

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

TWENTY-SIXTH SESSION

Official Records



**FOURTH COMMITTEE, 1956th
MEETING**

Friday, 26 November 1971,
at 4.10 p.m.

NEW YORK

Chairman: Mr. Keith JOHNSON (Jamaica).

The meeting began immediately after the showing of the documentary film "Papua and New Guinea 1971".

In the absence of the Chairman, Mrs. Skottsberg-Åhman (Sweden), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 68

**Question of Southern Rhodesia (continued)
(A/8423/Add.1, A/8423/Add.2 (parts I and II))**

1. Mr. TEMPLE (United Kingdom) recalled that he had previously undertaken to transmit to the members of the Committee any statement that the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, might make on returning to London from Salisbury. In accordance with that undertaking, on the previous day the United Kingdom delegation had sent to all missions to the United Nations the text of the statement made by Sir Alec in the United Kingdom House of Commons on 25 November. The text of the statement made by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom at the 1602nd meeting of the Security Council, held on the same date, had also been distributed. Both documents contained a summary of the terms of settlement which had been reached by the United Kingdom Government and the authorities in Salisbury, subject to their acceptance by the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole; the missions already had the text of those proposals in their possession. In Sir Alec's statement there was a reference to a United Kingdom Government White paper which contained the proposals as well as more detailed information on the subject. That White Paper would be sent to all missions as soon as it arrived from the United Kingdom at the beginning of the following week.

2. The proposals were simply proposals and did not in themselves represent any change in the current situation. Indeed, no change could take place until the test of acceptability described in detail by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom in the Security Council had determined whether or not the people of Southern Rhodesia considered the proposals to be acceptable. He urged the members of the Committee to study the proposals carefully and at the same time to consider what would happen if they were accepted and what would happen if it was impossible to improve the current situation by means of an agreement. He repeated his earlier warning not to give too much credence to newspaper reports. It was to be hoped that the members of the Committee would not allow themselves to be misled by interpretations published

in the press, particularly those originating in Salisbury. He referred specifically to a commentary published in *The New York Times* to the effect that the possibility of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia was subject to the veto of the white minority. That was inaccurate, since the Constitution in its entrenched clauses definitely provided for the achievement of an African majority, and that could not be frustrated by the white Southern Rhodesians.

3. He hoped that the members of the Committee would give careful consideration to the documents and statements to which he had referred, and again pointed out that a settlement would, in the final analysis, depend on the reaction of the people of Southern Rhodesia to the proposals.

4. Mr. TIGOUÉ (Togo) said that, until he had the French text of the documents referred to by the United Kingdom representative, he could only give his first impressions concerning the proposals. He had taken note with interest of the statement made by the United Kingdom representative the previous day in the Security Council. The initial impression created by the proposals was not very clear. The methods chosen appeared to be inappropriate and to give rise to doubts concerning the sincerity of the stated intentions. For example, the ideas expressed in the proposals concerning the draft constitution were not clear and the process which would have to be completed before the final stage was reached seemed to be too involved and complicated. The system described seemed undemocratic and even "parity", which had been referred to in the proposals, seemed impossible. The obstacles appeared to be virtually insurmountable.

5. As far as the acceptance or rejection of the proposals by the people of Southern Rhodesia was concerned, although the situation should not be prejudged, it was essential to bear in mind what would happen if the proposals were accepted and Southern Rhodesia was granted independence: once the country attained the status of an independent State, no one would be able to question what was happening within its territory or interfere in its internal affairs.

6. Mr. OUE'DRAOGO (Upper Volta) said that he did not intend to defend the press in general, but recalled that when reference had previously been made (1923rd meeting) to a locally published article which mentioned the points on which a settlement would be based, the United Kingdom delegation had also maintained that press reports were unreliable. Nevertheless, the text of the agreement reached in Salisbury was, on the whole, an accurate reflection of the article to which the United Kingdom representative had referred on that occasion. The inescapable conclusion,

therefore, was that the press did sometimes publish reliable information.

7. As far as the substance of the item under consideration was concerned, the Committee could not discuss the question in detail at that time because it would first be necessary to make a thorough analysis of the documents it had before it. Nevertheless, there were two questions which he wished to put to the United Kingdom representative in order to obtain some necessary information: firstly, how many Africans would, according to the administering Power, now be in a position to qualify for inclusion in the "higher roll"? Secondly, why was the declaration of rights which had been embodied in the 1961 Constitution—a declaration which had been intended to prevent *apartheid* from being established in Southern Rhodesia—not included in the documents supplied by the United Kingdom delegation?

