

United Nations
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION

Official Records

FOURTH COMMITTEE, 1617th
MEETING

Tuesday, 25 October 1966,
at 11 a.m.



NEW YORK

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Chairman: Mr. FAKHREDDINE Mohamed (Sudan).

AGENDA ITEM 23

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Southern Rhodesia (continued) (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Sir Senerat GUNewardene (Ceylon) recalled that he had expressed his Government's views on the question of Southern Rhodesia in the Fourth Committee the previous year (1523rd meeting). There was no reason to change those views; on the contrary, his delegation was more convinced than ever that they were correct.

2. Ceylon was essentially a Buddhist country, with 80 per cent of its inhabitants belonging to that faith. In its foreign policy, which was influenced by that philosophy, Ceylon advocated a middle-of-the-road approach. It believed in non-alignment, moderation, toleration and the principle of non-violence. Moderation, however, did not mean moderation in the pursuit of the eradication of evil; on the contrary, it should be the constant endeavour to eradicate evil in the world. Furthermore, toleration did not mean that evil should be accepted as an inevitable fact of life. Good will should be exercised in the pursuit of just aims.

3. He was speaking as the representative of a country that was a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. That institution, to which he attached great importance, was a multiracial organization, an association of free nations of different cultures, religions and political philosophies. Nevertheless, it was bound together by certain principles, such as a belief in democracy, majority rule and the preservation of peace.

4. The mongrel institution that had been allowed to come into being in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to the very foundations of the Commonwealth. So long as the racist and fascist Government in Southern Rhodesia continued to exist and to control the destiny of 4 million Africans, the Commonwealth would cease to have any meaning. The disruption of the Commonwealth was not a price worth paying for the safety of 200,000 white settlers.

5. The illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia was also a threat to stability and peace in Africa. Africa was undoubtedly on the march and Africans would not tolerate a situation in which 4 million fellow Africans suffered indignities and the loss of self-respect. Nor would Asia or enlightened world opinion tolerate such a situation. It was in that light that the members of the Committee should view the question of Southern Rhodesia and it was in that spirit that he appealed to the United Kingdom to review the entire matter. It was not just a question of overcoming temporary difficulties; the problem must be considered from a long-range point of view whereby independence would be ensured to the majority of the population. The awesome spectacle of 200,000 white settlers controlling 4 million coloured persons in their own land and treating them as serfs was one that could not be ignored. Four million people were being subjected to indignities, humiliation and hardship and were denied the right to freedom of speech, peaceful assembly and self-determination. Even countries, such as Ceylon, which had achieved independence without actual conflict could realize what it meant to suffer such indignities. It was a crime against society and against mankind.

6. The present Constitution of Southern Rhodesia was not an accident. For well over fifty years the white minority in Southern Rhodesia had treated the indigenous inhabitants as indentured labour for its own material and economic benefits. While it was true that wages were high, that was no compensation for the indignities inflicted upon the majority of the population. He was sure that the United Kingdom Government regretted the fact that in 1923 it had introduced a Constitution giving internal self-government to a handful of white settlers and denying the rightful aspirations of the majority of the inhabitants. That Constitution had been in existence for nearly four decades. The present rulers in Southern Rhodesia had shown no desire to mend their ways. The United Nations had embarked on a policy of decolonization. Country after country had become free in Africa, but the white settlers were not prepared to accept their ideas of independence.

7. The countries of Asia and Africa had always feared that the white minority in Southern Rhodesia would declare independence unilaterally and had not been surprised when that declaration had been made.

