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*Chairman:* Mr. FAKHREDDINE Mohamed  
 (Sudan).

AGENDA ITEM 67

Question of Territories under Portuguese administration: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (continued) (A/6292, A/6294, A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V; A/6335/Rev.1, A/6337, A/6340, A/C.4/L.842/Rev.1)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (concluded) (A/C.4/L.842/REV.1)

1. Mr. PEON DEL VALLE (Mexico), speaking in explanation of vote, said that he had not voted against the draft resolution A/C.4/L.842/Rev.1 at the previous meeting, despite the fact that his delegation disagreed with various points in it and in December 1965 (1592nd meeting) had voted against the draft resolution that had led to the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX). The Mexican delegation had not opposed the draft resolution, because of its unmistakable humanitarian and liberal spirit, because it was an important step towards the solution of the problem of the Territories under Portuguese administration and because the situation in those Territories had been growing more and more serious.

2. His delegation had not, however, been able to vote in favour of the draft resolution. There was insufficient justification for the wording of operative paragraph 3; in any case, it was an exaggeration to condemn the settlement of foreign immigrants, whatever their

origin, in the Territories as a crime against humanity. With regard to paragraph 7, his delegation did not consider that the breaking-off of diplomatic and consular relations with the Government of Portugal would contribute to a solution of the problem. The measures affecting trade, communications and transport, to be effective, required the co-operation of Portugal's major trading partners and it would be premature to count on that.

3. It would have been better if paragraph 8 had urged the members of any regional defensive organization to ensure that supplies, and especially war matériel, made available to Portugal for self-defence should not be used to prevent the people of the Territories from exercising their right to self-determination.

4. Paragraph 9 appeared to anticipate the results of paragraph 10, which his delegation fully supported.

5. Mr. HOPE (United Kingdom) said that his delegation had frequently stated its view that the Portuguese Government should apply the principle of self-determination in the Territories under its administration and regretted that there had been no progress in that direction. His delegation had hoped that the discussions referred to in the Secretary-General's report of 14 November 1966<sup>1/</sup> would take place and be fruitful. It still hoped that they would take place.

6. The debate on the Portuguese Territories had been similar to that of the previous year. Many elements in the resolution just adopted were identical in substance with General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX). The reasons why his delegation had voted against the resolution were clear from the statements which it had made.

7. Mr. McCARTHY (Australia) said that his delegation had voted against the draft resolution, not because it supported Portuguese colonial policies, for it held that the principle of self-determination should be applied in the Portuguese Territories as elsewhere, that Portugal had not fulfilled its obligations under the United Nations Charter, and that it should develop conditions in its Territories which would lead as speedily as possible to self-determination.

8. His delegation would have liked to be able to support the draft resolution but had been forced to vote against it because many of its implications went far beyond matters relating to Portugal alone. With regard to operative paragraph 3, he had listened carefully to the explanations given by Guinea and Ghana, but he still felt that they were not in possession of all the facts. Paragraph 7 trespassed on the func-

<sup>1/</sup>Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1966, document S/7385/Add.4.

tions of the Security Council and, if implemented, could have profound consequences, perhaps for the whole world. Paragraph 9 exerted pressure upon the specialized agencies and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) which was wrong in principle. Paragraph 10 would set a precedent which could have the most embarrassing consequences for many nations. His Government was not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and did not supply Portugal with arms or equipment and materials for the manufacture or maintenance of arms or ammunition. The operations of IBRD were more vital to many countries represented in the Committee than to Australia. His delegation therefore approached questions affecting the Bank in a spirit of concern for the possible consequences of the precedent created by paragraph 10 for countries which his Government wished to see developed with the assistance of the Bank.

9. Mr. NUTI (Italy) said that the fact that his delegation had not voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.842/Rev.1 did not mean that his Government's attitude to the question had changed. General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) applied fully to the Territories under Portuguese administration and their inhabitants were entitled to exercise their right of self-determination. Portuguese colonial policies were not in keeping with the principles accepted by the international community and could only bring about countless sufferings for all concerned.

10. It was regrettable that, owing to the nature of many of its provisions, the draft resolution had been unable to gain the unanimous support which alone might induce the Portuguese Government to reconsider its colonial policy. His delegation understood the sense of frustration of Member States which resented the slow progress of decolonization in some areas in Africa, but it would submit that it was not the adoption of highly controversial provisions such as those in the draft resolution that would ensure self-determination for the people of the Portuguese Territories.

11. His delegation could not accept the wording of operative paragraph 3 or the unilateral, biased judgement in operative paragraph 4. It had voted against paragraph 7 because of its reference to General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX), which it considered unconstitutional. Lastly, it could not endorse paragraph 8, which would imply that the members of NATO were directly responsible for Portugal's colonial policies. It categorically rejected that implication and the attempts made during the debate to discredit an alliance which had played an essential role in the maintenance of international peace. Moreover, paragraph 8 was tantamount to a decision to impose sanctions, a matter which fell exclusively within the competence of the Security Council.

12. His delegation nevertheless hoped that the resolution, despite its controversial provisions, would make a substantial contribution to the decolonization of Africa.