8. Mr. DIALLO (Guinea) said that the request that the question of Southern Rhodesia be given high priority among the items before the Committee had been made because many delegations had been under the impression that something was going on behind the scenes in Salisbury; the statement made by the United Kingdom representative in the Security Council on the previous day had the virtue of having removed the veil shrouding certain aspects of the problem. He did not wish to refer to the substance of the settlement at the current meeting since the agreement between Sir Alec Douglas-Home and the Ian Smith régime must be carefully appraised by the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the respective Governments of the countries represented in the Committee. Nevertheless, by way of a preliminary comment, he would venture to say that the statements he had heard left his delegation with a general impression of confusion, complexity and complicity. It had been said that they were simply proposals and that, consequently, there would be no change before the test of acceptability. However, it had also been said that there had been an agreement which, as could be gathered from the text, was extremely complicated. A computer would be needed to determine the true nature of the harm done to Africa by that agreement, but the text contained the revealing information that there would be 50 seats for 220,000 inhabitants and eight seats for the remaining 5 million. Although delegations had been asked not to give credence to newspaper reports, even editorials in the friendly United Kingdom press had stated that it would be 60 years before majority rule was achieved. The international community was witnessing an attack on its most cherished principles, particularly that of the equality of people. Even in the United Kingdom, each person was entitled to one vote. As the administering Power, the United Kingdom had seen many peoples attain their independence by violent means; the United States too had been a United Kingdom colony and had achieved independence by force. It was essential to oppose by all possible means the agreement between Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Ian Smith, which could ignite the first sparks of a conflagration in southern Africa. It was intolerable that foreigners should settle in Africa and treat Africans as chattel. The United Kingdom insisted that it could not use force against Smith, and the United Nations was guilty of pursuing a policy of *laissez-faire*, as evidenced by its acceptance of the term "illegal régime", which should be

neither tolerated nor used in United Nations documents. The issue required careful attention and two questions must be asked: firstly, what would happen if the proposals were not accepted? Secondly, what would happen if they were? If the people of Zimbabwe were actually consulted, the answer would undoubtedly be negative. What would happen then? Only the United Kingdom could answer that question, and answer it it must.

9. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had proposed at the 1602nd meeting of the Security Council that the United Kingdom should take the necessary steps to enable all the nationalist leaders in Southern Rhodesia to come to the United Nations to explain the text of the agreement. His delegation supported that proposal and appealed to the United Kingdom to persuade Salisbury to allow the nationalist leaders, who were currently in prison, to come and express the reactions of Zimbabwe. It also urged all delegations to give the highest priority to the issue. The United Kingdom should not only report to the Committee on the agreement but should also see that the nationalist leaders were given a hearing so as to ascertain the reactions of the African majority.

10. Mr. ABDILLEH (Somalia) said that the result of the talks could not come as a surprise to anyone, since it was a natural step in the United Kingdom conspiracy with Salisbury to betray the Africans. Although he would revert to the subject at a later stage, he denied that the agreement concluded with Ian Smith was legal, much less in the interest of the people of Zimbabwe. It had been said in the Committee that they were simply proposals; in the Security Council, however, they had been referred to as an agreement. The test of acceptability must conform to strict criteria and conditions. The settlement which had just been reached constituted an easy way of legalizing the activities of the Smith régime, to the lasting detriment of African interests. The agreement was wholly discriminatory: majority rule had been dealt a fatal blow, which seriously impaired the free participation of the people of Zimbabwe in the determination of their own destiny. The proportion of seats they would hold in the legislature was obviously derisory.

11. His delegation did not recognize the talks or their results. On 19 November 1971, during his visit to the Soviet Union, the President of his country had said that it was clear from the results of the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries that the African people rejected the ideas of the imperialists and believed that force was the only way to rid the continent of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. The President had condemned Douglas-Home's visit to Salisbury, which had been intended to "make a deal" with Ian Smith. The African people did not consider themselves bound by that agreement, in which not one of the five principles proclaimed by the United Kingdom had been taken into account. The agreement was not worth the paper upon which it was written.

12. Mr. NEKLESSA (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, on the basis of information transmitted by the United Kingdom at the 1602nd meeting of the Security Council, the previous day, the Soviet representative had made a statement in the Council defining his delegation's

position with regard to the agreement between the United Kingdom and the Ian Smith régime. The talks at Salisbury had been held despite the General Assembly's appeal to the United Kingdom not to negotiate the future of Zimbabwe with the rebel régime. The Government of the United Kingdom had failed to take into account General Assembly resolution 2652 (XXV) of 3 December 1970, which reaffirmed that any attempt to negotiate the future of Zimbabwe with the illegal racist minority régime would be contrary to the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV), nor had it consulted the people of Southern Rhodesia or the representatives of the political parties of the Territory.

