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ASSEMBLY**  
FIFTEENTH SESSION



**FOURTH COMMITTEE, 1117th  
MEETING**

*Friday, 24 March 1961,  
at 3.30 p.m.*

*Official Records*

*New York*

Agenda item 45:

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**Chairman:** Mr. Adnan M. PACHACHI (Iraq).

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Ortiz de Rozas (Argentina), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

**AGENDA ITEM 45**

**Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi (A/4689-A/4692, A/4694, A/4706 and Add.1, A/C.4/471, A/C.4/475, A/C.4/L.674 and Add.1) (*continued*)**

**RECORDS OF THE FOURTH COMMITTEE (A/C.4/475, A/C.4/L.674 AND ADD.1) (*concluded*)\***

1. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the statement by the Secretary-General (A/C.4/475) in connexion with draft resolution A/C.4/L.674 and Add.1, which proposed that there should be verbatim records of the discussion on the question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi.

2. Mr. RASGOTRA (India) said that he had studied document A/C.4/475 but was not convinced that the Secretariat was as helpless as the document seemed to imply. The question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi was of the greatest consequence not only for the people of the Territory but also for the Committee, the General Assembly and the whole International Trusteeship System; in view of the importance of having verbatim records, his delegation was prepared to face the financial implications of such a decision. The Committee had only once before made a similar request and the sponsors' only reason for making the request now was to ensure that there should be no misrepresentation of what was said.

3. Rather than stating the financial implications of the proposal, document A/C.4/475 gave a series of counter-proposals to the draft resolution. The Secretary-General's first suggestion, in paragraph 3 (a), would entail coming to an arrangement with the Special Political Committee. It would be wrong for the Fourth Committee to call in question the importance of discussions in other Committees; the Special Political Committee might, however, be asked if it would relinquish its privilege for a period of, say, two weeks. In that case, he would like to know how soon the verbatim records could be circulated; if that could be done only after the close of the session, no useful purpose would be served. Secondly, would it not still be possible to prepare verbatim records for the Special Political Committee at a later date?

4. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) noted the statement in paragraph 3 (a) that if the first solution was adopted, the Fourth Committee would be able to hold meetings on the Ruanda-Urundi question once a day only. Any agreement about records should take account of the need for the Committee to meet at least twice a day if it was to complete its business.

5. Mr. RASGOTRA (India) agreed that it was essential that the Committee should meet twice a day, if not more frequently.

6. U TIN MAUNG (Burma) endorsed the Indian representative's suggestion that the Committee should try to reach an arrangement with the Special Political Committee; that should not prove difficult. It was vitally important that the discussions which took place in the Committee should be known to the people of Ruanda-Urundi, since their future was at stake; it was also imperative that the Committee should meet more than once a day.

7. Mr. YOMEKPE (Ghana) supported the Indian representative's statement. He appreciated the difficulties of the Secretariat but felt that all resources should be strained to make the required services available.

8. Mr. HOO (Under-Secretary for Conference Services) pointed out that, as was explained in paragraph 2 of the Secretary-General's statement, verbatim reporters were not available to service the Fourth Committee. The Fifth Committee and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions continually stressed the need for economies, and the staff of verbatim reporters had accordingly been cut to the minimum; it might prove extremely difficult to recruit more, particularly in the case of French and Spanish reporters, who were not to be found in New York. The Secretary-General's suggestions were not intended as "counter-proposals" but as suggestions of ways in which the request in the draft resolution could be met.

9. In reply to the Indian representative's questions, he said that the verbatim records of the Special Political Committee were prepared on the day following the meeting; they were not distributed but were kept for delegates to consult if necessary, and the work was therefore lighter than it would otherwise be. If the sound recordings of the Fourth Committee's meetings were to be transcribed immediately, those of the Special Political Committee's meetings would have to be transcribed later. It would be impossible to service two meetings of the Fourth Committee a day.

10. Mr. ZULOAGA (Venezuela) suggested a compromise solution in the light of the explanations given by the Under-Secretary. Continuous discussion of the item was important and he suggested that, as a minimum, the texts of all statements made by the Administering Authority and by the members of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi should be

\* Resumed from the 1108th meeting.

circulated. In addition, it should be left to the Committee to request the distribution of other statements when they were considered sufficiently important.

11. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) thought it most important that the statements of petitioners should be distributed; with that addition, the solution suggested by the previous speaker might be acceptable.

12. Mr. BINGHAM (United States of America) considered the Venezuelan representative's suggestion a very constructive one. He pointed out that if any question arose later of what exactly had been said at any point in the discussion, recourse could always be had to the sound recordings and a transcript obtained if necessary.

13. Mr. RASGOTRA (India) explained that what he was anxious to avoid was the distribution of a record of an incomplete kind, which might give rise to distorted interpretations. In view of the Secretariat's explanations, however, he would be satisfied with the Venezuelan representative's suggestion, since the limitation of discussions to one meeting a day was unacceptable. He asked whether, if the solution now proposed was adopted, the verbatim statements would appear in the body of the records; he would not find it satisfactory if the verbatim texts were distributed separately from the records.

14. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) associated himself with the Indian representative's concern that the verbatim texts should appear in the body of the records.

15. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) asked whether the statements would appear in verbatim or summary form in the final printed records.

16. Mr. HOO (Under-Secretary for Conference Services) replied that even in the case of the First Committee, which was serviced by verbatim reporters, the final printed records were summary records. No records were ever distributed partly in verbatim and partly in summary form, though it would be possible to issue the statements as annexes to the record.

17. Furthermore, the solution proposed by the Venezuelan representative might in the end be little different from the original proposal if the Committee asked for a verbatim record for nearly every statement.

18. Mr. RASGOTRA (India) said he had understood the Under-Secretary to say that the texts of speeches which the Committee had asked to be circulated *in extenso* could be annexed to the summary records. In his delegation's view it would be preferable for the statements in question to appear in the body of the records.

19. Mr. HOO (Under-Secretary for Conference Services) observed that there was no precedent for producing a combination of summary and verbatim records. Moreover, the adoption of that method would delay the printing of the summary records.

20. Mr. RASGOTRA (India) rejoined that there was no reason why a new method should not be introduced. As far as the delay in the printing was concerned, the records did not in any event appear for some time and a further delay would be of no great importance.

21. Mr. ZULOAGA (Venezuela) thanked the representative of Guinea for his suggestion that the petitioners' statements too should be reproduced in full. The omission of such request had been an oversight on his part.

22. In reply to the Under-Secretary, he maintained that the Fourth Committee had never been unreasonable in its requests for the reproduction of speeches in full. The delegation of Venezuela had always shown understanding of the Secretariat's difficulties. He therefore hoped that the Under-Secretary would accept his proposal in the spirit in which it had been made and agree to the reproduction in full, in the text, of speeches which the Committee considered to be especially important.

23. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) felt that the proposal made by the representatives of Venezuela and Guinea would provide a solution. Although the proposal might be somewhat unorthodox, he could not see any real objection to the production of mixed verbatim and summary records. He felt sure that the members of the Committee would not abuse the right to ask that speeches should be reproduced *in extenso*.

24. Mr. OBEREMKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that the discussion seemed to be assuming a political character; on the one side were the sponsors of the draft resolution and on the other the Secretariat and the representatives of the colonialist Powers.

25. He was unable to understand the statement in the second part of paragraph 3 (a) of the Secretariat paper that if the Fourth Committee decided to have verbatim records of its meetings it would be able to hold only one meeting a day. The Special Political Committee met twice daily; indeed it had met twice on the previous day and he had before him verbatim records of both meetings. A great deal of documentary material was reproduced which interested certain representatives or certain members of the United Nations Secretariat. For example, the statement made by the United Kingdom representative at the 1113th meeting appeared almost word for word in the summary record, whereas statements made by other speakers were drastically summarized and sometimes even distorted. The question was not one of insufficiency of staff; there was in the Secretariat a disproportionate number of people who represented or sympathized with the colonialist Powers. That was why the Secretariat was unwilling to comply with the wishes of the representatives of the African-Asian Governments in the Committee.

