of the "Basic provisions" is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. X, resolution 37/85, annex.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 27* (A/38/27 and Corr.1), para. 10.

5 April as the date for examination of the Working Group's mandate, which was further considered at an informal meeting of the Committee on 12 April. Thereafter, in a plenary meeting, he summarized the debates that had taken place, both formal and informal, on the issue. The Chairman stressed that it had once again become clear that while a number of delegations held the view that the existing mandate was too narrow and that its scope should be widened, others were of the opinion that the mandate had not nearly been exhausted and that a great deal of useful work could still be done under it. Consequently, he concluded that no consensus had emerged on a revision of the mandate, either by drawing on the proposal that had been tabled by the group of 21 in 1981,¹⁵ modified as suggested orally by India at the plenary meeting of the Committee on 5 April 1983, or on the basis of the new draft proposed on behalf of the group of socialist countries by Mongolia at the same meeting. While recording that conclusion, which, he stated, did not rule out further informal contacts on the issue, the Chairman noted some constructive trends which, in his view, had emerged from the consultations, in particular the acceptance of a broad interpretation of the existing mandate. He felt that such a flexible approach could open the way for a wide-ranging, substantive examination by the Working Group of most, if not all, essential and relevant issues relating to the item on the Committee's agenda. In commenting on the Chairman's conclusions, the Soviet Union stressed that no broadened interpretation of the mandate could be a substitute for broadening the mandate itself. Argentina pointed out that the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament already provided for the right of each delegation to raise any issue which it might deem relevant to the question under discussion.

Once the re-established *Ad Hoc* Working Group began its work, most of the Committee's activity on the item was carried out in the Group's closed meetings, although delegations also continued to address it in plenary meetings, often through documents submitted to and introduced in the Committee.

In particular, during the second part of the session, Sweden introduced its "Draft treaty banning any nuclear-weapon test explosion in any environment",¹⁶ which prompted several comments regarding its provisions. In the introduction, it reviewed the unsuccessful efforts over 20 years for the cessation of all testing of nuclear weapons. In that light, Sweden built upon the draft treaty it had submitted in 1977,¹⁷ taking into account developments since then, in particular, the progress achieved in

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27)*, appendix II (CD/228), document CD/181.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/421), document CD/381.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/32/27)*, annex II, document CCD/526/Rev.1; the draft treaty is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, appendix VI.

trilateral talks,¹⁸ other working papers of the Committee¹⁹ and the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts, outlined below. As to the draft treaty itself, it would be comprehensive, provide for parties to keep under consideration the question of arrangements for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and be open to all States; its verification arrangements would be ready for implementation when the treaty entered into force. Those arrangements would include the international exchange of seismological and other data, as well as international on-site inspection and certain consultative, expert and secretariat machinery. The text of the draft treaty together with its protocols is reproduced in appendix VIII below.

Czechoslovakia felt that both the Swedish initiative and the earlier Soviet document, already referred to above, were comprehensive proposals which contained common elements on a number of basic aspects of a future treaty and would permit the Committee on Disarmament to start serious drafting work; therefore, it held, the mandate of the Working Group was obviously totally inadequate and should be adjusted. To the German Democratic Republic, it also appeared that both documents envisaged similar provisions with regard to such main issues as the scope of prohibition, a solution for the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, the procedure for the entry of the treaty into force and the overall approach to verification. It was convinced that certain differences between them concerning detailed questions of verification could be overcome through negotiations. Cuba, with regard to the Swedish draft treaty, questioned the need to include references to large non-nuclear explosions or provision for a system of exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity. Australia and the Netherlands felt that the Swedish document was an imaginative attempt to encompass various proposals on the issue. They remained sceptical, however, about the prospects of regulating the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, believing they should also be banned.

The United Kingdom, in the second part of the session, stated that a comprehensive test ban which met all the necessary requirements would be an important measure of disarmament, but that it must take place within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process and take full account of the need for States to protect their security. Bearing that in mind, it submitted two working papers to the Committee:²⁰ the first on peaceful nuclear explosions in relation to a nuclear-test ban and the second on verification aspects of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27)*, appendix II (CD/139), document CD/130; see also *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. VIII.

¹⁹ In particular, *ibid.*, *Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27)*, appendix II (CD/139), document CD/95 (Australia); *ibid.*, *Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/37/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/335), document CD/312 (Netherlands); and *ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/421), document CD/346 (USSR).

²⁰ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/421), documents CD/383 and 402.

The question of the scope of such a treaty was commented upon by several delegations in connection with the first paper. In it the United Kingdom argued that since any nuclear explosive device was capable of being used as a weapon, confidence in a comprehensive treaty could only be ensured if a ban on all nuclear explosions accompanied its entry into force and it subsequently questioned whether nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes could be carried out under arrangements precluding any possibility of military benefits. The United Kingdom, for its part, stated that it would be prepared to renounce permanently the right to conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as part of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban of all nuclear explosions in all environments. The Netherlands also took that view and observed that there were few potential applications for peaceful nuclear explosions. Considering environmental and other problems, it concluded, peaceful nuclear explosions were of marginal economic value, if any.

Brazil found that position to be inconsistent with the obligations entered into under the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty, as well as under article V of the non-proliferation Treaty, by which potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States parties. It also found it to be inconsistent with the progress reported in the trilateral negotiations in 1980 and with the terms of the unratified bilateral Treaty of 1976 on peaceful nuclear explosions. In Brazil's view, that reflected a continuing discriminatory approach which must be changed, in a manner consistent with the obligations of the nuclear Powers, to one of willingness to negotiate seriously and multilaterally with regard to the nuclear-test ban. Later, the Soviet Union stated that the United Kingdom's document indicated that since the suspension of the trilateral talks in 1980, the Western participants therein had changed their position in respect of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (which, it had been agreed, would be dealt with in a protocol), seismic verification (which, it had been agreed, could be worked out in detail by experts), and on-site inspections (which, it had been agreed in principle, could be on a voluntary basis). The USSR, for its part, was convinced that progress depended on widening the areas of agreement rather than raising additional problems. Moreover, it continued to attach great importance—albeit secondary by comparison with the goal of the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests—to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and was convinced also that an appropriate régime for their conduct could be worked out after the conclusion of the prospective treaty.

In its reply to such statements, the United Kingdom, stressing that a great deal of work was required if remaining differences were to be overcome, felt that the question was not whether nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be addressed in a treaty, but how; in that light it did not see any inconsistencies in its approach and that set out in the trilateral report, which had also called for a separate protocol to preclude military benefits. It emphasized that a satisfactory solution of that issue was crucial to the success of any nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Another question that gave rise to a substantive debate in the Committee was the verification system of a future nuclear-test ban. In addition to the United Kingdom, several members, among them Australia, Japan, Norway and Sweden, submitted working papers²¹ dealing with various aspects of that question. The United Kingdom felt that there would be an unacceptable risk in a test-ban treaty which did not provide adequate assurance against non-compliance. It argued that currently available verification means left gaps which might make it possible to conduct underground nuclear-weapon-test explosions at yields up to some tens of kilotons without detection. Commenting on that argument, the Soviet Union maintained that currently available seismic means of detection and identification—as indeed those which had existed even 10 to 20 years before—were quite sufficient to provide adequate assurance of compliance with a treaty, in combination with other verification procedures, such as on-site inspections on a voluntary basis, which had earlier been agreed to in principle. With reference to the questions raised in both of the United Kingdom's documents, it stressed that they were not new and, as the tripartite negotiations had shown, could be solved on a mutually acceptable basis if there were a sincere desire for and interest in the conclusion of a treaty. The other papers dealt with such areas as institutional arrangements, seismic exchanges and airborne radioactivity.

On separate occasions during the session, on the basis of its meetings of 7 to 18 February and 11 to 22 July, the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, consisting of experts from 20 countries and a representative from the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), submitted its fifteenth and sixteenth progress reports.²² Dr. Ola Dahlman, the new Chairman of the Group, in introducing the later report, stated that although significant progress had been made towards reaching a consensus on the draft text of its third and final report to the Committee on Disarmament, the Group needed one more meeting in 1984 to complete its work, particularly with regard to the detailed technical instructions which would be annexed to the report. He further informed the Committee of the preparations being made for a new experimental exercise to be held in 1984 on the exchange and analysis of seismological data through the Global Telecommunication System of WMO.

A number of States, including Australia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the USSR and the United States, commented on the reports of the *Ad Hoc* Group, generally expressing appreciation for its work. Australia felt that there was much that the Group could do in further refining operating procedures and techniques in anticipation of the day when negotiations on a comprehensive test ban commenced. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, while

²¹ *Ibid.*, appendix II (CD/421), documents CD/384 and CD/400 (Australia); CD/388, CD/389 and CD/390 (Japan); CD/395 (Norway); and CD/403 (Sweden).

²² *Ibid.*, documents CD/348 and CD/399.

attaching great importance to the work of the Group, emphasized that its future activity should be solely in the context of actual negotiations on a treaty, since otherwise that activity would mislead world public opinion as to the true situation in the Committee on Disarmament on the issue. At its plenary meetings on 12 April and 2 August respectively, the Committee adopted the recommendations contained in the Group's progress reports concerning its future sessions.

As indicated above, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear-Test Ban met throughout the Committee's session under its 1982 mandate. On 29 April, it adopted its programme of work which provided for the examination of all aspects of a comprehensive test-ban treaty relevant to the issues of verification and compliance, in conformity with the provisions of paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and enumerated specific topics for discussion, within the mandate, as follows:

1. Requirements and elements of verification
2. Means of verification, *inter alia*:
 - (a) national technical means
 - (b) international exchange of seismic data
3. Procedures and mechanisms for consultation and co-operation
4. Committee of Experts
5. Procedures for complaints
6. On-site inspection

It agreed to draw upon existing proposals, prior experience and the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts. The Working Group held 17 meetings between 8 April and 16 August.

Following the conclusion of its work, the Group submitted its report to the Committee.²³ It reported, *inter alia*, that differences of opinion persisted with regard to the scope of a nuclear-test ban, particularly in respect of the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes; the positions taken were essentially the same as those voiced in plenary meetings. The Group further registered a general recognition that the participation of all nuclear-weapon States was important in order to achieve an effective nuclear-test-ban treaty, although some delegations, in the interest of achieving early agreement, felt that it could come into force with the adherence by the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The report also affirmed that the Group had conducted an examination of the substance of all the items set out in its programme of work and had identified the areas of agreement, as well as of continuing disagreement, with respect of the various elements and means of a verification system for a nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The Working Group was not able to make a consensus recommendation regarding the subsequent course of action which the Committee

²³ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1), paras. 27-32.

on Disarmament should take on the item owing to the continuing disagreement as to whether the mandate of the Group had been fulfilled and thus needed revision to enable negotiations to commence. In conclusion, the Group reported that a large number of delegations had requested that the question of the mandate be taken up by the Committee at the beginning of its 1984 session. At its plenary meeting on 23 August, the Committee on Disarmament adopted the report of the Group.

In plenary meetings at the end of the session, Australia and Pakistan expressed support of the view that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group should be accorded a negotiating mandate in 1984, while the United Kingdom and the United States felt that many difficulties had yet to be overcome and that forced consideration of the mandate hindered progress on substantive matters.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

At the thirty-eighth session, over 50 Member States addressed the issue of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests in their statements in plenary meetings and in the First Committee.²⁴

Noting the twentieth anniversary of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, many among them, including Austria, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Ireland, Madagascar, Nepal, New Zealand, Qatar, Sweden, Venezuela and Zambia, expressed regret over what they saw as the failure of nuclear-weapon States parties to honour the undertaking contained in the preamble of that Treaty, to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. Austria observed that in spite of the tremendous efforts expended on the subject, the prospects for its solution had become even gloomier because the debate, in particular in recent years, had disclosed the fundamental obstacle to progress: the unwillingness of some nuclear-weapon States to relinquish nuclear-test explosions as a means of enhancing the effectiveness of their nuclear arsenals. To Brazil it appeared that the continual testing of nuclear weapons was incompatible with the above-mentioned undertaking of the original parties to the Treaty, and that the reported position of the United States called for clarification to ascertain whether it amounted to an implicit denunciation of the Treaty.

Critical remarks were also addressed to nuclear-weapon States parties with regard to their commitment under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968. Sweden held that without a nuclear-test ban, the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons was increasing day by day. It further argued that, having neglected their obligations, nuclear-weapon States could not expect universal accession to that Treaty. Pakistan contended that a comprehensive test ban was the essential first step towards progress in nuclear disarmament, and making it into a long-

²⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 40th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

term goal would have negative effects on both vertical and horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

A number of countries voiced frustration over the continuing impasse on the issue in the Committee on Disarmament. Eastern European and some other States held that the lack of progress was due to the attitude of some Western countries, particularly two nuclear-weapon States. Czechoslovakia stated that proof of the political nature of their position was reflected in those countries' negative approach to the basic provisions of a treaty the Soviet Union had submitted the previous year, which had codified understanding reached trilaterally. Argentina deplored that the question of a nuclear-test ban was no longer a priority issue for one of the main and essential protagonists. That view had trapped the Committee on Disarmament with a Working Group with a limited mandate. The USSR held that the United States position indicated that the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests as an arms limitation measure had fallen victim to its new nuclear-weapon programmes. At the same time, the USSR proposed a moratorium on all nuclear explosions pending the conclusion of a treaty, and reaffirmed its readiness to give effect to the bilateral Treaties limiting underground nuclear-weapon tests and underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, provided the United States would do likewise.

Speaking on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community, Greece reiterated their support for the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session with regard to the complete cessation of nuclear tests. A number of Western and other States drew particular attention to the question of verification of such a ban. The United States said that it was continuing to seek ways to verify nuclear-testing limitations effectively. The Netherlands attached great importance to the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive treaty which would encompass so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, and was convinced that while a number of problems, technical as well as organizational, remained to be solved, adequate verification of such a ban was feasible. It appealed to all delegations involved in the deliberations in the Committee on Disarmament to approach the remaining problems in a positive and realistic frame of mind. In view of the current level of technological sophistication, Japan regarded the questions of verification and compliance as central to a comprehensive test ban in the 1980s, and hoped the Committee would continue to consider those issues seriously in order to narrow the differences between member States. Although Egypt regarded verification and control as important, it agreed with the view of the group of 21 in the Committee on Disarmament that current means were sufficient, and it was political decision that was lacking.

For a number of countries, one of the major prerequisites for achieving a nuclear-test-ban treaty was a solution of the problem of its scope. In addition to the Netherlands, New Zealand and Turkey maintained that any future treaty should ban all types of nuclear explosions, including those conducted for peaceful purposes. Brazil, however, held that by raising that question as an obstacle to the achievement of an

effective test ban, the United States, the United Kingdom and some of their allies were, in fact, insisting on discussing the non-existent, while ignoring the ongoing testing of nuclear weapons.

A number of States, among them Egypt, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uganda and Zambia, emphasized their belief that China and France should join the efforts in the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate a nuclear-test-ban treaty. For Egypt, it seemed absurd to reach agreement on such a treaty without the participation and approval of all nuclear-weapon States. Nigeria could not envisage the conclusion of a treaty that failed to win the concurrence and commitment of all the nuclear-weapon States.

China reiterated its proposal to the effect that after the Soviet Union and the United States had agreed to stop testing, improving and manufacturing nuclear weapons and agreed to reduce them by half, a widely representative international conference should be convened with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States to negotiate the general reduction of nuclear weapons.

In addressing the Assembly, President Mitterrand of France stated that his country was concerned about the controversies over its tests and announced that it had decided to open its underground nuclear-test sites to a fact-finding visit of scientific personages from the South Pacific region; he hoped that that example would be followed by other nuclear-weapon States. New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Samoa, while generally welcoming that decision, expressed anew their deep concern over continued testing of nuclear weapons in that region, while Chile, Fiji and Solomon Islands emphasized their firm opposition to such testing on the grounds of its adverse effects on the regional flora, fauna and economy.

On 11 November, three draft resolutions were submitted to the First Committee under the agenda items entitled "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons", "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty" and "Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests".

On 15 November, Mexico introduced the first draft resolution, which was also sponsored by Bangladesh, Ecuador, Kenya, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Sweden, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia and, subsequently, by Colombia, Costa Rica, Indonesia and Mali. Mexico, on behalf of the sponsors, observed that the draft text reflected that of the previous year's resolution 37/72, and added that the three States which were the depositaries of the non-proliferation Treaty held the future of that Treaty largely in their hands by virtue of their commitment under article VI. The sponsors wished them to realize that a comprehensive test ban would contribute not only to the cessation of the arms race, but also to the strengthening of the non-proliferation Treaty. Accordingly, in its preambular part the draft resolution recalled the commitments made by the three nuclear-weapon States in the partial test-ban and the non-proliferation Treaties, referred to the negative influence that the lack of compliance with those undertakings had had on both the first and the

second Review Conferences on the non-proliferation Treaty, and expressed the conviction that the maintenance of such a situation would not augur well for the Third Review Conference, in 1985. By the operative part of the text, the Assembly would request immediate initiation of the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests in the renamed Conference on Disarmament. The sponsors were optimistic, Mexico stated, that that task would be facilitated by the fact that the negotiating body had received some concrete proposals.

On 22 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 100 to 2 (United Kingdom and United States), with 28 abstentions.

In explanation of its negative vote, the United Kingdom stated that the draft resolution referred only to nuclear-weapon tests and avoided the issue of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in the context of a comprehensive test ban; the draft also proposed a moratorium, which the United Kingdom had consistently rejected.

In explaining their abstentions, New Zealand and Samoa stated that they could not accept that the draft was limited to the prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons, and New Zealand further objected to the call for a moratorium limited to the three original parties to the partial test-ban. Argentina, Brazil, India and Zambia explained their abstentions on the grounds of the linkage established in the draft between a test-ban treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Among the States which explained affirmative votes, Fiji had a reservation because the draft was limited to weapon tests, but decided to vote for it because of its policy of general support for such initiatives. Algeria similarly voted for the proposal because it reflected many of its concerns, despite some reservations it had. The Soviet Union stated that it would vote in favour of the draft resolution because it wished to share in the appeal it contained for an immediate initiation of negotiations on a nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Soviet Union also noted that it was willing to examine proposals submitted by other States on the subject and that it had proposed a moratorium on nuclear tests until the conclusion of agreement. Mongolia, in explaining its support of the draft, stated that it regarded its paragraph 5 (see below) as particularly important; it was also concerned because all the nuclear Powers were not represented in the subsidiary body of the negotiating Committee. Cuba stated that its affirmative vote on the draft should not be interpreted as a change in its position with respect to the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty. Ireland, also voting affirmatively, agreed with the general thrust of the text but would not draw the conclusions contained in its paragraph 3.

The second draft resolution was sponsored by Australia, the Bahamas, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, Japan, Kenya, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sweden and Uruguay, and subsequently also by Colombia, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain and Thailand. In introducing the proposal on 11 November, New Zealand, after recalling

the commitment undertaken 20 years before by the three Powers that then possessed nuclear weapons to continue negotiations with a view to putting an end to all nuclear tests in all environments, observed that nuclear testing had shown no sign of ending. In the view of the sponsors, the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would show more clearly than anything else that the nuclear Powers were committed to ending the arms race and to reducing their nuclear stockpiles, as well as to preventing other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. From a substantive point of view, there were two main problems to be resolved before a treaty could be concluded—scope and verification. Regarding scope, the sponsors sought a ban on all nuclear explosions since, they believed, any nuclear explosive device could be used for warlike purposes. Moreover, there was doubt whether such devices could be used effectively for any non-military purpose. As to the question of verification, it was generally accepted that an effective system of verification was an essential requirement for a test-ban treaty, but the question was what constituted such a system. As there were means of detecting all but relatively small nuclear explosions, the risk of some undetected tests must be weighed against the greater ones involved in continued testing. Whichever view was accepted, the verification problem had to be resolved before such a treaty could be concluded. New Zealand further noted that although the draft might not fully satisfy every Member, it respected the autonomous nature of the Committee on Disarmament while covering the central problems and, in the sponsors' view, represented the highest level of agreement that could be reached at the time.

On 22 November, the Committee adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 99 to none, with 31 abstentions.

In explanation of their positions, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia and the Soviet Union stated that their abstentions on the draft were because it did not provide for practical negotiations on the issue. The German Democratic Republic found paragraph 6 (a) (see below) to be insufficient, and the USSR particularly objected to that paragraph and 6 (c) as well. India objected to paragraph 6 (c) as being unnecessary, and held that by including such issues the draft resolution would impede progress in the Committee on Disarmament. In its view, the first step to progress on a treaty would be to revise the mandate of the *Ad Hoc Working Group* so that it could start negotiations. Argentina abstained because, while supporting the banning of weapon tests, it disagreed with limiting the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and found the scope of a treaty envisaged in the draft to be too general.

Brazil, which voted in favour, stated that it had had in mind particularly the procedural recommendations contained in its operative paragraphs, especially paragraph 6, which, it believed, showed a positive trend towards starting negotiations; its affirmative vote was not to be taken as an endorsement of the paragraphs dealing with the future scope of a test-ban treaty. Indonesia also voted in favour, although it felt that by merely requesting the Committee on Disarmament to resume its examination of the issues with a view to negotiations, the draft fell short

of expectations. In its opinion, the Committee should be requested to embark on serious negotiations immediately. Ireland, while voting in favour, regretted that the text did not convey a greater sense of urgency.

On 15 November, Hungary introduced the third draft resolution, which was also sponsored by Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR and Viet Nam. In its introduction, Hungary pointed out that, in the view of the sponsors, the immediate cessation and prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests would be a major step in advancing international efforts to prevent nuclear war and halt the nuclear arms race. Despite the fact that endless meetings of various forums had addressed the problem without success, Hungary felt that the draft treaties submitted by the Soviet Union and Sweden had brought the international community closer to concluding an agreement. The sponsors believed that the work done by the Committee on Disarmament provided sufficient material for proceeding without further delay with the negotiation of a nuclear-weapon-test ban. Based on those main assumptions, the draft resolution would urge all States to exert every effort towards the speediest elaboration of a multilateral treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests by all States, and would urge the Conference on Disarmament to proceed promptly to negotiations, with a view to formulating such a treaty, taking into account all existing drafts and proposals and future initiatives, and for that purpose to assign to its subsidiary body a negotiating mandate under an appropriate item of its agenda.

On 22 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 98 to 4 (China, France, United Kingdom and United States), with 26 abstentions.

In explanation of vote, the United Kingdom stated that its negative position was because the draft referred only to nuclear-weapon tests, avoiding the issue of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, on which there were fundamental differences to be resolved. New Zealand, for that reason and because the draft contained nothing about the essential need for verification, abstained. Samoa abstained because of its established view that a test ban should be general and complete.

Ireland, voting affirmatively, stated that it had done so with some hesitation in view of the proposal's restrictive nature. Argentina stated that it supported the text because it referred satisfactorily to the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Explaining its position on all three draft resolutions discussed above, France held that any test ban should be placed within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process. It could not, therefore, associate itself with such proposals until the two main nuclear Powers, by the reduction of their arsenals, had created conditions that would, in turn, permit it to enter into commitments, including commitments on testing. It could not support any of the draft resolutions because they would attempt to involve France in the elaboration of a test-ban treaty in the absence of such conditions.

The General Assembly, at its 97th plenary meeting, on 15 December, voted on the draft resolution entitled "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons" (introduced by Mexico). It was adopted as resolution 38/62 by a recorded vote of 119 to 2, with 26 abstentions. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, which has been examined for more than twenty-five years and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than forty resolutions, is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to the attainment of which it has repeatedly assigned the highest priority,

Stressing that on seven different occasions it has condemned such tests in the strongest terms and that, since 1974, it has stated its conviction that the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war,

Reiterating the assertion made in several previous resolutions that, whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban,

Recalling that since 1972 the Secretary-General has declared that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement, that when the existing means of verification are taken into account it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground-test ban, and that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear-weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests,

Taking into account that the three nuclear-weapon States which act as depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water undertook in that Treaty, twenty years ago, to seek the achievement of the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and that such an undertaking was explicitly reiterated in 1968 in the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, article VI of which further embodies their solemn and legally binding commitment to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,

Bearing in mind the growing negative influence that the total lack of compliance with those undertakings had on both the first and the second Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held at Geneva from 5 to 30 May 1975 and from 11 August to 7 September 1980, respectively,

Convinced that the maintenance of such a situation would not augur well for the third review conference of that Treaty, which is to take place in 1985, and even for the future of the Treaty itself,

Deploring that, due to the persistent obstruction of a very small number of its members, the Committee on Disarmament—which henceforth will be designated as the Conference on Disarmament—has been unable to initiate multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, as it was specifically requested to do in General Assembly resolution 37/72 of 9 December 1982,

Noting that the Conference on Disarmament has already received various concrete proposals on this question, including a complete draft for the eventual text of the treaty as a whole,

1. *Reiterates once again its grave concern* that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated, against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States;

2. *Reaffirms its conviction* that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority;

3. *Reaffirms also its conviction* that such a treaty would constitute a contribution of the utmost importance to the cessation of the arms race and an indispensable element for the success of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, since it is only through the fulfilment of the obligations under the Treaty that its three depositary Powers may expect all other parties to comply likewise with their respective obligations;

4. *Urges once more* the three depositary Powers of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to abide strictly by their undertakings to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end;

5. *Urges also* all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and, meanwhile, to refrain from testing in the environments covered by that Treaty;

6. *Reiterates its appeal* to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament to initiate immediately the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests and to exert their best endeavours in order that the Conference may transmit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session the complete draft of such a treaty;

7. *Calls upon* the States depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by virtue of their special responsibilities under those two Treaties and as a provisional measure, to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons".

At the same meeting, the General Assembly also adopted the draft resolution entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty" (introduced by New Zealand), by a recorded vote of 117 to none, with 29 abstentions, as resolution 38/63, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Convinced of the urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty capable of attracting the widest possible international support and adherence,

Reaffirming its conviction that an end to nuclear-weapon testing by all States in all environments would be a major step towards ending the qualitative improvement, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, a means of relieving the deep apprehension concerning the harmful consequences of radioactive contamination for the health of present and future generations and a measure of the utmost importance in bringing the nuclear-arms race to an end,

Recalling that the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water undertook not to carry out any nuclear-weapon-test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, in the environments covered by that Treaty, and that in that Treaty and in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons the parties expressed their determination to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,

Recalling also its previous resolutions on this subject,

Taking into account that part of the report of the Committee on Disarmament concerning consideration of the item entitled "Nuclear-test ban" during its session in 1983,

Noting, in particular, that Sweden submitted to the Committee on Disarmament a draft treaty banning any nuclear-weapon-test explosion in any environment which took into account both the report on the trilateral negotiations submitted to the Committee in 1980 and the basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1982,

Recognizing the important role of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty,

Recognizing the importance to such a treaty of the work assigned by the Committee on Disarmament to the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events on a global network of stations for the exchange of seismological data,

Recalling paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, relating to verification of disarmament and arms control agreements, which stated that the form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend on, and should be determined by, the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement,

1. *Reiterates its profound concern* that, despite the express wishes of the majority of Member States, nuclear-weapon testing continues;

2. *Reaffirms its conviction* that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the greatest importance;

3. *Expresses the conviction* that such a treaty would constitute a vital element for the success of efforts to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race and the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, and to prevent the expansion of existing nuclear arsenals and the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries;

4. *Notes* that the Committee on Disarmament, in the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, re-established at its session in 1983 an *Ad Hoc Working Group* under item 1 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear-test ban", and that the *Ad Hoc Working Group* considered the issues under its mandate;

5. *Also notes* that the Committee on Disarmament agreed that the mandate of the *Ad Hoc Working Group* on a Nuclear-Test Ban may thereafter be revised as decided by the Committee, which will consider this question with appropriate urgency, and that the Committee discussed the matter;

6. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament:

(a) To resume its examination of issues relating to a comprehensive test ban, with a view to the negotiation of a treaty on the subject and, in accordance with that part of the report of the Committee concerning this item, to take up the question of a revised mandate for the *Ad Hoc Working Group* during its 1984 session;

(b) To determine, in the context of its negotiations on such a treaty, the institutional and administrative arrangements necessary for establishing, testing and operating an international seismic monitoring network as part of an effective verification system;

(c) To initiate investigation of other international measures to improve verification arrangements under such a treaty, including an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity;

7. *Urges* all members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to co-operate with the Conference in fulfilling these tasks;

8. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to report on progress to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty".

Finally, at the same meeting, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution entitled "Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" (introduced by Hungary), by a recorded vote of 118 to 4, with 24 abstentions, as resolution 38/72. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned over the continuing nuclear-arms race and the growing danger of nuclear war,

Convinced that the conclusion of a multilateral treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests by all States would constitute a vital element for the success of efforts to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race and the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, and to prevent the expansion of existing nuclear arsenals and the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries,

Convinced also that the elaboration of such a treaty is a task of the highest priority and

should not be made dependent on the attainment of any other measure in the field of disarmament,

Deploing that the Committee on Disarmament has to date been unable to carry out negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on such a treaty,

Recalling its previous resolutions on this subject,

1. *Urges* all States to exert every effort for the speediest elaboration of a multilateral treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests by all States;

2. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to proceed promptly to negotiations with a view to elaborating such a treaty as a matter of the highest priority, taking into account all existing drafts and proposals and future initiatives, and for that purpose to assign to its subsidiary body a negotiating mandate under an appropriate item of its agenda;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 38/72 on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests".

Conclusion

In 1983, no progress was made towards the solution of the question of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. On the contrary, in the view of many States, the debate disclosed that some major Powers were not ready in the current situation to relinquish nuclear-test explosions as a means of enhancing the effectiveness of their nuclear arsenals.

Despite a number of concrete proposals submitted during the year in the Committee on Disarmament, and the continued activities of the Committee's *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear-Test Ban and the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, no approach towards compromise or a consensus solution of the outstanding issues developed. The view was held by a large number of States, both in the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly, that a major obstacle to progress was the continued refusal of two nuclear-weapon States, supported by some other countries, to accede to change in the mandate of the Committee's Working Group to enable it to commence actual multilateral negotiations on the formulation of a treaty. On the other hand, the States resisting such a change in the mandate held that the current one was far from exhausted and, moreover, that it embraced the major outstanding issues, including verification and control and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which had to be resolved before such negotiations could be constructively undertaken.

Frustration over the deadlock gave rise in the Assembly, among other things, to a linkage being established in resolution 38/62 between a nuclear-test ban and the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It appeared, however, from several statements as well as from the voting pattern, that that move caused certain misgivings, even for some States favouring the conclusion of an agreement on an urgent basis.

Given the positions on the issue as the year ended, it seemed unlikely that there would be any early major breakthrough towards solution of the question.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Introduction

THE REALIZATION THAT GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT, as the ultimate objective of disarmament efforts, is likely to be unattainable in the near future has generated interest in partial disarmament measures in the United Nations and in a number of States and regions. Among these measures, the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones was launched as a means of halting the spread of nuclear weapons.¹ It is believed that the absence of nuclear weapons from a particular region would spare the countries concerned from the threat of nuclear attack or involvement in nuclear war and contribute to the achievement of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones has been considered an effective means of assuring the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons, thus enhancing their security. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly² reaffirmed this belief by stating that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constituted an important disarmament measure, and that the process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.

Since 1957, many proposals have been made for nuclear-weapon-free zones, but until now only one such zone has been established, that is, the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America. The efforts made in this direction could be classified in four categories: (a) treaties prohibiting nuclear weapons in certain geographical areas; (b) treaties prohibiting nuclear weapons in certain environments; (c) declarations proclaiming certain regions or continents denuclearized; and (d) studies on the question of the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The Antarctic Treaty³ of 1959 belongs to the first category: it ensured the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and prohibited

¹ For details, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 15, and *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), chap. V.

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 60 and 61.

³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402, No. 5778, p. 71.

any nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material there. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)⁴ of 1967 established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone within a populated area.

Treaties belonging to the second category have excluded nuclear weapons from such environments as outer space (Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies), the sea-bed and the ocean floor (Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof) and the Moon (Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies).⁵ An example of the third category is the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa of 1964. Falling under the fourth category is the comprehensive study on nuclear-weapon-free zones that was carried out by an *ad hoc* group of governmental experts in 1975 and transmitted to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.⁶ In 1982, the General Assembly created a new *ad hoc* group to review and supplement the 1975 study.

At its thirty-seventh session, as at other recent sessions, the Assembly had four agenda items on the subject entitled: (a) "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 36/83 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America", (b) "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa", (c) "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East" and (d) "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia". As in previous years, the subject was also considered to some extent during the sessions of the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1983

The question of nuclear-weapon-free zones was taken up by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1983 substantive session in connection with three agenda items.⁷

Among the measures suggested under agenda item 4 on the elimination of the danger of nuclear war, several delegations, including Egypt, Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia, mentioned the creation of nuclear-

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 281.

⁵ For the texts of the treaties, see resolution 2222 (XXI), annex (outer space Treaty); resolution 2660 (XXV), annex (sea-bed Treaty); and resolution 34/68, annex (Moon Treaty). The texts are reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

⁶ *Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.1.7). The study was initially transmitted to the General Assembly as document A/10027/Add.1.

⁷ For the records of the debate, see A/CN.10/PV.66-70 and A/CN.10/PV.65-72/Corrigendum.

weapon-free zones in different parts of the world as important regional arrangements. Some delegations referred to specific regions. The German Democratic Republic and Mexico spoke in favour of the creation of a zone free of nuclear battlefield weapons in Central Europe. Egypt recalled its 1977 proposal concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, while Bulgaria referred to its initiative on making the Balkans a nuclear-weapon-free zone. During its speech on agenda item 4, Argentina referred to the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone and stressed that the United Kingdom was responsible for the introduction of nuclear weapons into it, an act which Argentina regarded as a violation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The United Kingdom replied that its actions were not inconsistent with its obligations under the Treaty, to which Argentina was not a party.

The Contact Group established to consider item 4 was unable to achieve consensus on a set of recommendations. The result of its work was a document entitled "Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4", which was eventually annexed to the Commission's report. One of its 22 recommendations reads as follows:

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world on the basis of agreements and/or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned should be encouraged, with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. Those agreements or arrangements should be fully complied with and the effective respect for the status of such zones by nuclear-weapon States should be subject to adequate verification procedures, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons.⁸

Due to the lack of consensus, the Contact Group recommended that consideration of the item be continued at the 1984 substantive session with a view to formulating concrete recommendations on it.

As in the previous year, the Commission decided, in 1983, to establish a working group to deal with agenda item 6, the question of South Africa's nuclear capability, as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 37/74 B. During the plenary discussion on the item, some 20 delegations expressed their views. In the Working Group, a text submitted by the African Group was the basis for discussion. However, the consultations conducted by the Chairman revealed divergent positions regarding, *inter alia*, the legal and political interpretation to be placed on South Africa's actions and policy, in particular its policy of *apartheid*, the verification of its nuclear capability and its eligibility for access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In the absence of a consensus text or recommendations, the Working Group agreed that two working papers, one submitted by Mauritius on behalf of the African States members of the Disarmament Commission and the other submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, should be annexed to its report (the first-mentioned paper in both its original and revised versions), and be

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42)*, annex VIII, recommendation 11.

taken as a basis for discussion at the following session of the Disarmament Commission.⁹

The Commission also established a working group to deal with item 7, the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (ICDSI), also known as the Palme Commission, entitled "Common Security"¹⁰ and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 37/99 B. During the examination of the proposals and recommendations of the ICDSI report, differing views were expressed in the Working Group as regards the principles, proposals and recommendations contained in the report. During the plenary discussion, Mexico suggested that the Commission give priority to the proposal outlined by ICDSI for the establishment of a tactical or battlefield nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe. In a working paper, Mexico recommended that the Commission endorse that proposal and that provisions on geographical delimitation, verification machinery and other relevant points for the treaty or convention to be concluded should be negotiated without delay between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.¹¹ That proposal was supported by a number of delegations, including the German Democratic Republic,¹² whereas other delegations voiced their objections to it on various grounds. In an official reaction to the proposal, quoted in a working document, the Federal Republic of Germany stated that the proposal was unacceptable since, in view of the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Europe, such a zone would actually increase the risk of confrontation.¹³

On the recommendation of the Working Group, the Disarmament Commission noted that in many cases the proposals of ICDSI dealt with efforts under way in the Commission itself, and recommended that the report be duly taken into account in ongoing and future disarmament efforts.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1983

During the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament, the question of the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world received considerable attention from a number of delegations. As the subject was not considered as a separate item, statements were made in the context of the items on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It was also mentioned, although to a lesser degree, in

⁹ *Ibid.*, annexes XIV-XVI.

¹⁰ A/CN.10/38.

¹¹ A/CN.10/47.

¹² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42)*, annex I.

¹³ *Ibid.*, annex II.

statements on some other topics, such as chemical weapons and the comprehensive programme of disarmament.¹⁴

On the whole, two kinds of statements were made in the Committee on Disarmament on the subject: one expressing general support for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a partial disarmament measure on a regional level, and the other expressing support for the creation of such zones in specific regions.

States expressing general support stressed the increased interest in the concept and the importance and urgency of establishing denuclearized zones. One of the factors contributing to the urgency of the matter, according to Romania, was the acceleration of the arms race in the sphere of tactical and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, together with a shift in strategic thinking towards consideration of the limited use of nuclear weapons.

Some delegations, including Romania and Yugoslavia, supported the establishment of such zones as one of the measures which could be reached through regional disarmament efforts. In that context, Indonesia referred to paragraph 31 of the Political Declaration of the Seventh Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries,¹⁵ by which they affirmed that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.

Other delegations, among them Egypt, Finland and Romania, supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a realistic means available to non-nuclear-weapon States of safeguarding their interests against the nuclear threat. Romania also expressed its view on certain basic requirements that agreements for the establishment of such zones should meet, including the following: (a) they should provide for equal security assurances for all the countries of the zone on the basis of a solemn undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them and to respect the denuclearized zone status; (b) they should not restrict the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in any way but should, on the contrary, guarantee all States, on an equal footing and without discrimination, unlimited rights and possibilities as regards research in that sphere and the use of the achievements of nuclear science for their development; (c) they should provide for a clear and fair system of verification, based on the principle of the equality of States; and (d) such zones should be seen as an integral part of a coherent system of measures designed to lead to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

¹⁴ See *ibid.*, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1), paras. 33-73, 74-76, 77-80 and 87-88, respectively. For a record of the debate, see *ibid.*, appendix III (CD/421), vols. I-V.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, appendix II (CD/421), vol. II, document CD/354. The complete text of the final documents of the Conference was circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council under the symbol A/38/132-S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2.

Some Latin American States expressed their views on the usefulness of creating nuclear-weapon-free zones as a regional disarmament measure but, at the same time, some doubts on the adequacy of the guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States belonging to such zones against the use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. Argentina recalled reports in the international press that there had been nuclear weapons aboard ships of the United Kingdom's fleet sent to the South Atlantic in 1982 which, in its opinion, necessitated serious reflection on the real validity and significance of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In such a case, Argentina questioned the value of negative security assurances, even if they had been in full force and embodied in a legally binding international instrument. It concluded that the only alternative to what it considered as inequality between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States would be the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of all States.

Several delegations, including Mexico, Romania and Yugoslavia, supported the Swedish proposal for the creation of a battlefield nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe as a confidence-building measure which would contribute to the security of Europe. While supporting fully the Swedish proposal, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Poland advocated enlarging the zone to include a wider geographical area. On the other hand, the Federal Republic of Germany expressed doubts concerning current proposals for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It held that they did not meet, or did not meet fully, the conditions spelled out in the Final Document which, in its opinion, limited its recommendations for the establishment of such zones to whole regions. The Federal Republic of Germany further pointed out that the decisive question was whether or not nuclear weapons were targeted at a particular territory, not where they were stationed. In its view, negotiations which would lead only to a limited geographical disengagement of nuclear arsenals in Europe would not enhance stability, but merely create an illusion of greater security.

Several States expressed their support for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions. Some of them, including Cuba, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia, supported the establishment of such a zone in Northern Europe. Finland pointed out its long-time interest in the concept, expressed in both the global context, by initiating expert studies within the United Nations, and the regional context, by putting forward as early as 1963 the proposal for the creation of a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone to consolidate permanently, through international arrangements, the nuclear-weapon-free status of the Nordic region.

The delegations of Bulgaria and Romania, fully supported by Cuba, Hungary and Yugoslavia, reiterated initiatives for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Balkans. Indonesia said that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia would enhance the effectiveness of the zone of peace, freedom and neutrality

declared by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1971.

During the discussion on security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States, Kenya expressed its support for the denuclearization of Africa as an important element for its security, but at the same time voiced its concern at the military buildup in South Africa, with the full co-operation, including nuclear collaboration, of certain great Powers. Ethiopia stressed the urgency of keeping Africa free from nuclear weapons, in view of the growing international concern that South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability was posing grave danger, not only to the security of African States, but also to international peace and security in general.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

In 1983,¹⁶ as at several previous sessions, the Assembly had four items on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones on its agenda entitled: (a) "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 37/71 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)", (b) "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa", (c) "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East" and (d) "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia". In addition, in the context of the zone in the Middle East, a separate item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament" was considered.

In the general debate at the thirty-eighth session, a large number of States expressed their support for the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the specific proposals for establishment of such zones, especially in regions of their particular concern. In addition to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in areas which have been discussed for years in the United Nations, a number of delegations made references to the idea of creating zones in some other parts of the world, such as Northern Europe, the Balkans, the Pacific Ocean and Central Europe.

In the First Committee many delegations reiterated their support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in specific regions. A number of them saw the Treaty of Tlatelolco as a model for the realization of similar proposals in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and possibly other regions. Some of them dealt with the principles on which the creation of the zones should be based, while others expressed some doubts about their usefulness.

In the existing international situation, there were two facts which Argentina considered to be directly related to the question: an intensification of the initiatives to establish denuclearized zones in various parts of the world and, secondly, an alarming geographical proliferation of nu-

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd, 52nd, 83rd, 97th and 103rd meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 38th, 41st, 49th and 51st meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

clear weapons. Thus, there was a great need to continue to work on the basic characteristics that a nuclear-weapon-free zone should possess in order for it to create genuine security for countries which had renounced nuclear weapons. Argentina further elaborated on the implications of its conflict with the United Kingdom over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, *inter alia*, the conclusions that might be drawn from that experience for denuclearized zones and for the prevention of nuclear war. It recalled resolution 170 (VIII) of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), in which it expressed concern because of "the introduction of nuclear weapons, on the part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in areas included in the geographical zone defined by paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco". According to Argentina, experience in the South Atlantic showed that the nuclear Powers continued to have full freedom of action and that the introduction of nuclear weapons was an ever-present possibility. It believed that a solution should be sought in a further detailed study of the subject, especially with regard to the verifiable guarantees to which countries which undertook a nuclear-weapon-free status were entitled.

In its reply to Argentina, the United Kingdom said it gave full support to the Treaty of Tlatelolco to which, it pointed out, Argentina had failed to become a party. It also said it had been the practice of the British Government (and of other nuclear-weapon States) neither to confirm nor to deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons in a particular place at a particular time, but claimed it had observed its obligations under Protocols I and II of the Treaty.

Brazil stressed that adequate verification procedures to ensure that the nuclear-weapon Powers complied with their obligations regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones should be recognized as one of the essential prerequisites for their establishment. It also emphasized the urgent need for an effective mechanism to ensure that nuclear-weapon Powers did not violate their legally binding obligation not to introduce nuclear weapons into zones that enjoyed a nuclear-weapon-free status.

Speaking on the prevention of nuclear war, India stressed that undue emphasis was laid on piecemeal and peripheral aspects of disarmament, such as nuclear-weapon-free zones, in order to delay progress towards nuclear disarmament. It reiterated its view that the creation of such zones made sense only if they were conceived of as a part of a credible programme for the urgent achievement of nuclear disarmament. In addition, India said it was rightly acknowledged by the international community that the initiative for the creation of such zones must come from the countries of the region concerned and must follow the process of mutual consultations among them. Further, the region to be covered must be viable in the sense of being a well-defined geographical and geopolitical unit. However, in view of the fact that any nuclear war would engulf the entire world, it believed that the idea of nuclear-weapon-free zones had become unrealistic.

Bulgaria supported the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of Europe and of the world in general where that would contribute to the strengthening of international security. Located in the Balkan Peninsula, at the crossroads of three continents, Bulgaria was vitally interested in transforming that region into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Further, it was very conscious of the importance of establishing peace and lasting co-operation throughout the Mediterranean as a whole. Turkey favoured the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones wherever and whenever possible and practically feasible. However, certain conditions had to be met prior to their establishment and that, in turn, called for an adequate level of co-operation, understanding and confidence among the parties involved. In its view, only after each party concluded from its own assessment that such a level had been reached would it be prudent to get involved in serious undertakings.

Speaking on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community, Greece expressed their belief that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in certain parts of the world could make an important contribution to disarmament and to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, provided all States concerned were prepared to subscribe to them on the basis of agreements freely entered into and in keeping with internationally recognized principles.

The Soviet Union supported the idea of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions, in particular, Northern Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East and Africa. It was also in favour of the proposal to create a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons along the line separating the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries. According to Romania, the most significant measure for limiting the sphere of use of nuclear weapons was the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, with the nuclear Powers undertaking never to resort to nuclear weapons or, in general, to the use of force in such zones.

Finland said that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was yet another measure by which States could build confidence, enhance security and lessen the danger of nuclear conflict. Such zones must be created freely by the States concerned, but it was evident that in order to be effective, all such arrangements should be subject to negative security guarantees by the nuclear-weapon States. Finland recalled its initiative with regard to a comprehensive Nordic arms control arrangement and expressed its readiness to continue to pursue that objective.

A. *Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America*

Since the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by all the five nuclear-weapon States by 1979, only one item concerning that Treaty has remained on the Assembly's agenda: the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I which concerns the application of the Treaty to territories in the Latin American region for which outside States have *de jure* or *de facto* responsibility, such as the colonial Powers.

On 17 November, a draft resolution entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 37/71 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)" was introduced in the First Committee by Mexico, the depositary Government of the Treaty. The draft, submitted on 11 November, was sponsored, as at the previous session, by 20 Latin American countries¹⁷ and subsequently also by El Salvador.

In introducing the draft resolution, Mexico noted that its text was very similar to that of resolution 37/71, one of the five substantive changes being that in operative paragraph 1 the General Assembly no longer "regrets" but rather "deplores" that the signature of Additional Protocol I by France had not been followed by the corresponding ratification, notwithstanding the elapse of almost five years and the invitations which the General Assembly had addressed to it. Mexico further stated that it was deeply disappointed by the fact that France had not complied with the previous resolutions of the General Assembly and expressed a belief that that was due to lack of time or the pressure of other high-priority issues on those who were in charge of French foreign policy.

A number of countries explained their positions at the time of voting on the draft resolution in the First Committee. Before the vote, the United States, although intending to vote in favour, expressed its regret that the draft resolution continued to single out one country for not having ratified the Protocol, while there were countries within the region itself which had not ratified or adhered to the Treaty. Full adherence to the Treaty by all those States would substantially enhance the Treaty's effectiveness in ensuring that Latin America remained a zone free of nuclear weapons.

After the vote, France stated that it was obliged to abstain because it found it unacceptable to be singled out while certain countries within the sphere of application of the Treaty had neither signed nor ratified it, nor had they invoked the clause permitting its entry into force with regard to them.

Brazil, which voted in favour, believed it had become necessary to establish in the Treaty of Tlatelolco a system of verification of compliance by the nuclear-weapon Powers with all the Treaty's provisions and that its affirmative vote did not prejudice its position concerning the need for a system of verification.

Venezuela stated that it had to abstain in the voting on the draft resolution for the same reason it had in 1982,¹⁸ but it reaffirmed its support for the letter and spirit of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Argentina also explained its abstention by a reference to the reasons that had caused it to

¹⁷ Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay.

¹⁸ For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. XI.

take a similar position the previous year.¹⁹ Mali expressed its commitment to the establishment of denuclearized zones throughout the world as a contribution to the security of all peoples, but said it had to abstain, owing to the wording of operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft which, in its opinion, interfered with the internal procedures followed by States in relation to their security. Cuba reiterated its position that it was not a party to the Treaty since the nuclear Power in its area had been pursuing a hostile and aggressive policy towards Cuba and continued to maintain a military base on its territory.

The draft resolution was approved by the First Committee on 23 November by a recorded vote of 118 to none, with 7 abstentions (Argentina, Cuba, France, Guyana, Malawi, Mali and Venezuela), and adopted by the General Assembly, as resolution 38/61, on 15 December by a recorded vote of 135 to none, with 9 abstentions. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 3262 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3473 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 32/76 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/58 of 14 December 1978, 34/71 of 11 December 1979, 35/143 of 12 December 1980, 36/83 of 9 December 1981 and 37/71 of 9 December 1982 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),

Taking into account that within the zone of application of that Treaty, to which twenty-three sovereign States are already parties, there are some territories which, in spite of not being sovereign political entities, are nevertheless in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I, to which the States that *de jure* or *de facto* are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties,

Recalling that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of America became parties to Additional Protocol I in 1969, 1971 and 1981, respectively,

1. *Deplores* that the signature of Additional Protocol I by France, which took place on 2 March 1979, has not yet been followed by the corresponding ratification, notwithstanding the time already elapsed and the pressing invitations which the General Assembly has addressed to it;

2. *Once more urges* France not to delay any further such ratification, which has been requested so many times;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 38/61 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

B. Denuclearization of Africa

Since the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa was adopted in 1964 by the Organization of African Unity, the General Assembly has repeatedly called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. By resolution 37/74 B of 9 December 1982, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue to follow closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

report thereon to the Assembly at its thirty-eighth session. In his report,²⁰ the Secretary-General stated that he had followed closely South Africa's activities, but since he had neither received nor identified any further information on the subject, he had nothing to add to his earlier reports.²¹

On 11 November, Sierra Leone, on behalf of the Group of African States, submitted two draft resolutions, one entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa" and the other entitled "Nuclear capability of South Africa". Both drafts underwent revisions,²² as discussed below.

On 17 November Sierra Leone introduced both of the draft resolutions in the First Committee, stating that the African States wished, in submitting the two drafts, to reaffirm their long-standing commitment to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war in general, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, in particular, the prevention of the introduction of such weapons into Africa. The African States had continued to abide by and to support fully the objectives of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. Sierra Leone stressed that they were alarmed by the fact that South Africa had attained the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. They also regretted that several States, in particular certain Western States, some of which were nuclear-weapon countries, as well as Israel, had continued to collaborate with the South African régime in the military and nuclear fields. Sierra Leone drew attention to operative paragraph 7 of the draft on the implementation of the Declaration as the most substantive new element, by which the General Assembly would request the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to undertake, in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, to provide data on the continued development of South Africa's nuclear capability, with a view to identifying and examining practical measures for the speedy implementation of the Declaration and the promotion of the overall objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, it drew attention to new elements in the draft on South Africa's nuclear capability, particularly those reflected in operative paragraph 2, support for the independent States of southern Africa in safeguarding their territorial integrity and national sovereignty, and operative paragraph 8, condemnation of the decision of a major Power to permit certain corporations in its territory to transfer nuclear assistance to South Africa.

²⁰ A/38/196.

²¹ A/35/402 and Corr.1, A/36/430 and A/37/432.

²² See A/38/624, paragraphs 5-14, for further details. The Group of African States is composed of: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

On 21 November, the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution on the implementation of the Declaration in which, in operative paragraph 8, the Secretary-General was requested to provide the necessary support to UNIDIR to enable it to carry out the task entrusted to it. On 23 November, the sponsors submitted a new revised draft resolution, in which operative paragraph 7 was shortened.

On 21 November, the sponsors also submitted a revised version of the second draft resolution, in which the ninth preambular paragraph was expanded by urging immediate and unconditional withdrawal of South African troops from Angola. On 23 November, a second revised draft resolution was submitted and on 25 November Sierra Leone, on behalf of the sponsors, orally revised operative paragraph 8 to refer to "some Member States" instead of "a major Power".

On 25 November the First Committee took action on the draft on the implementation of the Declaration. It approved operative paragraph 8 separately, by a recorded vote of 103 votes to 1 (United States), with 22 abstentions. It then approved the draft resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 121 to none, with 6 abstentions (Belgium, France, Israel, Portugal, United Kingdom and United States). On 20 December the General Assembly voted separately on operative paragraph 8 and adopted it by a recorded vote of 123 to 1, with 22 abstentions. The Assembly then adopted the draft resolution as a whole, as resolution 38/181 A, by a recorded vote of 142 to none, with 6 abstentions. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling resolution 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, its earliest on the subject, as well as its resolutions 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965, 32/81 of 12 December 1977, 33/63 of 14 December 1978, 34/76 A of 11 December 1979, 35/146 B of 12 December 1980, 36/86 B of 9 December 1981 and 37/74 A of 9 December 1982, in which it called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Recalling that in its resolution 33/63 it vigorously condemned any overt or covert attempt by South Africa to introduce nuclear weapons into the continent of Africa and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent of Africa or elsewhere,

Recalling its resolution 35/146 A of 12 December 1980, by which it, *inter alia*, expressed its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field and expressed its deep alarm that the report of the Secretary-General had established South Africa's capability to manufacture nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming that South Africa's continued development of a nuclear capability seriously jeopardizes the realization of the objective of the Declaration and poses a grave threat not only to the security of African States but also to international peace and security,

Recalling also its resolution 37/100 F of 13 December 1982, by which it, *inter alia*, requested the Secretariat, in particular the Department for Disarmament Affairs, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research to lend assistance to States and regional institutions which may request it in the context of regional disarmament measures taken at the initiative and with the participation of all the States concerned,

Taking note of the report of the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies,

Taking note with concern of the report of the Disarmament Commission, in particular its paragraph 24 dealing with the question of the nuclear capability of South Africa,

Convinced of the urgent need for the international community to consider practical measures for the realization of the objective of the Declaration,

1. *Strongly reiterates* its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

2. *Reaffirms* that implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by African heads of State and Government would be a significant measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security;

3. *Condemns* South Africa's continued pursuit of a nuclear capability and all forms of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime which enable it to frustrate the objective of the Declaration which seeks to keep Africa free from nuclear weapons;

4. *Calls upon* all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to terminate forthwith any form of collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa which enables it to frustrate the objective of the Declaration;

5. *Demands once again* that the racist régime of South Africa refrain from testing, manufacturing, deploying, transporting, storing, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons;

6. *Demands once again* that South Africa submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

7. *Requests* the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, to provide data on the continued development of South Africa's nuclear capability;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary support to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research to enable it to carry out the task entrusted to it under the present resolution and for the Institute to submit a report to the Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa".

On 25 November, the First Committee also took action on the draft resolution on the nuclear capability of South Africa, approving it by a recorded vote of 112 to 4 (France, Israel, United Kingdom and United States), with 11 abstentions. On 20 December the General Assembly adopted it by a recorded vote of 133 to 4, with 11 abstentions, as resolution 38/181 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/76 B of 11 December 1979, 35/146 A of 12 December 1980, 36/86 A of 9 December 1981 and 37/74 B of 9 December 1982,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling that, in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it noted that the accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, presented a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm,

Taking note of resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/408 on South Africa's nuclear capabil-

ities, adopted on 14 October 1983 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency during its twenty-seventh regular session,

Recalling that, in its resolution 33/63 of 14 December 1978, it vigorously condemned any overt or covert attempt by South Africa to introduce nuclear weapons into the continent of Africa and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent of Africa or elsewhere,

Recalling its resolution 35/146 A of 12 December 1980, by which it, *inter alia*, expressed its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field and expressed its deep alarm that the report of the Secretary-General had established South Africa's capability to manufacture nuclear weapons,

Noting with regret that, despite international concern over the nuclear capability of South Africa and the recognized need to deal concretely and expeditiously with it, the Disarmament Commission failed to conclude consideration of this important item on its agenda with specific recommendations during its 1983 session,

Gravely concerned that South Africa, in flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, has not only continued but has in fact intensified its military attacks and other acts of aggression and subversion against independent States of southern Africa, in particular Lesotho, Mozambique and Angola, part of whose territory still remains occupied by South African forces,

Strongly condemning the military occupation by South African troops of parts of the territory of Angola in violation of its national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and urging the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan soil,

Expressing its grave disappointment that, despite repeated appeals by the international community, certain Western States and Israel have continued to collaborate with the racist régime of South Africa in the military and nuclear fields and that some of the same Western States have, by a ready recourse to the use of the veto, consistently frustrated every effort in the Security Council to deal decisively with the question of South Africa,

1. *Condemns* the massive build-up of South Africa's military machine, including its frenzied acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability for repressive and aggressive purposes and as an instrument of blackmail;

2. *Expresses its full support* for the Governments of the independent States of southern Africa in their efforts to guarantee and safeguard their territorial integrity and national sovereignty;

3. *Reaffirms* that the racist régime's acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardizes the security of African States and increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

4. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to consider substantively and as a matter of priority South Africa's nuclear capability during its session in 1984, taking into account, *inter alia*, the findings contained in the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field, with a view to adopting concrete recommendations on the question;

5. *Requests* the Security Council, for the purposes of disarmament and to fulfil its obligations and responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, to take enforcement measures to prevent any racist régimes from acquiring arms or arms technology;

6. *Further requests* the Security Council to conclude expeditiously its consideration of the recommendations of its Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa with a view to blocking the existing loopholes in the arms embargo so as to render it more effective and prohibiting, in particular, all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field;

7. *Condemns* all forms of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime of South Africa since such collaboration enables it to frustrate, *inter alia*, the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa which seeks to keep Africa free from nuclear weapons;

8. *Condemns*, in particular, recent decisions by some Member States to grant licences to several corporations in their territories to provide equipment and technical and maintenance services for nuclear installations in South Africa;

9. *Calls upon* all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to terminate forthwith all military and nuclear collaboration with the racist régime, including the provision to it of such materials as computers, electronic equipment and related technology;

10. *Demands once again* that South Africa submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow very closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

In connection with the voting on the two draft resolutions in the First Committee, 19 countries explained their positions in respect of one or both texts.

Among those voting in favour of both draft resolutions were the five Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Denmark, speaking on their behalf, stated that they supported the general purpose of the draft resolution on the nuclear capability of South Africa, but expressed certain reservations, particularly deploring what they regarded as the inappropriate singling out of individual countries and groups of countries and the failure to make a clear distinction between the responsibilities of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Ireland shared the former reservation and Austria, the latter. Spain expressed reservations about parts of both resolutions, and Albania said its affirmative vote did not change its position as regards the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In connection with the adoption of related draft resolutions on other nuclear-weapon-free zones, Brazil explained that it would vote in favour of the draft on the implementation of the Declaration because of the specific characteristics of the situation prevailing in South Africa.

The Soviet Union said it had consistently supported the denuclearization of Africa and condemned South Africa's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons, but had abstained in the separate vote on operative paragraph 8 of the resolution on the first-mentioned question, because it implied a departure from the established system of financing the activities of UNIDIR by means of voluntary contributions. It also held that the creation of a denuclearized zone in Africa should not be assumed to affect the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas. Bulgaria stated its concern about the acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Africa.

Australia, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Malawi and the Netherlands all voted in favour of the resolution on the implementation of the Declaration as a whole, but—except for Malawi—abstained in the separate voting on its paragraph 8, and abstained also on the draft resolution on South Africa's nuclear capability. Canada expressed its appreciation of some improvements in the wording of the first-mentioned draft, but also its preference for the original wording of paragraph 8 since it believed that the study called for should be financed out of existing resources. The Federal Republic of Germany also favoured

a strict interpretation of that paragraph; however, it stressed its high degree of identification with the draft's objectives, in spite of that reservation and certain ambiguities concerning the extent of the zone. Japan stated that paragraph 8 of the draft lacked conclusive evidence to support it, and Malawi said it would have abstained, had a separate vote been taken on paragraphs 3 and 4. In explaining its abstention on the second draft resolution, Australia said that it supported those paragraphs which focused on South Africa's potential to increase the danger of nuclear proliferation. The Netherlands also found both positive and negative aspects in the two drafts.

Belgium and Portugal abstained on both proposals. Belgium said the text of the first draft did not clearly indicate that the forms of nuclear collaboration mentioned were limited to the acquisition of a nuclear-weapon capability. Portugal believed the language used in certain paragraphs was excessive.

France, the United Kingdom and the United States abstained on the draft resolution on the Declaration (the United States was the only one to vote against its paragraph 8), and all three voted against the draft on South Africa's nuclear capability. While they supported in principle the objectives of the drafts, the United Kingdom held it would be wrong to limit the right to develop programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in individual cases for political reasons, the United States found some language in the two drafts potentially harmful to their underlying objectives and France believed the two texts did not make the necessary distinction between the peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy.

In connection with the item entitled "Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa", the General Assembly adopted, in 1983, several resolutions with some disarmament-related provisions.

By resolution 38/39 A, entitled "Situation in South Africa", the General Assembly, *inter alia*, reiterated its condemnation of the policies of certain Western States, especially the United States, and Israel and of their transnational corporations and financial institutions that had increased political, economic and military collaboration with South Africa despite repeated appeals of the General Assembly. The Assembly again requested IAEA to refrain from extending to South Africa any facilities which might assist it in its nuclear plans and, in particular, to exclude South Africa from all its technical working groups. The resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 124 to 16 (mainly Western States), with 10 abstentions. By resolution 38/39 D, entitled "Sanctions against South Africa", the General Assembly, *inter alia*, requested the Security Council to consider action under Chapter VII of the Charter towards comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa, through appropriate measures, including prohibition of all co-operation in the military and nuclear fields. The resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 122 to 10 (Western States), with 18 abstentions. By resolution 38/39 F, entitled "Relations between Israel and South Africa", the Assembly, *inter alia*, strongly condemned the continuing and increasing collaboration of Israel with South Africa, especially in the military and nuclear fields, and

demanded Israel to terminate all such collaboration. The resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 106 to 18 (mainly Western States), with 17 abstentions. By resolution 38/39 G, entitled "Military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa", the General Assembly, *inter alia*, urged the Security Council to take mandatory decisions, under Chapter VII of the Charter, to ensure the total cessation of all military and nuclear cooperation with South Africa by Governments, corporations, institutions and individuals. The Assembly strongly condemned the action of certain Western countries and Israel which had provided South Africa with "an enormous arsenal of military equipment and technology, as well as assistance in its nuclear plans", and which had allowed corporations under their jurisdiction to invest in the armaments industry in South Africa. The Assembly further condemned any manoeuvres to create military pacts or arrangements with the participation of South Africa. The resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 122 to 9 (Australia, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Paraguay, Portugal, United Kingdom and United States), with 17 abstentions.

Finally, under the agenda item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security", the Assembly adopted resolution 38/190, by paragraph 11 of which it called upon all States, particularly the members of the Security Council, to take appropriate and effective measures to promote the fulfilment of the objective of the denuclearization of Africa. The resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 135 to none, with 12 abstentions (mainly Western States).

C. *Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East*

Under the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East", Egypt submitted a draft resolution in the First Committee on 11 November and introduced it on 15 November, stating that it was almost a reproduction of General Assembly resolution 37/75. Explaining why it was necessary to repeat the previous year's resolution, Egypt pointed out that for nine years it had been taking the initiative on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, being aware that the effective realization of that objective necessitated the widest possible international support both inside and outside the region. The importance of establishing the zone stemmed from the fact that it would contribute not only to reducing tension and the threat of war in the Middle East, but also to enhancing security in the region of the Mediterranean and Europe. Egypt further stressed that although there had been consensus on the question since the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, it was fully aware of the political realities in the region and that the time might not yet be right to work on a practical approach acceptable to all the parties concerned. However, it firmly believed that there was a basic minimum position that should be maintained and which the draft represented.

On 23 November, the Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote and five countries explained their positions. Brazil said that it did not object to consensus because of the specific characteristics of the situation prevailing in the Middle East. Cuba, India and Zambia made it clear that the fact that they did not oppose the consensus was without prejudice to their positions concerning the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, mentioned in operative paragraph 1.

Israel joined the consensus on the resolution but expressed some reservations regarding the modalities included in the text. It believed that the most effective way to achieve the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons to the Middle East would be the creation of a zone modelled on the lines of the Tlatelolco Treaty. The preliminary consultations necessary to achieve that aim should be carried out directly among the States of the region, during which they should address the modalities for the establishment of the zone, the obligations and rights of the contracting parties and the machinery and procedures for ensuring effective compliance by the States with the obligations undertaken by each of them. Israel expressed a reservation because the draft omitted mention of the negotiating process, without which such an arrangement was unlikely to come about.

On 15 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft as resolution 38/64, also without a vote. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979, 35/147 of 12 December 1980, 36/87 of 9 December 1981 and 37/75 of 9 December 1982 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, in particular paragraph 63 (d), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Emphasizing the basic provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, which call upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, to agree to place all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to declare their support for the establishment of the zone and deposit such declarations with the Security Council for consideration, as appropriate,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing further the need for appropriate measures on the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities,

Bearing in mind the consensus reached by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

Desirous to build on that consensus so that substantial progress can be made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Urges* all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the States concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. *Calls upon* all States of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. *Invites* those States, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to declare their support for establishing such a zone, consistent with the relevant paragraph of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council;

4. *Further invites* those States, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;

5. *Invites* the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to both the letter and spirit of the present resolution;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

The item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament: report of the Secretary-General" was included in the provisional agenda of the thirty-eighth session in accordance with General Assembly resolution 37/82 of 9 December 1982. In the report,²³ the Secretary-General stated that he had continued to follow Israeli nuclear activities, taking into account information published by IAEA. He had received no new information in that regard and consequently had nothing to add to his earlier report to the General Assembly on the subject.²⁴

On 11 November, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, the Sudan and the United Arab Emirates submitted a draft resolution on the item in the First Committee, which was subsequently also sponsored by Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Kuwait, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Mauritania and Yemen. In introducing the draft on 17 November, Iraq stated that Israel was following a policy of militarization, especially in the nuclear field, and that its policy was accompanied by a total disregard of international law, security and the United Nations resolutions. Iraq stressed that collaboration between Israel and South Africa posed a grave danger to peace and security in the whole world. The sponsors of the draft asked the General Assembly to condemn Israel's refusal to renounce officially the acquisition and possession of nuclear weapons and the Security Council to take urgent and effective measures to implement its resolution 487 (1981). Given the danger to regional peace and security posed by Israel's policy of nuclear armament, Iraq believed that what was needed was action, rather than a number of condemnations.

The Committee took a vote on the draft resolution on 23 November.

²³ A/38/199.

²⁴ A/37/434.

First, it approved operative paragraph 3 by a recorded vote of 79 to 26, with 19 abstentions. The draft resolution as a whole was then approved by a recorded vote of 90 to 2 (Israel and United States), with 35 abstentions.

Several delegations explained their votes before or after the vote. In explaining its negative vote, Israel stated that the draft resolution introduced an imbalance into the international debate on the question and thereby hindered all efforts to bring regional problems under control. The draft was, according to Israel, discriminatory because it singled out Israel for investigation and was based on a study produced by a United Nations Group of Experts whose terms of reference had prejudged the outcome of the study. Israel further stressed two points. It found the draft resolution discriminatory considering that many countries, among them Arab States, were not parties at all to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, while some other Arab countries, which were parties to the Treaty, had not fulfilled their obligations in accordance with it. Secondly, the alleged nuclear and military co-operation between Israel and South Africa should be dismissed as unsubstantiated speculation. Israel expressed its readiness to begin negotiations on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone between the States of the Middle East. Israel also added that the adoption of operative paragraph 3 would constitute interference by the General Assembly in the affairs of IAEA, a separate body.

The United States said its decision to cast a negative vote was due to the discriminatory character of the draft, in that it singled out one Member State and ignored the number of States which had neither become parties to the non-proliferation Treaty nor placed their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. It added that operative paragraph 3 represented an inappropriate attempt by the General Assembly to instruct IAEA on a matter which related directly to the interpretation of the Agency's statutory provisions, a function properly reserved to the IAEA Board of Governors and the General Conference.

Belgium said it had called for a separate vote on paragraph 3 of the draft because it objected to the clause whereby the General Assembly would have assumed the right to interfere in the affairs of IAEA, and explained its abstention on the draft as a whole by the fact that the scientific co-operation between the Agency and all its member States applied to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, not to armament. Australia, too, could not accept operative paragraph 3 and abstained in the vote on the draft as a whole.

In explaining its abstention in the votes on operative paragraph 3 and the draft as a whole, Argentina said that in past years it had voted for similar versions of draft resolutions, but it believed that the matter was more serious in the current session and felt obliged to abstain by virtue of its position of principle.

Some States which supported the draft explained their difficulties with certain aspects of it. India said its vote was without prejudice to its

stand on the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. While supporting the efforts of the international community to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Peru stressed that it was essential that safeguards be applied universally. It expressed reservations about those paragraphs which contained provisions it found irreconcilable with the division of responsibilities between the General Assembly and the Security Council. Venezuela felt that the draft, as a whole, was in keeping with its international politics, but it expressed reservations about operative paragraph 1, because it condemned one single State for not renouncing the possession of nuclear weapons, and it abstained in the vote on operative paragraph 3.

On 15 December, the General Assembly took a vote on the draft resolution. It first approved paragraph 3 by a recorded vote of 79 to 28, with 31 abstentions. The draft resolution as a whole was then adopted as resolution 38/69, by a recorded vote of 99 votes to 2, with 39 abstentions. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions on Israeli nuclear armament,

Recalling its relevant resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also its resolution 35/157 of 12 December 1980 on military and nuclear collaboration with Israel,

Recalling its repeated condemnation of nuclear collaboration between Israel and South Africa,

Recalling Security Council resolution 487 (1981) of 19 June 1981 and taking note of the special report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* on recent developments concerning relations between Israel and South Africa,

Noting with concern Israel's refusal to comply with Security Council resolution 487 (1981),

Further noting with grave concern Israel's persistent refusal to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, despite repeated calls by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards,

Conscious of the grave consequences which endanger international peace and security as a result of Israel's development and acquisition of nuclear weapons and Israel's collaboration with South Africa to develop nuclear weapons and their delivery systems,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Condemns* Israel's refusal to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons and to place all its nuclear activities under international safeguards;

2. *Requests* the Security Council to take urgent and effective measures to implement its resolution 487 (1981) and to ensure that Israel complies with the resolution and places its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. *Requests* the International Atomic Energy Agency to suspend any scientific co-operation with Israel which could contribute to Israel's nuclear capabilities;

4. *Reiterates* its condemnation of the Israeli threat, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, to repeat its armed attack on peaceful nuclear facilities in Iraq and in other countries;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to follow closely Israel's nuclear activities and the nuclear and military collaboration between Israel and South Africa and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session thereon, as appropriate;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament".

The question of Israeli nuclear armament was also discussed in the framework of the agenda item dealt with in plenary meetings of the Assembly entitled "Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security". By resolution 38/9, which was adopted on 10 November by a recorded vote of 123 votes to 2 (Israel and United States), with 12 abstentions, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, reiterated its condemnation of Israel's continued refusal to implement Security Council resolution 487 (1981); noted that the statements made so far by Israel had not removed apprehensions that its threat to repeat its armed attack against nuclear facilities would continue to endanger the role and activities of IAEA; considered that any threat to attack and destroy nuclear facilities in Iraq and other countries constituted a violation of the Charter of the United Nations; requested once again the Security Council to consider the necessary measures to deter Israel from repeating such an attack; called for the continuation of the consideration, at the international level, of legal measures to prohibit armed attacks against nuclear facilities, and threats thereof, as a contribution to promoting and ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; and expressed its appreciation to the Secretary-General and the Group of Experts on the Consequences of the Israeli Armed Attack against the Iraqi Nuclear Installations for their comprehensive study.²⁵

In its study, submitted to the Secretary-General on 15 July 1983, the Group of Experts came to the following conclusions: (a) the Iraqi nuclear installations represented a part of Iraq's efforts for scientific and technical development and its nuclear activities were under the safeguards of IAEA, which revealed no non-compliance with the safeguards agreement concluded between Iraq and IAEA and based on Iraqi adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty; (b) the Tammuz-1 reactor was attacked and destroyed on 7 June 1981 by Israel, which had not adhered to the non-proliferation Treaty nor placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards system; the attack was condemned by the Security Council, the General Assembly and IAEA; (c) the direct, site-related consequences of the attack included three deaths and virtually the total destruction of the Tammuz-1 reactor, which resulted in direct losses of several hundreds of millions of dollars of investment; (d) no radiological health problems were caused, although there could have been an appreciable risk had the attack occurred after the reactor had become operational; (e) the more general consequences of the attack—to which the Group attached special importance—included its potentially serious damage to international norms and institutions; and (f) if Israel became a party to the non-proliferation Treaty, accepted full-scope safeguards and complied with the General Assembly's demand that it should refrain from its threat to repeat its armed attacks against nuclear facilities, the situation would substantially improve.

²⁵ A/38/337, annex.

In the plenary debate on the item, almost all States, including Algeria, Bulgaria, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, the Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, the USSR and Yugoslavia, which took part in the discussion expressed their condemnation of the Israeli attack as a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law and as an attack against the non-proliferation Treaty, IAEA and the Agency's safeguards régime. Speaking on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community, Greece expressed the deep concern with which they had approached the issue of the Israeli military attack on the Iraqi nuclear installations and its serious consequences, believing that it was a violation of the principles of the Charter and the rules of international law. The Ten repeated once more their call to Israel to comply fully with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) in all its aspects and stressed the vital importance for all countries of refraining from any act of violence which might result in escalating tensions in the Middle East.

A number of delegations, including Bulgaria, Egypt, India, Kuwait, Pakistan, the USSR and Yugoslavia, commented on the expert study. It was regarded as a valuable contribution to a broader understanding of the serious consequences which that and similar acts could have for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

After referring to its previous statements on the matter in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, Israel stated that the Group of Experts had predictably produced a biased report and noted that Iraq had been invited to present its views to the Group, while Israel had not. For that and other reasons it mentioned, Israel rejected the draft resolution on the question.

D. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

The item on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia was included in the agenda of the thirty-eighth session in accordance with resolution 37/76 of 9 December 1982. In his report on the item,²⁶ the Secretary-General stated that he had been in contact with the States of the South Asian region with regard to paragraph 4 of that resolution. There had been no request by the States concerned for his assistance in connection with the subject, but the view had been expressed that he should continue to be available for that purpose.

On 7 November, Pakistan submitted a draft resolution on the item. In introducing it on 9 November in the First Committee, Pakistan recalled the relevant paragraph of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the reaffirmation of the objective of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones by the Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned

²⁶ A/38/198.

Countries in New Delhi in 1983.²⁷ Pakistan said it shared with other States of the South Asian region a deep commitment to the objective of keeping the area free of nuclear weapons; that had been reflected in the unilateral declarations made by individual States in the region not to acquire nuclear weapons. Pakistan thus believed that proper conditions existed in the South Asian region to carry forward the objective of transforming it into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It further considered that nuclear-weapon-free zones constituted an important partial measure in a step-by-step approach to general and complete disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. The draft resolution once again reaffirmed the General Assembly's endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and urged the States of the region, and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested, to continue to make all possible efforts to establish such a zone.