13. The agreement between the United Kingdom and Smith was aimed at perpetuating the racist régime. The United Kingdom delegation had said that it had been able to obtain certain concessions which would weaken discriminatory laws and would ensure some improvement in the situation. In fact, the agreement was an attempt to put off to some remote future date the moment when the people would become self-governing, thereby perpetuating the enslavement of Zimbabwe. Despite the provisions of resolution 2769 (XXVI), which the General Assembly had adopted on 22 November on the recommendation of the Fourth Committee, the people had not been told about the agreement. The text stated that any settlement should be worked out with the participation of the leaders of the people of Zimbabwe, but the United Kingdom had not seen fit to consult them. Many of the politicians of Zimbabwe were in prison and the Smith régime refused to release them so that they could express their opinions on the talks. It was evident that the negotiations could only be considered as an international plot.

14. The Soviet representative had said in the Security Council that the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia had strengthened the colonialist régime in southern Africa. As had already been seen, certain United Kingdom actions in the United Nations were aimed at hampering the work of the anti-colonialist bodies and were closely linked to other activities, such as the sale of arms to South Africa and collaboration with Portugal. The United Kingdom had opposed effective sanctions against the Smith régime and had sabotaged the decisions adopted. Its attitude could be motivated only by the intention of protecting the colonialist and racist régimes, particularly the Smith régime, which aroused the indignation of world opinion.

15. It was known that the British delegation in Salisbury had received two memoranda from political parties. The Soviet representative in the Security Council had suggested that those memoranda should be considered by the United Kingdom. He had also proposed that the political leaders of Zimbabwe should be invited to speak in person in the United Nations. The United Kingdom had not yet replied to that suggestion. He asked the representative of the United Kingdom to explain his Government's attitude with regard to the memoranda.

16. Mr. TURKSON (Ghana) said that his delegation was considering the United Kingdom proposals affecting the future of Southern Rhodesia, which would have repercussions not only in Southern Rhodesia and the Commonwealth but in the United Nations. He assured the represen-

tative of the United Kingdom that he would study the proposals objectively, but he wished first to state that his delegation entertained grave doubts as to the form of consultation provided for in the proposals, and particularly on the so-called test of acceptability doctrine. The restoration of normal political activity and guaranteed freedom of expression was a prerequisite to any such consultation and the political leaders being detained should be protected from intimidation. He asked the representative of the United Kingdom a question that he considered crucial, namely, whether the constitutional changes referred to would be made prior to the legalization of independence or whether the United Kingdom intended to legalize the Smith régime after it had announced those measures. His delegation's attitude would depend upon the answer to that question.

17. Mr. OUCIF (Algeria) said that he had the impression that whatever questions were put to the United Kingdom, silence would be the only reply. He formally proposed that the question should remain on the Committee's agenda so that it could revert to the subject when necessary.

18. The CHAIRMAN said that the question would remain on the agenda.

AGENDA ITEMS 13, 23, 65, 70, 71 AND 12, 72, AND 73*

Agenda item 13 (*continued*) (A/8360, A/8404)

Agenda item 23 (Territories not covered under other agenda items) (*continued*) (A/8368, A/8369, A/8423 (part IV and (part IV)/Add.1, A/8423/Add.5 (part I), A/8423/Add.5 (part II) and Add.5 (part II)/Corr.1, A/8423/Add.6 (parts I-III), A/8423/Add.7 (parts I-IV))

Agenda item 65 (*continued*) (A/8423/Add.8/Rev.1, A/8520 and Add.1)

Agenda item 70 (*continued*) (A/8398, A/8513)

Agenda items 71 and 12 (*continued*) (A/8314 and Add.1-4, A/8403 (chapter XX), A/8403/Add.1 (part III), A/8423 (part III), A/8480)

Agenda item 72 (*continued*) (A/8485 and Add.1)

Agenda item 73 (*continued*) (A/8530)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)**

19. Mr. ASHWIN (Australia) recalled that the Committee had before it much written information on Papua New Guinea; besides the reports of the Trusteeship Council (A/8404) and of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (A/8423/Add.6 (part III)) and of the administering Power on Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea (A/8360), it also had the report of the Visiting Mission which had visited Papua and New Guinea at the beginning

* For the titles of the items, see "Agenda" on p. ix.

** Resumed from the 1953rd meeting.

of 1971.¹ The latter was particularly important, not only because three members of the Visiting Mission—the representatives of France, Iraq and Sierra Leone—were members of the Committee, and because, for the first time in United Nations history, a joint mission had been formed by members of the Trusteeship Council and the Special Committee, but, above all, because the report was of great value and gave a detailed and constructively critical commentary on the situation in Papua New Guinea. His Government and the Administration of Papua New Guinea had warmly welcomed the Mission's visit and the excellent report which it had prepared. His country had not agreed with all the Mission's comments, but it had agreed with many of them and, as the report of the Special Committee had noted, the Administration had already taken action in accordance with a number of the Mission's recommendations.