26. Mr. HOO (Under-Secretary for Conference Services) pointed out that it would be impossible for the verbatim records of speeches made in the Committee to be translated and circulated in the three working languages on the day after they had been delivered.

27. Mr. RASGOTRA (India) said that delegations had gone a long way to meet the objections raised by the Secretariat. If an additional effort on the part of the staff were called for the Committee expected that it would be made.

28. The CHAIRMAN said that if there were no objections the proposal made by the representative of Venezuela, supplemented by that of the representative of Guinea, would be adopted.

*It was so decided.*

29. Mr. RASGOTRA (India) said that in view of that decision the sponsors withdrew draft resolution A/C.4/L.674 and Add.1.

30. Mr. OWONO (Cameroun) urged that the decision just taken by the Committee should apply to debates concerning all Trust Territories.

31. The CHAIRMAN explained that the decision related only to the debate concerning the future of Ruanda-Urundi and could not be extended to cover debates on other items unless a fresh proposal in that sense were placed before the Committee.

32. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) urged the representative of Cameroun not to press his point for the time being. He could raise the question again when the Committee began its consideration of another item.

HEARING OF PETITIONERS (*continued*)\*\*

*At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Michel Rwagasana, representative of the Union nationale ruandaise (UNAR) and Mr. Alexandre Rutera, representing the Mwami Kigeli V, took places at the Committee table.*

33. Mr. RWAGASANA (Union nationale ruandaise) (*translated from French*):<sup>1</sup> Allow me, as spokesman for the nationalist movement in the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, to express my deep gratitude to the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly for having once again allowed me a hearing in connexion with the extremely grave situation prevailing in the Trust Territory.

34. I take this opportunity to thank the United Nations, on behalf of UNAR, for the constructive resolutions on the future of Ruanda-Urundi which it adopted during the first part of its fifteenth session; I refer to General Assembly resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV), which have unfortunately been systematically frustrated by the Belgian colonial Government. May I also, on behalf of the vast majority of the people of Ruanda-Urundi, express thanks to the members of the United Nations Commission, whose constructive and objective report unquestionably supported by the people of the Territory, will certainly furnish the General Assembly with the background information which it will need to form its conclusions on the development of the situation, and will enable it to seek effective remedies for the evils suffered by the sorely tried peoples of Ruanda-Urundi. For those peoples still retain their confidence in the United Nations. I also take the liberty, on behalf of my delegation, of expressing my gratitude to the various Governments which are giving us asylum during our exile.

35. Before I continue, let me remind you of a statement I made at the 1065th meeting of the Fourth Committee: "But we should like to give the following warning in advance: Belgium and its authorities are not ready to abide by the decisions of the General Assembly. For this reason we hope that the United Nations will take all necessary measures to have its resolutions respected. It must make Belgium understand that Ruanda-Urundi is not its own fief and that the United Nations has a word to say on this matter."

36. I remind you of this warning, to which the Committee did not at the time pay any attention, in order to place the problem of Ruanda-Urundi in its proper context. It was shown to be justified when, upon the completion of the work of the Committee and the General Assembly, the representative of Belgium stated that his Government opposed resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV) because they did not coincide with its own views. This stand taken in defiance of the wishes of the great majority of Member States actually marked

the beginning of a breach between this majority, which calls for respect for the Trusteeship Agreement, and the Belgian Government, which is resolved to pursue a unilateral policy in the Trust Territory.

37. The Administering Authority had never from the beginning of the crisis concealed its intention to act independently of the United Nations; that explains Belgium's flat rejection of the proposals of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960<sup>2</sup> and its discourteous refusal to follow the Trusteeship Council's recommendations of June 1960.<sup>3</sup> By those actions Belgium intended to show, as it is doing elsewhere, that in its colonial policy in Africa only its own views count, and that the United Nations has no power over it. It was ready—and this still holds good today—to agree with the Organization provided that Belgian colonial interests alone were fully safeguarded. As elsewhere, the Belgian Government decided to adopt an attitude of positive opposition towards the United Nations, thus, in practice, rendering void Ruanda-Urundi's status as a Trust Territory and seriously jeopardizing the purposes of the Trusteeship System as defined in the Trusteeship Agreement.

38. It would be a mistake to dwell on the reasons which impelled Belgium to act in this way; paragraph 162 of the Commission's report [A/4706] gives some idea of them, and I take the liberty of quoting a few lines: "The Commission cannot escape the impression that the local Administration, finding itself no doubt too much bound by promises to its favoured political parties and considering that its prestige was at stake, was reluctant to comply with the decisions taken by the Belgian Government to co-operate in giving effect to the recent United Nations resolutions on Ruanda-Urundi". The only observation to be made is that it is not the local Administration alone which is frustrating the decisions of the United Nations; the principal agent of this boycott of the Organization's resolutions in the Trust Territory is the Brussels Government.

39. My party could make no better comment on the most recent events in the Territory than does the Commission's report now before the Assembly. Paragraphs 147, 152, 153, 154, 158, 162, 167, 170, 172, 173, 175, 176, 184 and 200 provide information sufficient to show that there exists the threat of a general civil war.

40. I nevertheless feel that to remove all misconceptions, certain facts must be given special attention, in particular the facts relating to the Kisenyi meeting, the Ostend Conference, the full and unconditional amnesty, the refugee problem, the military bases and the accumulation of war matériel in the Territory, the unity of Ruanda-Urundi, the problem of public liberties and the question of the Mwami Kigeli V.

41. First with regard to the Kisenyi meeting, I have already had occasion to protest emphatically against the so-called participation of UNAR in this meeting, and I take the liberty of stating once again that no authorized representative of my party took part. It seems, however, that two persons connected with the neo-colonialist parties attended the meeting and made pledges on behalf of UNAR. As has been said, this meeting was simply a colonialist intrigue designed to prevent the national reconciliation which was about to begin. Protests have been sent from all sides against this Belgian-PARMEHUTU meeting.

\*\* Resumed from the 1092nd meeting.

<sup>1</sup> In accordance with the decision taken in paragraph 28 above, the text of this statement is reproduced in full.

<sup>2</sup> See T/1538.

<sup>3</sup> See A/4404, part II, chap. II.

42. I turn next to the Ostend Conference. The failure of the Conference caused us no surprise. The Visiting Mission and the Trusteeship Council will doubtless remember my repeated statements since March 1960, in which I have stressed the need for a round-table conference at which all political parties would be fully represented. It will also be remembered how the Belgian colonialist Government has shied at the idea of a conference of this kind. This stubbornness on the part of the Administering Authority has always been prompted by its desire to prevent a national reconciliation, which could have been achieved only by bringing together the leaders of UNAR in exile and those of the pro-Belgian parties. Therein lies the explanation of its flat refusal to allow me or the Vice-Chairman of UNAR to participate in this conference, which, incidentally, was held behind closed doors. It would appear that Belgian imperialism is reluctant to allow any possibility of national reconciliation; and that is why Belgium deliberately wrecked the Ostend Conference, in which the General Assembly had placed its hopes. By so doing, Belgium has once again demonstrated its wilful incapacity to bring peace and national pacification, and its deliberate intention of leading the country into civil war.

43. The question of the amnesty requires attention. The full and unconditional amnesty called for in General Assembly resolution 1579 (XV) is one of the keys to the peaceful accession of the Trust Territory to independence. It is therefore natural that Belgium, anxious to consolidate its puppet régime, should oppose any amnesty measure aimed at liberating the true nationalist leaders enjoying the confidence of the people. Belgium's intention to install neo-colonialism in Africa is no longer concealed, and it is with this one aim that it opposes the provisions of resolution 1579 (XV) regarding a full and unconditional amnesty.