Several countries explained their positions in connection with the vote in the First Committee. India expressed its view that a draft resolution on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia had become an annual and pointless ritual for the First Committee. It stated that the countries of South Asia did not have a consensus on setting up such a zone. India had constantly and categorically rejected that proposal and its reasons for doing so had been set forth in the past in clear terms.²⁸

Although voting in favour of the draft resolution, five States explained their positions on the question. Sri Lanka stated that its affirmative vote was consistent with its support for the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which could contribute to the strengthening of regional—and thereby international—peace, security and stability. However, it believed such a zone could be viable only to the extent that it was created with the full consent, support and co-operation of all countries in the zone. The United States supported the concept of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia and in other appropriate regions of the world. It believed that effective zones negotiated and supported by the States of the region could not only enhance the security of those States, but also reinforce non-proliferation goals on a regional basis. Japan supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, whether in South Asia or in any other region of the world. However, it reiterated its view that the establishment of such a zone, if it was to strengthen the security of the region, would require the fulfilment of a number of conditions, among them, that it should be agreed upon by all the countries concerned and be based on the initiatives of the countries of the region. Zambia reserved its position regarding the second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution because of its reference to non-proliferation. Bangladesh stressed the need for contacts and consulta-

²⁷ See footnote 15.

²⁸ As stated in previous years, the reasons were that such zones must be conceived as part of a nuclear disarmament programme, emanate voluntarily from all the States of a region and involve a well-defined geographical and political unit.

tions among the countries of the South Asian region to ensure unanimity on the issue, including defining the limits of the zone.

Among those who abstained, four States clarified their positions. Brazil held that the draft resolution did not reflect adequately its concerns regarding the requirements for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, such as consensus among the States directly involved and a commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to respect the status of the zone and to refrain from interfering in the negotiating process. Sweden expressed its positive attitude with regard to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, but stressed some fundamental prerequisites that should be fulfilled. Among them, Sweden mentioned the following: general agreement among all the States concerned; non-possession of nuclear weapons by the zonal States; the absence and non-deployment of nuclear weapons in such States; and the commitment by nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against targets within the zone. Sweden could not support the draft resolution as it was evident that all the States concerned were not in favour of it. Although supporting the idea of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Lao People's Democratic Republic felt that it was impossible to establish such a zone in South Asia because there were military bases in the region in which nuclear weapons were stationed. Indonesia believed the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones constituted the most effective means of preventing proliferation, but held that such proposals should be initiated by the States in the region and based on agreements freely arrived at between them, something which, it believed, remained to be realized in South Asia.

On 23 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 81 to 2 (Bhutan and India), with 42 abstentions. It was adopted by the General Assembly on 15 December, as resolution 38/65, by a recorded vote of 94 votes to 3, with 46 abstentions. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/73 of 10 December 1976, 32/83 of 12 December 1977, 33/65 of 14 December 1978, 34/78 of 11 December 1979, 35/148 of 12 December 1980, 36/88 of 9 December 1981 and 37/76 of 9 December 1982 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Reiterating its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,

Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in other regions, will strengthen the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the declarations issued at the highest level by Governments of South Asian States reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,

Recalling that in the above-mentioned resolutions it called upon the States of the South Asian region, and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be in-

terested, to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to this objective,

Further recalling that, in its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX), 31/73 and 32/83, it requested the Secretary-General to convene a meeting for the purpose of the consultations mentioned therein and to render such assistance as might be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the region of South Asia,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Reaffirms* its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

2. *Urges once again* the States of South Asia, and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as may be interested, to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to this objective;

3. *Calls upon* those nuclear-weapon States that have not done so to respond positively to this proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render such assistance as may be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia".

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In the framework of the agenda item entitled "General and complete disarmament", the General Assembly adopted resolution 38/188 I, entitled "Review of and supplement to the *Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects*", by which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to transmit to the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, established by resolution 37/99 F, for its consideration and analysis, all the relevant documents submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, as well as the records of the debate on that question. The resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 146 to none, with 3 abstentions (India, United Kingdom and United States). This resolution is dealt with in more detail in chapter XXIII below.

In a letter²⁹ dated 11 August 1983 addressed to the Secretary-General, the representatives of Antigua and Barbuda and Malaysia to the United Nations requested the inclusion of a supplementary item on Antarctica in the agenda of the thirty-eighth session of the Assembly, which, in the context of the Antarctic Treaty, was related to disarmament.

The item was discussed in the First Committee, and on 28 November, Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey and

²⁹ A/38/193 and Corr.1.

Uganda submitted a draft resolution. In introducing it, the representative of Malaysia stated that the draft was the result of negotiations between a number of interested countries on the one hand and the various Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties on the other. Both sides had agreed on a consensus text requesting the Secretary-General to undertake a comprehensive, factual and objective study on all aspects of Antarctica.

On 30 November, Sierra Leone submitted an amendment on behalf of the African Group,³⁰ which was subsequently withdrawn. At the same meeting, the Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote and it was adopted on 15 December by the General Assembly, as resolution 38/77, also without a vote.

Conclusion

In 1983, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world was discussed in the Disarmament Commission, the Committee on Disarmament and at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly. A large number of States supported the idea of the creation of such zones either in general or in regions of their particular concern. A number of delegations considered that the Treaty of Tlatelolco should serve as a model for the zones in other parts of the world. Along with the debate on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, proposals were put forward for the creation of such zones in some other regions, such as the Balkans and Northern and Central Europe, but no formal initiatives were taken on these proposals at the United Nations.

In the debate it was argued that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones would prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons and strengthen the security of the countries in such zones. However, certain prerequisites were emphasized, including the principles that general agreement should exist among all countries of the region on the creation of such a zone, that the zones should be based on agreements freely arrived at between the States of a given region and that the nuclear-weapon States should undertake obligations to respect the denuclearized status of such zones.

In 1983 two major trends were discernible: an increased interest on the part of States in the subject and a growing concern for the verifiability of agreements on the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Regional disagreements among prospective parties to proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones prevented any of the proposals from moving towards realization.

³⁰ See A/38/646, para. 6.

International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Introduction

QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY have been the subject of discussion within and outside the United Nations between countries that are suppliers and others that are recipients of nuclear technology.

Two approaches to this question have emerged. The supplier States emphasize the link between the transfer of nuclear technology, equipment and materials and the need to prevent horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons through universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty, whereas the developing countries, the recipients, attach primary importance to their right to free and unimpaired access to nuclear energy for social and economic development.

Against the background of these conflicting approaches, the need for an international consensus in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy has become apparent. In 1977, 15 supplier countries¹ agreed on a set of guidelines and principles to govern nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon States. These States adopted criteria calling for the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and requiring formal assurances against unauthorized applications, including restrictions on re-export and on reprocessing and enrichment activities.² Some suppliers have adopted more stringent policies which go beyond the requirements set out in the guidelines.³

In 1980, the Conference on the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which was set up on the basis of a United States initiative, completed an evaluation of data and options regarding less proliferation-prone nuclear fuel cycles. Sixty-six States took part in the evaluation, and the Conference submitted its report to the participating

¹ Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, USSR, United Kingdom and United States.

² See *The Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, chap. IX, for a detailed outline of the guidelines.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. 1: 1976, chap. IX; vol. 2: 1977, chap. IX; and vol. 3: 1978, chap. XIII, for more detail on individual suppliers' export policies.

Governments for their consideration in developing nuclear-energy policies.⁴

In connection with one of the aspects of the fuel cycle considered at INFCE, namely, assurances of supply of nuclear fuel, services and technology, the Board of Governors of IAEA decided, on 20 June 1980, to establish the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), open to all members of the Agency. The Committee advises the Board on means of ensuring long-term availability of such supplies in accordance with mutually acceptable considerations of non-proliferation and the Agency's role and responsibilities in relation thereto. The work of CAS in 1983 is discussed in chapter XII below.

The recipient countries, for their part, largely in response to developments on the supply side, attach increasing importance to the possibilities offered by mutual assistance, self-reliance and co-ordinated action in the United Nations and other bodies. In that context, they have proposed a United Nations conference to promote international co-operation on the question. By resolution 35/112 of 5 December 1980, on the basis of their initiative, the General Assembly decided to convene the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, and to establish a Preparatory Committee for the Conference. As of the end of 1982, the Preparatory Committee had held an organizational session and two substantive sessions.

In 1982, IAEA organized in Vienna the Conference on Nuclear Power Experience, which was attended by 63 countries. The Conference summarized the experience gained over three decades of nuclear power operations, mainly for the production of electricity. One of the main conclusions of the Conference was that nuclear power remained generally competitive with coal-fired plants, while oil-fired plants had much higher generating costs. There was agreement at the Conference that radiation protection at nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities had, in general, shown an excellent record. It was also widely held that adequate technology existed for radioactive waste management.⁵

Work of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference, 1983

The Preparatory Committee continued its work in 1983, holding its fourth substantive session in New York from 28 March to 8 April.

In accordance with General Assembly resolutions 35/112 and 36/78, the President of the General Assembly appointed the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia as additional members of the Preparatory Com-

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. XI.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. XII.

mittee. Thus, in 1983, the Preparatory Committee was composed of 66 Member States.⁶

At the opening meeting, the Chairman of the Committee made a statement calling on all members to reach the necessary agreements and understanding which were essential for the preparations of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. He went on to say that the Committee had already met three times in unsuccessful attempts to decide upon its draft agenda, its draft rules of procedure and the nature and form of its concluding documents. The Chairman said there could be no denying that the *status quo* was unsatisfactory and did not enhance the dynamic promotion of nuclear technology as a means of meeting growing needs in the social and economic field. Changes were, therefore, necessary and perhaps overdue: changes that would lead to more international co-operation and trade on a wide and non-discriminatory basis, favour unrestricted access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and respect the interests of all countries. Such developments, he continued, would in no way encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons or endanger international security and stability.

The Secretary-General of the Conference made a statement summarizing the course of past developments. He also mentioned that the Committee had not yet agreed on the content and substance of the agenda of the Conference, its rules of procedure and a preparatory framework, and hoped that it would be possible for the Committee, at its fourth session, to do so. He also emphasized that the Conference would represent the first international effort of its kind designed exclusively for the purpose of promoting international co-operation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development.

The Preparatory Committee held a general discussion on its substantive agenda items. Many representatives expressed support for the concerns underlined in the two opening statements, saying that a sincere spirit of compromise and mutual trust alone would enable the Committee to resolve the difficult issues before it. Some expressed the belief that the establishment of universally acceptable principles of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy constituted the major objective of the Conference, in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 32/50. Others felt that the Conference could successfully promote co-operation in the interests of both producers and consumers only with the reaffirmation and strengthening of the existing principles relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other

⁶ Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

nuclear explosive devices and the provisions of the IAEA safeguards system. While sharing the concern about proliferation, still others stressed that non-proliferation considerations should not be made a pretext for preventing States from exercising their sovereign right to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with national needs and priorities. A view was expressed that nuclear disarmament issues, such as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, would be better dealt with in an appropriate forum, such as the Committee on Disarmament.

Reference was also made to the relevant activities of IAEA and CAS. In that regard, the representative of IAEA informed the Preparatory Committee of the state of the Agency's preparations for the Conference, which took into account the observations made and the reservations expressed concerning the outline of topics it had submitted at the third session of the Committee.

Many representatives emphasized that decisions of the Conference on all substantive issues should be by consensus, while other representatives, although recognizing the merit of consensus, considered that such a procedure might set a precedent which could adversely affect future United Nations conferences and might be used by a small minority to block decisions which would benefit the majority of the international community.

During the general discussion, many representatives expressed the view that the Conference should not be unduly postponed, but observed that, owing to the lack of agreement on such basic issues as the provisional agenda, it would be difficult to determine the framework and the schedule for essential preparatory work. As it would not be advisable to convene such a conference without serious, detailed preparations, they believed the dates previously set for the Conference should be reconsidered.

In order to facilitate its work, the Preparatory Committee decided to establish an informal contact group to meet during the session to take up the consideration of the substantive questions before it. In its deliberations, the Contact Group devoted its attention mainly to the substantive issues of the agenda and, to a certain extent, discussed the decision-making process and future preparatory work for the Conference. In discussing the agenda, particular attention was given to the formulation of item 5 of the draft provisional agenda proposed by the Group of 77⁷ during the third session of the Preparatory Committee. In that connection, a number of proposals were made. The Chairman, in his personal capacity, also suggested a formulation.⁸ All the proposals were meant to be additional to the existing formulation of item 5. The Contact Group, however, was not able to decide upon the wording of that item and, therefore, could not report agreement on a draft agenda.

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 48 (A/37/48)*, part two, annex II, sect. A.

⁸ *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 48 A (A/37/48/Add.1)*, pp. 7-9.

During a general exchange of views on the decision-making process, it was suggested that the problem might be solved through an appropriate statement made by the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee and/or the President of the Conference and agreed upon beforehand by all the parties concerned. The Contact Group was unable to reach an agreement on decision-making.

Consequently, the Preparatory Committee recommended that the General Assembly should decide, at its resumed thirty-seventh session, not to convene the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in 1983 and that, at its thirty-eighth session, it should decide on the date and venue of the fifth session of the Preparatory Committee. The Committee also decided that the Conference secretariat should proceed as far as practicable with the preparations for the Conference, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

International Conference on Radioactive Waste Management

IAEA held an International Conference on Radioactive Waste Management in Seattle, from 16 to 20 May 1983. It was attended by 528 participants from 29 member States of IAEA and 8 international organizations. There were 149 papers presented and discussed in 21 technical sessions covering five major topics: waste management policy and implementation; handling, treatment and conditioning of wastes from nuclear facilities; storage and underground disposal of radioactive wastes; environmental and safety assessment of waste management systems; and radioactive releases to the environment from nuclear operations.

The Conference demonstrated that considerable progress had been made nationally and internationally towards establishing the goals, criteria and safety assessment methods necessary to alleviate concerns about long-term health and safety implications. While the major emphasis of the Conference was on high-level waste management, there was also a clear indication that continuing attention must be paid to the management of low- and intermediate-level wastes.

Consideration by the General Conference of IAEA, 1983⁹

The twenty-seventh regular session of the General Conference of IAEA was held in Vienna in October 1983. The General Conference unanimously approved the application of the People's Republic of China for membership.

During the general debate, the focus was on priority areas such as safeguards and non-proliferation, the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear power and safety, and technical assistance and co-operation. Support was expressed for the vital role of the Agency in dealing with nuclear energy

⁹ The text for this section was contributed by IAEA.

and promoting nuclear science and technology for peaceful uses. The Agency's work on nuclear safety was strongly supported and specific reference was made to the programme on nuclear safety standards for nuclear power plants (NUSS programme) as being of particular value. The development of the incident reporting system was also commended. Support was also expressed for specific programmes of IAEA in the field of radioactive waste management.

The Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (RCA) covering countries in Asia and the Pacific was commended as an example of co-operation among the developing countries of the region. It was noted that the RCA concept was being followed in setting up a similar co-operative agreement in Latin America.

Strong support was expressed for the Agency's technical co-operation activities, in particular in the area of training and advisory services on siting, safety and manpower planning for nuclear programmes in developing countries. Appreciation was expressed for the increase in resources for technical co-operation. The Agency's feasibility study on the availability of small and medium reactors was commended and encouragement was given for further funds in connection with that project.

The importance of the Agency's safeguards systems in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons was appreciated. Many countries considered that support of the institutions that provided for effective international safeguards should be strengthened, and that IAEA safeguards should remain credible and subject to continuous examination.

A number of countries stressed the importance of full-scope safeguards; others expressed the view that greater efforts should be made by the nuclear Powers to achieve nuclear disarmament, in conformity with article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. Many delegations gave high priority to the Agency's role in non-proliferation and believed that IAEA should make substantial contributions to the preparations for the Third Review Conference of the Treaty. Some States felt that the Agency safeguards system might have some relevance for the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and that a study might be made on the possibility of using the safeguards system as a model for verification of an agreement to cut off the production of fissionable material for nuclear warheads. Suggestions were also made that the Agency would have a role to play in respect to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The General Conference adopted several resolutions, *inter alia*, on the following subjects:

— Protection of nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes against armed attacks. The resolution declared that all such attacks should be prohibited and urged that binding international rules for that purpose should be adopted.

— Consequences of the Israeli military attack on the Iraqi nuclear research reactor and the standing threat to repeat that attack for (a) the

development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and (b) the role and the activities of IAEA. The resolution called on Israel to withdraw its threat and decided to withhold Agency research contracts with Israel and to refrain from holding technical meetings with Israel if, by the next General Conference, the threat had not been withdrawn. It also requested the preparation of a report on the consequences of an armed attack on peaceful nuclear installations and threats thereof on the Agency's safeguards system and the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

—South Africa's nuclear capabilities. The resolution demanded that South Africa should submit all its nuclear installations to inspection by the Agency, called on those member States which had not done so to end all nuclear co-operation with South Africa, and requested consideration of the implementation by the Agency of General Assembly resolutions concerning Agency assistance to South Africa and participation by South Africa in IAEA technical groups.

—Convention on Physical Protection. The resolution expressed the hope that the Convention on Physical Protection would enter into force at the earliest possible date and that it would obtain the widest possible adherence.

—Amendment of article VI.A.2 of the Agency's statute. The resolution requested the Board of Governors to submit its observations and recommendations on proposed amendments regarding that matter for approval by the next General Conference.

—Staffing of the Agency's secretariat. The resolution appreciated action taken to increase the number of staff drawn from developing countries and requested the Director-General to take further steps in that direction.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

At its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly had on its agenda two items on the question of the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, namely, "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency" and "United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy". Both were considered in plenary meetings, without reference to a Main Committee.¹⁰

In presenting the report of IAEA,¹¹ the Director-General of the Agency, Mr. Hans Blix, stated that several significant events had taken place in the Agency. He noted that the United States, which had suspended its participation in the Agency to undertake a reassessment of its activities, resumed its active participation in February 1983. He also noted that an application for membership in the Agency by the People's

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 45th, 46th and 96th meetings.

¹¹ *The Annual Report for 1982*, GC(XXVII)/684.

Republic of China had been approved by the General Conference. Negotiations had begun between the Agency and the Soviet Union on that country's voluntary offer to submit some of its peaceful nuclear installations to Agency safeguards and considerable progress towards an agreement had been made in those talks. He mentioned the International Conference on Radioactive Waste Management held at Seattle in May, which is discussed above.

Mr. Blix further stated that work was proceeding in the Agency on a broad range of matters relating to its two chief tasks, namely, the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and participation in efforts to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. He said that the most significant economic use of nuclear energy was the production of electricity and believed that if economic recovery was to be maintained, the world must continue to shift from its excessive reliance on oil to the use of coal and nuclear power as major alternatives. In that connection, Mr. Blix noted that IAEA had initiated the first phase of a new study of the general case for small and medium-sized power reactors, which would devote attention to the question of financing nuclear generating plants—a problem especially felt by the developing countries. He further noted that IAEA was seeking to establish a world-wide incident reporting system by which States could draw lessons from each other's experience. Another safety-promoting venture was the setting up of "operational safety review teams" to assist national regulatory bodies in their task of ensuring that safety was maintained at the required level during all phases of the operation of a nuclear power plant.

Mr. Blix also commented on the importance of other practical applications of nuclear techniques in various fields, such as agriculture, medicine and industry, which were promoted through the Agency's technical co-operation and assistance programme, and had involved about 500 projects in 1982.

Regarding the need for consensus on a reasonable balance of rights and obligations between suppliers and recipients in nuclear trade, Mr. Blix noted that CAS had recently made concrete progress on some specific technical aspects of the problems before it, and would continue to provide a forum in which both sides could bring forward their concerns and work together towards what could eventually be a mutually acceptable code of conduct.

In connection with the Agency's efforts to help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons through its safeguards system, he stated that the most important improvement would be the system's expansion in scope. In 1982, there had been further technical developments in and consolidation of the safeguards system and discussion of its most effective use.

During the course of the debate in the Assembly, many countries, concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, attached importance to the activities of IAEA in the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty. Australia regarded them as IAEA's foremost responsibility. Austria recognized the Treaty as the most effective barrier

against a further spread of nuclear weapons and, therefore, called for its universal acceptance. The Soviet Union felt the basis for the non-proliferation régime was the non-proliferation Treaty and stated that all questions of international co-operation should be considered in close connection with measures for the further strengthening of that Treaty. Czechoslovakia supported the idea that all deliveries of nuclear facilities and technology, material and fuel should be carried out exclusively within the framework of that régime. It believed that only if the non-proliferation Treaty were consistently observed could international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes be successfully developed. Hungary felt that the non-proliferation régime should be strengthened and expressed surprise at the attempts of some States to make it appear as an obstacle to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. China, however, remained critical of the non-proliferation Treaty, calling it discriminatory in nature.

Egypt, Finland and the Soviet Union, among others, expected IAEA to play an important role in the preparations for the Third Review Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty.

Greece, speaking on behalf of the European Community, recognized the Agency's safeguards system as an essential element of non-proliferation policy and a corner-stone in international nuclear co-operation in that it enabled verification of compliance with commitments made. Though recognizing the need for improving the system, Greece reiterated its appeal to non-nuclear-weapon States to place their facilities under IAEA safeguards in order to strengthen the non-proliferation régime. The Soviet Union advocated further strengthening of the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system and full safeguards coverage of nuclear activity of non-nuclear-weapon States. In that context, it had declared its readiness to submit to Agency safeguards a part of its peaceful nuclear activities. Poland also emphasized the importance of the IAEA safeguards system. Pakistan was of the view that the system was already reliable and effective, and should be protected and universalized on a non-discriminatory basis.

Egypt, like other developing countries, underlined the role of IAEA in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly for the benefit of developing countries. India deplored what it regarded as an increase in restrictive and discriminatory policies pursued by major suppliers of nuclear material and equipment. Pakistan stated that unilateral restrictions on access to nuclear technology, which had grown, could not prevent nuclear proliferation, but would only deprive developing countries of an essential technology. In its opinion, nuclear non-proliferation could be ensured through genuine political will and a consensus to achieve progress in nuclear disarmament, rather than by conferring the benefits of nuclear technology on a group of privileged States.

During the debate, a number of States, including Australia, Bulgaria, Egypt, the German Democratic Republic, Greece (on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community), Pakistan and the Su-

dan, stressed also the IAEA technical assistance and co-operation programme. Egypt noted the Agency's role in eliminating the Mediterranean fruit fly in Egypt and expressed the need to strengthen technical assistance programmes, not only in the nuclear field but also in the fields of science, medicine, agriculture and research, particularly with regard to developing countries. Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and Poland supported all efforts to expand and increase the effectiveness of the technical assistance programme. The Sudan stressed the necessity of providing the programme with funds from the Agency's regular budget or from other pre-allocated and guaranteed resources. On the other hand, several States, including Bulgaria and Poland, supported the concept of voluntary contributions payable in national currencies. Pakistan expressed concern at what it regarded as an increasing imbalance between the funds allotted to technical assistance and those reserved for safeguards, thus limiting the Agency's ability to meet legitimate and pressing demands for technical assistance from various developing countries. Finland felt the current system of negotiating the yearly target for technical assistance was not satisfactory and could be improved.

The United States strongly supported the overall programme of IAEA, including the development and implementation of an increasingly effective safeguards system and the sharing of the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy. Greece, Iraq and Pakistan commended IAEA for its activities in the field of nuclear power and nuclear safety, and Iraq stated that IAEA should always strive to reach a balance between its two main objectives, namely, promotional activities and safeguards. The Sudan stated that IAEA's safeguards and nuclear safety contributed to confidence-building.

Many States, including Austria, Egypt, Iraq, the Soviet Union and the United States, noted the progress made in CAS in the area of emergency and back-up mechanisms. Greece expressed the hope that the consensus achieved in CAS would facilitate agreement on principles of international co-operation in the field of nuclear energy. Hungary noted the importance to the work of that Committee and felt that speeding it up would have a positive effect on the preparation and success of the forthcoming Conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Iraq and the Sudan condemned Israel's attack against the Iraqi safeguarded nuclear installations and, in exercise of its right of reply, Israel rejected what it called the Iraqi attempts to politicize the agenda item on the IAEA report with discussions on a subject belonging to another item. Czechoslovakia, Egypt and Poland referred to the resolution of IAEA's General Conference on safeguarding peaceful nuclear installations against military attacks, and stated that it was the inalienable right of all nations not to be subjected to armed attack on their peaceful nuclear installations. Mexico, also referring to the resolution, reiterated its support for the establishment of an appropriate forum entrusted with drawing up a legal instrument to ensure international protection against such attacks.

On 4 November, Mexico, as acting Chairman of the Board of Governors of IAEA, introduced a draft resolution on the report of IAEA for 1982, which was also sponsored by Belgium and Bulgaria, Vice-Chairmen of the Board. The draft resolution was similar to corresponding resolutions of previous years, with a few additions and changes, such as welcoming the decision to grant China membership in the Agency, referring to the useful outcome of the International Conference on Radioactive Waste Management and recognizing the importance of the work of IAEA on nuclear safety. The sponsors expressed the hope that the draft resolution would be adopted by consensus.

At the same meeting, the draft resolution was adopted without a vote as resolution 38/8. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having received the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the General Assembly for the year 1982,

Taking note of the statement by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency of 4 November 1983, which provides additional information on developments in the Agency's activities during 1983,

Recognizing the importance of the work of and the relevance for the International Atomic Energy Agency to promote further the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as envisaged in its statute, and to improve further its technical assistance and promotional programmes for the benefit of developing countries,

Conscious of the importance of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other international treaties, conventions and agreements designed to achieve similar objectives, as well as ensuring, as far as it is able, that the assistance provided by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose, as stated in article II of its statute,

Welcoming the decision of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency of 11 October 1983 to grant membership of the Agency to the People's Republic of China,

Conscious of the useful outcome of the International Conference on Radioactive Waste Management, held at Seattle, United States of America, from 16 to 20 May 1983 by the International Atomic Energy Agency,

Recognizing the importance of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency on nuclear safety, which increases public confidence in nuclear power,

Bearing in mind resolutions GC (XXVII)/RES/407, GC (XXVII)/RES/408, GC (XXVII)/RES/409 and GC (XXVII)/RES/415, as adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its twenty-seventh regular session, held from 10 to 14 October 1983,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
2. *Urges* all States to strive for effective and harmonious international co-operation in carrying out the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency and to implement strictly the mandate of its statute in promoting the use of nuclear energy and the application of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes; in strengthening technical assistance and co-operation for developing countries; and in ensuring the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system;
3. *Expresses its satisfaction* at the prospect of mutual benefit arising from the membership of the People's Republic of China in the International Atomic Energy Agency;
4. *Affirms* its confidence in the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Director General of the Interna-

tional Atomic Energy Agency the records of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly relating to the Agency's activities.

In explanations of vote after the vote, Australia, although it had joined in the consensus, held the view that the fourth preambular paragraph was deficient in not referring accurately and objectively to article III of the statute of the Agency. Similarly, with reference to operative paragraph 2, Australia believed that the Assembly should be speaking not of ensuring the effectiveness of safeguards, but of strengthening their scope and extending their application. The Soviet Union believed that the importance of the work of IAEA in ensuring the safeguards provided for in the non-proliferation Treaty and other similar international agreements, including safeguards under the Agency's statute, was stressed in the fourth preambular paragraph. It also believed that operative paragraph 2 made a strong appeal to all States for effective and harmonious international co-operation in carrying out the work of IAEA. The United States noted the considerable efforts made by all groups to develop a jointly sponsored consensus resolution. It stated that it believed in the importance of maintaining a strong and continually improving safeguards programme, along with a correspondingly strong programme for promotion of technical assistance and co-operation in sharing the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology.

On 14 December, Mexico introduced a draft resolution on the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, which was also sponsored by Czechoslovakia and Greece. It stated that the feeling of a number of delegations that the General Assembly should confine itself to the adoption of a very specific draft resolution on the procedures to be followed in the future regarding the holding of the Conference and the work of the Preparatory Committee had resulted in the current draft resolution. By it, the General Assembly would decide, *inter alia*, that the Conference should be held in 1986 and that the Preparatory Committee should meet for two weeks at Vienna in June 1984 to complete its work on an agreed agenda as well as on other outstanding issues related to the Conference. The sponsors hoped that the General Assembly would adopt the draft resolution without a vote.

The German Democratic Republic, on behalf of other socialist countries, supported the convening of the Conference with the active participation of IAEA, provided the questions dealing with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were closely linked to measures that would strengthen the non-proliferation régime. It was in favour of including in the Conference's agenda a wide range of problems related to various aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and considered that only agreement through consensus could guarantee the success of the Conference.

Yugoslavia stated that the transfer of nuclear technology and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes constituted a complex political problem which had implications for international relations as well as for

the social and economic development of developing countries. It stated that finding solutions for the development and application of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes called for political action. It also believed that no policy aimed against proliferation would be viable if it were conducted at the expense of the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It noted that the two substantive issues which the Preparatory Committee had been unable to agree upon reflected the different approaches of the supplier and recipient countries. It considered that the political responsibility for the lack of success in the preparations thus far had to be borne by the technologically most developed countries.

At the same meeting, the draft resolution was adopted without a vote as resolution 38/60. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977,

Recalling its other resolutions regarding the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,

Noting the work carried out so far by the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,

1. *Decides* that the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy shall be held in 1986;

2. *Requests* the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and the Secretary-General of the Conference to undertake immediately appropriate consultations with Member States which could facilitate the resolution of pending issues related to the Conference, including its provisional agenda and rules of procedure, as well as to the venue and the actual dates of the Conference, and to report thereon to the Preparatory Committee at its fifth session, and decides that the expenses incurred in this regard will be covered from existing budgetary resources;

3. *Notes with appreciation* that the Conference secretariat is proceeding with the preparations for the Conference and requests the Secretary-General of the Conference to continue those preparations;

4. *Also decides* that the Preparatory Committee will hold its fifth session at Vienna in June 1984, for a period of up to two weeks, in order to complete its work on an agreed agenda as well as on other outstanding issues related to the Conference;

5. *Requests* the Preparatory Committee to submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session so that the Assembly may consider, in the light of this report, the venue and actual dates for the Conference in 1986, as also for further meetings of the Committee;

6. *Urges* the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as the specialized agencies and other relevant organizations of the United Nations system, to continue to contribute effectively to the preparations for the Conference so as to achieve meaningful results from the Conference, in accordance with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 32/50;

7. *Urges* all States to co-operate actively in the preparation of the Conference;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy".

Following the adoption, Greece stated, on behalf of the European Community, that while they welcomed the idea of the United Nations Conference, they believed that a proper distinction should be maintained

between it and the Third Review Conference of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. While the two Conferences had quite distinct aims, the underlying considerations common to both could have far-reaching effects on their work. The United States noted that the resolution reflected the all-important spirit of compromise essential to achieving a positive outcome at the United Nations Conference. It also emphasized that the Third Review Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty should have priority, and only after it had been held would the United States be prepared to consider further intergovernmental preparations for the later Conference.

Conclusion

The prospects for reaching a consensus among the suppliers and the recipients of nuclear technology as it relates to nuclear proliferation questions remained essentially unchanged in 1983.

The General Assembly decided that the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy would be held in 1986. The further work of the Preparatory Committee, which will take place before the Conference, may facilitate the resolution of the pending issues and thus pave the way for a more unified approach at the Conference itself.

At the end of the reporting period, it was expected that the forthcoming United Nations Conference, which represents the first worldwide effort to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, would result in a further clarification of the outstanding issues. The Third Review Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty, to be held in 1985, might further contribute to that process.

The beginning of negotiations between IAEA and the Soviet Union on the submission of some of that country's peaceful nuclear installations to Agency safeguards and the holding of the International Conference on Radioactive Waste Management may be cited as examples of promising activity that took place in the field of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in 1983.

ANNEX

United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy*

The question of convening an international conference, under the auspices of the United Nations system, aimed at promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development was first considered at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly. By resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977, the Assembly spelled out the following four principles on the subject:

* Text contributed by the Secretary-General of the Conference.

(a) The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is of great importance for the economic and social development of many countries;

(b) All States have the right, in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality, to develop their programme for the peaceful use of nuclear technology for economic and social development, in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs;

(c) All States, without discrimination, should have access to and should be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy;

(d) International co-operation in the field covered by the resolution should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through IAEA on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

After further consideration of the matter at the following sessions, the General Assembly, by resolution 35/112 of 5 December 1980, decided to convene in 1983 the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, in accordance with the objectives of resolution 32/50. The Assembly also decided to establish a Preparatory Committee for the Conference.

At its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly, by resolution 36/78 of 9 December 1981, endorsed the recommendation contained in the report of the first session of the Preparatory Committee that the Conference be held at Geneva from 29 August to 9 September 1983. By paragraph 9 of the resolution, the General Assembly urged all States to contribute to the successful outcome of the Conference by, *inter alia*, making available, in conformity with international obligations, information on their scientific and technological achievements and practical experiences in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

At its thirty-seventh session, the General Assembly had before it the reports of the second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee. By resolution 37/167 of 17 December 1982, the Assembly, expressing concern at the lack of progress in the Preparatory Committee, decided to reconsider the timing of the Conference and to take suitable decisions with regard to the date of the Conference in the light of the results of the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee. Again, by paragraph 8 of the resolution, the Assembly urged all States to co-operate actively in the preparation and the holding of the Conference.

At its resumed thirty-seventh session, the Assembly, on 10 May 1983, decided, on the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee at its fourth session, that the Conference would not be convened in 1983. Further, the Assembly took note of the Committee's decision that the Conference secretariat should proceed as far as practicable with the preparations for the Conference in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

At its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly, by resolution 38/60 of 14 December 1983, decided that the Conference should be held in 1986 and requested the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee and the Secretary-General of the Conference to continue preparations. Once again the Assembly urged all States to co-operate actively in the preparation of the Conference. The text of the resolution appears above in the main part of this chapter.

The contributions which were envisaged in paragraph 9 of resolution 36/78, including information on national priorities, projected needs and activities concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and which were required for the preparations for the Conference, were requested in a note verbale addressed to Member States by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 23 November 1982. In a follow-up letter of 14 June 1983, the Secretary-General of the Conference reiterated that it was essential to look to the future with a view to exploring possible ways and means of promoting international co-operation; thus, information concerning national programmes, future priorities and projections of needs and activities would be particularly useful. The material provided should, therefore, go beyond a mere description of the existing stage of development and status concerning the peaceful applications of nuclear energy at the national level and, to be of maximum value, should also include some information, ideas or suggestions specifically aimed at fostering co-operation in that field.

In response to those communications, some useful and relevant information has been provided, but a larger proportion of the material received so far is of a general nature, not specifically oriented towards the aims and objectives of the Conference.

By paragraph 11 of resolution 36/78, the General Assembly invited IAEA to fulfil its role, within the scope of its responsibilities, at all stages of preparation of the Conference and during the Conference itself, by contributing to the discussion of relevant issues and by providing technical data and documentation as needed, particularly in relation to the progress of the work of CAS. Further, by paragraph 12 of that resolution, the Assembly invited specialized agencies and other relevant organizations in the United Nations system to contribute effectively to the preparations for the Conference by, *inter alia*, making available studies, reports and other appropriate documents concerning the applications of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as the results and future prospects of such applications.

By paragraph 7 of resolution 37/167 and paragraph 6 of resolution 38/60, the General Assembly again invited IAEA to contribute to the Conference in terms of earlier resolutions 32/50 or 36/78, or both, in accordance with its responsibilities under its statute and to help achieve meaningful results from the Conference. Close and continuous contacts have been maintained with IAEA, as well as the specialized agencies and other concerned organs of the United Nations system. As one of the tangible results of those efforts, the Committee had before it, at its third session, two conference room papers reproducing lists of topics on which IAEA and some of the other concerned organizations had offered to contribute inputs to the Conference, together with preliminary material on a number of relevant topics. In taking note of that, the Committee expressed the hope that the relevant organizations of the United Nations system would continue to contribute to the preparation of the Conference. At its fourth session, some additional information was submitted to the Committee.

The General Assembly, by resolutions 35/112 and 36/78, expressed its conviction that progress in the work of CAS would greatly contribute to the success of the Conference. That Committee's work is discussed in chapter XII below.

In previous sessions of the Preparatory Committee, advantage has been taken of the opportunity for informal inter-agency consultations on a broad range of issues to ensure that contributions cover all main areas of interest and are relevant to the aims and objectives of the Conference and to avoid duplication as far as possible. The Secretary-General of the Conference has also reviewed these matters personally with a number of executive heads of specialized agencies and senior United Nations officials.

In a related area of activity, the Secretary-General of the Conference has been in contact with the heads of a number of international institutions and intergovernmental organizations which may be able to make a useful contribution by way of background material to the Conference. As a result, the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development has offered to prepare a paper on a suitable topic related to the aims and objectives of the Conference. Interest in the Conference has also been expressed by, among others, the International Centre for Theoretical Physics, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, and the World Energy Conference, which is expected to be represented by an observer at the fifth session of the Preparatory Committee. As already indicated in the statement by the Secretary-General of the Conference at the third session of the Committee, the Stanley Foundation, which has made useful contributions over the years in arranging seminars related to the themes of United Nations conferences, for example, new and renewable sources of energy and the peaceful uses of outer space, is considering a meeting on a suitable topic. The Conference secretariat is also engaged in correspondence with, among others, scientific and academic circles, and scholars in various countries in order to highlight the goals and purposes of the Conference and to generate the widest possible interest in and support for it.

In accordance with paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 37/167, the Preparatory Committee and the Secretary-General of the Conference are required to make appropriate arrangements, *inter alia*, through regional efforts, with a view to ensuring meaningful results from the Conference.

The Conference secretariat is in close contact with the United Nations regional economic commissions, particularly with regard to the evaluation of the specific needs and expectations of the different regions. The Preparatory Committee had before it, at its fourth session, a preliminary study on the possible role of nuclear energy in electric power developments in the developing countries of the Asian and Pacific region, which was prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. The Economic

Commission for Europe also outlined its relevant activities in a paper submitted at the same session of the Committee. Subsequently, in July 1983, the Secretary-General of the Conference had meetings with the executive secretaries of all regional commissions in Geneva for an overall discussion of the scope and modalities of regional preparatory activities.

The regional preparations involve two interrelated sets of activities: studies on regional experiences, problems and priorities in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and regional expert group meetings. Consultancy resources allocated by the General Assembly for the preparation of the studies are being utilized to research and prepare papers dealing, from a regional perspective, with relevant issues, including constraints faced in the development of nuclear energy and its specific potentials, needs and priorities; applications of nuclear science and technology in food and agriculture, health and medicine, hydrology, industry, etc.; scope for regional and interregional co-operation; and suggestions regarding practical measures to promote such co-operation.

The material and studies thus produced will constitute the basis for the regional preparations to be considered at regional expert group meetings. Those meetings will bring together experts in various disciplines in the field who, participating in their individual capacities, will review the current situation and future perspectives on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the light of such considerations as the specific needs and potential of each region and the role and scope of regional and interregional co-operation. They will also be expected to make suggestions regarding practical and effective measures to promote such co-operation.

In 1981, by paragraph 4 of resolution 36/78, the General Assembly considered that the outcome of the Conference should be embodied in appropriate documents, in a suitable format, pertaining, *inter alia*, to ways and means of promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

As reflected in the report of the second session of the Preparatory Committee, the question of document(s) incorporating decisions and conclusions of the Conference was considered at an informal meeting of the bureau of the Committee held in April 1982, and different points of view were expressed on that occasion. Resolutions and/or a final act in the form of a possible "declaration", "programme of action" or "code of conduct" were mentioned. It was the general feeling that the issue could be considered more realistically in the light of the decisions concerning the content and substance of the agenda of the Conference and the programme of work of the Committee. It was pointed out that the primary responsibility for drafting the documents incorporating possible conclusions of the Conference lay with the Committee. The Chairman felt that, since that would be a time-consuming process, it would be necessary to give early consideration to arrangements for inter-sessional work by the Committee through appropriate intergovernmental working and drafting groups.

Subsequently, the General Assembly, by paragraph 5 of resolution 37/167, reaffirmed the provision of paragraph 4 of resolution 36/78 referred to above. By paragraph 2 of the resolution, the Assembly requested the Preparatory Committee and the Secretary-General of the Conference, in order to speed up substantive preparations, to make appropriate arrangements, including as necessary through inter-sessional work by States members of the Committee under the guidance of its Chairman, to ensure meaningful results from the Conference. However, as pointed out in the statement by the Secretary-General of the Conference at the fourth session of the Committee, it has not been possible to proceed towards setting up meetings or other arrangements for inter-sessional work in the absence of a clear agreement within the Committee on the agenda of the Conference and the preparatory framework.

A distinctive feature which will give the forthcoming Conference a singular importance is that it will represent the first international effort of its kind designed exclusively for the purpose of promoting international co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development. If the Conference succeeds in laying the foundation of co-operation in this field, it will have rendered a valuable service to the international community. By generating confidence and trust, it could also contribute to the development of international co-operation in other areas of endeavour under the auspices of the United Nations.

CHAPTER XII

IAEA safeguards and related activities

Introduction

THIS CHAPTER HAS BEEN PROVIDED by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It deals primarily with safeguards and related activities of the Agency during 1983, and describes the situation at the end of the year. IAEA safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials and other equipment or information for military and other prohibited activities have been evolving almost since its establishment in 1956, and thus its methodology has been described briefly in earlier editions of *The Yearbook*.¹

Status of safeguards

A. *Safeguards agreements under the non-proliferation Treaty*

As of 31 December 1983, non-proliferation Treaty safeguards agreements had entered into force for 76 of the 117 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty at that time. The non-nuclear-weapon States having safeguards agreements in force under the Treaty are shown in annex I to this chapter.² For 41 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, the relevant safeguards agreements had not entered into force at the end of 1983 and an agreement with the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam was under negotiation.

B. *Agreements providing for safeguards other than those in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty*

By the end of 1983, the Agency was applying safeguards in 10 non-nuclear-weapon States which were not party to the non-proliferation Treaty, namely, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa and Spain.

For a complete list of the status of the agreements concerned as of 31 December 1983, see annex II to this chapter.

¹ See, for instance, *The Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, chap. XI; vol. 4: 1979, chap. XIV; or vol. 5: 1980, chap. XII.

² A reference to a party in this chapter, including its footnotes and annexes, does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the secretariat of IAEA or of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country or of its authorities or of its designation or concerning the limitation of its frontiers.

C. *Safeguards agreements under the Treaty of Tlatelolco*

Article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco requires States parties to the Treaty to enter into safeguards agreements with the Agency. The terms of the safeguards agreements negotiated so far under the Treaty of Tlatelolco are practically identical to those of the non-proliferation Treaty safeguards agreements, with some variations to take account of the different provisions of the two Treaties. Three States (Colombia, Mexico and Panama) have negotiated safeguards agreements with the Agency pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Mexico's agreement had entered into force but was suspended upon the subsequent conclusion of an agreement in connection with both the non-proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The agreement with Colombia entered into force on 22 December 1982 and safeguards are now applied pursuant to that agreement. The agreement with Panama was signed on 15 February 1977, but had not yet entered into force at the end of 1983.

Related activities

A. *International plutonium storage*

The concept of international plutonium storage was incorporated into the statute of the Agency in 1957 under article XII.A.5. Its aim is the international physical control of plutonium at the most sensitive fuel cycle stage—the storage and handling of plutonium in separated form after re-processing and before use.

In December 1978, an expert group was established on international plutonium storage, consisting of experts from 37 States members of the Agency. The Expert Group presented its technical report to the Director General of the Agency, outlining three alternative approaches to the implementation of article XII.A.5 of the Agency's statute as an extension of the Agency's safeguards system. The Expert Group did not reach consensus on a concept for international plutonium storage implemented under the provisions of the Agency's statute. The report of the Expert Group was submitted to the Agency's Board of Governors, which requested the Director General to submit his views so that consideration could be given to possible future arrangements. The Board agreed to hold consultations on the matter before further discussion.

B. *International spent-fuel management*

The Expert Group on International Spent-Fuel Management was first convened in 1979 and submitted a final report in 1982.³ The Expert Group examined the potential for international co-operation in the management of spent fuel and possible roles which IAEA might play in solv-

³ IAEA-ISFM/EG/26 (Rev.1).

ing problems created by growing accumulations of spent fuel. It also suggested areas in which IAEA could adapt its ongoing programmes to new needs in the field of spent-fuel management.

The report of the Expert Group was submitted to the Agency's Board of Governors with the recommendation that it request the Director General to consider the Group's recommendations on technical aspects of spent-fuel management in the formulation of such programmes in the future.

C. *Committee on Assurances of Supply*

In June 1980, the Board of Governors decided to establish the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS). Its mandate is to consider and advise the Board on:

(a) Ways and means by which supplies of nuclear materials, equipment and technology and fuel cycle services could be assured on a more predictable and long-term basis in accordance with mutually acceptable considerations of non-proliferation;

(b) The Agency's role and responsibilities in relation thereto.⁴

By the end of 1983, CAS had held ten sessions. At its fourth session, in November 1981, the Committee established two working groups to carry forward its work on two subjects between sessions. It agreed that the mandates of the working groups would be:

Working Group 1: to consider the possible formulation of draft principles of international co-operation in the field of nuclear energy in accordance with the mandate of the Committee;

Working Group 2: to consider further the concepts of emergency and back-up mechanisms.

At its seventh session, in January 1983, the Committee established a further working group (Working Group 3) to consider the question of mechanisms for revising international nuclear co-operation agreements.

During 1983, CAS and its Working Group 1 continued their consideration of principles of international co-operation in the field of nuclear energy and further narrowed down the areas where the views of member States diverge. Also, CAS formulated a number of conclusions regarding revision mechanisms for examination by the Board of Governors, and concluded its consideration of emergency and back-up mechanisms by making recommendations to the Board for the establishment within the Agency of a system which would contain information to be made available to a member State seeking relief through such a mechanism.

⁴ IAEA documents GOV/1997 and GOV/OR.553.

Physical protection of nuclear material

In response to growing recognition of the need for physical protection against theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups, the Agency in 1972 published recommendations on physical protection of nuclear materials in use, storage and transit. This publication, subsequently revised in 1977, has been widely used by Member States as a guide for establishing their national system of physical protection of potentially hazardous nuclear material. While physical protection is not part of the Agency's safeguards system, it is recognized that the national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material and of containment and surveillance measures, as required for safeguards purposes, are also relevant to the national systems of physical protection.

In order to further enhance co-operation among States in the area of physical protection of nuclear material, the Agency provided a forum for negotiation between governmental representatives of an international agreement on physical protection of nuclear material, which was completed on 28 October 1979 with the adoption of the text of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Convention aims at ensuring that the prescribed levels of protection are applied to potentially hazardous nuclear materials during international transport. It also provides for establishment by States parties of criminal jurisdiction over certain offenses involving nuclear material and extradition of criminals committing such offenses. The Convention was opened for signature on 3 March 1980 and has since been signed by 36 States and EURATOM; it had been ratified by 8 States by the end of 1983. Before the Convention enters into force, 21 instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval must be deposited with the Director General of the Agency.

Conclusion

The non-proliferation Treaty is the corner-stone of international non-proliferation efforts. The vast majority of nuclear facilities in the non-nuclear-weapon States, as indicated in the annexes below, are under non-proliferation Treaty safeguards, and most others, including complex and sophisticated facilities in the countries concerned, are under non-Treaty safeguards agreements.

At the same time, as evidenced in this chapter and chapter XI above, it has become clear that it is relevant to the perpetuation of the non-proliferation régime and to international development for all States to have access to technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, that is, assurances of supply are necessary for States which agree to submit their nuclear activities to full international control.

ANNEX I

Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty having safeguards agreements in force under the Treaty

The following 76 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have concluded safeguards agreements—now in force—pursuant to the Treaty.^a

Afghanistan	Holy See	Netherlands
Australia	Honduras	New Zealand
Austria	Hungary	Nicaragua
Bangladesh	Iceland	Norway
Belgium	Indonesia	Papua New Guinea
Bulgaria	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Paraguay
Canada	Iraq	Peru
Costa Rica	Ireland	Philippines
Cyprus	Italy	Poland
Czechoslovakia	Ivory Coast	Portugal
Denmark	Jamaica	Republic of Korea
Dominican Republic	Japan	Romania
Ecuador	Jordan	Samoa
Egypt	Lebanon	Senegal
El Salvador	Lesotho	Singapore
Ethiopia	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Sudan
Fiji	Liechtenstein	Suriname
Finland	Luxembourg	Swaziland
Gambia	Madagascar	Sweden
German Democratic Republic	Malaysia	Switzerland
Germany, Federal Republic of	Maldives	Thailand
Ghana	Mauritius	Turkey
Greece	Mexico	Uruguay
Guatemala	Mongolia	Venezuela
	Morocco	Yugoslavia
	Nepal	Zaire

^a In 37 cases, no safeguards are applied because the State concerned does not yet have any significant nuclear activities. Full application will begin as soon as the State concerned acquires nuclear material or a plant requiring the application of safeguards.

ANNEX II

Agreements providing for safeguards, other than those in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty, approved by the Board as of 31 December 1983

(While the Agency is a party to each of the following agreements, the list mentions only the State(s) party(ies) to them.)

<i>Party(ies)^a</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Entry into force</i>	<i>IAEA document No. INFCIRC</i>
(a) Project agreements			
Argentina	Siemens SUR-100 RAEP Reactor	13 March 1970 2 December 1964	143 62
Chile	Herald Reactor	19 December 1969	137
Finland ^b	FiR-I Reactor FINN sub-critical assembly	30 December 1960 30 July 1963	24 53
Greece ^b	GRR-I Reactor	1 March 1972	163
Indonesia ^b	Additional core load for TRIGA Reactor	19 December 1969	136
Iran (Islamic Republic of) ^b	UTRR Reactor	10 May 1967	97
Jamaica ^b	Fuel for research reactor	Approved by the Board October 1983 ^c	—
Japan ^b	JRR-3	24 March 1959	3
Malaysia ^c /United States	TRIGA Mark II Reactor	22 September 1980	287
Mexico ^b	TRIGA-III Reactor Siemens SUR-100 Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Plant	18 December 1963 21 December 1971 12 February 1974	52 162 203
Morocco ^b	Fuel for research reactor	2 December 1983	313
Pakistan	PRR Reactor Booster rods for KANUPP	5 March 1962 17 June 1968	34 116
Peru ^c	Research Reactor and fuel therefor	9 May 1978	266
Philippines ^b	PRR-I Reactor	28 September 1966	88
Romania ^b	TRIGA Reactor Experimental fuel elements	30 March 1973 1 July 1983	206 307
Spain	Coral I Reactor	23 June 1967	99
Turkey	Sub-critical assembly	17 May 1974	212
Uruguay ^b	URR-Reacto	24 September 1965	67
Venezuela	RV-I Reactor	7 November 1975	238
Viet Nam	Fuel for research reactor	1 July 1983	308

<i>Party(ies)^a</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Entry into force</i>	<i>IAEA document No. INFCIRC</i>
Yugoslavia ^b	TRIGA-II KRSKO Nuclear Power Plant	4 October 1961 14 June 1974	32 213
Zaire ^b	Trico Reactor	27 June 1962	37
<i>(b) Unilateral submissions^d</i>			
Argentina	Atucha Power Reactor Facility	3 October 1972	168
	Nuclear material	23 October 1973	202
	Embalse Power Reactor Facility	6 December 1974	224
	Equipment	22 July 1977	250
	Nuclear material, mate- rial, equipment and facilities	22 July 1977	251
	Atucha Nuclear Power Reactor II	15 July 1981	294
	Heavy water plant	14 October 1981	296
	Heavy water	14 October 1981	297
	Nuclear material	8 July 1982	303
Chile	Nuclear material	31 December 1974	256
	Nuclear material	22 September 1982	304
Cuba	Nuclear research reactor and fuel thereto	25 September 1980	298
	Nuclear power plant and nuclear material	5 May 1980	281
	Zero power nuclear reactor and nuclear material	7 October 1983	311
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Research reactor and nuclear material for this reactor	20 July 1977	252
India	Nuclear material, mate- rial and facilities	17 November 1977	260
Pakistan	Nuclear material	2 March 1977	248
Spain	Nuclear material	19 November 1974	218
	Nuclear material	18 June 1975	221
	Vandellos Nuclear Power Plant	11 May 1981	292
	Four nuclear facilities	11 May 1981	291
United Kingdom	Nuclear material	14 December 1972	175
Viet Nam	Research reactor and fuel therefor	12 June 1981	293
<i>(c) Treaty of Tlatelolco</i>			
Colombia	All nuclear material	22 December 1982	306
Mexico ^b	All nuclear material, equipment and facili- ties	6 September 1968	118

<i>Party(ies)^a</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Entry into force</i>	<i>IAEA document No. INFCIRC</i>
Panama	All nuclear material	—	—
<i>(d) Agreements concluded with nuclear-weapon States on the basis of voluntary offers</i>			
France	Nuclear material in facilities submitted to safeguards	12 September 1981	290
United Kingdom	Nuclear material in facilities designated by the Agency	14 August 1978	263
United States	Nuclear material in facilities designated by the Agency	9 December 1980	288
<i>(e) Other agreements^d</i>			
Argentina/United States of America		25 July 1969	130
Australia ^b /United States of America		26 September 1966	91
Austria ^b /United States of America		24 January 1970	152
Brazil/Germany, Federal Republic of ^b		26 February 1976	237
Brazil/United States of America		31 October 1968	110
Colombia/United States of America		9 December 1979	144
India/Canada ^b		30 September 1971	211
India/United States of America		27 January 1971	154
Iran (Islamic Republic of) ^b /United States of America		20 August 1969	127
Israel/United States of America		4 April 1975	249
Japan ^b /Canada ^b		20 June 1966	85
Japan ^b /France		22 September 1972	171
Japan/United States of America		10 July 1968	119
Japan ^b /United Kingdom		15 October 1968	125
Pakistan/Canada		17 October 1969	135
Pakistan/France		18 March 1976	239
Philippines ^b /United States of America		19 July 1968	120
Portugal ^b /United States of America ^b		19 July 1969	131
Republic of Korea/United States of America		5 January 1968	111
Republic of Korea ^b /France		22 September 1975	233
South Africa/United States of America		28 June 1974	98
South Africa/France		5 January 1977	244
Spain/United States of America		28 June 1974	92
Spain/Canada ^b		10 February 1977	247
Spain/Germany, Federal Republic of ^b		29 September 1982	305
Sweden ^b /United States of America		1 March 1972	165
Switzerland ^b /United States of America ^b		28 February 1972	161
Turkey/United States of America		5 June 1969	123
Venezuela/United States of America		27 March 1968	122

^a See footnote 2 of main text of this chapter.

^b Application of Agency safeguards under this agreement has been suspended in the State indicated, as the State has concluded an agreement in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty.

^c The requirement for the application of safeguards under this agreement was satisfied by the application of safeguards pursuant to the agreement concluded by the State in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty.

^d The designations of parties utilized in this section of the annex are the exclusive responsibility of IAEA.

Editorial note

IAEA has informed the United Nations of two additional safeguards agreements by which the Agency applies safeguards to the nuclear facilities in Taiwan, China. The relations between the Agency and the authorities in Taiwan are non-governmental and the agreements are implemented by the Agency on that basis.

PART THREE

**Prohibition or restriction of use
of other weapons**

Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

Introduction

THE EFFORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY to limit or prohibit the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons date back to 1874, when the Brussels Declaration prohibited the use of poisons and poisoned bullets in warfare. Some limitations on the use of asphyxiating or deleterious gases were imposed by the Hague Declaration, IV (2), of 1899, and the Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 confirmed the banning of poison or poisoned weapons. In spite of those instruments, chemical weapons were widely used in the First World War: according to official reports, gas casualties numbered about 1.3 million, of which 100,000 were fatal. That use of toxic gases generated so powerful a sense of outrage that countries were encouraged to adopt measures against both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The result was the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925,¹ which prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, as well as of bacteriological methods of warfare. The Protocol has established a general rule of international law and, with some exceptions, has in practice been generally adhered to by States. As of 31 December 1983, 105 States were parties to the Protocol.²

The subject continued to be discussed in the United Nations in the 1950s and 1960s primarily as one aspect of various comprehensive disarmament proposals.³

Scientific developments since the Second World War, that made possible the manufacture of chemical and bacteriological weapons which would have devastating effects and made the capability of delivering them infinitely more efficient than prior to that period, resulted in increasing interest in the question of further prohibitions on chemical and bacteriological weapons.⁴ Among the issues that impeded progress was the question whether chemical and bacteriological weapons should

¹ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138, p. 65.

² See *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5) and appendix I below.

³ For details, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 16.

⁴ This led to the study entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24), initiated on the recommendation of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC).

be considered jointly or as separate issues; in 1971, agreement was reached in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) that these two aspects should be dealt with independently. As a result, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction was commended for signature by the General Assembly in resolution 2826 (XXVI). The Convention was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975. At the end of 1983, 98 States were parties to it.⁵

Since 1971, the discussions on the question of chemical weapons have involved a number of complex matters, such as the scope of a prohibition and the question of verification. Between 1972 and 1982, numerous proposals and working papers were considered in the CCD and its successor, the Committee on Disarmament, including texts of draft conventions on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Also, each year the General Assembly has adopted resolutions expressing the need for negotiations to continue, as a matter of high priority, with a view to reaching early agreement on such a comprehensive and effective convention.⁶ At its tenth special session, in 1978, the Assembly stated in its Final Document that it considered the conclusion of such an instrument to be one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations.⁷

Parallel to the multilateral negotiations, between 1974 and 1980, the Soviet Union and the United States conducted bilateral negotiations on the question, and in 1979 and 1980 the two countries submitted substantial reports to the Committee on Disarmament on the progress which they had achieved.⁸

A significant development in 1980 was the decision of the Committee on Disarmament to establish an *ad hoc* working group on chemical weapons, with a mandate to define, through substantive examination, issues to be dealt with in the negotiation of a chemical weapons convention. In 1981, the Group, which was re-established, set out 18 draft "elements" for inclusion in such a convention.

A new aspect was added to the discussion in 1980, when allegations, which gave rise to controversy, were made on the basis of reports of the use of such weapons in certain parts of the world. The General Assembly called for an investigation by the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of experts, which submitted an initial report⁹ to the Assembly

⁵ See footnote 2.

⁶ See previous editions of *The Yearbook*, especially vol. 1: 1976, chap. XII; vol. 3: 1978, chap. XVI; and vol. 6: 1981, chap. XII.

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 21 and 75. (The Final Document is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I.)

⁸ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), vol. II, document CD/48, and *ibid.*, *Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27)*, appendix II (CD/139), vol. II, document CD/112; the reports are summarized in *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, chap. XV, and vol. 5: 1980, chap. XIII.

⁹ A/36/613, annex.

at its thirty-sixth session, in 1981, and a final one¹⁰ at its thirty-seventh session, in 1982.

In 1982, at its twelfth special session, the General Assembly made no tangible progress concerning chemical weapons, despite widespread recognition of the urgent need to deal with the question and the submission, among others, of a document by the USSR¹¹ on the basic provisions of a convention banning such weapons. The Committee on Disarmament, for its part, was able to make only limited progress, although the *Ad Hoc* Working Group was given a broader mandate and intensified its work towards the elaboration of a chemical weapons convention. It achieved further clarification of some divergent viewpoints, but little advance towards consensus on the questions of scope and verification of such a convention.

With regard to bacteriological (biological) weapons, the First Review Conference of the parties to the 1972 Convention was held in March 1980 for the purpose of ensuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention were being realized.¹² In the Final Declaration of the Conference¹³ the States parties reaffirmed their support of the Convention, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives and their commitment to implement effectively its provisions.

Questions related to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons were not discussed in a substantive way in the Disarmament Commission in 1983.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1983

The question of the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons continued to be considered by the Committee on Disarmament in pursuance of General Assembly resolutions 37/98 A, B and D and in accordance with its programme of work. As at previous sessions of the Committee, most of the substantive work in 1983 was carried out by the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons,¹⁴ which was re-established on 29 March, on the basis of its former mandate. A large number of delegations also made statements on the question in plenary meetings of the Committee.¹⁵ There was common agreement that a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons should be comprehensive in scope, including all existing and possible types of chemical weapons and that current stockpiles should be destroyed and production and storage facilities dismantled. However, it was also recognized that additional efforts were needed to achieve, at the earliest possible date,

¹⁰ A/37/259, annex.

¹¹ A/S-12/AC.1/12 and Corr.1. See also footnote 18.

¹² See *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. XIV.

¹³ BWC/CONF.1/10, sect. II.

¹⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, paras. 77-80.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, appendix III (CD/421), vols. I-V.

agreement on various aspects on which differences of viewpoint remained. Those differences concerned such areas as: the need for the inclusion of a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, as covered by the Geneva Protocol; the non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry and verification measures which might be applied thereto; and systematic verification to ensure non-development of chemical weapons in the future.

The United States submitted a new working paper entitled "United States detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban"¹⁶ elaborating further general points it had presented in 1982.¹⁷ In introducing the paper, its representative reiterated that the United States supported a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons and stressed the need for prohibition of the use of such weapons in circumstances not covered by the Geneva Protocol. Existing chemical weapons stocks and production and filling facilities should be promptly declared, and destroyed over a 10-year period. The key to an effective convention, he stated, was the firm assurance of compliance through effective verification. There should be systematic international on-site inspection on an agreed basis on declared chemical weapons stockpiles, production facilities and filling facilities and on the process of their elimination, as well as on declared facilities for permitted production of chemicals posing a particular risk. In addition, an effective mechanism for dealing with compliance issues would be essential, one that would promote prompt resolution of problems at the lowest possible political level, at the same time permitting them to be taken to higher levels, including the Security Council, whenever that might be necessary.

A number of delegations continued to hold that since the convention was dealing with the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, it would be advisable to include in it a provision prohibiting the use of such weapons. Thus, China's representative held that the scope of the prohibition in the future convention should include a prohibition on use which would complement and strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol. While acknowledging its significance and the role it played, he observed that the Protocol had historical limitations and deficiencies and that those could be remedied by a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons, with provisions for effective verification. Referring to the areas of prohibition under the Protocol and under the future convention, the representative of China later in the session added that the foremost way to unify the two régimes would be through bringing the prohibition in the future convention in line with that of the 1925 Protocol. That could be done on the common basis of having both régimes prohibit the direct and indirect use of the toxic physiological effects of chemical substances for fighting purposes, as well as of incorporating the concept of "chemical warfare agents" in the definition of chemical weapons to be included in the convention.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, appendix II (CD/421), vol. I, document CD/343.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/37/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/335), vol. II, document CD/264.

Australia supported the inclusion of a prohibition of use in a future convention and, noting that it had worked with Argentina, China, Indonesia and Pakistan on the matter, made the following points: (a) a new convention containing a distinct ban on use would be truly comprehensive; (b) the 1925 Geneva Protocol, rather than being weakened, would be strengthened; (c) treaties built on each other and there were numerous precedents; (d) the 1925 Protocol logically should have ended the use of chemical weapons, but unfortunately it did not – indeed the potential for use of chemical weapons under the Protocol existed; (e) the Protocol did not anticipate that the concept of war would evolve into the larger concept of armed conflict; (f) the Protocol allowed for ambiguity as to the chemicals to be covered; (g) the Protocol was limited (by reservations and interpretations) to non-first-use and to States that were parties to it; and (h) the logic of future verification mechanisms, verification not being provided for under the Protocol, was that use should be included in a future ban. Argentina was one of the countries that were most firmly in favour of the inclusion of a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in the scope of the future convention and advocated that an explicit reference to such a prohibition be made in it. That would permit the possibility of verification of non-use, which was not provided for in the Protocol, and would extend the scope of the prohibition to situations of hostilities not considered as cases of war or not foreseen in 1925.

On the other hand, a number of delegations expressed apprehension that the duplication in the future convention might be detrimental to the prohibition of use established by the Geneva Protocol. It was suggested that the problem should be solved by stressing the importance of the Geneva Protocol in the preamble of the future convention, and including in it an article stating that none of its provisions should be interpreted as in any way limiting or diminishing the undertakings of States under the Geneva Protocol and certain other international agreements.

That view was supported by, among others, the Soviet Union. As it announced early in the session, its decision to agree with the solution which had been proposed by a number of non-aligned and neutral States members of the Committee represented a change in its position. The change would make it necessary to amend the wording of the main prohibition contained in the “Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction”, which it had submitted to the Committee the previous year,¹⁸ so that it would cover the use of such weapons. Consequently, the section of the convention on verification should include appropriate procedures regarding compliance with the provision on the prohibition of their use. Czechoslovakia, for its part, observed that there was consensus that nothing in the convention should weaken the Geneva Protocol of 1925. In its view, one of the acceptable ways to ensure that would be to cover the prohibition of use by an explicit reference to the Protocol and its direct relevance for the parties to the convention.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. III, document CD/294; footnote 11 also refers.

Belgium believed the prohibition of use, whether of chemical or biological weapons, had become a prohibition of a general nature deriving from the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Because customary international law had established sufficiently the fact that the prohibition-of-use régime was common to both bacteriological and chemical weapons, Belgium expressed some reservations regarding the repetition of that prohibition within the framework of a convention on chemical weapons. It believed that the real problem lay in the verification of compliance with the prohibition enacted by the Geneva Protocol and subsequently enhanced by customary international law. In addition, it feared that incorporation of the prohibition of use within the convention might create a lacuna with regard to bacteriological weapons. It had, therefore, the previous year, proposed specific machinery for the verification of the prohibition on the use of both biological and chemical weapons.¹⁹

France also maintained reservations, believing that a repetition of non-use in the text of the future convention might create more problems than it resolved. In its view, it was essential to avoid in any way undermining the authority of the Geneva Protocol, which was the very basis of the régime of the prohibition of use of chemical weapons. France later reiterated that it was not convinced of the need for the inclusion of a non-use clause, as such a prohibition was already ensured in as complete a manner as possible by the 1925 Protocol. However, if a consensus emerged in favour of a repetition, it would be necessary to avoid anything which would prejudice the authority of the Protocol, and therefore it believed the preamble of the future convention ought to contain a paragraph reaffirming the Protocol's validity and stating that it formed part of international law.

Sweden advocated caution with regard to inclusion of prohibition because of the possible detrimental effects it could have on the Geneva Protocol. Such effects would be particularly serious if they were to create misgivings among the parties to the Protocol about its value. If, however, a majority of States were in favour of such an inclusion, that would reflect a new situation, which could be discussed. India similarly considered that the Protocol was adequate for prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. As it constituted a universal legal prohibition against their use, which was recognized in both international and customary law, India was apprehensive that the duplication of its provisions in another instrument might undermine its legal force and status. However, having reviewed its position, India, too, would be willing to support the incorporation of a suitable provision for a ban on use in the proposed convention if it supplemented and strengthened the prohibition already contained in the Protocol.

Many delegations emphasized, as at previous sessions of the Committee, the importance of verification of compliance with the terms of the future convention. In addition to expressing general agreement that its verification system should be based on a combination of national and in-

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, document CD/301.

ternational means which would complement and supplement each other, members voiced narrower differences of view than at previous sessions concerning co-operative international means of verification, including appropriate provisions for systematic on-site inspections. That was due in part to the position adopted by the Soviet Union, mentioned above, according to which the procedures for the verification of compliance with the prohibition of use should be contained within the section of the future convention on verification, including on-site inspection on a voluntary basis. Later in the session, the USSR reminded the Committee that, while it believed that national forms of verification, national technical means and international on-site verification on the basis of a justified request were adequate for verification purposes, it had agreed nevertheless that verification of the destruction of stocks and of the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes should be conducted on the basis of mandatory international on-site verification.

Poland emphasized, in commenting on the generally agreed acceptance of certain on-site inspections as a permanent feature of the international aspect of the verification system, that if some members were to continue to insist on the consideration of only those verification procedures, the Committee's elaboration of a draft convention would be long delayed. There was not, in Poland's view, only one problem, but there were others that deserved equally serious treatment, that also concerned verification. Moreover, Poland added, it was high time to commence the actual drafting process; that would above all require that the Working Group be re-established and set to work.

The German Democratic Republic early in the session expressed its reaffirmation of the proposal contained in the Prague Declaration²⁰ for a European chemical-weapon-free zone, and stated for its part that it stood ready to negotiate towards the creation of such a zone, together with interested States.

Viet Nam, speaking as a non-member, outlined the organization and findings of the International Symposium on Herbicides and Defoliants in War: Long-Term Effects on Man and Nature, which had been held at Ho Chi Minh City early in the year and attended by 160 experts, nearly half from 21 foreign countries, including both Eastern European and Western ones. It reported that there had been considerable damage in the host country's area, not only to tropical forests, which, in heavily sprayed areas, were on the point of disappearing, but also to river, maritime and coastal ecological systems; there was also strong evidence of harmful effects on humans from the use of herbicides and defoliants. Consequently, Viet Nam underlined the urgency of achieving a universal prohibition of chemical weapons. It felt that a sound basis for the speedy drafting of a convention existed in the practical proposals that had been put forward, particularly the "Basic provisions" presented by the USSR. Viet Nam felt that the future convention must provide for effective assurance of its strict application, but that verification methods should

²⁰ A/38/67-S/15556 and Corr.1.

not interfere in the internal affairs of States or create obstacles for the chemical industry for peaceful purposes.

The United Kingdom believed that the verification régime for the convention should combine routine international on-site inspections with the possibility of fact-finding procedures to investigate any doubt which might arise about compliance, and that agreement must be reached on a procedure for handling complaints. Routine international on-site inspection would be required for four actions contained in the provisions envisaged for the convention, namely, destruction of stockpiles, destruction of production facilities, production of super-toxic agents for permitted activities, and monitoring to ensure that chemical weapons were not being produced after the destruction of existing stockpiles. To facilitate an agreement on the last action, the United Kingdom submitted a working paper entitled "Verification of non-production of chemical weapons",²¹ whose aim was to show that the régime required to verify non-production need not be as onerous to the chemical industry as had been suggested. France believed that the verification system for the destruction of stocks should, in the first instance, guarantee that the nature and the quantity of the products destroyed in fact corresponded to what had been declared. Secondly, there must be no possibility for the diversion or substitution of products during the process of destruction. Finally, the system should guarantee that the destruction was carried out in a manner that was irreversible and that the final products were unusable as chemical weapons. In order to guarantee all that, international verification should be carried out continuously throughout the period of destruction operations; that meant that international inspectors would have to have access at all times to every part of those operations. As to on-site inspection by challenge, France believed that a consensus appeared to be emerging that a State subject to such a request should not be able to refuse to accede to it without explanations. It felt that once the destruction of stocks and facilities was complete, verification by the drawing of lots appeared to offer an appropriate method, and that on-site inspections should be conducted by an international team.

Argentina stressed that while verification should include systematic on-site inspection to investigate possible non-compliance with the convention, the system should be simply a mutual reassurance for States and not a mechanism of such complexity that by its nature it would entail endless negotiations.

According to Yugoslavia, the verification of chemical weapons should be implemented on the basis of national and international procedures: national verification should not preclude international activity, but rather the two should complement each other. Later in the session, Yugoslavia introduced a working paper²² dealing with technical aspects of the process of verification having to do with the declaration of stockpiles of chemical weapons, including facilities for the production of

²¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/421), vol. II, document CD/353.

²² *Ibid.*, vol. III, document CD/393.

chemical warfare agents and facilities for filling chemical weapons, the destruction of stockpiles and the monitoring of facilities for the production of super-toxic chemical agents for permitted purposes. Yugoslavia, bearing in mind three categories of toxicity of chemical warfare agents, shared the view expressed by a number of delegations that control should be comprehensive with regard to the verification of the destruction of super-toxic chemical agents, while less rigorous measures might be implemented for the destruction of the stockpiles of lethal or harmful agents. That meant that for the first category on-site inspection should be applied, which might be systematic or random, while for the second and third categories, national measures might be accepted with periodic international on-site verification.

Among other pertinent issues addressed in plenary meetings of the Committee was the question of the definition of chemical weapons. Japan, in referring to the problem, suggested that it was important by the time a convention was concluded to identify and list the chemical agents known to be used for weapons purposes and that such listing should become an accepted common undertaking by States parties to the convention. The convention should prohibit the development, production and so forth of the listed agents as chemical weapons, although a small quantity might be permitted for protective purposes in a very limited way. Japan added that there would probably be a need to provide for the constant up-dating of such a list.

In addition to the very large number of documents submitted on the item in previous years, the Committee and its *Ad Hoc* Working Group in 1983 had before them numerous new documents, both working papers and conference room papers.²³

The *Ad Hoc* Working Group was re-established by the Committee on 29 March under the chairmanship of Ambassador D. S. McPhail of Canada. It held 23 meetings between 6 April and 22 August and, in addition, the Chairman held a number of informal consultations. At their request, representatives of Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and Viet Nam, which were not members of the Committee, participated in the work of the Group. As a result of its work, the Group submitted a detailed report to the Committee, which was incorporated integrally into the Committee's report to the General Assembly.²⁴

During the session the Working Group intensified its efforts aimed at elaborating a convention on the basis of both existing material and new proposals. The main tasks of the Group were to attempt to resolve the remaining major items of substance on which there was still disagreement and to record the substance of the areas of agreement which had already been achieved. To that effect, on the basis of a proposal by the Chair-

²³ See *ibid.*, *Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, paragraph 79, for a list of all the documents submitted; the paragraph contains the report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

man, the Group decided to set up four contact groups to deal with specific spheres of the convention, as follows:

- (a) Contact Group A: Existing stockpiles;
- (b) Contact Group B: Compliance provisions and verification issues;
- (c) Contact Group C: Prohibition of use;
- (d) Contact Group D: Definitions.

The remaining two major issues, destruction of existing means of production and non-production, and others requiring attention, such as the prohibition of transfers and non-development, were considered by the Working Group itself. Areas of apparent prior consensus, including many aspects of the question of scope, definitions, co-operative and confidence-building measures, national implementation and international verification, and preambular and additional provisions relating to substance, were not discussed in detail. They were taken into account by the Group, however, in its work and in arriving at its conclusions. In spite of considerable general agreement, differences on some important issues persisted throughout the 1983 session of the Committee.

Thus, although confirming the degree of consensus achieved the previous year, various delegations in Contact Group A continued to differ, while considering the actual steps in the destruction process of chemical weapons stocks, about whether verification of destruction should be carried out by inspections on a quota basis or by continuous inspection. They also maintained their different views on the verification of the accuracy of declarations of stocks, the desirability of indicating their location and the possibilities of diverting weapons to peaceful purposes.

Although fact-finding procedures related to verification by challenge and some aspects of the structure and functions of a consultative committee were elaborated in Contact Group B, agreement was not reached on the stringency of the obligation to submit to on-site inspection in cases of challenge. Similarly, there was substantive agreement in Group C on the incorporation of the prohibition of use in the scope of a convention, as well as corresponding verification measures, and general recognition of the need for effective investigation of suspected use. The requirement remained, however, to work out a consensus formulation for inclusion of such a prohibition in the convention that would take into account both the Geneva Protocol and existing international law.