20. United Nations missions had been visiting New Guinea regularly for a good many years and their visits and the over-all scrutiny of the United Nations had had an undeniably stimulating effect on the development of the Territory. His country had always intended to pursue the goals laid down in the United Nations Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement. Although sometimes in the past development had not been as rapid as could have been wished, and his country had often been unable to support all the United Nations resolutions, if the situation was considered in perspective, the United Nations had undoubtedly played an important role in the progress of Papua New Guinea towards independence and in the development of its links with the world as a whole. That was why his country had invited the United Nations to send a special Visiting Mission to Papua New Guinea in 1972 to observe the elections to the next House of Assembly.

21. His Government would like more United Nations Members to have first hand experience of the problems and prospects of Papua New Guinea and, similarly, it was anxious that the people of Papua New Guinea should have more contact with other lands and other peoples. For that reason delegations from Papua New Guinea regularly joined his delegation for both Trusteeship Council and General Assembly sessions. Many other Papua New Guineans travelled overseas to attend conferences and seminars, to study or to visit those countries which had much to offer Papua New Guinea by way of example. The results of their visits had often proved worthwhile. His country and Papua New Guinea were grateful to the countries which had received those visitors so warmly and helpfully.

22. Papua New Guinea was now an associate member of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East and a member of the Asian Development Bank and its delegations attended meetings of those bodies in their own right, not as part of the Australian delegation. In the preceding month the Administration of the Territories had announced its intention to apply also for associate membership of the World Health Organization. The Papua New Guinea flag was flown at international meetings where the country had separate representation, and it was clear that Papua New Guinea was now more and more rapidly establishing its own distinct identity within the international community.

¹ *Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 2.*

23. The Administration and the Australian Government were currently studying what foreign service resources Papua New Guinea would need when it first assumed independence. There was already an International Affairs Branch in the Department of the Administrator which was in effect an embryonic foreign affairs office. To assist that office in future the Administration and the Australian Government were continuing and expanding the programme begun in 1970 to provide training for potential Papua New Guinean foreign service officers in the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and in Australian overseas posts.

24. The Committee was particularly interested in knowing when Papua New Guinea would obtain full internal self-government and independence. In its resolution 2700 (XXV) the General Assembly had called on Australia "to prescribe, in consultation with the freely elected representatives of the people, a specific time-table for the free exercise by the people of Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea of their right to self-determination and independence".

25. The Select Committee on Constitutional Development set up by the Papua New Guinea House of Assembly in June 1969 had made its final report to the House in March 1971. Its conclusions and recommendations were set out in the report of the Trusteeship Council (A/8404). The Select Committee had found that the majority of the people in Papua New Guinea felt that the stage of full internal self-government should not be reached before 1976. However, it was at the same time conscious of a quickening of political awareness, and it therefore recommended that the development of the Territory should be geared to preparing Papua New Guinea for full self-government during the life of the next House of Assembly, namely between 1972 and 1976. The recommendations of the Select Committee had been accepted by the Papua New Guinea House of Assembly and by the Australian Government. Legislation had been enacted by the Australian Parliament in the middle of the current year to give effect to the Select Committee's recommendations on changes in the elected representation in the House of Assembly, and further legislation was currently before the Australian Parliament which would give effect to the remainder of the Select Committee's recommendations.

26. The new House of Assembly which would be elected in February and March 1972, with a United Nations mission observing the process, would be composed of 82 members representing open electorates and 18 members representing regional electorates; it might also include not more than 3 nominated members if the House so decided. It would also include up to 4 members *ex-officio*, that figure being a reduction from the existing level of 10 official members. The retention of a maximum of 4 official members was intended to provide the means of introducing to the House government business regarding matters still under Australian control. That House, through a Ministerial Nominations Committee, would choose 17 persons from among its members to be ministers in charge of government departments. Those 17 would in turn choose one among them to be Deputy Chairman of the Administrator's Executive Council, their choice having to be approved by the House of Assembly as a whole. The Executive Council

would be composed of the Administrator, who was appointed by the Australian Government, 10 ministers and 3 official members. The ministers, other than the Deputy Chairman, who would be members of the Council would be appointed by the Australian Minister for External Territories. However, he would appoint them only on the advice of the Administrator and the Deputy Chairman.

27. Ministers in Papua New Guinea had had since the middle of 1970 a very wide range of responsibilities. Australia retained responsibility for external affairs including external trade, defence, the judiciary, law and order, civil aviation and the supervision of projects relating to the development programme. The Administrator was bound to accept the advice of his ministers on matters over which they had responsibility.