44. Another point to which I should like to draw attention is the matter of the Belgian military bases. My party has protested strongly against the setting up of military bases at Rumonge and Usumbura. Moreover, we feel that the Commission was perhaps unable to obtain sufficient information on the question of the Belgian military bases set up or being set up in the Trust Territory, or on the numbers of the Belgian troops concentrated there. In actual fact, Belgian troops number 3,500 men, of whom more than 2,000 are in the Kisenyi and Shangugu frontier areas of Ruanda, and in the Mutara regions. They are equipped with modern military supplies and fighter aircraft. It has to be pointed out that a few days after the adoption of resolution 1579 (XV), which calls upon the Administering Authority "to refrain from using the Territory as a base, whether for internal or external purposes, for the accumulation of arms or armed forces not strictly required for the purpose of maintaining public order in the Territory", new contingents of Belgian troops invaded the country and military supplies were sent in enormous quantities. In its issue of 20 January 1961, the Geneva newspaper *La Suisse* reported: "Belgian reinforcements for Ruanda-Urundi: Two battalions of Belgian troops were transported on Wednesday by Globemaster planes to the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi in order to defend its frontier with the Congo. A Belgian force, with ten jeeps carrying rocket-firing equipment, will cross the Ruanda-Congolese frontier into Kivu and Orientale Provinces, according to reports from Elisabethville, if the United Nations is unable to protect the whites there."

45. On 14 February 1961, moreover, a ship carrying 200 crates of arms and ammunition for Ruanda-Urundi was stopped at the port of Dar es Salaam because the workers refused to unload it, and was forced to turn back. The newspaper *Ngurumo*, in its Swahili edition of 16 February 1961, reported that Mr. Ngahyoma, the general secretary of the trade unions of Tanganyika, had protested against this unloading of arms in Tanganyika's port; and had decided on a boycott of any ship carrying arms or ammunition. Nor can we pass over in silence the clandestine recruitment at Usumbura of mercenaries for Bakwanga.

46. Unquestionably, Belgium has violated the above-mentioned resolution 1579 (XV).

47. As for as public liberties are concerned, they no longer exist in the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi. Except for the neo-colonialist parties, freedom of speech and of assembly no longer exist. Public opinion is gagged by a military dictatorship which supports a minority of puppets devoted to the Belgian colonialist cause. The political leaders of APROSOMA, including Mr. Gitera, a former President of what is called "the Council of Rwanda", on 8 December 1960 published a "manifesto" on this matter addressed to the chairman of the Kisenyi meeting. I quote from it a few passages relating to freedom of propaganda:

"3. The trusteeship authorities must abandon, at whatever cost, their weak and opportunist policies.

"The Administering Authority injured Ruanda in the past, during its forty years of occupation, by its favouritism towards the Tutsi; now it is harming Ruanda during this transitional period by its favouritism towards PARMEHUTU; it will harm Ruanda irrevocably if it does not cease to favour the PARMEHUTU dictatorship of African appearance.

"For example:

"The appointment by the Administering Authority of a PARMEHUTU Prime Minister, Head of the Provisional Government and national President;

"The appointment by the Administering Authority of Ministers and a Secretary of State all PARMEHUTU by party or tendency;

"The acceptance by the Administering Authority of the fact that the chiefs of communes, nearly all PARMEHUTU, should at the same time be mayors and political leaders;

"The appointment by the Administering Authority of African officials and administrators taken entirely from the ranks of PARMEHUTU, allowing them to combine the administrative positions in the country with their positions as political leaders of a racial and racist party, PARMEHUTU;

"Support of the PARMEHUTU electoral campaign by officials of the Trusteeship Administration (Europeans), with 'Information' vehicles (e.g. at Gitarama, Rukoma etc.), and tours of the country by the PARMEHUTU ministerial team at the country's expense, in collusion with the trusteeship authorities while the Parliament deliberately looked the other way;

"The open favouring of PARMEHUTU majorities everywhere, even in talks of an advisory nature;

"The trusteeship authorities closing their eyes at the most flagrant abuses of power: crimes against persons and property;

“Numerous PARMEHUTU communal chiefs threatening or torturing those who are not members of their party and publicly tearing up their membership cards or expelling them from their property;

“The organization of armed groupings at Gitarama, the PARMEHUTU headquarters, directed against Gitera, the President of the Council of Rwanda. It is really more than time that the Trusteeship Administration in Ruanda saw fit to abandon outright its partisan policy of easy opportunism. It is a policy of weakness. And, at this hour, it is a policy of destruction. The example of the Congo and of other regions of Africa amply prove that fact.

“For the greater good of a united Rwanda, and of all Ruandese, whether black or white, residing in Rwanda now and in the future, the APROSOMA-UNAFREUROP-NKUNDABERA National Party solemnly declares to the present eminent assembly at this meeting of Ruandese and to the world that APROSOMA and its members are opposed to the idea of any opportunist and self-seeking scheme of racial or racist and xenophobe tendencies in this multiracial Rwanda.”

48. This manifesto, may I say, is signed by Mr. Gasingwa, Mr. Ndayambaje, Mr. Sindikubwabo and Mr. Gitera.

49. I turn now to the problem of the unity of Ruanda-Urundi. There is no need to point out that the interests of reactionary colonialism have brought about the systematic division of the Trust Territory into two States, one of which is said to be a sovereign independent republic under provisional trusteeship, and the other a kingdom endowed with an autonomous provisional government. It will be noticed that there is an obvious deception in this new political situation, since in reality Belgium is hatching a plot to create two pseudo-independent quasi-States, at the head of which it would place puppets easy to control on account of the political and economic weakness of these small entities. The Committee's attention should be drawn to the fact that Belgium has violated the General Assembly resolution in this question also.

50. With regard to the so-called “republican” régime in Rwanda, my party has protested against the Administering Authority's flagrant violation of the Trusteeship Agreement in establishing a pseudo-republican régime in one of the provinces of the Trust Territory. We cannot fail to draw the General Assembly's attention to the fact that the so-called republic is a mere farce, and that it is in reality a political manoeuvre designed to challenge the application of the recent General Assembly resolutions, particularly as regards measures of full and unconditional amnesty, general elections supervised by the United Nations and a referendum on the institution of monarchy and on the person of the present Mwami.

51. The establishment of this régime for the benefit of a colonialist minority and with the support of Belgian troops has merely confirmed the opinion that the overwhelming majority of the people are in favour of the Mwami Kigeli V. This régime can exist only by the use of force and the imposition of prison sentences, and if it should be confirmed it would not be surprising to see vile crimes being committed in this part of the Territory, as has happened in the neighbouring territory. We would point out that some two weeks after the establishment of the so-called republic, 100 Hutu

and Tutsi women in the north were savagely beaten and throw into prison for having spoken out against the régime. Only a fortnight ago, cases of incendiarism and murder began to occur with even greater frequency than in the past. The official newspaper *Rudipresse* of 11 March 1961 reports:

“Incidents occurred during the early days of March in the Byumba and Gatsibu region. Certain Hutu elements of the population burned and looted about 150 huts belonging to the Tutsi.

“A more serious incident occurred on 5 March when a Tutsi was beaten to death. His attackers were arrested and imprisoned.

“This unrest was provoked by the hostile attitude adopted by certain Tutsi elements towards the new Rwanda authorities. The local defence force intervened vigorously and effectively and prevented any extension of the incidents. Some 100 incendiaries were arrested. The situation returned to normal after 7 March. The Minister of the Interior, Mr. Jean-Baptiste Rwasibo, went to Gatsibu on 3 March and spoke directly to the people so that order should be quickly restored.”