As to issues related to definitions, including those for chemical weapons themselves, precursors and key precursors, to criteria for drawing up a list or lists of precursors and the verification of their production, and to small-scale production of super-toxic chemicals for legal purposes, which were dealt with by Contact Group D, more work turned out to be needed. Accordingly the report was set out in two parts, the first contained views which the co-ordinator felt had not met with objections from delegations, and the second contained alternative views which had not met with agreement and included the objections raised. The difficulties encountered were connected mainly with the size of the chemical

industry, the number of plants and inspectors needed and the possible compromise of classified commercial process information.

The Working Group itself found the differences on matters concerning the existing means of production to be among the most difficult to resolve. Problems persisted regarding the declaration of plants. The need to inspect, close and seal declared plants was explored, as well as approaches to their elimination. The questions of the timing of declarations, the specification of locations, the methods of their elimination and possible special requirements for facilities for binary weapons²⁵ were also addressed. Finally, proposals for systematic international verification were advanced.

Regarding the area of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry, basic differences also remained, particularly with regard to possible restrictions on chemicals for permitted purposes and the development of lists, for example, of key precursors. Differences also remained concerning the verification measures which might be applied. On the question of the prohibition of transfers, agreement was reached that, except for elimination purposes, they would be restricted. It was also accepted that further consideration was required regarding the allowable circumstances and amounts for such transfers.

On the question of non-development, there was agreement that further development of chemical weapons should be prohibited, but it appeared that reaching consensus on verification by any systematic means would be difficult because of the need to preserve the right to undertake work for protection or for other permitted purposes.

The work and reports of the co-ordinators of the Contact Groups were discussed in depth in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group. The Group was able to elaborate substantive provisions, many of which were agreed upon, for a chemical weapons convention under main and sub-headings as follows:

- (a) General provisions
 - (i) Purpose and commitments
 - (ii) Definitions and criteria
 - (iii) Compliance
- (b) Specific provisions for elimination
 - (i) Existing stocks of chemical weapons
 - (ii) Existing means of production
- (c) Other substantive provisions
 - (i) Future chemical weapons non-production verification
 - (ii) Verification of the prohibition of use
 - (iii) Permitted transfers

²⁵ Binary weapons contain two chemical agents which, although they are not highly toxic individually, generate an extremely toxic substance when combined during delivery or upon impact.

- (d) Operational provisions
 - (i) National means for implementation
 - (ii) National technical means
 - (iii) International means for implementation
- (e) Co-operation and confidence-building provisions
 - (i) Consultation and co-operation
 - (ii) Protection of population and environment
 - (iii) Promotion of development goals
- (f) Additional provisions
 - (i) Preamble and other provisions
 - (ii) Withdrawal.

The Working Group's report to the Committee consisted of a four-section summary—"Introduction", "Organization of work and documentation", "Substantive work during the 1983 session" and "Conclusions on the substance of a possible convention"—and two annexes, the first containing the substantive provisions which it considered should be included in a convention, and the second consisting of the mandates of the co-ordinators of the four Contact Groups and their reports submitted to the Working Group. The portions of annex I which were not agreed to by all delegations, whether additional proposals or alternatives to other texts, were indicated as such and included in the annex.

The Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, in introducing the report to the Committee on Disarmament, commented on what the Group had accomplished in 1983 in order to supplement what the report itself indicated, and he outlined the process and working methods that had resulted in an integrated and systematic document, agreed to by the entire Group. Although it did not solve all substantive problems, it had made some progress in that regard. In certain areas, the intensive examination of comparable positions had revealed greater coincidence of views than had previously been apparent, such as agreement on the use of chemical names in the declaration of stocks and the usefulness of on-site automatic instruments in assisting other techniques of verification. Some new proposals which had been put forward were incorporated into the common document, among them, the United Kingdom's proposals for monitoring of non-production; separate Soviet proposals on prohibition of use, on prohibition of compounds containing the methyl-phosphorus bonds and on details required in declarations of stocks; and a proposal by Egypt on assistance in the event of violation. At the same time, the Chairman emphasized that there remained major areas wherein agreement was needed if there was to be success and that would require the making of hard decisions in capital cities. After noting that he had mentioned but a few of the many contributions made, he commended to the Committee, for its approval, the three recommendations made by the Working Group in its report, in order that a ban on chemical weapons might be finalized at the earliest possible time.

Towards the end of the session, both the Soviet Union and the United States made statements in which, while praising the *Ad Hoc* Working Group and its Chairman for their concerted efforts and working methods, each generally held the other responsible for the lack of greater substantive progress. In that regard, the USSR emphasized the United States further movement towards the production of binary weapons, noting that the Senate had earmarked funds for that purpose. The situation had also been complicated, the USSR stated, by, among other things, the United States avoiding concurrence with draft wordings for the future convention and maintaining a rigid position on the question of the verification of the destruction of stocks, as well as by more broadly based disagreements among members in such areas as the content of initial declarations of stocks. For its part, the United States—observing that the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom felt similarly—held that some key delegations had not been sufficiently prepared to discuss some of the main issues; for instance, several important proposals put forward in working papers had not received a detailed response, and the Soviet Union had refused to discuss production and filling facilities. It added that the drafting of treaty texts could not proceed faster than the resolution of key issues. The American representative then introduced a working paper²⁶ inviting member and observer delegations to participate in a workshop in the United States in November 1983, which would provide opportunities for a first-hand look at the procedures it used for the destruction of chemical weapons, briefings on its operations and discussion of all viewpoints regarding verification of destruction.

The Committee on Disarmament accepted the following recommendations of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group:

(a) That the views set forth in annex I to its report—substantive provisions to be included in a chemical weapons convention—be used as the basis for the future work of the Group;

(b) That the views contained in the reports of the Contact Groups appended as annex II to its report, including the draft formulations for possible use in a future convention, together with other relevant previous reports and documents of the Committee and future ones, also be utilized in the further elaboration of a convention;

(c) That the Working Group resume negotiations at the outset of the 1984 session of the Committee on Disarmament aimed at the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest date.

In conformity with recommendation (c), the Committee decided, at its 237th plenary meeting, on 26 August, that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons should resume its activities on 16 January 1984.

²⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1), appendix II (CD/421), vol. III, document CD/419.*

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

For the consideration of the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session had before it the report of the Committee on Disarmament, including that of its *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons,²⁷ the report of the Secretary-General containing that of the Group of Consultant Experts established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 37/98 D on provisional procedures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,²⁸ a number of communications, 16 in all, from various Governments related to allegations of the use of such weapons,²⁹ the Communiqué adopted by the Meeting of Ministers and Heads of Delegations of the Non-Aligned Countries, held in New York from 4 to 7 October 1983,³⁰ and the resolutions adopted by the Seventieth Inter-Parliamentary Conference, held at Seoul on 12 October 1983.³¹

Four draft resolutions pertaining to the agenda item on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons were submitted in the First Committee in 1983. Two of them dealt directly with a future treaty or convention banning chemical weapons. The other two concerned the existing international instrument, the Geneva Protocol, one dealing with the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Group of Consultant Experts, mentioned above, and the other, which was later withdrawn, with the observance of existing legal constraints on chemical and bacteriological weapons and condemnation of actions contravening those constraints. The debate connected with these proposals is considered below under two subheadings.

Discussion on chemical weapons treaty negotiations

In the general debate in the General Assembly,³² almost all delegations which spoke on the subject—including Australia, China, France, the German Democratic Republic, Greece on behalf of the European Community, El Salvador, India, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Norway, Turkey, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United Republic of Cameroon and Yugoslavia—stressed the importance of reaching as soon as possible an agreement on a convention prohibiting chemical weapons, a number of them referring to the work of the Committee on Disarmament in 1983. Canada observed that the Committee had made progress in the area of chemical weapons, producing, as a result of co-operation extended to the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, a consensus document outlining the elements of a convention and recommending that the Group undertake negotiations from the outset of 1984. After noting

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1), paras. 77-80.

²⁸ A/38/435.

²⁹ See A/38/639, para. 4.

³⁰ A/38/495-S/16035.

³¹ A/38/529.

³² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 103rd meetings.

that technological development had made chemical weapons increasingly pernicious, as events in recent years had demonstrated, Canada added that it would be a real achievement if a draft convention on chemical weapons could be agreed upon by the end of 1984.

The representative of the Netherlands, referring to the chemical weapons issue as one of the main and most extensively debated items on the agenda of the Committee, had hoped that in the current year it would have matured sufficiently to allow for practical and fruitful negotiations. While substantive progress had been achieved and the analysis of the problems involved seemed to have been exhausted, he observed that the Committee should be exhorted to engage in a final drive to conclude an agreement which would free the world from the spectre of chemical warfare.

In the First Committee,³³ the delegations speaking either in the general debate or specifically on the agenda item entitled "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons" also emphasized the urgent need for conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. A number of them also discussed in detail some more specific issues such as the scope of the future convention, the question of the possibility of so-called interim measures, the problems of verification and the work of the Committee on Disarmament. The majority of them, however, reiterated views they had already expressed in other bodies, especially in the Committee on Disarmament and its Working Group.

Regarding the need for prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, the representative of China stated that during the Second World War the Geneva Protocol had played a significant part in restricting such use. However, there were still hundreds of thousands of tons of chemical weapons in the arsenals of the super-Powers. That amply proved that they did not intend to renounce those weapons of mass destruction. In recent years, a chemical arms race centring around quality improvement had also played a role in their rivalry for military superiority. Particularly worrying, in its view, were reports on the use of chemical or toxic weapons in armed conflict. All that underlined the urgent demand for speedy negotiations for the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition and destruction of all chemical weapons. Referring to the work of the Committee on Disarmament, China pointed out that some headway had been made, and the opinion in favour of including a ban on the use of chemical weapons in a convention had gained wide support, as that would complement and strengthen the 1925 Protocol. It believed there should be effective verification, including necessary on-site inspections. China stated that it would continue to take an active part in the negotiations.

Speaking on behalf of the European Community, the representative of Greece stated that the Ten welcomed the fact that some progress had been made in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, in

³³ *Ibid.*, First Committee, 3rd to 39th and 50th and 52nd meetings, and *ibid.*, First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.

particular with regard to the questions of the scope of the convention and the content of the declarations on stocks to be destroyed; he attributed that in part to a more efficient organization of work in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group.

A number of delegations, although acknowledging that some progress had been made in 1983 in the Committee, expressed their disappointment that the results fell short of their legitimate expectations. Among them were Eastern European States, including the Byelorussian SSR, Hungary, Poland and the Ukrainian SSR, and Viet Nam. Several of them voiced regret that a new arms race in chemical weapons was taking place, especially through the introduction of new types of weapons, particularly binary weapons, and held that while negotiations on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons were under way, States should renounce the production and deployment of all new types of chemical weapons. Thus, dissatisfied with the prolonged negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, the German Democratic Republic suggested some interim steps, including renunciation of the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons and regional measures against their deployment.

The proposals of those countries for the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe and a freeze on the production and deployment of chemical weapons pending the conclusion of a comprehensive convention met with some objections from several States. The United States emphasized that it was against so-called interim measures which had been proposed as steps designed to expedite negotiations, because, in its view, they would give rise to various problems, including verification and protection against the reintroduction of such weapons, and would, in short, have precisely the opposite effect. It added that efforts should be devoted to the fundamental objective of achieving a complete prohibition of chemical weapons, and that it was convinced that the multilateral forum offered the best chance for that at the current time.

On various specific questions, such as the verification of a ban on chemical weapons, views similar to those already expressed in the Committee on Disarmament were heard again in the debate in the First Committee.

The first of the two draft resolutions on the negotiation of a convention, which was entitled "Prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons", was submitted to the First Committee on 7 November by Afghanistan, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and Viet Nam, and was later also sponsored by Angola. It was introduced on 10 November by the representative of the German Democratic Republic, who stated that there were increasing signs that a new round of the arms race in the chemical field was being initiated, in that the intention existed to produce new types of chemical weapons, and underlined the need for a fresh impetus to the negotiations in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament to overcome the obstacles hampering the successful elaboration of a con-

vention on chemical weapons. In the interim, agreement on a freeze would contribute best to that objective. By the draft resolution which referred in its preamble to concern about binary weapons and to proposals for chemical-weapon-free zones, the General Assembly would urge the Committee on Disarmament to intensify the negotiations in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, would call for a freeze and would ask States to refrain from any action which might impede the negotiations. On 16 November, the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution, which was introduced the following day, again by the German Democratic Republic. In the revised text, which was submitted after consultations held in recognition of the need for strong support, the operative paragraph which had concerned the freeze during the negotiations was deleted. The German Democratic Republic added that the sponsors of the draft resolution, while agreeing to accept the suggestion that it was not necessary to include a freeze, remained of the conviction that an agreed freeze on chemical weapons would expedite the negotiations on the complete prohibition of all such weapons.

Speaking at the time of the introduction of the revised draft resolution, the Federal Republic of Germany outlined its position in the context of the proposals before the First Committee. In view of the advanced stage of the negotiations, it endorsed the hope that the Committee on Disarmament would work resolutely so as to arrive rapidly at the adoption of a draft convention. It added, however, that the situation was not entirely satisfactory in that some Eastern European delegations, in trying to shift the responsibility for lack of progress onto others, were misrepresenting facts. Although it had welcomed Soviet proposals on inspection and verification, it felt that the Soviet Union had not shown readiness to apply an adequate verification régime. The Federal Republic of Germany could not vote in favour of the first draft resolution, primarily because it was an attempt to use forums to propagate political projects, such as a chemical-weapon-free zone and a freeze on the production and deployment of chemical weapons, measures that would make the conclusion of a universal convention on chemical weapons even more difficult. It had repeatedly stated that to be truly weapon-free, a zone must no longer be within reach of such weapons and its status must be verifiable. Likewise, non-production would have to be verifiable, and the questions to be resolved in both cases would be as difficult as those for a convention. The Federal Republic would support the second draft resolution (discussed next), which was designed to instil momentum in the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

While others emphasized that they supported the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, Viet Nam, the only country to explain specifically its affirmative vote in the First Committee, emphasized the importance it attached to the earliest possible conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and said that it was, therefore, pleased to be a sponsor of both the resolutions which dealt with the question and which fully met that objective.

Among others abstaining, New Zealand, at the time of voting, stated that it could not support the draft resolution because it showed a lack of balance in its approach and threatened to hinder rather than to advance the work of the Committee on Disarmament; it added that there was no justification for singling out one kind of chemical weapon while ignoring the existing large arsenals of other kinds. Australia had similar reasons for its abstention, and added that the text did not meet its concerns with regard to the scope of a future chemical weapons convention in that it failed to refer to the inclusion of a ban on use. It also had reservations about the references to chemical-weapon-free zones in the preamble. Brazil, too, abstained, explaining that the convention should encompass all types of chemical weapons and noting that the concept of chemical-weapon-free zones was not in keeping with its position. India was unable to support the idea of the setting up of chemical-weapon-free zones as an interim measure, holding that all efforts should be global in approach, directed towards the early conclusion of a multilateral convention that would free the entire world of that kind of weapon. The Netherlands regarded the draft resolution as an unbalanced and one-sided document which affected the consensus regarding the preparation of a chemical weapon ban and which, while criticizing the resumption of the production of chemical weapons, at the same time remained silent about continuing reports of their use and did not effectively refute them.

The revised draft resolution was approved by the First Committee on 23 November by a recorded vote of 73 to 1 (United States), with 49 abstentions and was adopted by the General Assembly, on 20 December, by a recorded vote of 98 to 1, with 49 abstentions, as resolution 38/187 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, which states that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represents one of the most urgent measures of disarmament,

Referring to the unanimous and categorical reaffirmation by all Member States at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, of the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Convinced of the need for the earliest conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would significantly contribute to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Recalling its resolutions 36/96 B of 9 December 1981 and 37/98 A of 13 December 1982,

Expressing profound concern at the intended production and deployment of binary chemical weapons,

Taking into consideration the decision by the Committee on Disarmament on the mandate for the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons, as well as the work of this Group during the session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1983,

Deeming it desirable for States to refrain from taking any action that could delay or further complicate negotiations,

Aware that the qualitative improvement and development of chemical weapons complicate ongoing negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons,

Taking note of proposals on the creation of chemical-weapon-free zones aimed at facilitating the complete prohibition of chemical weapons,

1. *Reaffirms* the necessity of the speediest elaboration and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

2. *Appeals* to all States to facilitate in every possible way the conclusion of such a convention;

3. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify the negotiations in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons in fulfilment of its present mandate, to achieve accord on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date and, for this purpose, to proceed immediately to drafting such a convention for submission to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

4. *Reaffirms its call* to all States to refrain from any action that could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons on the territory of other States.

The second draft resolution on chemical weapons negotiations, entitled "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons", was submitted on 11 November by Argentina, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the Ukrainian SSR, and was later also sponsored by Australia, Belgium, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Mongolia, Spain and Viet Nam. In introducing the draft resolution on 17 November, the representative of Canada stated that the draft, by which the Assembly would urge the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention, had become known as the "traditional" chemical weapons resolution. Accordingly, he invited other States to join as sponsors in endorsing it, and asked that it be adopted by consensus so that the full weight of the international community would stand behind it.

Before the vote, New Zealand stated that it strongly supported the draft resolution, as it asked the Committee on Disarmament to intensify its work with a view to the earliest possible adoption of a convention. The Lao People's Democratic Republic, emphasizing that it was in favour of the successful completion of the negotiations, would also vote affirmatively. Following the approval of the draft resolution, the Byelorussian SSR affirmed that it was in favour of the start of negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament *Ad Hoc* Working Group and had supported the proposal on that basis.

The draft resolution was approved by the First Committee on 23 November, without a vote, and adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December, also without a vote, as resolution 38/187 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and to their destruction,

Reaffirming the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June

1925, and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,

Having considered the report of the Committee on Disarmament, which includes, *inter alia*, the report of its *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons,

Considering it necessary that all efforts be exerted for the resumption and successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

1. *Takes note* of the work of the Committee on Disarmament during its session in 1983 regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons and, in particular, appreciates the work of its *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons and the progress achieved therein;

2. *Expresses its regret* that an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated;

3. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its session in 1984, the negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date, and to re-establish its *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons for this purpose;

4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

Report of the Group of Consultant Experts established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 37/98 D on provisional procedures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol

By its resolution 37/98 D of 13 December 1982, the General Assembly, by a vote of 86 to 19, with 33 abstentions, decided to establish procedures to make possible the prompt and impartial investigation of information concerning possible violations of the provisions of the Geneva Protocol, thereby upholding its authority. It also requested the Secretary-General to investigate, with the assistance of qualified experts, information that might be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning activities that might constitute a violation of the Protocol or of the relevant rules of customary international law; to compile and maintain lists of experts to undertake such investigations, and of laboratories with the capacity to undertake testing for the presence of agents whose use was prohibited; to devise procedures, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, for such investigations; and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session. The Group of Consultant Experts established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 37/98 D on provisional procedures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol held two sessions in New York from 9 to 20 May and from 22 August to 2 September 1983. The Secretary-General's report of the Group was submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, as mentioned above.

The substance of the report was contained in two annexes.

Annex I, in pursuance of paragraph 5 of the resolution, contained the replies of 25 States to a note verbale by which the Secretary-General advised all Member States that he would appreciate receiving the names of any qualified experts and laboratories whose services they might be in a position to provide. By the terms of the resolution, the experts' services would be available at short notice to undertake investigations, and the laboratories would have the capability of testing for the presence of agents whose use was prohibited. While a number of Western and other States replied, some of them extensively, by submitting lists of experts and laboratories, three Eastern European States submitted more generally worded replies in which they explained their reasons for opposing the implementation of the resolution.

Annex II contained the report of the Group of Consultant Experts. It consisted of three main chapters: "I. Organization of work and summary of proceedings", "II. Procedures devised by the Group of Consultant Experts" and "III. Assembling and systematic organization of documentation". In addition, the report contained three appendices dealing with various specific aspects of an investigation. Chapter II on the procedures was divided into four main sections:

- (a) Criteria to guide the Secretary-General in deciding whether or not to initiate an investigation;
- (b) Follow-up actions related to the initiation of an investigation;
- (c) Specific guidance for the conduct of an investigation;
- (d) Specific tasks relating to the organization and conduct of an investigation.

In connection with the initiation problem, the report underlined that the issue was not whether the allegations in connection with a complaint were true, but whether they described a situation or incident that might be a violation of the Geneva Protocol or of the relevant rules of customary international law. A number of criteria, dealing mostly with the nature, amount and timeliness of the information provided by the Member State making the complaint, were enumerated to guide the Secretary-General in deciding whether an investigation was warranted.

With regard to follow-up actions in connection with a decision to undertake an investigation, three different types of situation were envisaged: "situation I" would obtain when the country where the incident reportedly occurred had agreed to accept a team of experts on its territory; "situation II", when access was not possible, either because the Government in question denied it or because the security of the investigating team or its logistic support could not be assured; and "situation III", when no possibility existed for visiting either the country in question or a neighbouring country. The actual follow-up actions would vary according to the requirements of each type of situation, ranging from selecting the team of experts to selecting a neighbouring country or countries where evidence might be available, and evaluating such evidence.

The section on specific guidance for the conduct of an investigation dealt with a number of different aspects of that question. Guidance was provided for the Secretariat on the classification of qualified experts and

laboratories and on the collection, handling, transportation and methods of preservation of samples, including those assumed to be chemical and biological warfare agents. Two subsections dealt with the selection of the members of the team of experts and of laboratories. A detailed procedure was devised for an on-site investigation, including the evaluation of the complaint and examination of alleged victims. Another subsection spelt out the contents of the report of a team of experts. The specific tasks relating to the organization and conduct of an investigation were envisaged in three major phases. Phase I, which would be of a preparatory nature, would start immediately after the adoption of the proposed procedures. Phase II would begin once a complaint had been received by the Secretary-General. Phase III would consist of the activities which the Secretary-General would promptly initiate once a decision had been taken to conduct an investigation.

The Group of Consultant Experts pointed out in the report that because of the complexity of the subject-matter and the short time available, it had not been possible to review thoroughly certain aspects, particularly those to be covered in chapter III on the assembling and systematic organization of documentation, but also subsections of some main sections of chapter II.

In the debate in the First Committee,³⁴ several delegations referred to reports on the alleged use of chemical weapons in different parts of the world and expressed concern about the apparent violations of the Geneva Protocol which the reports, if true, indicated.

The representative of the United States, referring to his country's findings on the use of illegal chemical weapons in Afghanistan and South-East Asia, stated that it believed that the Soviet Union and its allies had violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical weapons and the 1972 Convention on biological and toxin weapons, and he reviewed in detail his Government's evidence, which, he said, could not be explained away, that had led to that belief. Reiterating that the United States was committed to a comprehensive convention, he recalled that in 1982 the General Assembly had adopted resolutions by which it recommended that a special conference be held by the States parties to establish effective procedures to deal with issues concerning compliance with the biological weapons Convention (resolution 37/98 C), and that the Secretary-General should establish procedures to investigate promptly possible violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol (resolution 37/98 D). The United States felt that it was important that both resolutions be implemented promptly. France, referring to the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the latter resolution, observed that 17 States had provided names of experts or laboratories and that, as a result, the Secretary-General would be able to carry out an investigation if the need arose; there had also been negative replies raising legal arguments against the resolution in that it was tantamount to a revision of the 1925 Protocol.

³⁴ See *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 39th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

The resolution could not properly be interpreted that way, France held. Democratic Kampuchea, in speaking of reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons and bacteriological methods of warfare by Viet Nam in the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Democratic Kampuchea, and by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, also supported the convening of a special conference on the biological weapons Convention, provided for in resolution 37/98 C.

China considered that it was imperative to formulate procedures and measures to investigate the possible violation of the Geneva Protocol, with a view to safeguarding its authority and applying sanctions, especially since there had been further reports and evidence regarding the use of chemical and toxic weapons. Owing to its geographical proximity to the area of alleged chemical weapons attacks, Thailand attached great importance to the subject and expressed deep concern at the continuing reports of the alleged use of such weapons. Should the reports be true, the actions involved not only undermined the efforts aimed at banning the use of chemical weapons, but, in its view, also posed a threat to States and exposed defenceless populations of the areas concerned and of neighbouring countries to the acute and delayed effects of such weapons.

On the other hand, the representative of the Soviet Union referred to the United States allegations about the use of chemical weapons of Soviet manufacture as myths, which were ludicrous and did not stand up to the facts. He added that the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, established by the United Nations, had reached the conclusion that it was impossible to confirm that such weapons had been used, even though there had been efforts by the United States to deceive everybody, and concluded by stating that the Soviet Union had never used chemical weapons and had never transferred them to anyone; on the contrary, it had consistently advocated and would advocate in the near future the complete elimination of the means of chemical warfare.

The representative of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, in referring to accusations made by the United States against his country with regard to the use of chemical weapons, stated that the United Nations experts had expressed doubts that such accusations were well-founded, and cited from various reports indicating that the testimony of refugees could not be meaningfully verified and expressing the belief that the toxic substances found were of natural origin and not significantly toxic. He added that, on the other hand, it was well documented that the United States had used chemical weapons — Agent Orange — in Viet Nam.

The draft resolution relating to the report of the Group of Consultant Experts, entitled "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons", was submitted on 11 November by Australia, Belgium, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, Norway, Sweden and Uruguay; it was subsequently also sponsored by the Netherlands and Zaire. In introducing the proposal in the First Committee on 17 November, France stated that its purpose was to implement the previous year's resolution 37/98 D. France had in mind the fact that the tasks entrusted to the

Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, by paragraph 7 of that resolution had not been carried out in 1983 because, although it had done a remarkable job, the Group had not been able to review certain aspects thoroughly. Therefore it would be necessary for the experts to continue and to complete their work in 1984. Concerning the legal character of the resolution, France explained that it could not be interpreted as tantamount to a revision of the Protocol in a manner contrary to the law of treaties, because it did not, and could not, create any new legal obligations for the parties to the Geneva Protocol, which, having the character of a convention, was beyond the reach of a General Assembly resolution. The purpose of the draft resolution was quite different: it was designed to secure respect for the Protocol by means of investigations whose results would be made available to the international community. Action designed to ensure compliance with an obligation under international law could not be construed as being contrary to international law, France added. Emphasizing that the initiative was not linked to the reports on allegations of use of chemical weapons and expressing the wish of the sponsors to place it outside any controversy or political context, it hoped that the proposal would be considered constructively, as called for by the subject, namely, respect for, and strengthening of international law in one of its most serious provisions, that which prohibited the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons of mass destruction.

Among the delegations which voted against the draft resolution, seven explained their positions before or after the voting. That of Viet Nam reiterated the stand it had taken the previous year on resolution 37/98 D, namely, that it did not meet the objective of eliminating chemical weapons; rather, it diverted attention from that urgent task. It called for a verification procedure regarding the 1925 Protocol which was not legally in keeping with the norms of international law and practice, in Viet Nam's view, and it significantly undermined the Secretary-General's neutral status, forcing him to become involved in highly sensitive, controversial political issues. Poland, recalling the controversy and dissent in the Committee surrounding resolution 37/98 D, maintained that the investigation of information that might be brought to the Secretary-General's attention by any Member State concerning activities that might constitute a violation of the 1925 Protocol, or of the relevant rules of customary international law, would itself constitute a violation, by aiming at revising it, and would contravene the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in particular its articles 39 to 41. The Lao People's Democratic Republic stated that the United States used the initiative to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries on the pretext that chemical weapons were being used in South-East Asia. Afghanistan and India referred to the reasons they had given the previous year, with India emphasizing that it believed the setting up of machinery, as envisaged, outside the framework of the international treaty concerned would be a bad precedent. Similar arguments were put forward by the representatives of the Byelorussian SSR and the USSR, who stressed the illegality

of the proposed procedure, as contrary to either the Geneva Protocol itself or the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and who observed that it was being undertaken against the wishes of a number of States parties to the Protocol.

Some of the States abstaining expressed similar views. Argentina felt that to introduce, through a resolution of the General Assembly, a system of verification pertaining to a convention which did not provide for such a system was a highly unfortunate precedent. Yugoslavia, although favouring effective systems of verification and control of the implementation of international disarmament agreements, emphasized that their application must be universal, not selective, and based on authentic facts to ensure that they were not misused. Mexico abstained for the same reasons it had in the case of resolution 37/98 D, basically, that, in keeping with the law of treaties, one could not, in its view, amend a solemn instrument—treaty, convention or protocol—except with the participation of all the States parties. Algeria, although recognizing the purely procedural aspect of the proposal, none the less felt obliged to abstain since it was based upon a resolution containing irregular procedure with respect to both doctrine and international practice.

Canada, which supported the draft resolution, explained that it believed the terms of the Vienna Convention were quite in harmony with those of the Protocol and, moreover, regarded it as a procedural one based on the concept that it was important for the United Nations to continue work already undertaken. New Zealand said it had welcomed the adoption of resolution 37/98 D, which provided for interim procedures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Protocol, pending the adoption of permanent arrangements, and was pleased that a number of countries had participated in its implementation. It did not accept the argument that the procedures involved extended the scope of an obligation under the terms of the Protocol. Indonesia, expressing its support for any effort aimed at the strengthening of the Protocol, stated that its affirmative vote should not be interpreted in any way contrary to its position that the objectives of the draft resolution would be more appropriately met by a comprehensive convention on chemical weapons, such as that being sought by the Committee on Disarmament.

On 23 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 77 to 20, with 29 abstentions, and the General Assembly adopted it, on 20 December, by a recorded vote of 97 to 20, with 30 abstentions, as resolution 38/187 C. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the provisions of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,

Recalling also its resolution 37/98 D of 13 December 1982,

1. *Takes note* of the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 37/98 D;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to pursue his action to this end and, in particular, to complete during 1984, with the assistance of the Group of Consultant Experts established

by him, the task entrusted to him under the terms of paragraph 7 of resolution 37/98 D and to submit his report on the work of the Group;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the General Assembly regularly informed on the implementation of resolution 37/98 D.

The fourth draft resolution proposed under the agenda item "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons" had the same title; it was submitted in the First Committee on 11 November by Swaziland, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay, and later also sponsored by Somalia. By the draft resolution, the General Assembly, after recalling its previous resolutions relating to the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the biological weapons Convention, and noting reports that such weapons had been used in military operations in various regions of the world, would call anew for strict observance of existing legal constraints on chemical and bacteriological weapons and condemn actions that contravened those constraints, would welcome the ongoing efforts to ensure the most effective possible constraints on chemical and biological weapons and would urge the Committee on Disarmament to accelerate its negotiations aimed at the elimination of chemical weapons.

On 17 November, the representative of the United States announced that the sponsors, although greatly concerned about the issue which the draft resolution dealt with, were also cognizant of the heavy work-load before the Committee and the desire of the Chairman to minimize the number of proposals before it. Therefore, they had decided not to pursue the draft resolution at the current time. Speaking for his own Government, he emphasized that the withdrawal of the proposal did not indicate any lessening of its profound concern about the subject.

Conclusion

Modest but tangible results were achieved in 1983 in the Committee on Disarmament on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. As a result of the negotiations in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons and its Contact Groups, the Committee succeeded in elaborating and agreeing on many of the substantive provisions to be included in a chemical weapons convention. Some of the limited progress achieved may be attributed to more flexible positions on the part of some States regarding such long-standing issues as the scope and verification procedure for a future convention. However, crucial differences on certain key issues persisted throughout the 1983 session, and they involved the major Powers. They concerned such areas as the actual steps in the process of the destruction of chemical weapons stocks, including the content of initial declarations on stockpiles, and whether verification of the destruction of stockpiles should be carried out by inspections on a quota basis or continuously. Although there was general recognition of the existence of a rule of customary international law regarding the non-use of chemical weapons and agreement on most issues relating to the incor-

poration of a prohibition of their use in a new convention, positions varied as to the scope of such a provision and how it should be reflected in the convention.

At the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the urgency and importance of final negotiation of a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons was emphasized, and the hope was expressed that such a convention would be finalized during the 1984 session of the Conference on Disarmament (as the Committee on Disarmament would then be named). However, in the debate, in both plenary meetings of the Assembly and the First Committee, the unresolved differences of viewpoint among States remained evident. While the so-called traditional chemical weapons resolution urging the Conference on Disarmament to intensify the negotiations (38/187 B) was adopted by consensus, the new proposal, mentioning binary weapons and chemical-weapon-free zones and calling for restraint during the negotiations (38/187 A), was adopted by a vote of 98 to 1, with 49 abstentions.

Differences of opinion also existed regarding reports on the alleged use of chemical weapons in various parts of the world. Disagreement was particularly marked with regard to proposals put forward on the relevant existing international instruments—the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 biological weapons Convention—especially in the debate on the draft resolution concerning the report of the Group of Consultant Experts established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 37/98 D on provisional procedures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which had not completed its work; the proposal was finally adopted by a vote of 97 to 20, with 30 abstentions (resolution 38/187 C).

The negative position or non-support of 50 States in connection with each of the two resolutions which were the subject of controversy illustrates that, as of the end of 1983, serious difficulties still stood in the way of reaching consensus solutions.

New weapons of mass destruction

Introduction

THE EMERGENCE OF NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION was already foreseen in 1948, when the Commission for Conventional Armaments defined them "to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above."¹

In the following years, however, the subject of new weapons of mass destruction was not a priority in the discussions on disarmament at the United Nations. Only in 1969, on the initiative of Malta, did the General Assembly adopt two resolutions inviting the CCD to consider certain implications of radiological weapons and military applications of laser technology. At that time, however, the CCD did not find those areas to be of immediate concern.² The question of radiological weapons is discussed in chapter XV below.

Taking into account the further acceleration of scientific and technological advances during the 1970s, the Soviet Union, in 1975, proposed including in the agenda of the General Assembly the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.³ Together with the proposal, a draft agreement on the subject was submitted, and the General Assembly, by resolution 3479 (XXX), requested the CCD to proceed to work on such an agreement.

Since then, the Soviet Union and other Eastern European States have recommended a general prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, maintaining that it is more difficult to eliminate weapons after they are deployed than to ban their development and manufacture. According to that approach, new

¹ S/C.3/32/Rev.1; for details, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 2, p. 28.

² Resolutions 2602 C (XXIV) and 2602 D (XXIV); for details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976, chap. XV.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 31, 34-38, 120, 122 and 126, document A/10243.

types of weapons of mass destruction would include any types based on qualitatively new principles of action regarding their method of use, the target to be attacked or the nature of their impact.

Most Western States, however, have held that new scientific developments should be dealt with individually as they arise and appear to have a weapons potential. They have also felt that some of the potential new weapons that have been speculated about would be included in existing weapons categories and should be dealt with in that context. Furthermore, the Western States have sought greater clarity in defining the weapons to be prohibited.

In 1977, the Soviet Union submitted to the CCD a revised draft agreement⁴ which envisaged, besides a general and comprehensive prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, special agreements to be concluded on particular types of weapons. A list of types and systems of weapons to be prohibited would be annexed to the agreement and could subsequently be expanded as new developments occurred.

In the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, a paragraph was included⁵ which called for the pursuit of efforts to prevent the emergence of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and for their prohibition, simultaneously allowing for specific agreements on such weapons as might be identified.

In the debates in the CCD and its successor, the Committee on Disarmament, from 1978 to 1982, members generally reiterated their established views. In 1978, the Soviet Union proposed⁶ the setting up of an *ad hoc* group of governmental experts to consider the various aspects of the question. In the same and subsequent years, proposals were submitted by socialist members of the negotiating body for a draft convention on the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon⁷ and on infrasound weapons.⁸ A document prepared by the Soviet Union in 1979⁹ discussed certain possible new weapons of mass destruction, including radiological weapons. However, no agreement was reached on any of the proposals.

In the General Assembly, during the same period, the subject was considered.¹⁰ In 1979 and 1980, Eastern European and non-aligned States sponsored draft resolutions by which the Committee on Disarmament would again be requested to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, for the purpose of drafting

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/32/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/511/Rev.1; see also *The Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, appendix X.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 77.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/564.

⁷ *Ibid.*, document CCD/559. (For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. X.)

⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. III, document CCD/575.

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), vol. II, document CD/35.

¹⁰ For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, chap. XVI; vol. 5: 1980, chap. XV; vol. 6: 1981, chap. XIII; and vol. 7: 1982, chap. XV.

a comprehensive agreement and possible agreements on particular types of such weapons. The draft resolutions were adopted as resolutions 34/79 and 35/149. In the following two years, the same States further proposed that the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily important States should, as a first step, make declarations, identical in substance, renouncing the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, with the Security Council thereafter approving those statements. The latter drafts were adopted as resolutions 36/89 and 37/77 A.

In 1982, a number of mainly Eastern European States submitted a draft resolution by which the General Assembly would call upon all States to renounce the use of new discoveries and scientific and technological achievements for military purposes. The draft resolution was adopted as resolution 37/77 B.

The Western States did not support those resolutions and, although agreeing that the question should be kept under review, continued to believe that a general agreement would present various difficulties, particularly in the area of verification, which could lead to suspicion and would not provide for a distinction between peaceful and military research.

There was no substantive consideration of the question of new weapons of mass destruction in the Disarmament Commission in 1983.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1983

In accordance with its programme of work, the Committee on Disarmament considered the item "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons" during the periods from 11 to 15 April and from 25 to 29 July. Whereas the negotiations on radiological weapons took place mainly in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the subject, that was re-established by the Committee, the question of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction was considered at plenary meetings.¹¹ There was no movement towards a compromise as only a few members of the Committee made statements on the issue, reaffirming their established positions.

The socialist members recalled their earlier proposals. The German Democratic Republic summarized its approach to the question by referring to four goals: (a) adoption of a declaration by the permanent members of the Security Council, as well as by other militarily significant States, renouncing the creation of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction; (b) establishment of an *ad hoc* group of experts; (c) conclusion of a comprehensive or "umbrella" agreement which would be supplemented by a list of specific types and systems of prohibited weapons; and (d) conclusion of separate agreements on the prohibition of specific new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, if that

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1), appendix III (CD/421), vols. I-V.*

was deemed necessary. Towards the end of the session, it recalled that the socialist and other countries had, over the previous eight years, advocated the elaboration of an agreement prohibiting such weapons and the General Assembly had recognized the significance of the matter in a number of resolutions, but there had been no progress. In the view of the German Democratic Republic, it was not the complexity of the issue that was to blame, but the unwillingness of some countries to participate in negotiations aimed at the exclusion of qualitatively new developments in the field. To illustrate the urgency of reaching agreement, the German Democratic Republic reminded the Committee that a few years earlier, attention had been drawn to laser and particle-beam weapons as a possible dangerous development, and that such weapons were no longer hypothetical.

Ethiopia attached great importance and urgency to concluding an agreement or agreements to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, since past experience had shown how difficult it was to eliminate weapons once they were developed and deployed. Referring to the main objectives of resolutions 37/77 A and B, Ethiopia stated that they coincided with the wishes of all developing countries. Yugoslavia also stressed the need for launching substantive negotiations within the Committee on the banning of all types of weapons of mass destruction.

The USSR emphasized that it was in general against the use of any weapons — weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. It felt that stopping the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction and freezing them quantitatively and qualitatively offered a reasonable alternative to the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

Romania discussed the subject of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction in the context of military research and development, since it held that no other sphere of human activity had more influence on contemporary society: it accelerated the arms race, perverted values and distorted the true purposes of science. Romania warned that the militarization of science led, in particular, to: efforts to attain superiority in a specific weapon system; the search for an element of surprise in the technological race, which had proved unrealistic in practice; and difficulties for verifying any measure directed at halting and reversing the arms race. For those reasons, Romania continued to advocate immediate and concrete action in the Committee on Disarmament on the subject of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Furthermore, it reiterated its previous proposal for associating scientists with the work of the Committee by creating an *ad hoc* body on that question.

In connection with the drafting of the report of the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly,¹² the Western States which had not previously made statements in the Committee on the subject of new weapons of mass destruction, expressed their established view on it. Ac-

¹² *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1), paras. 84-86.

ording to them, a general prohibitory agreement would be too ambiguous to be useful in actual situations. They believed it would be more appropriate to negotiate agreements to ban potential new weapons of mass destruction on a case-by-case basis, as such weapons were identified.

As the Committee on Disarmament could not agree on any specific recommendation for future action on the subject, in its report it merely summarized the discussion in the Committee in 1983.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

The item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament" was included in the agenda of the General Assembly in accordance with resolution 37/77 A. The Member States which referred to the issue in their statements in plenary meetings or in the First Committee reaffirmed their established positions.¹³ The subject was mentioned in general terms by Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen and Honduras.

Criticizing the United States, some socialist States from Eastern Europe regarded its policies as an obstacle to progress. According to the Soviet Union, the United States was deliberately sowing confusion among the public by giving an appearance of comprehensiveness to American projects and by labelling weapons devised for the mass destruction of human beings "protectors of peace". Moreover, it attempted to justify new armaments with the argument that they would serve as bargaining chips in negotiations and thus provide a way of getting results. However, the Soviet Union pointed out, it had been impossible to achieve agreements on any of the many types of weapons that were being manufactured on that pretext. Bulgaria, in a plenary meeting, expressed the opinion that in the United States new, unknown weapons of mass destruction were being developed. The Byelorussian SSR accused the United States of hindering the implementation of United Nations resolutions on, among other subjects, the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

On 11 November, the Byelorussian SSR, on behalf of 27 Eastern European and non-aligned States,¹⁴ introduced a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons". In its introductory statement, the Byelorussian SSR stated that in view of the fact that rapid and far-reaching changes were taking place in the develop-

¹³ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 103rd meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 39th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

¹⁴ Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Upper Volta, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe and, subsequently, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

ment of military technology, mankind was on the threshold of a new danger. Qualitatively new types of weapons of mass destruction were being elaborated which would make agreement concerning their limitation, reduction and prohibition extremely complex, if not completely impossible. The sponsors were convinced that the new stage in the arms race would undermine international stability and greatly enhance the danger of the outbreak of war. The task of effectively preventing such a turn in the course of events had, therefore, acquired particular significance and urgency. Not a single delegation would question the genuine need to prevent the emergence of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, although there was a certain divergence of opinion concerning the effective ways of achieving that goal. The sponsors believed that the first step towards a solution of the problem might be statements, identical in substance, by the permanent members of the Security Council, as well as by other militarily significant States, renouncing the production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. The statements could then be approved by a decision of the Security Council. The highly dangerous and potentially destabilizing character of the new qualitative leap in the arms race, the Byelorussian SSR concluded, made it necessary to come to grips with a larger problem, namely, ensuring that, ultimately, scientific and technological achievements were used solely for peaceful purposes.

On 23 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 94 to 1 (United States), with 28 abstentions (mainly Western States). China did not participate in the vote.

After the vote, Greece, speaking on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community, stated that, as in previous years, the Ten had abstained in the vote and continued to hold the view that the approach presented in the draft resolution was not a realistic one. They agreed that there was a need to prohibit all and any new weapons of mass destruction which could be identified as such, but believed that those weapons and their technology could be effectively and permanently prohibited only if they were subject to concrete and verifiable controls. The Ten recognized the difficulty in clearly distinguishing the precise delimitation of civilian and military research and felt that fundamental consideration had not received adequate emphasis in the draft resolution, where special importance was given to a single blanket prohibition on the development and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction. It was not clear how such a prohibition could be verified, particularly in view of the need which would arise for international supervision of civil research activities. Consequently, in the opinion of the Ten, a comprehensive prohibition would not contribute to strengthening confidence in the area in question. The Ten fully recognized, however, the continued need for international discussions for the purpose of identifying potentially dangerous developments in science and technology, so that necessary control could be introduced early.

Sweden, which also abstained in the vote, stressed that it was deeply convinced of the importance of preventing at an early stage the use of

scientific and technological achievements for the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, and therefore supported steps to ensure that new major scientific discoveries were used for peaceful, and not destructive, purposes. However, it continued to have doubts about the idea of a general prohibition in that field. It noted with satisfaction that the draft resolution requested the Committee on Disarmament to prepare specific agreements on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction. Sweden would continue to support all efforts in that direction in order to find practical solutions to the disarmament aspects of scientific and technological advances in the military field.

On 20 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft as resolution 38/182 by a recorded vote of 116 to 1, with 26 abstentions. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3479 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/74 of 10 December 1976, 32/84 A of 12 December 1977, 33/66 B of 14 December 1978, 34/79 of 11 December 1979, 35/149 of 12 December 1980, 36/89 of 9 December 1981 and 37/77 A of 9 December 1982 concerning the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraph 39 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, according to which qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race and efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction, and the development of new means of warfare,

Recalling the decision contained in paragraph 77 of the Final Document to the effect that, in order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements might ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements, and that efforts aimed at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction should be appropriately pursued,

Expressing once again its firm belief, in the light of the decisions adopted at the tenth special session, in the importance of concluding an agreement or agreements to prevent the use of scientific and technological progress for the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Noting that in the course of its session in 1983 the Committee on Disarmament considered the item entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons",

Convinced that all ways and means should be utilized to prevent the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Taking into consideration the part of the report of the Committee on Disarmament relating to this question,

1. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to intensify negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons;

2. *Once again urges* all States to refrain from any action which could adversely affect the talks aimed at working out an agreement or agreements to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

3. *Calls upon* the States permanent members of the Security Council as well as upon other militarily significant States to make declarations, identical in substance, concerning the refusal to create new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, as a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on this subject, bearing in mind that such declarations would be approved thereafter by a decision of the Security Council;

4. *Calls again upon* all States to undertake efforts to ensure that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this item by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session;

6. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-ninth session;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament".

Conclusion

The divergent approaches towards the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons continued to persist and no progress was made in the area in 1983. The Eastern European States and a number of non-aligned countries reaffirmed their belief that the conclusion of a general international agreement of a comprehensive character would be the most effective way. They also supported the conclusion of separate agreements banning specific types of weapons of mass destruction, advocated declarations by the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States pledging not to develop any such weapons, and called for setting up an *ad hoc* group of qualified governmental experts within the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate both a general agreement and separate agreements on specific new weapons of mass destruction.

The Western States continued to believe that a general prohibitory agreement would be too ambiguous to be useful and would not permit the definition and implementation of the requisite verification measures. They considered, however, that periodic informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament, with the participation of experts, would allow it to follow the question in an appropriate manner and to identify adequately any cases which might require particular consideration, thus justifying the opening of specific negotiations.

If the positions described above remain unchanged, it is unlikely that substantive progress on the subject can be achieved in the near future.

Radiological weapons

Introduction

THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS, which was established in 1947 by the Security Council, by a resolution adopted in 1948 defined weapons of mass destruction to include, *inter alia*, “radioactive material weapons”, which were later on called radiological weapons.¹ These weapons are not known to exist as yet but, if produced, they would be intended to disperse radioactive substances in the target area independently of nuclear explosions for the purpose of causing injury to human beings. The discussion on prohibiting such weapons began in a serious fashion in the late 1960s.

The General Assembly first took up the question of the prohibition of radiological warfare in 1969, on the initiative of Malta. It adopted resolution 2602 C (XXIV) by which, *inter alia*, it invited the CCD to consider, without prejudice to existing priorities, effective methods of control against the use of radiological methods of warfare conducted independently of nuclear explosions. In its report to the General Assembly in 1970, the CCD devoted one paragraph to the question,² concluding that on the basis of available information, it was difficult to see the practical usefulness of discussing measures related to radiological warfare. The subject was not discussed again in the General Assembly until 1976, when the United States, noting the continuing accumulation of nuclear materials as a result of reactor operations, suggested that an agreement to prevent their use as radiological weapons should be considered.

In 1977, the Soviet Union and the United States began bilateral negotiations on the question of radiological weapons and the subject was also considered in the CCD. The parties to the bilateral talks informed the CCD in 1978 that progress had been made towards the prohibition of radiological weapons. The same year, the General Assembly, at its tenth special session, included a paragraph in its Final Document³ stating that a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

¹ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 2.

² See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970*, document DC/233, para. 26.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-10/4), sect. III, para. 76.

As a result of the bilateral negotiations, the Soviet Union and the United States submitted, on 9 July 1979, an agreed joint proposal to the Committee on Disarmament,⁴ which decided to continue consideration of it at its next annual session. The same year, the United States and the Soviet Union also submitted a draft resolution in the General Assembly which was adopted, without a vote, as resolution 34/87 A. By it the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to proceed as soon as possible to reach agreement, through negotiations, on the text of a convention and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session on the results achieved.

During the initial consideration of the joint proposal by the Committee on Disarmament, the sponsors and some other delegations were optimistic about the possibility of an early finalization of a draft treaty. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons was established in 1980 for that purpose and its mandate has been renewed every year since then. In the period 1980-1982, the deliberations in the Committee and its Working Group revealed differences in concept regarding approach, priority, definition, verification and certain other matters. In 1981, Sweden brought up the need for a prohibition of attacks on civilian nuclear installations in order to prevent the possibility of a massive release of radioactive material. That proposal received wide support from members of the group of 21, but a number of States belonging to other groups objected to its incorporation into the text of the envisaged convention, partly because it would enlarge its scope beyond what had been originally intended and partly because it would involve time-consuming negotiations with various new implications. Such divergent views on the subject have complicated the issue and thus prevented progress in negotiations in the Committee on the conclusion of a radiological weapons treaty during its 1981 and 1982 sessions.

During the same period, the General Assembly each year considered the prohibition of radiological weapons on the basis of the reports of the Committee on Disarmament and adopted resolutions on the subject by consensus, urging the Committee to continue negotiations for early conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, and in 1982, for the first time, by its resolution 37/99 C, it requested the Committee to continue to search for a solution to the question of prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities.

In 1983, the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons was not discussed in the Disarmament Commission.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1983

The agenda item entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons" was considered in

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), vol. II, documents CD/31 and CD/32.

plenary meetings of the Committee on Disarmament at its 1983 session, during the periods 11 to 15 April and 25 to 29 July. It was negotiated as well in the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons,⁵ also discussed below.

During the course of the session,⁶ any optimism for early elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons dissipated. As during previous sessions of the Committee, divergent views were expressed, particularly concerning the question of linkage between so-called traditional radiological-weapon matters and the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities.

Most members of the group of 21 insisted on linking the traditional radiological-weapon matters with attacks on nuclear facilities. Thus, the representative of Sweden reminded the members of the Committee that the 1979 joint proposal by the Soviet Union and the United States on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons was extremely limited in content. Subsequently, Sweden had proposed that the treaty include also a prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, because such attacks could cause the emission of radioactivity on a massive scale. It explained that it had done so not only because it considered it important to ban even that means of waging radiological war, but also because it wanted to inject substance into the joint draft. As to the nuclear facilities that should be protected from attacks having radiological consequences, Sweden considered that four main types qualified, namely, nuclear power and research reactors above a certain thermal output, intermediate spent-fuel storage sites, reprocessing plants and high-level waste deposits. Referring to the problem of the so-called linkage, Sweden stated that it desired to combine the two aspects of the subject, traditional radiological weapons and prohibition of attacks, into one treaty, so as to make sure that the negotiations on prohibition of attacks were carried to a successful conclusion. With regard to the suggestion that protection of nuclear facilities was already afforded by the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,⁷ Sweden said it did not deny that the Protocol had some value in that respect, but added that it had several shortcomings. The Protocol referred solely to "nuclear electrical generating stations"; thus other facilities enjoyed protection in only a very general way. Moreover, a relatively small number of States were parties to the Protocol. The linkage between the two questions was also supported by, among others, Egypt and Pakistan.

A few delegations were expressly against linking the prohibition of radiological weapons to attacks against nuclear facilities. Thus, France

⁵ See *ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, paras. 81-83.

⁶ *Ibid.*, appendix III (CD/421), vols. I-V.

⁷ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Protocol I), adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts at its fourth session, 17 March to 10 June 1977.

stated that the question of the protection of nuclear facilities appeared to it to be a separate issue, relating to the law of war rather than to disarmament. In introducing a working paper⁸ which, *inter alia*, summarized the arguments against the linkage of the two issues, the United Kingdom recalled that the question of attacks on nuclear electricity-generating stations was already covered in the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. In addition, it believed there were fundamental dissimilarities between the use of radiological weapons and attacks on nuclear facilities which made it inappropriate for them to be dealt with in a single legal instrument. The fact that both the use of radiological weapons and attacks on nuclear facilities would cause damage by dispersal of radioactive material was, in the opinion of the United Kingdom, too narrow a reason to warrant such a solution. Pointing out the dramatic increase, over the preceding 30 years, in the amount of radioactive material that could be put to weapons use, the United States, late in the session, stated that it believed strongly that there were genuine and significant security reasons for prohibiting such use and for negotiating provisions to guard against diversion of radioactive material to banned activities. It added that conclusion of a radiological weapons treaty remained hostage to a set of complex linkages which, it felt, were related more to the character of the Committee than to the substance of the treaty itself. The United States was convinced that a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons could be concluded with dispatch, but—referring to the position of those who supported the linkage idea—noted that it appeared impossible to negotiate the treaty in the Committee.

As to the definition of radiological weapons, it seemed to the United Kingdom that, in spite of the obvious difficulties in defining a weapon which did not exist, its key features would be that it would function by dispersing or disseminating radioactive material in the environment, and that it would be so designed that the primary danger would arise from exposure to the dispersed radioactive material. After referring to the “positive” and “negative” definitions of radiological weapons which had been put forward in the Committee, the United Kingdom said it had come to the conclusion that a positive definition might be unattainable. It preferred, therefore, a negative definition, in other words, one that would specifically exclude nuclear weapons and other explosive devices. Such a definition had, in its view, a greater possibility of being unambiguous and unmistakable in intent.

Japan suggested the exclusion of “radioactive materials” from the definition of radiological weapons. Its inclusion would, in Japan’s opinion, create problems, since it was difficult to foresee radioactive material dedicated to weapons use only.

Several delegations expressed some scepticism regarding either the definition of radiological weapons or the whole idea of their prohibition. Brazil stressed that a suitable definition of the exact kind of weapon to be

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1), appendix II (CD/421), vol. II, document CD/374.*

prohibited continued to be elusive. The proponents of the prohibition were, in its view, apparently unable to present a clear, precise and uncontroversial explanation of the characteristics of the radiological weapon to be banned. The solutions put forward either fell short of the clarity necessary or raised serious doubts about their ultimate effect. Pointing out that it did not possess nuclear weapons, and it had no intention of developing them or any radioactive means of warfare, Brazil warned that the proposed treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons must not become another device to place restrictions on the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes or an instrument for legitimizing the possession and continuing development of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. Argentina felt that there was a pretence of willingness to negotiate on the prohibition of non-existent weapons of doubtful effectiveness, the very definition of which was unclear. In its view, delimiting the concept of radiological weapons on the basis of radioactive materials entailed the risk of creating new and additional restrictions on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, particularly the application of radioisotopes. That could result in increases in the cost of manufacturing food and health products, to the detriment of the countries with fewer resources. It observed that an attempt was being made to prejudice particularly the interests of the developing States, while at the same time inflexibility was being shown on the adoption of effective measures to eliminate real and immediate threats.

After stressing the importance of ensuring the safe development of peaceful nuclear facilities, the Soviet Union said that an attack on nuclear installations could have serious consequences not only for the States exposed to such an attack, but also for the neighbouring countries, since the radioactive substances released might spread far beyond the targeted State's boundaries. It believed it was in the interests of the international community to ensure the safety of peaceful nuclear facilities; thus the prohibition of attacks on such facilities by means of an international agreement would be an extremely important measure. However, the Soviet delegation objected to confusing what it regarded as two different questions: the prohibition of radiological weapons and the protection of peaceful nuclear facilities from attack. It had always been in favour of separate negotiations on those two issues and against their linkage. Moreover, it was convinced that the speedy conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons would open the way to progress in the negotiations on the other issue.

Later, during the summer session of the Committee, the Soviet Union elaborated in detail its position on the question of prohibiting attacks against nuclear installations. After stating that the subject was both specific and extremely complicated, not only from the political standpoint, but also from the military, legal and technical points of view, it referred to some of the issues which had been discussed and on which different opinions had been expressed. With respect to the scope of the protection, it advocated the prohibition of deliberate attacks on civilian nuclear facilities. On the subject of what specific nuclear facilities should

be covered, the Soviet Union proposed including in the list: nuclear power stations, research reactors, nuclear fuel production and reprocessing plants and the places of storage of fissionable materials. It added that the attempt to solve the question of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities within the framework of an agreement on the prohibition of radiological weapons had become the main obstacle to progress in resolving both issues and that it was high time to complete the elaboration of such a treaty. It recommended independent consideration of the subject of the protection of nuclear facilities against attacks and the conclusion of a separate agreement on it, but was ready to display a certain flexibility on the question.

A few delegations, believing that the linkage between the two issues had become the major stumbling-block to further progress, made suggestions on ways of solving the problem. Belgium considered that a reasonable compromise could be reached that would consist of a commitment to negotiate the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities—which would form an integral part of the convention on radiological weapons—and efforts to work out precise procedures for the implementation of that commitment. Belgium added that it would put forward a proposal to that effect at a later stage. Japan believed that the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting attacks on nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes, within the framework of a radiological weapons treaty, would be of great significance in breaking the seeming deadlock in the elaboration of such a treaty. In that sense, it expected that the outline of a draft optional protocol, which it had proposed the preceding year, would serve as a useful catalyst. Romania thought that an adequate and unanimously acceptable solution to the problem of the protection of nuclear facilities was the key to drafting the text of an agreement banning radiological weapons. Australia said that many considerations had led it to support a ban on attacks against nuclear facilities: first, there was the basic need to ensure that radioactive contamination would not be resorted to as a method of warfare; secondly, the relevant provisions of the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were inadequate; and, thirdly, few countries had ratified the Protocols. It remained, however, flexible on the precise form of an agreement and its standing in relation to other international agreements.

Some delegations referred to the efforts of the Committee and its *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons to elaborate a convention prohibiting such weapons. Bulgaria noted that there had been a positive development in that the Working Group had set up two sub-groups. It expected them to clarify some of the main problems but did not expect that a draft agreement would be formulated in the course of the session. In its view, a higher degree of political will and flexibility would be necessary to achieve early results. Believing that, over the years, the question of radiological weapons had matured to a point where fruitful negotiations had become a real possibility, the Netherlands expressed its disappointment at the results of the Commit-

tee's efforts in 1983. It felt that only a fundamental reassessment of their positions by some delegations would enable the Committee to continue usefully its efforts the following year.

The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, who had chaired the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons during the Committee's 1982 session, commented on the Committee's current work on the issue, expressing the view that the negotiations were on the point of stagnation. He perceived three overriding obstacles to progress, namely, (a) the use by some delegations of the future radiological weapons treaty as a platform for imposing additional obligations on nuclear-weapon States in the field of nuclear disarmament; (b) the demand that the future convention contain an article providing for free access to nuclear technology in a broad sense, going beyond radiological materials, and (c) persistence of widely different views on the scope of prohibition. He criticized the negotiating behaviour of some delegations, referring to their lack of flexibility and their using the radiological weapons treaty as a vehicle for extraneous subject-matter. He believed that a successfully concluded convention could contribute to the momentum of the multilateral disarmament process, whereas stagnation detracted from the credibility of the Committee's efforts. Holding that there was general agreement on the limited practical importance of the prohibition of radiological weapons and that that medium-priority item should not divert too much of the Committee's attention, he characterized the radiological weapons convention as a "perishable good", where a premium would seem to be placed on quick and purposeful action. Starting from the premise that there was, in any case, a basic consensus on a number of points, he made some suggestions on how the negotiations could be invigorated in order to overcome the stalemate.

In addition to the documents submitted on the item in previous years, the Committee and its *Ad Hoc* Working Group in 1983 had before them a number of new documents, working papers, conference room papers and informal working papers prepared by the secretariat.⁹

The *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons was re-established by the Committee on 29 March under the chairmanship of Ambassador Curt Lidgard of Sweden. It held six meetings from 8 to 29 April and from 13 June to 17 August. On 8 April, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, upon the Chairman's suggestion, decided to establish two groups to undertake substantive examination of the two major issues before the Working Group. Group A, co-ordinated by the representative of the United States, was mandated to consider questions relating to traditional radiological weapons subject-matter, and Group B, co-ordinated by the representative of the Soviet Union, was mandated to examine issues relating to the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. It was understood that the question of linkage between those two issues would be left aside for the time being and would be considered in the *Ad Hoc*

⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, para. 83, for details.

Working Group itself at the end of the session. At their request, the representatives of a number of States non-members of the Committee participated in the work of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, namely, Austria, Burundi, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Senegal and Spain.

As requested by the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, Group A considered the subject of radiological weapons in the traditional sense. The substantive discussion encompassed four outstanding questions: a definition of radiological weapons, an appropriate article in the treaty regarding peaceful uses of nuclear energy, undertakings and obligations of States in the related field of nuclear disarmament, and compliance provisions.

Based on previously submitted consolidated texts and all relevant proposals, Group A considered each of the four issues, but differences on matters of substance remained.

In connection with the question of compliance, Sweden proposed a consultative committee of experts for lodging complaints in case of an alleged violation and a fact-finding Committee for carrying out on-site investigations. The United States proposed a standing and independent fact-finding panel in addition to a consultative meeting of parties to the treaty. Some members of the group of 21 expressed reservations about certain aspects of the United States proposal, in particular about the composition of the panel. Group A also had extensive discussions on the problem of definition, including the elements of a positive definition which would describe the specific characteristics of radiological weapons.

On 3 August, the Co-ordinator prepared a consolidated negotiating text of a radiological weapons treaty¹⁰ which reflected in a single document the state of the negotiations, including areas of agreement and disagreement. The text contained internal brackets and, in some cases, alternative formulations. Although there was no agreement on the text, the Group decided to forward it to the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, it being understood that the text had been prepared on the Co-ordinator's own responsibility.

Group B was established for the purpose of considering the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. It devoted its efforts to the consideration of various issues involved, such as objectives, the scope of the prohibition, legal aspects and zones, as well as compliance and verification. Differences of opinion among delegations on all these issues persisted during the 1983 session, although it was generally recognized that the question of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities was a complex problem and an important issue to solve. An exchange of views in the Group was considered necessary and useful in clarifying the various positions of delegations, in particular on the scope of the prohibition and relevant legal questions. With respect to the scope, a list of five categories of nuclear facilities was suggested, to which the

¹⁰ *Ibid.*; the text is annexed to the report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group.

prohibition of attacks should apply. On the other hand, it was generally understood that naval vessels and submarines equipped with nuclear reactors were weapons systems designed for warfare, and thus should not be subject to protection. The problem of dual-purpose nuclear facilities, i.e., facilities which could be used for both peaceful and military purposes, was also discussed. As to the adequacy of existing legal instruments, it was widely held that the scope of prohibition for nuclear facilities covered under the 1977 Additional Protocol was limited and inadequate and should be supplemented. However, some Western States held that existing international law provided for substantial protection of the nuclear facilities in question, and had not been convinced of the necessity for additional protection.

At two meetings on 11 and 15 August, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group considered the question of linkage between traditional radiological weapons subject-matter and the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. A general exchange of views took place on the basis of a compilation of alternative mechanisms for that linkage, prepared by the secretariat. However, the discussion revealed that the positions of the delegations continued to diverge.

In submitting its report to the Committee, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group concluded that although certain outstanding issues remained in the traditional radiological weapons subject-matter, the extensive discussions and intensive negotiations in Group A had further clarified many of the problems involved and would pave the way for future work on the subject. The substantive discussion of the question of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities in Group B was also considered useful, having led to a better comprehension of the problems and contributed to the examination of common approaches and possible activities of the Group at a later date.

In its report to the Committee, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group again recognized the importance of the linkage problem and stressed that it must be solved. Accordingly, the Working Group recommended to the Committee that an *ad hoc* working group be established at the beginning of the 1984 session to continue its work and to assess how best to make progress on the subject. On 23 August, the Committee adopted the report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, which was included in the Committee's report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

Late in the session, Pakistan expressed bewilderment because those delegations which had deplored the lack of progress on radiological weapons had not done so in connection with issues of higher priority. It was convinced that agreement on the proposed treaty was possible only if attacks on nuclear facilities were recognized as the most practical form that radiological warfare could take, and if there was political will to negotiate substantively on a prohibition of such attacks. Australia said it was disappointed at the lack of progress on both "tracks" of the issue and believed that, objectively, a convention on the traditional aspect could be concluded quickly. Such a convention, however, would be a thin achieve-

ment which could not bear the weight of the extraneous loads being brought to bear on it.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

During the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, references to the question of radiological weapons were made mainly in the First Committee.¹¹ A number of delegations stressed the importance of reaching an agreement on their prohibition, but only a few dealt with the subject in more detail. Argentina observed that there had been appreciable progress in the sense that the substance of a draft treaty seemed to be emerging. Stressing that certain fundamental points were still to be settled, it expressed the view that the day was not far off when an agreement would finally be concluded on the question. However, that was not true with regard to the issue of attacks against nuclear facilities, concerning which many problems remained. In spite of the fact that for several years the Committee on Disarmament had tried to reach agreement on a convention banning radiological weapons, and some doubts had been raised as to the value of such a convention as long as radiological weapons had not been developed, Denmark supported the continuation of the work in that Committee and expressed the hope that a draft convention would materialize. The United States believed that the Committee on Disarmament should rededicate its efforts to the banning of a whole class of radiological weapons before they were ever produced. Given the political will, it should be possible, in its view, to reach early agreement on a consolidated treaty text to outlaw such weapons. Although recognizing that, compared with more compelling priorities, a radiological weapons treaty might be viewed as a modest accomplishment, the United States believed that even modest accomplishments could have value.

A few delegations stressed that the linkage between the traditional radiological weapons treaty and the question of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities was essential. Thus, Egypt welcomed the increased support for the Swedish proposals to prohibit such attacks. In its view, recent events showed the importance of the matter and its close link with radiological weapons, as any attack on nuclear facilities would result, in fact, in a dissemination of nuclear radiation. In conformity with the position of the group of 21, Egypt said it could not accept a draft convention that would separate the question of radiological weapons from the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. It declared that the differences in the Committee on Disarmament must be overcome. Nigeria held that a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons had validity and relevance in so far as it prevented the addition of another weapon system to an existing awesome stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. It believed, however, that the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities should form an integral part of such a convention, in

¹¹ See *ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 36th and 52nd meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

particular because the radiological consequences of such attacks could be as destructive as those of a nuclear explosion. It stressed that the protection of nuclear facilities was essential to the development efforts of States. Taking a different view, Mongolia suggested that the Committee on Disarmament should, as soon as possible, work towards an agreement on the prohibition of radiological weapons, without prejudice to any future solution to the problem of international measures to prevent attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities.

On 11 November, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Japan and Sweden submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons" under the agenda item concerning the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. On 16 November, the same draft resolution was resubmitted under the agenda item on general and complete disarmament, and was introduced on 17 November by Sweden. Sweden stated that in recognition of the potential dangers of the use of radiological weapons and of the need to reach agreement on their comprehensive prohibition, the question of radiological weapons had been on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for several years. Although some progress had been achieved in the negotiations at the 1983 session, divergent views persisted. Sweden added that the purpose of the draft resolution was mainly procedural, as it requested the Conference on Disarmament to continue its work on the subject so that a convention prohibiting radiological weapons could be promptly concluded and an early solution found to the question of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities.

On 21 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote.

Two delegations explained their positions after the adoption of the draft resolution. The United States reiterated its firm commitment to the prohibition of radiological weapons and said it looked forward to further efforts to conclude a treaty on them. At the same time, it continued to be willing to discuss the question of whether additional legal protection was needed with respect to military attacks on nuclear facilities, sharing the concerns of many other countries about the potential effects of such attacks. In that context, it noted that some protection was already provided by the general provisions and specific rules of international law on armed conflict, in particular the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols. The United States stressed the complexity of the question of attacks on nuclear facilities and the need for continuing the evaluation of the existing prohibitions and rules, as well as for gathering expert opinion on the adequacy of existing legal protection. It also emphasized the need to keep in mind that certain aspects of the question concerned rules of combat, while others concerned arms control. While the United States welcomed continued efforts to solve the nuclear facility problem, it held that the conclusion of a radiological

weapons treaty must not be held up because of them. France expressed a reservation regarding the title of the draft. Noting that the resolution dealt with two subjects, one of which was not covered by the agenda item it was submitted under, France stated that it would have preferred that the draft deal solely with that item, which corresponded to the mandate of the Working Group on that question in the Committee on Disarmament.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution at its 103rd plenary meeting on 20 December 1983 as resolution 38/188 D, again without a vote. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the resolution of the Commission for Conventional Armaments of 12 August 1948, which defined weapons of mass destruction to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or the other weapons mentioned above,

Recalling its resolution 2602 C (XXIV) of 16 December 1969,

Recalling paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons,

Reaffirming its resolution 37/99 C of 13 December 1982 on the conclusion of such a convention,

Convinced that such a convention would serve to spare mankind the potential dangers of the use of radiological weapons and thereby contribute to strengthening peace and averting the threat of war,

Noting that negotiations on the conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons have been conducted in the Committee on Disarmament,

Taking note of that part of the report of the Committee on Disarmament on the work of its 1983 session which deals with those negotiations, including the report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons,

Recognizing that, notwithstanding the progress achieved in those negotiations, divergent views continue to exist in connection with various aspects,

Taking into consideration that the peaceful applications of nuclear energy involve the establishment of a large number of nuclear installations with a high concentration of radioactive materials, and bearing in mind that attacks against such nuclear facilities could have disastrous consequences,

Noting with satisfaction the wide recognition of the need to reach agreement on the comprehensive prohibition of radiological weapons,

1. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to a prompt conclusion of the elaboration of a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons in order that it may be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

2. *Further requests* the Conference on Disarmament to continue its search for a prompt solution to the question of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, including the scope of such prohibition, taking into account all proposals submitted to it to this end;

3. *Takes note* of the recommendation of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons, in the report adopted by the Committee on Disarmament, to re-establish an *Ad Hoc* Working Group at the beginning of its 1984 session to continue its work and in that context to review and assess how best to make progress on the subject-matter;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session

of the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons and on the question of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons".

Conclusion

As negotiations on the question of radiological weapons continued in the Committee on Disarmament in 1983, the problem of a linkage between the so-called traditional radiological weapon matters and the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities was deliberately given less prominence than in the previous year.

On the suggestion of the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons, two subgroups were established to deal with two major aspects of the issue area. Group A considered the subject of radiological weapons in the traditional sense and submitted a consolidated negotiating text of a radiological weapons treaty, prepared by the Co-ordinator of the Group, which included areas of agreement and disagreement. Group B was established to consider the question of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. However, differences of opinion among delegations on many aspects of those issues continued during the 1983 session. In the Working Group there was some discussion on the question of linkage, but positions continued to be far apart.

The General Assembly considered the issue at its thirty-eighth session on the basis of the report of the Committee on Disarmament and adopted, without a vote, resolution 38/188 D, by which it requested the Conference on Disarmament to continue negotiations on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons so as to be able to submit it to the Assembly at its thirty-ninth session. The Assembly further requested the Conference to continue to search for a prompt solution to the question of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities.

The deliberations in the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly in 1983 and the separate consideration of the two major issues in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group demonstrated that the differences of view among delegations went beyond the problem of linkage. Thus the optimism concerning an early agreement on the prohibition of radiological weapons had been somewhat premature.

Prohibition of the stationing of weapons and prevention of an arms race in outer space

Introduction

THE LAUNCHING OF THE FIRST MAN-MADE SATELLITE into outer space in 1957 marked the beginning of the space age. The following year, the General Assembly decided to include an item in its agenda dealing with the peaceful uses of outer space. Subsequently, the Assembly established the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which in 1959 became a permanent body.

For more than two decades since then, outer space questions have been actively discussed in various forums of the United Nations, particularly in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,¹ and in its Legal Sub-Committee, its Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee and its various working groups. Such deliberations contributed to the conclusion of several important international instruments² concerning both military and peaceful aspects of the uses of outer space. The 1963 partial test-ban Treaty prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons, *inter alia*, in outer space. In 1967, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon

¹ The Committee, at the end of 1983, was composed of the following 53 States: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, USSR, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia.

² Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, 1963 (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43); Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967 (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex); Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 1968 (resolution 2345 (XXII), annex); Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 1972 (resolution 2777 (XXVI), annex); Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 1976 (resolution 3235 (XXIX), annex); and Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 34/68, annex). (Years shown are years of entry into force.) The texts of the partial test-ban Treaty, the 1967 outer space Treaty and the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon are reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

and Other Celestial Bodies, was concluded. By the end of 1983, these two Treaties had been ratified by some 111 and 84 countries, respectively. (See appendix I below.)

The past two decades have also been a period of rapid development in the field of space technology, and the inherent dangers of an arms race in outer space have caused increasing concern. Many countries considered it necessary to take further measures to preclude more specifically the possibility of the militarization of outer space. In 1978, the General Assembly formally recognized such concerns in the Final Document of its tenth special session and called for additional measures to be taken and appropriate international negotiations to be held on that issue.³ By its resolution 34/68, adopted in 1979, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to open for signature and ratification the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Opened for signature on 18 December 1979, the Agreement had been signed by 11 countries by the end of 1983, four of which had also ratified it (Chile, Netherlands, Philippines and Uruguay). In accordance with one of its provisions, the Agreement will enter into force 30 days after its ratification by a fifth country. It elaborates, in greater detail than the 1967 Treaty, the obligations of States to ensure that the Moon and other celestial bodies within the solar system, other than the Earth, are used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

In 1981, the General Assembly included in the agenda of its thirty-sixth session an item entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space" on the initiative of the Soviet Union, which annexed a draft treaty to its request.⁴ In the First Committee, the Soviet proposal was supported by a number of socialist countries, and Mongolia introduced a draft resolution on the subject, by which the Assembly, taking into account the draft treaty, would request the Committee on Disarmament to start negotiations on the text of a treaty to prevent the extension of the arms race into outer space. The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution as resolution 36/99.

On behalf of a group of Western countries, Italy introduced, under the item on general and complete disarmament, another draft resolution, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", which expressed a similar concern but with a different emphasis. By its terms, the Assembly would, *inter alia*, request the Committee on Disarmament to consider the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and to give priority to the negotiation of an effective and verifiable agreement prohibiting anti-satellite systems. Subsequently, the Assembly adopted the draft as resolution 36/97 C.

In 1982, the question of peaceful uses of outer space and prevention of an arms race in that environment attracted increased attention. Besides being considered by the Committee on Disarmament and the

³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 80.

⁴ A/36/192.

General Assembly, the subject was specifically discussed at the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE 82), held in Vienna in August. The discussion at the Conference focused primarily on future developments, such as space transportation systems, space manufacturing and solar power stations in space, and their potential benefits, as well as the hazards that might arise from those activities. Military aspects also received considerable attention and, in fact, turned out to be the most controversial issue at the Conference. In its report,⁵ the Conference, *inter alia*, recognized the grave dangers presented by the extension of the arms race into outer space and urged all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the prevention of such an eventuality and to adhere to the 1967 outer space Treaty. The Conference further strongly recommended that the competent organs of the United Nations, the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament in particular, give appropriate attention and high priority to the issue. The Group of 77 stated in a separate declaration that the testing, stationing and deployment of any weapons in space should be banned and recommended that the "two major space Powers" open negotiations for an early agreement to prevent an arms race in outer space.