28. The veto power, which Australia had exercised in theory in regard to Papua New Guinea ordinances, no longer applied to any legislation relating to subjects for which the ministers had full responsibility. On subjects where it was not legally necessary for the Administrator to obtain the advice of his ministers, he was required to accept such advice should it be offered. Lastly, when decisions were being taken by the Council regarding the expenditure of funds, the three official members were able to take part in the discussion but were not permitted to vote.

29. All those facts made it clear that there was already a considerable degree of self-government in Papua New Guinea, the more so because responsibility for decisions on economic policy in general, including development planning, budget formulation, negotiations with Australia regarding the size of the annual grant, and matters relating to land, now lay fully with the Executive Council. Nevertheless, the chief executive figure in Papua New Guinea continued to be the Administrator, who was appointed by the Australian Government, although, as he had already stated, the Administrator was required to accept the Council's advice. With the election of a new House of Assembly in 1972 that, too, would begin to change. The Australian Government had already made it clear that if a cohesive group of ministers with majority backing in the House of Assembly emerged from the elections, Australia would regard that group as constituting a government; the principal member of the group, the Deputy Chairman, would in effect become a Chief Minister; and the authority of the Administrator would become confined to matters which remained an Australian responsibility.

30. As for the final stage after the assumption of full internal self-government, the Australian Government had made it clear that the period of time which would elapse between then and independence would be a matter for the Government of Papua New Guinea to determine for itself. The Select Committee had said that target dates for internal self-government and independence should not be arbitrarily set. At the same time, it considered that an approximate time-table, such as it recommended in its report, would provide a sense of direction to the development of Papua New Guinea for internal self-government.

31. The Australian Government believed that it had done what the General Assembly had called on it to do. In that connexion he recalled that when Mr. Djermakoye, Under-

Secretary-General for Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories, had visited Papua New Guinea in June 1971, he had said that with the accelerated rate of political development in the Territory there might soon be a demand for internal self-government and that a time-table as called for by the General Assembly during its twenty-fifth session had already been established. He had gone on to say that that had been accomplished mainly through the efforts of all the interested parties—the people of the Territory, their elected representatives, the Administration, the Australian Government and the United Nations—working together, and it was a cause for rejoicing.

32. The final clause of the fourth recommendation contained in paragraph 11 of chapter XIX of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (see A/8423/Add.6 (part III)) stated that the administering Power should be in a position to set the time-table as requested by General Assembly resolution 2700 (XXV) of 14 December 1970. The Australian Government considered that there was already an approximate time-table and that it might be possible to make it more specific after the next House of Assembly elections, subject to the decisions which might then be taken by that House.

33. In accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolution 2700 (XXV) and the views expressed by the Visiting Mission and the Trusteeship Council, a programme for accelerated localization of the public service had been tabled in the House of Assembly. The key elements of that programme were the following: first, it provided that local public service officers would be given preference over expatriate officers in promotion; secondly, it provided for very extensive training programmes at all levels of the public service; thirdly, it required all departments to draw up their own programmes for localization, programmes which would be co-ordinated and overseen by the Localization Section of the Public Service Board. Finally, it made arrangements to provide compensation or other employment for displaced expatriate officers and for the retention of those expatriates whose skills would be required in the public service of Papua New Guinea for some time to come.

34. He quoted two passages from the paper on accelerated localization and training which had been presented in the House of Assembly at the end of August. With regard to policy and objectives, that paper stated that the task of the Public Service Board was to take all steps possible to provide the future Government of Papua New Guinea with a strong, stable and efficient public service staffed as far as possible by Papuans and New Guineans. That would require a combined effort by both local and overseas staff. The reality of internal self-government would depend on the extent to which Papuans and New Guineans were advanced to active roles in policy and higher administrative fields. After setting out arrangements for localization and training, the paper stated that it was important that local officers should have the co-operation and support of all overseas officers and employees and the full support and financial assistance of the Australian Government.

35. In recommendation 5 contained in paragraph 11 of chapter XIX of its report (see A/8423/Add.6 (part III)), the

Special Committee urged rapid implementation of the programme of localization and also urged that there should be no expatriate recruitment at lower levels, except where special technical skills were not available.

36. His Government was fully aware of the importance of proceeding with localization. The Chairman of the Public Service Board, the Chief Electoral Officer and the head of the Department of Business Development were local officers, as were the heads of a number of government departments and other officers holding senior posts. The first senior executive course had begun two months earlier. Some 20 local officers were taking the course, which lasted one year and included a first stage of practical training in departments, a second stage of seminars in development administration and management techniques, and a third stage in which the 20 officers would be assigned to senior posts in departments.