He had been shocked by the fact that the Labour Government, which had been largely responsible for the United Kingdom's achievements in the matter of decolonization, had made the fateful statement that it would not use force in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence. That had been an open invitation to Smith to declare independence. His delegation was not attributing any motives to Mr. Wilson or to the United Kingdom Government or challenging their good faith. At the time of the unilateral declaration, the Labour Government had only just taken office and had perhaps thought that a conciliatory attitude might win over the Smith régime. The Asian countries had not thought that such a policy would work, but the United Kingdom had had the primary responsibility for guiding Southern Rhodesia to independence and it had no doubt considered that the best course. The statement by the United Kingdom Government that force would not be used had, however, had the opposite effect. He must admit, in all fairness to the United Kingdom, that it had consulted the Commonwealth countries at every stage. The Labour Government was democratic in its outlook and had been responsible for granting freedom to India, Burma, Ceylon and Pakistan in 1948 and for transforming the British Empire into the Commonwealth of Nations, but the action which it had taken thus far in the Southern Rhodesian question had not produced the desired result. Mr. Wilson had declared that economic sanctions would be effective and would bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks. The Asian countries had never considered that voluntary sanctions would have any effect, since there were powerful nations which were interested in forming an empire south of the Zambezi River and which would not observe such sanctions. One year had elapsed since then. A Sanctions Committee set up at the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers at Lagos had examined the situation carefully and had found that the sanctions had not been fruitful and that Smith had not been brought to his knees. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference held in London in September 1966, Mr. Wilson had said that if voluntary sanctions failed his Government would ask the Security Council to impose mandatory sanctions. As there was no doubt that voluntary economic sanctions had failed, he wondered why Mr. Wilson had not yet turned to the Security Council. In any event, the Ceylonese delegation did not think that mandatory sanctions would be effective unless they were accompanied by force and applied against certain neighbouring countries as well.

8. It would be fatal for the Commonwealth to allow the situation in Southern Rhodesia to continue much longer. Immediate action was required to prevent disruption of the Commonwealth, and the United Kingdom should heed that fact.

9. The United Kingdom Government had vast experience in dealing with minority questions, rebellions and ensuring law and order. It had experienced and talented administrators. He wondered, therefore, how 200,000 adventurers were able to defy the United Kingdom Government and world opinion. The United Kingdom had stated clearly that the Smith régime was illegal and that the unilateral declaration of independence was an act of rebellion. It had also said that any steps taken to enforce or implement that declaration would

be treasonable. High treason could not be dealt with by negotiation. The United Kingdom Government had clearly said that Ian Smith was a rebel and that it would not negotiate with rebels. The Southern Rhodesian marauders were not, however, being treated as rebels; the arm of the law had not reached them. No country in the world had done more for the rule of law than the United Kingdom, but it was not upholding the rule of law and the principles of democracy in Southern Rhodesia.

10. In India, the United Kingdom had met the passive resistance movement led by a veritable saint, Mahatma Gandhi, with lathi charges; Indian soldiers had been ordered to fire upon fellow Indians, and Mahatma Gandhi had spent most of his life in British prisons. Pandit Nehru, the anchor of the Commonwealth, had also been incarcerated for a considerable part of his life. Other Indian leaders had been thrown into prison because of their policy of passive resistance.

11. He recalled that, when he was a child, the United Kingdom Government had, on the mere suspicion of a small-scale rebellion, declared martial law, brought forces from India and as far away as Africa and incarcerated Ceylonese leaders, including the man who had become Ceylon's first Prime Minister. The United Kingdom had dealt with the Mau Mau movement in Kenya in a similar manner. When it had considered that the situation in British Guiana, Aden and Cyprus had constituted a rebellion, it had called upon the rebels to surrender, handed over the Government to the Governor and promulgated harsh laws. The inhabitants had been ordered to surrender their arms under penalty of death. Courts of law had been replaced by military tribunals. No exception had been made for women and children. The United Kingdom appeared to apply a double standard and to vary its policy according to the region or race involved. He believed in British justice and was shocked to think that there were different types of British justice. The fact remained, however, that the Southern Rhodesian rebels had not been called upon to surrender and the Government of the Territory had not been handed over to the Governor.

12. He and his fellow countrymen had been tutored in the tradition of British law, which was against the use of force. In the present case it was not a question of force being used in violation of the United Nations Charter. Force was part of the function of government, had been used throughout the ages and was being used every day to enforce law and order. Once the Smith régime had been declared illegal, it had been the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government to enforce law and order in the Territory and to protect the majority of the population. He asked why the United Kingdom had not used force in Southern Rhodesia. The process of decolonization in Africa had been peaceful and the United Kingdom had been quite ready to grant independence to all its colonies, except where the interests of the white settlers had been involved, as for instance in Kenya and Uganda. The situation was even more acute in Southern Rhodesia because of the larger number of settlers. He understood the difficulties which the Labour Government faced. The United Kingdom Government had hitherto complied with the provisions of the

Charter and United Nations resolutions fairly and completely. Its present policy might be due to a strong Southern Rhodesian lobby. Most States agreed, however, that force must be used. The United Kingdom had the support of the Commonwealth countries and the United Nations. World opinion, morality and justice were on its side. As a person who had faith in British justice and believed in the Commonwealth, he appealed to the United Kingdom Government not to waste a single day. It should not rely on mandatory sanctions, but should take over the Government of Southern Rhodesia in order to restore law and order in that Territory. There was no other way. He hoped that his humble appeal as a member of the Commonwealth would be heeded.