52. In addition, influential members of parties other than those supported by the Government are unjustifiably expelled from their communes of origin and sent to concentration camps at Nyamata or Rubago. Thus, sixty-five of our regional supporters were expelled from Shangugu district under decision No. 7/61 of 15 February 1961 issued by the local administrator. I shall attach a copy of this decision to the written text of my statement.

53. It would be pointless to enumerate all the political and social evils which this régime of dictatorship is now engendering in Ruanda. However, we could mention, in concluding this section, the attempts to dismiss indigenous officials who have refused to take an oath of loyalty to the so-called republic, the systematic political indoctrination of the local defence force now being formed, and the political indoctrination of the civil service. The following extract from letter No. 1007/B.R.S. from the Resident of Ruanda may throw some light on the way in which the local Administration is tackling the problem of Africanizing the civil service:

“I wish to make it clear that the appointment of deputy provincial administrators does not imply their inclusion in the established civil service. Their functions are not those of an assistant principal provincial administrator, for example.

“The deputy provincial administrators were selected on the recommendation of the Provisional Government. The choice was based, firstly, on their professional competence, and secondly, on their popularity and their influence over the population.

“The deputy provincial administrators were appointed independently of the civil service establishment for reasons of political expediency.

“It is obvious that as soon as UNAR ceases to be viewed by people as a party taking orders from abroad, it will be conceivable and desirable that certain officials of the Administration belonging to this party should also be proposed as candidates for these offices.

“The matter is now one for the Provisional Government. The Administering Authority will support the latter's proposals.”

54. Finally, on the question of the Mwami, UNAR has already explained its position, and the United Nations has taken its decision in General Assembly resolution 1580 (XV). This question is one of the internal problems which divide the Banyarwanda. It can be settled only by the people themselves, for respect for law is one of the essential conditions of any democratic political development. We have always stated that the Mwami Kigeli V is loved by the overwhelming majority of his people, but that because of his nationalist sentiments he is hated by the local Administration and its lackeys.

55. I do not think we should abuse the patience of the Committee, for we have already supplied enough evidence to throw light upon this delicate problem of the future of Ruanda-Urundi. On behalf of the peace-loving people of Ruanda-Urundi, we shall try to put forward proposals which, we feel, are necessary for the prevention of further bloodshed in the Territory. Such further bloodshed would lead to the commission of crimes which the United Nations could not prevent. In order to lead our country to democratic and peaceful independence, the United Nations should take the following measures.

56. Firstly, resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV) of 20 December 1960 should be put into effect without delay. To this end, the General Assembly should solemnly declare that these resolutions are formal international obligations which the Administering Authority is bound to fulfil under the provisions of the Trusteeship Agreement of 13 December 1946 and of Article 7 of the Charter.

57. Secondly, the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi should be given wide and clearly defined terms of reference, authorizing it to intervene effectively in order to maintain public order in the Territory and to restore the rule of law and civil liberties. The Commission's new terms of reference should enable it, in case of need, to call upon any appropriate United Nations organ in order to ensure compliance with the General Assembly's decisions.

58. Thirdly, through the good offices of the United Nations, provincial executive colleges should be set up in Rwanda and Burundi. In Rwanda the college should be composed of two representatives of each of the four political parties. In Burundi, it should be composed of representatives of the parties considered to be the sole representatives of opinion in Burundi. Their task would be to dispatch current business before the proposed legislative elections.

59. Fourthly, a provisional government of national union should be set up for Ruanda-Urundi as a whole, again through the good offices of the United Nations; this government would function until the end of the talks on independence.

60. Fifthly, the police and local administrative authorities should be politically neutralized, to ensure that the legislative elections are democratic. The elections should take place in June 1961 and all adults, both men and women, should take part.

61. Sixthly, all Belgian troops should be withdrawn immediately and unconditionally and replaced by the national gendarmerie led by officers of the United Nations security force.

62. The Union nationale ruandaise considers that these ends could be achieved only through the immediate termination of Belgian trusteeship over Ruanda-Urundi,

since Belgium is morally incapable of leading the African people to peaceful and democratic independence.

63. Before concluding, I should like to say a word about the introductory statement made by the Belgian representative (1108th meeting). Apart from the criticisms it contained of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, this statement was a faithful repetition of the arguments put forward in the Fourth Committee during the first part of the General Assembly's fifteenth session. Having imprisoned or exiled the nationalist leaders, Belgium has set up a military dictatorship, and has conceived the ingenious idea of making persons devoted to its cause the rulers of the Territory. The Belgian Government's objective has never varied: it is to make the international community recognize institutions modelled on the Belgian pattern. The alleged *coup d'état* of Gitarama was only a political manoeuvre thought up in Belgium in order to confront the United Nations with a *fait accompli* and force it to deal with men who represent only a minority party, only one current of opinion in the Territory. The objective was the same at the so-called legislative elections in Burundi.

64. I shall take the liberty of saying straight out that for the United Nations to recognize authorities not based on popular suffrage would be a challenge to democracy. We consider that there is not at the present time, either in Ruanda or Burundi, any authority which can legitimately speak in the name of the people. The only institutions so far recognized by the United Nations are the Bami institutions, which could be changed only by a free decision of the people themselves.

65. The nationalist parties of Ruanda-Urundi are determined to continue their struggle for immediate and unconditional independence. They will resolutely oppose by all possible means the unilateral, partisan policy of Belgium, which is intended to endow Ruanda-Urundi with prefabricated institutions that do not meet the aspirations of the people. We remain confident in our people, who are struggling for complete and genuine independence.

66. Mr. RUTERA (*translated from French*):<sup>4</sup> The petition which I am going to present to you comes from His Majesty Kigeli V, King of Ruanda, who asked me, by his letter of 10 March 1961, to present it to you in his name. Here is the petition:

"Mr. Chairman, and distinguished representatives,

"Trusting in the United Nations, the supreme hope for peace and justice throughout the world, I submit to the Fourth Committee once again the question of Ruanda-Urundi; the General Assembly's efforts to settle this question have been systematically thwarted by the Administering Authority.

"The latter has accorded a very adverse reception to the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its session last December; this applies both to the resolution concerning the future of Ruanda-Urundi and to that dealing with the institution of the Mwami in Ruanda.

"I venture to say that in regard to both these resolutions the Belgian Government's attitude has been disconcerting.

"Thus the measures of full and unconditional amnesty urgently requested by the United Nations have

<sup>4</sup> In accordance with the decision taken in paragraph 28 above, the text of this statement is reproduced in full.

not been applied and the emergency régime has not been abolished but has merely been changed in form, being now conducted by the republican pseudo-Government set up by the Administering Authority. The return of thousands of refugees to Ruanda has not taken place, for the Administering Authority has not adopted the possible means to that end.

“The General Assembly’s recommendation concerning the holding of a conference fully representative of political parties resulted in the Ostend meeting, which failed because it was numerically dominated by political parties to which the Government, by devious means, has given a monopoly. It was for Belgium to give the political guides of the people of Ruanda-Urundi an opportunity to discuss on an equal footing the true interests of the nation, but matters should not have been arranged so as to give the parties favourable to Belgian policy the majority of votes and the opportunity to impose their own views. The failure of the Ostend meeting was thus foreshadowed by the monologue with which it began.

“The United Nations resolution calling upon the Administering Authority to refrain from using the Trust Territory as a military base has had precisely the opposite effect. Two weeks after the adoption of this resolution the Belgian Administration of Ruanda-Urundi was allowing Mobutu’s troops who were attacking Kivu Province to pass through the Territory, and giving them assistance. In fact, the Belgian military bases in Ruanda-Urundi have been reinforced, to the point that, notwithstanding the emergency régime in force in this country, the people and the indigenous authorities have protested against these manoeuvres by the Belgian Government that are turning Ruanda-Urundi into a springboard for attacks on the Congo.