37. He assured the Committee that one of his Government's major objectives was the speedy localization of the Papua New Guinea public service as well as maximum participation of indigenous inhabitants in the economy.

38. There were a number of basic elements in the effort to attain the latter objective. First of all, there was the question of political control of development planning and economic policy generally. The Executive Council had full responsibility for planning and budget formulation as well as in taxation policy, the raising of internal revenue and negotiating with Australia the amount of grant and development aid funds to be made available each year. The budget for the current financial year provided for a total expenditure of \$A197.7 million, of which \$A84.3 million would come from internal revenue, \$A70 million from Australian aid and \$A43.4 million from loans. Total Australian assistance for the current year, including non-budget items, was \$A131 million. Although Australian financial assistance was likely to continue for a considerable period of time, it was the deliberate policy of the Administration, supported by the administering Power, that Papua New Guinea should progressively finance more and more of its expenditures from its own resources. Accordingly, new taxes had been imposed and it was proposed to extend the tax structure over the next few years so as to make it possible to reach the growing taxable capacity of the local population.

39. Another aspect of political control was that deriving from the possible establishment of State-owned enterprises. The Administration by no means excluded from consideration the possibility of establishing such enterprises. With development planning now the responsibility of Papua New Guinean ministers, it would be for them to decide on areas where the establishment of public enterprises might be practical and beneficial.

40. A most important aspect of political control was control over foreign investment. There could be no doubt that Papua New Guinea needed foreign investment if development was to be maintained. The question was how to obtain real benefits from foreign investment without being dominated by it. An Investment Corporation had been established with the task of acquiring for the Government of Papua New Guinea and for other public bodies a percentage of the equity in foreign-owned enter-

prises. Besides having the power to acquire shares, arrange local share issues and obtain options for future participation, the Corporation would be able to enter into joint ventures and set up investment companies and other subsidiaries. All foreign investment proposals were subject to Government scrutiny. New investors in Papua New Guinea were also required to give guarantees with regard to employment and training programmes for Papua New Guineans.

41. A recent study of the flow of private foreign investment into Papua New Guinea over the preceding few years had indicated that in the financial year 1969-1970 total inflow had been \$A110.7 million. Income payable abroad for the same period had been \$A21.5 million, but of that latter figure an amount of \$A7.6 million had been reinvested in Papua New Guinea. The actual outflow had therefore been \$A13.9 million, or 12.5 per cent of the inflow. Those figures showed that what was happening in Papua New Guinea in the area of foreign investment was partnership and co-operation in the interests of Papua New Guinea development, with a reasonable return for the investor, and not exploitation of the kind described in some passages of the relevant report of the Special Committee (see A/8423/Add.6 (part III), chap. XIX).

42. The House of Assembly had declared itself in favour of foreign investment for development purposes and would use the means available to ensure that foreign enterprises operating in Papua New Guinea identified themselves fully with the interests of the country.

43. Like many developing countries, Papua New Guinea faced the serious problem of making the most economical use of land held under traditional collective ownership. Traditional methods of landholding were complex and varied greatly from place to place. It had been the policy of the Administration to purchase only land which was not needed to satisfy the requirements of the people in the foreseeable future or land which was ownerless. Only the Administration could acquire land held under customary tenure. In the middle of 1971, legislation based to some extent on the Kenyan system and designed to facilitate the conversion of land held under customary tenure to individual registered tenure had been introduced in the House of Assembly. His delegation had presented a detailed outline of the legislation at the 1377th meeting of the Trusteeship Council. When the House had considered the legislation, a number of members had questioned whether it provided adequate protection for traditional landowners and whether the proposed system was appropriate for Papua New Guinea. As a result, the Administration had agreed to withdraw the legislation for further consideration in 1972. The Administration was aware of the need, for development purposes, to bring more land into cash productive use. Currently, only some 3 per cent of the total land area of Papua New Guinea, including land used for towns, administrative services, etc., was in productive —i.e. non-subsistence—use. Nevertheless, the Administration was concerned that any land legislation enacted should be that which was best for the people of Papua New Guinea and which was recognized as such by their representatives.

44. The Special Committee had noted in its report (*ibid.*) that local participation in the economy, at least in some

sectors, was on a rather small scale. That was true with regard to industrial and larger-scale commercial enterprises. In the agricultural sector, however, Papua New Guineans were playing an increasingly significant role and in many cases expatriate plantation owners were themselves assisting in the transition to local ownership. Coffee production in 1970 had been valued at about \$A24 million, of which \$A18 million had been produced by Papua New Guineans.