13. Mr. DIALLO Seydou (Guinea), supported by Mr. JUARBE Y JUARBE (Cuba), proposed that the important statement made by the representative of Ceylon should be included in extenso in the summary record of the meeting.

It was so decided.

14. Mr. THIAM (Mali) said that the statement made by the United Kingdom representative at the beginning of the general debate (1606th meeting) drawing the Committee's attention to the communiqué issued by the recent Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in London, had added nothing new to the evidence before the Committee. The real question was what the United Kingdom Government had done and intended to do to restore legality in Southern Rhodesia and to create democratic conditions there. The attitude adopted by the United Kingdom during the past year was clearly to be understood as part of a general plan to enable United Kingdom and foreign monopolies, as well as the racist settlers, to continue to exploit the peoples of southern Africa. In his unilateral declaration of independence, Ian Smith had had the full backing of South Africa and Portugal and the blessing of the Western imperialist Powers. Ian Smith and his clique could never have remained in power against the wishes of the African majority if the United Kingdom had not earlier used its veto in the Security Council in order to allow the transfer of the armed forces and police to the white settler minority. Subsequently, following the unilateral declaration of independence, the United Kingdom had hastened to the Security Council for the purpose of enabling Smith to consolidate his régime.

15. Under Article 73 of the Charter, the United Kingdom remained fully responsible for Southern Rhodesia and must be compelled to implement all the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Instead of strictly enforcing the sanctions recommended in Security Council resolution 217 (1965), the United Kingdom had strengthened the régime's position by allowing the reactionary Lisbon and Pretoria Governments to violate the oil embargo and increase their trade with Salisbury. The latest Southern Rhodesian budget testified to the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions. Meanwhile, Mr. Wilson was engaging in secret talks with Ian Smith, who had made it clear that he did not intend to see an African Government during his lifetime. On 12 August 1966 Ian Smith had declared in the so-called Parlia-

ment of Southern Rhodesia that he was optimistic regarding the outcome of those talks.

16. More recently, a United Kingdom spokesman had said, first, that an essential condition for a solution was the return to legality. It was not clear how the United Kingdom intended to restore legality, since it rejected the use of force, despite the readiness it had shown in the past to use force in maintaining its colonial empire, and as had only recently been exemplified in the case of Aden.

17. Secondly, the United Kingdom spokesman had declared that there was no fixed time limit for the gradual transfer of power to the African majority. That proposition was highly revealing of the United Kingdom's intentions. It was clear from the study of the activities of foreign interests carried out by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples that the United Kingdom wished to remain in Southern Rhodesia for economic and strategic reasons. United Kingdom and United States companies had enormous interests in the sugar industry, in agriculture and in the mining industries in Southern Rhodesia, and 70 to 80 per cent of the profits were paid into accounts in the United Kingdom. He fully supported the conclusions and recommendations in the report of Sub-Committee I, annexed to the Special Committee's report (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III, annex), and urged the General Assembly to take up urgently the agenda item proposed in paragraph 102 (f) of the Sub-Committee's report. In his view, it was the interests and activities of foreign monopolies which were responsible for the delaying tactics now being used by the United Kingdom Government. Meanwhile, basic human rights were being progressively trampled on in Southern Rhodesia, as was clear from the recent report of the International Commission of Jurists.

18. Faced with the refusal of the United Kingdom to intervene in Southern Rhodesia, the United Nations should, first, reaffirm the right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Secondly, the Security Council should be invited to make economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia mandatory on all States. Thirdly, no legal quibbling could alter the fact that the United Kingdom was fully responsible in Southern Rhodesia. Finally, economic sanctions should be imposed against any State which refused to implement the measures decided upon.

19. His delegation considered that the people of Zimbabwe had a right to expect assistance from the United Nations. Mali would spare no effort to give moral and material assistance to the Zimbabwe people, and to all peoples struggling against injustice and oppression.