During the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, many Member States addressed the question of preventing an arms race in outer space but, in general, they expressed their previous positions and proposals on the issue.

Owing to widespread concern about the matter, the Committee on Disarmament, at its 1982 session, decided to include in its agenda a new item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". During the course of discussion, there was general recognition of the need to ensure that any activity in outer space should be strictly for peaceful purposes, but the question of how best to tackle the subject gave rise to several different proposals on possible approaches and priority areas. The Committee was unable to agree to establish a working group on the subject, although that was advocated by a majority of the Committee's members.

At its thirty-seventh session, the General Assembly again considered outer space questions under two agenda items, the one on general and complete disarmament including a new sub-item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space and prohibition of anti-satellite systems". As in the other disarmament forums during the year, discussion focused mainly on whether work should be concentrated on a general agreement to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects or should emphasize, as a matter of priority, a verifiable agreement prohibiting anti-satellite systems as a first step towards that broad objective. As a result of its deliberations, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions, 37/83 and 37/99 D, which, while containing much common ground, reflected the two approaches, particularly in their requests to the Committee on Disarmament to deal with the matter at its 1983 session.

⁵ A/CONF.101/10 and Corr.1 and 2.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1983

The Committee on Disarmament considered the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", in accordance with its programme of work,⁶ during the period from 18 to 22 April and from 8 to 12 August, in both plenary and informal meetings. During the course of the deliberations in the plenary meetings,⁷ there was general recognition that outer space should be preserved for peaceful uses, reflecting the view reaffirmed at the UNISPACE 82 Conference of the previous year.

Vice President Bush of the United States, in his address delivered at the outset of the debate on the subject in the Committee, stressed his country's leadership in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. He said that the United States intended to continue that role since some of the activities in outer space were important to its national security and that of its allies, and he enumerated the existing agreements with arms control provisions affecting outer space. With regard to the question whether additional measures were needed, he stated that his country did not have a simple answer, but believed that the conditions did not exist which would make negotiations appropriate. However, the United States was prepared to participate in an exchange of views on the subject in the Committee, which he felt should be conducted in a more systematic way than in the past.

Other Western States, including Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, suggested that the Committee should define the various issues to be dealt with in the negotiation of effective and verifiable measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, particularly with a view to eliminating the threat of anti-satellite warfare, in keeping with resolution 37/99 D. In order to ensure a thorough examination of the issues involved, those States advocated the setting up of an *ad hoc* working group with an appropriate mandate. France said that the subject should be studied thoroughly, in view of its complexity. As its own contribution, France submitted a working paper⁸ which, *inter alia*, dealt with the technological developments which were likely to occur in the foreseeable future and the inadequacy of the existing legal instruments in ensuring the immunity of satellites. The Netherlands expressed the view that, for the foreseeable future, complete demilitarization of outer space was not a good or realistic idea, since many artificial satellites with military functions had a stabilizing effect. With respect to halting the development of anti-satellite weapons, the Netherlands believed that discussion and subsequent negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament could greatly benefit from a speedy resumption of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on that issue.

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, paragraphs 88-94, for details about the Committee's consideration of the item.

⁷ *Ibid.*, appendix III (CD/421), vols. I-V.

⁸ *Ibid.*, appendix II (CD/421), vol. II, document CD/375.

In several statements during the Committee's two sessions, the Soviet Union advocated starting without delay negotiations on the prohibition of the stationing in outer space of weapons of any kind. That approach had been spelt out in a draft treaty it had submitted the previous year.⁹ In the opinion of the Soviet Union, several factors contributed to the need for new legal instruments on the subject, including gaps in the existing agreements which allowed the arms race to continue in space and the high cost of military space technology. Rejecting the argument that there were as yet no specific types of weapons designed for use in and from outer space as a reason for not starting negotiations, it emphasized the importance of preventive prohibition, and criticized the decision announced by the United States in March 1983 to begin developing a global anti-missile system, which could be deployed in space, for being conducive to an intensification of the arms race. Late in the session, the Soviet Union submitted a document¹⁰ which stated its commitment not to be the first to put into outer space any type of anti-satellite weapon for the period during which other countries, including the United States, refrained from stationing such weapons in outer space. It also reaffirmed its readiness to resume the bilateral Soviet-American talks on the subject. The Soviet Union held that delay in starting negotiations on the relevant item in the Committee was inadmissible, and urged the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group to elaborate a treaty or treaties.

The other members of the group of socialist States expressed their support for the views presented by the Soviet Union. Reflecting their common position, Mongolia recalled the proposal for the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group on the subject, which it had submitted the previous year.¹¹ It said the wording of the group's mandate should be based on the provisions of resolution 37/83. Poland emphasized that while existing agreements on outer space prohibited certain kinds of activities, they left loopholes that could allow that environment to be filled with lethal weapons. Hungary said all channels should be duly exploited in order to start negotiations immediately on the problem area.

Members of the group of 21, for instance, Algeria, underlined the principle that outer space – the common heritage of mankind – should be preserved exclusively for peaceful uses for the benefit of all. They expressed their deep concern about the increasing militarization of that environment. Egypt said the third world countries had a direct security interest in ensuring that the outer space above their territories was not used for military purposes that could endanger them, since they lacked the means to protect themselves. Members of the group of 21 reaffirmed their proposal, submitted in the previous year,¹² that a working group should be established immediately with a mandate to undertake negotia-

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/37/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/335), vol. II, document CD/274.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/421), vol. III, document CD/420.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/37/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/335), vol. II, document CD/272.

¹² *Ibid.*, vol. IV, document CD/329.

tions for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

Expressing concern about the military applications of space technology, Sweden noted that as the military balance became increasingly dependent on satellites for communications, command, control and intelligence, the ability of such functions to survive also became increasingly threatened by the development of anti-satellite weapons systems. After citing examples of anti-satellite applications of space technology by both of the two major space Powers, Sweden, gravely concerned, pointed out the destabilizing potential of the research and development programme the United States planned to embark upon, with the ultimate goal of obtaining the capability of destroying ballistic missiles launched by the adversary. It noted that such a major undertaking would not only entail the spending of enormous funds and a waste of precious scientific resources, but also increase the level of nervousness and international tension, lead to countermeasures, and hence give rise to a new cycle of the arms race. Therefore, Sweden attached great importance to the early initiation of negotiations to prohibit the establishment of anti-satellite systems and to dismantle existing ones. That view was widely shared by other members of the group of 21 in the Committee.

China attached great importance to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and expressed deep concern about the fact that the major Powers with enormous space capabilities were extending their race into that environment, making "space war" no longer a figment of science fiction, but a growing component part of their respective global strategies. It said such a dangerous trend must be stopped promptly and held that an international legal instrument on the prohibition of an arms race in outer space should be elaborated through negotiations. Thus, it was in favour of the establishment by the Committee of an *ad hoc* working group on the question. Noting the fact that there existed approximately a thousand military satellites belonging to the so-called three-C system, i.e., command, control and communication, which contributed to the major-Power rivalry for military superiority and world domination, China believed that the question of their limitation should be dealt with in the future, in an effort to reach the final objective of the demilitarization of outer space.

Sri Lanka said three approaches were prevailing in the Committee regarding the issue area. A passive approach, the continuation of which it regretted, stressed the highly complex nature of outer space matters, but showed no willingness to recognize the need to negotiate on them. Another approach was more positive in that it had led to some initiatives for negotiation but, because of its fragmented nature, it avoided the main issue, namely, preventing an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. The third approach, with which Sri Lanka associated itself, was a comprehensive one and offered the best prospects for the Committee to address the issue properly. Responding positively to resolution 37/83, the Committee should, in Sri Lanka's opinion, set up a working group on the basis of the proposal of the group of 21. The working group should,

first, seek to draft a comprehensive agreement or agreements to prohibit (a) the stationing in orbit around the Earth, on any celestial body or at any other location in outer space of any weapon which had been designed to inflict injury or cause any other form of damage on the Earth, in the atmosphere or on objects placed in space and (b) the testing, production, deployment or use of any space-based, air-based or ground-based weapon system which was designed to damage, destroy or interfere with the functioning of any spacecraft of any nation. Secondly, the working group would start examining the feasibility of extending article IV of the outer space Treaty of 1967 to include a ban on all kinds of weapons from space, including all weapons based in space for use against any target and all anti-satellite weapons regardless of where they were based.

As the debate increasingly centred around the problem of the mandate for the working group, the United Kingdom, at the beginning of the Committee's summer session, suggested a mandate based on what it called a pragmatic approach. That would mean confining it initially to the examination of the scope and continued validity of arms control agreements governing space, possible definition of areas where it would be desirable to extend that scope and the identification of means by which such an extension could be achieved. The Soviet Union said it could not share that approach because it would mean restricting the mandate to an examination of problems of a research nature.

During its summer session, the Committee also established a contact group with the task of formulating an appropriate mandate for a working group. At the time the Contact Group was established, the group of 21 and the socialist States had their separate proposals for setting up a working group, but the socialist States indicated they could also support the proposal of the group of 21, which China, too, supported. Some Western States, pending agreement on the working group's mandate, preferred a systematic exchange of views on the subject in the Committee. The Contact Group held 12 meetings under the chairmanship of the Committee's Chairman.

Towards the end of the summer session, the various groups submitted new documents which established their positions on the problem in question. A paper submitted by Mongolia¹³ largely repeated the previous proposals of the socialist countries. It stated that the proposed mandate should provide a possibility for negotiation on an agreement on preventing an arms race in outer space in all its aspects and for identification, at an initial phase, of the questions of immediate concern.

The ten Western members submitted a draft mandate,¹⁴ according to which the Committee would request the *ad hoc* group to identify, through substantive examination, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, taking into account all existing agreements and proposals, as well as future initiatives. Mongolia commented on the

¹³ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27* (A/38/27 and Corr.1), appendix II (CD/421), vol. III, document CD/410.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, document CD/413.

Western proposal, stating that it was far from the positions held by the socialist countries and did not mention the most important thing—conducting actual negotiations on an appropriate international instrument.

The group of 21 submitted a statement¹⁵ in which it summarized the earlier developments concerning the issue area and recalled that in the consultations held during the session it had been confronted by the Western position favouring a restrictive mandate. In spite of the fact that the mandate and the amendments to the Western proposal which it had put forward had not been accepted, the group of 21 had decided not to prevent the adoption of the Western proposal, if all other groups were willing to accept it. It would, in that case, participate in the working group on the understanding that its mandate constituted only an initial stage. As stated in the report of the Committee, while the group of 21 did not object to the identification through substantive examination of relevant issues, it nevertheless considered that the extension of an arms race to outer space and its use for hostile purposes should be permanently outlawed.

Both the group of socialist States and the Western countries expressed their disappointment that their respective proposals had not proven acceptable to one another. During its 1983 session, the Committee was thus unable to reach consensus on an appropriate mandate for an *ad hoc* working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, although in the end there was no objection, in principle, to the establishment of the working group as such.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

Pursuant to its resolutions 37/83 and 37/99 D of 1982, the General Assembly, at its thirty-eighth session, considered the question of outer space and its uses under the previous two items of its agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space: report of the Committee on Disarmament" and "General and complete disarmament", the latter including a sub-item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space and prohibition of anti-satellite systems: report of the Committee on Disarmament", and a third item entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth", which was included in the agenda at the request of the Soviet Union. In proposing the item, the Soviet Union stated that it was seeking to avoid the militarization of outer space, being particularly concerned about the plans to create and deploy various space-weapon systems capable of destroying targets both in space and on the Earth. Annexed to that proposal was a draft treaty entitled "Treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth".¹⁶

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, CD/418.

¹⁶ A/38/194.

As in the previous year and at the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament, during the thirty-eighth session of the Assembly¹⁷ many delegations expressed their deep concern over the intensified militarization of outer space and the urgency of the situation, and stressed the need for effective measures to be taken to prevent an arms race in outer space.

During the course of the general debate in the First Committee, non-aligned and neutral countries, including Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sweden and Uganda, supported the basic principles that outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it must not become an arena for an arms race. They expressed concern about the development of weapons systems, which would lead to further militarization of space, and believed that the Committee on Disarmament should establish an *ad hoc* working group on the subject, without delay, to undertake negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Nigeria, for instance, pointed out that events in the recent past had shown that the extension of the arms race into outer space posed a real threat to international peace and security. The development of a space-based anti-satellite defence system had introduced a new dimension into space warfare prospects. The increase in the use of anti-satellite weapons, high-energy lasers and particle-beam weapons negated the spirit of the 1967 outer space Treaty and other pertinent legal instruments whose objective was to promote the exploration and use of outer space solely for peaceful purposes.

Sweden stated that new advanced technologies such as beam weapons were considered by the super-Powers for use in outer space, not only for anti-satellite purposes, but also for ballistic-missile defence, and efforts in that area had gathered considerable momentum. Sweden did not believe that beam weapons for ballistic-missile defence would lead to a more stable world. Moreover, in its view, development of space-based ballistic-missile defences would violate the 1972 anti-ballistic missile Treaty. If a certain technique was used, the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty could be jeopardized, and deployment of such missiles would violate the 1967 outer space Treaty.

Brazil criticized both super-Powers for opening up the space dimension of the arms race. It pointed out that every effort to initiate concrete multilateral action to prevent that had encountered all sorts of procedural obstacles, the result being that the two super-Powers continued to have free rein in their quest for supremacy in the use of space for warlike purposes. The maximum concession by the super-Power that perceived itself, for the time being, at a disadvantage in the race had been its agreement to hold informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament in order to educate the rest of the members on the problem involved.

¹⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings, 5th to 33rd and 97th meetings; ibid., First Committee, 3rd to 41st meetings, and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.*

China accused the two major Powers of engaging in a new round of the arms race by, among other things, enthusiastically engaging in recent years in the development of outer space weaponry. They were pushing their contention for space supremacy to a new peak by developing large-scale anti-missile systems and sophisticated weapons to counter such systems, such as space-based anti-missile laser weapons, microwave and high-energy particle-beam weapons. China held that the exploration and exploitation of outer space should serve to promote the economy, science and culture of all countries. Bearing in mind the complexities of restricting satellites for military purposes, since they could play a certain role in monitoring the implementation of disarmament agreements and in giving early warning against surprise attack, China felt the first step should be to ban anti-satellite weapons. It also believed that the Committee on Disarmament should set up a working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space to negotiate on the prohibition of the testing, development, production, deployment and use of all kinds of outer space weapons and on their destruction, and to draw up relevant international legal instruments. Since it was the Soviet Union and the United States that currently had the capability to deploy such weapons and to use force in outer space, China maintained that they could not shirk their responsibility for preventing an arms race in that environment.

Several socialist countries expressed their grave concern about the subject. Bulgaria stressed that the consequences of the militarization of outer space and its employment as a field of aggressive military preparations were impossible to calculate and predict. Hungary pointed out that the source of its concern was the United States programme which included: the completion of the development of an anti-satellite missile system; the development of directed-energy laser and particle-beam weapons; the construction of space shuttle launching facilities for military operations; the launching of a long-term research programme for the eventual construction of a large-scale and highly effective anti-missile defence system with space-based elements; and the growing number of, and support for, conceptual studies on future space stations and space planes for military use. In its view, all those efforts were directed towards the implementation of a truly military space programme for a new generation of weapons systems aimed at targets in outer space, in the atmosphere and on Earth. Hungary, as well as Mongolia and Poland, mentioned the concept of a pre-emptive first strike as an option made possible by the capabilities of current or future space systems. Hungary also emphasized that the squandering of valuable material and human resources on such programmes was as condemnable as their military consequences were dangerous.

The Soviet Union said the critical urgency of preventing the militarization of space was increasing every day. Previous agreements had provided the basis for possible international co-operation in outer space, but the policy of keeping it free from military preparations was under threat. The Soviet Union recalled that in August it had proposed to negotiate the prohibition of the use of force in space and had submitted a draft treaty on the subject, as mentioned above. It said the proposed treaty combined

the political and legal obligations of States to refrain from the use of force against one another in and from outer space with practical steps designed to avert its militarization. The Soviet Union also stressed its willingness to consider all proposals aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and to resume negotiations with the United States on anti-satellite weapons. Many socialist States, for instance, Mongolia, expressed their appreciation of the unilateral moratorium on launching anti-satellite weapons into outer space which the Soviet Union had assumed. They also expressed their regret that negotiations on a new legal instrument in the Committee on Disarmament had not yet begun.

On behalf of the ten member States of the European Community, Greece stated that they supported the creation of an *ad hoc* working group within the Committee on Disarmament that would make possible the structural and comprehensive consideration of questions concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. The Ten stressed that the danger of such a race must be tackled urgently and the problem be given serious consideration, including the possibility of exercising effective control over space weapons by means of verifiable international measures. They regretted the lack of consensus on a mandate for the proposed *ad hoc* working group and hoped agreement could be reached in the Committee's 1984 session.

Italy, in supporting the idea that the question of outer space should be examined in all its aspects, maintained that strengthening the outer-space legal régime with regard to the protection of satellites, including a comprehensive and verifiable ban on anti-satellite systems, remained the most urgent task for the proposed working group in the Committee on Disarmament. It assumed the working group would take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, among them the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union.

The Netherlands pointed out that in many cases both civilian and military functions in space could be performed by the same satellites, and their military functions seemed to have a stabilizing effect in terms of observation, early warning and communications—all essential elements in verifying compliance with arms control measures, preventing surprise attacks and ensuring maintenance of communications in periods of tension and conflict. In its view, a complete demilitarization of outer space was not a desirable goal, at least for the foreseeable future. It proposed, therefore, that satellites should be declared inviolable and, in conjunction with such a measure, the testing, stationing and use of specific anti-satellite systems should be prohibited, as it had suggested in the Committee on Disarmament.

Because of the different approaches adopted by the various political groups, three separate draft resolutions were introduced in the First Committee, each with a particular emphasis. As a result of the Committee's deliberations, two of the three draft resolutions submitted were not put to the vote.¹⁸

¹⁸ For details on the draft sponsored by Mongolia, see A/38/647, and for that sponsored by a group of mainly Western countries, see A/38/640, paragraphs 18-19.

On 11 November, under the agenda item requested by the Soviet Union, Mongolia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth". In introducing it on 17 November, Mongolia noted that by operative paragraphs 2 and 3 the General Assembly would request the Committee on Disarmament "to intensify its consideration of the question of preventing an arms race in outer space, including the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group on the subject, and in this context to work out specific measures of a practical nature aimed at preventing the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth with a view to concluding, as soon as possible, a relevant international agreement", and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space "to proceed, as a matter of priority, to the elaboration of a text of a binding international instrument which would establish legal norms prohibiting the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth, and to set up an *ad hoc* working group on the subject". On 18 and 22 November, Mongolia submitted revisions associated with those two paragraphs. By operative paragraph 2 of the second revised version, the General Assembly would request the Committee on Disarmament "in cooperation and co-ordination with the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, to consider as a matter of priority the question of elaborating such a treaty, taking into account all relevant proposals as well as the views and comments expressed during the discussion of the matter in the General Assembly"; and, by operative paragraph 3, it would request the Committee on Disarmament "to intensify its consideration of the question of preventing an arms race in outer space, including the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group on the subject, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space".

On 11 November, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain and Uruguay submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space and prohibition of anti-satellite systems". In the operative part of the draft resolution, the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, express "the hope that, at the beginning of its 1984 session, the Committee on Disarmament, in discharging its responsibilities as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, will establish, without delay, an *ad hoc* working group with an appropriate mandate, to deal with the question of preventing an arms race in outer space"; and would request the Committee on Disarmament "to continue its consideration of the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, including ways of strengthening the outer-space legal régime with regard to the protection of satellites".

On 11 November, Egypt and Sri Lanka submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", which was later also sponsored by India, Indonesia, Ireland, Maldives and Sweden. The draft resolution was introduced by Egypt on 17 November.

On 23 November, those seven countries submitted a revised draft resolution which was later also sponsored by Bangladesh, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Pakistan, Poland, the Sudan, the Ukrainian SSR and Viet Nam. In introducing it on 25 November, Egypt noted that the revision was the outcome of negotiations held between the sponsors of the original draft and the sponsors of the other two draft resolutions with a view to offering the First Committee the opportunity to come to a single decision on a single draft resolution on the subject. For that reason, Egypt hoped that the revised draft would receive wide acceptance in the Committee. At that time it also made some oral revisions to the draft.

It was at the same meeting that Mongolia announced it would associate itself with the revised draft resolution introduced by Egypt, whose aim, as it understood it, was to intensify further the work of the Committee on Disarmament on a priority basis with a view to undertaking concrete negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements preventing an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. Because operative paragraph 6 of the draft covered the essential elements contained in its own proposal, Mongolia informed the Committee that it would not press its draft resolution to a vote.

On behalf of the Western countries that sponsored the second draft resolution, Italy, at the meeting on 25 November, informed the Committee that they would not insist that it be put to a vote, in response to the appeal of several delegations to consolidate all the draft resolutions on the subject into a single one. However, it stated that their decision in no way meant that they had given up the approach which had characterized their activities in the field of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, but rather it testified further to their desire to pursue their objective in a constructive manner in order to facilitate the future task of the Committee on Disarmament on the issue.

At the same meeting, the First Committee approved the revised draft resolution introduced by Egypt by a recorded vote of 121 to 1 (United States), with 1 abstention (United Kingdom).

In explaining its position in connection with the voting, the United Kingdom stated that it abstained not so much because it disagreed with the draft's overall objective, but because it prejudged a number of important issues and ignored or dismissed several problems which, though already discussed at length in international forums, still awaited resolution. It said it would have voted for the draft withdrawn by Italy.

Australia, Belgium, Brazil, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Turkey and the USSR, in explaining their affirmative votes, all agreed on the need to set up an *ad hoc* working group in the Committee on Disarmament with an appropriate mandate. Some of them, however, had reservations about certain parts of the text of the draft. Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany and Turkey had reservations about the expression "exclusively for peaceful

purposes”, in operative paragraph 1. The Federal Republic, as well as Italy, Japan and Norway, also objected to highlighting the draft treaty proposed by the Soviet Union. In addition, Japan said the various terms of the draft should have been precisely defined. Belgium could not subscribe to concepts linked to the demilitarization of outer space, in so far as that affected security. Italy believed operative paragraph 7 on the mandate for a working group did not fully respect the autonomy of the Committee on Disarmament, and Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan had similar reservations. Norway believed the proposed mandate was broader than what was currently acceptable to all members of the Committee on Disarmament. The Federal Republic of Germany also believed that it should be left to the parties of former bilateral discussions to decide the appropriate time to renew their bilateral efforts.

On 15 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” as resolution 38/70, by a recorded vote of 147 to 1, with 1 abstention.

The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man’s entry into outer space twenty-six years ago,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind,

Reaffirming further the will of all States that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be exclusively for peaceful purposes,

Recalling that the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, have undertaken, in article III, to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding,

Reaffirming, in particular, article IV of the above-mentioned Treaty, which stipulates that States parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner,

Reaffirming also paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty,

Recalling its resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99 of 9 December 1981, 37/83 of 9 December 1982 and 37/99 D of 13 December 1982,

Gravely concerned at the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space,

Mindful of the widespread interest expressed by Member States in the course of the negotiations on and following the adoption of the above-mentioned Treaty in ensuring that the exploration and use of outer space should be for peaceful purposes, and taking note of proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session and at its regular sessions and to the Committee on Disarmament,

Noting the grave concern expressed by the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space over the extension of an arms race into outer space and the recommendations made to the competent organs of the United Nations, in particular the General Assembly, and also to the Committee on Disarmament,

Convinced that further measures are needed for the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Recognizing that, in the context of multilateral negotiations for preventing an arms race in outer space, the resumption of bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America could make a significant contribution to such an objective,

Taking note of the report of the Committee on Disarmament,

Noting that in the course of its session in 1983 the Committee on Disarmament considered this subject both at its formal and informal meetings, as well as through informal consultations,

Aware of the various proposals submitted by Member States to the Committee on Disarmament, particularly concerning the establishment of a working group on the subject and its draft mandate, which had been considered extensively by a contact group,

Taking note of the draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and from Space against the Earth, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as views and comments expressed during the discussion of that draft at its thirty-eighth session,

Expressing its deep concern and disappointment that, although there was no objection, in principle, to the establishment without delay of such a working group, the Committee on Disarmament has not thus far been enabled to reach agreement on an acceptable mandate for the working group during its 1983 session,

1. *Reaffirms* that general and complete disarmament under effective international control warrants that outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it shall not become an arena for an arms race;

2. *Emphasizes* that further effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space should be adopted by the international community;

3. *Calls upon* all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space;

4. *Reiterates* that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has a primary role in the negotiation of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in all its aspects in outer space;

5. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space;

6. *Also requests* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals, including the consideration of the proposal referred to in the preambular part of the present resolution;

7. *Further requests* the Conference on Disarmament to establish an *ad hoc* working group at the beginning of its session in 1984, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space;

8. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this subject by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session;

10. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

Conclusion

In 1983, the question of the militarization of outer space and efforts to prevent an arms race in that sphere elicited deep concern in the international community. An intensive discussion on the subject in a Contact Group of the Committee on Disarmament centred on the formulation of an appropriate mandate, acceptable to all delegations, for an *ad hoc* working group. Despite the fact that there was, in principle, no objection to the establishment of such a group, the Committee, at its 1983 session, was unable to reach a consensus on a mandate.

At the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the main focus of discussion continued to be on whether the work should be concentrated on a general agreement to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union, or whether priority should be given to a verifiable agreement prohibiting anti-satellite systems, as a first step.

The voting pattern on the revised draft resolution adopted by the General Assembly—two other proposals having been withdrawn—reflected the basic positions which various groups and countries held during the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament. The non-aligned countries, China and the socialist States insisted on the early establishment of a working group on outer space to negotiate an agreement or agreements, as appropriate. Most Western countries were in favour of the establishment of a working group to consider the issue, but advocated a more restricted mandate for it. The United Kingdom had stronger reservations about the question, and the United States, although it dropped its opposition in principle to the setting up of such a group, continued to oppose the solution favoured by the majority of the member States during the negotiations in the First Committee.

As a result, it was generally felt that at its 1984 session, the Conference on Disarmament would continue its efforts to reach consensus on a mandate for the working group, which, if successful, would enable it to move towards the common goal of ensuring that outer space is used for peaceful purposes.

PART FOUR

Consideration of conventional disarmament and other approaches

Limitation of conventional armaments and arms transfers on a world-wide and regional basis

Introduction

1983 DID NOT WITNESS A SINGLE MEASURE OF PROGRESS in restraining the constant march of conventional armaments and arms transfers other than the formal entering into force of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. On the contrary, it was estimated that the annual world-wide military expenditure approached \$800 billion,¹ of which, it is generally accepted, non-nuclear spending accounted for over four fifths. Furthermore, in all too many instances conventional weapons and armed forces were used in combat, with the resultant death and destruction which was their designed purpose. In this context, it is relevant to note that the frequency of wars would appear to be on the increase. According to one assessment:

In the 1950s the average was 9 a year; in the 60s, 11 a year; and in the 70s and so far in the 80s, 14 a year.²

The same source observed that, in the first half of 1983, 13 wars were under way. It is also important to note that while a very large proportion of total military expenditure is incurred by the industrialized countries, particularly the Soviet Union and the United States, almost all the wars since 1945 have been fought in developing countries. One other noticeable characteristic of modern warfare is that, in general, civilians suffer more of the casualties than the armed combatants.

Notwithstanding the situation outlined above and the integral trends towards both increasing military expenditures and increasing international violence, there has been comparatively little attention paid to the conventional weapons facet of the arms race in international disarmament efforts. Beyond doubt, the primary reason underlying that attitude has been the wide recognition that, destructive though it may be, conventional war does not threaten the survival of the human species as

¹ SIPRI, ed., *World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1983* (London, Taylor and Francis, 1983), pp. 129-130, estimated \$700-\$750 billion in 1982 dollars for the year 1982.

² Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1983* (Washington, D.C., World Priorities, 1983), p. 20.

does the prospect of nuclear war. The international community has therefore concentrated its energies on measures towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, the subject of part two of this volume, as well as on other weapons of mass destruction, which are considered in part three.

Even so, there has been some evidence of a growing recognition that, without diverting priority efforts from nuclear matters, greater attention than hitherto must be paid to measures of conventional disarmament. As reasons why conventional arms restraint should be pursued more vigorously, advocates of greater action have pointed to the escalating accumulation of conventional weapons, particularly in the two major military alliances, where the arrival of apparent nuclear parity has stimulated the rethinking of certain military strategies; to the increasing number of transfers of arms, and the high frequency of their use outside the territories of industrialized countries; to their destructive and destabilizing effects, especially at the regional level; and to the negative consequences of their excessive accumulation on the economies of States, particularly in the developing and non-arms-producing countries.

Recent technological developments have led to significant qualitative improvements in conventional weapons: such factors as sophisticated guidance and control systems, improved operating characteristics, greater accuracy and greater lethality are rapidly changing much of the nature of possible warfare between industrialized countries. Such changes lead in turn to changes in tactics, to redeployment of forces and, in some instances, to a blurring of the distinction, in terms of military effectiveness, between nuclear and conventional armaments. In the interests of raising the nuclear threshold, it has been argued in some quarters that the level of conventional armaments should be increased rather than reduced; however, the fact remains that an outbreak of conventional war involving nuclear-weapon States could lead to nuclear conflict, and so there is a counter-argument to the effect that a safer world can be obtained only by measures of both nuclear and non-nuclear disarmament.

Separately, the availability and unrestrained spread of conventional weapons have encouraged a thriving market in arms transfers, thus spurring the emergence of regional arms races and military rivalries, mainly among developing countries in certain regions. In addition, an increasing number of countries have established indigenous armaments industries, thus further promoting arms transfers, reducing the possibilities for worthwhile restraint and contributing to the continuing diversion of human, financial and material resources from more beneficial economic and social tasks.

While the factors described above and other effects of conventional arms accumulation have slowly but surely drawn increasing attention, there has been no agreement on how to pursue conventional disarmament. Some countries, notably several Western States and China, have stated that conventional and nuclear disarmament should be pursued simultaneously. However, other countries—mostly developing coun-

tries—have consistently held that conventional disarmament does not warrant the same importance as nuclear disarmament which, in accordance with the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,³ should be given the highest priority in disarmament negotiations. There have also been concerns expressed that attempts to limit transfers of arms might not take due account of the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, nor of the need of recipient States to protect their security.

A view has been persistently expressed that restraints on arms transfers would also be used to maintain the technological gap and military superiority of certain countries over others; therefore, arms transfers should not be subject to limitation without the concurrent establishment of effective restraints on arms production in militarily significant States.

The Final Document also called for the pursuit “on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis” of agreements or other measures of limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons.⁴ That comprehensive treatment agreed to by the Assembly represented an effort to embrace differing views on possible approaches to conventional arms restraint.

The only bilateral effort in recent years was the Conventional Arms Transfer Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those Talks were initiated in 1977 and four rounds were held in 1978, but they produced no results and have not resumed since that time.

The regional approach has been based on the concept that it might be easier to find agreement among States from one particular geographical area rather than to attempt to find broad solutions applicable to world-wide circumstances. A comprehensive study on regional disarmament,⁵ submitted to the General Assembly in 1980, concluded, “Conventional disarmament is a field in which the number of possible measures and the scope for regional initiatives is virtually unlimited”. In the regional context, the situation in Europe has attracted the most hope for progress in view of its place as the region with the world’s largest concentration of armaments and armed forces. Negotiations currently entitled the Vienna Talks on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe began in November 1973 between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty countries. By the beginning of 1983, those Talks were in their tenth year without having achieved success; although much valuable groundwork had been carried out in the discussions, fundamental differences concerning the numbers of troops

³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 20. The Final Document is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I.

⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 83.

⁵ *Study on all the aspects of Regional Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.2), para. 198.

deployed in Central Europe and certain proposed verification measures continued to bar the way to progress. Some countries, however, hold to the view that solutions do not lie in regional approaches. India, for one, has regarded any attempt to emphasize the regional approach over the global approach as "flawed", maintaining that the arms race must be addressed on a global basis.

The solitary success in conventional arms restraint in recent years was the conclusion, in 1980, of the agreement entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects" and its three annexed Protocols.⁶ That Convention, through three currently annexed Protocols, provides for the protection of civilians and civilian objects from attacks by means of incendiary weapons, land-mines and booby traps, and prohibits entirely the use of fragments that cannot readily be detected in the human body. As the first international arms regulation agreement to be negotiated at a United Nations conference, the Convention and its Protocols represent a significant step in efforts by the international community to prohibit or at least restrict the use of the categories of weapons they cover. The Convention entered into force on 2 December 1983 and, as of the end of the year, 23 countries had deposited instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General (appendix I below refers).

In an effort to focus attention on the complexities of the conventional arms race and to investigate the possibilities for progress, at its thirty-sixth session, in 1981, the General Assembly adopted resolution 36/97 A on the basis of an initiative of Denmark. By that resolution, it called on the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified experts, to carry out a comprehensive study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces.⁷ The study began in July 1982, by which time the Disarmament Commission had adopted by consensus a text entitled "Guidelines for the study on conventional disarmament".⁸ According to resolution 36/97 A, the Secretary-General was requested to submit a final report on the study to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, in 1983.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1983

A number of references to the problem of the conventional arms race were made in the course of general statements in the Disarmament Commission,⁹ although there was no specific item on the agenda devoted to the issue.

⁶ For the text of the Convention and its Protocols, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, appendix VII, or *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

⁷ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 6: 1981, chap. XVII.

⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. XVIII; the text of the "Guidelines" is given *in extenso*.

⁹ A/CN.10/PV.66-70 and A/CN.10/PV.65-72/Corrigendum.

Sweden drew attention to the estimate that world military expenditure in 1983 was expected to exceed \$800 billion and that the international arms trade was continually breaking earlier sales records. The representative of Sweden declared that the two super-Powers' share of world military resources was about 50 per cent and their share of international arms exports was about 70 per cent. China and Spain referred to the need, while promoting nuclear disarmament, not to overlook the conventional arms race. China stated that the super-Powers, in their arms expansion and war preparations, were attaching greater and greater importance to the strengthening of their capacities for fighting all types of conventional war. Only by enabling conventional disarmament to move forward simultaneously and in conformity with nuclear disarmament, thus eliminating the threat of nuclear war and all wars of aggression, could world peace be effectively safeguarded. Spain acknowledged the first priority as nuclear disarmament, but pointed out that the conventional arms race continued unbridled and consumed the greater percentage of military expenditures.

In referring to the refusal of the United States and its allies to pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union stated that the Western argument, namely, that there was a threat of the use of conventional weapons as the USSR and its allies possessed them in greater quantities, did not tally with the facts. Moreover, the Soviet Union had proposed in 1979 that all States which had participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe at Helsinki in 1975 should reach agreement on non-first-use of both nuclear and conventional weapons, but the Western countries had refused. The Soviet Union added that the task of eliminating nuclear arsenals should not make member States blind to problems relating to conventional weapons and armed forces. Bearing in mind the constant improvement in, and the ever-growing might of, conventional weapons, they should make fresh efforts for a substantial reduction in levels of conventional weapons and armed forces, both globally and regionally.

The United States observed that since 1974 it had produced 3,050 tactical combat aircraft, whereas the Soviet Union had produced twice as many. The United States had produced 27 attack submarines, the Soviet Union 61. As for armoured vehicles including tanks, the United States noted that it had produced 11,200, while the Soviet Union had produced 54,000. The representative of the United States posed the question whether that constituted an arms race, pointing out that it normally took at least two protagonists to race.

The questions of regional efforts towards the limitation of conventional armaments and of arms transfers were not raised in the Disarmament Commission in 1983, overshadowed as they were by the subject of the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe and elsewhere.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1983

The Committee on Disarmament continued to focus its energies on other issues, as described elsewhere in this volume, and did not specifically address aspects of conventional disarmament. Even so, there were several references in statements¹⁰ by speakers, some of whom indicated that they believed greater attention should be given to the subject.

The Secretary-General, in his statement to the Committee on Disarmament on 15 February, noted that the past four and a half years had seen frequent outbreaks of conventional war, with untold loss of life, destruction and human suffering as a result. Disarmament, said the Secretary-General, could not be restricted to nuclear arms, and effective measures to promote conventional disarmament were essential to both increase security and help prevent the violence and bloodshed evident in various parts of the world.

The Foreign Ministers of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, in addressing the Committee, drew attention to the growing accumulation of conventional arms, the resultant diversion of immense resources urgently needed for tackling vital development tasks and the ever-present risk that armed conflict of one kind might easily lead to another at a higher level. All of them emphasized that the question should no longer be ignored by the international community or the Committee, and the Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany saw a particular need to complement the Vienna Talks by means of a forum covering the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. That need could be met within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, he stated, and advantage should be taken of the opportunity. In the general debate Belgium attached particular importance to the question of conventional disarmament, along with that of nuclear disarmament.

In the context of an extensive discussion about the wording of the Committee's agenda, Japan stated that the question of preventing nuclear war had to be looked at in the wider context of preventing any armed conflict, nuclear or conventional. France expressed its readiness to take part fully in a discussion of substance on the prevention of nuclear war, provided that the discussion also covered the prevention of war in general and the prevention of conventional war. The United Kingdom believed that the Committee on Disarmament would be failing in its responsibilities if it sought to discuss the prevention of nuclear war to the exclusion of conventional conflict.

Bulgaria believed that the process of strengthening European security would be enhanced by making headway at the Vienna Talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. In that negotiating forum, the socialist countries had tabled a constructive pro-

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1), appendix III (CD/421), vols. I-V.*

posal, and they were of the opinion that all the prerequisites existed for working out an early agreement.

Yugoslavia, among other points it made in stressing the need for both nuclear and conventional disarmament, emphasized that the delimitation line between nuclear and conventional weapons was being removed, thus virtually eliminating the political, technological and psychological barrier between the use of conventional weapons and the use of nuclear weapons.

China declared its long-standing view that the prevention of conventional war was a real and important issue. Moreover, since the subject was already being discussed in the Disarmament Commission and was also under study by a Group of Experts, China believed it advisable that the Committee should arrange a specific discussion on the subject at an appropriate time in the future.

India held that the threat to survival posed by nuclear weapons could not be equated to the death and destruction resulting from conventional weapons. India accordingly maintained its established position that nuclear matters should be given first priority.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

Although not a separate item on the agenda, the subject of conventional weapons arose on a number of occasions at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly,¹¹ either in its own right or as part of efforts aimed at regional measures of disarmament.

In his report to the Assembly on the work of the Organization,¹² the Secretary-General stated that the situation relating to conventional arms was a source of increasing concern and that it was necessary to bear in mind that the many millions killed in war since Hiroshima and Nagasaki had all died from conventional weapons. The situation, the Secretary-General continued, had had a corrosively harmful effect, not least on the world's developing countries, which felt obliged to spend an increasing proportion of their resources for defence purposes, often to the detriment of essential needs. A similar theme was also voiced in several plenary statements. President Mubarak of Egypt observed that the spiralling of the production of conventional weapons and their use constituted a serious threat to the security of many medium-sized and small countries and an onerous burden upon their economies. Mexico expressed concern at the fact that countries with limited resources were investing an undue proportion of their national efforts in acquiring weapons and consolidating their military preparedness. Rwanda drew attention to the immense financial, material and scientific resources squandered on the escalating arms race and the scandalous paradox of

¹¹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 97th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 41st meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

¹² *Ibid.*, *Supplement No.1 (A/38/1)*.

arms expenditures and world poverty. Thailand noted that, while the predominant goal of nuclear disarmament remained undisputed, the danger posed to peace, security and mankind by conventional armaments must not be ignored and that measures to arrest the alarming trend were therefore urgently needed.

Similar views were expressed in the First Committee, where many members emphasized the significance of conventional weapons. Austria pointed out that since 1945 over 100 wars had caused 16 million deaths, and that many weapons could hardly be called "conventional" any more. By far the greatest part of the buildup was in the two alliances, but in recent years the East-West confrontation had increasingly spilled over into the third world, causing regional arms races. Several countries noted the spread of conventional arms conflict to many parts of the world, with Zambia, for instance, pointing to the fact that at the time of speaking there were wars in nine parts of the world, none of which were the result of a nuclear confrontation, but rather the products of an unabating conventional arms race.

The Netherlands was one of several countries believing that the focus on nuclear issues should not result in neglect of the issue of conventional weapons, whose power had been vastly increased by modern technology. It stated that the conventional imbalance in Europe was a potential source of instability, and progress in disarmament in that field would reduce Western Europe's dependence on nuclear deterrence and therefore increase the possibilities for reductions in nuclear weapons. Nigeria, however, held to the reverse view, namely, that progress in nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere conducive to approaching conventional disarmament. India went further, maintaining that there was an increasing tendency to emphasize "unimportant and subsidiary issues" in such a manner that the overriding objective of preventing nuclear war and proceeding towards nuclear disarmament was impeded. It listed conventional disarmament as one of several peripheral aspects, and declared that such matters had been deliberately brought to the forefront to give a semblance of progress and to delay progress in nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet Union presented its policy regarding the limitation of conventional weapons as a comprehensive approach, as evidenced by its numerous proposals for efforts at a global level in the General Assembly and elsewhere. The USSR stated that it kept open the door to negotiations and reaffirmed its willingness to seek an agreement with the other permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States to freeze—on a reciprocal basis—armed forces and conventional armaments.

The matter of arms transfers was referred to by several representatives as well as by the Secretary-General. The latter, in his report on the work of the Organization, recalled that in the Final Document of 1978, the General Assembly had called for consultations among major arms-supplier and recipient countries to limit transfers of conventional weapons, but as yet no concrete follow-up action had been taken. The

Secretary-General suggested that the two Governments concerned should give careful thought to the possibility of reviving the bilateral talks on conventional arms transfers which had been suspended in 1978. He further suggested that the scope of those talks could eventually be enlarged, perhaps within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament, to cover multilateral aspects and to include representation of recipient as well as supplier countries.

In the First Committee, the USSR noted the Secretary-General's appeal and reminded members that it had proposed repeatedly to the United States the resumption of the dialogue on the question. However, far from responding to Soviet proposals, the representative of the USSR declared, the United States had openly avowed its reliance on the traffic in arms as an instrument of its foreign policy. The USSR reaffirmed its readiness to resume Soviet/United States negotiations on the matter.

Australia, Chile, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Peru, Togo and Uganda were among the countries that expressed concern at the transfers of conventional weapons, particularly in cases where such transfers provided *matériel* beyond the needs of self-defence or where their supply had replaced productive and useful development assistance. Sweden, observing that many developing countries felt they had to spend scarce resources on the import of weapons, believed that it would be desirable to promote limitations on, and to establish guidelines for, international arms transfers and that the United Nations would be a suitable forum for that task.

The matter of regional disarmament attracted specific comment. Greece, on behalf of the European Community, recalled that the General Assembly had, on a number of occasions, unanimously stressed the importance of the regional approach; the Ten appealed to Governments and relevant regional institutions to intensify their consultations in order to agree, within their own framework, on disarmament measures. Austria, Pakistan, Portugal and the Soviet Union were among those members which recommended the regional approach as a potentially important means of limiting and reducing armed forces and conventional armaments and contributing to peace and security. The USSR pointed out that such an approach would make it possible to take into account the inherent peculiarities of a region, and thus to elaborate more far-reaching measures.

In the regional context, many States commented on developments in Europe. The primary preoccupation was the situation of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR concerning the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (see chapter V), but beyond that issue several points were made on the Vienna Talks on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe, the Madrid Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the forthcoming Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

Poland regretted the absence of a positive response to the latest comprehensive proposals advanced in the Vienna Talks by the Eastern European States. The Soviet Union attached great importance to the negotiations and, since 1973, it observed, the Warsaw Treaty participants had submitted more than 20 compromise proposals. Early in 1983, they had proposed a draft agreement providing for the reduction over a period of three years of NATO and Warsaw Treaty armed forces in Central Europe to equal collective limits of 900,000 on each side, irrespective of the differences in the data on the numbers of troops both sides had at the beginning of the process, while each would determine for itself the necessary magnitude of reduction. The proposal also contained an extensive set of confidence-building measures and verification arrangements.

The United States recalled that in 1982 the Western side had put forward a new initiative to give momentum to the Vienna Talks. That initiative would bind parties in the Central European zone of reductions, in one agreement, to undertake substantial and immediate reductions to meet specified manpower ceilings, thereby meeting what the Soviet Union had alleged was a major concern of the other side. However, a positive response from the Soviet Union and its allies was still awaited. The United Kingdom stated that in the Vienna Talks, as in so many other negotiations, there must be assurance that any agreement would be balanced and verifiable. Accordingly, it was necessary to insist that the numbers of forces on both sides be agreed prior to their reduction and that the forces be reduced in a manner that could be properly verified. Greece, speaking on behalf of the Ten, stated that the fact could not be ignored that serious differences of opinion prevailed on the subject of verification.

There were several expressions of hope for the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, due to open in Stockholm on 17 January 1984. Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Zambia were among those that looked forward to a constructive and, hopefully, successful conference. Norway emphasized that it was essential to prevent the Conference from developing into a fruitless exercise on general principles and declaratory proposals. Measures should be designed to create more transparency and predictability in the military field; in particular, they should be designed to reduce the danger of surprise attacks and the use of military force for political purposes. The United States believed that the Conference should not try to duplicate the work of other security negotiations, but could make a valuable contribution by negotiating measures designed to decrease the possibility of a surprise attack in Europe, to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation and to improve the channels of communication during times of crisis. The Soviet Union shared the view that the Conference had an important role to play in reducing the level of military confrontation in Europe. The first stage of that process should be the discussion and adoption of confidence- and security-building measures

covering the whole continent and the adjacent sea and ocean areas and airspace. It hoped that the Conference would be conducted in a business-like manner; for its part, the USSR would do its utmost to ensure success.

Two draft resolutions were placed before the First Committee in connection with the limitation of conventional weapons and regional measures of disarmament.

On 11 November, Austria, Belgium, Cuba, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "United Nations Conference on Prohibitions and Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects", which was subsequently sponsored also by New Zealand. In connection with the proposal, the General Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General¹³ in which, as depositary of the Convention, he informed the Assembly of the state of adherence to the Convention and its Protocols. Specifically, the Assembly was informed that the condition required by the Convention, namely, the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, having been fulfilled on 2 June 1983, the Convention and its three annexed Protocols would enter into force six months after that date, on 2 December 1983.

On 15 November the sponsors of the draft resolution submitted a revised version in which the words "general agreement on" were added to the first line of the third preambular paragraph (see below). Subsequently sponsored also by Costa Rica, Ecuador and Viet Nam, the revised draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Nigeria in the First Committee on 17 November. In noting the sponsors' pleasure at the imminent entry into force of the Convention, Nigeria drew particular attention to the fact that the draft resolution urged those States which had not yet become parties to exert their best endeavours to do so as early as possible. The sponsors also hoped that the possibility of further restrictions and prohibitions of use of other specific types of conventional weapons would be kept open for future negotiations and agreements.

Speaking in explanation of vote before the vote, the Soviet Union stated that it did not object to adoption of the draft resolution by consensus and that it fully supported operative paragraph 1 of the draft. At the same time, the Soviet representative wished to emphasize again that his country had proposed that further steps be taken, for example, to prohibit or limit the use of phosphorous munitions against human targets. He pointed out that with the entry into force of the Convention, there would be no obstacle to talks on additional protocols to it.

The draft resolution was approved by the First Committee on 21 November without a vote and adopted by the General Assembly on

¹³ A/38/405.

15 December, also without a vote, as resolution 38/66. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 32/152 of 19 December 1977, 35/153 of 12 December 1980, 36/93 of 9 December 1981 and 37/79 of 9 December 1982,

Recalling with satisfaction the adoption, on 10 October 1980, of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, together with the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III),

Reaffirming its conviction that general agreement on the prohibition or restriction of use of specific conventional weapons would significantly reduce the suffering of civilian populations and of combatants,

Taking note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* that an increasing number of States have either signed, ratified, accepted or acceded to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which was opened for signature in New York on 10 April 1981;

2. *Further notes with satisfaction* that, upon the fulfilment of the conditions set out in article 5 of the Convention, the Convention and the three Protocols annexed thereto entered into force on 2 December 1983;

3. *Urges* all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as to obtain ultimately universal adherence;

4. *Notes* that, under article 8 of the Convention, conferences may be convened to consider amendments to the Convention or any of the annexed Protocols, to consider additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols, or to review the scope and operation of the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto and to consider any proposal for amendments to the Convention or to the existing annexed Protocols and any proposals for additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General as the depositary of the Convention and its three annexed Protocols, to inform the General Assembly from time to time of the state of adherence to the said Convention and its Protocols;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

On 11 November, 30 countries submitted a draft resolution entitled "Regional disarmament", which was subsequently also sponsored by a further 5 countries.¹⁴ The draft resolution was introduced in the First Committee on 15 November by the representative of Belgium, who stated that it was designed essentially to ensure the implementation of General Assembly resolution 37/100 F, which had encouraged regional

¹⁴ Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay and Zaire.

initiatives and been adopted unanimously in 1982. The sponsors believed that the international community should be informed formally of the convening of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. In addition, they hoped that in the future the General Assembly would have a document covering all activities related to the regional approach to disarmament, including communications from Governments and regional institutions on the measures they were taking, and also information from the Department for Disarmament Affairs regarding its activities in the field of the regional approach to disarmament.

In connection with the subject, the General Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General¹⁵ consisting of a compilation of comments by Member States submitted pursuant to resolution 37/100 F.

Before the vote in the First Committee, India explained that it would abstain on the draft resolution, claiming that there was a compelling need to maintain the focus on issues of the highest priority, namely, the nuclear arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Only a global approach could have a chance of success; in the nuclear age there could not be a piecemeal approach to disarmament in geographical terms, nor could a regional view be tenable.

Subsequently, Greece, on behalf of the European Community, expressed the hope that the General Assembly would adopt the draft resolution unanimously, observing that while growing weapons stockpiles should be seen in a global context, the regional approach to disarmament might often be relevant and was therefore justified. The Ten also wished to express satisfaction about the preparations for the Stockholm Conference, and would try to ensure that confidence- and security-building measures significant for all of Europe would be adopted in its first stage.

The draft resolution was approved by the First Committee on 21 November without a vote, and adopted by the General Assembly on 15 December, also without a vote, as resolution 38/73 J. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 37/100 F of 13 December 1982 on regional disarmament,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the status of this question;
2. *Takes note also* of the fact that, at the request of the States having participated in the Madrid meeting of representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, held from 11 November 1980 to 9 September 1983, on the basis of the provisions of the Final Act relating to the follow-up to the Conference, the Government of Spain has transmitted the Concluding Document of this meeting to the Secretary-General;
3. *Expresses its satisfaction*, in this connection, at the convening at Stockholm of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, commencing on 17 January 1984, as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe;

¹⁵ A/38/376 and Add.1 and 2.

4. *Takes note also* of the proposals made in the context of regional disarmament since the adoption of its resolution 37/100 F;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the General Assembly regularly informed on the implementation of resolution 37/100 F, as well as on the activities carried out by the Secretariat, in particular the Department for Disarmament Affairs, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, in the field of the regional approach to disarmament;

6. *Decides* to include in the agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Regional disarmament: report of the Secretary-General".

A third resolution related to conventional disarmament was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 38/188 A. By that resolution, the General Assembly extended by a year the mandate of the study being carried out by the Secretary-General with the assistance of the Group of Experts on All Aspects of the Conventional Arms Race and on Disarmament relating to Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces. For details of the General Assembly's consideration of that resolution, see chapter XXIII.

Conclusion

As each year goes by it would seem that the subject of limiting and reversing the conventional arms race gradually gains more attention. While there are some who hold to the view that nothing must be allowed to divert energies away from efforts to find agreements on measures of nuclear disarmament, at the same time the incidence of conventional conflict continues to grow and the toll of death and destruction mounts as a result of the use of conventional weapons, mainly in developing countries.

Current technological development, moreover, resulting in weapons of ever-increasing sophistication and lethality, is having a great effect on the conventional armaments of the two major alliances. In addition, transfers of sophisticated arms from industrialized countries, together with the development of indigenous arms production facilities in developing countries, are leading to a rapid spread of modern weapons to many parts of the world.

However, the subject of regulating conventional arms is beset with sensitive political problems. The complex nature of tensions within each region, the sovereign right to self-defence, national pride, the development of indigenous technology, the right to measures of collective security, the implications of arms transfers for suppliers and for recipients, and—for the nuclear-weapon States—the relationships within their force structures between nuclear and conventional weapons—all of these illustrate but some of the many interweaving factors that complicate the prospects for conventional disarmament. Overarching all has been a continuing tense relationship between certain major Powers, particularly, of course, the Soviet Union and the United States. In such circumstances, it must inevitably be difficult for the international community to address the sensitive problems involved. Indeed there has, as yet, been no inter-

national consensus that these problems should be addressed, either on a global or on a regional basis.

As of the end of 1983, therefore, there was little cause for optimism that the continuing accumulation and use of conventional weapons would be halted in the near future.

Reduction of military budgets

Introduction

THE PROBLEM OF REDUCING MILITARY EXPENDITURES has been addressed by the United Nations for more than three decades. Twenty-six¹ General Assembly resolutions and 13 studies² on the subject and closely related problems carried out under the Organization's auspices bear testimony to the United Nations efforts to cope with a question that is of growing concern to the international community and to the general public.

In 1973, a Soviet initiative making the first specific approach to the subject led to the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 3093 A (XXVIII), which called upon the five permanent members of the Security

¹ Twenty-four of the resolutions, adopted up to the end of 1982, are: 380 (V) of 17 November 1950; 914 (X) of 16 December 1955; 1516 (XV) of 15 December 1960; 1837 (XVII) of 18 December 1962; 2387 (XXIII) of 19 November 1968; 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969; 2667 (XXV) of 7 December 1970; 2685 (XXV) of 11 December 1970; 2831 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971; 3075 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973; 3093 A and B (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973; 3462 (XXX) and 3470 (XXX) of 11 December 1975; 31/68 of 10 December 1976; 32/75 of 12 December 1977; 33/67 of 14 December 1978; 34/83 F of 11 December 1979; 35/142 A and B of 12 December 1980; 36/82 A and B of 9 December 1981; and 37/95 A and B of 13 December 1982. The two resolutions adopted in 1983 are discussed in this chapter.

² *Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.62.IX.1); *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.72.IX.16); *Disarmament and Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.IX.1); *Reduction of Military Budgets of States Permanent Members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and Utilization of Part of the Funds Thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing Countries* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.I.10); *Reduction of Military Budgets: Measurement and International Reporting of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.I.6); "A comparative study of global military expenditures and development assistance since 1945 as stated in available official and unofficial sources" (Background paper prepared by the Secretariat), *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1* (A/S-10/1), vol. V, document A/AC.187/73; "Reduction of military budgets: report of the Secretary-General" (A/32/194 and Add.1); *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.1); "Reduction of military budgets: report of the Secretary-General", *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 6* (A/S-10/6 and Corr. 1 and Add.1); *Reduction of Military Budgets, International Reporting of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.9); *The Relationship between Disarmament and Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.1); *Reduction of Military Budgets: Refinement of International Reporting and Comparison of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.4); and *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.2).

Council to reduce their military budgets by 10 per cent and allocate a part of the funds thus saved for the provision of development assistance to developing countries. The other four permanent members of the Council objected to the Soviet proposal for various reasons. In the same year, on the basis of a proposal submitted by Mexico, the Assembly also adopted resolution 3093 B (XXVIII), pursuant to which the Secretary-General, assisted by qualified experts, prepared a report on the subject.³

The General Assembly since then has sought to develop, through further studies and surveys, a standardized instrument for defining, measuring and reporting military expenditures. In 1976, the Assembly considered, on the basis of one of the studies,⁴ a matrix-cum-questionnaire to be used as the instrument of a standardized reporting system. On the basis of the recommendations⁵ of an intergovernmental group of experts, the General Assembly, by resolution 32/85, adopted in 1977, requested the Secretary-General to determine which countries would be prepared to participate in an experimental test of the reporting instrument.

Following the tenth special session of the General Assembly, in 1978, which stressed in its Final Document⁶ the importance of reducing global military expenditures, the Assembly adopted, at its regular session the same year, resolution 33/67, by which it requested the Secretary-General to conduct a practical experimental test of the reporting instrument and thereby develop recommendations for its implementation, and forward them to the Assembly in 1980. Pursuant to the resolution, the Secretary-General appointed an *Ad Hoc* Panel on Military Budgeting for that purpose. The following year, on the basis of a Romanian initiative, the General Assembly adopted resolution 34/83 F, by which it requested the Disarmament Commission to undertake an examination of effective ways and means of achieving agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures.

At its session in 1980, the Disarmament Commission's deliberations on the subject revealed differences of opinion concerning, in particular, the use of a standardized instrument for reporting military expenditures. A number of recommendations on the subject, which reflected those differences, were agreed to, by consensus, and included in the Commission's report to the General Assembly.⁷ The General Assembly, at its regular session that year, by resolution 35/142 A, requested the Commission to continue its deliberations and to develop principles which should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles in a document. The Assembly also considered the report of the *Ad Hoc* Panel on Military Budgeting.⁸

³ A/9770/Rev.1; later published as a United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.1.10.

⁴ A/31/222/Rev.1; later published as a United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.1.6.

⁵ See A/32/194 and Add.1.

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 89 and 90.

⁷ See *ibid.*, *Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/35/42)*, sect. IV, para. 21; the recommendations are reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. XX, annex II.

⁸ A/35/479; later published as a United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.1.9.

The *Ad Hoc* Panel had concluded that the experimental test, in which 14 Member States participated, showed that the proposed reporting instrument⁹ was viable. It provided a practical basis for taking appropriate decisions to implement a system of international standardized reporting of military expenditures. The Panel also recommended a further study on the problems involved in comparing the military budgets of different countries and those likely to arise in the field of verification.

By resolution 35/142 B, the General Assembly recommended that all Member States make use of the reporting instrument to report their military expenditures annually to the Secretary-General. It also requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of an *ad hoc* group of qualified experts, to further refine the reporting instrument in the light of suggestions received from States in the course of its regular implementation and to suggest solutions to the problems of comparison and verification of military expenditures. The Secretary-General was requested to report on the implementation of those tasks to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session.

In the 1981 session of the Disarmament Commission, a joint initiative by Romania and Sweden was the focus of intensive discussions. It envisaged the adoption of certain principles regarding military budget reductions, possibly in the form of a declaration. Unable to arrive at consensus, the Commission decided to recommend continuation of its deliberations in 1982. It annexed to its report to the Assembly a background paper listing some of the principles and ideas submitted by members.¹⁰ At its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly, by resolution 36/82 A, requested the Disarmament Commission to continue with its efforts to reach agreement on the principles that should govern military expenditure reductions. By another resolution, 36/82 B, based on a Swedish initiative, it also stressed the need for wider use of the reporting instrument, reiterating its recommendation that all Member States use it to report annually to the Secretary-General, by April 30, their military expenditures in the latest fiscal year for which data was available. In fact, 21 States had used it to report their military expenditures by 30 April 1981.

In 1982, the Commission's Working Group on military budgets exchanged views on the background paper annexed to the previous year's report and other proposals and ideas submitted by members. Once again unable to reach agreement, the Commission recommended, in its report to the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, that it be allowed to continue its work at its next substantive session, in 1983.¹¹

⁹ The "Instrument for standardized international reporting of military expenditures", which is in the form of a grid or matrix, is discussed and reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chap. XX and its annex III; it has remained essentially similar since that time.

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/36/42)*, para. 20 and annex I. (The background paper of the Chairman of the Working Group on the reduction of military budgets is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 6: 1981, chap. XIX, annex II.)

¹¹ See *ibid.*, *Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-12/3)*, para. 25.

At its twelfth special session, in 1982, the Assembly did not take any specific action on the question of reducing military budgets. However, in its Concluding Document it noted that the “vastly increased military budgets since 1978” represented a huge and growing diversion of human and material resources that constituted a “colossal waste of precious resources which might otherwise be used to elevate the living standards of all peoples”.¹²

Pursuant to resolution 35/142 B, the Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets reported to the Assembly¹³ at its twelfth special session. The report contained a discussion of two related problems: the first concerned alternative methodologies to be used in making international and intertemporal comparisons of military expenditures, and the second related to verification of agreements that might be concluded on the reduction of military budgets. The Group also recommended certain minor changes in the use of the reporting instrument. In addition to recommending that it be used by an ever-increasing number of States from different geographic regions and with different budgeting and accounting systems, the Group recommended further study of the problem of comparing military expenditures. In particular, it suggested consideration of the possibility of constructing price indices and purchasing-power parities for military expenditures of different countries in order to facilitate valid comparisons among them.

Later in the year, at its regular session, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions on the reduction of military budgets. By resolution 37/95 A, adopted without a vote, it requested the Disarmament Commission to continue, in 1983, its efforts to elaborate the principles that should govern actions of States in freezing and reducing military expenditures. The Assembly also declared once again its conviction that it was possible by international agreements to reduce military budgets without impairing the right of States to security, self-defence and sovereignty. By resolution 37/95 B, adopted by a vote of 96 to 13, with 9 abstentions, the Assembly stressed the need for wider participation by States in the international reporting system and requested the Secretary-General to invite Member States to submit suggestions on practical means to promote that goal. The Assembly also reiterated its recommendation that all Member States should make use of the reporting instrument. Finally, it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified experts and the voluntary co-operation of States, to undertake the task of constructing price indices and purchasing-power parities for the military expenditures of participating States, to keep the Assembly informed of its progress and to submit a final report to the Assembly at its fortieth session, in 1985.

¹² *Ibid.*, Annexes, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32, para. 61. (The Concluding Document is reproduced *in extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, appendix I.)

¹³ *Ibid.*, *Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 7* (A/S-12/7); later published as a United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.4.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1983

At its substantive session held in May-June 1983, the Disarmament Commission, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 37/95 A, had a twofold item on the reduction of military budgets on its agenda, worded, as in other recent years, as follows:

5. Reduction of military budgets:

- (a) Harmonization of views on concrete steps to be undertaken by States regarding a gradual, agreed reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries, noting the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;
- (b) Examination and identification of effective ways and means of achieving agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, taking into account the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 34/83 F, 35/142 A, 36/82 A and 37/95 A, with a view to identifying and elaborating the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles into a suitable document at an appropriate stage.¹⁴

In the course of a general exchange of views¹⁵ on 10 and 11 May, a number of members made references to the Commission's efforts to reduce military budgets. Romania recalled that for three successive years, it had reduced its defence expenditures, and had decided recently to freeze them at the 1982 level until 1985. It expressed its conviction that a freeze on military expenditures and their gradual reduction would contribute, in a concrete way, to the establishment of a balance of military forces at lower levels of armaments, thereby strengthening security by curbing the arms race and creating the necessary conditions for overcoming the world economic crisis.

Recalling its 1981 joint initiative with Sweden¹⁶ and points found in 1982 resolution 37/95 A, Romania noted that the basic elements that ought to guide the Commission's work had been identified: the urgency of the need to freeze and reduce military budgets; the identification and elaboration of principles that should govern a freeze and reductions, viewing all efforts to deal with the technical aspects of the subject as mutually complementary in that process; an emphasis on the responsibilities of nuclear-weapon and other militarily important States; and, finally, recognition that the elaboration of the principles could contribute to the harmonization of views and mutual trust necessary to achieve agreements. Romania believed that it was possible for the Commission at its 1983 session, on the basis of a constructive and flexible approach, to finalize the principles upon which a freeze and reduction of military budgets would be based.

¹⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42)*, para. 10.

¹⁵ A/CN.10/PV.66 and 67 and A/CN.10/PV.65-72/Corrigendum.

¹⁶ A/CN.10/26; the paper is reproduced in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42)*, annex XI.

Sweden observed that world military expenditures were expected to exceed \$800 billion in 1983, representing an immoral waste of global resources in a world where every fifth human being lived in poverty, and where a child died of hunger or illness every other second. According to Sweden, the enormous resources spent on the military had not led to a safer world. A number of other States also included in their interventions passing references to the economic burden or waste of military spending and its detrimental effect on socio-economic development. Yugoslavia observed that it was time for the Commission, having been seized of the subject for four years, to harmonize positions and identify ways of achieving a reduction in military expenditures. It was convinced that the reallocation of the resources thus released would contribute greatly to world-wide development, particularly in the developing countries.

The United States, noting that the question had long been on the Commission's agenda and questioning the value of further discussion, recalled that it had consistently emphasized that the consideration of reductions was necessarily dependent upon the participation of all States in the reporting of military expenditures, and that the General Assembly had repeatedly endorsed that goal. It recalled the proposal which President Reagan had announced at the Assembly's twelfth special session, in 1982, on the convening of an international conference to give added impetus to such reporting. While it would continue to seek practical progress towards that end in accordance with the United Nations format, the United States held that until realistic comparison and verification became possible, it could not seriously support a continuation of work on the elaboration of principles. It could not see any prospect for reducing military budgets until States took at least the first step of revealing that basic element of their military data.

The Soviet Union stated that for many years it had declared its willingness to seek flexible and mutually acceptable ways of resolving the problem of reducing military budgets and had submitted well-known proposals to that end at the United Nations. In January 1983, the USSR and its allies had again proposed and appealed¹⁷ to the NATO countries to seek a practical agreement not to increase military expenditures and, subsequently, to reduce them either in percentage or absolute terms. The agreement should include all militarily significant States, and the resources released would be used for economic and social development. The USSR stated that the reason there had been no progress was that a number of States were refusing to achieve that kind of practical agreement. Proposals for machinery for comparing military budgets, in its view, must be considered as a stratagem for evading their reduction. If States had the political will to reduce their military budgets, not much time would be required to arrive at an agreement. In the absence of such a will, however, the intricate accounting machinery would be used to increase distrust and suspicion, thus prolonging the problem.

¹⁷ For the text of the Political Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, see A/38/67-S/15556 and Corr.1.

Among other Eastern European States, Bulgaria expressed itself firmly in favour of a reduction of military expenditures and, as a first step, advocated freezing them. Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia also stressed the urgent need for the non-increase and subsequent reduction of military expenditures. Underscoring the importance of political will, they believed that the proposal made by the Warsaw Treaty parties, referred to above, should be acted upon. Czechoslovakia hoped that appropriate negotiations would be embarked upon without further ado.

Cuba spoke of the wastefulness, human costs and dangers of the arms race and military expenditures. In its view, the reduction of military budgets was a subject that could not be divorced from the arms race and general and complete disarmament. It was apparent that there was an urgent need to halt the increase in military budgets and make efforts to devote the resources thus released to the economic development of nations, particularly the developing countries.

India stated that since the security situation facing various States in different parts of the world was not similar and changed over time in response to various factors, it did not favour the formulation of a document containing principles that would be universally applicable to military budget reductions by all States. Rather, it contended that the freezing and reduction of military expenditures must be conceived of in the context of a global approach to disarmament and of established objectives, principles and priorities. Moreover, measures adopted with that aim must be interrelated with other disarmament measures in the context of progress towards general and complete disarmament. India also favoured a practical programme to reallocate resources from military to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries. Egypt, also linking the reduction of military budgets to complete disarmament, felt that the subject would not constitute any real problem if there was a positive political will in that direction. Until such intentions were indicated, however, it hoped that the Disarmament Commission would be able to arrive at a consensus on the question of principles.

On 9 May, the Commission established an informal open-ended working group – as in the previous two years – (Working Group I) to consider the question of military budget reductions. The Working Group held 14 meetings between 12 and 31 May under the chairmanship of Mr. Ion Diaconu of Romania. It conducted its deliberations on the basis of a background paper, annexed to the report of the Disarmament Commission to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session,¹⁸ containing some of the proposed principles and ideas which should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military expenditures. In addition, members also referred to working papers submitted in previous

¹⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-12/3)*, annex II. See also footnote 10.

years, namely, that submitted jointly by Romania and Sweden in 1981,¹⁹ and another submitted by India in 1982.²⁰ Two new working papers were put forward in 1983. One,²¹ submitted by Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, outlined the position of the Western countries in general. According to their view, an agreed and balanced reduction of military expenditures would only be possible if it were based on the principles of transparency and comparability. The elaboration of agreed methods for measuring and comparing military expenditures between different periods of time and between countries representing different geographic regions and budgeting systems was thus considered a necessary condition for meaningful negotiations on balanced reductions of military budgets. That would require the regular availability of significant and reliable data on military expenditures, in a format suitable for international comparison. The working paper, therefore, urged the systematic use, by an increasing number of States, of the instrument for the standardized reporting of military expenditures established by the United Nations, as an important first step. Stressing that agreements to reduce military expenditures should contain adequate measures of verification, the proposal added that the use of the reporting instrument was a necessary pre-condition, although not sufficient in itself for such agreements.

The other new working paper,²² submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Poland, took a different viewpoint. Arguing that urgent measures were necessary to curb the rapid increase in military expenditures and to reduce them, it urged that negotiations on the non-increase and reduction of military budgets be commenced without delay or any pre-conditions, and stated that conceptions of openness and transparency of military expenditure data were aimed at distracting attention from effective disarmament measures. It further argued that data on armaments belonging to different social systems were not exactly comparable, and that attempts to compare military expenditures in capitalist economies with those in socialist planned economies would lead to lengthy disputes involving practical and theoretical problems that would be almost impossible to resolve. On the other hand, it stated that existing global figures were completely sufficient for the purpose of concluding effective expenditure reduction agreements. It observed, in addition, that the States which published some details beyond what was international custom did not deal with the economic and other consequences of armaments, nor were their officially registered appropriations accurate. The working paper concluded by stating that the curbing and subsequent reduction of military expenditures could not be achieved by abstract discussions about data. Instead, it would be timely to concentrate on practical steps

¹⁹ See footnote 16.

²⁰ The paper is reproduced in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42)*, annex XII.

²¹ *Ibid.*, annex IX.

²² *Ibid.*, annex X.

towards initiating sincere negotiations. The only prerequisite, according to the paper, was the political willingness of all States concerned.

During its meetings, the Working Group proceeded with the substantive work of identifying and elaborating the principles that should govern a reduction of military budgets. Proposals and suggestions were made to reconcile conflicting positions, but no consensus could be reached as they remained effectively unchanged. Following the discussion, the Chairman of the Working Group submitted a working paper containing a set of suggestions for the formulation of several of the proposals and ideas that had been considered. His suggestions, together with the other working papers, proposals and ideas submitted to the Working Group, were intended to serve as the basis for further reflection and the continuation of activity on the subject.

The text of the Chairman's paper²³ reads as follows:

1. Concerted efforts should be made by all States, in particular by those States with the largest military arsenals, and by the appropriate negotiating forums, with the objective of concluding international agreements to freeze and reduce military budgets, including adequate verification measures acceptable to all parties. Such agreements should contribute to genuine reductions of armed forces and armaments of States parties, with the aim of strengthening international peace and security at lower levels of armed forces and armaments.

2. All efforts in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures should take into account the principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2).

3. Pending the conclusion of agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures, all States, in particular the most heavily armed States, should exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures.

4. The reduction of military expenditures should be implemented gradually and in a balanced manner, either on a percentage or on an absolute basis mutually agreed, so as to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage, and without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security, to sovereignty and to undertake the necessary measures of self-defence.

5. The freezing and reduction of military budgets should be achieved in accordance with the principle of the greatest responsibility. Therefore, the freezing and reduction of the military budgets should be implemented in stages, beginning with nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States.

6. Human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures should be devoted to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

7. Negotiations on freezing and reduction of military budgets would be facilitated by the elaboration of agreed methods of comparing military expenditures between periods of time and between different countries, as well as by using an agreed instrument for reporting in a standardized manner the actual military budgets.

8. In the process of negotiations on freezing and reduction of military budgets, a reasonable amount of data on the military budgets should be made available by the participating States. In this respect, the participating States may use the standardized international reporting instrument established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 35/142 B or any other methods agreed among them.

²³ *Ibid.*, annex XIII.

9. Each State party to an agreement of reduction of military expenditures will identify armaments and military activities which will be subject to physical reductions within the limits provided for in the agreement.

10. Agreements on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures should be subject to strict and efficient verification. The agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures should contain adequate measures of verification, satisfactory to all parties, in order to ensure that their provisions are strictly applied and fulfilled by all States parties.

11. Unilateral measures undertaken by States concerning the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, especially when they are followed by similar measures adopted by other States on the basis of mutual example, could contribute to favourable conditions for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures.

12. Confidence-building measures could help to create a political climate conducive to freezing and reduction of military expenditures.

13. The United Nations should play a central role in orienting, stimulating and initiating negotiations on freezing and reducing military expenditures, and all Member States should co-operate with the Organization as among themselves, with a view to solving the problems implied by this process.

14. The freezing and reduction of military expenditures may be achieved, as appropriate, on a global, regional or subregional level, with the agreement of all States concerned.

15. The agreements on freezing and reduction of military budgets should be inter-related with measures of disarmament, within the context of progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The reduction of military budgets should therefore be complementary to agreements of the limitation of armaments and disarmament and should not be considered as a substitute for such agreements.

16. This declaration should be regarded as a firm political commitment to start negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures as soon as possible.

On 2 June, the Commission adopted, by consensus, the report²⁴ of the Working Group, which contained the following recommendations:

20. In the light of its consideration of agenda item 5(a) and (b), the Disarmament Commission recommends that the General Assembly should request the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its next substantive session, the consideration of this agenda item, including consideration of the Chairman's suggestions as well as other proposals and ideas on the subject matter, with the view to further identifying and elaborating the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles in a suitable document at an appropriate stage.

21. The Disarmament Commission also recommends that at its next substantive session, further consideration should be given to other proposals and ideas, as well as recommendations, including those contained in document A/CN.10/35.

Following the adoption of the Commission's report to the General Assembly, a number of members commented further²⁵ on the Commission's work on the reduction of military budgets. Sweden regretted that, once again, no agreement could be reached on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures. It believed the question of openness to be important and that future discussions on the subject would be greatly facilitated through wider participation in the ongoing work on the reporting and comparison of military budgets. In its opinion, it should be possible

²⁴ See *ibid.*, Supplement No. 42 (A/38/42), sect. IV, para. 23; the report consists of 21 integral paragraphs.

²⁵ A/CN.10/PV.69 and 70 and A/CN.10/PV.65-72/Corrigendum.

to agree on the need for reliable and comparable data to enable relevant negotiations to go forward.

Speaking on behalf of the members of the European Community, the Federal Republic of Germany emphasized their view that a mutually agreed reduction of military expenditures, without detriment to any country's national security, would help curb the arms race and increase the possibility of reallocating resources to economic and social development. The Ten held that the endeavour should be based on a procedure providing for adequate comparability and verification, and that the standardized reporting system constituted an important first step in that direction. They regretted that one group of States had so far refused to participate in the implementation of that system. The Ten also hoped that all States would participate in the future in the discussion of the principles of transparency, comparability and verification set forth in the working paper that had been submitted by a number of countries. The United States was convinced that those principles were critical to any agreement and believed also that there was a need for new initiatives to give a fresh impetus towards universal reporting of military expenditures, such as, for example, an international conference on the subject.