13. Mr. GROS ESPIELL (Uruguay) said that his delegation had maintained an inflexibly anti-colonial position in both the Fourth Committee and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Imple-

mentation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and could not understand the Portuguese attitude, which was not in keeping with current realities. Colonialism was an outmoded system which conflicted with the principles of the United Nations.

14. Nevertheless, his delegation had abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.4/L.842/Rev.1, for several reasons. Operative paragraph 3 was couched in unacceptable terms. Paragraph 7 clearly implied interference in the internal affairs of States in that it would oblige them to adopt certain measures which they alone were competent to decide. Moreover, his delegation, as a member of the Security Council, could not support a decision which would prejudice its eventual attitude in the Security Council.

15. His Government hoped that Portugal would lead the people of its colonies to independence and self-determination in accordance with the General Assembly's resolution.

16. Mrs. ANDERSON (United States of America) said that her Government had consistently expressed the belief that the people of Portugal's African colonies should be given full opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination. There could be no valid reason for denying them the privilege of freely deciding their political future.

17. Her delegation was sympathetic to elements in draft resolution A/C.4/L.842/Rev.1, but those elements were indissolubly linked to others which went too far in the present circumstances. Her delegation had reservations in regard to the heavy emphasis placed on the influence of foreign factors in the present situation in the Territory, the primary responsibility for which lay with Portugal. Neither the United States nor NATO provided arms or military equipment for use in those Territories. As recently as 3 October 1966, at the 1303rd meeting of the Security Council, the United States representative in the Council had stated that the commercial export of United States arms and military equipment direct to the Portuguese African Territories was prohibited. Her delegation was also unable to support certain other paragraphs which appeared to encroach on the responsibilities of the Security Council.

18. Her delegation's views and reservations had already been expressed in the Fourth Committee and the Special Committee in connexion with similar resolutions. She regretted that, despite its interest in solving the problem, her delegation had been unable to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

19. Mr. CARRASQUERO (Venezuela) said that his delegation had abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.4/L.842/Rev.1 because, while it approved of many of the paragraphs, it could not support the sixth preambular paragraph or operative paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10. His Government condemned the colonial war in Portugal's African Territories but it doubted the Committee's competence to request the application of measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, which must be decided by the Security Council.

20. His delegation's voting record was proof of its support for people under the colonial yoke but its

reservations were such that it had been unable to support the draft resolution. His Government endorsed the inalienable right of the peoples under Portuguese domination to self-determination and independence, and his delegation's abstention did not mean there had been any change in its unswerving anti-colonial position.

21. Mr. AHY (Iran) said that there was no need to reaffirm his delegation's support for every proposal which would contribute to the ending of Portuguese colonial domination in Africa.

22. His delegation's position in regard to sanctions was already on record. It held it essential that realistic procedures for the effective implementation of sanctions should be devised. It had therefore been obliged to abstain in the vote on operative paragraph 7.

23. Mr. BOZOVIC (Yugoslavia) said that, as a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.4/L.842/Rev.1, he regretted that delegations which had objected to the text of the resolution had not been more specific during the discussions of its aims earlier in the debate. If they had been, the sponsors could have adapted the text accordingly.

24. If the Committee's aim was the application of the United Nations Charter to Territories under Portuguese administration, it must request action to achieve that end; the moderation of the resolution was out of all proportion to the acts of the Portuguese authorities. A resolution which had been adopted by such a large majority could not properly be described as unilateral or biased. It was merely an attempt to say what delegations had been saying for the previous seven years. Positive progress was necessary if the people of Portugal's colonial Territories were to achieve independence.

25. The reference to Portugal's military allies was necessary since those allies must ensure that Portugal was not supplied, directly or indirectly, with arms or military equipment which it could use to maintain or further its domination of the people of its colonies.

26. Mr. DE MIRANDA (Portugal) said that his delegation had already stated its view that the draft resolution was illegal and based on false assumptions. The sixth preambular paragraph was devoid of truth; it was well known that three of Portugal's overseas provinces were subject to armed attack from neighbouring countries and it was the duty of the Portuguese Government to protect its people. There was no justification for the reference in the seventh preambular paragraph to the activities of foreign financial interests, since the latter had no political role whatsoever. The foreign companies in question were furthering the development of the Territories and their activities would be perfectly acceptable elsewhere. Similarly, operative paragraph 4 was a baseless attack on such enterprises. Operative paragraph 8 was an incorrect and unwarranted reference to NATO.

27. The language of operative paragraph 3 was extravagant, for the Portuguese settling in Angola were not foreigners any more than Angolans settling in European Portugal were foreigners. There was no land shortage and the people were not suffering as a result of European settlement, which in any case promoted multiracialism.

28. The export of labour had been thoroughly investigated by the International Labour Organisation, which had found nothing objectionable in the practice. To describe it as a crime against humanity was a gross exaggeration. Operative paragraphs 9 and 10 attempted to interfere with the functioning of the specialized agencies. Portugal was receiving no help from international agencies for use in its overseas provinces.