20. He welcomed the action taken by the Committee in adopting an interim draft resolution (A/C.4/L.835) concerning the secret negotiations taking place between Mr. Wilson and Ian Smith. Statements that had been made seemed to indicate that there was a serious danger that those talks would lead to a conclusion which would not take into account the right of the Zimbabwe people to complete liberation.

21. Mr. BARRERA (Ecuador) said that there was a legal aspect to the question before the Committee which was of great importance for the survival of law and of international institutions. The majority of Members of the United Nations, in a praiseworthy desire to enable the Zimbabwe people to exercise the right to self-determination as soon as possible, were urging that the United Kingdom should use force unilaterally. Ecuador agreed that the situation in Southern Rhodesia had deteriorated, that an illegal and vicious régime remained in power there, that foreign economic interests were siding with the illegal régime and that the United Kingdom had not yet been able to report any real progress in solving the problem. In encouraging the use of force by a particular Power, however, the General Assembly would be encroaching on the domain of the Security Council, contrary to the United Nations Charter. Secondly, the preservation of international law and justice could not be entrusted to the armed might of a particular Power. Such a move would be contrary to contemporary developments in international law and to the increasing emphasis being placed in juridical circles on the condemnation of violence. Many delegations had fought in the United Nations for the non-recognition of advantages acquired by force. To encourage the practice of resorting to force in every situation would be extremely dangerous for world peace. Furthermore, there was a practical contradiction in the fact that many who criticized the United Kingdom for its economic interests in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa should wish to entrust the use of force to the United Kingdom.

22. Ecuador did not propose that the problem should be left unsolved. It must be approached as a whole and all its implications must be borne in mind, including the interests of States adjacent to Southern Rhodesia. The use of enforcement measures and of force was governed by Chapter VII of the Charter and the best procedure would be not to call on a single powerful country to use force, but to invoke Articles 39 *et seq.* of the Charter.

23. With regard to the respective competences of the General Assembly and the Security Council, Hans Kelsen pointed out, in The Law of the United Nations, that the enforcement action referred to in Articles 39, 41 and 42 of the Charter represented an exception to the right of the General Assembly to discuss and make recommendations on any matter. Even the most advanced projects for a new Charter avoided placing faith in unilateral action on the part of one State.

24. Ecuador had faithfully complied with the resolutions of the United Nations concerning Southern Rhodesia and had prohibited imports from and exports to Southern Rhodesia; it had also prohibited ships flying its flag from carrying products to the Territory and had decreed that passports issued by the unlawful régime in Southern Rhodesia were not to be recognized.

25. Ecuador was ready to support any draft resolution designed to enable the Zimbabwe people to exercise their rights without fear. It had voted in favour of the resolution recently adopted by the Committee (1615th meeting). It must state firmly, however, that it was unwilling to join in encouraging the use of force as a method of settling disputes.

26. Mr. JUARBE Y JUARBE (Cuba) said that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) had placed upon the United Kingdom an obligation to transfer all powers to the people of Southern Rhodesia, which, as had been confirmed in Assembly resolution 1747 (XVI), was a Non-Self-Governing Territory. The General Assembly, the Special Committee and the Security Council had repeatedly called on the administering Power to recognize the rights of the people and to prevent a declaration of so-called independence by the colonialist and racist minority. In August 1964 the United Kingdom had stated that it would not accept a unilateral declaration of independence, and in May 1965 the Security Council—by its resolution 202 (1965)—had requested Member States not to accept such a declaration. The appeals of the Security Council and of the General Assembly had, however, gone unheeded by the administering Power. In November 1965, a handful of racists had seized for themselves the independence which belonged to the people of Zimbabwe, and had defied the United Nations for a whole year, protected by the inactivity of the administering Power and supported openly by Portugal and South Africa, and clandestinely by the United States. Meanwhile, the oppression of the Zimbabwe people had increased.

27. While the Salisbury régime used physical force against the Zimbabwe people and instituted economic measures of reprisal against Malawi and Zambia, the administering Power refused to use force in order to restore peace and engaged in protracted discussions with the usurpers whom it had previously called traitors. Imperialist Powers were in the custom of using force against independence movements; yet, in spite of the backing of the General Assembly, which in resolution 2105 (XX) had invited all States to provide material and moral assistance to the national liberation movements in colonial Territories, the United Kingdom had been unwilling to use force to remove the racist usurpers.