Hungary recalled the proposals put forward by the USSR and other Eastern European States and observed that, in spite of those clear-cut and constructive proposals, no practical progress had been made towards a real reduction of military budgets. It admonished those States, including some permanent members of the Security Council, which, in its opinion, were refusing to reach a practical understanding and disguising their unwillingness by setting unjustifiable pre-conditions. The USSR commented that Western delegations had tried to conceal their absence of desire to reduce military expenditure by discussions on openness, transparency, comparability, accountability and so forth.

China was of the view that the super-Powers should take the lead in drastically reducing their military budgets, since they accounted for more than 50 per cent of global military spending. Other countries could subsequently join them in reducing military expenditures in stages, according to appropriate ratios and procedures. China stressed that such a process of reductions should be carried out in conjunction with measures for nuclear and conventional disarmament. Moreover, measures to reduce military budgets should in no way prejudice the self-defence and security capabilities of third world countries, since those capabilities were still inadequate.

Brazil argued that experience had shown that the nuclear-weapon States, whose military expenditures were continuing to increase, did not seem to accept their special responsibilities for reducing them: they were primarily concerned with confrontation between their alliances. It believed that the differences apparent in the proposals examined at the current session of the Commission did not augur well for future work. It therefore felt that perhaps the Commission should afford Governments some time for reflection, and that the General Assembly might wish to wait for one

to two years before requesting the Disarmament Commission to resume its work on the question.

In its concluding statement, India argued that the Working Group on the reduction of military budgets had managed to create a façade of progress by engaging in an intellectually stimulating but politically futile exercise of considering governing principles for that purpose. That exercise merely served to distract attention from the urgent need for concrete measures to freeze and reduce military budgets. It held that the deliberations of the Working Group had proved the validity of India's position and hoped that the Commission would concentrate its attention on such concrete measures.

The work of the Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1983

In 1983, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 37/95 B, the Secretary-General appointed the Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, consisting of seven experts drawn from all geographic regions; the members are listed in the annex to this chapter. The Group met twice in 1983, from 7 to 11 March and from 8 to 19 August, holding 26 formal meetings as well as a number of informal ones. In its report for the year, entitled "Progress report on the construction of price indices and purchasing-power parities for military expenditures",²⁶ the Group stated that at its second session, in August, it had examined replies received from 21 countries in response to a note verbale sent in April by the Secretary-General to all Member States with a view to ascertaining which of them would be willing to assist the Group in the discharge of its mandate.

Of the 21 countries that replied, 10²⁷ indicated their willingness to participate in an exchange of data for the exercise. Although the Group felt that it would be highly desirable to obtain wider participation which would include countries in all geographic regions and with different accounting and budgeting systems, it was at the same time of the view that the number of participating States constituted sufficient ground for proceeding with its task. At its second session, the Group prepared initial requests for information from the participating States; it stated in the report that the successful completion of its task depended heavily on its ability to obtain the necessary data. The Group observed that in view of the complexity and scale of its data collection efforts, further needs were anticipated, primarily during 1984, for which resources should be provided, in addition to those currently allocated for statistical and computer services.

²⁶ A/38/354 and Corr.1, annex.

²⁷ Those countries were: Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1983

Although the reduction of military budgets was not a specific item on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament in 1983, a number of members referred to the question in their statements in plenary meetings.²⁸

Speaking for the Federal Republic of Germany, the Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister advocated transparency with regard to world-wide expenditure on armaments and the relationship between arms spending and expenditure on economic and social development. In that context, he recalled his earlier proposal for a twofold register showing spending on armaments and on development aid, as well as one on arms exports and imports. Noting that for three successive years the Federal Republic had been reporting its military expenditures through the standardized reporting system established by the United Nations, he stressed that the system could be successful only if the members of the Warsaw Treaty organization also participated in it. Similarly, the Foreign Minister of Belgium referred to the need of the major alliances for mutual knowledge of respective defence efforts and stated that the reporting instrument offered one possibility for progress in that direction. At the same time, Belgium emphasized that it was necessary to have an instrument of comparability that would make it possible to carry on negotiations on the reduction of military budgets in a climate of trust.

Romania believed that the adoption of measures to freeze military expenditures at their current level and to achieve a 10-15 per cent reduction of them by the end of the decade would be of vital importance in reducing international tension and the danger of war. It supported the idea that the Committee should take up the question of a reduction of military budgets in the near future, after the elaboration of principles and the resolution of other technical problems currently under consideration.

Algeria, France, India, Kenya and Pakistan, among others, expressed general concern about the costly and dangerous economic and social consequences of the high level and rate of growth of military spending, or emphasized the primacy of disarmament within the context of development.

India, for instance, was of the view that expenditures on armaments, which accounted for 5 per cent of the world gross domestic product in 1982, had played a major role in bringing about inflation and what it called the worst global economic recession since the early 1930s. It argued that significant disarmament measures, implemented on an urgent basis, could be a factor in reversing the adverse implications of the situation both for disarmament and for development in developing countries. After reviewing the overall history of calls for the reduction of military budgets in the United Nations, Kenya noted the inclusion of that item and of disarmament and development in the Committee's

²⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix III (CD/421), vols. I-V.

“decatalogue” (see page 15 above). It noted that the most earnest call for disarmament in favour of development had always come from the third world, and cited statistical evidence attesting to the enormous financial and human resources wastefully squandered on the arms race. It felt that reductions in military spending and the redeployment of resources to social and economic development would not only increase the prospects for resumed growth in the world economy, but also convert to civilian uses scientific and technological resources being used for military purposes, and would also facilitate the attainment of the new international economic order.

According to Yugoslavia, the increase in military spending that was under way threatened the economic security of all countries by aggravating the protracted crisis of the world economy. That entailed grave political and social consequences, particularly for developing countries.

The representative of Pakistan, speaking as Chairman of the Committee for July, stated that the magnitude of the expenditure on armaments presented a chilling contrast with the situation in most parts of the world, where hundreds of millions lived shelterless and hungry. Such misuse of resources could only sharpen the already dangerous polarization of the world, he added.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

1983 marked the tenth year the General Assembly had an item concerning the reduction of military budgets on its agenda. In addition to the report of the Disarmament Commission, discussed above, other documents that the Assembly considered pursuant to resolution 37/95 B were: (a) the report of the Secretary-General entitled “Views of States on practical means of promoting the wider participation of States in the international system of standardized reporting of military expenditures”,²⁹ containing responses by Austria, the Dominican Republic, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Kenya, Portugal, Sweden and the United States; (b) the report of the Secretary-General³⁰ on the construction of price indices and purchasing-power parities for military expenditures”; and (c) the latest report of the Secretary-General³¹ entitled “Military expenditures in standardized form reported by States”, which contained responses from 23 countries.

As in previous years, the general debate in the Assembly and deliberations in the First Committee indicated the growing concern of many Member States about the implications—both for international peace and security and for the world economy—of the growth and magnitude of world military expenditures. At the same time opinions continued to

²⁹ A/38/353 and Corr.1 and Add.1.

³⁰ A/38/354 and Corr.1.

³¹ A/38/434; reports were received from: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.

differ as to the best or most expeditious means of curbing and reducing spending on armaments.

In the general debate,³² many speakers, including several heads of State or Government, deplored the tragic and irrational waste of resources on armaments and underscored the importance of the relationship between disarmament and development. President Mubarak of Egypt, for instance, observed that world expenditure on armaments in 1982 equalled the incomes of two billion people living in the 50 poorest countries in the world. Any effort to achieve general disarmament, in his view, should stem from an appreciation of the interrelationship between disarmament, international security and development. President Kyprianou of Cyprus said that the arms race depleted the strength of those with the material and technical resources to contribute to the improvement of the quality of life globally. It was inadmissible that famine, poverty, illiteracy and disease should still be plaguing a significant portion of the world's population.

In further discussing the disarmament-development link, President Mitterrand of France stated that the essential issue was how to use resources that would be released by a gradual but methodical reduction in military expenditures of the small number of major Powers to foster development in the third world and, through reductions and conversions, to ensure favourable economic effects also for the military Powers. He proposed that action be taken in two stages. First, there should be a meeting — which France was prepared to host — of major military Powers to discuss the problems posed by the link between disarmament and development and the creation of an international fund for the benefit of development. As a second stage, those countries would do preparatory work for a conference on disarmament and development open to all Members of the United Nations and, in the course of their work, would identify an initial series of targets for transfers of resources for the benefit of development.

Prime Minister Jugnauth of Mauritius and Commander Ortega Saavedra of Nicaragua also deplored the waste and squandering of resources on armaments in a world where poverty, malnutrition and lack of medical attention were major problems. President Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania highlighted the contrast between the \$850 billion spent on arms in 1982 and the \$36 billion of official development assistance granted by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). He noted that the super-Powers accounted for over half of total world military expenditure and that a sizeable proportion of the rest derived among their allies. President Pereira of Cape Verde stressed that a climate of détente and disarmament and a renunciation of the arms race would be conducive to the rational utilization of the potential of the scientific and technological revolution for the benefit and well-

³² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings, 5th to 33rd and 103rd meetings.*

being of all mankind. Prime Minister Somare of Papua New Guinea observed that no one could be said to be immune from the dangers of war or the economic consequences of the arms race. The President of the Council of State of Poland, Henryk Jablonski, believed that an immediate agreement to not increase military expenditures and to take concrete measures for their subsequent reduction would constitute a turning-point in efforts to overcome the pursuit of military superiority and illusory security.

Bangladesh, for its part, noted the discrepancy between spending on armaments and on development, and stated that one way to promote disarmament and divert resources to development would be the institution of measures of international taxation on expenditures on nuclear armaments. Bolivia regarded the fact that the equivalent of the annual budget of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) was absorbed by the arms race in a mere five hours as a reason for deep concern and reflection. Senegal observed that official development assistance from all sources as of the end of 1983 was the equivalent of what the world spent on the military in only 18 days.

In the discussion in the First Committee,³³ Australia expressed the view that any really significant increase in the flow of economic aid from developed to less developed countries was unlikely to take place unless the former reduced their military budgets. Similarly, Ireland emphasized the importance of achieving effective disarmament measures which would free resources for reallocation to economic and social purposes. Bhutan, Ecuador and Mozambique expressed similar sentiments. Bhutan looked to the major military Powers to set the trend by agreeing to freeze and subsequently reduce their military budgets. Nepal argued that although the primary effort should be to reduce the armed forces and armaments of the nuclear-weapon and other major Powers, one could not overlook the growing tendency among developing countries to increase their military expenditures, thus diverting their scarce resources from critical development needs and generating regional tensions.

As to the more specific aspect of the modalities of achieving limitations and reductions of military expenditures, there were significant differences in the positions among different Member States. Western countries generally continued to stress the utility of the standardized reporting system and further efforts to make military expenditures more amenable to comparison and verification. They viewed that as an important first step in any endeavour to reduce military budgets. Greece, in that context, stated that the members of the European Community welcomed the General Assembly's acknowledgement of the importance of the standardized reporting system and earnestly hoped that a group of countries which had not participated in it up to that time would do so as soon as possible. The Ten regarded the system as an important confidence-building measure which could improve the climate for disarmament.

³³ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 33rd and 40th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

Austria, Italy and Norway expressed similar views, with Norway adding that it was also prepared to support other measures such as the convening of a conference on military expenditures.

The Soviet Union and Eastern European States also reaffirmed their position. The USSR put forward the view that the history of the subject of the reduction of military budgets furnished vivid examples of the manner in which an obsession with studies could be detrimental to practical steps to curb the arms race. Recalling its 1973 initiative on the question, it observed that in the 10 years that had elapsed since that time, no real progress had been achieved. It argued that proposals concerning "accounting models" and "comparability" were aimed exclusively at avoiding a solution to the problem and distracting attention from the massive military buildup in the NATO countries. It proposed that the General Assembly call upon the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States to agree not to increase their military expenditures after 1 January 1984, and to agree on specific measures for subsequent practical and mutual reductions in expenditures which could include reductions in both percentage and absolute terms, as the Soviet Union had previously proposed. Funds released as a consequence of such reductions would be used for economic and social development, including that of developing countries. Czechoslovakia and the Ukrainian SSR expressed similar views. Czechoslovakia recalled that about 80 per cent of military expenditures was on conventional weapons and stated that the NATO countries, for a whole decade, had rejected constructive proposals while taking a decision to increase their expenditures by 3 per cent per annum in real terms.

Romania referred to a proposal³⁴ which its President had sent to the Presidents of the USSR and the United States in which he called, *inter alia*, for the two unilaterally to freeze their military budgets at 1983 spending levels for the next two years and to begin negotiations on reductions of their military expenditures. Cuba favoured an immediate freeze which, it felt, would create a favourable climate for subsequent reductions of the military budgets of all nuclear-weapon States and members of the two principal military alliances. It held that insistence on transparency and comparability of military expenditures, which was a difficult and inaccurate exercise in the best of circumstances, served only to make a solution more difficult.

The Sudan, as one among the group of countries first to use the reporting instrument to report its military expenditures to the Secretary-General, appealed to all States, particularly those with large military arsenals, to make every effort to reach international agreements to reduce spending on armaments, that would lead to the genuine reduction of forces and the consequent strengthening of international security. The Dominican Republic supported all efforts for the limitation of military budgets, including the objectives of resolution 37/95 B, and stated that it was in an excellent position to co-operate with the Group of Experts on

³⁴ See A/38/375.

the Reduction of Military Budgets in its efforts to construct price indices and purchasing-power parities for military expenditures.

On 11 November, Austria, Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Indonesia, Ireland, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, the Sudan, Sweden and Uruguay submitted a draft resolution on the reduction of military budgets, which was subsequently also sponsored by Colombia and Malta.

In introducing the draft resolution on 15 November, Romania observed that, like previous years' resolutions, it envisaged a continuation of efforts to reduce military budgets at two levels. First, the General Assembly would reiterate its appeal to all States, particularly the most heavily armed ones, to exercise restraint in their military spending, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of such expenditures. Secondly, it would call on the Disarmament Commission to continue to work towards the identification and elaboration of the principles which should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing their military expenditures. The adoption of such principles, Romania added, would contribute to harmonizing the positions of States and would promote the confidence necessary to reach relevant agreements. The sponsors of the proposal were of the firm conviction that it would be possible to begin negotiations and reach specific agreements to reduce military expenditures only through a constructive and flexible approach, one which would encourage a convergence of the various views on ways of proceeding in a sensitive area. They also hoped that the non-controversial nature of the resolution's provisions would facilitate its adoption by consensus.

Also on 11 November, a second draft resolution was submitted by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Norway, Romania, the Sudan and Sweden. Subsequently, New Zealand and Uruguay also became sponsors. Sweden, in introducing the resolution on 17 November, noted that one example of the progress on the question was the adoption by the General Assembly, in 1980, of a standardized system for international reporting of military expenditures. It observed that, while not many States had so far participated in the reporting, the system was still at an early stage. It then stressed that the main objective of the whole exercise was to promote international agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures. If and when Member States, particularly the most heavily armed ones, were to attempt seriously to negotiate such agreements, the existing reporting system would provide a necessary basis, as they would need to know what the expenditures were and how they would be defined in the context of an agreement. It was therefore important to preserve and further improve the system through continuous and possibly growing participation by States in its implementation. Thus, by operative paragraph 2 of the draft the Assembly would stress the need for the broadest possible participation, and by operative paragraph 3 it would recommend that all States use the

reporting instrument to report their military expenditures annually to the Secretary-General.

On 25 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution introduced by Romania, as its sponsors had hoped, without a vote. At the same meeting it approved that introduced by Sweden by a recorded vote of 78 to 12 (including Eastern European States, except Romania), with 8 abstentions.

In explaining its position on both drafts, prior to the voting, Brazil emphasized that measures to reduce military budgets should be taken first by the nuclear-weapon Powers. Although it would adhere to the consensus on the first draft resolution, it would abstain on the second, since that proposal did not stress the special responsibility borne by the nuclear-weapon States.

Following the voting, countries clarified their positions. The German Democratic Republic, which voted against the second draft resolution, held that, given the necessary political will, agreements to freeze or reduce military budgets could be readily attained, and that pre-conditions for negotiations, such as demands for transparency and agreement on reporting, comparison and verification, prevented such negotiations. In the event of an agreement, the German Democratic Republic, no less than other States, would be interested in ensuring that all parties had assurances as to its observance. But it did not regard the draft resolution as being of the kind that contributed to progress in reducing military budgets.

India had abstained on the second draft resolution and would have done so on the first had it been voted upon, because it could not endorse the premise that all States, rather than just five or six militarily significant ones, were somehow responsible for the phenomenon of rising military expenditures. It also felt that exercises such as that endorsed by the second draft resolution served to deflect attention from the principal issues.

Several countries explained their support of the consensus on the first resolution and their affirmative votes on the second. The Netherlands stated that it had not opposed the consensus on the first draft resolution but would have abstained had it been put to a vote. While it favoured a mutually agreed, gradual reduction of military budgets, it also believed that such a measure would be meaningful only if it were adequately verifiable. Accordingly, it had always contributed to efforts to render military budgets more amenable to comparison and verification, and regretted that States of one particular group—including a sponsor of the draft resolution—continued to refuse to report their military expenditures. According to the Netherlands, the negative votes on the second draft resolution, cast by States of the same group, showed that they were not serious about reductions in military budgets but only paid lip-service to that valuable idea. The United Kingdom, supporting the consensus on the proposal introduced by Romania, stated that principles alone could not build confidence. For that reason, it too had consistently advocated the use of the reporting system by a larger number of States and welcomed

the second draft resolution's emphasis on that point. It expressed its disappointment, however, that no Warsaw Treaty country had participated in the reporting system. Recalling the reservations it had expressed about the price-indexing and purchasing-power parity exercise requested in resolution 37/95 B of the previous year, the United Kingdom stated that although it thought that further work on that question was necessary, the limited participation in the exercise had led it to believe that it would be difficult to justify its completion on the scale suggested by the Chairman of the Group of Experts.

The United States also welcomed the second draft's emphasis on the need for wider use of the reporting instrument, and asserted that if agreements on reductions were to become more than a theoretical possibility, it was essential to have data on national military budgets and a method for establishing their comparability. In joining the consensus on the first draft, the United States understood that the resolution's acknowledgement of the many activities being carried out in the area of military budget reductions specifically included those concerning participation in the reporting system and efforts to resolve comparison and verification problems. France stated that it had supported the consensus on the draft resolution introduced by Romania, in spite of some reservations, in view of Romania's sponsorship also of the second draft resolution. France understood that to mean that Romania subscribed to the provisions of that draft resolution concerning wider participation in the reporting system, and hoped that Romania would itself participate in it. Yugoslavia, which voted in favour of the draft resolution presented by Sweden, stressed that it could be useful and effective only if all countries, primarily the leading Powers and other militarily significant States, participated in the reporting system.

On 20 December, the General Assembly adopted both draft resolutions. The draft resolution introduced by Romania was adopted, again without a vote, as resolution 38/184 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the ever-spiralling arms race and growing military expenditures, which constitute a heavy burden for the economies of all nations and have extremely harmful effects on world peace and security,

Reaffirming once again the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special-Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, according to which the gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example in absolute figures or in terms of percentage, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would contribute to curbing the arms race and would increase the possibilities for the reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries,

Recalling that at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, all Member States unanimously and categorically reaffirmed the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, as well as their solemn commitment to it,

Recalling also the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second United Nations Disarmament Decade, in which it is provided that during this period renewed efforts should be made to reach agreement on the reduction of military expenditures and the reallocation of resources

thus saved to economic and social development, especially for the benefit of developing countries,

Recalling further the provisions of its resolution 34/83 F of 11 December 1979, subsequently reaffirmed in its resolutions 35/142 A of 12 December 1980, 36/82 A of 9 December 1981 and 37/95 A of 13 December 1982, in which it considered that a new impetus should be given to the endeavours to achieve agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditure, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned,

Aware of the various proposals submitted by Member States and of the activities carried out so far within the framework of the United Nations in the field of the reduction of military budgets,

Convinced that identification and elaboration of the principles which should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets could contribute to harmonizing the views of States and create confidence among them conducive to achieving international agreements on the reduction of military budgets,

Considering that the identification and elaboration of the principles which should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets and the other current activities within the framework of the United Nations related to the question of the reduction of military budgets should be regarded as having the fundamental objective of reaching international agreements on the reduction of military expenditures,

Taking note of the report of the Disarmament Commission on the work accomplished during its session in 1983 on the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets",

1. *Declares once again its conviction* that it is possible to achieve international agreements on the reduction of military budgets without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security, self-defence and sovereignty;

2. *Reaffirms* that the human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures could be reallocated for economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries;

3. *Calls upon* all Member States, in particular the most heavily armed States, to reinforce their readiness to co-operate in a constructive manner with a view to reaching agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures;

4. *Appeals* to all States, in particular to the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries;

5. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its 1984 substantive session, the consideration of the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets", including consideration of the suggestions of the Chairman of the working group, as well as other proposals and ideas on the subject-matter, with a view to further identifying and elaborating the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles in a suitable document at an appropriate stage;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets".

The draft resolution, introduced by Sweden, was adopted by a recorded vote of 116 to 13, with 8 abstentions. Resolution 38/184 B reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the arms race and present tendencies to increase further the rate of growth of military expenditures, its deplorable waste of human and economic resources and its potentially harmful effects on world peace and security,

Considering that a gradual reduction of military expenditures on a mutually agreed basis would be a measure that would contribute to curbing the arms race and would in-

crease the possibilities of reallocating resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries,

Convinced that such reductions could and should be carried out on a mutually agreed basis without detriment to the national security of any country,

Reaffirming its conviction that provisions for defining, reporting, comparing and verifying military expenditures will have to be basic elements of any international agreement to reduce such expenditures,

Recalling that an international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures has been introduced in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 35/142 B of 12 December 1980, and that annual reports on military expenditures are now being received from a number of Member States,

Considering that a wider participation in the reporting system of States from different geographic regions and representing different budgeting systems would promote its further refinement and would, by contributing to greater openness in military matters, increase confidence between States,

Noting, in this connection, the proposal to convene an international conference on military expenditures,

Recalling its resolution 37/95 B of 13 December 1982, in which the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified experts and with the voluntary co-operation of States, to undertake the task of constructing price indices and purchasing-power parities for the military expenditures of participating States,

Considering that a wide participation in this exercise is essential for achieving the most useful results possible,

Noting that in the progress report of the Secretary-General, in which the Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets established that a direct contact between its members and the voluntarily participating Member States is vital for the work of the Group,

Emphasizing that all above-mentioned activities and initiatives, as well as other ongoing activities within the United Nations related to the reduction of military budgets, should have the fundamental objective of facilitating future negotiations aimed at the conclusion of international agreements on the reduction of military expenditures,

1. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Secretary-General containing the replies received in 1983 from Member States in the framework of the above-mentioned reporting system and with the submitted data arranged by the Secretariat according to statistical practice, and of the report of the Secretary-General containing views and suggestions of States on practical means of promoting the wider participation of States in the international system of standardized reporting of military expenditures;

2. *Stresses* the need to increase the number of reporting States with a view to the broadest possible participation from different geographic regions and representing different budgeting systems;

3. *Reiterates its recommendation* that all Member States should report annually, by 30 April, to the Secretary-General, using the reporting instrument, their military expenditures for the latest fiscal year for which data are available;

4. *Also takes note with appreciation* of the progress report of the Secretary-General on the ongoing exercise undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 37/95 B;

5. *Reiterates* its invitation to all Member States to participate in the above-mentioned exercise;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets with sufficient financial and other resources for the carrying out of its complex tasks as outlined in the progress report of the Secretary-General;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets".

Conclusion

In the course of 1983, the United Nations continued to grapple, unsuccessfully, with the complex problems involved in limiting and reducing military budgets and with the related objective of diverting resources from the arms race for the purpose of promoting economic and social development.

For the third year in succession, the Disarmament Commission strove to reach agreement on the principles that should govern the further actions of States in the freezing and reduction of military expenditures. Discussions in the Working Group established for that purpose revealed continuing, irreconcilable differences among individual member States and groupings. The working papers submitted by Western and Eastern European States, in particular, prominently highlighted those differences.

The extent and growth of world military expenditure was a source of considerable concern in 1983. In their deliberations, many countries deplored the tragic waste of human and material resources on the arms race. Military spending was seen as being directly related to — even one of the primary reasons for — exacerbation of the global economic crisis, the slow pace of development, and international tensions. Many States therefore regarded limitations on and reductions of military expenditures as imperative.

Pursuant to resolutions 38/184 A and B adopted by the Assembly at the end of the year, the Disarmament Commission may be expected in 1984 to continue its endeavours in the field of the reduction of military budgets, and the Group of Experts will continue with its task of constructing price indices and purchasing-power parities to enable the comparison of national military expenditures.

ANNEX

Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets

Vito Caporaso, Italy	Daniel Gallik, United States
Hans Christian Cars, Sweden	Stefan O. Mateescu, Romania
José A. Encinas del Pando, Peru	Victor O. Odeka, Nigeria
Benjamin Parwoto, Indonesia	

Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

Introduction

THE QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING A ZONE OF PEACE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN was included in the agenda of the General Assembly for the first time in 1971, under an item entitled "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace", at the request of Sri Lanka, later joined by the United Republic of Tanzania.¹ As a result of that initiative, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2832 (XXVI), by which the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the airspace above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, was designated for all time as a zone of peace. The Assembly also called upon the great Powers to enter into consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to halting the further escalation of their military presence there and to eliminating from the area all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, it called upon the littoral and hinterland States, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to enter into consultations aimed at the implementation of the Declaration whereby (a) warships and military aircraft would not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against any littoral or hinterland State; (b) the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations would be ensured; and (c) international agreement would be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

In 1972, by its resolution 2992 (XXVII), the General Assembly established the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, consisting of Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia, to study practical measures to achieve the objectives of the Declaration. The number of its members has been increased at various subsequent dates from 15 to 47. Its composition in 1983 is given in the following section.

Since 1973, consideration of the question of the Indian Ocean by the General Assembly has generally taken place in connection with the annual reports of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. In 1974, the General Assembly

¹ For details, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1, chap. XI).

requested the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to enter into consultation with a view to convening a conference on the Indian Ocean. In 1975, it noted that those States had reached agreement in principle on such a conference and invited all States, in particular the great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, to co-operate with the *Ad Hoc* Committee. In 1977, the Assembly requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee to make preparations for a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States as a step towards convening the expected conference.

The proposal concerning a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean was mentioned in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in 1978.² At its regular session that year, the Assembly, by resolution 33/68, decided to convene a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in 1979. That Meeting, in its Final Document, included in the report of the Meeting to the General Assembly,³ made recommendations on the convening of a full conference on the Indian Ocean, and also enumerated principles of agreement for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

Also in 1979, the General Assembly, by resolution 34/80 B, decided to convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean in 1981 at Colombo and to enlarge the *Ad Hoc* Committee further, inviting the permanent members of the Security Council and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to serve on it and participate in its work, particularly in the context of preparations for the Conference. In 1980, the General Assembly, by resolution 35/150, requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee, *inter alia*, to finalize the preparations for the Conference, including the dates for its convening.

Since 1981, the *Ad Hoc* Committee has been unable to make definite progress in the preparations for the Conference or to finalize its dates. That year, the General Assembly, by resolution 36/90, requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee to continue its efforts to achieve the necessary harmonization of views on the relevant issues, and to make every effort to accomplish the necessary preparatory work for the Conference, including the consideration of its convening not later than the first half of 1983.

At its twelfth special session, in 1982, the General Assembly had before it the special report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean,⁴ in which, *inter alia*, it recommended that the Assembly, at that session, might wish to make specific recommendations to facilitate the expeditious discharge by the Committee of its mandate and to implement resolution 36/90. Although the Assembly did not take any action on the question at that time, the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, para. 64.

³ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 45 (A/34/45 and Corr.1)*; the proceedings and report of the Meeting are summarized in *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, chap. XX.

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 5 (A/S-12/5)*.

Session recommended that all items on which decisions had not been reached should be taken up at the thirty-seventh session of the Assembly for further consideration.⁵

During the course of 1982, the *Ad Hoc* Committee was again unable to reach consensus on finalizing the dates for convening the Conference in 1983. In view of that, the General Assembly, by resolution 37/96, which was practically identical with resolution 36/90, requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee to continue its work on the necessary harmonization of views and to make every effort to complete the preparatory work for the Conference, including consideration of its convening not later than the first half of 1984.

Consideration by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1983

Pursuant to resolution 37/96, by which the General Assembly renewed its mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean⁶ held three sessions in 1983, from 31 January to 9 February, from 11 to 22 April and from 12 to 22 July, as well as two additional meetings, on 15 and 30 November. At the last meeting, the Committee adopted its report to the General Assembly.⁷ As in previous years, the report contained a draft resolution, recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee, for adoption by the Assembly. In accordance with resolution 34/80 B, the *Ad Hoc* Committee had decided to recommend the United Arab Emirates, which had applied for membership, for appointment as a member of the Committee, and the President of the General Assembly, on 11 May, appointed it as an additional member. The Committee was unable, in the time available, to reach consensus on the applications for participation in its work made by Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Hungary, Mongolia and Viet Nam.

As before, the main task of the *Ad Hoc* Committee in 1983 was to do preparatory work for the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean. Consequently, it dealt with the substantive and organizational issues related to the Conference in accordance with resolution 37/96, including consideration of dates for its convening in 1984. That was done on the understanding, announced by the Chairman in connection with the adoption of the agenda, that substantive issues related to the zone of peace would be taken up before consideration of organizational issues, that adequate time would be devoted to substantive issues without pre-

⁵ *Ibid.*, Annexes, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32, para. 64.

⁶ The composition of the Committee in 1983 was: Australia, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/38/29)*.

cluding sufficient work on organizational matters and that the Committee would give consideration to all documents placed before it by its members.

Two basic approaches regarding the Conference on the Indian Ocean continued to prevail in the discussion. Most of the non-aligned members, supported by the Eastern European States, held that the Committee should finalize the dates for the Conference as soon as possible and begin practical preparations, including discussion on its draft agenda and other substantive and organizational matters, with the aim of holding it not later than the first half of 1984. Those members also expressed the view that the continued deterioration of the political and security climate had established the urgency of the early convening of the Conference, and that the creation of a zone of peace in accordance with the 1971 Declaration would, *inter alia*, contribute to the strengthening of the security of States within the zone and to international peace and security as a whole.

In that connection, Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic submitted a working paper entitled "Conception for a structure of the second stage of the Conference on the Indian Ocean",⁸ which was an explanatory memorandum to a working paper submitted by the same delegations in the previous year.⁹ In introducing it, the German Democratic Republic stressed that the document was intended to deal with some of the questions related to the structure of the Conference and its agenda in a more detailed manner. In the opinion of those two delegations, the second stage of the Conference should be devoted to the elaboration of the draft final document of the Conference, a task to be performed primarily in the relevant committees and sub-committees. The number of committees would depend on the number of agenda items; on the basis of a previously submitted proposal for a draft agenda,¹⁰ the setting up of two or three committees in the second stage could be envisaged. Each committee would guide the sub-committees established for the elaboration of the relevant sections of the draft final document of the Conference. The setting up of sub-committees on the following aspects of the zone of peace could be contemplated: geographical limits of the zone, foreign military presence, nuclear weapons, security, peaceful settlement of disputes, and use of the Indian Ocean by vessels and aircraft of all countries. The creation of a sub-committee on the political principles of relations between the States in the region of the Indian Ocean could also be envisaged. To ensure that the work of the committees and sub-committees was effective, it should be conducted within the framework of an appropriate mandate to be drafted in the *Ad Hoc* Committee in connection with the formulation of the agenda. The co-ordination of the work of the committees and sub-committees, as well as the consolidation of the results of their work into a comprehensive final document, should be entrusted to a steering committee composed of the heads of all delega-

⁸ A/AC.159/L.53, annex.

⁹ A/AC.159/L.43.

¹⁰ A/AC.159/L.35.

tions attending the second stage of the Conference. That stage should be limited to a specific period, for example, six months, during which time the working bodies of the Conference would operate on a continuous basis.

The Soviet Union also submitted a statement¹¹ in which it renewed its call upon all States whose ships used the Indian Ocean to refrain from any steps that could complicate the situation in that region, i.e., not to send to that area any large naval formations, not to hold any military exercises there and not to expand or modernize the military bases of those non-coastal States which had such bases in the Indian Ocean. In a later stage of the discussion, the Soviet Union also stated that it was ready to join in any concrete measures aimed at transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and limiting any military presence in the zone, provided that other Powers did likewise and, in particular, that foreign military bases and nuclear strategic aircraft and submarines were withdrawn.

Other members of the Committee, however, took the view that until the necessary harmonization of views on the remaining issues had been achieved, and until there was closer agreement on the scope and nature of a zone of peace and on how the Conference would contribute to its establishment, the setting of conference dates was premature, and that the prevailing political and security climate in the region, including the situation in Afghanistan, prejudiced the likelihood of success of any such Conference. Thus, a number of Western countries, including Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, called for defining a mutually acceptable set of principles, which could be based on the document entitled "Proposal for a set of principles on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace",¹² submitted by the Western members of the Committee the previous year. In their opinion, such a method could contribute to the restoration of mutual trust and confidence among all States concerned with the creation of a zone of peace in the region.

Some passages referring to the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace had also been included in the communiqué of the ANZUS Council, agreed in Washington on 19 July 1983 between the ANZUS partners, Australia, New Zealand and the United States. It was submitted to the Committee by Australia and the United States.¹³ In that communiqué, the Council members stated that vital Western economic and security interests were engaged in the Indian Ocean area, and that the proposal for an Indian Ocean zone of peace should stress fundamental norms of international behaviour and should focus on basic causes of tension in the region. In their opinion, the proposal should be developed by agreement between the regional States and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, and should have as an important objective the bringing about of a lasting

¹¹ A/AC.159/L.51.

¹² A/AC.159/L.44.

¹³ A/AC.159/L.58, annex.

improvement in the security of the regional States, thus facilitating political, social and economic development in the area.

Among other developments during the course of the 1983 sessions of the Committee was Madagascar's proposal for the adoption of an international legal instrument that would define the rights and obligations of States involved in the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and that should lead to effective disarmament measures which could, if necessary, be phased. The instrument should define a single security régime for the entire zone of peace, thus avoiding the need to establish several nuclear-weapon-free zones within the region. It should be modelled on the Treaties on the non-military use of various environments:¹⁴ the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the Antarctic Treaty and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, in order to establish a system for the peaceful use of the Indian Ocean which respected, under agreed conditions, the notions of collective or individual self-defence and of free navigation.

Stating its wish to facilitate the achievement of the Committee's objectives in a propitious climate, Egypt submitted a document entitled "Nucleus of safeguards to govern the conduct and work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean".¹⁵ Those safeguards were the following:

(a) The Committee should ensure that the interests of the States of the Indian Ocean region remained its primary concern;

(b) A spirit of co-operation, accommodation and co-ordination should prevail among all members of the Committee;

(c) All Committee members should refrain from exploiting the Committee's work for political or propaganda gains;

(d) The right of all Committee members to make proposals before the Committee for its objective consideration should be respected;

(e) Committee members should avoid political polemics and adopt an objective approach to the issues before them;

(f) The Committee's task was of a collective nature and its decisions were taken by consensus.

At its session in April, the Committee decided to have a discussion on the basis of the informal list of topics referred to in paragraph 21 of its report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.¹⁶ The topics were: geographical limits, foreign military presence, nuclear weapons, security, peaceful settlement of disputes, use of the Indian Ocean by

¹⁴ For the texts of the Treaties, refer to resolutions 2222 (XXI), annex (outer space Treaty) and 2660 (XXV), annex (sea-bed Treaty) and United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402, No. 5778, p. 71 (Antarctic Treaty). The texts are reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

¹⁵ A/AC.159/L.54, annex.

¹⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 29* (A/35/29).

foreign vessels and aircraft, and other matters. Following discussion, and at the request of the Committee, the secretariat compiled statements submitted by members, incorporating them into a background paper entitled "Views expressed by member States of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean on the basis of the informal list of topics referred to in paragraph 21 of its report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session".¹⁷

Two general approaches emerged in the Committee in connection with that document. In the opinion of the Western and some non-aligned States, that paper, together with a similar one prepared by the secretariat in 1980,¹⁸ should be analysed during the forthcoming sessions of the Committee with the aim of reducing areas of difference on substance among member States and identifying points on which there was a convergence of views. On the other hand, the socialist, as well as most of the non-aligned States, maintained that the document, while very valuable for informational purposes, should nevertheless be treated only as a background paper.

During its third session, in July, the Committee started consideration of its report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, including its recommendation in the form of a draft resolution. The Committee had before it a text proposed by Sri Lanka on behalf of the non-aligned members of the Committee. By that proposal, the General Assembly would decide that the United Nations Conference on the Indian Ocean would be opened at Colombo on 4 June 1984 for a period of three weeks,¹⁹ as a necessary step for the implementation of the 1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Moreover, the *Ad Hoc* Committee's mandate would be renewed and further preparatory sessions would be held in 1984 to decide, on a priority basis, on the provisional agenda and documentation for the Conference and to finalize consideration of matters relating to, *inter alia*, participation, level of representation, organization and rules of procedure, appropriate arrangements for any international agreement that might ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, and a report of the Committee to the Conference.

The Committee was not able to agree on a consensus text concerning its recommendations at the July session. Therefore, immediately after that session, an open-ended drafting group began meeting informally with the aim of elaborating the report of the Committee to the General Assembly.

On 30 November, the Committee first adopted parts I and II of its report by consensus, and then it proceeded to consider part III, containing a draft resolution. During the discussion, the Soviet Union stated that since the formulas employed in operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft (see below) did not provide a sufficiently reliable basis for the preparatory work of the Conference, it could not support their adoption by

¹⁷ A/AC.159/L.55 and Add.1-5.

¹⁸ A/AC.159/L.26 and Add.1-9.

¹⁹ On 15 July, the delegation of Sri Lanka, on behalf of its Government, informed the Committee that the Government of Sri Lanka was ready to host the Conference on the Indian Ocean from 4 to 22 June 1984, at Colombo.

consensus and accordingly requested a vote; it would abstain in that vote. After appeals made by other members of the Committee, the Soviet Union, expressing its wish to work effectively together with the non-aligned countries, withdrew its proposal for voting on the draft resolution before the Committee. Subsequently, the Committee recommended the adoption of the draft resolution contained in part III of its report to the General Assembly.

Meeting of Ministers and Heads of Delegations of the Non-Aligned Countries to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session

The Meeting of Ministers and Heads of Delegations of the Non-Aligned Countries to the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly was held in New York from 4 to 7 October 1983 with a view to considering action on issues before the General Assembly of special concern to non-aligned countries.

In a communique,²⁰ the Meeting, *inter alia*, reaffirmed the determination of the non-aligned States to continue their endeavour towards the attainment of the objectives embodied in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and as considered at the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of July 1979. The Meeting reiterated its conviction that any manifestation of the military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean area, foreign bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, conceived in the context of great-Power rivalry, constituted a flagrant violation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The Meeting viewed with disquiet and concern the continuous escalation of the military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean area, including the expansion of their existing bases, their search for new base facilities and the establishment of their new military command structures against the express wishes of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and other non-aligned countries. In the opinion of the Meeting, those activities endangered the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and peaceful development of the States in the area.

The Meeting noted that with the expansion of the membership of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, the non-aligned littoral and hinterland States had expected the early convening of the Conference at Colombo. It was therefore a matter of regret that, notwithstanding the efforts of the non-aligned countries to secure the implementation of the 1971 Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, the Conference could not yet be convened, due to the opposition of certain States. The ministers and heads of delegations reaffirmed their determination to make all efforts to ensure that the Conference be held in 1984. They also reaffirmed their satisfaction over the initiative of the President of Madagascar to convene a summit conference on the Indian Ocean in Tananarive.

²⁰ A/38/495-S/16035.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

In its consideration of the item "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace", the General Assembly had before it, in addition to the 1983 report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean and the communiqué of the October Meeting of Ministers and Heads of Delegations of the Non-Aligned Countries, the final documents of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983,²¹ and resolutions adopted by the Seventieth Inter-Parliamentary Conference, held at Seoul on 12 October 1983.²²

The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee was introduced by its Chairman, Mr. I. B. Fonseka of Sri Lanka, on 2 December in the First Committee.²³ He stated that due to the divergence of views, the Committee had once again been unable to reach consensus on finalizing the dates for the convening of the Conference. He noted that, as before, the reasons were the prevailing political climate and the argument that there had not been an adequate harmonization of views. Opinion within the Committee, however, differed as to the extent of the harmonization that was either necessary or possible before convening the Conference. In his view, if there was a will to hold the Conference, it could be held. But that willingness, unfortunately, was less than forthcoming on the part of some members of the Committee, and hence the third postponement of the Conference. He then reviewed the content of the draft resolution recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee, by which the General Assembly, *inter alia*, would request it to make decisive efforts in 1984 to complete preparatory work relating to the Conference, in consideration of the political and security climate in the region and with a view to enabling the opening of the Conference in Colombo in the first half of 1985, and, at the same time, to make determined efforts in 1984 to achieve the necessary harmonization of views on the remaining relevant issues.

During the course of the debate in the First Committee,²⁴ mainly non-aligned and Eastern European delegations made general comments on the subject, supporting the idea of convening the Conference on the Indian Ocean and reaffirming their conviction that implementation of the Declaration would constitute a significant measure towards strengthening international peace and security. Several States explained their substantive positions on the subject after the introduction of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

Pakistan, for example, stated that the goal of establishing a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean would remain elusive unless the Committee addressed itself to both the non-regional and regional aspects of the threat to the security of that area. A political settlement of the question

²¹ A/38/132-S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2.

²² A/38/529.

²³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, First Committee, 48th meeting.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, First Committee, 3rd to 48th meetings, and *ibid.*, First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.

of Afghanistan was indispensable for a meaningful advance towards that goal. It also perceived an integral relationship between improvement in the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean region and the expectation of positive results from the Conference scheduled for 1985. Pakistan believed that the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean was a process that would not be advanced by static concepts or the imposition of unrealistic pre-conditions. The Conference would be a positive step, even if expectations of it were modest. The *Ad Hoc* Committee, therefore, should focus on the preparatory work.

Iraq regretted that the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee during the previous three years had been deadlocked by reason of the intransigence of certain countries which asserted their own interests over those of others. It felt that supporting the draft resolution contained in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee was the very least that the members of that Committee could agree to, even if it did not meet the wishes of the coastal and hinterland countries.

India expressed its disappointment at the outcome of the *Ad Hoc* Committee's work. It stated that the Committee had recently suffered a set-back as a result of international power play, with some States attempting to alter the very concept of the zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, and to shift attention away from the dangers posed to the littoral and hinterland States by the increasing military presence of great Powers in that area. The Committee had been subject to a systematic attempt to whittle away its very basis, in order to suit the interests and concerns of a few members. It recalled that the characteristics of the zone of peace were clearly spelled out in resolution 2832 (XXVI), and held that the Committee should focus attention on those issues. India felt that the setting of pre-conditions with regard to either the harmonization of views or the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area was merely a pretext to kill the proposal for the Conference. While it was generally accepted that some degree of convergence of views was necessary before it could take place, such harmonization was an on-going process and could not become a pre-condition for its convening. The seriousness of the political and security climate in that region, caused by the presence of great Powers and their confrontation in the area, necessitated the early and urgent holding of the Conference. Finally, India regretted that the Committee had been precluded from arriving at an agreement on the finalization of dates for its convening in 1984, and hoped that the new 1985 dates could be adhered to.

Mexico questioned two basic arguments, namely, the prevailing unfavourable political climate and the need for harmonization of views, put forward by some States which appeared to be reluctant to see the Conference take place. In its opinion, it was when the climate was politically delicate that greater efforts had to be made in international forums to change it. With regard to the harmonization of views, Mexico regretted that the position of certain States, in particular some permanent members of the Security Council, was in complete contradiction to the positions that they had adopted on other subjects, such as the Third

Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Mexico hoped that those countries whose negative attitude had led to the constant postponement of the Conference on the Indian Ocean would adopt one in keeping with their position on the holding of the Review Conference referred to, in 1985.

Mozambique pointed out that the convening of the Conference was always being questioned by certain countries which, on the pretext of the existence of a new situation in the region, attempted not only to postpone the Conference, but even to question the very notion of a zone of peace as defined by resolution 2832 (XXVI). It said it had joined in the consensus on the draft resolution in the *Ad Hoc* Committee, despite its reservations on operative paragraphs 5 and 6. Should the draft be put to a vote in the First Committee, Mozambique would abstain on those two paragraphs.

Before the First Committee proceeded to take a decision on the draft resolution recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee, Poland stated that the argument of the necessity to reach consensus was used as an instrument of leverage and pressure by those who were not interested in convening the Conference on the Indian Ocean. At the same time, the work of the Committee was being used as a screen behind which the buildup of United States naval forces, rapid deployment forces and foreign bases, like Diego García, could be carried out. Regretting that the Committee had failed to reach consensus on the finalization of dates for the convening of the Conference during 1984, Poland expressed serious reservations as to operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft resolution. In its opinion, those paragraphs, lacking clarity, constituted an instrument that would make it possible to procrastinate in reaching decisions concerning the opening of the Conference. Poland recalled that during the drafting of the text it had warned against the approach taken in those paragraphs. Consequently, it requested separate and recorded votes on them, explaining that it had not insisted on a vote in the *Ad Hoc* Committee, because it had felt that the appeals not to vote stemmed from sincere intentions to maintain the previous practice in the work of the Committee. However, in the First Committee, where decisions were taken by means of voting, Poland saw importance and merit in putting the aforementioned paragraphs to a vote. In its opinion, that would serve as a warning that the socialist States could not remain indifferent *vis-à-vis* the attempts to build into the draft resolution structures allowing the indefinite postponement of the Conference. Poland announced that it would abstain on paragraphs 5 and 6. However, it was in favour of adopting the draft resolution as a whole without a vote, to manifest its support for a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. That view was shared by the German Democratic Republic, which supported Poland's request for separate votes. It underlined, nevertheless, that the draft resolution set forth concrete tasks to be completed by the *Ad Hoc* Committee in 1984.

At the same meeting, on 2 December, operative paragraph 5 was approved by a roll-call vote of 97 to none, with 16 abstentions, and operative paragraph 6 was approved by a roll-call vote of 94 to none, with

20 abstentions. The draft resolution as a whole was then adopted without a vote.

After the First Committee's decision on the resolution, the Soviet Union stated that there had been no progress in the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Among the obstacles were the fact that, from year to year, the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly contained no precise indications concerning the tasks to be completed in preparation for the Conference and some States insistence that the resolutions include pre-conditions for its convening. At the same time, the Indian Ocean region was becoming transformed into an arena for an accelerated arms race, with the accumulation of the most up-to-date weapons, including nuclear weapons, and an increase in the number of military bases. States opposed to the convening of the Conference continued their obstruction in the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Consequently, some of the paragraphs in the draft resolution submitted to the Assembly, particularly operative paragraphs 5 and 6, served their purposes of substituting pointless discussion for active work in preparing for the Conference. For that reason, the Soviet Union had abstained from voting on those paragraphs.

Bulgaria, also having abstained on paragraphs 5 and 6, explained that it could not subscribe to formulations which, in essence, were alien to the urgent necessity to take practical measures to strengthen peace and security in the Indian Ocean.

Democratic Yemen, which voted in favour of paragraphs 5 and 6, pointed out that the lack of progress made by the *Ad Hoc* Committee in 1983 and in previous years had had an influence on the voting on those paragraphs, and that it should be taken as a warning to the members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to strive to complete preparatory work for the Conference during the 1984 session.

Ethiopia, also voting in favour of the two operative paragraphs, expressed the view that a discussion of substantive issues, as well as a harmonization of views, could not be a pre-condition for the holding of the Conference. Furthermore, it believed that the adverse political and security climate prevailing in the Indian Ocean region, instead of being an obstacle to the early convening of the Conference, was a compelling political reason for its taking place without any further delay. Similar views were expressed by Cuba and Viet Nam, which, however, abstained in the voting on the paragraphs in question.

The United States pointed out that it had participated in the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee for several years on the clear understanding that its work and reports to the General Assembly proceeded on the basis of consensus. However, some delegations had chosen to depart from that long-standing procedure, attacking the very underlying principles on which the work of the Committee had been conducted in the past and must be conducted in the future. The implications of that action were grave and could not be properly assessed immediately. The United States had worked on the assumption that consensus on the draft resolution

was the collective objective and had, therefore, reluctantly agreed to less than fully satisfactory language. While it would have posed no objection to the adoption by consensus of the draft, since consensus had been replaced by votes on two paragraphs, the United States announced that it did not participate in the decision that the Committee had taken.

On 20 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft²⁵ without a vote, as resolution 38/185.

Following that decision, the United States, recalling its statement in the First Committee, stressed once again that it would have posed no objection to the resolution's adoption by consensus. However, in the light of the actions taken by some States in the First Committee, the United States requested that the record reflect that it was not participating in the decision taken by the Assembly concerning the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

Resolution 38/185 reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3259 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3468 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/88 of 14 December 1976, 32/86 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/68 of 14 December 1978, 34/80 A and B of 11 December 1979, 35/150 of 12 December 1980, 36/90 of 9 December 1981 and 37/96 of 13 December 1982, and other relevant resolutions,

Recalling further the report of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean,

Reaffirming its conviction that concrete action for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Recalling its decision, taken at its thirty-fourth session in resolution 34/80 B, to convene a Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo during 1981,

Recalling also its decision to make every effort, in consideration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area and progress made in the harmonization of views, to finalize, in accordance with its normal methods of work, all preparations for the Conference, including the dates for its convening,

Recalling further its decision at the thirty-seventh session in resolution 37/96, concerning the consideration of the convening of the Conference not later than the first half of 1984,

Recalling the exchange of views in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean in 1983,

Noting the exchange of views on the adverse political and security climate in the region,

Noting further the various documents before the *Ad Hoc* Committee,

Convinced that the continued military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean area, conceived in the context of their confrontation, gives urgency to the need to take practical steps for the early achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,

Considering that all other foreign military presence in the area, whenever it is contrary to the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, gives greater urgency to the need to take practical steps towards the early achievement of the objectives of the Declaration,

²⁵ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 103rd meeting.

Considering also that the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean requires the active participation of and full co-operation among the littoral and hinterland States, the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users to ensure conditions of peace and security based on the purposes and principles of the Charter, as well as on the general principles of international law,

Considering further that the creation of a zone of peace requires co-operation and agreement among the States of the region to ensure conditions of peace and security within the area, as envisaged in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States,

Calling for the renewal of genuinely constructive efforts through the exercise of the political will necessary for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,

Deeply concerned at the danger posed by the grave and ominous developments in the area and the resulting sharp deterioration of peace, security and stability which particularly seriously affect the littoral and hinterland States, as well as international peace and security,

Convinced that the continued deterioration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area is an important consideration bearing on the question of the urgent convening of the Conference and that the easing of tension in the area would enhance the prospect of success being achieved by the Conference,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean and the exchange of views in the Committee;

2. *Regrets* that the *Ad Hoc* Committee has failed to reach consensus on the finalization of dates for the convening, during 1984, of the Conference on the Indian Ocean;

3. *Emphasizes* its decision to convene the Conference at Colombo as a necessary step for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, adopted in 1971;

4. *Takes note* of the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee during 1983;

5. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to make decisive efforts in 1984 to complete preparatory work relating to the Conference on the Indian Ocean, in consideration of the political and security climate in the region and with a view to enabling the opening of the Conference in Colombo in the first half of 1985, it being understood that such preparatory work would comprise organizational matters including the provisional agenda for the Conference, rules of procedure, documentation and consideration of appropriate arrangements for any international agreement that may ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, and substantive issues;

6. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee at the same time to make determined efforts in 1984 for the necessary harmonization of views on the remaining relevant issues;

7. *Renews* the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee as defined in the relevant resolutions and requests the Committee to intensify its work with regard to the implementation of its mandate;

8. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to hold three further sessions in 1984 of a duration of two weeks each, with the possibility of holding a fourth session to be considered as required;

9. *Requests* the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to continue his consultations on the participation in the work of the Committee by States Members of the United Nations which are not members of the Committee, with the aim of resolving this matter at the earliest possible date;

10. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session a full report on the implementation of the present resolution;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the *Ad Hoc* Committee, including the provision of summary records.

Conclusion

During 1983, the two basic approaches regarding the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean continued to prevail. Most delegations, including non-aligned and Eastern European States, reiterated the position that the *Ad Hoc* Committee should proceed without delay to practical preparations for the Conference, including consideration of its provisional agenda and other substantive and organizational matters, with the aim of holding it in 1984, as a necessary step for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The Western States, on the other hand, maintained their view that it was still premature to contemplate the convening of the Conference and that the Committee should instead concentrate on the further harmonization of views, as well as on the elaboration of a mutually acceptable set of principles on which an Indian Ocean zone of peace might be based. Those States also stressed that the convening of the Conference would not be appropriate without an improvement in the political and security climate in the region.

Should those basically divergent positions continue to prevail in 1984, there is little likelihood of the Committee's making substantive progress in its efforts to convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean in 1985, as envisaged in resolution 38/185.

Second Review Conference of the parties to the sea-bed Treaty

Introduction

THE SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (sea-bed Treaty) was held at Geneva from 12 to 23 September 1983. The Conference was convened in order to enable the States parties to review the Treaty's operation with a view to ensuring that its purposes and provisions were being realized.

The sea-bed Treaty evolved as the result of the growing interest during the 1960s in the economic potential of the sea-bed in areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, and the recognition of the need to establish an international régime to ensure that the exploration and exploitation of that environment would be carried out for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all mankind. Many countries feared the dangerous consequences of the possible militarization of the sea-bed environment, and felt that an effort to eliminate such a possibility should be pursued in the context of disarmament negotiations.

In 1968, the Soviet Union proposed that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) in Geneva consider initiating negotiations on an international agreement that would prohibit the military use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The following year, the Committee began negotiations on the subject, having received separate draft treaty proposals from the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet proposal,¹ submitted on 18 March 1969, called for the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and its subsoil beyond a coastal zone of 12 miles, whereas the draft treaty proposed by the United States,² on 22 May 1969, proscribed the stationing of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the same environment beyond a coastal limit of 3 miles. Despite this initial difference in approach, as well as other differences, the United States and the USSR elaborated a joint draft treaty³ which they submit-

¹ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232, annex C, document ENDC/240.

² *Ibid.*, document ENDC/249.

³ *Ibid.*, annex A, document CCD/269/Rev.1.

ted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD)⁴ in revised form on 30 October 1969.

After arduous negotiations, during which the USSR/United States joint draft treaty underwent several modifications and revisions, the CCD agreed on a final draft text which was submitted to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session, in 1970. On 7 December of that year, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2660 (XXV), by which it commended the Treaty, contained in an annex, for signature and ratification by Member States of the United Nations.

The Treaty was opened for signature on 11 February 1971 and entered into force on 18 May 1972. By the time of the Second Review Conference, 73 countries had become parties to the Treaty, including 3 nuclear-weapon States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, whose Governments are the depositaries of the Treaty.

Among the Treaty's noteworthy provisions are the following.

Under article I, the parties undertake not to emplace nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons, beyond the outer limit of a sea-bed zone defined in article II as a zone coterminous with the 12 mile-wide zone referred to in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.⁵ In response to the concerns expressed by some countries during the Treaty negotiations, article IV, which states that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the position of any State party with respect to existing conventions, including the 1958 Convention, or to other matters relating to rights or claims concerning, *inter alia*, coastal matters and the sea-bed, was included in the Treaty.

Article III, which deals with verification procedures, grants each party the right to verify, through observation, the activities of other parties on the sea-bed and beyond the zone defined by articles I and II, provided that such observations do not interfere with such activities. It also sets out recourse procedures in the event that, after observation, a State party maintains reasonable doubts concerning the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by another State party under the Treaty.

Under article V, the Parties "undertake to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof". The preamble to the Treaty, it should be noted, expresses the conviction of the parties that the Treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the sea-bed from the arms race.

Article VI specifies the procedure to be followed in amending the Treaty. Article VII provides for the holding of conferences to review the

⁴ The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was expanded and renamed the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in August 1969.

⁵ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 516, No. 7477, p. 205.

operation of the Treaty with a view to ensuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized, taking into account any relevant technological developments. Article VIII deals with the right of a State party to withdraw from the Treaty and the procedures to be followed in such an event. Article IX states that the Treaty shall in no way affect the obligations assumed by States parties under international instruments establishing zones free from nuclear weapons.

First Review Conference of the parties to the sea-bed Treaty⁶

Pursuant to its article VII, the First Review Conference of the parties to the sea-bed Treaty was held in Geneva from 20 June to 1 July 1977 in order to review the operation of the Treaty. Attended by 42 of the States parties and 3 signatories, the Conference adopted a Final Document⁷ embodying a Final Declaration, in which it assessed the operation of the Treaty article by article and made a number of recommendations regarding the further implementation of its provisions.

As reflected in that Document, the review undertaken by the Conference indicated that the Treaty had been faithfully observed by the parties, and the five years that had elapsed since its entry into force demonstrated its effectiveness. The continued observance of article I remained essential to the overall objective of avoiding an arms race on the sea-bed, but the Conference was concerned that the Treaty had not yet achieved universal adherence. It therefore called upon those States that had not yet become parties, particularly those with nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, to accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.

The Conference affirmed the commitment of the parties under article V to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further disarmament measures for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, and noted that no information had been presented to it indicating that major technological developments had taken place since the Treaty's entry into force in 1972 which might affect its operation. The Conference recognized, however, the need to keep such developments under continuing review. It therefore invited the CCD, in consultation with the States parties to the Treaty and taking into account the proposals made at the Review Conference and any relevant technological developments, to proceed promptly with the consideration of further measures to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed.

The Conference also decided to hold a further review conference, again in Geneva, in 1982 or, in any case, not later than 1984.

⁶ For a more detailed account, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, chap. XXI.

⁷ SBT/CONF./25; also circulated in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. II, annex II, document CCD/543.

Developments since the First Review Conference

There were few developments in connection with the sea-bed Treaty in the intervening years between the First and Second Review Conferences. References were made to it in the course of the work of the CCD and the Committee on Disarmament and in the First Committee of the General Assembly.

In the CCD, in 1977, several delegations noted with satisfaction the results of the First Review Conference, observing that it had confirmed that the Treaty had worked satisfactorily.⁸ The socialist speakers generally drew attention to the Conference's recommendations concerning negotiations on further measures for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed. The Soviet Union felt that the Committee, having elaborated the sea-bed Treaty and having the competence for reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the various problems of disarmament, should conduct negotiations on practical steps leading to the goal of the complete exclusion of the sea-bed from the arms race. The United Kingdom, observing that the Treaty had worked well, reiterated its belief, stated at the Conference, that there had been no recent technological developments affecting it. However, it expressed the hope that at an appropriate time it would be possible to consider establishing an *ad hoc* expert group to keep technological developments under review in order to allay the fears of any State which might believe that technological developments relevant to the operation of the Treaty were taking place.

The same year, in the First Committee, a number of countries noted with satisfaction that the Review Conference had been held in a constructive atmosphere, that its decisions had been adopted by consensus and that it had reaffirmed that no violations of the Treaty had occurred during the period under review. On 12 December, the General Assembly, by resolution 32/87 A, adopted by consensus, welcomed with satisfaction the positive assessment by the Review Conference of the effectiveness of the sea-bed Treaty since its entry into force. It invited all States that had not done so, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, to ratify or accede to the Treaty, which would contribute to international confidence, and called upon all States to refrain from any action that might lead to the extension of the arms race to the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

In the CCD in 1978, the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to begin consultations concerning a procedure for starting discussions on the question of the further demilitarization of the sea-bed. In its view, the Treaty created the prerequisites for the complete exclusion of the sea-bed from the arms race by committing States parties to continue negotiations on the further demilitarization of that environment. The United States expressed the view that the Treaty had not only achieved its

⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/32/27)*, paras. 240 and 241.

primary purpose but had also played a broader role in preventing the emergence of an arms race on the sea-bed. It had seen no evidence of an arms race in that environment and saw little prospect for one in the future. Thus, it did not believe that it was necessary for the Committee, or any other forum, to consider further disarmament measures in that area. However, it believed that the subject should be kept under careful review.⁹

In the Preparatory Committee for the tenth special session of the General Assembly and at the session itself, held in 1978, the question of the arms race on the sea-bed was also discussed, and in the Final Document of the session, the General Assembly stated:

In order to promote the peaceful use of and to avoid an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, the Committee on Disarmament is requested—in consultation with the States parties to the Treaty . . . and taking into account the proposals made during the 1977 Review Conference of the parties to that Treaty and any relevant technological developments—to proceed promptly with the consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race in that environment.¹⁰

When the Committee on Disarmament adopted the agenda for its 1979 session, it reached the understanding that item IX, dealing with “collateral measures” (see page 15 above), included the question of further measures to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed. On 20 April of that year, Poland submitted a working paper¹¹ in the Committee entitled “Further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor”, in which it, *inter alia*, stated that the Committee was responsible for “the promotion of possible measures of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed or ocean floor”, a responsibility that might be suitably recognized by the early inclusion in its schedule of an occasion when “attention could be focused on matters in that area”.

On 27 June 1979, the Soviet Union and the United States jointly transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament the text of the Treaty between their two countries, which had been signed by their respective Heads of State meeting in Vienna from 15 to 18 June, on the limitation of their strategic offensive arms (SALT II, which, at the end of 1983, had not been ratified).¹² Under article IX, paragraph 1 (b) of that Treaty, each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy “fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the ocean floor, on the sea-bed, or on the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or in the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles, which move only in contact with the ocean floor, the sea-bed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers”.

⁹ See *ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, paras. 219-223.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 79.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), vol. 1, document CD/13.

¹² *Ibid.*, document CD/28; the text is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, appendix IX.

In the course of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, in 1981, Sweden stressed the need to follow closely what it saw as the expanding military utilization of the oceans and the sea-bed, and proposed that the three depositary Governments of the sea-bed Treaty take urgent steps towards fulfilling the Treaty's provision in article V for a continuation of negotiations concerning further measures for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. Sweden believed a second review of the Treaty was desirable, particularly in view of rapid developments in the field of marine technology. It therefore proposed that informal consultations be held during that session in order to reach agreement on the date for such a review and on appropriate ways of making a technological assessment which, according to the First Review Conference, should be a responsibility of the multilateral disarmament negotiating body in Geneva.

In 1982, at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, several States referred to the question of further measures to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed. Sweden, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe, among others, called for effective measures for the demilitarization of the sea-bed, an environment which, it was felt, should be used exclusively for the peaceful benefit of all countries. Sweden reiterated its proposal that technological developments in that field should be kept under review in preparation for the Second Review Conference of States parties to the sea-bed Treaty, and held that the Committee on Disarmament should play an active role in such preparations. In the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session,¹³ there was no specific reference to the sea-bed or to the Treaty, although States reaffirmed their commitment to the provisions of the 1978 Final Document of the General Assembly.

Following the special session, Sweden raised the matter of technological developments in the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament. Recalling the text of the review of article VII in the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference, and specifically its reference to the establishment of an *ad hoc* expert group under the auspices of the Committee for the purpose of keeping under review the major technological developments which affect the operation of the Treaty, Sweden proposed that the Committee on Disarmament, in preparing its agenda and outline of work for 1983, should make provision for the fulfilment of that task. It recalled further that the First Review Conference had agreed that such an expert group might contribute to the orderly preparation of the next review conference.

During informal consultations at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, in 1982, parties to the sea-bed Treaty agreed that the Second Review Conference, called for in the Final Declaration of the first one, should be held in 1983.

On 13 December, the General Assembly, on the basis of a draft resolution sponsored by Australia, Belgium, Colombia, Denmark,

¹³ *Ibid.*, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32.

Ecuador, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, India, Japan, Norway and Romania, adopted by consensus a procedural resolution, 37/99 H, by which it noted that, following appropriate consultations, a preparatory committee for the Second Review Conference of the Treaty was to be established prior to holding the Conference in 1983. It requested the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance in that regard and for the Review Conference itself, and recalled its expressed hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty.

Work of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference of the parties to the sea-bed Treaty

The Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference held one session, in which 42 States parties to the Treaty participated,¹⁴ at Geneva from 2 to 5 May 1983. Four non-parties who were signatories – Greece, Lebanon, Madagascar and Senegal – were also invited to participate, in response to their written requests, without the right to take part in decision-making. The Committee elected Ambassador Martin Huslid of Norway as its Chairman. It decided to take its decisions by consensus.

In the course of its sessions, the Preparatory Committee agreed on a provisional agenda for the Second Review Conference and other organizational and procedural matters, and decided that the Conference would be held at Geneva from 12 to 23 September 1983.

In paragraph 18 of its final report,¹⁵ the Preparatory Committee, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to submit to the Second Review Conference a document containing: (a) a compilation of official communications with regard to the implementation of the objectives and provisions of the Treaty which the Secretary-General might have received; and (b) a compilation of papers on technological developments (military as well as peaceful) relevant to the Treaty, which parties might wish to provide, or which were otherwise available to the Secretary-General from Governments.

In response to the Committee's request, the Secretary-General sent a note verbale, dated 25 May, to the three depositary Governments, the substantive part of which read as follows:

The Secretary-General would appreciate it if His Excellency's Government, as a Depositary of the Treaty, would transmit to him, before 15 July 1983, the communications it may have received pursuant to paragraph 18 (b) (i) of the Final Report of the Preparatory Committee. The Secretary-General would also appreciate the assistance of His Excellency's Government in making the necessary arrangements so that the Secretary-General may receive, directly, or through its intermediary, before 15 July 1983, the papers on

¹⁴ Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

¹⁵ SBT/CONF.II/1.

technological developments that Parties to the Treaty may wish to provide in accordance with paragraph 18 (b) (ii) of the Final Report of the Preparatory Committee.

In their separate communications¹⁶ to the Secretary-General in response to his note verbale, the depositary Governments (USSR, United Kingdom and United States) informed him that they had not received any official communication from any State party to the sea-bed Treaty concerning the implementation of its objectives and provisions. The USSR and the United Kingdom added that they had not received and did not have any information of technological developments relevant to the operation of the Treaty.

Consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, 1983

In 1983, in the Committee on Disarmament, Sweden reiterated its proposal for consideration by the Committee of the major technological developments which affected the operation of the sea-bed Treaty, believing that such developments might lead to increased military use of the sea-bed within either the current scope of the Treaty or an enlarged one.

The Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference of the States parties to the sea-bed Treaty also invited the Committee on Disarmament to undertake appropriate follow-up measures with respect to the conclusions of the First Review Conference on articles V and VII of the Treaty.¹⁷ In response, the Committee on Disarmament, on 9 August, held an informal meeting and provided the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference with the following summaries of statements:

Sweden noted the rapid civilian technological development in the field as a consequence of the ongoing enormous exploitation of the sea-bed; developments which are directly applicable for military purposes and thus could affect the sea-bed Treaty. Some examples hereof were given. Sweden also pointed at the increasing need and capacity to hide military activity in the water and on the sea-bed, including non-nuclear activity, which gives strong reasons to broaden the Treaty. Sweden referred to articles V and VII of the Treaty. Sweden also urged all States, especially those having the most advanced technology and weapons, to make available at the coming review conference all possible information concerning actual and foreseeable developments in the field.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics emphasized the desirability of universal participation in the Treaty and said it was in favour of a complete demilitarization of the seabed. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics also stated that it had received no official communications with respect to the implementation of the Treaty and had no information concerning technological developments which affect the functioning and effectiveness of that international instrument.

The United Kingdom stated that it continued to believe the sea-bed Treaty was a valuable measure of arms control which had worked in a satisfactory manner for the past 12 years. The United Kingdom was not aware of any technological developments which affected the operation of the Treaty, nor of any change in circumstances which had broken or invalidated any of the original provisions contained in the Treaty. The United Kingdom also urged the widest possible adherence to the Treaty.

¹⁶ SBT/CONF.II/4.

¹⁷ See SBT/CONF.II/1, para. 21, and SBT/CONF.II/20, part III, SR.1, paras 4. and 5.

The United States delegation noted its satisfaction with the Treaty but expressed willingness to be attentive to any concerns of States that might feel otherwise. The United States called for wider adherence and, while noting important advances relating to the seabed in a number of scientific disciplines, indicated that the United States perceives none that have constituted a technological development affecting the purposes or implementation of the Treaty.¹⁸

Second Review Conference of the parties to the sea-bed Treaty

The Second Review Conference, held at Geneva from 12 to 23 September 1983, was attended by 45 of the 73 States parties to the Treaty, four signatories and two observer States,¹⁹ as well as two non-governmental organizations. The substantive work of the Conference was devoted largely to two items on its agenda, namely: (a) "Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for under article VII" (which consisted of a general debate and a specific review and appraisal of all the Treaty's articles as well as its preambular paragraphs and purposes); and (b) "Preparation and adoption of Final Document(s)".

At its first meeting, the Conference elected Ambassador Martin Huslid of Norway by acclamation as its President, and adopted its agenda and rules of procedure as recommended by the Preparatory Committee. In the general debate, the parties to the Treaty gave their individual assessments of the Treaty's overall operation and effectiveness. In all, the Conference held 10 plenary meetings.²⁰

Regarding the scope of the Treaty, it was generally recognized by delegations that, within its limits, the Treaty had been effective and that the continued observance of the prohibition contained in article I was essential to the objective of avoiding an arms race in nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. At the same time, many non-aligned and socialist States parties reiterated their belief that the scope of the Treaty was too narrow, and called again, as at the First Review Conference, for the initiation of negotiations on further measures for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed. For their part, Western States generally did not see any current need for such negotiations. In their opinion, the Treaty had not only achieved its primary purpose by banning nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from the sea-bed, but had also played a broader role by preventing the emergence of an arms race in that environment.

Two main points of view were discernible with respect to the verification procedures. On the one hand, a number of States parties,

¹⁸ SBT/CONF.II/3/Add.1.

¹⁹ Parties: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom, United States and Yugoslavia. Signatories: Brazil, Colombia, Greece and Madagascar. Observer status: Algeria and Mexico.

²⁰ SBT/CONF.II/20, part III (SBT/CONF.II/SR.1-10).

among them Japan, Morocco and Romania, considered that since most States parties did not possess adequate independent means of verification, the procedures provided for in article III should be further elaborated to include resort to international mechanisms. On the other hand, others, including the three depositaries, maintained that the relevant provisions were adequate to ensure effective verification of compliance with the Treaty and broad enough to permit States parties to resort to various international procedures.

As at the First Review Conference, the availability of information on relevant technological developments was again a matter of concern to a number of participants, among them Argentina, Sweden and Yugoslaviä. Scepticism was expressed regarding statements by the three depositaries that in the six years since the first review no such developments had been identified. Proposals were made to ensure the collection, assessment and dissemination of relevant data through such mechanisms as a United Nations expert study group (proposed by Sweden), the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) (proposed by the Netherlands), or an *ad hoc* expert group under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament (proposed by Hungary). The first two proposals were opposed by all three depositaries, and the third by the United Kingdom and the United States.

With regard to the relationship between the sea-bed Treaty and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it was generally held that nothing in that Convention should affect the rights and obligations assumed by States parties under the sea-bed Treaty. Some countries, for example, Australia and the United States, held that the extent of the sea-bed area to which the Treaty's prohibition applied should not be affected by the entry into force of the law of the sea Convention. The United States further considered that it would be desirable to include in the Final Declaration a statement that would open the possibility of enlarging that area. However, no agreement could be reached on language to that effect with respect to the zone covered by the Treaty.

Some difficulties also arose with regard to a preambular paragraph of the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference concerning the importance of the natural resources of the sea-bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction for the economic progress of States, particularly of developing countries. Some developing countries favoured the retention of such a paragraph and, in addition, proposed that the Conference should recall that the law of the sea Convention declared that such resources constituted the common heritage of mankind. The proposal did not meet with the approval of some Western countries, with or without the reference to the Convention, with the result that a new text was added by which the Conference emphasized the interest of all States, including, specifically, that of developing ones, in the progress of the exploration and use of the sea-bed and its resources for peaceful purposes.

In summing up the general debate on 15 September, the President of the Conference observed that many delegations had stressed the importance of the Treaty as a step towards the complete exclusion of the seabed from the arms race. He also noted that a large number had stressed that States parties had faithfully respected the Treaty and must continue to do so. Many had noted the commitment to negotiations on further measures contained in article V. With regard to article VII, some delegations had emphasized that new technological developments should be carefully followed, although such developments need not necessarily imply a change in the Treaty. With respect to article X, many States parties had urged States not parties to the Treaty, especially nuclear-weapon States, to adhere to it as soon as possible. While there had been a large measure of agreement shown by the general debate, the President observed that there had also been differences of view relating, in particular, to the scope of the Treaty, to its verification procedures and to the best way to monitor technological developments. The President further observed that the majority of States parties felt that the Convention on the Law of the Sea should not necessitate any changes to, or lead to any reduction in, the scope of the sea-bed Treaty.

On 23 September, at its final plenary meeting, the Second Review Conference adopted its Final Document,²¹ referred to above, by consensus. Part II of the Document contains the Final Declaration which consists of a preamble and the Conference's article-by-article review of the Treaty, including certain affirmations and requests concerning its operation and a call for additional States to become parties.

In bringing the Second Review Conference to its formal closure at that meeting, the President of the Conference expressed satisfaction at the work it had accomplished. While it had been said that the Treaty was not the most important instrument in the field of disarmament, it nevertheless provided for the exclusion of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from two thirds of the globe and constituted an important step towards the complete exclusion of that area from the arms race. The President observed that the Conference illustrated that it was possible, through fruitful dialogue and goodwill on the part of all parties concerned, to recognize common interests and objectives in the pursuit of general and complete disarmament.

The Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference reads as follows:

PREAMBLE

The States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof which met in Geneva in September 1983 in accordance with the provisions of Article VII to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized:

Recognizing the continuing importance of the Treaty and its objectives,

²¹ SBT/CONF.II/20.

Recalling the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof held in Geneva from 20 June to 1 July 1977,

Affirming their belief that universal adherence to the Treaty would enhance international peace and security,

Recognizing that an arms race in nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed would present a grave threat to international security,

Recognizing also the importance of negotiations concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof,

Considering that a trend towards a relaxation of tension in international relations would provide a favourable climate in which more significant progress can be made towards the cessation of the arms race,

Reaffirming their conviction that the Treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race, and towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Emphasizing the interest of all States, including specifically the interest of developing States, in the progress of the exploration and use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and its resources for peaceful purposes,

Noting that the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has concluded and the Convention on the Law of the Sea was opened for signature on 10 December 1982.