“To the General Assembly’s recommendation that ‘in view of the essential community of interest and the facts of history and geography, the best future for Ruanda-Urundi lies in the evolution of a single, united and composite State’ [resolution 1579 (XV)], the Administering Authority has reacted with a determination, that I can only describe as dangerous for the future of Africa as a whole, to separate Ruanda and Burundi, thus destroying a community that has existed *de facto* for more than forty years.

“As to the General Assembly resolutions relating to the institution of the Mwami, and to myself as Mwami of Ruanda, the Belgian Government has not merely opposed my return to Ruanda and the holding of a popular referendum but has in addition recognized the self-styled Republic of Ruanda, which has been proclaimed in utter disregard of the elementary rules of democracy.

“For my part, I have done everything in my power to facilitate the task of finding a truly national solution to the problems of my State in accordance with the United Nations resolutions, but my good will has come up against a wall of obstruction erected by the Belgian Government.

“Although the Belgian Minister for African Affairs had given me to understand that he would be unable to receive me, and that he opposed my return to Ruanda, I nevertheless went to Belgium. There I addressed a letter, the gist of which is reproduced below, to His Majesty King Baudouin, through the Grand Marshal, the Prime Minister, the Minister for African Affairs, the Chairman of the Senate Com-

mittee on African Affairs, the Chairman of the Round-Table Conference at Ostend, and the Chairman of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi:

“I have the honour to inform you that I have arrived in Belgium and am staying at the Hotel Plaza, Brussels.

“In connexion with the Round-Table Conference now in progress at Ostend, I felt it my duty to be in Belgium in order to give you, as well as the participants in the Round-Table Conference, an opportunity for direct contact with me. I need hardly say that I am at your disposal for any discussion you may deem desirable. Furthermore I beg to give formal expression to my desire to meet you as soon as your many concerns may permit.

“It should be understood that I renounce all ceremonial and protocol. I am here to serve the interests of my State and have no other concern.

“In case it may be of service, I confirm to you once again my desire to be a democratic and constitutional Chief of State for Ruanda and to co-operate with all Ruandese assigned to me by the Ruandese electorate in democratic elections.

“ . . . ”

“In reply to this letter, the Prime Minister informed me that he had requested Count Harold d’Aspremont-Lynden, Minister for African Affairs, to meet me and acquaint me with the Belgian Government’s views. In a letter of 10 January 1961 the Minister for African Affairs, after informing me that he would regard as extremely regrettable any direct intervention on my part in the discussions at the Ostend meeting, promised me an interview. When this had taken place I sent the Minister a note enlarging on the various points covered at that interview. This note deals with various questions which are naturally concomitant with Ruandese problems. It makes the following points:

“1. That it is my intention to be a democratic and constitutional Chief of State for my country;

“2. That as a democratic and constitutional Chief of State I am obviously prepared to agree that legislative power should be exercised in Ruanda by a legislative assembly, on the understanding that the laws will be promulgated by me, subject to counter-signature by a minister;

“3. That I am prepared to have a Government which is responsible to the legislative assembly, and which must therefore be composed of persons enjoying the confidence of the majority in the legislative assembly, and hence of the electorate, on condition that all democratic freedoms are guaranteed beforehand to all political parties;

“4. That I am prepared to accept a national referendum on the retention or abolition of the institution of the monarchy in Ruanda subject, however, to safeguards of freedom and objectivity to be agreed upon with me, in conformity with the United Nations General Assembly resolution on the question;

“5. That I am prepared to co-operate amicably with Belgium on all national and international questions affecting the higher interests of our two countries;

“6. That I am prepared to reach agreement with you on my co-operation with a provisional Govern-

ment presided over by a Hutu personality capable of winning the confidence of a majority of the other political parties;

"7. That I am prepared to use all my influence to check any policy of vengeance to which my return to Ruanda might give rise;

"8. That I undertake to reconstruct my Cabinet in order to make it broadly representative of all shades of opinion in my State;

"9. That I am prepared to reach agreement with you on the course of action to be followed at the United Nations, on condition that you accept the proposals I have made in the foregoing paragraphs and that my immediate return to my State is guaranteed.

"I reiterate in conclusion my conviction that in order to restore peace in my State Belgium will implement fully the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.

"...'

"After the pseudo-Republic of Ruanda had been proclaimed with the blessing of the Belgian Government, I addressed, to the Minister for African Affairs a letter of 31 January 1961 informing him that in view of the political events that had recently taken place in my State with the complicity of the Belgian Administration I was compelled to terminate my stay in Belgium and was therefore unable to continue the conversations I had hoped to hold with him concerning my return to Ruanda as decided by the United Nations General Assembly.'

"On 2 February 1961, I dispatched the following letter from Paris to His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for African Affairs:

"In flagrant violation of the United Nations resolutions and Trusteeship Agreements, the Provisional Government forcibly installed by the Administering Authority has just instigated an illegal act which confronts Belgium with its international responsibilities. A so-called Republic has just been proclaimed in Ruanda. As the only Ruandese Chief of State recognized by Belgium and international authority I reserve the right, in the event of failure by Belgium to comply with its obligations, to take all necessary steps in conformity with the legitimate aspirations of the Ruandese people.'

"Mr. Chairman and distinguished representatives: you may judge for yourselves, from the above information, my efforts for conciliation and the bad faith of the Belgian Government. By flouting the United Nations resolutions, the Administering Authority has challenged the Organization and thus seriously impaired its prestige. The future of the peoples of Ruanda-Urundi is gravely compromised by the shortcomings of the Administering Authority.

"In view of this particularly serious situation I beg the United Nations to terminate Belgian trusteeship in Ruanda-Urundi immediately, as the surest means of saving the country from an imminent catastrophe and of attaining the objectives of trusteeship, which Belgium has missed. The United Nations itself would organize elections for the installation of a democratic Government and a popular referendum on the institution of the Mwami. It would compel Belgian troops to withdraw from Ruanda-Urundi and would establish a national police force to keep

order throughout the country. The United Nations would then grant Ruanda-Urundi real independence.

"In conclusion I express once again my confidence that the United Nations in its wisdom, to which I pay a tribute, will certainly find an effective solution to the distressing problems now presented by Ruanda-Urundi and will lead that country to international sovereignty in peace and harmony.

"For my part, I remain prepared, as in the past, to accept the verdict of the people provided that the guarantees of freedom are observed; and the only way to ensure this is for the United Nations to organize and supervise the popular consultations."

“(Signed) KIGELI V  
“Mwami of Ruanda”

67. The letter which I have just read has been distributed as a document [T/PET.3/L.105]. I was instructed to present it to you, which I have now done. If the Fourth Committee should wish to ask me any questions concerning Mwami Kigeli V, I am at its disposal.

*At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Thadée Siryuyumunsi, representative of Unité et progrès national (UPRONA), took a place at the Committee table.*

68. Mr. SIRYUYUMUNSI (Unité et progrès national) (translated from French):<sup>4</sup> The party Unité et progrès national (UPRONA) of Burundi realizes the very great importance of the March 1961 session of the United Nations General Assembly, during which the situation in Ruanda-Urundi will be considered and decisions will no doubt be taken which will place Rwanda and Burundi irrevocably on the road to complete independence. Whether the start made will be a happy and auspicious one, or whether it will take place in an atmosphere of confusion and dispute, thus rendering more arduous a path which is already difficult, will depend on these decisions.