28. Cuba, for its part, was ready to comply with General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX) and considered that it was the duty of all States to do so.

29. It was clearly urgent that the General Assembly should adopt a resolution calling for all necessary action to be taken, including the use of force, to remove the minority régime in Salisbury and to allow the Zimbabwe people to assume control of their own affairs. The Assembly must also recommend to the Security Council that it should compel all Member States to break off economic, political and other relations with the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and that it should take account of the activities of States which were supporting the Salisbury régime, in the light of possible measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. It was likewise essential that all the countries concerned should ensure that their nationals no longer participated in the activities of monopolies in Southern Rhodesia, since such activities helped to perpetuate colonialism and racial discrimination there. United States monopolistic concerns were playing a decisive role in supporting the régime, as was clear from the study which had been carried out by the Special Committee.

30. His delegation would support any draft resolution reflecting the position which he had set out.

31. Mr. DIALLO (Upper Volta) said that for almost a year a handful of white settlers in Southern Rhodesia had defied the United Nations and the dignity of all mankind, especially of the Africans. Leaders of the Commonwealth had met both at Lagos and in London, always with the same agenda. Economic sanctions had been advocated but had been announced in advance and had not had the desired result.

32. The United Kingdom had always claimed the primary responsibility in the dispute, and that had been granted both at Lagos and in London. The United Kingdom Government should recognize that it was not in a position to carry out its responsibilities, not because it lacked the power, but because it lacked good faith and considered its own economic interests above the preservation of law and order and the inalienable right of the people to freedom. It was time for the United Kingdom to refer the question to the United Nations. He hoped that other Western Powers would not allow the democratic principles of freedom, equality and self-determination to be flouted.

33. All were aware of the fascist nature of the Southern Rhodesian and South African régimes. Yet those régimes were supported by Members of the United Nations which claimed to love peace but which had unhesitatingly mobilized their forces to put an end to Hitler's aggression and had used their air forces to save the lives of a few Whites in the Congo.

34. Black Africa would not indefinitely tolerate the challenge to its dignity. It would be naïve to imagine that the African majorities in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola would remain forever subject to white minorities. Those white minorities would eventually be forced to abandon their exploitation of the Africans. It was to be hoped that the patience of the Africans would last long enough to allow the United Kingdom time to act, but Mr. Wilson knew that violence would eventually break out and destroy the great international trusts from the Congo to the Cape. In order that the harmonious relations existing between black and white in many parts of Africa and the world might be preserved, he hoped that an immediate solution might be found. It was time for the United Nations to act. The Security Council should be asked to apply mandatory economic sanctions immediately unless the United Kingdom resorted to the use of force.

35. Mr. BENNANI (Morocco) said that, since the unilateral declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia, the majority of the delegations which had spoken on the subject, both in the Security Council and in other United Nations bodies, had demonstrated how ineffective had been the action taken by the United Kingdom because of the lack of co-operation of international financial circles and the Republic of South Africa's public support of the illegal régime.

36. The question of Southern Rhodesia had been discussed in the United Nations for several years with the aim of persuading the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, to recognize the right of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom, dignity and independence in accordance with the Declaration on

the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The United Nations was not merely concerned with the illegal declaration of independence, although that was a threat to Africa and especially to Southern Rhodesia's neighbours. The so-called independence had in no way changed the situation of the people of Zimbabwe, except that the domination of the racist minority had become more open and official. The duty of the Fourth Committee and of the United Nations remained the same, namely, to secure the right of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence, but it was now imperative that there should be no further delay because of the dangers which had arisen as a result of the unilateral declaration of independence.

37. His delegation was greatly concerned about the attempts that were constantly being made to direct the attention of the United Nations and world opinion solely to the unilateral declaration of independence and to the effectiveness or non-effectiveness of the action which the United Kingdom had taken or should take to deal with the rebellion. The United Kingdom's measures were aimed first and foremost at putting an end to the rebellion and only subsequently at inducing the rebels gradually to grant certain rights and freedoms to the majority of the population, until majority rule was eventually achieved. Thus, even if the rebels did retract their unilateral declaration of independence, the people of Southern Rhodesia would find themselves in the same situation as they had been before that declaration; they would still be dominated and oppressed by the white minority, but that domination would then be in some way legal since it would be the result of negotiations between the United Kingdom and the white settlers. The African countries, as also most other countries, were well aware of the manoeuvre which would sooner or later transform Southern Rhodesia into another South Africa. If the rebels could not be persuaded to retract their declaration of independence, Southern Rhodesia would immediately become another South Africa; if they retracted it, that situation would only be postponed. World opinion would be appeased and the racists would be left in peace to achieve their ultimate objective.