45. The Administration was using various means to accelerate the rate at which Papua New Guineans were becoming participants in the economy as a whole. A principal instrument for that effort was the Development Bank, which provided financing and advice to persons wishing to set up enterprises in any sector. Mention should also be made of the Department of Business Development, in the establishment of which a report prepared by a United Nations adviser had been of major importance and which was headed by a Papua New Guinean officer. The functions of the Department were to help Papua New Guineans set up their own businesses, to administer the registry of co-operative societies and assist the development of cottage industries, and to survey potential business ventures which were likely to promote indigenous development. Another technique being used was illustrated by the oil palm estate at Hoskins in New Britain, a joint venture in which selected settlers from all parts of Papua New Guinea had been given blocks averaging 15 acres of good land each and Development Bank loans which enabled them to move to the area, build houses, buy young palms, and feed and clothe themselves until their blocks began to produce. A total of 1,412 blocks had been distributed so far, and it was estimated that income to the owner from each fully bearing block in the future would be \$2,000 per annum. The project was coming into production in 1971, and the returns so far had been above those expected. Block holders would deliver their produce to a central processing plant which was controlled by a company in which 50 per cent of the equity was held by the Papua New Guinea Government. Co-operative societies, local government councils and loan societies were used to encourage Papua New Guineans to play an increasing role in the economy. The Administration had taken action to reserve selected commercial sites for local businessmen and to authorize local councils to give Papua New Guineans within their areas preferential rights to engage in certain business activities. It should also be mentioned that legislation had been enacted to restrict the entry of overseas workers into certain occupations requiring few skills. The restrictions would be progressively extended to more skilled categories of workers. Maximum participation of Papua New Guineans at all levels of the economy was a major objective of the Administration's current revised five-year development plan.

46. Education, except at the tertiary level, was now entirely a Papua New Guinean responsibility, and both the Minister and the acting Department head were Papua New Guineans. His delegation had reported in detail on progress in education to the Trusteeship Council during the current year. Since both the Council and the Special Committee had made reference in their reports to the subject of dropouts from primary school, he wished to inform the Fourth Committee that the National Education Board had asked headmasters of all primary schools in Papua New Guinea to conduct a survey of persons who had left primary school at

class VI level over the preceding three years. The survey was aimed at determining how effectively the primary school system was preparing pupils who went no further with their education to lead a useful life in the community. It was important to ensure that the curriculum was given an orientation which made it of value to children who would subsequently be living in a village environment. Children who completed primary school but who did not wish or were unable to go on to secondary school might well be dissatisfied with the village environment, gravitate to the townships and add to the problems already existing there. That was a problem the world over, and part of the answer lay in making adjustments in primary school curricula and bringing about a general improvement in rural life.

47. The physical and human background against which all those developments were taking place must be borne in mind. The incredible linguistic diversity, the mountains and the vast swamplands of the island had long imposed an awesome isolation on the peoples who lived there not only from the outside world, but from each other. Those circumstances led to the creation, thousands of years ago, of small social units and prevented the building up of the larger social groups which were essential for social, economic and political growth.

48. It should be pointed out in that connexion that the idea of national unity and of national institutions was something which came from the outside world. Traditionally, the people thought only in local terms. The territorial boundaries were a heritage of the colonial era. Now that Papua New Guinea was rapidly approaching full self-government and independence, the issue of national unity had become of the greatest importance. There was uncertainty about what it might mean in practice for different parts of the country. Less developed areas and minority groups, in particular, sought assurances that they would not be disadvantaged by political change and some Papuan leaders had expressed concern about its implications, especially in the preceding few months. The division between Papua and New Guinea was an unfortunate historical legacy. The two areas had been administered as one since 1949 and the boundary between them had in practice no administrative significance and little legal significance. Nevertheless, the inhabitants of Papua regarded themselves as distinct from New Guineans and *vice versa* and some feared that since the people of New Guinea outnumbered the Papuans, the less developed areas of Papua might suffer from neglect in the future. A number of prominent persons from Papua had also expressed the view that New Guinea had been in a more favoured position because of the visits there of United Nations missions. The Australian Government and the Administration understood those fears and were doing everything possible to allay them. As part of that effort, Ministers of the Papua New Guinea Government, who were themselves from Papua, had recently been invited to visit Canberra for discussions with the Australian Minister for External Territories on the economic, social and political implications for Papua of the movement towards self-government for Papua New Guinea. Following those talks, the latter had agreed to a study being made on how to assist less developed areas through special measures and said that it had been agreed that the question of constitutional safeguards for Papua was a matter for consideration by a Select Committee of the next House of

Assembly. He had also assured the Papuans that all future United Nations missions would be invited to visit both Papua and New Guinea and had stated that the Papuan Ministers had gone on record in favour of national unity for the two areas.