69. It is with a view to facilitating these discussions that UPRONA will try to describe the existing state of affairs and to submit its own conclusions. It will do so in a manner free from emotion and it will do its best to be impartial and objective; it will overlook the affronts and slander to which it has always been subjected and will only refer to certain instances of these affronts in order to bring out the attitude of the Administering Authority or the specious nature of certain statements.

70. UPRONA invites the General Assembly's attention to the statement submitted by Mr. Joseph Biroli, the Chairman of the Parti démocrate chrétien, who represented the Front commun at the 1067th meeting of the Fourth Committee. Generally speaking, this statement gives a very good picture of the general situation in Burundi and we agree with Mr. Biroli's views on the objectives to be attained and on the means whereby this should be done.

71. It is true that the increasingly confused situation in Burundi is mainly due—and here we quote the very words of Mr. Biroli's statement—firstly, to the struggle between a reactionary trend and a democratic trend; secondly, to the desire of these reactionary parties to seize power before the people had time to claim their rights, choose their leaders and decide their future; thirdly, to the struggle for or against the Mwami of Burundi; and fourthly, to the struggle for or against

an imposed or improvised independence, despite the recommendations of the Visiting Mission.

72. Today, the four points referred to by Mr. Biroli are still more than ever the outstanding causes of discord. In his statement Mr. Biroli artfully presented his own party as representing the democratic trend and UPRONA as the reactionary party; we on the other hand maintain that the position is exactly the opposite. At the time when Mr. Biroli made his statement, it would have been difficult for people who lacked a thorough knowledge of Burundi to realize this. Since then, however, events have provided undeniable proof of it and we shall make bold to give a brief summary of them.

73. In its report [T/1538], the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, considered "that it might be dangerous to proceed with the communal elections in the current tense atmosphere" [para. 449]. Reference is made in the same report to the Resident-General's statement that in Burundi "the process of organizing political opinions into political parties had only just commenced" [para. 450]. If these two statements are taken together, they clearly indicate that the communal elections were premature and that in any case they would be devoid of any value as a conscious expression of the political will of the masses.

74. The above leads one to the conclusion that the intentions of those who wanted the elections to be held without the United Nations being present were suspect; they wanted to take advantage of the ignorance of the electors and their lack of preparation, and it would be entirely accurate to say that they sought "to seize power before the people had time to claim their rights, choose their leaders and decide their future".

75. Now, what was the attitude of the parties concerned? UPRONA did not want elections under those conditions. The Parti démocrate chrétien insisted on their being held and gained their point. Both during and after these elections, UPRONA continually protested against the pressure brought to bear on the electors and against the coercion and violence to which the party was subjected and which, in any country where there was an honest Government, would have invalidated the result of the elections. UPRONA will not dwell on these facts and the supporting evidence; in this connexion, it would draw attention to the opinion apparently formed by the United Nations Commission which visited Burundi in January 1961 and left it immediately, in such a way as to constitute a silent protest on its part against the state of affairs prevailing there.

76. Not only did the Parti démocrate chrétien and the Belgian Administration accept these results, but, as we shall see later on, they gave them undue political significance.

77. On 20 December 1960, at its fifteenth session, the United Nations General Assembly resolved that no hasty new steps should be taken in Ruanda-Urundi, that the date of the legislative elections as a result of which a Government would be set up in Burundi should be postponed until after 7 March 1961 and that a permanent United Nations Commission should proceed to the Territory to supervise all stages of those elections, including the preparatory measures, the conduct of the elections and the counting of the votes, and to take part in the exercise of trusteeship. The Belgian Government accepted these resolutions.

78. What did the political parties do? UPRONA announced that it was in agreement and that its wishes

had been met. The Parti démocrate chrétien protested, organized demonstrations at Kitega and insisted on the immediate establishment of a provisional government on the basis of the results of the communal elections. In the space of three days, the Belgian Administration set up this Government, announced that second-degree elections would be held at which the sole electors would be the communal councillors (2,850 people) and thus had a State Council elected. Moreover, two or three days later a so-called popular *coup d'état* took place in Ruanda which, by a strange coincidence, passed off exactly in the same way.

79. In the Kayanza constituency, there were nine seats to be filled. All of them were allotted to the Parti démocrate chrétien. Out of these nine representatives, seven consisted of Mr. Baranyanka himself, his sons, his sons-in-law and his nephews. It seems clear that the Baranyanka family are the founders and owners of this party. Persons wishing to speak on behalf of other parties were forbidden even to enter that region and were summarily imprisoned if they ventured to do so. In order to avoid such disputes, UPRONA withdrew its own speakers.

80. Naturally UPRONA refused to associate itself with such a farce. Once again, let us recall the words spoken by Mr. Biroli, the Chairman of the Parti démocrate chrétien in denouncing those who sought "to seize power before the people had time to claim their rights, choose their leaders and decide their future".

81. Since then, this so-called Government which, even supposing it had been a proper Government, should have confined itself to organizing a self-governing administration in the country, intervenes on the international scene by such steps as entering into official contact with the Government of Katanga with a view to discussing an alliance with that country. The affairs of the Congo do not concern us and we have nothing but sympathy for the inhabitants and leaders of that region. But the delicate international position of Katanga makes it necessary at the very least to adopt a prudent wait-and-see attitude; in any case, it is not for a new-born provisional Government which is the subject of controversy and which is illegal to launch Burundi on uncharted seas. UPRONA is unable to avoid the unpleasant impression that the parties which agreed to form this Government are paying for the support received by them from the Administration by backing a Belgian policy which has incurred some suspicion among other nations.

82. To counteract the above criticisms, the weighty argument will be adduced that all this was done with the approval of the Mwami Mwambutsa and that it is therefore odd that an openly monarchist party should dispute the legality of what has taken place. It is true that everyone claims to respect the Mwami and acknowledges that he is above party. Radio Usumbura, which is under the exclusive control of the Belgian Administration, announced that the Mwami was in agreement with the establishment of the provisional Government; in particular, Mr. Cimpaye, the Prime Minister, based his first appeal to the country on the approval of the Mwami, whom he eulogized as to whom he stated that he was subject.

83. UPRONA declares most categorically that this was nothing but lies, trickery and intimidation; the contrary, the Mwami never approved and ceased to protest against what was being done and the use that was being made of his name. He w

even informed about some institutions and appointments. No heed was paid to his protests, his voice was stifled and he was literally forced to be present at the inaugural meeting of the new State Council, at which his absolute silence constituted the only form of protest allowed to him.

84. UPRONA places irrefutable proof of this state of affairs at the disposal of the General Assembly. In his letter of 26 January 1961 to the Resident-General, a copy of which was sent for information to the Resident of Burundi, the Mwami of Burundi wrote:

*[For the text of the letter read by Mr. Siryuyumunsi, see A/4706/Add.1, annex XXII.]*

85. On 5 February 1961, the Mwami of Burundi wrote the following letter to the Resident-General of Ruanda-Urundi and sent copies for information to His Majesty the King of the Belgians, Brussels; the Minister for African Affairs, Brussels; the Chairman of the United Nations Commission of Observers, Usumbura; the Resident of Burundi, Kitega; and the Chairmen of all political parties:

*[For the text of the letter read by Mr. Siryuyumunsi, see A/4706/Add.1, annex XXV.]*

86. After that, there is no need to comment once more on the pious words of the Chairman of the Parti démocrate chrétien with regard to seizing power and so on.

87. But this unheard-of situation brings out the full meaning of another point which we quoted from Mr. Biroli's statement, namely "the struggle for or against" Mwami Mwambutsa.