Affirming that nothing contained in the Convention on the Law of the Sea affects the rights and obligations assumed by States Parties under the Treaty,

Taking note of the information concerning the informal meeting held in 1983 under the auspices of the Committee on Disarmament as well as the communications from the Depositary Governments,

Appealing to States to refrain from any action which might lead to the extension of the arms race to the sea-bed and ocean floor, and might impede the exploration and exploitation by States of the natural resources of the sea-bed and ocean floor for their economic development,

Declare as follows:

PURPOSES

The States Parties to the Treaty reaffirm their strong common interest in avoiding an arms race on the sea-bed in nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction. They reaffirm their strong support for the Treaty, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives and their commitment to implement effectively its provisions.

Article I

The review undertaken by the Conference confirms that the obligations assumed under Article I of the Treaty have been faithfully observed by the States Parties. The Conference is convinced that the continued observance of this Article remains essential to the objective which all States Parties share of avoiding an arms race in nuclear weapons or any other type of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed.

Article II

The Conference reaffirms its support for the provisions of Article II which define the zone covered by the Treaty. The Conference agrees that the zone covered by the Treaty reflects the right balance between the need to prevent an arms race in nuclear weapons and any other types of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the right of States to control verification activities close to their own coasts.

Article III

The Conference notes with satisfaction that no State Party has found it necessary to invoke the provisions of Article III, paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5, dealing with international complaints and verification procedures. The Conference considers that the provisions for consultation and co-operation contained in paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 include the right of interested States Parties to agree to resort to various international consultative procedures. These procedures could include *ad hoc* consultative groups of experts in which all States Parties could participate, and other procedures. The Conference stresses the importance of co-operation between States Parties with a view to ensuring effective implementation of the international consultative procedures provided for in Article III of the Treaty, having regard also for the concerns expressed by some States Parties that they lack the technical means to carry out the verification procedures unaided.

The Conference reaffirms in the framework of Article III and Article IV that nothing in the verification provisions of this Treaty should be interpreted as affecting or limiting, and notes with satisfaction that nothing in these provisions has been identified as affecting or limiting, the rights of States Parties recognized under international law and consistent with their obligations under the Treaty, including the freedom of the high seas and the rights of coastal States.

The Conference reaffirms that States Parties should exercise their rights under Article III with due regard for the sovereign rights of coastal States as recognized under international law.

Article IV

The Conference notes the importance of Article IV which provides that nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the position of any State Party with respect to existing international conventions, including the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, or with respect to rights or claims which such State Party may assert, or with respect to recognition or non-recognition of rights or claims asserted by any other State, related to waters off its coast, including, *inter alia*, territorial seas and contiguous zones, or to the sea-bed and the ocean floor, including continental shelves. The Conference also noted that obligations assumed by States Parties to the Treaty arising from other international instruments continue to apply.

Article V

The Conference reaffirms the commitment undertaken in Article V to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

In this regard, the Conference notes that negotiations on such measures have not yet taken place. Consequently, the Conference again requests that the Conference on Disarmament, in consultation with States Parties to the Treaty, taking into account existing proposals and any relevant technological developments, proceed promptly with consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

Article VI

The Conference notes that over the 11 years of the operation of the Treaty no State Party proposed any amendments to this Treaty according to the procedure laid down in this Article.

Article VII

The Conference notes with satisfaction the spirit of co-operation in which the Review Conference was held.

The Conference takes note of the fact that no information has been presented to it indicating that major technological developments have taken place since 1977 which affect the operation of the Treaty. The Conference, nevertheless, recognizes the need to keep such developments under continuing review, and that relevant information should be available

at the time of the next review Conference. It considers that for this purpose timely preparations should be made by the Preparatory Committee for the next Review Conference with a view to providing information on major technological developments relevant to the Treaty. Such preparations, which could include the assistance of appropriate expertise, might facilitate the implementation of the purposes stated in the section dealing with Article V. Such preparation might also be useful to the Conference on Disarmament in its negotiations of further measures under Article V.

In order further to facilitate the dissemination of information relevant to the Treaty to States for their assessment, the Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to collect such information from officially available sources and publish it in the United Nations Yearbook on Disarmament.

The Conference, recognizing the importance of the review mechanism provided in Article VII, decides that a third Review Conference shall be held in Geneva at the request of a majority of States Parties not earlier than 1988 and, in any case, not later than 1990. The next conference shall determine in accordance with the views of a majority of those States Parties attending whether and when an additional review conference shall be convened.

Article VIII

The Conference notes with satisfaction that no State Party has exercised its rights to withdraw from the Treaty under Article VIII.

Article IX

The Conference reaffirms its conviction that nothing in the Treaty affects the obligations assumed by States Parties to the Treaty under international instruments establishing zones free from nuclear weapons.

Article X

The Conference stresses that the 11 years that have elapsed since the date of entry of the Treaty into force have demonstrated its effectiveness. The Conference welcomes the adherence of 10 States to the Treaty since the First Review Conference. At the same time the Conference notes with concern that the Treaty has not yet achieved universal acceptance. Therefore the Conference calls upon the States that have not yet become Parties, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction, to do so at the earliest possible date. Such adherence would be a significant contribution to international confidence.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

While a large number of delegations expressed concern at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly over what they saw as an escalating naval arms race worldwide, there were few specific references to the sea-bed Treaty or to the work of the Second Review Conference. Among the delegations which referred to the Treaty in the First Committee,²² Angola, Denmark, Norway, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom reaffirmed their support for it, with the Soviet Union calling for wider adherence to it. Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom welcomed the Conference's positive assessment of the effectiveness of the Treaty. In the view of the United Kingdom, the Conference had "confirmed the utility of the existing régime". Denmark was encouraged by the fact that no State party had so far invoked the Treaty's complaints

²² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, First Committee, 3rd to 34th meetings, and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.*

and verification procedures. It also saw as positive the Conference's recognition of the importance of providing information on technological developments relevant to the operation of the Treaty before the next review conference, scheduled to take place some time between 1988 and 1990.

On 4 November, 26 sponsoring countries, belonging to all groupings and including the 3 depositary States of the sea-bed Treaty,²³ introduced in the First Committee a draft resolution entitled "Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof".

In introducing the draft resolution on 7 November, the representative of Norway, who had been President of the Conference, stated that the Second Review Conference had adopted by consensus a Final Declaration in which the States parties to the Treaty had recognized the continuing importance of the Treaty and its objectives, and had noted that the obligations assumed under it had been faithfully observed by its parties. At the same time, the Conference had reaffirmed the strong support of the States parties for and continued dedication to the principles and objectives of the Treaty and their strong common interest in avoiding an arms race on the sea-bed in nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction. He observed also that the Conference had appealed to all States to refrain from any action which might lead to the extension of the arms race to the sea-bed. Furthermore, he added that in view of the commitment of the State parties—under article V of the Treaty—to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, the Review Conference had requested the Conference on Disarmament, in consultation with the States parties to the Treaty, to proceed promptly with consideration of such further measures, taking into account existing proposals and any further technological developments. Turning to the text of the draft resolution itself, the representative of Norway noted that it referred to most of the text of the Final Declaration that he had just mentioned and also contained some supplementary provisions. He hoped that it would be adopted by consensus.

The First Committee approved the draft resolution on 21 November without a vote, and the General Assembly²⁴ adopted it on 20 December, also without a vote, as resolution 38/188 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2660 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, in which it commended the

²³ Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Malta, Mongolia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom and United States.

²⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings, 103rd meeting.*

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof,

Convinced that the Treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race,

Recalling that the States parties to the Treaty met at Geneva from 12 to 23 September 1983 to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty were being realized,

Noting with satisfaction that the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof concluded that the obligations assumed under the Treaty had been faithfully observed by the States parties,

Noting that in its Final Declaration the Review Conference affirmed its belief that universal adherence to the Treaty would enhance international peace and security,

Noting furthermore that the States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their strong support for and continued dedication to the principles and objectives of the Treaty, as well as their commitment to implement effectively its provisions,

Recognizing that in the Final Declaration the States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed the commitment undertaken in article V to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof,

1. *Welcomes with satisfaction* the positive assessment by the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof of the effectiveness of the Treaty since its entry into force, as reflected in its Final Declaration;

2. *Reiterates* its expressed hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty;

3. *Affirms* its strong interest in avoiding an arms race in nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed, the ocean floor or the subsoil thereof;

4. *Calls again upon* all States to refrain from any action which might lead to the extension of the arms race to the sea-bed and the ocean floor;

5. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament, in consultation with the States parties to the Treaty, taking into account existing proposals and any relevant technological developments, to proceed promptly with consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly relevant to further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof;

7. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof to the General Assembly at its fortieth session.

Conclusion

The sea-bed Treaty constitutes an arms regulation agreement that represents a positive step towards ensuring the avoidance of the militarization of the sea-bed environment. As recognized at the Second Review Conference of the States parties, the Treaty, even with its current scope, has been faithfully observed and has functioned effectively in performing its primary objective, namely, to ban nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from the sea-bed. At the same time, it was again also

recognized that the Treaty might be supplemented by additional measures so as to exclude, comprehensively, the sea-bed area from all aspects of the arms race.

An issue of concern to many States parties to the Treaty has been the question of the availability of information on relevant technological developments which some of them feel must have occurred in the six years since the previous Review Conference. The Second Review Conference, in the Final Declaration, recognized the need to keep the issue under continuing review and called for relevant information on such developments to be made available in time for the next such conference.

Another issue of concern to many, largely developing, countries participating in the Second Review Conference was the question of the relationship between the Treaty and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was opened for signature in December 1982. The Final Declaration of the Conference stated that nothing in the law of the sea Convention should affect the rights and obligations assumed by States parties under the sea-bed Treaty. However, it is conceivable that when that Convention enters into force, its relationship with the sea-bed Treaty could become an issue in future reviews of the Treaty, as well as in the consideration of further measures for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed.

It is significant that the sea-bed régime has continued to grow in membership, with 10 new States becoming parties to the Treaty in the intervening years between the two Review Conferences, and that no State has withdrawn from the Treaty. Through the Second Review Conference, States parties have once again reaffirmed the Treaty's continuing validity and effectiveness.

PART FIVE

Information and studies

CHAPTER XXI

World Disarmament Campaign and Disarmament Week, and provision of information

Introduction

THE VALUABLE ROLE WHICH WORLD PUBLIC OPINION CAN PLAY in promoting the cause of disarmament was fully recognized in 1978 in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly.¹ In the Document the Assembly proclaimed the week starting 24 October, the day of the foundation of the United Nations, as Disarmament Week, that is, a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament.²

At its thirty-fifth session, in 1980, the General Assembly, by resolution 35/152 I, requested the Secretary-General to carry out, with the assistance of a small group of experts, a study on the organization and financing of a world disarmament campaign under the auspices of the United Nations. The study was annexed to a report of the Secretary-General that was submitted to the Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.³ It emphasized the importance of mobilizing public opinion in support of disarmament, so that it might exert a positive influence towards the achievement of meaningful and effective disarmament measures. The experts further underlined the need to involve as many segments of the world's population as possible in the exercise and outlined the catalytic role which the United Nations could play in a balanced, factual and objective manner worldwide. After discussion of the report, the General Assembly adopted resolution 36/92 C by which, *inter alia*, it noted with satisfaction the contents of the study and commended its conclusions; it further requested the Secretary-General to transmit it, together with views expressed regarding its implementation, to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, so that it could take appropriate decisions thereon.

Subsequently, issues regarding the Campaign were discussed extensively in the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, which recommended

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 99-107 and 123. (The Final Document is reproduced *in extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I.)

² *Ibid.*, para. 102.

³ A/36/458.

that, at the opening meeting of the special session, the President, following a formal decision, should launch the Campaign.

Thus, on 7 June 1982, the Assembly at its twelfth special session — or second such session devoted to disarmament — launched the World Disarmament Campaign under the auspices of the United Nations. Subsequently, and in keeping with a recommendation of the Preparatory Committee, the Secretary-General presented at the session a further report entitled “Outline of a programme for the World Disarmament Campaign”,⁴ which, together with the aforementioned study and pertinent views of Member States, became the basis for discussions during the session. In it, the Secretary-General made clear that the Campaign would have to be carried out in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner, in co-operation with Governments and non-governmental organizations. He also stated that the programme outlined concentrated on (a) extending United Nations means of communication with the world public, the media and non-governmental organizations; (b) systematic co-operation with national and international non-governmental organizations that could stimulate public understanding; (c) special events (Disarmament Week); and (d) a publicity programme for the Campaign itself. Under those four headings, the report outlined steps which might be taken during the period 1982-1984.

The Secretary-General further recommended that the information materials of the United Nations produced for the World Disarmament Campaign should be distributed as widely as possible. United Nations information centres and other field offices should play an important role in the dissemination of such information to all constituencies. Moreover, projects should be undertaken in co-operation with interested national and international non-governmental organizations. As only some of the projected activities could be effected from funds available in the regular budget of the United Nations, the extent to which the entire programme could be carried out would depend on the availability of extrabudgetary resources. The Secretary-General finally stressed that the World Disarmament Campaign could succeed only through a concerted effort by the United Nations and its system of agencies and programmes, Member States and the concerned public.

After extensive consideration⁵ during the course of the session, the General Assembly reached consensus on a text describing the World Disarmament Campaign, which it annexed to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly.⁶ In the text, the objectives, contents and modalities of the World Disarmament Campaign were defined. Concerning the financial implications, it was recognized that additional human, financial and material resources would be necessary to carry out an effective Campaign. To that end, the

⁴ A/S-12/27.

⁵ For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. XXI.

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes*, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32, annex V; the Concluding Document is reproduced *in extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, appendix I.

Secretary-General was urged to explore the possibilities of redeploying existing resources. Also, Member States were invited to supplement available United Nations financial resources with voluntary contributions, and it was stated that contributions by non-governmental organizations, foundations and trusts, and other private sources would also be welcome.

Also pursuant to the relevant decision made by the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the Secretary-General submitted to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh session a report⁷ outlining a general framework and providing specifics of a programme of activities for 1983, together with the financial aspects of the proposed programme. At that session the General Assembly, in the context of follow-up to its special sessions on disarmament, adopted three resolutions relating to the World Disarmament Campaign. By resolution 37/100 H, it invited Member States, in the implementation of the Campaign, to take into account the various views expressed at the twelfth special session, including the proposal for a world-wide signature-collecting action for the prevention of nuclear war and for disarmament, and also to ensure a better flow of information and to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information. By resolution 37/100 I, adopted without a vote, the General Assembly approved the general framework of the Campaign and the proposals for the programme of activities for 1983 as specified by the Secretary-General in his report, invited further voluntary contributions and decided that there should be a pledging conference for contributions from Member States at the Assembly's thirty-eighth session. By resolution 37/100 J, also adopted without a vote, the Assembly called on States to facilitate the flow of a broad range of accurate information on disarmament matters and to encourage their citizens freely to meet and to express their own views thereon.

By a further resolution, 37/78 D, the Assembly unanimously expressed appreciation to all States and organizations concerned for their support of Disarmament Week, and invited them to take various measures to give that event a fresh impetus and to inform the Secretary-General of their activities.

Finally and in a separate context, the Assembly adopted resolution 37/99 G, by which it noted that the Final Document had encouraged Member States to ensure a better flow of information on various aspects of disarmament and that objective information on military capabilities could contribute, *inter alia*, to confidence-building and disarmament, called upon States to consider additional measures to facilitate the provision of such information and invited them to convey their views on such measures to the Secretary-General.

⁷ A/37/548.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament, 1983

Neither the Disarmament Commission nor the Committee on Disarmament had an item relating to information activities on its agenda in 1983.⁸

In the Disarmament Commission, however, there was considerable debate, in the context of its agenda item relating to military budgets, in connection with the reporting of information on military expenditures, as discussed in chapter XVIII above. In addition, during the general exchange of views, some members commented on the ever-growing expression of public concern about the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspects. For instance, Argentina and Mongolia referred to the nuclear-weapon freeze movement, with Mongolia stressing that it was one attestation of public concern about the threat of nuclear war. In its closing remarks, Sweden looked upon the World Disarmament Campaign as an ongoing disarmament effort and hoped that it would take the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (ICDSI)⁹ into account in its activities.

In the Committee on Disarmament there was considerable similar comment about expressions of concern on the part of the public regarding the danger of the arms race and, particularly, of nuclear war. It was voiced by both socialist and Western States in the Committee as well as non-aligned and neutral members of the group of 21. In fact, the Secretary-General, in his address to the Committee on 15 February, observed that, in parallel to statements of commitment indicating that "all countries of East and West, North and South alike" were giving high priority to arms limitation, there was mounting concern among peoples all over the world about the threat of nuclear war.

The USSR, in its opening address, noted that throughout the world peoples were demanding the adoption of concrete measures to lessen the danger of war. Nigeria was encouraged by the fact that public opinion had shifted in favour of disarmament and that the subject was no longer one of only marginal political interest. Yugoslavia, while acknowledging the increased concern of world public opinion over the arms race and its urgent demand for beginning the disarmament process, observed that the publicly expressed readiness of some States to reduce weapons significantly was often contrary to their actual behaviour. Later in the session, in discussing its policy, the United States said that, for its part, transparency was not just a theory but an instrument for increasing mutual trust and confidence, and that it was convinced that unimpeded access by the public to a broad range of information — about capabilities,

⁸ For details of the exchange of views in the Disarmament Commission, see A/CN.10/PV.65-70 and A/CN.10/PV.65-72/Corrigendum, and in the Committee on Disarmament, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix III (CD/421), vols. 1-V.

⁹ A/CN.10/38.

motivations and each other generally — could exercise a positive influence on efforts to achieve meaningful arms control measures and to prevent war.

Regarding the World Disarmament Campaign, Kenya stated that the education of the masses in favour of disarmament was a heavy responsibility which already was starting to make some Governments behave more sensibly in disarmament matters. Accordingly, the Campaign merited systematic encouragement if its primary purposes were to be realized. Ethiopia recognized the role of the Department for Disarmament Affairs in the conduct of the Campaign and felt, in that connection, that the importance of education and public information activities should be stressed. It then recalled the words contained in the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), "Since war begins in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defence of peace must be established".

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

At the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, several speakers referred in the plenary general debate¹⁰ to the role of information and world public opinion in the quest for disarmament, but the substantive discussion of the subject area took place in the First Committee,¹¹ where five draft resolutions were submitted, four of which were subsequently adopted as resolutions by the Assembly.

World Disarmament Campaign

At its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly had before it the Secretary-General's report,¹² pursuant to resolution 37/100 I, on the implementation of the programme of activities of the World Disarmament Campaign for 1983. In the report, the Secretary-General described those activities under five subheadings, concerning: United Nations information materials; interpersonal communication, seminars and training; special events; a publicity programme; and United Nations field offices. In introductory parts of the report, he provided background information and a brief review of the relevant activities undertaken by the United Nations system since the launching of the Campaign, noting that they had followed the general guidelines laid down for it. The financial aspects of the programme were outlined in the final part of the report. The report of the Secretary-General covering the activities of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies¹³ (see chapter XXII) also contained various brief

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th to 33rd and 97th and 103rd meetings.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 40th and 46th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

¹² A/38/349.

¹³ A/38/467.

comments on the implementation of the Campaign, expressing, *inter alia*, appreciation for the manner in which that difficult task was being carried out.

In the section on activities, the report outlined the co-ordinating role of the Department for Disarmament Affairs and the participation of other departments and bodies, particularly the Department of Public Information. Then, under the subheadings listed above, it described, *inter alia*: information materials, noting the introduction of a Disarmament Newsletter; regional conferences and seminars, among them two held at New Delhi and Caracas for non-governmental organizations and educators respectively; special events, such as panel discussions, exhibits and film-making activities; and the provision of publicity for the Campaign through various activities, including particular publications and the media.

In the course of the debate in the First Committee, among the many States which recognized the potential of public opinion and of the Campaign for fostering disarmament, Nigeria drew particular attention to the current lack of progress in disarmament talks and the apparent unwillingness of some States to undertake meaningful disarmament, and stated that the only option seemed, therefore, to be the mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament. That opinion, enlightened about the destabilizing character of the arms race and its capacity to distort the socio-economic options of States, it believed, could prompt Governments to take decisions in favour of disarmament. Nigeria felt the World Disarmament Campaign in that context should be encouraged and should provide a forum for the free, objective exchange of views in all regions of the world. Senegal, noting particularly the failure of the Committee on Disarmament to make progress, stated that the Campaign, as an instrument for peace, should increase awareness of what was involved in the deadlock and make possible a collective militant effort to exert the necessary pressure on Governments to show more common sense. Mexico was convinced that, because of the Campaign, the voices of the peoples of the world would gain greater persuasive power than had the statements made in the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament. Those voices would contribute, as a result of moral pressure in all countries, to giving concrete expression to the political will to disarm, which the General Assembly had called a decisive element. Ecuador felt that the Campaign was one tangible aspect of follow-up of disarmament resolutions, which had been proliferating without implementation.

Austria and Norway, while supporting the World Disarmament Campaign and recognizing as one of its primary purposes the dissemination of information concerning disarmament, believed that only through free discussion and debate in all parts of the world on the basis of balanced and objective information could the public exercise a positive influence on the attainment of disarmament objectives.

The United States, welcoming the opportunity to discuss the World Disarmament Campaign, reaffirmed its commitment to a truly universal

and objective world-wide discussion on disarmament that would meet the criteria clearly established for the Campaign at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It accordingly urged all countries to promote an unhindered flow of information to all peoples of the world and to permit the widest possible freedom of public expression and assembly on the crucial issues of world peace and disarmament. In that regard, the United States cited a number of reported incidents seeming to indicate, in contrast to ready public access to vast amounts of diverse, relevant information about war and peace and the freedom to demonstrate for disarmament in all open, democratic societies, that in the Soviet Union and other Eastern European States independent peace campaigners had been subjected to intimidation and restraint. It referred also to the existence of multi-sided media and the many public and private institutions freely expressing views on arms control and security issues in the United States and other open societies, and regarded it as unfortunate that that was not the case everywhere. Thus it felt that ensuring adequate access in all regions remained the central, difficult area of the Campaign, and it commended the efforts of the Department for Disarmament Affairs for its dedication in attempting to implement and translate the Campaign's goals into deeds.

Bulgaria informed the Committee of the unanimous support of its public for the World Disarmament Campaign and its goals, and stressed that the anti-nuclear movement had acquired world-wide proportions and was gaining in momentum. In that country alone, a participating non-governmental organization, the Committee of Bulgarian Women, had sponsored over 20,000 meetings and collected 2,350,000 signatures in favour of peace, and Bulgarian groups had taken part in many other international peace movements. Bulgaria stated that such unequivocal calls to preserve peace had led to some pressures on peace movements in Western countries and to attempts to confuse public opinion by pursuing a policy of misinformation about the socialist countries and non-aligned States. That, in its view, was in contradiction to the fundamental principles of the Campaign, as well as to relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It observed that the countries concerned had shown an unwillingness to participate in the Campaign. Within its framework, Bulgaria placed great importance on the concept of collecting signatures on behalf of peace and disarmament. It also felt that the annual report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Campaign could usefully contain information on the more important public actions and events resulting from its mobilizing effect, thereby giving Member States a clearer idea of the support of world public opinion. The Byelorussian SSR also called attention to growing anti-war and anti-missile movements and attached great importance to the World Disarmament Campaign. It voiced strong opposition to any attempt to distort its purposes, emasculate its content or replace serious discussion with attacks on States whose peoples were actively participating in the Campaign and whose Governments heeded their will.

The Soviet Union reviewed in some detail the large number of peace

rallies and mass participation in them in that country in 1983, stating that they reflected the deep concern of the Soviet people at the growing threat of war. Representatives of anti-war organizations from abroad had also visited the USSR and Soviet peace supporters similarly had participated in disarmament activities in other countries. The Soviet Union accordingly wished to assure the Committee that its public did not need to be prompted about the need for disarmament or compelled to take part in the World Disarmament Campaign. While the Campaign was indeed conducted in different ways in different countries, depending on their social and political systems, that should not lead to the unwarranted conclusion—that had been expressed—that rallies and events in the USSR were officially inspired. In closing, the Soviet representative said the Campaign was entirely consonant with the wishes of the Soviet people and with his country's foreign policy.

Romania shared the view, mentioned also in the Secretary-General's report, that the resources allocated thus far were inadequate for the effective implementation of the objectives of the Campaign. It believed that the Secretariat department concerned should have the necessary means to intensify its efforts to achieve the objectives of the Campaign. There might also be closer co-ordination between Campaign activities and those planned for other major events aimed at larger audiences, such as the International Peace Year. Romania felt also that non-governmental organizations, the mass media and schools should play a greater role in mobilizing public opinion in support of disarmament. In concluding, it stated that as funds allocated to the Campaign increased, there must be a broader diversification of activities, greater attention to proposals by States and by persons representing public opinion, and the development of ways for the public to make itself heard in disarmament debates and negotiations.

The first United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign was held during the 1983 Disarmament Week, on 27 October. Either during the Conference or at other times in the course of the year, the following pledges to the Campaign were made:¹⁴

Australia	30 000 Australian dollars
Bangladesh	25 000 taka
Burma	1 500 United States dollars
Canada	100 000 Canadian dollars
Cuba	5 000 Cuban pesos
Czechoslovakia	300 000 Czechoslovak koruny
Democratic Yemen	2 000 United States dollars
Denmark	250 000 Danish kroner
Egypt	40 000 Egyptian pounds
Greece	10 000 United States dollars
India	100 000 United States dollars
Indonesia	5 000 United States dollars
Japan	50 000 United States dollars
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	5 000 Libyan dinars

¹⁴ Pledges made to the World Disarmament Campaign during 1982 are listed in *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. XXI.

Nigeria	10 000 naira
Norway	25 000 United States dollars
Poland	100 000 zlotych
Sri Lanka	5 000 United States dollars
Tunisia	10 000 United States dollars equivalent
Uganda	300 000 Uganda shillings
Viet Nam	50 000 dong

After the pledges had been made, the Conference adopted its Final Act, which stated that the Secretary-General would keep a list of pledges made until 31 March 1984, when it would be issued. The General Assembly subsequently adopted resolution 38/73 D (discussed next) providing, *inter alia*, for a second Pledging Conference.

On 11 November, Bangladesh, Egypt, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Sweden and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "World Disarmament Campaign", which was subsequently also sponsored by Indonesia, Romania and Venezuela. In introducing the draft resolution on 15 November, Mexico reviewed its operative part, in particular pointing out that paragraph 1 took note of the Campaign's activities for 1983, as described in the report of the Secretary-General, while, by paragraphs 2 and 3, the Assembly would express satisfaction at the voluntary contributions made by Member States at the first Pledging Conference and would decide to hold a second one at its thirty-ninth session in order to give others an opportunity to announce their donations. Paragraphs 4 and 5 were intended to ensure that work relating to the Campaign would be as effective as possible by recommending that voluntary contributions not be earmarked for specific activities and requesting the Secretary-General to instruct the United Nations information centres and regional commissions to give wide publicity to the Campaign. Given the absence of any controversial element in the draft resolution, the sponsors hoped it would be adopted by consensus.

Before the vote in the Committee, the Netherlands, in explaining its position, expressed objection to the idea of pledging conferences, both past and future, and said that too much emphasis on such conferences might erroneously suggest that the success of the Campaign depended merely on raising the necessary funds when, in fact, what was needed more was the pledge to an unconditional commitment in no way to impede the unqualified, free flow of information.

Thereafter, on 25 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote.

Following that approval, the USSR explained its understanding of operative paragraph 4 and its implementation to be that, in accordance with the Secretary-General's report and in particular its paragraph 13, the Secretary-General would consult donor countries about concrete measures for the Campaign in their countries which would be financed by their contributions. The German Democratic Republic explained its understanding of operative paragraph 4 to be that the Secretary-General's power to take decisions regarding the Campaign was based on the United Nations Charter, the Final Document of the Tenth Special

Session, particularly the priority tasks which it set out, and United Nations resolutions adopted in order to carry out those tasks, especially with a view to preventing nuclear war and achieving nuclear disarmament. The Federal Republic of Germany, while sharing in the consensus on the draft resolution and recognizing the worthy goals of the Campaign, expressed its reservations concerning operative paragraph 3, providing for another Pledging Conference, in that it doubted whether such a Conference was the best means available to elicit maximum contributions for the Campaign and, more importantly, it held that the objectives of the Campaign depended less on funds than on a free, unencumbered flow of information, especially by countries that still excluded their citizens from sharing freely in the broad information process on political issues.

The General Assembly, on 15 December, adopted the draft resolution, again without a vote, as resolution 38/73 D. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in paragraph 15 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it declared that it was essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation and stressed the importance of mobilizing world public opinion on behalf of disarmament,

Recalling also its resolutions 35/152 I of 12 December 1980, 36/92 C of 9 December 1981 and 37/100 I of 13 December 1982, as well as the reports of the Secretary-General of 17 September 1981, 11 June 1982 and 3 November 1982,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General of 30 August 1983 on the implementation of the programme of activities of the World Disarmament Campaign,

Having also examined the part of the report of the Secretary-General dealing with the activities of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies relating to the programme of activities of the World Disarmament Campaign, as well as the final act of the 1983 United Nations Pledging Conference for the Campaign held on 27 October 1983,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* the implementation of the programme of activities of the World Disarmament Campaign for 1983 as described in the report of the Secretary-General;

2. *Notes also with satisfaction* the voluntary contributions made by Member States to the World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund, prior to and during the 1983 United Nations Pledging Conference for the Campaign;

3. *Decides* that at its thirty-ninth session there should be a second United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign, in order that all those Member States that have not yet announced their voluntary contributions may have an opportunity to do so;

4. *Recommends* that the voluntary contributions made by Member States to the World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund should not be earmarked for specific activities inasmuch as it is most desirable that the Secretary-General may enjoy full freedom to take the decisions he deems fit within the framework of the Campaign previously approved by the General Assembly and in exercise of the powers vested in him in connection with the Campaign;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to instruct the United Nations information centres and regional commissions to give wide publicity to the World Disarmament Campaign and, whenever necessary, to adapt, as far as possible, United Nations information materials into local languages;

6. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session a report covering both the implementation of the programme of activi-

ties of the World Disarmament Campaign by the United Nations system during 1984 and the programme of activities contemplated by the system for 1985;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "World Disarmament Campaign".

A second draft resolution, entitled "World Disarmament Campaign: actions and activities", was submitted by Bulgaria, Mongolia, Romania and Viet Nam on 11 November, and was later also sponsored by the German Democratic Republic. In introducing the draft resolution on 15 November, Bulgaria stated that its provisions were designed to contribute to the successful carrying out of the Campaign, to ensure broad-based participation therein and to initiate within its framework practical actions and activities conducive to the effective attainment of the ultimate goal: the mobilization of world public opinion on behalf of peace and disarmament. After noting that Campaign documentation¹⁵ recognized diverse types of Campaign activities, including the collection of signatures, Bulgaria stated that operative paragraph 2 of the text dealt with the need for ensuring a better flow of accurate information and avoiding the dissemination of false and tendentious information on various disarmament questions, as well as with the actions and activities of the world public in support of peace and disarmament. The thrust of the text was in conformity with the principles of the Campaign and, in the opinion of the sponsors, should be generally acceptable.

On 25 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 88 to 1, with 30 abstentions (Western States and others).

Following the vote, Brazil, which had cast the negative vote, stated that it remained convinced that activities such as collecting signatures did not conform to the function and purpose of the United Nations.

France had abstained in the vote. It explained that it had serious reservations regarding the reference to the collection of signatures at the end of the preamble and did not believe that operative paragraph 2 would promote a truly satisfactory dissemination of information; it felt that the references to accurate or false and tendentious information opened the way to censorship or controversy. The United Kingdom, which also abstained, regretted that a second proposal on the Campaign had been thought essential and felt that operative paragraph 2, which urged Member States to avoid the "dissemination of false and tendentious information", was an open invitation to censorship and posed the question of who would pass judgement. With its tradition of freedom of speech, it would never be party to the suppression of the free exchange of ideas and believed that, on a subject as important as disarmament, every facet should be fully explored and publicly debated.

Australia, which had taken the draft resolution at its face value and had voted in favour, applauded the dissemination of accurate information and believed that no State should disseminate false or tendentious

¹⁵ Particularly documents A/37/548 and A/38/349 and resolution 37/100 H.

information about disarmament issues or, indeed, about any matter. It emphasized, however, that it did not endorse State censorship or centralized control of information available to citizens and strongly favoured freedom of information.

The General Assembly, on 15 December, adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 112 to 1, with 29 abstentions, as resolution 38/73 F. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Aware of the growing public concern at the dangers of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, and its negative social and economic consequences,

Noting with satisfaction the successful beginning of the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign and its positive impact on the mobilization on a large scale of world public opinion on behalf of peace and disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions 36/92 J of 9 December 1981 and 37/100 H of 13 December 1982, as well as the report of the Secretary-General on world-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament,

Welcoming the voluntary contributions made to the World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund to carry out the objectives of the Campaign,

Taking into account the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the programme of activities of the World Disarmament Campaign,

Convinced that the United Nations system, Member States, with respect for their sovereign rights, and other bodies, in particular non-governmental organizations, all have their role to play in achieving the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign,

Taking into account the great number of various activities carried out within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign, including action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament,

1. *Reaffirms* the usefulness of further carrying out actions and activities which are an important manifestation of the will of world public opinion and which contribute effectively to the achievement of the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign and thus to the creation of a favourable climate for making progress in the field of disarmament with a view to achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

2. *Invites once again* Member States to co-operate with the United Nations to ensure a better flow of accurate information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament as well as actions and activities of the world public in support of peace and disarmament, and to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report annually to the General Assembly on the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution.

On 11 November, Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay submitted a draft resolution entitled "Peace and disarmament movements", which was subsequently also sponsored by the Bahamas, Costa Rica, the Netherlands, Portugal and Singapore. In introducing the draft resolution on 17 November, the United States said that the sponsors were convinced that a well-informed discussion of all points of view could build confidence and thus contribute to arms limitation. As secrecy created mistrust and wars had resulted from lack of communication, the draft resolution sought to ensure that citizens of all nations had the freedom to make well-informed

choices on the vital questions surrounding disarmament. The sponsors viewed the proposal as a follow-up to the previous year's resolutions 37/100 I and J on the World Disarmament Campaign.

By the draft resolution,¹⁶ the General Assembly would call upon States to permit their citizens free public expression of their own views on disarmament and the free exchange of such views between their citizens and the Secretary-General, express regret that some groups had had difficulty in engaging in such activities, and encourage States and non-governmental organizations to provide the Secretary-General with information pertinent to the monitoring of compliance with commitments to free debate on disarmament questions.

On 21 November, Czechoslovakia submitted amendments to the draft resolution consisting of the addition of a new first preambular paragraph, by which the Assembly would emphasize that Governments should take into account the "will of the peoples" as reflected by the mass movements for the prevention of nuclear war and for nuclear disarmament, and a new operative paragraph 1, by which it would urge Governments of nuclear-weapon and other militarily significant States to harmonize their policies with the demands of such movements. On 23 November, the United States submitted sub-amendments to those amendments which referred to the "wishes of all people concerned", rather than the will of mass movements, being taken into account by Governments and, in operative paragraph 1, urged Governments, especially of militarily significant States, to redouble their efforts to achieve general disarmament and prevent nuclear and any other type of war.

On 23 November, the original and subsequent sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution in which they deleted references to difficulties being encountered in connection with the subject activities. Thereafter, on 29 November, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria submitted amendments to the revised draft resolution, both further modifying operative paragraph 1.

On 30 November, the United States, on behalf of the sponsors, stated that their conviction had not changed, but that their efforts and those of other interested delegations to find consensus language had failed, and that the latest proposals would reflect a significant change in the focus and basic objective of the draft resolution. Therefore, they had decided, with regret, to withdraw it.

Disarmament Week

In 1978, the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament proclaimed the week beginning 24 October, the day of the foundation of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament. Accordingly, Disarmament Week has been commemorated every year since then, as an appropriate time to increase public awareness of the dangers of the arms race, particularly the nuclear

¹⁶ A/38/641, paras. 24 to 30.

arms race, mobilize public opinion and create an atmosphere conducive to progress in disarmament.

In 1983, in accordance with resolution 37/78 D of 9 December 1982, the Secretary-General reported replies received from 17 Governments and relevant departments of the Secretariat, as well as United Nations information centres, specialized agencies, research institutes and international non-governmental organizations concerning their activities undertaken to promote the objectives of Disarmament Week 1983.¹⁷

In the First Committee, the observance of Disarmament Week 1983, held on 24 October,¹⁸ was marked by statements by the President of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General and representatives of the five regional groups.

In his statement, the President of the General Assembly emphasized that Disarmament Week was being observed at a time when the international situation was becoming increasingly threatening, when the search for absolute security by the great Powers served only to increase their sense of insecurity and when the nuclear arms arsenals posed a general threat to the very survival of mankind. He stated that countries must stop reacting to other societies in a military manner, before it was too late. He asked if mankind was so bankrupt intellectually that it had nothing better to rely on for peace than the so-called balance of terror, and observed that the Charter of the United Nations set out as the first of its purposes the maintenance of international peace and security. The President called for bold, imaginative steps to reduce tensions, to improve international relations, to promote development as well as international economic co-operation and to turn mankind away from the precipice. He observed that the World Disarmament Campaign, still in its early stages, was already attracting public attention to the nature of the international machinery, whether bilateral or multilateral, which persistently failed to achieve progress for a safer future. A decisive element in restoring public confidence in an effective United Nations would be a demonstration in the deliberations of the First Committee and in the multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in 1984 that common interests could be identified, compromises could be made and agreements could be reached to set the international community on the road towards disarmament. The foremost task was to remove the threat of nuclear war and to ensure the survival of mankind and, at the same time, pursue negotiations on measures of disarmament with greater imagination. The President concluded by making an appeal for a rededication to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter to save succeeding generations from the danger of a nuclear war.

The Secretary-General urged Governments and peoples of Member States to concentrate on the urgent need to make a start in reducing the increasingly vast and sophisticated arsenals of armaments. He noted that

¹⁷ A/38/144.

¹⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, First Committee, 11th meeting.*

the two major nuclear Powers were holding bilateral talks under the oppressive shadow of great tension and profound disagreements; he pointed out that the importance of an equitable and reliable agreement designed to reduce nuclear arsenals transcended the importance of such disagreements. The Secretary-General specifically called on the Soviet Union and the United States to give serious thought to the adoption of provisional measures which would give more time for negotiations to achieve positive results. With regard to strategic armaments, both parties should consider creating less dangerous and more stable systems, while pursuing the ultimate objective of eliminating all nuclear arms. He added that the most important thing for the time being was the continuation of the negotiations. On the other hand, he observed, the broad forum of the Conference on Disarmament provided opportunities for progress in limiting the threat posed by armaments and the enormous burden they represented. The Secretary-General urged continued, determined efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to reach agreement on the prohibition of use of chemical and radiological weapons and nuclear testing, as well as to establish a peaceful régime for outer space. He concluded by appealing to Member States to bear in mind the considerable progress which could be made in disarmament through a patient and constructive dialogue, in strict compliance with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

The representative of Senegal, speaking as Chairman of the Group of African States, said the promotion of disarmament was a particularly urgent matter for Africans, not only because of the constant threat of a nuclear holocaust, but also because they witnessed the squandering of enormous resources which could have eradicated, several times over, disease, hunger and ignorance from the third world. Emerging, four decades earlier, from the nightmare of war, mankind had hoped that it would be able in the future to prevent the outbreak of a new war by building a new system of international relations based on confidence, co-operation and solidarity, but justice and peace had become a reality for only a small number of countries. He believed that the nuclear Powers had a decisive role to play in eliminating the threat of South Africa's nuclear capability, and that they should enter into specific binding commitments, guarantee observance of the non-nuclear status of Africa and refrain from transferring any nuclear technology to South Africa. He appealed to national and world public opinion to create militant political forces capable of bringing the necessary pressure to bear on the various Governments to induce them to realize finally that there was no alternative to disarmament and peace.

The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, speaking on behalf of the Group of Asian States, said that nations celebrated Disarmament Week with regret and bitterness, as no progress had been achieved. Noting that Disarmament Week had made public opinion in different parts of the world more sensitive to the arms race and nuclear weapons, he mentioned two important issues, closely related to disarmament, which constituted a matter of global concern: the relationship of disarm-

ament to development and to international security. In conclusion, he called for the reaffirmation of full support to the United Nations to enable it to carry out its difficult tasks.

Speaking as Chairman of the Group of Eastern European States, the representative of the Byelorussian SSR observed that Disarmament Week coincided with the fortieth anniversary of the Moscow Conference, attended by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom, which recognized the need to establish a universal organization for the maintenance of international peace and security: the United Nations. In spite of certain achievements since then in the limitation of the nuclear arms race, military expenditures were higher than at the time of the Second World War. He did not want Disarmament Week to be restricted to the customary ritual speeches, but instead to become a powerful stimulus to strengthen peace, to avert the danger of nuclear war and to achieve agreements on real measures of nuclear and conventional disarmament, up to and including general and complete disarmament. He added that the World Disarmament Campaign, in which the peoples of the world were taking part ever more energetically, must play a part in that endeavour. He recalled that the socialist States had submitted for consideration a complete set of constructive proposals, the acceptance of which would, in his opinion, amount to the renunciation of the use of either nuclear or conventional weapons by any State against any other State. The socialist States believed that all peoples should be freed of the danger of a nuclear disaster and have an opportunity to devote their efforts to creative purposes, in conditions of undisturbed peace.

The representative of El Salvador, speaking as Chairman of the Group of Latin American States, said the deteriorating international situation made it urgent that attention be given to disarmament. The Latin American States fully supported disarmament efforts at all levels, including conventional weapons, intermediate-range missiles, long-range nuclear forces and the use of arms in outer space. He noted that the figures on world-wide military expenditures were astronomical and that the arms race could not be dissociated from its harmful effects on the economic and social development of States. The trend must be reversed. He pointed to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its Protocols as proof of Latin America's concern about the threat of atomic weapons. He concluded by stating that Latin America gave its support to disarmament, applauded initiatives to mobilize global public opinion in the World Disarmament Campaign, and trusted that common sense would prevail.

Speaking as Chairman of the Group of Western European and Other States, the representative of France recalled that Disarmament Week was a response to the legitimate concern for involving the peoples of Member States in efforts to promote disarmament. While it was primarily for Governments to carry on a determined quest for significant progress in that field, the difficulty of the endeavour and the magnitude of the stakes made it quite right that their efforts should be accompanied by a flow of information to their populations in order to make them more aware of what was happening. He was convinced that the activities

in connection with Disarmament Week would help unite the entire international community in the search for ways to reduce military arsenals. He concluded by reaffirming the support of the Group of Western European and Other States for all efforts to achieve genuine disarmament in a more harmonious and united world.

On 26 October, the traditional Disarmament Week NGO Forum, sponsored by the Department for Disarmament Affairs and the Department of Public Information, was held in the form of a panel discussion on the subject "The prospects of disarmament in the 1980s". The panelists included Ambassador Louis G. Fields, representative of the United States to the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva; Ambassador Amre M. Moussa, Deputy Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations; Ambassador Vladimir F. Petrovsky, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union; and Mrs. Daniela Szokoloczi de Alcala, Counsellor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela. Invitations had been sent to more than 2,000 non-governmental organizations and individuals around the world.

Also as elements of the observance of Disarmament Week, the Department for Disarmament Affairs, in co-operation with the United Nations *Ad Hoc* Internship Programme, held a one-day seminar on disarmament for all interns then at Headquarters; staff members of the Department, upon invitation, addressed non-governmental organizations in a number of countries on disarmament questions; and the Department of Public Information sponsored radio programmes in various locations.

During the general debate in the First Committee, attention was also given to Disarmament Week.

The representative of Mongolia noted that Disarmament Week had become a world-wide action aimed at the mobilization of world public opinion in support of halting and reversing the arms race—especially the nuclear arms race—in all its aspects. Disarmament Week represented an effort to increase public awareness of the growing danger of nuclear war. He expressed appreciation to the Department for Disarmament Affairs for preparing a broad report on the activities of Governments, international governmental and non-governmental organizations in holding Disarmament Week.¹⁹

The representative of UNESCO said that his organization continued to organize special activities for Disarmament Week, such as an exhibit of disarmament-related materials, as it had done since 1978.

The Dominican Republic noted that Disarmament Week was another manifestation of the efforts to increase the awareness of mankind regarding the dangers of the arms race and arms buildup. The Byelorussian SSR observed that the 1983 Disarmament Week was marked by a powerful upsurge in anti-war activity, backed by public opinion through mass demonstrations. Ireland, in commenting upon the subject, found it relevant to ask why so little progress had been achieved over the previous four decades in curbing the arms race.

¹⁹ A/38/144.

A draft resolution entitled "Disarmament Week" was submitted by Mongolia on 11 November. On 17 November, a revised draft resolution was submitted by Afghanistan, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, the Ukrainian SSR and Viet Nam, in which the word "anti-missile" was replaced by "anti-nuclear" in the third preambular paragraph (see below). The revised draft resolution was subsequently also sponsored by India and Mozambique. In introducing the revised draft on 17 November, Mongolia said it represented a follow-up measure to the decisions taken by the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and was formulated along the same lines as those previously adopted.

On 25 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 107 to none, with 13 abstentions.

In connection with the voting in the Committee, Canada stated it had voted in favour because it strongly supported Disarmament Week. Canada also expected that those agencies involved in implementing operative paragraph 4 would take particular care to remain within their mandates. Australia, unable to support the draft resolution, stated it regretted the inclusion of operative paragraph 4, which called on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in particular, to undertake activities which, Australia believed, were outside the scope of its statute. France, abstaining in the vote, also had serious reservations on that paragraph since it invited the specialized agencies to disseminate information on the consequences of the arms race. France believed that would be contrary to the reasonable balance of responsibilities and competence established within the United Nations system.

The General Assembly²⁰ on 20 December adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 136 to none, with 12 abstentions, as resolution 38/183 L. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Gravely concerned over the escalating arms race,

Emphasizing the urgent need for and the importance of wide and continued mobilization of world public opinion in support of halting and reversing the arms race, especially the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects,

Mindful of the world-wide mass anti-war and anti-nuclear movement,

Noting with satisfaction the broad and active support by Governments and international and national organizations of the decision taken by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, regarding the proclamation of the week starting 24 October, the day of the foundation of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament,

Recalling the recommendations concerning the World Disarmament Campaign contained in annex V to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, in particular the recommendation that, in view of the fact that Disarmament Week has played a useful role

²⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings, 103rd meeting.*

in fostering the objectives of disarmament, the week starting 24 October should continue to be widely observed as Disarmament Week,

Recalling also its resolutions 33/71 D of 14 December 1978, 34/83 I of 11 December 1979 and 37/78 D of 9 December 1982,

1. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the report of the Secretary-General on the follow-up measures undertaken by governmental and non-governmental organizations in holding Disarmament Week;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to all States and international and national governmental and non-governmental organizations for their energetic support of and active participation in Disarmament Week;

3. *Invites* all States, in carrying out appropriate measures at the local level on the occasion of Disarmament Week, to take into account the elements of the model programme for Disarmament Week, prepared by the Secretary-General;

4. *Also invites* the relevant specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency to intensify activities, within their areas of competence, to disseminate information on the consequences of the arms race and requests them to inform the Secretary-General accordingly;

5. *Requests* Governments, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 33/71 D, to inform the Secretary-General of activities undertaken to promote the objectives of Disarmament Week;

6. *Invites* international non-governmental organizations to take an active part in Disarmament Week and to inform the Secretary-General of the activities undertaken;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 33/71 D, to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session a report containing the information referred to in paragraph 7 of resolution 37/78 D, as well as paragraphs 4 to 6 above.

Information on military capabilities

Under the agenda item entitled "General and complete disarmament", the General Assembly had before it the Secretary-General's report,²¹ requested by resolution 37/99 G, containing 16 replies²² of Member States communicating their views and proposals concerning additional measures to facilitate the provision of objective information on, and objective assessments of, military capabilities and providing preliminary ideas on the possible role of the United Nations in that context. The replies reflected two general positions. One emphasized the importance of exchanging information between States to build confidence, to contribute to studies, research and analysis, to aid in reaching agreements in such areas as the reduction of military budgets and to help ensure better-informed public opinion through an increased availability of quality data. The other regarded the absence of political will as the major problem, and the collection and exchange of information as of value only in the context of the disarmament process or specific disarmament agreements. According to the second view, emphasis on data could divert attention from practical disarmament problems or be used as a pre-condition for negotiation. Thus the responses indicated that such measures might contribute to both the information and study processes, the sub-

²¹ A/38/368 and Add.1 and 2.

²² The reply of the Federal Republic of Germany was on behalf of the 10 member States of the European Community.

ject of this part of *The Yearbook*, but were also related to such considerations as confidence-building, trust and political will, and military expenditures and regional questions, dealt with mainly in early chapters of parts one and two and in chapters XVII and XVIII.

In the First Committee, Austria, whose initiative had led to the adoption of resolution 37/99 G, stated that inadequate information on the military strength of States had been a major cause of mistrust, fear and tension in international relations and a significant reason for the continuation of the arms buildup and the stagnation of disarmament efforts. In the absence of reliable information, Governments had long tended to overestimate the military strength of potential adversaries and to carry out arms programmes on the basis of worst-case estimates, thus setting a vicious circle in motion. Portugal, among others holding a similar position, felt that experience had demonstrated that only by raising the level of confidence among States, through the increased visibility of their military activities, could one hope to achieve disarmament objectives. Denmark stressed that confidence among States was essential if progress was to be achieved in arms control and disarmament negotiations.

Several States, including the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, felt that the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe should seek agreement on a set of confidence- and security-building measures applicable to the whole of Europe and designed to create more transparency and predictability in the military field. The Federal Republic of Germany stated that transparency in military conduct must be at the centre of confidence-building and, in that regard, felt the efforts of the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission to render military budgets more comparable and their reduction verifiable merited praise. Ecuador supported the Federal Republic of Germany's appeals for measures to contribute to mutual trust, particularly for greater transparency in the military behaviour of both the super-Powers. The Sudan also welcomed the Federal Republic's comments on confidence-building measures. The United States observed that it had proposed specific confidence-building measures, such as the pre-notification of ballistic missile launchings and major military exercises, and had suggested means of improving communications between its Government and that of the USSR in a crisis.

Austria stated that the standardized international reporting of military expenditures could contribute to reliable information on military matters, and that the idea of an international satellite-monitoring agency had the potential of providing objective information on security matters. Greece, speaking on behalf of the 10 members of the European Community, welcomed the Assembly's acknowledgement of the importance of a unified system of communication and comparability of military expenses, regarding it as an important confidence-building measure which could improve the climate for disarmament.

Austria supported the activities of the United Nations in the dissemination of information on disarmament, mentioning the studies which had proved to be a useful tool for clarifying specific aspects of the arms

race and disarmament, for strengthening public support for disarmament measures and for facilitating negotiations. It drew attention to the fact that much of the work of the Secretariat, such as in *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* project, focused on activities of the Organization, while facts and data on the arms race usually came from a variety of governmental and non-governmental sources. It supported all those activities but believed that the United Nations itself should be developed to become a source of objective data on security-related issues. In referring to the World Disarmament Campaign and the role of public opinion, Austria stated that it was only through free discussion and debate on the basis of balanced and objective information that the public could exercise a positive influence on efforts to attain disarmament goals. The success of the Campaign would therefore be directly commensurate with the amount and quality of information available.

The USSR held the view that mistrust and suspicion among States were generated by the policies of certain circles that desired to act from a position of strength and by their attempts to place the arms race in ever newer and more dangerous orbits, rather than by a lack of transparency. It felt that to claim, in those conditions, that an increase in the volume of information about armed forces and armaments could build confidence would be a delusion. The absence of political will to stop the arms race and reluctance to seek mutually acceptable agreements on the basis of equality and equal security could not be remedied by any flow of data on arms and armed forces, studies on the comparability of military information or any other such activities. The Byelorussian SSR referred to the proposed Soviet programme of peace for the 1980s, and stressed that it mentioned a series of confidence-building measures. Those included, in particular, advance announcements with regard to military exercises not only by land forces, as had already been agreed, but also by naval and air forces, and to major troop movements. The programme also proposed a substantial expansion of the zone in which such confidence-building measures would apply, that is, to all of the European part of the USSR, if there were a similar expansion of the zone for the Western countries as well.

Czechoslovakia shared the view that confidence-building measures should promote the solving of disarmament problems. It recalled that the Prague Political Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty²³ had stated that easing the threat of war required the creation of a climate of trust involving, *inter alia*, political dialogue, measures in the economic and military fields, the dissemination of accurate information, and renunciation of aspirations to great-Power status and of attempts to teach others how to live. That approach, it stated, would guide its future work on confidence-building. Romania noted that mobilization, objective information and world public opinion could have a positive effect on efforts to halt the arms race, and felt that the World Disarmament Campaign should make a greater contribution to an awakening of public

²³ A/38/67-S/15556 and Corr.1.

opinion to the real situation concerning both arms and disarmament negotiations.

On 11 November, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Colombia, Ecuador, France, Indonesia, Ireland, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, the Sudan and Sweden submitted a draft resolution entitled "Measures to provide objective information on military capabilities", which was later also sponsored by Costa Rica and the Federal Republic of Germany. In introducing the draft resolution on 9 November, the representative of Austria said that its preambular part set out the motives underlying the proposal, including a reference to the relevant provision—paragraph 105—of the Final Document of the Assembly's 1978 special session devoted to disarmament. He went on to state that operative paragraph 1 took note of the report of the Secretary-General; operative paragraph 2 called once more upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant ones, to consider additional measures to facilitate objective information on, and assessments of, military capabilities; and operative paragraph 3 again invited Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views and proposals. By operative paragraph 4 the Assembly would request the Secretary-General to ask the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies to consider the modalities of further studying the question. In that context, he recalled that the Advisory Board was also the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), which had already carried out relevant work. The sponsors accordingly considered it appropriate for the Board to suggest how to proceed with measures to provide objective information. The last operative paragraph requested the Secretary-General to report to the Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

On 25 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 77 to none, with 17 abstentions.

Following the vote, the USSR explained its abstention, stating that during the disarmament process the exchange of information would be desirable and that it would be possible in a general climate of international confidence. That had been its experience in preparing and concluding disarmament agreements. The only condition, for the USSR, was that such an exchange be directly linked to concrete disarmament measures and not be some sort of separate, preliminary step, as in fact was envisaged in the draft resolution. India, in explaining its abstention, considered that progress in disarmament was a matter of the exercise of political will by the major Powers and that a lack of progress could not be attributed to the lack of information on military expenditures or to the absence of an adequate format for collecting such information.

Costa Rica later stated that if it had been present it would have voted in favour. It supported the text as a whole and, in particular, the last preambular paragraph on the building of confidence, which it considered necessary for the success of any disarmament negotiations.

The General Assembly, on 20 December, adopted the draft resolu-

tion by a recorded vote of 119 to none, with 21 abstentions, as resolution 38/188 C. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 37/99 G of 13 December 1982,

Deeply concerned about the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security and the deplorable waste of human and material resources for military purposes,

Recalling paragraph 105 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which encourages Member States to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament, to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the arms race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Noting that misperceptions of the military capabilities and the intentions of potential adversaries, which could be caused, *inter alia*, by the lack of objective information, could induce States to undertake armaments programmes leading to the acceleration of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and to heightened international tensions,

Aware that objective information on the military capabilities, in particular among nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, could contribute to the building of confidence among States and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements and, thereby, help to halt and reverse the arms race,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General;

2. *Calls once more upon* all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, to consider additional measures to facilitate the provision of objective information on, as well as objective assessments of, military capabilities;

3. *Invites* all States that have not communicated to the Secretary-General their views and proposals concerning such measures to do so as soon as possible, and those States that have already communicated such views and proposals to supplement them, as appropriate;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ask the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies to consider the modalities of studying the question of measures to facilitate objective information on, and objective assessments of, military capabilities, in particular among nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States;

5. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session on the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution.

Conclusion

Activities contributing to the World Disarmament Campaign continued to grow in all respects—number, variety, organizations involved, geographical reach—as it entered into its second year of implementation, during 1983. Moreover, Disarmament Week, as an event fostering the objectives of disarmament, was increasingly associated with the Campaign. In 1983, the first formal United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign was convened during that week. The General Assembly, by its resolution on Disarmament Week, expressed satisfaction with the widespread support shown for it and encouraged the continuation of its observance.

The programme of activities associated directly with the purposes of the Campaign under United Nations auspices—to inform, to educate and

to generate understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament – was universally regarded by the General Assembly as having been carried out satisfactorily, as indicated by its consensus adoption of resolution 38/73 D on the implementation of the Campaign. By that resolution, the Assembly also decided to hold a second Pledging Conference during its thirty-ninth session, in 1984.

In addition to the recognition of the value of specific, planned activities, there emerged an increased acknowledgement also of the effectiveness of the role of public opinion in creating a climate favourable to progress in disarmament and of the importance of having reliable information in that connection. That need, with regard to the arms race and disarmament, was recognized in resolution 38/73 F on actions and activities in connection with the Campaign, by which the Assembly invited Member States to co-operate with the United Nations to ensure a better flow of accurate information.

Separate from the Campaign, but associated with recognition of a requirement for both Governments and the public to have objective information also on military capabilities, was resolution 38/188 C, intended to foster enhanced mutual understanding, to contribute to confidence-building, to facilitate relevant research and analysis for various uses and to add to objective information accessible to the public.

While not every aspect of the World Disarmament Campaign and of other relevant information activities has so far met with unqualified endorsement from all quarters, the continuing doubts focus on such considerations as the feasibility of their universal implementation and whether they are of practical value, and not on matters of principle or objectives. Accordingly, trends witnessed in 1983 in the growth of the World Disarmament Campaign and in efforts to enhance other relevant information activities on a global scale may be expected to continue as long as the questions of the arms race and disarmament figure as prominent concerns of Governments and peoples.

CHAPTER XXII

Work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

Introduction

THE ADVISORY BOARD ON DISARMAMENT STUDIES was initially established following a decision taken by the General Assembly at its tenth special session in 1978, as a group of eminent persons to advise the Secretary-General on studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.¹ The initial members served until the expiration of the term of office of the then Secretary-General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, and, as a result, the Board did not meet during 1982.

During the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, in 1982, proposals for possible future activities of the Advisory Board were made by Norway² and Turkey.³ However, as was the case with other substantive items on the agenda, the Assembly was unable either to discuss the subject of the Advisory Board at that special session or to take any decision on its future role.

Later in the year, at its thirty-seventh session, the General Assembly, after consideration of a note of the Secretary-General,⁴ adopted resolution 37/99 K. By section III of that resolution, it requested the Secretary-General to revive the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and to entrust it with the functions set out in his note, taking into account the provisions of section IV of the resolution. The Advisory Board was revived with the following functions:

(a) To advise the Secretary-General on various aspects of studies and research in the area of arms limitation and disarmament carried out under the auspices of the United Nations or institutions within the United Nations system, in particular on the integration of a programme of such studies with a comprehensive programme of disarmament, once this has been established;

(b) To serve as the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR);

(c) To advise the Secretary-General on the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign;

¹ For details regarding the establishment of the Board, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. XXV; for descriptions of its work and status in the intervening years, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, chap. XXII; vol. 5: 1980, chap. XXI; vol. 6: 1981, chap. XX; and vol. 7: 1982, chap. XXIII.

² A/S-12/AC.1/32.

³ A/S-12/AC.1/54.

⁴ A/37/550.

(d) At the specific invitation of the Secretary-General, to provide him with advice on other matters within the area of disarmament and arms limitation.⁵

Sessions of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1983

The Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, as revived by the Secretary-General, was composed with a new membership and entrusted with the additional functions set out above.

The composition of the Advisory Board for 1983 is set out in annex I to this chapter. The Board held its eighth and ninth sessions at United Nations Headquarters, in New York, from 6 to 13 September and from 12 to 16 December 1983, respectively. In accordance with a decision taken by the Board that, in principle, the chairmanship should rotate on an annual basis, Ambassador O. Adeniji of Nigeria served as the Board's Chairman for its 1983 sessions.

Those sessions of the Board were devoted mainly to the consideration of: (a) United Nations studies on disarmament, (b) the work and statute of UNIDIR, and (c) the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign.

United Nations studies on disarmament

The Board reaffirmed that the main purposes of disarmament studies remained as had previously been identified, that is, to assist in ongoing negotiations, determine possible new areas of negotiations or promote public awareness of the problems involved. The Board also discussed areas which studies might usefully cover in the light of those purposes. While the fact that the General Assembly had not yet been able to adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament was considered to impede the formulation of a programme of studies with which it would be integrated, on the other hand, it was seen as creating an opportunity for the Board by obliging it to advise on individual proposals. The Board agreed to make recommendations for a study on the question of deterrence, to be carried out by a group of experts under United Nations auspices. The precise title and the modalities of the study, it was also agreed, would be further discussed at the next session of the Board, in 1984.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

While meeting for the first time in its function as Board of Trustees of UNIDIR, the Advisory Board, in 1983, discussed and approved the report of the Director on the work of the Institute for submission to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

⁵ A/38/467; the Secretary-General's 1983 report on the Advisory Board contained necessary reformulations of the language of his note of the previous year.

Following a thorough discussion of the considerations that should guide the research work of the Institute, the Board identified two categories of possible work in particular: (a) in-depth research to be undertaken by qualified specialists in a given area, aiming at assisting in ongoing negotiations and identifying possible new areas for negotiations; and (b) information papers which would not be in-depth studies, but would serve a useful purpose as background information for delegations taking part in United Nations deliberative bodies, as well as for the public at large. The work of UNIDIR during 1983 is described in annex II to this chapter, the text of which was contributed by the Institute.

The Board considered UNIDIR's proposed research programme for 1984-1985 and decided that the ongoing research projects should be continued and certain new ones undertaken, as proposed.

The Board agreed that a study should be carried out on the conditions and possibilities for negotiating reductions and limitations of intercontinental strategic nuclear-weapons categories, including the possibility of merging negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. In that context, the Board felt it to be worthwhile to study also the possibility of broadening the scope of negotiations so as to embrace tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons.

In considering the financing of UNIDIR's activities, the Board was of the opinion that they should be financed partly from the regular budget of the United Nations, as far as basic operating and administrative costs were concerned, and partly from voluntary contributions and special purpose grants which, it envisaged, should cover the main study programme. That position was reflected in the draft statute of UNIDIR which the Board prepared in pursuance of resolution 37/99 K, part IV, for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session. The draft statute was transmitted to the General Assembly as an annex to the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Board.⁶ Thereupon Norway submitted a draft resolution to the First Committee⁷ by which the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, have approved the draft statute of the Institute. The First Committee, however, in the light of observations made by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, agreed that the draft statute should be returned to the Board of Trustees with the request that it spell out the meaning of the provisions of the statute, so that the Assembly could take a decision on it at its next regular session, in 1984. On 20 December, the General Assembly adopted decision 447 to that effect.

That decision reads as follows:

Draft statute of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

At its 103rd plenary meeting, on 20 December 1983, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, decided that the draft statute of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research should be returned to the Board of Trustees of the In-

⁶ See footnote 5.

⁷ See A/38/640, paras. 9 to 11.

stitute with a request that the Board spell out the meaning of the provisions of the draft statute, so that the General Assembly could take a decision on the draft statute at its thirty-ninth session.

Implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign

In accordance with the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly⁸ and pursuant to resolution 37/100 I, the Board discussed the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign at its 1983 sessions.

The Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs introduced the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the programme of activities of the World Disarmament Campaign.⁹ The Board noted that its relevant views, as well as its support for the Campaign and appreciation for the manner in which it was being carried out, would be expressed in the Secretary-General's report on its work. The Board believed that the effectiveness of the Campaign should be carefully appraised, including its use of printed material. The Board emphasized that the Campaign should be carried out in a factual, balanced and objective manner in all regions of the world, and that, in the light of its educational function, the language of the publications used should be easy to comprehend.

The Board held it desirable that the contributions to the Campaign should not be earmarked for specific purposes, so that they could be allocated to any appropriate use within its framework. Selectivity in the approach of the Campaign and the publication of written materials in other languages, besides the official languages of the United Nations, were called for. Several members recommended the adjustment of activities to specific situations and audiences, and underlined the importance of increased contacts with the media.

To help it in formulating its views on the implementation of the Campaign, the Board invited the Non-governmental Organizations (NGO) Committee on Disarmament at United Nations Headquarters, the Special NGO Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and the World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA) to send representatives to meet with the Board. The New York NGO Committee on Disarmament and WFUNA were present at the Board's December meeting and a statement was received from the Geneva Committee.

The Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs opened the exchange of views with a statement on the implementation of the Campaign from the perspective of the United Nations, saying that it focused to a very large and growing extent on the non-governmental organizations. The representatives of those organizations made detailed statements on their work in connection with the Campaign and expressed their opinions on the manner in which it was being and might be conducted.

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes*, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32.

⁹ A/38/349.

The Board was especially interested in the following five questions:

(a) How the non-governmental organizations could be made to feel an integral part of the Campaign;

(b) How the Campaign's policy was determined and how it was implemented;

(c) What the overall thrust of the Campaign was;

(d) How States could be encouraged to contribute significantly to it;

(e) How its three constituencies (the United Nations, Member States and non-governmental organizations) could strengthen each other's efforts.

The Geneva and New York NGO Committees further submitted a memorandum in which they recommended, among other things, that the number of their members participating in the exchange of views with the Advisory Board be a minimum of two or three from each of the two NGO Committees, in order to provide the Board with as broad and representative a view of their activities and concerns as possible.

Many Board members voiced their recognition of the important role of the non-governmental organizations in the implementation of the Campaign. However, it was the opinion of the Board that only representatives of the co-ordinating bodies should be invited, that only one or, at the most, two persons from each one of them should appear before it and that they should be in a position to make a balanced and objective presentation of the views of their constituencies. Their participation would be strictly limited to an exchange on the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign.

As it had done on previous occasions, the Board discussed its mandate and functions in a more general framework. It was suggested that the Advisory Board should assume a wider role in advising the Secretary-General on the future of disarmament. This led to an exchange of views on the extent to which it would be appropriate for the Board to make such observations to the Secretary-General. The Board decided to devote in the future one day of each session to a general discussion of the situation in the area of disarmament.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1983

During the debate in the First Committee,¹⁰ a number of member States, including Egypt, France, Norway and the United Republic of Cameroon, welcomed the revival of the Advisory Board. The Federal Republic of Germany felt that the Board should be given sufficient opportunity to review the study proposals and to evaluate them in relation to other concurrent study plans. In a similar fashion, the United Kingdom raised the

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, First Committee, 3rd to 35th and 40th and 41st meetings, and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.*

question of how one could note satisfaction at the revival of the Board, while at the same time ignoring one of its prime functions, i.e., to give consideration to the merits of proposals for United Nations studies. The United Kingdom felt it would be more logical and more effective if sponsors of studies were to seek the views of Member States and of the Advisory Board before the General Assembly was asked to vote on their proposals. The United Kingdom expressed the hope that some agreement could be reached to follow such a procedure before further studies were requested. A proposal was actually submitted by Austria (discussed in chapter XXI above), by which the Advisory Board was requested to consider the modalities of studying the question of measures to facilitate objective information on, and objective assessments of, military capabilities, in particular among nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States. That constituted the first instance in which the General Assembly asked for the advice of the Board *before* it decided that a particular study should be undertaken, a procedure the Board has consistently advocated. The Soviet Union, however, in commenting on the Austrian initiative, did not see any reason why the Advisory Board should be involved in such matters.

On 11 November, Algeria, Argentina, Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies", which was subsequently also sponsored by the Federal Republic of Germany, Mali and the United Kingdom. By the draft, the General Assembly, expressing its satisfaction that the Secretary-General had revived the Advisory Board and taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on its activities in 1983, would request the Secretary-General to report annually to the General Assembly on its work. In introducing the draft resolution on 17 November, the representative of Mexico summarized the developments concerning the Board since 1978 and expressed the expectation that the Assembly would be able to approve the draft resolution by consensus.

The draft resolution was approved by the First Committee on 21 November, without a vote. On 20 December,¹¹ the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 38/183 O. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 124 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Recalling further its resolution 37/99 K of 13 December 1982, by section III of which it requested the Secretary-General to revive the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies,

1. *Expresses* its satisfaction that the Secretary-General has revived the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies;

2. *Takes note* with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Advisory Board in 1983;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report annually to the General Assembly on the work of the Advisory Board.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 103rd meeting.

The General Assembly's decision, taken the same day, to return the draft statute of UNIDIR to the Advisory Board for clarification is dealt with above, in the section on the Advisory Board.

Conclusion

The revival of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies reflected the desire of Member States to maintain a comprehensive and long-term approach to the United Nations study activities in the field of disarmament and arms limitation. Although it is difficult for the Board to formulate a study programme in the absence of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, with which it ideally should be integrated, this also creates the obligation and the opportunity for the Board to advise on individual proposals, with a view to avoiding duplication and thus lending a solid rationale to an otherwise unstructured programme of studies.

The additional designation of the Board as the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR seems to have increased the potential of the Board to play a role in enhancing the effectiveness of the study programme of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. By providing comprehensive and precise guidance for the research activities to be undertaken by the Institute, the Board can help ensure that disarmament research within the United Nations system is conducted in a co-ordinated and efficient way. It has to be kept in mind, however, that there is a basic difference between the body's function as the Advisory Board and that as the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR. Whereas the Board *recommends* to the Secretary-General that a particular study should be undertaken by a United Nations expert group, it *decides* on studies to be undertaken by UNIDIR.

The mandate of the Board has also been broadened by adding to it the tasks of advising the Secretary-General on the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign and—at a specific request—on other matters within the area of disarmament and arms limitation.

ANNEX I

Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies*

Oluyemi Adeniji, Ambassador, Ministry of External Affairs, Nigeria

Hadj Benabdelkader Azzout, Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algeria

Oleg N. Bykov, Deputy Director, Institute for World Economy and International Relations of the Academy of Sciences, USSR

James E. Dougherty, Professor of Politics, Saint Joseph's University, Philadelphia, United States

Omran El-Shafei, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt

Constantin Ene, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romania

* Inclusion of a name does not necessarily indicate membership on the Board for the entire year.

Edgar Faure, Member of the French Academy and Member of the Senate, France
 Alfonso García Robles, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the Committee on Disarmament
 Ignac Golob, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations
 A. C. S. Hameed, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sri Lanka
 Liang Yufan, Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations
 Ronald Mason, School of Molecular Science, University of Sussex, United Kingdom
 Akira Matsui, Ambassador, Vice-President of Japan Atomic Energy Forum, Tokyo, Japan
 William Eteki Mboumoua, Minister at the Presidency in charge of Special Functions, United Republic of Cameroon
 Manfred Mueller, Professor, Institute for International Relations of the Academy for Political Science and Legal Studies, Potsdam, German Democratic Republic
 Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Argentina
 Maharajakrishna K. Rasgotra, Foreign Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, India
 Friedrich Ruth, Ambassador, Federal Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament, Federal Republic of Germany
 Agha Shahi, Professor Emeritus of International Relations to Universities in Pakistan, Pakistan
 Tadeusz Strulak, Ambassador, Deputy Director of the International Organizations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland
 Jose A. Tabares del Real, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cuba
 Oscar Vaernö, Ambassador, Special Adviser to the Foreign Minister on Arms Control and Disarmament, Norway

ANNEX II

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research*

Introduction

UNIDIR was established on 1 October 1980 within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). The General Assembly, by its resolution 37/99 K, of 13 December 1982, decided that UNIDIR should function as an autonomous institution, working in close relationship with the Department for Disarmament Affairs, and that the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies should function as its Board of Trustees. It requested the Board to draft the statute of UNIDIR on the basis of its existing mandate. The Assembly also invited Governments to consider making contributions to UNIDIR and requested the Secretary-General to give it administrative and other support.^a

The new status of UNIDIR became effective on 1 January 1983. The Advisory Board met as the Board of Trustees of the Institute for the first time, from 6 to 13 September 1983, at United Nations Headquarters in New York. The Board discussed the report of the Director on the work of the Institute,^b which it approved for submission to the General Assembly. Members of the Board expressed satisfaction at the work done by the Institute, regarding it as useful and as having proceeded along the lines which the General Assembly had foreseen. Its staff was commended for having achieved notable results with modest means.

* Text contributed by UNIDIR.

^a For details on the origin of UNIDIR, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 6: 1981, chap. XX and annex II, and vol. 7: 1982, chap. XXIII and annex II.

^b A/38/475.

In the discussion on the Board's role with regard to UNIDIR, it was agreed that in the discharge of its supervisory function, the Board should not deal with details of the Institute's daily work, which should be left to the Director. The Board agreed that while it might address any element of the Institute's work, it should provide comprehensive and general guidelines for its activities and help to ensure co-ordination of disarmament research within the United Nations system. The Board expressed a wish that the basic costs of the Institute be borne by the regular budget of the United Nations; it also agreed to recommend that whenever the Assembly assigned specific studies to UNIDIR, it should allocate the necessary funds. Although a draft statute of UNIDIR was approved by the Board in 1983, it will be submitted for approval to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, in 1984.

Research programme

The Advisory Board discussed the research work of UNIDIR and formulated a number of general guidelines, as follows.

(a) Disarmament research can be of great importance in promoting and encouraging negotiations and deserves strong support. It should, however, avoid interfering in ongoing negotiations;

(b) The research programme should be realistic, that is to say, it should take into account the existing situation in regard to the arms race and disarmament endeavours. Research projects should be selected according to the priorities set out in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;^c

(c) The Institute can play a potentially important role in promoting contact and co-ordination between research institutes, especially through meetings between representatives of such bodies, which may range from formal conferences to frequent informal gatherings;

(d) One purpose of UNIDIR's work is to bridge the gap between national disarmament research and studies conducted under United Nations auspices;

(e) The Institute's research programme should be designed to promote United Nations objectives and should be carried out on the basis of the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament;

(f) In its choice of topics for research, the Institute should concentrate on a limited number of worthwhile subjects. In this connection, several members emphasized the relationship between disarmament and development and in particular the question of conversion of resources;

(g) In that choice, care should be taken to avoid duplication. Data produced should not duplicate those put out elsewhere and, while the Institute was in a position to generate specific expertise, it should avoid using its resources for expertise available elsewhere;

(h) One factor in the choice of topics was whether a given project could result in a balanced account, that is, whether all necessary data could be obtained. Efforts should always be made to obtain diversified and complete data;

(i) The Institute's work could help developing nations that lack the means for disarmament research, and the programme should take this into account;

(j) The work of the Institute has an important educational function and is of particular relevance to the World Disarmament Campaign. The Institute's output should, for this purpose, be easily readable and clear. Its relations with the non-governmental organizations and the media should be stressed;

(k) While the principle of a five-year programme approach could be accepted, the need for flexibility within an adopted research programme was stressed.

Research projects under way in 1982-1983

International law of disarmament

Disarmament deliberations and negotiations frequently raise complex legal issues, for example, regarding the interpretation of various treaties. Such questions are the subject of a large number of articles and studies, many of them mentioned already in the *Repertory of Disarmament Research*,^d published by UNIDIR; however, no comprehensive work exists. The UNIDIR project aims at producing a treatise on the law of disarmament which will be an authoritative, practical reference work.