38. The manoeuvre he had described was only part of a comprehensive plan to encircle Africa by establishing colonialist strongholds first in the extreme south of Africa, then in Palestine to the east of the continent, then in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and the Territories under Portuguese administration, and, lastly, in the north of the continent in the Territories still occupied by Spain. The methods used might differ, but the aim in all those regions was the same. The only way to put a stop to that plan was to secure the immediate independence of all African Territories still under colonial domination, in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Southern Rhodesia was a test case and on the way in which it was settled would depend to a large extent the elimination of colonialism in Africa. The colonialists and supporters of apartheid were aware of that and were therefore endeavouring to maintain their hold on Southern Rhodesia. The United Nations should do everything in its power to free Southern Rhodesia and its people. The United Kingdom could, if it wished,

assist in achieving that aim; it was its duty, both as administering Power and as a founder Member of the United Nations and permanent member of the Security Council, to do so. Once the United Kingdom had accepted that the real nature of the problem was to ensure the freedom and independence of Southern Rhodesia, the way would be clear. The United Kingdom would realize that it should negotiate, not with the rebels, but with the true representatives of the people in order to decide on the method of granting independence and to take firm action to put an end to the racist régime. That was the only basis for a just solution.

39. Mr. BARNETT (Jamaica) said that, although the previous year the Smith régime had been almost universally condemned as rebellious and its leaders as guilty of treason, neither epithet was any longer applied. The economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia had not succeeded in bringing down the illegal régime. They had admittedly caused some economic privation and disruption of the economy but that had not been their prime objective.

40. The policy pursued by the United Kingdom Government since the unilateral declaration of independence had implicitly made at least two assumptions, namely, that there was an alternative group among the white electorate willing and able to assume the government of the Territory, and that that group would be prepared to return the Territory to a constitutional status antedating the 1923 Constitution. Adequate participation by the African population had not been seriously considered, although the United Kingdom had hoped to guide the Territory to majority rule some time in the future. Events had shown that it was unreal to suppose that there were any Whites in Southern Rhodesia who would jeopardize their own position for the sake of their black fellow citizens. There had been no white group rallying round the Chief Justice or Sir Humphrey Gibbs, and Smith was as strong as, if not stronger than, ever.

41. The "talks about talks" between the United Kingdom Government and the Smith régime were concerned with reaching a compromise satisfactory to both, which would include an assurance to the black population that they would some day govern the country, by the grace of the white community. As the Minister

for Foreign Affairs of Zambia had said at the Committee's 1612th meeting, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom could not be prevailed upon at the Commonwealth Conference in London to come out unequivocally for majority rule before independence was given to the Territory.

42. The six principles on which the United Kingdom's policy was based were worded in such a way that they appeared to give the white community a veto over any arrangement they considered to be against their interests. Those principles had been reaffirmed in the communiqué issued at the end of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in September 1966. That communiqué could not be regarded as the last word on the matter. His Government, which had signed the communiqué, held the United Kingdom Government to its decision that if the illegal régime did not take steps to end the rebellion and to arrange for executive authority to be vested in the Governor, the United Kingdom Government would withdraw all previous proposals for a constitutional settlement and would, before the end of the year, seek a Security Council resolution providing for effective and selective mandatory economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. It was not the understanding of his delegation that the United Kingdom's approach to the Security Council was conditional upon the unanimous support of the Commonwealth representatives in the United Nations.

43. His Government was still convinced that mandatory economic measures of a general and comprehensive character should be applied under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter and should cover both exports and imports. It was prepared, however, to allow the United Kingdom to exercise its last option.

44. His delegation was concerned at the recent press report that Ian Smith believed that agreement between his régime and the United Kingdom Government was much closer than most people thought, that it was not the question of the Constitution which was delaying agreement and that what was being discussed was not independence, which was a fact, but future relations between Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.