88. It is true that the Mwami is above party. UPRONA does not represent the interest and the policy of the Mwami any more than anyone else does. UPRONA is not an instrument of the Mwami and has received no mission, no instructions and no favour from him. UPRONA is a monarchist party; that is to say it considers the monarchy to be the institution best fitted to ensure the stability of future institutions, since in the past it brought about the creation and survival of the unity of the Murundi people. UPRONA by no means denies the need to bring the sovereign's role up to date; but it considers that this role should remain an active one, that its extent has yet to be defined and that it is not for one or more parties, still less for the Administering Authority, to establish at this stage what the limits of that role should be or how it should be carried out. All the other parties—and the Parti démocrate chrétien almost more than any other—proclaim their devotion to the Mwami. But the facts set out above and the proofs which we have adduced make it clear along what cunning lines Mr. Biroli is thinking, i.e. he wants to undermine the monarchy while publicly professing his respect for it.

89. It is surely inadmissible that parties which practise the attainment of their ends by force or agree to such a doctrine should base their legitimacy on a lying claim to have the Mwami's approval, to be his friends and to be loyal supporters of the institution of the monarchy. The very fact that these people, these parties and the Administration feel it necessary to have recourse to what is nothing less than a moral swindle shows also how solid and deep-rooted are the monarchist sentiments of the people and how it is therefore essential that evolution should revolve round the monarchy.

90. Nor can it be claimed that monarchy is incompatible with progress and democracy. The example of

King Baudouin of Belgium, who is loved by his people and respected throughout the world, provides us with a final argument.

91. UPRONA does not consider itself to be adopting a one-sided view in drawing the following conclusions from what has been said above. Firstly, the situation is entirely contrary to what was advocated by the United Nations Visiting Mission of March 1960, to the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly of 20 December 1960 and to the undertakings of the Belgian Government. Secondly, the institutions which have been hurriedly set up—the Interim Government, the second-degree elections and the State Council—are illegal: not only have they not been approved by the Mwami but they were created and established with utter disregard for the Mwami's objections; nor have these objections been surmounted either by negotiation or by a formal decision in writing by the Resident-General in his capacity as arbiter between the Resident of Burundi and the Mwami. Thirdly, the way in which the local Belgian Administration has disregarded the undertakings given by the Belgian Government to the United Nations and has repeatedly claimed to have obtained the agreement of the Mwami, well knowing that this is untrue, and the unfriendly way in which it received the United Nations Commission, together with the latter's abrupt departure, constitute clear proof of coercion and recourse to force. Fourthly, at any rate some of the political parties in Burundi and a section of public opinion there, while enduring this state of affairs protest against it.

92. UPRONA realizes that the United Nations cannot concern itself with mere party struggle or with questions of ill-will between individuals or even of opposing ideologies, inasmuch as in a Trust Territory the persons concerned all have the same freedom in accordance with a system under which the representatives of the Administering Authority are strictly neutral. But the party Unité et progrès national of Burundi maintains that this is not the case and hopes that it has been able to prove it. On the contrary, it contends that at all events the local representatives of the Administering Authority support one group of political parties and make changes in the time-table recommended and laid down by the United Nations and accepted by the Belgian Government, in order to suit their own interests; they alter the purport and the text of decrees signed by King Baudouin, in order to meet the exigencies of the causes championed by these parties, and, for no other reason than this same party interest, they introduce changes in the basic structure of the country, whereas such measures lie solely within the province of the Mwami and of a legislative assembly derived from free elections under universal suffrage which have been properly prepared and supervised.

93. UPRONA nevertheless takes the liberty of speaking for itself, for the criticisms and attacks levelled against it in the General Assembly in December 1960 and the public and persistent hostility of the Belgian Administration are such as to make this party suspect in the eyes of certain Members of the Assembly and consequently to weaken the effect of its arguments. UPRONA was the first party in Burundi to demand political rights for the Burundi and the independence of the country at a fixed date. It immediately became the object of the hostility of the local Belgian Administration. I can assure you that the position and the doctrines of this party have never changed and never will.

94. My party is accused mainly of being reactionary, feudalistic, xenophobe, Communist, anti-Belgian.

95. It would be easy to refute those accusations by referring to the manifestos of the party but it would be objected that they consist of mere words which do not provide any proof. It is difficult, moreover, to provide irrefutable proof as long as the party has no say in the action of the Government. Exactly the same thing, however, applies to the other parties. Nevertheless, the fact that UPRONA is the only party which has associated itself with the views and resolutions of the United Nations concerning the organization of democratic structures in Burundi and that its members—and its members alone—were for that reason put in prison or kept in controlled residence and were thus ineligible for election, is an obvious fact the significance of which is clear. While there may perhaps be differing concepts of democracy, that of UPRONA is the same as that of the United Nations. Moreover, the proposal to be set forth in the conclusion to this statement will attest to the party's good faith.

96. The charge of xenophobia is easy to refute. From the outset UPRONA has advocated the integration of all honest foreigners and the granting to them of political rights on an equal footing with the Burundi. The party has consistently defended this position in its written statements and during the talks at Kitega and Ostend and has opposed any change in the Interim Decree of 25 December 1959 on that subject. It is because of the opposition of the other parties, particularly the Parti démocrate chrétien, that these rights have not been recognized or upheld. The result of this injustice and this error is that the foreigners, particularly the Europeans, are becoming discouraged, fearing a repetition of the events in the Congo, and are either trying to sell their property and leave the country or limiting their activity. This is producing a slow strangulation of the economy, the flight of capital, a black market in foreign exchange, encouraged by the exorbitant exchange privileges accorded to the trusteeship officials, increased unemployment and an unwarranted and uncontrolled rise in the prices of merchandise and foodstuffs. UPRONA expressly requests the General Assembly to include in its resolutions a provision calling for the restoration of the political rights of all foreigners who have been resident in Burundi for five years or more.

97. As for the charge of Communism, UPRONA does not know what to reply for the good reason that it does not know exactly what Communism is, nor has it any false shame about admitting its ignorance on that score. What the party and its leaders know about Communism they have learned from reading anti-Communist newspapers and literature and from listening to the anti-Communist propaganda broadcast over Radio Usumbura. Those critical accounts present Communism as a doctrine of violence and force, hostile to religion and the monarchy, to freedom of thought, to private property in any form and to the educated classes. If that is the case, the charge of Communism levelled against UPRONA is hardly consistent with other charges that the party is reactionary, feudalistic and imbued with the spirit of caste. Neither the nationalist party, its leaders, nor, as far as is known, any of its members is in contact with or has been approached by any Communist country or party. But UPRONA is not afraid to affirm its lively curiosity with regard to an ideology which governs the fate of a thousand million people, the same curiosity

which it feels concerning the American, the Arab and the Indian worlds.

98. For all the Barundi, independence also means the release of the intellect from the spiritual prison of the Black Africa of the past, where only ideas and concepts approved by some metropolitan political hygiene squad could be disseminated, and its freedom to range the whole world. UPRONA's basic criticism of the trusteeship régime is that it has not understood its mission. As long as it appeared that the trusteeship régime would continue indefinitely it was understandable—if subject to criticism—that it thought it should and could take all decisions, including those of spiritual, intellectual or political orientation, and rely solely on its own judgement in establishing certain institutions and abolishing others, for it could in good faith assume that it would have time to carry out its plans or alter them if necessary. It should also be noted that during the forty years in which that situation existed the credo of the trusteeship régime was to uphold and strengthen the authority of the Bami. But from the moment that the Administering Authority decided or realized that its mandate was to expire once and for all within a very short time, it ceased to have any moral right to take steps which would have long-term consequences and its new mission was to continue to give advice, to maintain order and, for the rest, to observe the strictest neutrality.