It will analyse not only positive law, but will also give a presentation of theses and arguments on controversial issues relating to the international law of disarmament. The

^c *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III.

^d Geneva, UNIDIR, 1982. 449 p. (Sales No. GV.E.82.0.2.)

study will focus mainly on the provisions of existing treaties relating to disarmament and also examine humanitarian law and other relevant aspects of law.

It will be in five parts. The first will place the law of disarmament in the general framework of international law and will define disarmament in relation to other concepts such as sovereignty, security, development and human rights. The second will deal with conventional law regarding various types of weapons: nuclear, chemical and biological, radiological, conventional, etc. The third will deal with regions and environments: Antarctica, outer space, the sea-bed and ocean floor, nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace. The fourth will deal with machinery for deliberations and negotiations. The fifth will consider trends as they emanate from the work of the United Nations in the disarmament field.

The project will be completed in 1984.

Disarmament and the right to security

The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly reveals links between disarmament and the right of States to security. The concept of the right to security is not equivalent to such concepts as, for instance, self-defence (Article 51 of the United Nations Charter). So far it has not been fully defined.

The UNIDIR project examines the concept and its relationship with similar notions, using the Final Document as the basic reference point. It is meant to bring together and to analyse relevant instruments of law, national and international documents and doctrines prevailing in various parts of the world.

The project was near completion as of December 1983.

Arms control

The study examines the concept and practice of arms control in relation to disarmament. The project was envisaged originally as a general analysis of the field of disarmament, defining it in the general context of international relations, presenting its goals, principles, institutions and machinery, as well as the efforts to reach its objective. The Institute has recognized a need for more conceptualization and decided to continue work on the subject.

Denuclearization of the Balkans

For more than 25 years, alongside efforts designed to promote bilateral relations between the Balkan countries, the idea of setting up a zone of peace, good-neighbourliness and co-operation, free of nuclear weapons, in the Balkan area has been taking shape. The main goal pursued is the transformation of the Balkans into an important factor for stability, security and co-operation in the European continent. Several initiatives have been put forward at the regional level, in the United Nations, at the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva and in other international forums. Over the last few years there has been broad development of bilateral co-operation between Balkan countries, and multilateral actions aimed at promoting co-operation and good-neighbourliness in the area. A landmark in this process is the series of meetings on Balkan multilateral co-operation in economic, technical and scientific fields (communications, transport, energy and raw materials for energy) held in Athens (1976), Ankara (1979), Sofia (1981) and Bucharest (1982).

The objective of the UNIDIR study is to outline and clarify various political, military, technical and legal aspects of such a project. It will take into account the experience gathered over a quarter of a century on proposals and the setting up of nuclear-weapon-free zones, e.g., the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Rapacki Plan and a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone. The singular character of the project stems from the fact that:

(a) It is a proposal aimed at setting up such a zone in a region including countries which are and are not members of a military alliance;

(b) It involves a comprehensive approach to the problem, as its goal envisages turning the Balkans into a zone of peace, good-neighbourliness and co-operation.

The first draft has been prepared.

Chemical weapons

The issue of banning chemical weapons has for many years been on the agenda of the General Assembly and the successive multilateral negotiating bodies, and was the subject of bilateral Soviet/American negotiations. Ample documentation and literature on the subject is available—most of it in connection with the work of the negotiating body.

The UNIDIR study will provide a comprehensive view of the technical, legal and political issues relating to the efforts to ban chemical weapons. It will examine the consequences, for regional and international security, of the existence and possible proliferation of chemical weapons, including those which might be produced as a result of scientific and technological progress. It will also analyse the questions relating to the prohibition of such weapons, such as a uniform interpretation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, customary law and the provisions of a future convention on chemical weapons. A large part will deal with the question of verification.

The study will be completed early in 1984.

New technologies in the field of conventional armaments

Conventional weapons systems have undergone a continual and rapid refinement in terms of size, speed, propulsion, fire-power and accuracy. Technological advances have led to new types of conventional weapons with potentially far-reaching military and political implications, for example, precision-guided munitions and remotely piloted vehicles. The new weapons, together with developments in such areas as night vision devices, battlefield surveillance and communications, may further upgrade standing military forces.

Of particular importance is the strategic debate in Western Europe relating to the new technologies. The study initiated by UNIDIR entitled "New technologies in the field of conventional armaments: strategic aspects and implications for disarmament and arms limitation" aims at identifying the following aspects: the nature and performance of the new technologies and armaments, impact on the strategic postures of States, the relationship between the technologies and nuclear weapons, impact on negotiations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament and the consequences of the proliferation of the new technologies and weapons to developing countries.

The study will be completed by July 1984.

Science and technology for disarmament

The project aims at studying the availability of technologies for disarmament and at indicating areas in which technology could aid disarmament, especially in the area of verification.

Security of States and the lowering of levels of armaments

This is a continuous project, the objective of which is to analyse prevailing security concepts and doctrines. The selection of case studies aims at providing a picture of the different situations in which various countries are:

- (a) Major nuclear-weapon States;
- (b) Medium-sized nuclear-weapon States;
- (c) Small and medium-sized countries:
 - (i) members of military alliances;
 - (ii) non-aligned countries;
 - (iii) neutral countries;
- (d) Regional approaches;
- (e) Zones of peace, denuclearization.

Within the project the following papers have been completed:

- (a) "A perspective from the United States of America", by James E. Dougherty;
- (b) "The policy of a medium-sized nuclear-weapon State: France", by Pierre Dabiez;

- (c) "Security of small and medium-sized European States":
 - (i) Belgium, by René Schalbroeck;
 - (ii) Romania, by Constantin Vlad;
 - (iii) Yugoslavia, by Vojin Dimitrijević;
 - (d) "Africa, its security and the nuclear option", by G. Aforoka Nweke;
 - (e) "Security doctrines in Central Africa", by Joseph Owona and Antoine Zanga;
 - (f) "The nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America", by Hector Gros Espiell;
 - (g) "The Indian Ocean as a zone of peace", by K. Subrahmanyam.
- Three new case studies are currently under preparation:
- (a) "Austrian security policy", by Hanspeter Neuhold;
 - (b) "Egyptian security policy", by Saad Alfarargi;
 - (c) "Swiss security policy", by Dietrich Fischer.

Studies requested by the General Assembly in 1982 and 1983

The establishment of an international disarmament fund for development

The General Assembly, by resolution 37/84 of 9 December 1982, gave UNIDIR a mandate to carry out a specific investigation of the modalities of an international disarmament fund for development, in consultation with other relevant international institutions.

For the implementation of that mandate, UNIDIR, to orient the research, established a steering group composed of Mansur Ahmad (Pakistan), Gheorghe Dolgu (Romania), Sergio de Queiroz Duarte (Brazil), Edgar Faure (France), Sten Lundbo (Norway) and Ibrahim Sy (Senegal).

The steering group, chaired by Mr. Faure, met on 21 and 22 June 1983. The meeting was also attended by Rikhi Jaipal, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament; Albert Tevoedjre, Director of the International Institute for Labour Studies; members of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs and others who had been invited.

The following general orientation was agreed upon:

- (a) UNIDIR's report would be based on the general principles of the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled *The Relationship between Disarmament and Development*,^c and would pursue further the analyses and proposals it contained, taking into account suggestions of the steering group;
- (b) The establishment of an international disarmament fund for development (IDFD) should be the expression of a political commitment to disarmament and should not be used to legitimize the arms race;
- (c) The objective of IDFD should be to promote security through disarmament and development;
- (d) The establishment of IDFD should develop the link between disarmament and development at the political and institutional levels;
- (e) The setting up of IDFD should serve to increase the awareness of the international community as a whole of the importance of the link between disarmament and development, which would be in the interests of both the developed countries and the developing ones;
- (f) The study should elicit, as speedily as possible, political initiatives on the part of Governments and within the framework of the United Nations.

Four separate, interrelated aspects of the study have been undertaken:

- (a) "Modalities for the establishment of IDFD", by Marek Thee;

^c United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.1.

- (b) "Institutional, technical and political aspects of IDFD", by Finn Sollie;
- (c) "How the IDFD should be organized: the advantages of the regional approach", by Hugo Sada;
- (d) "The relationship between the conversion of military activities to civilian activities and IDFD", by Jacques Fontanel and Daniel Colard.

At the meeting of the Consultative Committee on Substantive Questions (Programme Matters) of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, held from 10 to 14 March 1983, representatives of organizations of the United Nations system were invited to cooperate in the carrying out of the investigation.

The UNIDIR study will be completed in 1984 and will be submitted to the General Assembly.

Denuclearization of Africa

The General Assembly, by resolution 38/181 A of 20 December 1983, mandated UNIDIR to provide data on the development of South Africa's nuclear capability. By the relevant portion of the resolution, it requested UNIDIR, "in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, to provide data on the continued development of South Africa's nuclear capability". The Assembly also requested the Institute to submit a report to the Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, in 1984.

Future research work

Limitation of military uses of outer space

The study, based on publicly available information, will deal with the militarization of outer space and its implications for disarmament research, aiming at three objectives:

- (a) A factual description of current and possible new military activities in outer space and of their technical capabilities and limitations;
- (b) Their implications for disarmament efforts;
- (c) Their impact on negotiations and existing conventional law, and possible new domains for regulation.

Nuclear-test ban

The project, based on available material, will provide comprehensive coverage of the technical, scientific and political issues relating to negotiations to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It will examine the question of the effects of nuclear-weapon tests on the development of warheads and the implications of a comprehensive test ban for nuclear disarmament efforts.

Sub-Saharan Africa: security concepts and regional arrangements

The objective of the study is to identify and analyse the main concerns of the region in the context of its geographical location, historical experience and global strategic relationships. It will try to identify potential sources of conflict within the region and discuss implications of external endowments. The study will be based on existing literature and original research, including interviews and field trips.

The Board of Trustees has requested the Director of UNIDIR to explore ways to obtain the resources for the project.

Reduction of strategic, intermediate-range and tactical nuclear weapons

The Board of Trustees has requested the Institute to study the conditions and possibilities for negotiating reductions and limitations in intercontinental and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, including the possibility of merging the two categories. The possibility of

broadening the scope of negotiations to include tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons is also to be studied.

Disarmament—the subjective factors: perceptions, concept-formation, styles of argument, implications

The project will cover the following:

- (a) Assumptions regarding the potential adversary: their role in disarmament and arms control;
- (b) Concept-formation: a synoptic analysis of central strategic terms in Chinese, English, French and Russian;
- (c) Styles of argument: an analysis of arguments against disarmament proposals.

Arms transfer dependence

The proposed study will focus on the dependence of States on their sources of armaments (and the arms producers' dependence on their clients). While interdependence is not totally avoidable, excessive dependence will be viewed as undesirable. Perceptions of the problem will be explored, through which a greater understanding of dependence in arms limitation may be obtained.

Activities relating to treaty review conferences

In connection with the 1984 Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, UNIDIR, together with the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), will co-sponsor a symposium in Geneva.

A paper on the non-proliferation régime, designed to be useful to participants in the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is being planned.

Other activities

Conference of European Research Institutes on Disarmament

The convening by UNIDIR of regional conferences of research institutes on disarmament was suggested at the first Conference of Directors of Research Institutes, convened by UNIDIR in 1981. Major research institutes from European States as well as from other parts of the world have been invited to participate and many have accepted; a number of governmental officials have also been invited.

The Conference was originally envisaged to take place in Bucharest, from 27 June to 1 July 1983. However, a number of research institutes found it impossible to attend in view of other commitments. As UNIDIR wished to have the largest representation possible from the majority of European States at the Conference, it was decided to postpone it until 1984.

UNIDIR has prepared for the Conference:

- (a) a discussion paper
- (b) surveys of literature on particular issues.^f

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^f For example, Marek, "Conceptual issues related to European security, arms control and confidence-building measures, negotiations in Geneva, Vienna and Madrid: insights from current literature", Geneva, UNIDIR, October 1983.

UNIDIR maintained close working relations with the bodies and organizations of the United Nations system having activities in disarmament, in particular the Department for Disarmament Affairs, UNESCO, the United Nations University and IAEA.

It developed close relations also with a number of national research institutes, non-governmental organizations and the media. It prepared certain special materials for such contacts (summaries of studies and guides to sources),^g which were viewed as contributions of UNIDIR to the World Disarmament Campaign.^h

^g For example: "A brief guide to some basic sources on disarmament", UNIDIR, February 1983, 44 p. (UNESCO Symbol SS-83/CONF.816/9), prepared for the Symposium on the Media and Disarmament, organized by UNESCO from 18-22 April 1983, in Nairobi, and "Sources of information on disarmament and related issues: a short guide", Geneva, June 1983, 37 p., published by UNIDIR in co-operation with the Information Service, United Nations Office at Geneva. The latter paper is divided into three parts: part one presents the main United Nations bodies with responsibilities and activities in the field of disarmament; part two contains a list of United Nations reports prepared by the Secretary-General with the assistance of experts, background papers prepared by the United Nations Secretariat and general publications of the United Nations Department for Public Information; part three indicates some secondary sources and general reference materials such as bibliographies, collections of documents and guides to research institutes.

^h Further information on the Institute's activities and publications may be found in General Assembly document A/38/475, or by contacting the Institute, Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10.

United Nations disarmament studies programme

Introduction

SINCE THE EARLY 1960s THE PREPARATION OF VARIOUS STUDIES by the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament has continued to expand, reflecting the growing interest in such activity among Member States. These studies are intended to assist the negotiating process and to provide general information which may bring about a better understanding of the problems of the arms race and disarmament. The studies are authorized by General Assembly resolutions and carried out by the Secretary-General, with the assistance of experts and consultants appointed by him.

This chapter covers actions taken in this area in 1983; it includes an account of the follow-up of the study on the relationship between disarmament and development and three studies in progress: those on conventional disarmament, nuclear-weapon-free zones, and military research and development. Three new studies were initiated in 1983 on the following subjects: the naval arms race, concepts of security, and unilateral nuclear disarmament measures.

Follow-up of recent disarmament studies

Study on the relationship between disarmament and development

At its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly had before it the report of the Secretary-General¹ on the implementation of resolution 37/84 on the follow-up of the study entitled *The Relationship between Disarmament and Development*, completed in 1981.² In the resolution, the General Assembly had, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to take appropriate administrative action as specified in chapter VII of the study, containing its conclusions and recommendations.³

The Group of Governmental Experts appointed by the Secretary-General in 1978 to study the relationship between disarmament and

¹ A/38/436.

² United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.1.

³ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 6: 1981, chap. XXI.

development had recommended, *inter alia*, that the issues addressed by the report regarding resource utilization, impact of the arms race, conversion problems and possible measures for reallocating resources could be appropriate points of reference for United Nations research, planning and educational programmes, and recommended that the disarmament-development perspective elaborated in the report be incorporated in a concrete and practical way in the ongoing activities of the United Nations system. Emphasizing that the disarmament and development perspective was both interdisciplinary and interdepartmental, the Group also recommended that the Secretary-General take appropriate action, through the existing inter-agency consultative mechanism of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) and its Consultative Committee on Substantive Questions, to foster and co-ordinate the incorporation of that perspective in the programmes and activities of the United Nations system. Noting that there was no special centre of expertise in the international dimensions of the relationship between disarmament and development nor any part of the United Nations system with that particular focus, the Group identified the former Centre for Disarmament and the Office of the Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation as the two units having lead functions in the fields of disarmament and development.

In consultation with the office of the Director-General, the Department for Disarmament Affairs brought the subject to the consideration of the Consultative Committee on Substantive Questions (Programme Matters), known as CCSQ (PROG), with a view to appropriate action being undertaken for inter-agency consultation to foster and co-ordinate the incorporation of the disarmament and development perspective in the programmes and activities of the United Nations system.

The relationship between disarmament and development was discussed during the first regular session of that Committee, which was held in Geneva from 10 to 15 March 1983. The Committee noted that disarmament-related issues were receiving, in general, increasing interest in the governing bodies of the various organizations of the United Nations system and that, as a consequence, several organizations had received specific mandates in that area. It recognized that the issues related to the arms race and to disarmament were of a multidisciplinary nature and should be approached as such by the United Nations system; the strong and widespread interest expressed in that subject gave an opportunity of reinforcing the ongoing or planned activities through collaboration and co-operation. The members of the Committee voiced their intention to pursue and strengthen their collaboration with the Department for Disarmament Affairs and, to that end, decided that the organs and organizations of the United Nations system should designate focal points to facilitate continuing informal contacts with the Department for Disarmament Affairs. Furthermore, the Committee was of the view that *ad hoc* groups of technical experts in the field of disarmament might be convened when necessary, in order to carry out specific tasks, such as the preparation of inputs to the report of the Secretary-General to the General

Assembly. The Committee agreed to continue considering the item whenever appropriate.

In April, the Department for Disarmament Affairs approached the various departments, organs and organizations and specialized agencies of the United Nations system, as well as the regional commissions, to seek the designation of focal points for further contacts⁴ and to explore the possibility of convening an *ad hoc* group of technical experts to implement the decision of CCSQ (PROG). The Department also sought information on whether any specific programmes were already being implemented into which a disarmament-development perspective could be appropriately incorporated.

Information received from IAEA, other specialized agencies and other United Nations organizations devoting attention to the disarmament and development perspective was included in the Secretary-General's above-mentioned report. Providing a preliminary survey of the initiatives taken by the Department for Disarmament Affairs in that field, the report mentioned that a growing number of requests had been received by the Department for an elaboration of the basic reasoning of the Secretary-General's report on the relationship between disarmament and development, for further investigation of the problems covered in the report, for the supply of additional information relevant to it and for expert advice to facilitate programmes and activities undertaken with a view to incorporating that perspective. Such requests had come from Member States, as well as from other departments, agencies, organizations, organs and regional commissions of the United Nations system, and also from both the general public and specialized interest groups. It was also mentioned that on the basis of the communications received, as well as direct personal contacts, the Department for Disarmament Affairs, in consultation with the Office of the Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation, was planning to convene in early 1984 an *ad hoc* group of technical experts with a view to discussing the further implementation of the decisions taken by CCSQ (PROG) in pursuance of resolution 37/84.

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⁴ In response, focal points for further contacts with the Department for Disarmament Affairs were identified by the Office of the Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation, the Department of Public Information, the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, the Department of Technical Co-operation for Development, the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

During the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, President Mitterrand of France devoted the final part of his address to the General Assembly⁵ to the problems posed by the link between disarmament and development. He said it was necessary to go back to the origin of military expenditures, namely, the growing link between military insecurity and economic insecurity which characterized the world. He also reiterated the proposal, made by France on two previous occasions, concerning the creation of an international fund which would make it possible to give effect to the disarmament-development link. He suggested that action on the idea be taken in two stages: the first would consist of a meeting between the most interested States, which France was ready to host once the major military Powers had announced their agreement. In the second stage, the participating States would set themselves the task of preparing and defining the targets for a United Nations conference, open to all Member States, on the subject.

Support for the French proposal was expressed during the debate in the First Committee⁶ by, *inter alia*, Greece and Senegal. Senegal regarded as particularly important the idea of a conference on the relationship between disarmament and development and hoped the major military Powers would accept it without delay. Greece said it was encouraged by the French proposal and supported all efforts to integrate the disarmament-development perspective with current United Nations activities. Sweden said it had decided to launch a study on the national aspects of that subject, including conversion, and would make it available in English for the benefit of other interested parties.

On 9 November, the Bahamas, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Iceland, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Romania, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sweden and Yugoslavia submitted in the First Committee a draft resolution entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development", which was later also sponsored by Bangladesh, Colombia, Ecuador, Greece, Indonesia, Mali and Uruguay. In introducing the draft resolution on 11 November, the representative of Sweden stressed that it should be viewed in the context of the continued efforts to ensure implementation of the study on the relationship between disarmament and development, and emphasized the crucial importance of the recommendations of that report.

On 25 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by 112 votes to none, with 13 abstentions. In an explanation of vote, the representative of the Soviet Union said that the draft resolution was a natural extension of resolution 37/84, on which it had been obliged to abstain. As the Soviet Union did not endorse all the recommendations of the 1981 study, it could not, therefore, support the presentation of a report by the Secretary-General to the fortieth session of the General Assembly based on measures pursued by Member States and within the United Nations system in accordance with that resolution.

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 9th meeting.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 46th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

On 15 December the draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly⁷ by a recorded vote of 137 to none, with 12 abstentions, as resolution 38/71 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the conclusions contained in the study entitled *The Relationship between Disarmament and Development,*

Recalling also its resolution 37/84 of 9 December 1982,

1. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Secretary-General on measures taken within the United Nations system in implementation of resolution 37/84;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its fortieth session based on appropriate measures taken by Member States and within the United Nations system in accordance with resolution 37/84.

Separately, the existence of a close link between disarmament and development was reaffirmed in the preambular part of resolution 38/188 J. For the discussion of that resolution, see chapter II.

On 11 November, France submitted a draft resolution entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development", which was later also sponsored by the Ivory Coast, Mali and Zaire. In introducing the draft resolution on 17 November, France stated that disarmament and development were the major objectives in international co-operation and that the idea of a link between the two and the assistance that the former could provide for the latter had been accepted by everyone. It also cited the statement made by President Mitterrand during the general debate in the General Assembly in September, which has been summarized above.

The sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution on 23 November which was further revised on 29 November, and subsequently also sponsored by Djibouti and Togo. The changes to the text were small and designed to encourage the widest possible support.

On 30 November, the Committee adopted the draft resolution without a vote.

In an explanation of vote, the Soviet Union noted the improvements made in the original text by the sponsors and reiterated its conviction that the prevention of a nuclear war and the achievement of real progress in disarmament were the basic premises for the liberation of supplementary funds for purposes of development, particularly of developing countries. At the same time, it was decisively opposed to the idea of creating a fund known as "disarmament for development", although it did not object to an examination of possible organizational measures in connection with the transfer of funds released as a result of a disarmament programme of particular assistance to the developing countries. Furthermore, certain provisions of the draft resolution were ambiguous, but since they did not predetermine any decisions on the matters covered, the Soviet Union found it possible not to object to its adoption without a vote, although it said this should not be interpreted as a change in its attitude to resolution 37/84.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 97th meeting.

The Federal Republic of Germany drew attention to the reservations it had expressed previously on the subject. In particular, it believed that one of the prerequisites for the successful implementation of the draft resolution would be that Member States agreed on the crucial significance of transparency and on comparability of defence expenditures of States for the attainment of a reduction of military expenditures.

On 15 December, the General Assembly⁸ adopted the draft resolution as resolution 38/71 B, also without a vote. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned by the arms buildup and trends in military expenditures, the consequent waste of human and economic resources and the resulting risks for world peace and security,

Also concerned by the extent of the crisis affecting the world economy, particularly the developing countries,

Considering that the magnitude of military expenditures is now such that their various implications can no longer be ignored in the efforts pursued in the international community to secure the recovery of the world economy and the establishment of a new international economic order,

Also considering that a reduction of arms expenditures, especially by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily important States, on a mutually agreed basis would be a measure that would curb the arms buildup and would make it possible to release additional resources for use in economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries,

Bearing in mind the conclusions of the study entitled *The Relationship between Disarmament and Development*, as well as General Assembly resolutions 36/92 G of 9 December 1981 and 37/84 of 9 December 1982, in which the General Assembly took note of those conclusions,

Noting that an investigation of the modalities of an international disarmament fund for development was undertaken in 1983 by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 37/84,

Recalling the recommendation of the General Assembly in that resolution that the question of the conversion of resources from military to civilian purposes and the reallocation to economic and social development of the resources released by disarmament measures should be included in the provisional agenda of the Assembly at intervals to be decided upon,

Convinced that the time has come to study measures that could be taken on the basis of the conclusions and recommendations of existing studies or studies being prepared on the question,

Noting that the envisaged initiatives include, in particular, a proposal for a conference on the various implications of the relationship between disarmament and development and a proposal on the establishment of an international disarmament fund for development,

1. *Expresses its conviction* that increased solidarity in the field of development would serve the cause of international peace and security and that the resources released by the reduction of arms expenditures would contribute to the growth and stability of the world economy, and particularly the economies of developing countries;

2. *Invites* Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General, by 1 April 1984, their views and proposals concerning the relationship between disarmament and development, in particular with regard to the following:

(a) The evaluation of the burden of armaments in the world;

(b) The impact of military expenditures on the world economic situation and development;

⁸ See footnote 7.

(c) The contribution that a reduction in arms and military expenditures, in particular by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily important States, or a contribution by those States, as appropriate, would make to development tasks;

(d) The ways and means that would enable this contribution to be made, in particular in the interests of the economic and social progress of the developing countries;

(e) The consideration of proposals relating to the convening of a conference;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the replies of Member States to the Disarmament Commission in good time;

4. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to include this item in the agenda of its next session, to be held in 1984, to consider the replies received and to make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

Study on the reduction of military budgets

The work in 1983 of the Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 37/95 B, is described in chapter XVIII, together with the text of resolution 38/184 B.

Studies in progress

Study on conventional disarmament

Following the approval, in principle, by the General Assembly in its resolution 35/156 A of 12 December 1980 of the carrying out of a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, the Disarmament Commission endeavoured in 1981 to work out the general approach to that study, its structure and scope. However, the Commission was unable to reach agreement on the approach.

In 1981, by its resolution 36/97 A of 9 December, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish the group of qualified experts in accordance with the provisions of the previous resolution, namely, on a balanced geographical basis, and asked the Disarmament Commission, at its 1982 session, to complete its consideration of the general approach to the study, including its structure and scope, and to transmit the conclusions to the group of experts. Resolution 36/97 A also reiterated the General Assembly's request that the Secretary-General submit a final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

At its 1982 session, the Disarmament Commission agreed upon a text entitled "Guidelines for the study on conventional disarmament".⁹

The Secretary-General appointed experts from Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, France, the

⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-12/3)*, annex III; the text is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. XVIII.

German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, Peru, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United Republic of Tanzania, the United States and Yugoslavia to assist him in the preparation of the study.

The Group began its work in July 1982 under the chairmanship of Ambassador Skjold Mellbin of Denmark, whose country had initiated the study. After two sessions in 1982, in July and December, the Group met again in 1983, from 11 to 22 April and from 18 to 29 July. Although the Group's work proceeded constructively, its progress fell behind, due to the difficulties encountered in the course of its discussions. In an effort to maintain the timetable by which the Secretary-General was called upon to make a final report to the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, a fifth session was held from 5 to 16 September, but there was insufficient progress to permit completion of the study.

In a letter to the Secretary-General, the Chairman explained that owing to the very wide area embraced by the study and the sensitivity and complexity of the issues involved, the Group of Experts needed further time in order to complete its work. The Secretary-General gave a report¹⁰ on the situation to the General Assembly, with the Chairman's letter annexed to it.

In the general debate in the First Committee,¹¹ several members gave their support to the extension by one year of the Group's mandate. China felt that the Group had done a lot of hard work and had no objection to an extension; Egypt expressed similar views. Denmark hoped that the General Assembly would agree to the continuation of the study and Greece, speaking on behalf of the ten members of the European Community, fully supported continuation of the work. The Soviet Union, while expressing the belief that studies should not be used as a pretext for refusing to engage in businesslike negotiations on specific issues, was not opposed to extending the mandate of the study.

On 28 October, Denmark submitted a draft resolution entitled "Study on conventional disarmament". In introducing the draft resolution on 2 November, the representative of Denmark pointed out that, solely as a matter of procedure, it requested the Secretary-General to continue the study and to submit the final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session. On 15 November Denmark submitted a revised draft resolution in which a small amendment was made to the first preambular paragraph.

On 21 November, the First Committee approved the revised draft resolution by a recorded vote of 107 to none, with 9 abstentions.

Explaining its vote before the vote, India stated that it would abstain. It believed that the highest priority in the field of disarmament should be accorded to measures aimed at nuclear disarmament; attention

¹⁰ A/38/437.

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 34th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

should not be diverted nor should the time and energies of the international community be wasted on non-priority issues. However, India had no objection to agreeing to the request for more time. In an explanation of vote after the vote, the United States said that it had voted in favour, but was of the opinion that the study should be funded within existing resources.

The United Kingdom expressed disappointment that, despite an extra session, the Group of Experts had been unable to complete its work. The United Kingdom believed that the additional costs of an extension should be found from the resources already proposed for the biennium 1984-1985, and said that on that basis it had been able to support the draft resolution.

On 20 December, the General Assembly¹² adopted the draft resolution, as resolution 38/188 A, by a recorded vote of 138 votes to none, with 8 abstentions. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions in which, *inter alia*, it approved the carrying out of a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, to be undertaken by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a group of qualified experts appointed by him on a balanced geographical basis,

Recalling the discussions at the 1981 and 1982 substantive sessions of the Disarmament Commission on the general approach to the study and its structure and scope, which resulted in the establishment of agreed guidelines for the study,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General to which is annexed a letter from the Chairman of the Group of Experts on All Aspects of the Conventional Arms Race and on Disarmament relating to Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces informing the Secretary-General that, owing to the very wide area embraced by the study and the sensitivity and complexity of the issues involved, the Group of Experts needs further time in order to complete its work;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue the study and to submit the final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

Study on nuclear-weapon-free zones

At its thirty-seventh session, in 1982, the General Assembly adopted resolution 37/99 F by which it decided that a study should be undertaken to review and supplement the *Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects*¹³ in the light of information and experience accumulated since its completion in 1975. The Secretary-General was requested to carry out the study with the assistance of an *ad hoc* group of qualified governmental experts and to submit it to the Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, in 1984. Pursuant to that resolution, the Secretary-General appointed 21 governmental experts from Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, China, Cuba,

¹² *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 103rd meeting.

¹³ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.1.7; the study was initially transmitted to the General Assembly as document A/10027/Add.1.

Egypt, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United Republic of Tanzania, the United States and Yugoslavia. The list of experts is annexed to this chapter.

The Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones held two sessions in 1983, under the chairmanship of Mr. Klaus Törnudd, Under-Secretary for Political Affairs of Finland. It held an organizational session from 14 to 18 March, during which it conducted a general exchange of views and agreed on the structure and outline of the study. At that session it was also decided that the experts would submit written contributions to the Secretariat which would then produce a draft of the study for consideration by the Group. Such a draft was discussed at the second session of the Group, from 25 July to 5 August. On the basis of discussions at that session further work was to be carried out in 1984.

The discussion that took place at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly on the general subject of nuclear-weapon-free zones is described in chapter X of this volume.

On 11 November in the First Committee,¹⁴ Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Review and supplement to the *Comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects*". The draft was subsequently also sponsored by Colombia and Indonesia. In introducing the draft on 17 November, Brazil, after referring to the experiences gained in connection with the conflict in the South Atlantic in 1982 and their relevance for the Tlatelolco Treaty, stated that the whole question of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the extension of negative security assurances had to be reassessed in the light of the commitment by the nuclear-weapon Powers to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament. It believed that the Group of Experts established by resolution 37/99 F would benefit greatly in carrying out its mandate if it had before it all the relevant documents submitted on the subject at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, as well as the records of the views expressed on it during the general debate. The experts would then be better prepared to shed new light on the overall question of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

In explanation of vote before the vote, India stated that its position on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as stated during the second special session devoted to disarmament,¹⁵ remained unchanged, but as the draft resolution was merely of a procedural character, India would abstain in the vote. Following the vote, the Federal Republic of Germany said that although it had voted in favour of the resolution, it felt that resolutions should not normally interfere with procedure and with the

¹⁴ For the discussion on the study in the First Committee, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, First Committee*, 21st, 24th, 33rd and 38th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

¹⁵ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. XI.

orderly transaction of United Nations studies according to their mandate.

The First Committee approved the draft resolution on 23 November by a recorded vote of 125 to none, with 3 abstentions (India, United Kingdom and United States). It was adopted by the General Assembly¹⁶ on 20 December, as resolution 38/188 I, by a recorded vote of 146 to none, with 3 abstentions. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 37/99 F of 13 December 1982, in which it decided that a study should be undertaken to review and supplement the *Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects* in the light of information and experience accumulated since 1975,

Recalling also that in paragraph 61 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly it was determined that the process of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones should be encouraged, with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons,

Considering that the documents submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as the views expressed in the general debate on this particular subject, provide additional elements relevant to the updating of the study,

Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, established by resolution 37/99 F, for its consideration and analysis all the relevant documents submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, as well as the records of the debate on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Study on military research and development

Following the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 37/99 J of 13 December 1982, the Secretary-General established in early 1983 a group of experts to carry out a comprehensive study on the scope, role and direction of the military use of research and development, the mechanisms involved, its role in the overall arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and its impact on arms limitation and disarmament, particularly in relation to major weapons systems, such as nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, with a view to preventing a qualitative arms race and to ensuring that scientific and technological achievements might ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes.

With the participation of experts from 12 countries, namely, Argentina, China, Egypt, France, the German Democratic Republic, India, Japan, Peru, Sweden, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, the Group held its first session from 21 to 25 March, in New York. Experts from Czechoslovakia and Ghana later joined the Group. At the first session, Dr. Rolf Björnerstedt of Sweden was elected as Chairman and the discussion was devoted primarily to the organization of work and a preliminary exchange of views on the content of the study. The list of experts is annexed to this chapter.

¹⁶ See footnote 12.

The second session took place in New York from 5 to 15 July and was attended by all 14 experts. A more detailed discussion of the subject-matter was held, taking into account responses by 28 Governments to resolution 37/99 J, in which the General Assembly had invited all States to submit views to the Secretary-General. The Group decided to ask the Secretariat to prepare a working draft of its report for consideration at the third session, due to be held in February 1984.

Studies initiated by the General Assembly in 1983

Study on the naval arms race

On 18 October, Sweden expressed in the First Committee¹⁷ its concern about the naval arms race, especially about the development of naval forces and the technological development of naval arms systems, which was dominated by the major naval Powers, but was also gradually influencing the navies of smaller countries. Sweden believed that the situation had increased the risk of confrontation at sea, unintended incidents and unnecessary conflicts. A further dimension was added by the growth in tactical nuclear weapons which, in fact, outnumbered the strategic ones. Sweden therefore proposed that the United Nations should carry out a broad study on various aspects of the naval arms race, which could provide valuable information and give impetus to arms control and confidence-building measures in the naval field.

Argentina believed that such a study should specifically focus on military nuclear aspects of the massive naval presence in all regions of the world. It recalled the concern expressed by the Co-ordinating Bureau of the non-aligned countries about the serious implications of military and naval manoeuvres, as well as other operations carried out by nuclear-weapon States, including the utilization of nuclear energy for non-peaceful purposes.

On 12 November, Austria, Finland, Indonesia, Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Study on naval forces and naval armaments", which was later also sponsored by Iceland. Sweden introduced the draft resolution on 17 November, calling attention to the naval buildup and the development of naval arms systems and expressing concern about their possible effects on the freedom of the high seas, on the principle of non-interference with international sea communications for trade and shipping and on the economic exploitation of the resources of the sea. Sweden believed that the proposed study would enhance international understanding of the issues involved, as well as facilitate the identification of possible areas of disarmament and confidence-building measures. It also recommended that the study be carried out by a small number of experts in order to limit the costs.

¹⁷ For the discussion on the study in the First Committee, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, First Committee*, 4th, 8th and 33rd to 40th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

On 22 and 23 November the sponsors submitted changes in the form of revised draft resolutions. In sum, the revisions changed the title of the draft resolution to "Study on the naval arms race", and amended the fourth preambular paragraph to differentiate between those naval units which constituted integral parts of the strategic nuclear forces of the two major nuclear-weapon Powers and were therefore included in the strategic arms negotiations, and other naval nuclear-weapon systems which were not the subject of any disarmament negotiations.

The First Committee adopted the revised draft resolution on 25 November by a recorded vote of 93 to 1 (United States), with 31 abstentions.

In explanation of vote before the vote, the United Kingdom said that it had abstained as there had been little or no prior discussion on the desirability or the practicability of setting up an expert group capable of the task. Furthermore, by postulating a naval arms race, the study seemed disposed to produce a set of conclusions with which the United Kingdom would find it hard to agree. In addition, it was concerned that the increasing financial and operational burden of such studies would produce worse rather than better effects on United Nations disarmament efforts.

The United States, which had cast a negative vote, questioned the vagueness of the study's terms of reference and underlying concepts, finding it difficult to see how a small number of experts could deal in a meaningful way with the vast array of issues to be covered under the proposal. Furthermore, consultations with the main sponsor of the draft resolution had not brought about changes in the text to indicate that the study would be carried out within the existing resources of the United Nations. The Soviet Union explained that it had abstained because the study dealt purely with technical aspects and was not aimed at taking practical measures to reduce naval activity and armaments. India had abstained in the vote; in its view, singling out naval activities was not the right approach and the attention of the international community should be centred on nuclear disarmament, rather than being diverted to activities which did not seem to have any utility. Argentina said that it had voted in favour because it believed that the recent buildup in naval deployments was a very timely issue. It was highly appropriate for the United Nations to concern itself with the question. The Federal Republic of Germany, which had abstained, said it regarded the proposed study as an example of a proliferation of United Nations studies in the disarmament field without an adequate preparatory stage.

On 20 December, the General Assembly¹⁸ adopted the draft resolution as resolution 38/188 G by a recorded vote of 113 votes to 1, with 32 abstentions. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Concerned about the naval buildup and the development of naval arms systems,

Mindful of the paramount importance for the security and well-being of all nations, for international trade and shipping and for economic exploitation of marine resources of

¹⁸ See footnote 12.

preserving freedom of the high seas and of keeping open international sea communications for trade and shipping in a manner consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and with the principles of international law,

Mindful also of recent developments in the law of the sea,

Noting that some naval units constitute integral parts of the strategic nuclear forces of the two major nuclear-weapon Powers and are therefore included in the strategic arms negotiations while other naval nuclear-weapons systems are not the subject of any disarmament negotiations,

Recalling paragraph 96 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which stated that taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by carrying out studies by the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts,

Convinced that a broad study carried out by the United Nations on the naval arms race, as well as on the development of naval forces and systems and their deployment, would enhance international understanding of the issues involved,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study on the naval arms race, on naval forces and naval arms systems, including maritime nuclear-weapons systems, as well as on the development, deployment and mode of operation of such naval forces and systems, all with a view to analysing their possible implications for international security, for the freedom of the high seas, for international shipping routes and for the exploitation of marine resources, thereby facilitating the identification of possible areas for disarmament and confidence-building measures;

2. *Invites* all Governments to submit to the Secretary-General, not later than 1 April 1984, their views on the content of such a study and to co-operate with him by making relevant material available in order to achieve the objectives of the study;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit the final report to the General Assembly at its fortieth session.

Study on concepts of security

Early in the debate in the First Committee,¹⁹ Sweden made a statement in which it, among other things, criticized the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and advocated the concept of common security. It declared that to say peace could be achieved only through deterrence was another way of saying that the search for security had to be based on fear, on the threat of revenge. That, in its opinion, could not provide a long-term basis for peace. All peoples had a common interest in avoiding nuclear war and on that the concept of common security was based. Political means must be given priority, and negotiations were essential in order to deepen understanding of the security interests of the opponent. That would provide a basis for a policy of negotiations and co-operation, leading to growing confidence. The foundation would then be laid for a policy of common security.

On 11 November, Austria, Costa Rica, Finland, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues", which was sub-

¹⁹ For the discussion on the study in the First Committee, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, First Committee*, 4th, 33rd and 40th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

sequently also sponsored by the Bahamas, Colombia, Ecuador and Romania.

In introducing the draft resolution on 17 November, Sweden recalled that, by its resolution 37/99 B, the General Assembly had submitted the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues entitled "Common Security—a programme for disarmament" to the Disarmament Commission. At its 1983 session, the Disarmament Commission had welcomed that report and had also recommended that it be duly taken into account in continuing and future disarmament efforts. The draft resolution was the result of that recommendation. During the recent years of tense relations between the major Powers, little effort had been put into the search for measures fostering a sense of common security in international relations. Sweden believed that it was currently all the more important to develop such positive concepts of security. As a starting point, the draft resolution requested the Secretary-General to carry out a study of concepts of security, in particular security policies which emphasized co-operative efforts and mutual understanding between States.

On 25 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 110 votes to 1 (United States), with 14 abstentions (mostly Western States).

Explaining its vote against the draft resolution, the United States said that in principle it did not object to disarmament studies by the United Nations, but the subject-matter should be well defined; the data base available should make possible an objective and balanced review of the problem; the task should be practicable from the point of view of the expertise required to conduct it; and the study should not require the allocation of additional funds. In the case in question, the United States believed, the terms of reference were broad and vague; they seemed to cover any and all matters pertaining to foreign and international security policies of States. Furthermore, the draft resolution welcomed the report of a group of private individuals which none of the Governments represented in the First Committee had endorsed. The United States was also puzzled and surprised by the introduction of a matter on which, it had thought, an understanding had been reached in the Disarmament Commission that it would not be pursued. The study would also require additional funds, whereas the United States had, in consultations with the main sponsor, sought to bring about a change in the text indicating that the proposed study should be carried out within existing resources of the United Nations.

The Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Japan and Turkey, all of which had abstained in the vote, expressed various doubts on the wisdom of carrying out a study, the outline of which they found vague; on the absence of sufficient consultations before the presentation of the proposal; or on the precedent of introducing into United Nations practice the discussion of reports by private persons. The Federal Republic of Germany also believed that the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies should have been given the opportunity to review

study projects, to evaluate them and to ensure that all those planned were arranged in a rational manner to facilitate proper support and servicing by the Department for Disarmament Affairs.

India had abstained because it was not in favour of any alternative security doctrine other than that of collective security as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Furthermore, it had reservations about some of the recommendations of the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues.

On 20 December, the General Assembly²⁰ adopted the draft resolution as resolution 38/188 H by a recorded vote of 132 votes to 1, with 15 abstentions. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 37/99 B of 13 December 1982, in which it noted the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues entitled "Common security—a programme for disarmament", submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling also that the Disarmament Commission, in accordance with resolution 37/99 B, considered the recommendations and proposals in the report of the Independent Commission, and that the Disarmament Commission recommended that the report be taken into account in ongoing and future disarmament efforts,

Regretting the lack of trust and confidence between States, especially between the nuclear-weapon Powers, reflected, *inter alia*, in the concepts of security adopted by Governments,

Bearing in mind that the Disarmament Commission held a broad discussion of the concept of common security which it found a valuable approach in the search for lasting peace and security,

Emphasizing the need for creating concepts enhancing political and economic confidence between nations and policies arrived at not against, but in co-operation with other nations, as, for instance, in the *Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures*,

Recalling paragraph 96 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it stated that taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by the carrying out of studies by the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues as a timely and constructive contribution to international efforts to achieve disarmament and to maintain and strengthen international peace and security;

2. *Recommends* that the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues be duly taken into account in ongoing and future disarmament efforts;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study of concepts of security, in particular security policies which emphasize co-operative efforts and mutual understanding between States, with a view to developing proposals for policies aimed at preventing the arms race, building confidence in relations between States, enhancing the possibility of reaching agreements on arms limitation and disarmament and promoting political and economic security;

4. *Invites* all States to submit to the Secretary-General, not later than 1 April 1984, their views on the content of such a study and to co-operate with him in order to achieve the objectives of the study;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit the final report to the General Assembly at its fortieth session.

²⁰ See footnote 12.

Study on unilateral nuclear disarmament measures

Mexico introduced in the First Committee²¹ on 17 November a draft resolution entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission", which had been submitted on 11 November and was sponsored by Ecuador and Mexico, and subsequently also by Colombia. Explaining that the draft resolution stemmed from one of the items in the report of the Disarmament Commission, Mexico noted that nearly all the provisions of the Final Document of 1978 had remained dead letters, and that in the five years since the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it had not been possible to agree on a single new treaty or convention on nuclear disarmament. Mexico believed it to be necessary to turn to other procedures, and that one such procedure which might be explored would be the taking of unilateral measures, as, for example, had been successfully done in the voluntary suspension of nuclear-weapon tests from 1958 to 1961.

Mexico emphasized the importance of States having confidence that their security would not be jeopardized. It suggested that, for example, one State or a group of States could begin the process by announcing unilateral adoption of some modest disarmament measure, specifying that it would be cancelled if there was no reciprocal measure within a reasonable period. At the same time, it could be stated that if reciprocity did ensue, then the scope of the measures could be expanded gradually and very considerably. By the draft resolution, the Secretary-General would be asked to prepare, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, a report to be submitted to the thirty-ninth session of the Assembly on ways and means of stimulating the adoption of unilateral nuclear disarmament measures.

On 23 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 109 votes to 1 (United States), with 15 abstentions (mainly Western States).

In explanation of vote, China said that it had voted in favour as it believed it to be necessary to explore all reasonable and feasible channels for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, and had itself taken the unilateral measure of announcing, immediately on acquiring nuclear weapons, that it would not be the first to use them nor would it use them against non-nuclear-weapon States. Mongolia, Oman and the Soviet Union indicated that they had supported the draft resolution on the basis that they supported any efforts to prevent nuclear war and achieve nuclear disarmament. The Netherlands abstained in the vote. While believing that the study might have some merit, the Netherlands recalled that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had recently taken a unilateral step in announcing the withdrawal of 1,400 nuclear warheads from Europe, over a number of years. That step, as well as other possible measures which a study could identify, could inspire Governments to

²¹ For the discussion on the study in the First Committee, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, First Committee*, 33rd and 39th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

follow suit. The Netherlands, however, doubted whether the study would, in practical terms, contribute much to the success of current arms control negotiations.

On 20 December, the General Assembly²² adopted the draft resolution as resolution 38/183 J by 132 votes to 2 (United Kingdom, United States), with 14 abstentions. Subsequently the delegation of the United Kingdom advised the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having examined the various concrete proposals submitted to the Disarmament Commission at its 1983 session and reproduced by the Commission in its report to the General Assembly,

Considering that one of these proposals, intended to expedite negotiations of nuclear disarmament through the preparation of a study on unilateral measures, would be of particular value in view of the impasse existing in both the bilateral and the multilateral negotiations,

Requests the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts and applying the methods customary in these cases, a report, to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, on ways and means that seem advisable for stimulating the adoption of unilateral nuclear disarmament measures which, without prejudice to the security of States, would come to promote and complement bilateral and multilateral negotiations in this sphere.

Conclusion

The programme of United Nations disarmament studies continues to be a heavy one, with one study's mandate extended by a year and three new studies authorized by the General Assembly in 1983. It is clear that studies are a well-established aspect of the United Nations machinery for the consideration of the arms race and disarmament. At the same time, some Member States have indicated by their votes and their statements that studies are not necessarily always appropriate and should not take up too much of the available resources.

It is also worth noting that, intended as they are to assist in ongoing or new negotiations and to shed light on the issues involved in each area under scrutiny, studies are fundamentally political exercises. Studies cannot be expected to find easy agreement on issues on which there is basic international discord.

²² See footnote 12.

ANNEX

Composition of study groups established in 1983*

Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

Benoit d'Aboville, France	Andrzej Karkoszka, Poland
Mansur Ahmad, Pakistan	Miguel Marin-Bosch, Mexico
Ahmed Attaf, Algeria	Pedro Nuñez Mosquera, Cuba
Musinga T. Bandora, United Republic of Tanzania	Ahmed Osman, Egypt
Thomas Barthelemy, United States	N. F. Price, United Kingdom
Marin Buhoara, Romania	Ernst-Joerg von Studnitz, Federal Re- public of Germany
Nikola Čičanović, Yugoslavia	Klaus Törnudd, Finland
Radoslav Deyanov, Bulgaria	G. A. Vorontsov, USSR
Tetsuya Endo, Japan	Ronald Walker, Australia
D. Roberto García Moritan, Argentina	Yang Hushan, China
Kashi Prasad Jain, India	

Group of Governmental Experts on Military Research and Development

Alexander Akalovsky, United States	B. I. Komzin, USSR
S. K. Baafi, Ghana	Liu Zhong Yu, China
Abdel Halim Badawy, Egypt	Herbert Meissner, German Democratic Republic
Rolf Björnerstedt, Sweden	Antonio F. Moreno, Argentina
Percy Cornejo-Barreda, Peru	Hugo Sada, France
Ian Cuthbertson, United Kingdom	N. S. Venkatesan, India
Zdenek Havlik, Czechoslovakia	
Masayoshi Kakitsubo, Japan	

* Inclusion of a name does not necessarily indicate service with the study group for the entire duration of its mandate.

APPENDICES

Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements

Actions taken in the period 1 January to 31 December 1983

The following list shows action taken,^a if any, during the period 1 January to 31 December 1983 with regard to the arms regulation and disarmament agreements for which full information is provided in the second edition of the publication entitled *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*.^b No other relevant agreements were concluded or opened for signature during the period.

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare

SIGNED AT GENEVA: 17 June 1925

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each signatory as from the date of deposit of its ratification; accessions take effect on the date of the notification of the depositary Government

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: France

NEW PARTIES: Democratic Kampuchea—15 March 1983 (a)^c
Guatemala—3 May 1983 (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 105

The Antarctic Treaty

SIGNED AT WASHINGTON: 1 December 1959

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 23 June 1961

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: United States of America

NEW PARTIES: China—8 June 1983 (a)
India—19 August 1983 (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 28

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water

SIGNED BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN MOSCOW: 5 August 1963

^a Accession is indicated by (a) and succession by (s). Instruments of ratification, accession or succession may be deposited with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L) and/or the United States of America (W) or other depositaries, as applicable.

^b *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

^c With the following reservation:

"The said Protocol shall *ipso facto* cease to be binding in regard to any enemy whose armed forces or whose Allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol."

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 8 August 1963

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1963

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 111

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 27 January 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1967

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: China—30 December 1983 (W) ^d

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 84

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT MEXICO CITY: 14 February 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each Government individually

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Mexico

TREATY—NEW SIGNATORIES: Antigua and Barbuda—11 October 1983 ^e

NEW PARTIES: Antigua and Barbuda—11 October 1983 ^e

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I—NEW PARTIES: none

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II—NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 31

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 1 July 1968

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 March 1970

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

^d With the following declaration:

"The Government of the People's Republic of China declares as illegal and null and void the signature on and ratification of the said Treaty on 27 January 1967 and 24 July 1970 respectively by the Taiwan authorities usurping the name of China."

^e With the following Declaration of Waiver signed at St. John's on 1 September 1983:

"WHEREAS the Government of Antigua and Barbuda is a signatory to the treaty for Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

"AND WHEREAS the Government of Antigua and Barbuda has deposited its instrument of ratification of the aforesaid treaty with the Government of Mexico.

"AND WHEREAS paragraph 2 of article 28 of the aforesaid treaty provides that all signatory states shall have the imprescriptible right to waive wholly or in part the requirements laid down in paragraph 1 of article 28 and that they may do so by means of a declaration which shall be annexed to their respective instrument of ratification and which may be formulated at the time of deposit of the instrument of ratification or subsequently.

"NOW THEREFORE the Government of Antigua and Barbuda hereby declares its complete waiver of the requirements laid down in paragraph 1 of article 28 of the treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, in consequence of which the aforesaid treaty enters into force for Antigua and Barbuda upon deposit of this instrument."

NEW PARTIES: Sao Tome and Principe—20 July 1983 (M) (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 120

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 11 February 1971

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 18 May 1972

DEPOSITORY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Argentina—21 March 1983 (L) (M) (W)^f

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 73

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 10 April 1972

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 26 March 1975

DEPOSITORY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Democratic Kampuchea—9 March 1983 (W)

Germany, Federal Republic of—7 April 1983 (L) (W)

Colombia—19 December 1983 (W)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 98

^f With the following declaration, signed at Buenos Aires on 9 February 1983:

“WHEREAS: by Law No. 22,507, sanctioned and promulgated on 7 October 1981, the ‘Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the sub-soil thereof’, signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 11 February 1971, was approved,

“NOW THEREFORE: I ratify the aforesaid Treaty in the name and on behalf of the Argentine Government, making the following declaration:

“One of the constant concerns by which we have been guided has been to use all available means to obviate the possibility that the Draft, by virtue of its sphere of application, might affect the position of the various States with regard to questions of international maritime law and particularly those relating to the territorial sea and the continental shelf. We have said and we emphatically repeat that a document of this nature could not and must not, either directly or indirectly, attempt to solve or even affect the complex problems pertaining to the Law of the Sea (CCD/PV.445, para. 48 et seq., CCD/PV.454, paras. 10 and 11, and CCD/PV.475/Add.1, para. 16). For that reason we have taken due note of the statements made by the co-sponsors of the Draft to the effect that such is not the aim of the Treaty and that its provisions are in no way intended or designed to undermine, strengthen or affect the positions of States with regard to such questions; nor to prejudice or influence any decisions that may be taken in future on that subject or endorse or revoke obligations that have been or may be assumed by virtue of international instruments. On the basis of those statements, which we consider equivalent to a formal commitment, and of the provisions of Article IV—known as the “safeguard clause”—by the letter and spirit of which we strictly abide, we wish to place on record that we interpret the references to the freedoms of the high seas as in no way implying a pronouncement on the different positions with regard to questions of international maritime law. By the same token it is our understanding that mention is made of coastal States’ rights of exploration and exploitation over their continental shelves purely because they are the ones that might be most frequently affected by verification procedures. In other words we exclude from the outset any possibility that by means of this document certain positions with regard to continental shelves may be strengthened, to the detriment of others based on different criteria (CCD/PV.492, paras. 51 and 52).

“This Declaration constitutes the authentic interpretation of the Treaty and it is on that understanding that the Government of the Argentine Republic ratifies the instrument.”

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GENEVA: 18 May 1977

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 October 1978

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: Netherlands—15 April 1983^g

Romania—6 May 1983

Germany, Federal Republic of—24 May 1983^h

Greece—23 August 1983 (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 42

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 18 December 1979

NOT YET IN FORCE

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: Netherlands—17 February 1983ⁱ

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 4

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 10 April 1981

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 2 December 1983

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES:^j Lao People's Democratic Republic—3 January 1983 (a)

Austria—14 March 1983

Yugoslavia—24 May 1983

Poland—2 June 1983

Norway—7 June 1983

Guatemala—21 July 1983 (a)

Australia—29 September 1983

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 23

^g For the Kingdom in Europe and the Netherlands Antilles. Accompanied with the following declaration:

“The Kingdom of the Netherlands accepts the obligations laid down in Article 1 of the said Convention as extending to States which are not a party to the Convention and which act in conformity with Article 1 of the Convention.”

^h Accompanied with the following declaration:

“With effect from the day on which the Convention enters into force for the Federal Republic of Germany it shall also apply to Berlin (West) subject to the rights and responsibilities of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America including those relating to disarmament and demilitarization.”

ⁱ For the Kingdom in Europe and the Netherlands Antilles.

^j All States ratifying the Convention so far have given notification of their acceptance of Protocols I, II and III.

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1983

(s) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions)

State	Geneva Protocol		Antarctic Treaty		Partial Test Ban		Outer space		Treaty of Tlatelolco		Non-proliferation		Sea-bed Convention		BW Convention		ENMOD		Celestial bodies		Conventional weapons		
	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)†	
AFGHANISTAN					X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X						X	
ALBANIA																							
ALGERIA				X																			
ANGOLA																							
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA									X	X													
ARGENTINA		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
AUSTRALIA		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
AUSTRIA		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BAHAMAS									X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BAHRAIN																							
BANGLADESH									X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BARBADOS		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BELGIUM		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BELIZE																							
BENIN					X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BHUTAN					X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BOLIVIA		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BOTSWANA																							
BRAZIL		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BULGARIA		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
BURMA																							
BURUNDI																							
BYELORUSSIAN SSR																							
CANADA		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CAPE VERDE																							
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CHAD																							
CHILE		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1983 (continued)

State	Geneva Protocol		Antarctic Treaty		Partial Test Ban		Outer space		Treaty of Tlatelolco		Non-proliferation		Sea-bed		BV Convention		ENMOD		Celestial bodies		Conventional weapons	
	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)
CHINA		X		X					X	X	X										X	X
(A.P.II)***																						
COLOMBIA			X			X		X	X	X	X			X		X						
COMOROS														X								
CONGO											X											
COSTA RICA			X		X		X		X	X	X			X		X						X
CUBA						X		X						X		X						
CYPRUS		X		X		X		X			X			X		X						X
CZECHOSLOVAKIA		X		X		X		X			X			X		X						X
DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA		X									X			X		X						
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA*											X			X		X						
DEMOCRATIC YEMEN						X		X		X	X			X		X						X
DENMARK		X		X		X		X		X	X			X		X						X
DJIBOUTI						X		X		X	X			X		X						X
DOMINICA																						
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC		X		X		X		X		X	X			X		X						X
ECUADOR		X		X		X		X		X	X			X		X						X
EGYPT		X		X		X		X		X	X			X		X						X
EL SALVADOR		X		X		X		X		X	X			X		X						X
EQUATORIAL GUINEA														X								
ETHIOPIA		X		X		X		X		X	X			X		X						X
FIJI		X		X		X		X		X	X			X		X						X
FINLAND		X		X		X		X		X	X			X		X						X
FRANCE		X		X		X		X		X	X			X		X						X
(A.P.I.-II) (A.P.II)																						
GABON						X		X														X
GAMBIA		X		X		X		X		X	X			X		X						X
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC		X		X		X		X		X	X			X		X						X
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF		X		X		X		X		X	X			X		X						X

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1983 (continued)

State	Geneva Protocol		Antarctic Treaty		Partial Test Ban		Outer space		Treaty of Tlatelolco		Non-proliferation		Sea-bed		BW Convention		ENMOD		Celestial bodies		Conventional weapons		
	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)†	
GHANA		X			X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X							
GREECE	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X						X	
GRENADA									X		X	X	X	X	X	X							
GUATEMALA	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X			X
GUINEA																							
GUINEA-BISSAU			X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X							
GUYANA					X	X	X	X															
HAITI					X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							
HOLY SEE*	X																						
HONDURAS			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							
HUNGARY	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X
ICELAND	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X
INDIA		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X
INDONESIA	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X
IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF)	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X
IRAQ	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X
IRELAND	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X
ISRAEL	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X
ITALY	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X
IVORY COAST	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X
JAMAICA	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X
JAPAN	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X
JORDAN	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X
KENYA	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X
KUWAIT	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X
LEBANON	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X
LESOTHO	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X
LIBERIA	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1983 (continued)

State	Geneva Protocol		Antarctic Treaty		Partial Test Ban		Outer space		Treaty of Tlatelolco		Non-proliferation		Sea-bed Convention		ENMOD		Celestial bodies		Conventional weapons		
	(s)	(f)	(s)	(f)	(s)	(f)	(s)	(f)	(s)	(f)	(s)	(f)	(s)	(f)	(s)	(f)	(s)	(f)	(s)	(f)	
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA	X				X	X		X			X			X							
LIECHTENSTEIN**											X										X
LUXEMBOURG	X				X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X					X
MADAGASCAR					X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X							
MALAWI	X				X	X					X					X					
MALAYSIA	X				X	X	X				X	X	X	X							
MALDIVES	X										X	X	X	X							
MALI					X			X			X	X	X	X							
MALTA	X					X					X	X	X	X							
MAURITANIA					X	X					X	X	X	X							
MAURITIUS	X				X	X	X				X	X	X	X							
MEXICO	X				X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X							X
MONACO*	X				X	X	X				X	X	X	X							X
MONGOLIA	X				X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X					X
MOROCCO	X				X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X					X
MOZAMBIQUE					X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X					X
NAURU**											X										
NEPAL	X				X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X					X
NETHERLANDS	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
										(A.P.f)											
NEW ZEALAND					X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X					X
NICARAGUA	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X					X
NIGER	X				X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X					X
NIGERIA	X				X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X					X
NORWAY	X				X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X					X
OMAN					X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X					X
PAKISTAN	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X					X
PANAMA	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X					X

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1983 (continued)

State	Geneva Protocol		Antarctic Treaty		Partial Test Ban		Outer space		Treaty of Tlatelolco		Non-proliferation		Sea-bed		BW Convention		ENMOD		Celestial bodies		Conventional weapons	
	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
PARAGUAY	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
PERU			X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
PHILIPPINES	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
POLAND			X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
PORTUGAL	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
QATAR	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
REPUBLIC OF KOREA*			X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
ROMANIA	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
RWANDA	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
SAINTE LUCIA			X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
SAINTE VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES			X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
SAMOA			X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
SAN MARINO**			X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE			X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
SAUDI ARABIA	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
SENEGAL	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
SEYCHELLES			X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
SIERRA LEONE	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
SINGAPORE	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
SOLOMON ISLANDS	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
SOMALIA			X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
SOUTH AFRICA	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
SPAIN	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
SRI LANKA	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
SUDAN	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
SURINAME			X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					
SWAZILAND			X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X					

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1983 (continued)

State	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial Test Ban	Outer space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Non-proliferation	Sea-bed	BW Convention	ENMOD	Celestial bodies	Conventional weapons
	(s) (r)	(s) (r)	(s) (r)	(s) (r)	(s) (r)	(s) (r)	(s) (r)	(s) (r)	(s) (r)	(s) (r)	(s) (r) [†]
SWEDEN	X		X	X		X	X	X			X
SWITZERLAND*	X		X	X		X	X	X			X
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC		X	X	X		X		X	X		
THAILAND	X		X	X		X	X	X			X
TOGO		X	X	X		X	X	X			
TONGA**	X		X	X		X		X			
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO		X	X	X	X	X		X			
TUNISIA		X	X	X		X	X	X	X		
TURKEY		X	X	X		X	X	X			X
TUVALU**						X					
UGANDA		X	X	X		X		X			
UKRAINIAN SSR		X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
(A.P. II)											
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES								X			
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
(A.P. I&II)											
UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON		X	X	X		X	X				
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	X		X	X		X	X	X			
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
(A.P. I&II)											
UPPER VOLTA	X		X	X		X					
URUGUAY	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	
VANUATU											
VENEZUELA	X		X	X	X	X		X			
VIET NAM	X		X	X		X	X	X	X		X
YEMEN	X		X	X		X	X	X	X		X
YUGOSLAVIA	X		X	X		X	X	X	X		X

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1983 (continued)

State	Geneva Protocol		Antarctic Treaty		Partial Test Ban		Outer space		Treaty of Tlatelolco		Non-proliferation		Sea-bed		BW Convention		ENMOD		Celestial bodies		Conventional weapons	
	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)	(s)	(r)
ZAIRE.....			X		X	X	X				X	X				X	X					
ZAMBIA.....					X			X														
ZIMBABWE.....														X								

† = All States ratifying the Convention so far have given notification of their acceptance of Protocols I, II and III.
 * = Non-member States maintaining permanent observer missions to the United Nations.
 ** = Non-member and non-observer States belonging to specialized agencies.
 *** = A.P. means Additional Protocol.

Texts for the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to the Committee on Disarmament*

I. INTRODUCTION^a

1. The threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race, which already in 1978 gave rise to the justified alarm of the General Assembly, far from disappearing has considerably increased during the four years that have elapsed since the holding of its first special session devoted to disarmament. It was thus natural not to unduly delay the convening of the second special session, which, with the same purpose as the first, had been explicitly provided for in the Final Document of that session.

2. Both in the general debate of this second special session of the Assembly, in which an impressive number of heads of State or Government and Ministers of Foreign Affairs participated, as well as in the deliberations of the *Ad Hoc* Committee and the Working Groups, it became evident that there had been no erosion in the support of all fundamental conclusions of the Final Document, such as the following:

(a) The objective of security, which is an inseparable element of peace, has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. Yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind since, far from helping to strengthen international security, it on the contrary weakens it, and since existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are sufficient to destroy all life on earth.

(b) The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles, of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. On the other hand, progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.

(c) Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to the nuclear-weapon States and most of their allies, with prospects of further expansion and the danger of further increases in the expenditures of other countries. The hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or

* *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, para. 88, annex.

^a Draft prepared by the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in his capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament established at that session. The draft was not discussed in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group in 1983.

improvement of weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material but also technical and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries.

(d) Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

3. It was undoubtedly for reasons like the above that, in one of the last paragraphs of the Programme of Action outlined in the Final Document, the General Assembly decided that the implementation of the priorities defined therein should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which "remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the field of disarmament". The Assembly completed this statement, adding that the negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament and deciding that, with this purpose in mind, the Committee on Disarmament should undertake the elaboration of a "comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated".

4. The General Assembly did not only stress several times the importance of this goal which it called the "ultimate goal" of all disarmament efforts. On more than one occasion it stated also its opinion as to which should be the "immediate goal", defining it as "the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace".

5. Bearing in mind those antecedents and taking as the main basis for its deliberations the draft transmitted by the Committee on Disarmament, the General Assembly has elaborated this Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which received the approval by consensus of all the States Members of the United Nations which participated in its second special session devoted to disarmament. In addition to the present introduction, the Programme comprises five chapters whose titles, clearly indicative of their contents, are the following: "Objectives", "Principles", "Priorities", "Measures and stages of implementation" and "Machinery and procedures".

6. It has not been possible to reach agreement for the Comprehensive Programme to become a treaty, as some States would have preferred in order to make its provisions legally binding. There has been, however, unanimous support for the idea that all necessary steps must be taken to enhance the political and moral value of the Programme. It has thus been agreed that a special copy of the Programme shall be carried by a personal representative of the Secretary-General to the capitals of all States Members of the United Nations, in order to have it signed by the respective heads of State or Government. This symbolic act will be a clear sign that this time there is the required "political will" to proceed along the road of uninterrupted negotiations in good faith in the field of disarmament. Should there be some States where constitutional obstacles prevent recourse to the above procedures, alternative methods of similar significance should be employed. Thus the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, although not a treaty in itself, would indeed become a source of numerous successive treaties, thanks to which mankind may start the twenty-first century in conditions totally different from those that prevail at present and are the cause of deepest concern.

II. OBJECTIVES

1. The immediate objectives of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be to eliminate the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, the prevention of which remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day, to implement measures to halt

and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and to clear the path towards lasting peace. To this end, the Programme will also aim:

- To maintain and further the momentum generated by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;
- To initiate or engage in further negotiations, to expedite the halting of the arms race in all its aspects, in particular the nuclear arms race;
- To consolidate and develop the results reflected in agreements and treaties achieved so far, relevant to the problems of disarmament;
- To open and accelerate the process of genuine disarmament on an internationally agreed basis.

2. The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme is to ensure that general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is fully achieved.

3. Throughout the implementation of the Programme towards the progressive reduction and final elimination of armaments and armed forces, the following objectives should be pursued:

- To strengthen international peace and security, as well as the security of individual States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
- To contribute to the safeguarding of the sovereignty and independence of all States;
- To make, through the implementation of the Programme, an effective contribution to the economic and social development of States, in particular developing States;
- To increase international confidence and relaxation of international tension;
- To establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding with a view to promoting conditions favourable to the implementation of the Programme;
- To mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament, through balanced, factual and objective information and education in all regions of the world, so as to generate further understanding and support for the efforts to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament.

III. PRINCIPLES

1.^b The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples that the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible, and they have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.

2.^b The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency.

3.^b Progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.

4.^b All States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. They stress the special importance of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence, non-acquisition and non-annexation of territories by force and non-recognition of such acquisition or annexation, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

^b The placement of this paragraph in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be determined later.

5. In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements.

6.^b The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States.

7. Significant progress in disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, would be facilitated by parallel measures to strengthen the security of States and to improve the international situation in general.

8. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

9.^b Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances or be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means.

10. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

11. Negotiations should be based on the strict observance of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, with full recognition of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and reflecting the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in this sphere.

12. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitation, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security.

13. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security.

14. In a world of finite resources, there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. The continuation of the arms race is detrimental to and incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation. Consequently, there is a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter and resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.

15. Disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace

and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order.

16.^b Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization.

17. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

18. In accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

19.^b The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

20. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament should be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

21. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries.^c

22. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation.^d

23.^c In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

24. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed.

25. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development or prejudice their security.

26. Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concur-

^c One delegation reserved its position on the present text of this paragraph.

^d Some delegations felt that the language of this paragraph should be brought in accordance with paragraph 28 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

rently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

27. Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race. Efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare, so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes.

28. Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among States. When multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament are negotiated, every effort should be made to ensure that they are universally acceptable. The full compliance of all parties with the provisions contained in such agreements would contribute to the attainment of that goal.

29. All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.

30.^b The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned and the full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.

31. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests, bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied on a non-discriminatory basis.

32. As security and stability should be assured in all regions taking into account the specific needs and requirements of their respective situations, bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

33. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States.

34. Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament, such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed to by eight Latin American countries on 9 December 1974.

35.^b It is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation. In order that an international conscience may develop and that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disarmament with the full co-operation of Member States.

36.^b Draft multilateral disarmament conventions should be subjected to the normal procedures applicable in the law of treaties. Those submitted to the General Assembly for its commendation should be subject to full review by the Assembly.

37. Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures and to further the relaxation of international tension.

38.^b Taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by carrying out studies by the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts.

39.^b In particular publicity should be given to the decisions of the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

IV. PRIORITIES

1. In the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the ultimate goal, the priorities which reflect the urgency attached to the measures for negotiations are:

- Nuclear weapons;
- Other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons;
- Conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects;
- Reduction of armed forces.

2. Effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. Along with negotiations on these measures, effective measures should be negotiated to prohibit or prevent the development, production or use of other weapons of mass destruction, as well as on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments.

3. Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently. Bearing in mind these priorities, negotiations should be pursued on all measures which would lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

V. MEASURES AND STAGES OF IMPLEMENTATION^e

First stage

DISARMAMENT MEASURES

A. Nuclear weapons

I. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

^e The heading is without prejudice to the position of delegations with respect to questions relating to stages of implementation. The following text has been considered for eventual inclusion in the chapter on machinery and procedures:

All efforts will be made by States, particularly through the conduct of negotiations in good faith on specific disarmament measures, to achieve the goal of General and Complete Disarmament, as defined in the Comprehensive Programme, by the year 2000. In order to assure continued progress towards the full realization of this ultimate goal, a special session of the General Assembly shall be convened periodically to review the implementation of the measures included in the various stages of the Comprehensive Programme. The first such special session of the General Assembly shall be held in (1987) (1988) (1989), and will: (a) review the implementation of the measures included in the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme; (b) consider the readjustments that need to be made in the Programme in the light of the review and the steps that need to be taken to stimulate progress in its implementation; (c) elaborate in more concrete terms the measures to be implemented in the second stage of the Programme, taking into account the progress made so far and other developments in international relations, as well as science and technology; and (d) decide on the time for the next special session to review the implementation of the measures included, and adjusted as necessary, in the second stage of the Comprehensive Programme, with the understanding that such session would be held not later than six years after the first.

In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

2. The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and on the production on fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(c) A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

Consideration can be given in the course of the negotiations to mutual and agreed limitation or prohibition, without prejudice to the security of any State, or any types of nuclear armaments.

3. Nuclear test ban:

The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind. It would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore, all efforts should be made to conclude, as an important part of the process of nuclear disarmament, a multilateral nuclear-test-ban treaty at the earliest possible date.^f

4. Pending the conclusion of further agreements relating to nuclear disarmament, the USSR and the United States should, on a reciprocal basis, continue to refrain from actions which would undercut existing strategic arms agreements concluded between them.

5. USSR-United States strategic arms negotiations:^g

(Consultations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the text are under way.)

6. Bilateral negotiations on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe:^g

(Consultations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the text are under way.)

7. Multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament:^h

The urgent initiation of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations is of vital interest to the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. The conclusion of multilateral disarmament agreements would be facilitated by substantial progress in the bilateral negotiations in this area between the States which possess the most important arsenals and have a special responsibility in the field of nuclear disarmament. Also, multilateral negotiations are particularly important to achieve significant and universal progress towards the achievement of nuclear disarmament. This will require negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages, taking due account of the relative quantitative and qualitative importance of existing arsenals and the necessity of maintaining the undiminished security of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, at each stage, and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all

^f Some delegations reserved their position with respect to the first sentence of this text. Other delegations reserved their position with regard to the last sentence.

^g One delegation held that paragraphs 5 and 6 should be consolidated.

^h Two delegations reserved their position on the text of paragraph 7 pending the preparation of the text of paragraphs 5 and 6.

parties concerned, for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, for the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and for the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

In the course of such negotiations, a combination of the measures as detailed in paragraph 2 above, or a combination of different elements of such measures, could be considered.

The overall objective of the measures for nuclear disarmament outlined in the preceding paragraphs for negotiation during the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme, and on those included in subsequent stages, would be to achieve qualitative and quantitative limitations on and significant reductions of the nuclear-weapon arsenals existing at the beginning of the stage.

8. Avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war:
(Text pending.)

9. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons:

The nuclear-weapon States should take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Bearing in mind the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States, efforts should be pursued to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

10. Nuclear non-proliferation:

It is imperative, as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States, and on the other progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the former undertaking to stop the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament by urgent application of the measures outlined in the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document, and all States undertaking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Effective measures can and should be taken at the national level and through international agreements to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Therefore, the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should jointly take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by States parties to those instruments will be an important contribution to this end. Adherence to such instruments has increased in recent years and the hope has been expressed by the parties that this trend might continue.

Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. All States should also have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries. International co-operation in this field should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided that the agreed safeguard measures mentioned above are applied.

In accordance with the principles and provisions of General Assembly resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977, international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, should be strengthened.

11. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones:

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitute an important disarmament measure and should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, taking into account the characteristics of each region. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated, in particular: (i) to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone; (ii) to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

(a) Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), taking into account the views expressed on the adherence to it at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the General Conference of OPANAL and other relevant forums, and including ratification of additional Protocol I by all States concerned.

(b) In Africa, the Organization of African Unity has affirmed the denuclearization of the continent. The United Nations General Assembly in successive resolutions has supported the African initiative for the denuclearization of the continent and at its tenth special session the General Assembly, by consensus, called upon the Security Council to take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of this objective.

(c) The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in compliance with General Assembly resolution 35/147 would greatly enhance international peace and security. Pending the establishment of such a zone in the region, States of the region should solemnly declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, and agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Consideration should be given to a Security Council role in advancing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

(d) All States in the region of South Asia have expressed their determination to keep their countries free of nuclear weapons. No action should be taken by them which might deviate from that objective. In this context, the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been dealt with in several resolutions of the General Assembly, which is keeping the subject under consideration.

(e) Efforts to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world should be promoted at the initiative of States which intend to become part of the zone.

(f) Ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.

B. Other weapons of mass destruction

1. All States should adhere to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

2. All States which have not yet done so should consider adhering to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

3. It is necessary to make all possible efforts for the early conclusion of an international convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

4. An international treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons should be concluded, bearing in mind the negotiations under way in the Committee on Disarmament and all proposals made in connection therewith.

5. Effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such types and systems of weapons. This question should be kept under continuing review.

C. *Conventional weapons and armed forces*

1. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions.ⁱ

2. (Interested States will have to continue consultations on the text of the paragraph on Europe.)

3. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States. Such measures might include the following:

(a) Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament, such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed to by eight Latin American countries on 9 December 1974.