49. That could also be said for the most part of the Gazelle Peninsula in the island of New Britain. There the Tolai people had for some time been divided between those who supported the system of administration through the existing local government council and those who opposed the council for various reasons and backed a political organization, the Mataungan Association. The main reasons for that division were land ownership and land scarcity and the refusal of the Mataungans to support the principle of multiracialism in the formation of local government councils. The Administration had done everything possible to encourage the Tolai to get together. It had purchased extensive areas of land for redistribution to landless people and had proposed the establishment of a committee composed entirely of Tolai people with representatives from the major groups to advise it on all matters relating to land, including acquisition and distribution. The Administration had also had to insist on the payment of taxes and on the maintenance of law and order. As a result, there had been clashes between Mataungan groups and the police. It was to be hoped that elections to the local council, which were to take place in 1972, would provide an opportunity for the Tolai to reach agreement on who should represent them in future at the local government level.

50. As the Fourth Committee would appreciate, the approach of full self-government was creating tensions which the Administration, supported by the Australian Government, would continue to do what it could to allay. The Administration was seeking to accord fair treatment to all areas of the country. They were all represented in the House of Assembly through both open and regional seats. Furthermore, a tradition was being developed of establishing a fair regional balance in the composition of the Ministries. The new House of Assembly would have to look more deeply into the problem of the relationship between the central government and its constituent elements and the best means of protecting the interests of the less populous and less developed areas. In doing so, it would be able to examine the functioning of the new Area Authorities which were to represent the districts of Papua New Guinea. The House of Assembly had taken steps to establish those Authorities during the current year. The first one was currently being established for New Ireland and would have 18 members representing all the New Ireland local government councils together with the New Ireland members of the House of Assembly. It was not intended that the Area Authorities should be a third tier of government. Their powers, functions and sources of revenue would be worked out on a somewhat experimental basis and it was hoped that they would give the people of the various regions of Papua New Guinea a greater say in regional development and provide a channel through which regional pressures could be brought to bear on the Government to persuade it to take whatever action with regard to regional development that was agreed upon by the representatives of the region concerned.

51. There were other important factors in the development of national unity. One of them was economic

development. All over the country now, and particularly in the copper mines at Bougainville and the oil palm industry in New Britain, Papua New Guineans from throughout the country were coming to live together. There were sometimes differences between groups because local customs and the bonds of loyalty and friendship were strong, but the people were beginning to realize that they were one people with a common destiny.

52. The public service, the police and the defence forces were another factor. It had always been the policy of the Administration to recruit for those services on a nationwide basis and to use them as an instrument for bringing people together. There were of course times when local emotional ties hampered dedication to national interests, but that was characteristic of people all over the world. For the most part, the public service, the Constabulary and the defence forces were and would be strong instruments for the preservation of national unity.

53. The organization of political parties was a relatively recent development in Papua New Guinea, but it was now in full flood. Three parties—the United Party, the Pangu Pati (Papua and New Guinea Union Party) and the People's Progress Party—were developing nation-wide organizations, lists of candidates and policies. The Administration was encouraging that process and would publish a booklet on political parties at the end of 1971 for use in the 1972 elections, in which nation-wide political parties would be able to outline their aims and platforms. It had also been agreed to allocate radio time to nation-wide parties before those elections to assist them in the conduct of their electoral campaigns. While political education was a task which the Administration had to undertake, the principal responsibility in that field rested with the people of Papua New Guinea themselves, with their representatives in the House of Assembly, with the local councils and with the political parties.

54. The Australian Government had made it clear that it considered that Papua New Guinea should advance towards full self-government and independence as a united country. Consequently, it welcomed the views on that question expressed by the Visiting Mission, the Trusteeship Council and the Special Committee and was deeply conscious of the content of paragraph 6 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It therefore hoped that the General Assembly would endorse the view that Papua New Guinea should move into nationhood as one united country. That would be a contribution of substance to the future of the country. The Australian delegation hoped to receive guidance and assistance from the Assembly and all its members on that question. The future strength and stability of the independent nation of Papua New Guinea was a matter of consequence not only to its immediate neighbours, Australia and Indonesia, but to the Asian and Pacific region as a whole and to the community of nations.

55. He concluded by reading out a statement by the Administrator which had appeared in the Papua New Guinea Government Gazette for 1 July 1971 dealing with the National Identity Bill establishing the national name, the flag and the emblem of Papua New Guinea.

56. Mr. RAOUF (Iraq) thanked the representative of Australia for his detailed report and recalled that there were other small territories being administered by other Powers, some of which had boycotted the Special Committee. He asked whether the Fourth Committee would receive reports from those Powers, particularly from the United Kingdom,

before it took up those Territories. If not, it would be forced to base its debate solely on the documentation currently available and press reports, which the representative of the United Kingdom did not regard as reliable.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.