99. It is unnecessary to demonstrate that such was not the case. Whereas formerly all important decisions were taken at Brussels after careful deliberation and were signed by King Baudouin, since 1959 the local Administration has been resorting to the excessive use of legislative ordinances. The trusteeship over Ruanda-Urundi has slipped out of the hands of King Baudouin and into those of the dictatorship exercised by the Resident-General and his acolytes. The Belgian Parliament has entirely ceased to discuss Ruanda-Urundi and on the occasion of the talks at Kitega and Ostend the Minister for African Affairs delegated the chairmanship to a high official who had only an indirect knowledge of the problems of Ruanda-Urundi. Never in the history of the trusteeship régime have local officials been given—or rather assumed—such broad powers, so much so that a mere police agent is given the right to make arrests, to carry out personal searches and to confiscate property, without a warrant, without justification, without appeal and without judicial intervention. The district officers are empowered to carry out searches at any hour of the day or night, to seize and intercept the mails and postal communications, to requisition means of transport and to commit persons to controlled residence.

100. Radio Usumbura is under the exclusive control of the Administration, which uses it for the following purposes: to criticize the nationalist political parties; to broadcast massive republican propaganda in Burundi; to attack such foreign countries as Russia, Morocco, Guinea, Mali, the United Arab Republic etc., although Belgium holds its mandate from those as well as other countries; to speak in the name of the Mwami, although neither the sovereign himself nor the nationalist political parties have the facilities to refute such statements.

101. The *Chronique congolaise*, a newspaper of Usumbura, published articles by its own staff and by Europeans established in Burundi criticizing the policy and acts of the Administration. The editor of the newspaper, a French national, was arrested on about 15 February 1961 at nine o'clock in the evening, taken

to prison and forced to leave for Belgium by air the following day. Two weeks later the newspaper ceased publication, the Administration having seized the printing press from the owners. The muzzling of the opposition is now complete.

102. The former General Council was composed partly of Europeans representing the private sector who were resident in Ruanda and Burundi and had been selected by the Administration itself. Those Europeans were always realistic in their approach and vigilantly protected the interests of Ruanda-Urundi, particularly in budgetary and economic matters. When the Resident-General installed his own dictatorship and serious incidents began to occur one after another in both Ruanda and Burundi, that Council was ignored and reduced to inactivity. Despite the protests of its members, during the eighteen months which its mandate had still to run it was convened only once to consider an agenda limited strictly to currency reform. The Resident-General rejected a motion urging that the political situation in the Territory should be discussed. Several members of the Council, including a Belgian resident in Ruanda who was also a member of the Commission royale pour la protection des indigènes, were placed in controlled residence.

103. On 7 March 1960 Legislative Ordinance No. 111/68 was issued, defining in detail and prescribing prison sentences of up to twenty years for plotting and carrying out acts prejudicial to the security of the State. On 28 January 1961 the Provisional Government of Ruanda abolished the monarchy, proclaimed the republic, organized second-degree elections within a few hours and established a parliament. That action, down to its minutest details, constituted a violation of every one of the paragraphs of the Ordinance in question. Not only did the Administration fail to apply the law but it immediately recognized the *fait accompli* and ever since then the official radio station at Usumbura, which is in Burundi, has been singing the praises of Ruanda. The affairs of Ruanda do not, of course, concern us. The Legislative Ordinance, however, is applicable to the whole of Ruanda-Urundi. We have not the slightest doubt concerning what would have happened if UNAR or RADER in Ruanda or UPRONA in Burundi had made the slightest attempt along those lines or if the Mwami Mwambutsa had so much as made public his disagreements with the trusteeship régime and the scandalous abuse made of his name and his authority.

104. This situation clearly demonstrates the arbitrary character of the régime prevailing in Ruanda-Urundi, for no one knows beforehand when or why the law may or may not be transgressed.

105. In brief, UPRONA desires that the following should be done: firstly, that the General Assembly should inform the Belgian Government that the latter has proved itself incapable of abiding by its commitments to observe real neutrality as between the political parties—a commitment which it undertook freely and with full knowledge of what it was doing; secondly, that the Mwami Mwambutsa should be allowed to exercise the normal but real prerogatives of the Chief of State until such time as the constitution defines them precisely; thirdly, that the following recent decisions of the local Administration should be revoked: the Interim Government; the second-degree legislative elections; the State Council which was set up as a result of those elections; the Ordinance of the Resident-General giving the Resident of Urundi power to appoint high political

officials (permanent secretaries, *chefs de cabinet*); fourthly, that a permanent United Nations commission should be set up in Burundi, not only entrusted with the organization and supervision of the elections but also required to participate in the administration of the Territory and vested with powers of control over the army.

106. UPRONA is convinced of the need to codify the new institutions, basing them on solid foundations, namely carefully prepared and supervised elections, so that the legislative assembly of tomorrow cannot be called into question whatever its composition and majority. Normally this is a rôle that should have been and could have been discharged by the Administering Authority but that Authority, having failed to maintain neutrality, is henceforth incapable of providing the necessary moral safeguards and is in fact itself in need of a guarantee which could only come from the United Nations.

107. Once free and supervised elections have taken place and a government has been formed by the Mwami and invested by the legislative assembly, the first task should be the framing of a constitution. Whatever party is in opposition should be called upon to take part in that task as well as other bodies and persons nominated by the Mwami. A supervised referendum would ratify the constitution. Only after that will it be possible to organize the life of the country in its independent status. UPRONA requests that the United Nations should safeguard minorities, the parliamentary opposition, against possible arbitrary action by a majority and provide guarantees that the constitution cannot be changed without the minority being allowed freely to present its objections. This should continue for a sufficiently long period to enable the people to become fully aware of its rights and its powers. Since UPRONA is convinced that it will itself obtain an absolute majority in free elections, this proposal should be enough to allay completely any suspicion regarding its intentions.

108. UPRONA draws attention to the fact that the situation improperly and illegally created by the Administering Authority namely the establishment of a provisional Government not sanctioned by the Mwami, second-degree elections and a provisional State Council, all of which have been disputed, is fraught with serious consequences for the future. The situation in fact gives to an ill-informed and unenlightened people a tacit but definite lead on the manner of voting and indicates to them the powerful parties to be feared and therefore to be supported, since they have the visible support of the Belgian Administration; the majority of the electors do not yet realize that the rôle of that Administration is practically terminated, for its prestige, heightened by the presence of a host of white paratroops and continuous military and air exercises, is still considerable. For that reason the opposition is obliged in turn to stiffen its propaganda and to resort to arguments which are not those it would normally choose.

109. Considering various aspects of colonialism, particularly Belgian colonialism in Ruanda-Urundi, where the inhabitants are obliged to obey purely paternalist orders; considering the complete lack of neutrality on the part of the Administration in respect of political parties, in spite of the fact that more than half of those parties were created by it for the sole purpose of placing them in opposition to the nationalist party; noting the efforts made by that Administration to sow discord among families and to provoke disturbances among the

population by disseminating information calculated to mislead the people and by the use of the official radio, from all of which it is clear that the Administering Authority is no longer capable of playing the part it would normally be called upon to play, namely to lead the Territory of Ruanda-Urundi to independence in order and peace; considering that Belgium has thereby failed to fulfil its most sacred obligations, on the one hand to the people of Ruanda-Urundi and on the other hand to the United Nations, from which it received the mandate; considering that the purpose pursued by the United Nations in its recommendations and resolutions is to abolish colonialism in all its forms and that on that account the nationalist parties are entitled to hope that the influence and wisdom of the General Assembly will not sacrifice the future of a whole people to the

blind obstinacy of the colonialists; considering that there can be no doubt that as long as Belgium maintains trusteeship over our Territory there is no hope of seeing order established in Ruanda-Urundi either now or after independence; UPRONA requests the General Assembly to withdraw immediately and unconditionally the mandate entrusted to Belgium for the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi and to arrange for it to be taken over either by another country or directly by the United Nations during the period of transition between the legislative elections and independence. UPRONA calls upon this Assembly to ensure the right to liberty, dignity, justice and independence for the people of Burundi.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.