(b) Consultations should be carried out among major arms suppliers and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons, based in particular on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

4. Prohibition of restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons, including those which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have indiscriminate effects:

(a) Adherence by all States to the agreement adopted by the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

(b) Broadening of the prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, either through amendments to the existing Protocols or through the conclusion of additional Protocols, in accordance with article 8 of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

(c) The result of the above-mentioned Conference should be considered by all States, especially producer States, in regard to the question of the transfer of such weapons to other States.

ⁱ In the view of one delegation, the inclusion of this paragraph was dependent on the text that may be agreed for paragraph 21 of the chapter on principles.

D. *Military budgets*

1. Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

2. The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means of its implementation acceptable to all of them, taking account of the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction of military budgets.

3. The General Assembly should continue to consider what concrete steps should be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets, bearing in mind the relevant proposals and documents of the United Nations on this question.

E. *Related measures*

1. Further steps to prohibit military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques:

Review of the need for a further prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques with a view to the adoption of further measures to eliminate the danger to mankind from such use.

2. Further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof:

Consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof in order to promote the peaceful use of, and to avoid an arms race in, that environment, taking into account the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the proposals made during the First and Second Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, as well as any relevant technological developments.^j

3. In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

4. The establishment of zones of peace:

The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions, to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole.

(a) South-East Asia:

Steps should be taken by the States of the region towards the early establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia, taking into account the need for ensuring stability and for enhancing prospects for co-operation and development in the region.^k

(b) (Interested States will have to continue consultations on the text on the Indian Ocean);

^j Two delegations reserved their position with respect to the reference in this paragraph to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

^k Some delegations reserved their position on the present text of this subparagraph.

(c) (Interested States will have to continue consultations on the text on the Mediterranean).

OTHER MEASURES

1. *Confidence-building measures*

In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament. For this purpose, measures such as the following, and other measures yet to be agreed upon, should be undertaken:

(a) The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tensions, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict;

(b) States should assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament.

2. *Prevention of the use of force in international relations*

(a) Strict adherence and full commitment by all States Members of the United Nations to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular the principles of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any States or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence, non-acquisition and non-annexation of territories by force and non-recognition of such acquisition or annexation, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

(b) Strengthening the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security and full implementation of the decisions of the Security Council by all States Members of the United Nations in accordance with their obligations under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter.

3. *Mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament*

In order to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament, the specific measures set forth below, designed to increase the dissemination of information about the armaments race and the efforts to halt and reverse it, should be adopted in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner:

(a) Throughout the implementation of the Programme, therefore, governmental and non-governmental information organs of Member States and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies as well as non-governmental organizations should, as appropriate, undertake further programmes of information relating to the danger of the armaments race as well as to disarmament efforts and negotiations and their results, particularly by means of annual activities conducted in connection with Disarmament Week. These actions should constitute a programme to further alert world opinion to the danger of war in general and nuclear war in particular.

(b) With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems created by the armaments race and of the need for disarmament, Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels.

(c) The World Disarmament Campaign, which was solemnly launched by the General Assembly at the opening meeting of its second special session devoted to disarmament.

ment, should provide an opportunity for discussion and debate in all countries on all points of view relating to disarmament issues, objectives and conditions. The Campaign has three primary purposes: to inform, to educate and to generate public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

(d) As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. Also, studies pursued under the auspices of the United Nations, in particular by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, could bring a useful contribution to the knowledge and exploration of disarmament problems, especially in the long term.

(e) Member States should be encouraged to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament, to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the armaments race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

(f) In particular, publicity should be given to the decisions of the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, especially the Final Document of the first special session.

4. *Verification*^m

(a) In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements.

(b) In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development.ⁿ

DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. In view of the relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development, the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should make an effective contribution to economic and social development of all States, in particular of the developing countries. In this context, it is of particular significance that substantial progress in disarmament should be made in accordance with the responsibility that each State bears in the field of disarmament, so that real resources now being used for military purposes can be released to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

2. Disarmament would contribute over the long term to the effective economic and social development of all States, in particular developing countries, by contributing towards reducing the economic disparities between developed and developing countries and establishing the new international economic order on the basis of justice, equity and co-operation and towards solving other global problems.

3. The Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security.

^l The placement of this paragraph in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be determined later.

^m Some delegations indicated a preference for the paragraphs under this heading to be amplified and given greater prominence, such as an introduction to chapter V, "Measures and stages of implementation", or as a separate chapter preceding chapter V. One delegation held that the paragraphs under this heading should form part of chapter VI, "Machinery and procedures".

ⁿ The final placement of the second sentence of this paragraph will be determined later.

1. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Intermediate stage^o

Last stage^o

VI. MACHINERY AND PROCEDURES

1. The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, should continue to have a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament.

2. Negotiations on multilateral measures of disarmament envisaged in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should, as a rule, be conducted in the Committee on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

3. Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

4. The United Nations should be kept duly informed through the General Assembly, or any other appropriate United Nations channel reaching all Members of the Organization, of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

5. All efforts will be made by States, particularly through the conduct of negotiations in good faith on specific disarmament measures, to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament, as defined in the Comprehensive Programme, by the year 2000. In order to assure continued progress towards the full realization of this ultimate goal, a special session of the General Assembly shall be convened periodically to review the implementation of the measures included in the various stages of the Comprehensive Programme. The first such special session of the General Assembly shall be held in (1987) (1988) (1989), and will: (a) review the implementation of the measures included in the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme; (b) consider the readjustments that need to be made in the Programme in the light of the review and the steps that need to be taken to stimulate progress in its implementation; (c) elaborate in more concrete terms the measures to be implemented in the second stage of the Programme, taking into account the progress made so far and other developments in international relations, as well as science and technology; and (d) decide on the time for the next special session to review the implementation of the measures included, and adjusted as necessary, in the second stage of the Comprehensive Programme, with the understanding that such session would be held not later than six years after the first.^p

6. In addition to the periodic reviews to be carried out at special sessions, there should be an annual review of the implementation of the Programme. Therefore, an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament" should be included annually in the agenda of the regular sessions of the General Assembly. To facilitate the work of the Assembly in this regard, the Secretary-General should submit annually a report to the General Assembly on progress in the implementation of the Programme.

^o The heading is without prejudice to the position of delegations with respect to questions relating to stages of implementation.

^p This paragraph has not been discussed. Therefore, the issues dealt with therein remain open.

7. During its annual review, or at its periodic special sessions to review the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the General Assembly may, as appropriate, consider and recommend further measures and procedures to enhance the implementation of the Programme.

8. In the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission shall continue functioning as a deliberative body, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, and shall consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament.

9. Proposals listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the first special session and annex II of the Concluding Document of the second special session devoted to disarmament should be considered, and decisions taken, at an appropriate time.

10. At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation.

Activities of the United Nations Environment Programme related to disarmament*

Introduction

The Declaration on the Human Environment adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held at Stockholm in June 1972 and endorsed by the General Assembly, clearly states in principle 26 that:

"Man and his environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of mass destruction. States must strive to reach prompt agreement, in the relevant international organs, on the elimination and complete destruction of such weapons."

Since the creation of UNEP, its Governing Council has adopted a number of resolutions, and also some of the activities of UNEP are related to that principle for the enhancement of the environment. A brief review of such resolutions and activities is given in this appendix.

Resolutions and reports

A. *Effects of weapons on ecosystems*

1. The United Nations Conference on Desertification, held in 1977, adopted resolution 4 concerning the effect of weapons of mass destruction on ecosystems. It noted that the use of chemical and biological weapons during wars was one of the factors contributing to desertification in certain parts of the world and that those factors were most seriously felt in developing countries, including those which were currently engaged in armed struggle for independence and those which had recently achieved independence through armed struggle. It condemned the use of any techniques that cause the desertification of the environment and denounced the effects of destructive weapons and practices on the ecosystems of all countries. The use of chemical and biological weapons which destroy or diminish the potential of ecosystems and are conducive to desertification was also condemned and the prohibition of the use of poisons in water as a weapon of war was demanded. Resolution 4 of the Desertification Conference was endorsed by General Assembly resolution 32/172. In implementation of the resolution, UNEP and the former United Nations Centre for Disarmament prepared a study on the effect of weapons of mass destruction on ecosystems. On the basis of that study, the Secretary-General presented a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session^a (A/33/259, annex II).

B. *Remnants of war*

2. The problem of material remnants of war has been the subject of several decisions of the UNEP Governing Council and the General Assembly since 1975. At its thirtieth session, the General Assembly requested UNEP to undertake a study of the problem of the material remnants of wars, particularly mines, and their effects on the environment, and to submit a report on the subject at its thirty-first session (resolution 3435 (XXX), paragraph 5).

* Text contributed by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

^a *UNEP Studies*, vol. 1, "The effects of weapons on ecosystems", by J. P. Robinson of the Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, Brighton, England. (Published for the United Nations Environment Programme by Pergamon Press.)

The Governing Council of UNEP, at its fourth session, in April 1976, by decision 80 (IV) authorized the Executive Director, *inter alia*, to proceed with the study requested by the General Assembly and, on its behalf, to submit an interim report to the Assembly at its thirty-first session. The Governing Council also agreed to consider the matter further at its fifth session with a view to submitting a more complete study to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session.

3. The above-mentioned interim report on the study was submitted to the General Assembly in December 1976 (A/31/210). At the same session, the Assembly adopted resolution 31/111 requesting UNEP to ensure the completion of the study.

The mandate of UNEP decision 80 (IV) was reiterated by decision 101 (V), adopted by the Council at its fifth session.

4. The Executive Director, in compliance with General Assembly resolutions 3435 (XXX) and 31/111, submitted a report (A/32/137) entitled "Material remnants of wars and their effect on the environment" to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session, highlighting the adverse effect of remnants of wars on the environment. The General Assembly took note of the report and, *inter alia*, invited concerned Governments to co-operate in the matter with the UNEP Executive Director (resolution 32/168, December 1977).

5. The Governing Council of UNEP, at its sixth session, in May 1978, requested the Executive Director of UNEP to continue to gather, through the International Referral System, sources of information on methods of dealing with environmental problems caused by the material remnants of wars, to render assistance to Governments in preparing their programmes for the elimination of mines in their territories and to carry out and promote studies on the environmental effects of the material remnants of wars, particularly mines (decision 6/15, May 1978).

6. The problem of remnants of war was again the subject of General Assembly resolution 35/71 of 5 December 1980 and UNEP Governing Council decision 9/5 of 25 May 1981. At its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly took note of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the above resolution (A/36/531) and adopted resolution 36/188 requesting the Secretary-General to continue his contacts and consultations with Member States in order to find ways and means of solving the problem, including the possibility of convening a conference under the auspices of the United Nations. A similar request was also made by the UNEP Governing Council at its tenth session in its decision 10/8 of 28 May 1982.

7. Pursuant to resolution 36/188, the views and observations of all States were sought by a letter from the Executive Director of UNEP on behalf of the Secretary-General. A report on the replies received (A/37/415) was submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. In its resolution 37/215, the Assembly took note of the report and requested the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the Executive Director of UNEP, to prepare a factual study on the problem of remnants of war, particularly mines, which would include an analysis of the following aspects of the problem:

(a) The economic and environmental problems experienced by developing countries affected by remnants of war, the loss of life and property they have suffered, their specific demands in this respect and the extent to which the responsible States are willing to compensate the affected States and to assist them in solving the problem.

(b) The legal status of the problem.

(c) The international co-operation required to solve the problem.

(d) The role of the United Nations in this regard, including the possibility of convening a conference pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 35/71 and 36/188.

It also requested the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the Executive Director of UNEP, to submit the study in time for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

8. In pursuance of resolution 37/215, the Executive Director of UNEP again sought the views of Governments and, within the framework of a joint UNEP/SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) programme of studies on military activities and the human environment (see F below), organized a meeting of high-level experts on the economic, environmental and legal aspects of remnants of war. They met in July 1983 and

produced a study, "Explosive remnants of conventional war". The study was annexed to the report of the Secretary-General to the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly (A/38/383), which also reflected the information and views forwarded to UNEP by those Governments that had replied to the letter of the Executive Director.

9. On 19 December 1983, at its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 38/162, which, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the Executive Director of UNEP, to continue to seek the views of States on the recommendations contained in section VIII of the above-mentioned study; also requested the Secretary-General to intensify his efforts to urge the States concerned immediately to conduct bilateral consultations with the aim of concluding, as soon as possible, agreements for the solution of that problem, it being understood that the legitimate right of the affected developing countries to full compensation for damages due to them should be ensured; and called upon all States to co-operate with the Secretary-General in carrying out the tasks requested of him so as to enable him, in co-operation with the Executive Director of UNEP, to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session a report on the results of his consultations and endeavours with the States concerned.

C. *Pernicious effects of the arms race on nature*

10. The General Assembly, at its thirty-fifth session, in October 1980, adopted, by a recorded vote of 68 to none, with 47 abstentions, resolution 35/8 on the historical responsibility of States for the preservation of nature for present and future generations and asked UNEP to prepare a report on the pernicious effects of the arms race on nature and to seek the views of States on possible measures to be taken at the international level for the preservation of nature. At the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, a progress report on the implementation of resolution 35/8 was submitted by the Secretary-General (A/36/532 and Corr.1). The Assembly adopted resolution 36/7 by which it requested the Secretary-General, *inter alia*, to complete the preparation of a report containing recommendations for the adoption by States of specific obligations and measures relating to the protection of nature from the pernicious effects of the arms race and to the limitation and prohibition of the types of military activity which present the greatest danger for nature. It also requested the Secretary-General to submit that report to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

11. A summarized version of a study on the pernicious effects of the arms race on nature was submitted to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament (A/S-12/9).

D. *The state of the world environment*

12. The Governing Council of UNEP, at its seventh session, in May 1979, decided to include the topic "Environmental effects of military activity" in the report on the state of the environment. In pursuance of that request, the publication *The State of the World Environment: Selected Topics* included chapter V on the environmental effects of military activity.

13. The UNEP report *The World Environment 1972-1982*, prepared with the main objective of assessing the state of the world environment decade after the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, included chapter 16 on peace and security.^b

E. *Hostile use of environmental modification*

14. The Governing Council of UNEP, at its fifth session, in May 1977, took note of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques annexed to General Assembly resolution 31/72 of 10 December

^b *The World Environment 1972-1982*. A report by the United Nations Environment Programme. Edited by M. W. Holdgate, M. Kassas and G. F. White and co-ordinated by E. El-Hinnawi, Tycooly International, Dublin, 1982.

1976 and requested member States to facilitate exchanges of information on the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes (UNEP/GC.102(V)).

15. The Governing Council of UNEP, at its eighth session, adopted decision 8/7, section (a) of which was entitled "Provision for co-operation between States in weather modification". In paragraph 1 of that decision, the Governing Council decided, *inter alia*, that weather modification should be dedicated to the benefit of mankind and the environment.

16. The issue of environmental modification techniques is one of the activities included in the joint UNEP/SIPRI programme of studies on military activities and the human environment. A symposium on the legal and technical aspects of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques will be held in co-operation with UNIDIR in April 1984.

F. *Military activity and the environment in the context of the System-Wide Medium-Term Environment Programme (SWMTEP)*

17. In its decision 9/10 (B), the UNEP Governing Council approved, on a provisional basis, the structure and objectives of SWMTEP. At the same session, the Council, by decision 9/4, requested the Executive Director to include in his presentation of SWMTEP the analysis of the impact of the arms race on nature.

18. Also at its ninth session, the UNEP Governing Council approved decision 9/8, on global armaments spending, which called upon Governments to stop the arms race and, until disarmament was achieved, to allocate at least 0.001 per cent of armaments spending for development projects and the protection of the environment.

19. The Governing Council of UNEP, meeting in a Session of Special Character in May 1982, adopted resolution I which indicated the main environmental trends, problems and priorities to be addressed. The resolution drew attention to the fact that the continuing increase in the production, stockpiling and risk of use of weapons of mass destruction and the development of new types of chemical and bacteriological weapons not only posed a major threat to the environment and even to life on earth, but also competed for limited resources that could be better used for constructive purposes. Later on the resolution requested that priority for action be given to ensure that the environmental implications of existing and new types of armaments and warfare would be taken into account.

20. At the same Session of Special Character, the Council approved resolution III, on arms and the environment, which, considering that a major threat to the environment, of greater concern than a decade before, was the possibility of a global confrontation, appealed to Governments and the world community as a whole to do the utmost to halt the arms race and thereby prevent a major threat to the environment. It then requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to bring the appeal to the attention of the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

21. The structure of SWMTEP was approved by the Council by decision 10/13 of 31 May 1982. This structure included chapter XV on the arms race and the environment (UNEP/GC.10/7 and UNEP/GC.11/7), which indicated, *inter alia*, the following activities that UNEP could implement in co-operation with other agencies: preparation of reports on the state of the art on possible effects of military activity on the environment, examination of the issues of ecologically important areas in relation to potential damage of military activity, analysis of existing treaties in relation to environmental effects of military activities, study of the use of natural resources for military activities, etc.

22. Part of the above-mentioned activities are considered in a joint programme of studies on military activities and the human environment that UNEP has with SIPRI.

G. *Ozone research and monitoring*

23. UNEP organized a meeting of experts designated by Governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations at Washington, D.C., in March 1977. The outcome of the meeting was an agreed World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer. Following the recommendations contained in the Plan of Action, the Co-ordinating Committee on

the Ozone Layer was set up. It was composed of representatives of the international agencies and non-governmental organizations participating in implementing the Plan of Action, as well as representatives of countries with major scientific programmes contributing to it.

24. The Committee has met six times to review progress made in implementing the Plan of Action, identify deficiencies and make recommendations for future work. An assessment of ozone depletion and its impacts was made by the Committee at each meeting. Members also reported on ongoing and planned research work carried out by their countries or organizations relevant to the Plan of Action. The assessment, reports and recommendations made at the meetings on the CCOL are published regularly in the UNEP Ozone Layer Bulletin, an eighth edition of which will be published in mid-1984.

25. UNEP is supporting a Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Project meant to provide advice to member States, to the United Nations and other appropriate international organizations concerning various aspects of atmospheric ozone.

26. The Governing Council of UNEP, at its ninth session, in May 1981, adopted decision 9/13, section B of which is entitled "Protection of the ozone layer". In paragraphs 1 and 2 of that decision, the Governing Council decided, *inter alia*, to initiate work on the elaboration of a global framework of a convention for the protection of the ozone layer. It further decided to establish an *ad hoc* working group of legal and technical experts which should report, through the Executive Director of UNEP, to the Governing Council on the progress of its work.

27. Three sessions of the Working Group will be held in the period 1983-1984 for the purpose of developing a draft convention for the protection of the ozone layer. Two draft technical annexes concerning research and systematic observations and information exchange and a draft protocol on the regulation of emissions of chlorofluorocarbons were also elaborated simultaneously by the Working Group. The Working Group will meet in late 1984 or early 1985 to complete its work before the draft convention is considered by a meeting of plenipotentiaries.

H. Radiation from nuclear explosions

28. The report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR)^c included special chapters on the effects of nuclear explosions. Artificial radioactive material from nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere has been the cause of widespread contamination of the environment. The Committee has regularly assessed the exposure to which the population of the world has been subjected as a result of the atmospheric nuclear tests.

29. The same report examined the genetic effects of radiation in the children of atomic bomb survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

^c *Ionizing radiation: sources and biological effects*. UNSCEAR report to the General Assembly, 1982; see annex E, Exposures resulting from nuclear explosions, and annex I, Genetic effects of radiation.

Activities of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization related to disarmament*

At its twenty-first session, the General Conference adopted resolution 11.1, entitled "Creation of a climate of opinion conducive to the halting of the arms race and the transition to disarmament". It also adopted, at the same session, resolution 3.01 on the programme for the social sciences and their applications, of which objective 2.1 concerns the "promotion of peace research, in particular on manifestations of violation of peace, causes preventing its realisation, ways and means to eliminate them and proper measures to be taken in order to maintain and reinforce a just, lasting and constructive peace at the level of groups, societies and the world . . ."

In conformity with these two resolutions, UNESCO has continued in 1983 its activities, particularly in relation to research, publishing and the organization of training seminars.

Research and publications

The results of a pluridisciplinary research project on research and development activities in the military field and their influence on scientific communities and on scientific and technological development have been published in the *International Social Science Journal* (volume 35, No. 1, 1983) under the title "Burdens of Militarization". This volume, introduced by Alfred Kastler, the Nobel Prize Winner for Physics in 1966, deals in its first two parts with the subjects "Military research and development in industrialized countries" and "Militarization in the Third World" respectively. In its concluding section, this volume examines the potential role of the scientific community in the conversion of the arms industry in the establishment of a new international economic order and in disarmament.

The *UNESCO Yearbook on Peace and Conflict Studies 1982* (the third volume in the *UNESCO Yearbook* series) was published in 1983 and contains studies on approaches to the problems of peace and security as well as detailed information on the activities of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

As in the 1980 and 1981 volumes of the *Yearbook*, this volume also includes methodological studies on education and research in the field of peace and conflict as well as information on the developments of the relevant competent institutions. The 1983 *Yearbook*, to be published in the course of 1984, will touch upon the theme of the perception of the threat to, and of the conceptions of, security, a theme which was the subject of an international Expert Meeting held at UNESCO Headquarters from 2 to 5 November 1982.

Finally, French and Spanish translations of the manual published in English in 1981 by UNESCO entitled *Armaments, Arms Control and Disarmament* are being prepared.

Several publications, which have been prepared over the period 1981-1983, are to appear in 1985. They include a book for teachers on the teaching of contemporary world problems relating to education for peace, disarmament and human rights, a guide on methods of disarmament education and a study on the possibility of co-ordinating the efforts of educational institutions with those of other social institutions able to contribute towards peace and disarmament.

* Text contributed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

Meetings

The Intergovernmental Conference on Education for International Understanding, Co-operation and Peace and Education relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms, with a view to developing a climate of opinion favourable to the strengthening of security and disarmament, which was held at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris (12-20 April 1983), was convened by the Director-General in pursuance of resolution 1/01 (paragraph 5 (d)), adopted by the General Conference at its twenty-first session, and in accordance with the work plan of the Approved Programme and Budget for 1981-1983. The Conference was considered by the participants as an important landmark in the UNESCO programme for the development of international education by increasing awareness of the role played by education in the fields covered by the recommendation concerning education for international understanding, co-operation and peace and education relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms, adopted by UNESCO in 1974.

The discussions clarified the role of education and the tasks which devolve upon it in the light of earlier decisions taken by the General Conference and the United Nations General Assembly, and of the conclusions and recommendations of certain meetings convened by UNESCO, such as the World Congress on Disarmament Education.

Of the 21 recommendations adopted by the Intergovernmental Conference, 20 dealt with measures to be taken in order to attain the objectives of the 1974 recommendation. Recommendation 15 in particular concerns the contribution made by the mass media to the subject of the Conference.

Within the framework of the Organization's contribution to the World Disarmament Campaign launched by the General Assembly on 7 June 1982, UNESCO organized from 18 to 22 April 1983, in Nairobi, Kenya, an International Symposium on the Media and Disarmament. Thirteen main participants, researchers and journalists from different countries, were invited to attend the symposium in their personal capacity.

Topics related to disarmament were studied by a number of the 1,700 institutions (in 86 member States) participating in the Associated Schools Project. An International Congress on the occasion of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Associated Schools Project was convened in Sofia, Bulgaria (12-16 September 1983) in pursuance of resolution 1/01 (paragraph 5 (d)), mentioned above. The Congress elaborated a medium-term strategy (1984-1989) for the development of the Project, one of the objectives of which is to contribute towards the Action Plan for Disarmament Education.

From 5 to 9 December 1983, UNESCO organized in Dakar, Senegal, a regional seminar on peace research and disarmament education in Africa. The seminar had as its objectives the definition of regional priorities as regards peace research and the in-depth consideration of the ways and means of integrating disarmament problems with the process of education in Africa. In order to broaden the reflection of the participants (representatives from African universities and observers from international non-governmental organizations and the United Nations University), studies were prepared on the following themes: the problematic of peace and disarmament in Africa; African perception of the notion of security; the economic aspects of armaments and the development of African countries; the status of disarmament education and peace research in Africa; ways and means of integrating peace research and disarmament education with the education process in Africa; *apartheid* and the southern African liberation movements; and the strategy for regional and international co-operation in the field of peace research and disarmament education in Africa.

The seminar was the last in a series of three regional training seminars, foreseen in the Organization's Approved Programme and Budget for 1981-1983 following the recommendations of the World Congress on Disarmament Education, organized by UNESCO in 1980. The first of the regional seminars for the Latin American and Caribbean region was held in Venezuela in October 1981, and the second seminar for the Asia and Pacific region was held in Indonesia from 30 August to 3 September 1982.

Conclusion: principal orientation of the Approved Programme and Budget of UNESCO for 1984-1985

At its twenty-second session, the General Conference adopted resolution 20 entitled "The role of UNESCO in generating a climate of public opinion conducive to the halting of the arms race and the transition to disarmament". The General Conference also adopted resolution 13.1 on Major Programme XIII: "Peace, international understanding, human rights and the rights of peoples". In paragraph 2 (a) (ii) of this resolution, the General Conference invited the Director-General, *inter alia*, to promote research into the causes and consequences of the arms race and the creation of conditions conducive to disarmament by encouraging study of the problems of armaments and their consequences in UNESCO fields of competence, and of the links between peace, disarmament and development, in association with the activities provided for under subprogramme VIII 1.1: "Development and international relations".

In accordance with these resolutions, the Approved Programme and Budget for 1984-1985 foresees a number of activities, as outlined in subprogrammes XIII.1.1, XIII.1.2 and XIII.3.1 to 3.4. These activities involve:

- The philosophical reflection on peace in the present world context;
- The study of factors contributing to peace and research into the causes and consequences of conflicts and their different interpretation;
- The analysis of international relations in their political, social and cultural dimensions and development of the study and teaching of public international law;
- The study of the problems of armaments and their consequences in UNESCO fields of competence;
- The study of the links between peace, disarmament and development;
- The improvement of action to implement the 1974 recommendation and stimulation of activities concerning the follow-up to the 1983 Intergovernmental Conference;
- Action for the extension, in higher education, of education for peace, disarmament and respect for human rights and the rights of peoples;
- Out-of-school education and adult education;
- An experimental project concerning the role of the mass media in spreading knowledge and information relating to peace, human rights and the rights of peoples;
- Promotion of co-operation between educational institutions and social institutions, in particular the mass media;
- Encouragement of reflection and action by young people.

Activities of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations related to disarmament*

While FAO has no specific mandate in the area of disarmament, it cannot ignore or fail to be concerned by the contrast between the escalation of world military spending and the chronic shortage of resources for development programmes. FAO's concern is all the greater as there are no perceptible signs that this deplorable state of affairs will cease.

In the fulfilment of its mandate in the food and agriculture sector, besides bringing relief to the victims of wars and disturbances, FAO continues to be active in its efforts to contribute to the dissemination of information on the perilous effects of the arms race.

In this connection, the Organization wishes to report that on the occasion of Disarmament Week, starting on 24 October 1983, it contributed the following message:

FAO welcomes the observance of Disarmament Week. As emerged very clearly from the World Food Day celebrations throughout the world and at FAO Headquarters on 16 October, rapid disarmament is an essential requisite in any attempt to alleviate the sufferings of the poorest people in the world. The United Nations has consistently been trying to achieve progress in disarmament. Despite these efforts, however, the results are discouraging.

There is a stalemate in negotiations in strategic nuclear arms control. Not only is the planet being rapidly turned into a vastly overarmed camp but we are also witnessing the beginning of a militarization of space.

In a vain attempt to ensure each nation's security, astronomical sums of money have been and are still increasingly being wasted on the building of destructive power. Since 1945 there have been over 150 wars in which millions of people have lost their lives, and millions more have been crippled, bereaved or made homeless and hungry. Villages, towns, cities, whole countries have been left hating, distrusting and fearing each other.

At a time of mounting dangers when the "overkill" capacity of nuclear weaponry threatens to extinguish all life on earth, FAO appeals once again to the leaders of nations finally to acknowledge and recognize the rights of people to life and to food thereby putting into practice the principles embodied in the United Nations Charter and in the Constitution of FAO.

Throughout the year under review, the Director-General repeatedly appealed to world leaders to reflect on the "absurdity and danger of an overarmed but underfed humanity", condemning in his major policy statements the tragedy of the arms race.

ANNEX I

Excerpt from an address to the staff of FAO by the Director-General

12 January 1983

MILITARY EXPENDITURE

Can we watch unmoved as more than 600 thousand million dollars a year are swallowed up in military expenditure, when 15 to 18 thousand million invested annually from now to the end of the century would suffice to put the poorest countries on the road to food self-sufficiency?

But, of course, the peasants in the developing countries are not only poor: they are also isolated. They do not form, as in the West, powerful professional associations able to

* Text contributed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

impose their views even on government councils. And in the developed countries, development aid does not have a pressure group as persuasive as the military-industrial complex.

This frantic arms race has disastrous repercussions on the world as a whole. It maintains a climate of insecurity and tension, exhausts economies, diverts resources to sterile purposes and increases indebtedness, particularly in the third world.

The industrial countries devote to arms 20 times more than the amount allocated to assistance to the third world.

When contemplating this absurd expenditure, one cannot help but reflect that 2.3 thousand million dollars would have been enough to cover the fertilizer imports of the poorest countries in 1981-1982; or that with 15 thousand million dollars, 3 million hectares of new land could be brought under irrigation; or that 4 thousand million dollars would be enough to procure all the draught animal equipment necessary for 90 developing countries.

Unfortunately the second special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, held in New York from 7 June to 9 July 1982, produced almost no results, and the discussions in Geneva, Vienna and elsewhere drag on eternally. However, the decision by the General Assembly to launch a World Disarmament Campaign deserves to be supported. FAO will consider how it can contribute to this Campaign, within its modest limits.

ANNEX II

Excerpt from a statement at the informal meeting of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination on problems of development by the Director-General of FAO

Paris, 30 March 1983

To alleviate the problem, should a two-tier price system be established, which would ensure guaranteed remunerative prices for producers and subsidized prices for consumers? Or should producers be assisted with other forms of income support, as is done in nearly all the developed countries?

I know that this idea does not sit well with the champions of financial orthodoxy. And, what is more, a reduction in price supports for foodstuffs or other goods — I mentioned fertilizer just a moment ago — often is one of the requirements established for the granting of loans. Why not make the granting of loans conditional on a decrease in the expenditure of the Ministry of Defence or Armaments, rather than in funds for foodstuffs?

ANNEX III

Excerpt from a statement at the eighth session of the Committee on World Food Security by the Director-General of FAO

Rome, 13 April 1983

THE PARADOX OF WORLD ECONOMIC PRIORITIES

The world economic scene is characterized by a host of incredible paradoxes: the human family — this humanity that we like to say is unified — is rent by conflicts; everywhere, we see nothing but tension, turmoil and torment. Disregarding the very foundations of their fragile economies, countries race towards catastrophe, hurtling into open or insidious warfare. Already impoverished peoples are submerged by waves of refugees plunged in the depths of human misery. Trade, aid and resources from institutions providing humanitarian and development assistance are shrinking; world military expenditures are expanding at a dizzy rate and today are 20 times higher than official development assistance. A single nuclear aircraft carrier costs more than the GNP of 53 countries. Each year the developing countries spend nearly as much on importing arms as on importing foodstuffs.

As to the proposed global negotiations, there has been no definite progress. No matter how widely the principle of world interdependence is accepted, countries disregard it in their

policies. The time has truly come for us to understand that no problem can be viewed in isolation any longer, whether it concerns the North or the South, the economic order or food security. Never before have the security and stability of so many developing countries depended so closely on economic growth and on progress in the agricultural and rural sector. At the summit meeting of non-aligned countries at New Delhi, one head of State clearly warned us: the slightest aggravation of the situation may set off riots, rebellions and revolutions.

ANNEX IV

Excerpt from a statement at the sixth session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development by the Director-General of FAO

Belgrade, 8 June 1983

ARMAMENTS OR DEVELOPMENT?

I wish to raise another matter which, although not directly related to the activities of FAO or those of UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), may have profound repercussions on the world in which we are carrying out our mission. The Charter of the United Nations stipulates "that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest". This principle has been enshrined in history, but is far from being a fact of contemporary reality. Indeed, today 100 million persons are involved directly or indirectly in military activities, which consume no less than 4.5 per cent of the world's GNP, and which are certainly not undertaken "in the common interest". Resources which should be invested in development are devoured by armaments. The developing countries alone today absorb 75 per cent of the world's arms imports. In 1979 the military expenditure of the two super-Powers exceeded the total value of world trade in agricultural goods. The most sophisticated weapons are being bought and sold even in the heart of the most remote regions. In such an environment, recourse to violence for political ends is no longer unthinkable: on the contrary, it is entirely commonplace.

If the rising tide of military expenditure does not ebb, if the spirit of the United Nations Charter is not revived, we may find ourselves bequeathing to the twenty-first century a legacy of devastation rather than development.

ANNEX V

Excerpt from a statement to the eighty-third session of the FAO Council by the Director-General

Rome, 13-24 June 1983

MISSILES, MONEY AND FOOD

Mr. Chairman, it could be said that the world's most urgent problems today can be summed up in three words—missiles, money and food. The excessive abundance of armaments, the instability of the monetary system, and the extreme fragility of food supplies, especially for the poorest countries and the poorest people, are major challenges of the mid-1980s. All three must be tackled and solved if there is to be hope for a better global economy.

ARMAMENTS

I am not going to moralize here about the resources spent on arms which should be channelled to development. Let me just point out that the world contains over 17,000 targeted strategic weapons. The military expenditures of the two super-Powers exceed the entire value of all world trade in agricultural products. Arms exports are an important factor in some economies. And the developing countries are now responsible for 75 per cent of all arms imports; in 1980 they devoted over 300 million dollars a day to military expenditures.

ANNEX VI

**Excerpt from a statement to the 1983 second regular session
of the Economic and Social Council
by the Director-General of FAO**

Geneva, 7 July 1983

The contrast between military spending on an exponential curve and social programmes, which are questioned in spite of their negligible amounts, continues to be painfully acute.

ANNEX VII

**Excerpt from an address on the occasion of the
Third World Food Day by the Director-General of FAO**

Rome, 17 October 1983

CONTRADICTIONS AND ABSURDITIES

How would we explain to them, in fact, some of the contradictions and absurdities of our time:

— That, for example, the military expenditures of Member Governments of the United Nations—at \$700 billion annually—represent about 30 times all the official development assistance allocated to the relief of social and economic problems in the third world;

— That the military budgets of the developing countries themselves, by 1980, amounted to almost \$115 billion, causing one to wonder what comparative priority is being accorded to food and agriculture or agrarian reform and rural development.

ANNEX VIII

**Excerpt from a statement to the twenty-second session
of the FAO Conference by the Director-General**

Rome, 5-24 November 1983

WORLD ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

The increase in the number of local conflicts and areas of tension has fostered a climate of uncertainty and suspicion which does little to encourage international solidarity or further development. All too often, confrontation is preferred to dialogue.

Nations are being bled dry by the arms race, and particularly the weakest ones. What is the logic in a suicidal form of behaviour which involves twenty times the total for official development aid, or 800 billion dollars, being thrown out of the window on military expenditure every year? And what a senseless waste it is, at a time when development resources are as tightly rationed as they are.

ANNEX IX

Over a billion dollars a day . . . ^a

In 1983, world cereal production reached an estimated total of 1.62 billion tons—a good harvest equalling 350 kilogrammes for every man, woman and child.

Yet, this 350 kilogrammes figure is dwarfed by the per capita availability of 3,450 kilogrammes of TNT. Not counting conventional weapons, the nuclear destructive capacity alone amounts to ten times the grain produced in the world in a good crop year . . .

Although the nuclear arsenal is more than sufficient to turn the globe into a radioactive graveyard, the global armaments race is still continuing.

^a News Feature (July 1983) written by Heinrich von Loesch.

The first Disarmament Decade declared by the General Assembly of the United Nations, the 1970s, became in reality an armaments decade. And the eighties, proclaimed as the Second Disarmament Decade, have so far brought a number of disarmament initiatives, but no tangible progress. The unbelievable figure of 1.6 billion United States dollars continues to be spent by the world on armaments every day for over 600 billion dollars a year.

"The capacity to overkill the underfed is surely the foremost evidence of irrationality in human affairs . . .", says Director-General Edouard Saouma of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

It maintains a climate of insecurity and tension, exhausts economies, diverts resources to sterile purposes and increases indebtedness, particularly in the third world. The industrial countries devote to arms 20 times more than the amount allocated to assistance to the third world.

Thus, every day of the year, 1.6 billion dollars drain economies, and spread misery, suffering and starvation as if there already was not enough poverty and hunger in the world.

Some five hundred million people are already undernourished, according to conservative estimates by FAO. At least one billion people live in absolute poverty.

Arms serve to buy security, say those whose business it is to purchase arms. But with all the billions of dollars spent day after day on weapons the world has not become a safe place. On the contrary, along with the mushrooming overkill capacity, fear and insecurity are also growing.

Poverty, lack of food and social injustice are the roots of unrest in developed and developing countries alike.

A Government whose people are well fed and satisfied with economic and social progress does not require arms to maintain internal security. Food security is the only true security a country can enjoy, and as Mr. Saouma stated: "A Government that fears for its security could do well to equip itself with an arsenal of grain, not bombs. The training of farmers may do more for peacekeeping than the drilling of soldiers."

Nobody reasonably expects that universal disarmament can be achieved overnight. What appears within reach, however, is a slowing down of the arms race, an agreement not to exceed current levels of arms spending in the future, and perhaps even a gradual disarmament.

The bonus in terms of funds freed for development would be enormous, since even fractions of current arms spending would suffice to solve humanity's most pressing problems.

Willy Brandt noted in his introduction to the first report of the North-South Commission:

One half of one percent of one year's world military expenditure would pay for all the farm equipment needed to increase food production and approach self-sufficiency in food-deficit low-income countries by 1990.

And asks Mr. Saouma:

Can we watch unmoved as more than 600 thousand million dollars a year are swallowed up in military expenditure, when 15 to 18 thousand million invested annually from now to the end of the century would suffice to put the poorest countries on the road to food self-sufficiency?

Other facts: a sum of 2.3 thousand million dollars would have been enough to cover the fertilizer imports of the poorest countries in 1981-1982; or that with 15 thousand million dollars, 3 million hectares of new land could be brought under irrigation; or that 4 thousand million dollars would be enough to procure all the draught animal equipment necessary for 90 developing countries.

All the daily cooking and heating fuel needs of the rural population in the third world could be covered if 2 thousand million dollars were available annually up to the year 2000 to be invested in fuelwood plantations. The impact of these additional forests on the quality of the cropland and the battle against desertification could hardly be overestimated . . .

Part of the savings made possible by curbing the arms race could be used by the developing countries themselves. They are presently spending about 117 billion dollars per year to maintain their military strength, of which 19.5 billion on arms purchases abroad. Though their per capita military expenditure is only one tenth that of the rich countries,

they have doubled their arms purchases over the last decade and become the major buyer in the world market for weapons.

Armaments also involve a tremendous loss of qualified manpower. Half a million of the world's most gifted experts are working in military research. If redeployed for productive purposes, including development, they could probably achieve technological breakthroughs for the betterment of the lives of millions.

In the developing countries, more than 14 million people are currently serving in the armed forces, mostly young men at their most productive age. Although the military performs useful civilian functions in many poor countries, such as training and education, those under arms could probably do a lot more for development, particularly as regards rural life and agriculture.

Worldwide, at least 50 million people are directly or indirectly engaged in military or paramilitary activities. At least 5 million of them are workers producing weapons and other specialized military equipment.

The effects of increased military spending on the world economy, already suffering from prolonged recession, are thus likely to be depressing, according to 27 experts who studied the relationship between disarmament and development upon request of the United Nations Secretary-General. Direct displacement of investment and indirect constraints on productivity caused by the military bias in technological research and development are, according to the experts' report, the main negative effects of military outlays.

They recommended that further consideration be given to establishing an international disarmament fund for development. In examining various proposals made in the United Nations regarding suitable machinery for the transfer of resources from disarmament to developing countries, the study gave particular consideration to the French proposal for the creation of a special fund for this purpose.

"There is enormous potential for reallocating military resources to bring food and prosperity to the poor", Mr. Saouma says.

For example, for less than the cost of one nuclear submarine we could develop 10 million hectares of grazing land in the third world or provide almost 200 million sets of hand tools for poor farmers.

I also think time is overdue to move from appeals to actions. That's why I attach great importance to proposals for setting up an International Disarmament Fund for Development – based on international taxes to be levied on arms sales or arsenals.

If such a fund ever comes into being, we at FAO are ready and equipped to assist agricultural development for real world security.

Activities of the World Health Organization related to disarmament*

In its resolution WHA 34.38, "The role of physicians and other health workers in the preservation and promotion of peace as the most significant factor for the attainment of health for all", the World Health Assembly requested the Director-General to establish an International Committee of Experts in Medical Sciences and Public Health to study the contribution that WHO could and should make to facilitate the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on strengthening peace, détente and disarmament and preventing thermonuclear conflict. The Committee established several working groups and allocated to them the task of collecting, reviewing, and summarizing the most recent information on the possible effects of nuclear-weapon explosions on health and the health services.

In its report "Effects of nuclear war on health and health services", submitted to the World Health Assembly at its thirty-sixth session, in May 1983, the Committee considered three possible scenarios: (1) the detonation of a 1-megaton bomb over a large city; (2) "limited" nuclear war with smaller tactical weapons equivalent to 20 megatons, aimed at military targets in a relatively densely populated area; and (3) all-out nuclear war, using nuclear weapons equivalent to some 10,000 megatons (about half the estimated present stockpiles). They concluded that no health service in any area of the world would be capable of dealing adequately even with the casualties caused by the single bomb envisaged in the first scenario. They stated that in the event of explosions considered in the second and third scenarios, whatever remained of the medical services in the world could not alleviate the catastrophic consequences in any significant way. To the immediate catastrophe must be added the long-term effects on persons and on the environment: famine and disease would be widespread and social and economic systems totally disrupted.

In resolution WHA 36.28, "The role of physicians and other health workers in the preservation and promotion of peace as the most significant factor for the attainment of health for all", the Health Assembly noted with grave concern the conclusions of the Committee on the effects of nuclear war on health and health services, and endorsed the Committee's conclusion that it would be impossible to prepare health services to deal in any systematic way with a catastrophe resulting from nuclear warfare, and that nuclear weapons constitute the greatest immediate threat to the health and welfare of mankind.

In accordance with the request of the Health Assembly, wide publicity is being given to the report, and the work of collecting, analysing and regularly publishing accounts of activities and further studies on the effects of nuclear war on health and health services is being undertaken. The Director-General has established a small group of experts to carry out these tasks, in close-collaboration with other United Nations agencies, and with other bodies and organizations as required.

At the request of the Chairman of the United Nations Committee on Disarmament and further to the nomination by the Director-General of WHO of two representatives, a WHO expert attended one meeting of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

* Text contributed by the World Health Organization (WHO).

Activities of the World Meteorological Organization related to disarmament*

Introduction

WMO is not directly involved in questions of disarmament. Some of the activities of the Organization, however, have some relevance to article III of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (General Assembly resolution 31/72, annex) and the understandings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament relating thereto.^a A brief review of such activities in 1983 is given in the present note. Before describing those activities, it should be noted that the World Weather Watch, which is the basic programme of WMO, contains the following provision:

The World Weather Watch shall be used only for peaceful purposes, due account being taken of the national sovereignty and security of States, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the spirit and traditions of the World Meteorological Organization.

Weather modification

The main objective of the WMO Weather Modification Programme, which was confirmed by the ninth Congress of WMO (1983), is to enable WMO to provide sound scientific and technical advice to its members on the planning, implementation and evaluation of weather modification projects. Highest priority has been given to precipitation enhancement and hail suppression. Falling also within the scope of the programme is the co-ordination of research activities related to tropical cyclone moderation, lightning suppression and fog dispersal. The primary thrust of the programme has been the site selection field experiment of the Precipitation Enhancement Programme. Results of the analysis of the first three years of field data, however, have not been conclusive regarding the suitability of the test site, but a firm foundation has been developed for analysing the cloud seeding potential of regions designated for precipitation enhancement or redistribution.

Ozone research and monitoring

Action was continued in implementing the WMO Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Project, the objective of which is to enable WMO to provide advice to member countries and to the United Nations and other appropriate international organizations concerning various aspects of atmospheric ozone. The project is being carried out with support from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

The main activities are related to the improvement of the global network of ground-based total-ozone measuring stations and the organization of meetings of experts for discussion and preparation of reviews of specific problems relating to the project in accordance with the UNEP World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer. The third WMO statement, "Modification of the ozone layer due to human activities and some possible geophysical consequences", was adopted and distributed at the end of December 1981.

* Text contributed by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

^a See *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2), appendix IX.

World Climate Programme

The World Climate Programme is one of the major programmes of WMO. The objectives of the programme are to:

- Aid nations in the application of climatic data and present knowledge of climate to the planning and management of all aspects of man's activities;
- Improve the present knowledge of climate and understanding of the relative roles of various influences on climate;
- Provide the means to foresee future changes of climate and warn of potential man-made changes that might be adverse to the well-being of humanity.

The overall work is distributed among four component programmes:

- The World Climate Data Programme;
- The World Climate Applications Programme;
- The World Climate Research Programme (conducted jointly by WMO and the International Council of Scientific Unions);
- The World Climate Impact Studies Programme, the activities of which are carried out by UNEP in close co-operation with WMO.

The World Climate Programme is of very wide scope, and the planning and implementation of its wide-ranging activities demand co-operation with many other international governmental and non-governmental organizations.

Draft treaty banning any nuclear-weapon test explosion in any environment*

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures towards nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party to this Treaty undertakes not to carry out any nuclear-weapon test explosion in any environment at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
2. Each Party to this Treaty undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, assisting, permitting or in any other way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear-weapon test explosion anywhere.
3. Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to take any measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional process to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the provisions of the Treaty anywhere under its jurisdiction or control.

Article II

1. Each Party to this Treaty undertakes not to carry out any nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes and accordingly to refrain from causing, encouraging, assisting, permitting or in any other way participating in the carrying out of any such explosion until international arrangements for conducting them are worked out which would be consistent with this Treaty and the obligations of each Party under other relevant international treaties.
2. The Parties undertake to keep under consideration the question of arrangements for conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis, including the aspect of precluding military benefits. Such arrangements may take the form of a special agreement or agreements constituting an integral part of this Treaty.

Article III

This Treaty does not affect obligations which have been assumed by Parties under other international agreements, including the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.

Article IV

1. Each Party to this Treaty will use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law to verify compliance with the Treaty and undertakes not to interfere with such means of verification.

* *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1), appendix II (CD/421), vol. II, document CD/381.*

2. Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate in good faith in an effective international exchange of seismological data in order to facilitate the monitoring of this Treaty.

Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate in good faith in order to achieve an effective international exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity and other measures for facilitating the monitoring of this Treaty.

The arrangements for these international co-operative measures, which are laid down in Protocol I annexed to this Treaty, shall be operative at the time of the entry into force of this Treaty.

3. The Parties to this Treaty undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in good faith for the clarification of all events pertaining to the subject-matter of this Treaty. In accordance with this provision, each Party to the Treaty is entitled:

(a) to request and receive information from any other Party;

(b) to request an on-site inspection in the territory of any other Party for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not a specified event was a nuclear explosion. The requesting Party shall state the reasons for its request, including available evidence. Recognizing the importance of ensuring confidence among Parties that treaty obligations are being fulfilled, the Party which receives the request shall state whether or not it is prepared to agree to an inspection. If the Party which receives the request does not agree to an inspection in its territory, it shall state the reason for its refusal. Procedures for such inspections and the manner of their conduct, including the rights and functions of the inspecting personnel, are laid down in Protocol II annexed to this Treaty.

4. In order to avoid unfounded accusations or misinterpretations of large non-nuclear explosions the Party conducting such an explosion may invite an inspection at the site of the explosion. The rules and procedures for such inspections are laid down in Protocol II.

5. For the purpose set forth in this article a Consultative Committee shall be established to oversee the implementation of the Treaty and of the international verification arrangements. A Technical Expert Group and a permanent Secretariat shall be established to assist the Consultative Committee. The functions and rules of procedure of the Consultative Committee, the Technical Expert Group and the Secretariat are set out in Protocol III annexed to this Treaty.

Article V

The Protocols annexed to this Treaty constitute an integral part of the Treaty.

Article VI

Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Such proposals shall be submitted to the Depositary, who shall, in consultation with States Parties, take appropriate action. Amendments shall enter into force for each Party accepting them upon their acceptance by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining Party on the date of acceptance by it.

Article VII

Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article VIII

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall be the Depository of this Treaty.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit with the Depository of instruments of ratification by twenty Governments, including the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

4. For those States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depository shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and of any amendments thereto, any notice of withdrawal, as well as of the receipt of other notices. He shall also inform the Security Council of the United Nations of any notice of withdrawal.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depository in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article IX

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty, if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depository three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article X

If this Treaty has not been adhered to by all Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council five years after its entry into force, each Party shall by giving notice to the Depository have the right to withdraw from the Treaty with immediate effect.

Article XI

This Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations who shall send certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

PROTOCOL I

International co-operative measures to facilitate the verification of a Treaty banning any nuclear-weapon test explosion in any environment

1. Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate in good faith in an effective international exchange of seismological and other data. The purpose of these international measures is to assist the Parties in the verification of the Treaty by providing additional technical information for their national assessment. These international co-operative measures include designated seismological stations in participating countries and in other territories, efficient systems for the exchange of seismological data, and especially established International Data Centres.

2. Each Party to this Treaty shall have the right to participate in the international exchange of seismological data by contributing data from designated seismological stations and by receiving all the seismological data made available through the international exchange. To ensure that seismological stations having the necessary geographical coverage will be incorporated in the exchange, the States given in table I have agreed to provide data from the stations specified in the same table.

Each Party participating in the international data exchange shall provide geographical

co-ordinates, geological site description and a description of the instrumentation of each designated station. Any changes in these data shall be immediately reported. Data on designated stations are collected, compiled and regularly reported by the Secretariat of the Consultative Committee.

3. Each Party participating in the international data exchange shall for this purpose designate an appropriate National Body through which it will communicate.

This body shall handle the exchange of seismological data and contacts with International Data Centres, the Consultative Committee and its Secretariat on matters related to the operation of the data exchange.

4. The seismological stations designated for participation in the international exchange shall have the basic equipment as specified in the Operational Manual for Seismological Stations. These stations shall be operated, calibrated and maintained as specified in the same manual. Information on the operation and the calibration of the stations shall regularly be sent to the Secretariat of the Consultative Committee.

5. Seismological data from each designated station shall routinely and regularly be reported through the appropriate National Body. The seismological data to be reported, the reporting format and time schedule are specified in the Operational Manual for Data Exchange. The seismological stations shall, through the appropriate National Body, cooperate with the International Data Centres to clarify any technical question in connection with reported data.

In addition to routinely submitted data each Party participating in the international data exchange shall provide any additional seismological data from its designated stations requested through International Data Centres by any Party to the Treaty. The procedures for making such requests and the format and time schedule for responding are laid down in the Operational Manual for Data Exchange.

6. Seismological data shall be transmitted through the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization, WMO/GTS, or through other agreed communication channels. The detailed procedures for exchanging data are laid down in the Operational Manual on Data Exchange.

7. International Data Centres shall be established at the following locations: _____

Each Centre shall be under the jurisdiction of the State in whose territory it is located, and the cost of establishing and operating it shall be borne by that State. Easy and free access for representatives from all Parties to the Treaty and for Officers of the Secretariat of the Consultative Committee shall be guaranteed to all facilities of all International Data Centres.

Each International Data Centre shall receive all seismological data contributed to the international exchange by its participants, process these seismological data without interpreting the nature of seismological events, make the processed seismological data available to all participants and maintain all seismological data contributed by participants as well as the results of the processing at the Centres. The procedures to be used at International Data Centres to receive and compile reported data, to conduct necessary computation, to interact with other International Data Centres in the analysis and to transmit the results of the computations to participating States are laid down in the Operational Manual for International Data Centres.

International Data Centres shall also co-ordinate requests for additional seismological data from one Party to another and redistribute data obtained as a result of such requests.

8. In addition to the exchange of seismological data specified in paragraphs 2-7 of this Protocol, a similar exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity shall be established. This exchange shall include equipment for collecting atmospheric radioactivity operated by each contributing State, an exchange of collected data and International Data Centres where data are processed, compiled and redistributed as described in paragraph 7 of this Protocol. The additional rules and procedures needed to establish and operate this exchange are laid down in an Operational Manual for the Exchange of Atmospheric Radioactivity.

9. International Co-operative Measures described in this Protocol and in the Operational Manuals annexed to it shall be established and be operative at the time of entry into force of this Treaty.

10. The Consultative Committee and its Secretariat have the task of overseeing the overall operation of the international data exchange as is set forth in Protocol III.

The Committee, its Technical Expert Group and Secretariat have the responsibility to maintain the efficiency of the exchange by improving and amending the equipment and the operational procedures. The Parties to the Treaty undertake to implement such changes of the data exchange which may be agreed upon.

11. With a view to improving the verification of this Treaty, negotiations on additional international measures, such as the exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity, hydro-acoustic signals in the oceans and infrasound and micro-barographic signals in the atmosphere, shall be undertaken by the Parties to the Treaty. Such additional measures shall as closely as possible be integrated in the co-operative measures specified in this Protocol and an agreement on such additional measures shall be annexed to this Protocol.

TABLE I

(Text to be elaborated.)

PROTOCOL II

Procedures for international on-site inspection

1. The Parties to this Treaty undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in good faith for the clarification of all events pertaining to the subject-matter of this Treaty. If any Party sees the need to further clarify any event observed in the territory of another Party to the Treaty it shall seek such clarification through bilateral consultations. These consultations may include the exchange of additional technical information and other measures, such as on-site inspections, which the two Parties concerned may agree upon.

If the event cannot be satisfactorily clarified through such bilateral consultations, the Party seeking further clarification can request an international on-site inspection. Requests for such international on-site inspection shall be made through the Consultative Committee. The requesting Party shall state the reasons for its request, including appropriate technical and other evidence.

The requesting Party shall further specify the area to be inspected. This area must be continuous and not exceed 1,000 km² or a length of 50 km in any direction.

2. If a Party receiving a request agrees to an international on-site inspection of the requested area, or part thereof, the practical arrangements for the inspection shall be worked out by the Secretariat of the Consultative Committee in co-operation with the Party to be inspected. Such arrangements shall be worked out within one month after a Party has agreed to an inspection. The inspection shall be conducted by experts chosen by the Chairman of the Consultative Committee among experts made available for this purpose by the Parties to the Treaty. The experts shall be selected taking into account available expertise and the desire to obtain equitable geographical and political representation. The International Inspection Team shall be headed by an officer from the Secretariat and contain . . . additional experts. The International Inspection Team shall further comprise necessary technicians, interpreters and secretaries provided by the Secretariat.

The total number of such support personnel shall not exceed. . . .

At all times while the inspecting personnel are in the territory of the Party to be inspected, their persons, property, personal baggage, archives and documents as well as their temporary official and living quarters shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities as provided in Articles 22, 23, 24, 29, 30, 31, 34 and 36 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to the persons, property, personal baggage, archives and documents of diplomatic agents as well as to the premises of diplomatic missions and private residences of diplomatic agents.

Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities it shall be the duty of the inspecting personnel to respect the laws and regulations of the State in whose territory the inspection is to be carried out, in so far as they do not impede in any way whatsoever the proper exercising of the rights and functions provided for by the Treaty and this Protocol.

3. The purpose of an international on-site inspection is purely fact-finding and the International Inspection Team shall not make any assessment as to the nature of the inspected event. The Inspection Team shall present a factual report of the observations made during the inspection. This report shall as far as possible present the consensus view of the participating experts. In case consensus cannot be achieved, the report shall reflect the views of all the participating experts.

The report shall be made available to all Parties to the Treaty through the Consultative Committee.

4. (This paragraph should contain a specification of the techniques to be used and the procedures to be followed when conducting on-site inspections. As these issues have not been properly discussed, there is at present no basis for preparing an appropriate text. To facilitate further discussions some more or less intrusive techniques are presented that might be considered in connection with on-site inspections. More technical data must be collected and compiled on the various inspection techniques and their potential usefulness. Rules and procedures have to be worked out for the conduct of these inspections, for the selection and the acceptance or refusal of more intrusive techniques and for the transportation of people and material.

The following inspection techniques might be useful to consider:

- Visual inspection from the air and on the ground including rules and procedures for taking photographs;
- Measurement of radioactive radiation in the atmosphere above the area, at ground level and in waters;
- Temporary seismological measurements in the area to record possible aftershocks and also events at larger distances to improve the possibilities to interpret the recordings of the event that led to the inspection;
- Seismological reflection measurements, in limited areas, to provide data for detection of possible subsurface activities;
- Measurement of temperature anomalies;
- Drilling and measurements in boreholes to obtain subsurface data at selected points.)

5. If the Party which receives the request does not agree to the inspection of the requested area or part of it, it shall provide the reasons for its decision.

6. As stated in Article IV, paragraph 4, of this Treaty, a Party conducting a large non-nuclear explosion may invite an inspection at the site of the explosion. An Inspection Team, established as in paragraph 2 of this Protocol and headed by an officer of the Secretariat of the Consultative Committee, containing . . . experts, shall be established. The privileges and immunities of members of this Inspection Team shall be the same as specified in paragraph 2 of this Protocol. The Inspection Team shall be present before the explosion takes place and stay until the explosion has been conducted. Only visual observations shall be made. The Inspection Team shall provide a factual report of the observations during the inspection. This report shall be distributed to all Parties to the Treaty.

PROTOCOL III

The Consultative Committee, its functions and rules of procedures

1. A Consultative Committee shall be established to oversee the overall functioning of the Treaty and its verification arrangements. The Consultative Committee shall also serve as a forum to discuss and resolve disputes concerning the Treaty and its verification arrangements which might occur between Parties to the Treaty. The Consultative Committee and its subsidiary bodies, the Technical Expert Group and the Secretariat shall be established when the Treaty enters into force.

In performing its duties the Consultative Committee shall:

- Oversee the implementation of the Treaty;
- Prepare review conferences in accordance with Article VII of this Treaty;
- Review the verification arrangements of the Treaty on the basis of material provided by the Technical Expert Group and the Secretariat;

- Decide on changes in the equipment and technical procedures used to verify compliance with the Treaty;
- Be a forum in which any Party can make inquiries and receive information as a result of such inquiries;
- Be a forum in which any Party can request an international on-site inspection and the factual results of such inspections are presented;
- Guide and oversee the work of the Technical Expert Group and the Secretariat;
- Decide on the annual budget of the Secretariat and elect the Director and the Deputy Director of the Secretariat.

2. Each Party to the Treaty shall have the right to be a member of the Consultative Committee.

3. The Depositary of the Treaty or his representative shall act as Chairman of the Consultative Committee.

4. The Committee shall meet annually and, in addition, upon the request of any Party when an extraordinary meeting is considered necessary to oversee the implementation of the Treaty or to settle disputes between Parties to the Treaty concerning its compliance.

The Consultative Committee shall work on the basis of consensus on the following matters:

- Review and analysis of the overall operation of the Treaty and its verification arrangements;
- Decisions on changes in the equipment and technical procedures used to verify compliance with the Treaty.

The Consultative Committee shall take decisions by a majority of the members present and voting on the following issues:

- Decisions on the annual budget of the Secretariat;
- Election of the Director and the Deputy Director of the Secretariat.

5. The Consultative Committee shall establish a Technical Expert Group open to governmental experts from all Parties to the Treaty. The Technical Expert Group shall evaluate the technical performance of the international verification measures, including the techniques and procedures for on-site inspections, propose changes in the equipment and technical procedures used to verify compliance with the Treaty and to undertake any technical studies that the Consultative Committee may request. The Technical Expert Group shall further be a forum for technical discussions of events for which a Party seeks clarification through international measures.

The Technical Expert Group shall meet at least once a year. The Group shall establish its own rules of procedure and elect its own Chairman. The Group shall try to achieve consensus. In case consensus cannot be achieved, reports from the Group shall reflect the views of all the participating experts.

The Technical Expert Group shall report to the Consultative Committee on an annual basis or when requested.

6. To support the work of the Consultative Committee and the Technical Expert Group a permanent Secretariat shall be established.

The Secretariat shall:

- Support the work of the Consultative Committee and the Technical Expert Group by organizing their meetings and by preparing requested background material and studies;
- Supervise that the participating seismological stations are operated and data are reported as specified in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Protocol I of this Treaty;
- Act as a contact with the WMO on matters of Data Exchange through its Global Telecommunications System and supervise and review, in co-operation with WMO, the data exchange specified in paragraph 6 of Protocol I of this Treaty;
- Supervise the operation of the International Data Centres to ascertain that these Centres are established and operated as specified in paragraph 7 of Protocol I of this Treaty;

– Supervise the exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity to ascertain that the exchange is established and conducted as specified in paragraph 8 of Protocol I of this Treaty;

– Compile and present operational statistics and reports on experiences of the International Data Exchange to the Technical Expert Group;

– Organize and conduct international on-site inspections as specified in Protocol II of this Treaty, and report the result of such inspections to the Consultative Committee;

– Maintain lists, in co-operation with the Parties to the Treaty, of international experts available to conduct on-site inspections and the equipment necessary for such inspections.

7. The Secretariat shall consist of a Director and a Deputy Director, elected for a period of four years by the Consultative Committee, as specified in paragraph 2 of this Protocol, and an appropriate number of officers and support personnel. The annual budget of the Secretariat shall be approved by the Consultative Committee, as specified in paragraph 2 of this Protocol. The cost shall be borne by the Parties to the Treaty in accordance with the United Nations assessment scale prorated to take into account differences between the United Nations membership and the number of Parties to this Treaty. The Secretariat shall be located at

List of resolutions and decisions on disarmament and related questions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, held from 20 September to 20 December 1983 (including voting)

- | Resolutions on disarmament questions | <i>Reference
in text</i> |
|--|------------------------------|
| <p>38/61 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 37/71 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)</p> <p><i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 135 to none, with 9 abstentions, as follows:</i></p> <p><i>In favour:</i> Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe</p> <p><i>Against:</i> None</p> <p><i>Abstaining:</i> Argentina, Belize, Cuba, France, Guyana, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Mali, Venezuela</p> | <p>225</p> |
| <p>38/62 Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons</p> <p><i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 119 to 2, with 26 abstentions, as follows:</i></p> | <p>211</p> |

38/62 *In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zimbabwe

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Solomon Islands, Spain, Turkey, Zambia

38/63 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty

212

Adopted by a recorded vote of 117 to none, with 29 abstentions,^a as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zimbabwe

Against: None

^a The delegations of Samoa and Vanuatu subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

- 38/63 *Abstaining:* Afghanistan, Argentina, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, France, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Israel, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Poland, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zambia
- 38/64 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 233
Adopted without a vote
- 38/65 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 240
Adopted by a recorded vote of 94 to 3, with 46 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Against: Bhutan, India, Mauritius
Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belize, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Upper Volta, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia
- 38/66 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 348
Adopted without a vote
- 38/67 Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 190
Adopted by a recorded vote of 108 to 17, with 18 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central

38/67 African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Burma, India, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Japan, Malaysia, Paraguay, Philippines, Saint Lucia, Singapore, Sweden, Uruguay

38/68 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use nuclear weapons

187

Adopted by a recorded vote of 141 to none, with 6 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Argentina, Brazil, India, Philippines, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

38/69 Israeli nuclear armament

Adopted by a recorded vote of 99 to 2, with 39 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Israel, United States of America

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Burma, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Swaziland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Zaire

38/70 Prevention of an arms race in outer space

332

Adopted by a recorded vote of 147 to 1, with 1 abstention, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United

38/70 Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet
(cont.) Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

38/71 Relationship between disarmament and development

Resolution A

452

Adopted by a recorded vote of 137 to none, with 12 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam

Resolution B

453

Adopted without a vote

38/72 Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests

213

Adopted by a recorded vote of 118 to 4, with 24 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan

38/72 Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, (cont.) Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: China, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Saint Lucia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Turkey, Venezuela

38/73 Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly

Resolution A – Confidence-building measures 33

Adopted without a vote

Resolution B – Freeze on nuclear weapons 169

Adopted by a recorded vote of 124 to 15, with 7 abstentions,^b as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

^b The delegation of Ghana subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

- 38/73 *Abstaining:* Australia, China, Ghana, Iceland, Japan, Saint Lucia,
(cont.) Zaire
- Resolution C — United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament 35
- Adopted without a vote*
- Resolution D — World Disarmament Campaign 418
- Adopted without a vote*
- Resolution E — Nuclear-arms freeze 169
- Adopted by a recorded vote of 124 to 13, with 8 abstentions, as follows:*
- In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe
- Against:* Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America
- Abstaining:* Australia, Bahamas, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Saint Lucia, Spain, Zaire
- Resolution F — World Disarmament Campaign: actions and activities 420
- Adopted by a recorded vote of 112 to 1, with 29 abstentions, as follows:*
- In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea,

38/73 Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao
(cont.) Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab
Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda,
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic
of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen,
Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Brazil

Abstaining: Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Canada, Chile,
Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal
Republic of, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
United States of America, Uruguay

Resolution G — Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear
Weapons

145

Adopted by a recorded vote of 126 to 17, with 6 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin,
Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian
Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic,
Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Fin-
land, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indo-
nesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan,
Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives,
Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco,
Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania,
Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic,
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United
Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tan-
zania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen,
Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Federal Republic of, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Austria, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Philippines

Resolution H — Disarmament and international security

37

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 133 to none, with 13 abstentions, as
follows:*

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bar-
bados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde,
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa

- 38/73 (cont.) Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
- Against:* None
- Abstaining:* Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America
- Resolution I – Convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament 38
- Adopted without a vote*
- Resolution J – Regional disarmament 349
- Adopted without a vote*
- 38/74 Implementation of the conclusions of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty 125
- Adopted by a recorded vote of 134 to none, with 7 abstentions,^c as follows:*
- In favour:* Afghanistan, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,

^c The delegation of Samoa subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

38/74 (cont.) Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire

Against: None

Abstaining: Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, India, Pakistan, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia

38/75 Condemnation of nuclear war

150

Adopted by a recorded vote of 95 to 19, with 30 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Austria, Bahamas, Chad, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Liberia, Malawi, Morocco, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Sweden, Zaire

38/76 Nuclear-weapon freeze

171

Adopted by a recorded vote of 108 to 18, with 20 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait,

38/76 Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, (cont.) Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua, New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Chad, China, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Liberia, Malawi, Morocco, Paraguay, Philippines, Saint Lucia, Somalia, Swaziland, Sweden, Uruguay, Zaire

38/181 Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa
Resolution A – Implementation of the Declaration

227

Adopted by a recorded vote of 142 to none, with 6 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Israel, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution B – Nuclear capability of South Africa

228

Adopted by a recorded vote of 133 to 4, with 11 abstentions, as follows:

38/181 *In favour:* Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, Israel, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Federal Republic of Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal

38/182 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

304

Adopted by a recorded vote of 116 to 1, with 26 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

38/182 *Abstaining:* Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, (cont.) Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Somalia, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

38/183 Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

Resolution A – Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations

111

Adopted by a recorded vote of 88 to 31, with 24 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordāh, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam

Abstaining: Angola, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Burma, Chad, Chile, Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland, United Republic of Cameroon, Uruguay

Resolution B – Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

142

Adopted by a recorded vote of 110 to 19, with 15 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New

38/183 Guinea, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Austria, Bahamas, China, Dominica, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Paraguay, Philippines, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Singapore, Uruguay

Resolution C — Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon

123

Adopted by a recorded vote of 74 to 12, with 57 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Gambia, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Malawi, Maldives, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Venezuela, Zaire

Resolution D — Nuclear weapons in all aspects

120

Adopted by a recorded vote of 108 to 19, with 16 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,

38/183 Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Bahamas, Chad, Dominica, Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Paraguay, Philippines, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Swaziland, Uruguay, Zaire

Resolution E – Report of the Disarmament Commission 23

Adopted without a vote

Resolution F – International co-operation for disarmament 24

Adopted by a recorded vote of 109 to 15, with 15 abstentions,^d as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

^d The delegation of Uruguay subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

38/183 *Abstaining:* Austria, Brazil, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, (cont.) Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Lebanon, Paraguay, Philippines, Spain, Sweden

Resolution G — Prevention of nuclear war

144

Adopted by a recorded vote of 128 to none, with 20 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Haiti, Iceland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution H — Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session

27

Adopted by a recorded vote of 132 to 9, with 8 abstentions,^e as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia,

^e The delegations of Belgium and Italy subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote against.

38/183 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, (cont.) Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Israel, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Spain

Resolution I – Report of the Committee on Disarmament

30

Adopted by a recorded vote of 129 to 2, with 18 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey

Resolution J – Unilateral nuclear disarmament measures

465

Adopted by a recorded vote of 132 to 2, with 14 abstentions,^f as follows:

^f The delegation of the United Kingdom subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

38/183 *In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Turkey

Resolution K – Comprehensive programme of disarmament

84

Adopted without a vote

Resolution L – Disarmament Week

426

Adopted by a recorded vote of 136 to none, with 12 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of

38/183 Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of
(cont.) Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay,
Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zim-
babwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Democratic Kampuchea, France,
Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United
States of America

Resolution M – Implementation of the recommendations and decisions
of the tenth special session

119

Adopted by a recorded vote of 133 to 1, with 14 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bar-
bados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde,
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica,
Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic
Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German
Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia,
Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan,
Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mal-
dives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco,
Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland,
Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Came-
roon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu,
Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Federal
Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Resolution N – Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations

113

Adopted by a recorded vote of 122 to 1, with 25 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo,
Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Den-
mark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic,
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland,
Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic
Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mada-
gascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius,

38/183 Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Angola, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Dominica, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Honduras, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Resolution O — Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

438

Adopted without a vote

Resolution P — Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations

115

Adopted by a recorded vote of 99 to 18, with 24 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Vanuatu, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Romania, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam

Abstaining: Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burma, Cape Verde, China, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Mauritius, Nepal, Peru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, United Republic of Cameroon, Uruguay, Venezuela

38/184 Reduction of military budgets

Resolution A

371

Adopted without a vote

541

38/184 Resolution B

(cont.)

Adopted by a recorded vote of 116 to 13, with 8 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire

Against: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam

Abstaining: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mozambique, Syrian Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia

38/185 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace 387

Adopted without a vote

38/186 World Disarmament Conference 91

*Adopted without a vote*38/187 Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons
Resolution A — Prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons 288*Adopted by a recorded vote of 98 to 1, with 49 abstentions,* as follows:*

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Qatar,

* The delegation of Malawi subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

38/187 Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao (cont.) Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Seychelles, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay

Resolution B – Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons 289

Adopted without a vote

Resolution C – Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons 295

Adopted by a recorded vote of 97 to 20, with 30 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Uruguay, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam

Abstaining: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Barbados, Benin, Brazil, Burma, Cape Verde, Chile, Cyprus, Finland, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Madagascar, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Qatar, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia

38/188 General and complete disarmament

Resolution A – Study on conventional disarmament

456

Adopted by a recorded vote of 138 to none, with 8 abstentions, as follows:

543

38/188 *In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Bahrain, India, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Yemen

Resolution B – Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

404

Adopted without a vote

Resolution C – Measures to provide objective information on military capabilities

431

Adopted by a recorded vote of 119 to none, with 21 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,

38/188 Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
(cont.) Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of
America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugo-
slavia, Zaire

Against: None

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic
Republic, Guyana, Hungary, India, Lao People's Democratic Republic,
Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United
Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Zambia

Resolution D — Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling
and use of radiological weapons

317

Adopted without a vote

Resolution E — Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for
weapons purposes

124

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 124 to none, with 23 abstentions, as
follows:*

In favour: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria,
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin,
Bhutan, Bolivia, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Demo-
cratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Fin-
land, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland,
Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory
Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria,
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland,
Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of
Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay,
Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
France, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Lao People's
Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Poland,
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of
America, Viet Nam

Resolution F — Curbing the naval arms race: limitation and reduction of
naval armaments and extension of confidence-building measures to seas
and oceans

62

Adopted by a recorded vote of 73 to 19, with 44 abstentions,^h as follows:

^h The delegations of Panama and Uruguay subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour; the delegations of Honduras and Malaysia had intended to abstain.

38/188
(cont.)

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Angola, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Liberia, Malawi, Maldives, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Togo, Zaire

Resolution G — Study on the naval arms race

460

Adopted by a recorded vote of 113 to 1, with 32 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Angola, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominica, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Mozambique, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Saint Lucia, Togo, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist

38/188 Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great
(cont.) Britain and Northern Ireland, Viet Nam

Resolution H — Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security
Issues

463

Adopted by a recorded vote of 132 to 1, with 15 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Somalia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Resolution I — Review of and supplement to the *Comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects*

458

Adopted by a recorded vote of 146 to none, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal,

38/188 Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: India, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution J – Institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament

65

Adopted by a recorded vote of 114 to 17, with 12 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, China, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Paraguay, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Spain, Sweden

Decisions

38/421 Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth

330

The General Assembly took note of the report of the First Committee.

- 38/447 Draft statute of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 435
The General Assembly decided that the draft statute of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research should be returned to the Board of Trustees of the Institute with a request that the Board spell out the meaning of the provisions of the draft statute, so that the Assembly could take a decision on that draft statute at its thirty-ninth session.

Resolutions on related questions

- 38/8 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 253
Adopted without a vote

- 38/9 Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security 237

Adopted by a recorded vote of 123 to 2, with 12 abstentions,ⁱ as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Israel, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Guatemala, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Malawi, Paraguay

- 38/39 Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa

Resolution A — Situation in South Africa

Adopted by a recorded vote of 124 to 16, with 10 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African

ⁱ The delegations of Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Seychelles subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

38/39
(cont.)

Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Spain, Sweden

Resolution D – Sanctions against South Africa

231

Adopted by a recorded vote of 122 to 10, with 18 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

38/39 *Abstaining:* Australia, Austria, Botswana, Denmark, Finland,
(cont.) Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Lesotho,
Malawi, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden

Resolution F – Relations between Israel and South Africa

231

Adopted by a recorded vote of 106 to 18, with 17 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Bahamas, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Guatemala, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Malawi, Panama, Paraguay, Portugal, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Spain

Resolution G – Military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa

232

Adopted by a recorded vote of 122 to 9, with 17 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore,

- 38/39 (cont.) Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe
- Against:* Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Italy, Paraguay, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America
- Abstaining:* Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden
- 38/60 United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 255
- Adopted without a vote*
- 38/77 Question of Antarctica 66,
242
- Adopted without a vote*
- 38/126 Development and strengthening of good neighbourliness between States —
- Adopted without a vote*
- 38/189 Strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region 67
- Adopted without a vote*
- 38/190 Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security 67,
232
- Adopted by a recorded vote of 135 to none, with 12 abstentions, as follows:*
- In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
- Against:* None

38/190 *Abstaining:* Belgium, Canada, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, (cont.) Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

38/191 Implementation of the collective security provisions of the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security

68

Adopted by a recorded vote of 109 to 20, with 18 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Canada, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Viet Nam

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