29. His delegation wished to express its most formal reservations in regard to draft resolution A/C.4/L.842/Rev.1.

30. Mr. MALECELA (United Republic of Tanzania), speaking on a point of order, said that he did not wish to enter into polemics, but the item under discussion was the question of Territories under Portuguese administration. There was no item entitled "Portuguese overseas provinces" on the agenda and he accordingly requested the Chairman to rule the Portuguese representative out of order whenever that representative referred to "Portuguese overseas provinces".

31. Secondly, it was his understanding that representatives were now explaining their votes. If the Portuguese representative proposed to reply to the statement made by the Tanzanian delegation a few days previously, the Tanzanian delegation would request the Chairman to allow it to exercise its right of reply.

32. The CHAIRMAN said that all members of the Committee were aware of the title of the item under discussion. The Portuguese representative was the only member who called the Territories in question "overseas provinces" and he did not propose to rule that representative out of order, because that would delay the Committee's work.

33. If the Portuguese representative wished to exercise his right of reply in connexion with the statement made by the Tanzanian delegation, he would have an opportunity to do so after the explanations of vote.

34. Mr. APPIAH (Ghana) said that it was his understanding that, under the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, members could not discuss the internal affairs of a Member State. Yet the Portuguese representative's statement seemed to be an invitation to the Committee to discuss the subject of Portuguese provinces.

35. The CHAIRMAN said that he would call upon the Portuguese representative to reply to the point raised by the Ghanaian representative at a later stage.

36. Mr. DIALLO Seydou (Guinea) said that everyone knew that any draft resolution concerning Portugal was bound to be opposed by certain delegations. Australia had said that Ghana and Guinea were not in possession of all the facts. The Guinean delegation certainly knew how Australian soldiers were defending freedom elsewhere in the world. His delegation had no faith in the statements of good intentions of certain delegations, whose position had not changed in the past twenty years. Their civilization was doomed and they were trying to defend Portugal because that country was their ally. Although they had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), they had done nothing to implement the historic Declaration on the

Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Africa was in the midst of a struggle to free itself and the problem would be solved by the freedom fighters. Despite the negative vote of certain delegations, there was no doubt that Portugal would be driven out of Africa.

37. Mr. DE MIRANDA (Portugal), referring to the Ghanaian representative's remarks, recalled that the Portuguese delegation had made certain reservations at the outset of the debate and had said that it would participate in the discussion subject to those reservations.

38. With regard to the remarks of the representative of Tanzania, he said that the Portuguese delegation had merely wished to provide some information in connexion with the incident to which that representative had referred at the 1648th meeting. On the basis of information obtained from the competent Portuguese authorities, his delegation was now in a position to state that no Portuguese soldiers had entered the United Republic of Tanzania. He therefore categorically rejected the Tanzanian representative's claim that the Portuguese Government was in any way responsible for the alleged incident.

39. Mr. MALECELA (United Republic of Tanzania) said that the Portuguese representative had merely repeated the denial which he had made at the 1648th meeting of the Committee. What the Tanzanian delegation had wanted the Portuguese representative to convey to his Government was the Tanzanian Government's serious warning that it would not tolerate such acts of extreme provocation much longer. If they continued, the Government of Portugal would bear full responsibility for the consequences.

40. The Tanzanian Government made no secret of its intention to drive Portugal out of Africa. The United Republic of Tanzania considered that it had frontiers, not with Portugal, but with Portuguese colonies, and it considered that it had a duty to help the people of those colonies to achieve independence. He hoped that the Portuguese representative would take his warning seriously.

#### AGENDA ITEM 69

Question of Fiji: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (continued)\* (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. VIII; A/C.4/L.844 and Add.1 and 2)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued) AND CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION A/C.4/L.844 AND ADD.1 AND 2

41. Mr. MALECELA (United Republic of Tanzania) said that, before introducing draft resolution A/C.4/L.844 and Add.1 and 2, he would like to comment on the statement which the United Kingdom representative had made at the 1652nd meeting of the Committee. It was not so long ago that the world had been told in a United Kingdom newspaper, The British Empire Today, that an atmosphere of enlightened co-operation prevailed in the Territory of Fiji. In that recent statement on the Territory, the United Kingdom representative

had been obliged to refer to an article in The New York Times of 20 November 1966. The Tanzanian delegation found it surprising that, shortly before the Fourth Committee had taken up the question of Fiji, an article had appeared in The New York Times which had presented a distorted picture of the situation in the Territory and had commended the administering Power. It was clear that the article represented the views not of the indigenous inhabitants but of the administering Power. It was strange that articles which appeared in The New York Times sometimes also appeared in other newspapers ostensibly written by different correspondents but all reflecting the views of the administering Power.

42. The draft resolution before the Committee largely repeated the provisions of previous resolutions since the administering Power had not yet implemented those provisions. Operative paragraph 2 expressed deep regret that the administering Power had not yet taken effective measures to implement the various resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee concerning Fiji. He wished to make it clear that it was the desire of the Afro-Asian countries that the administering Power should continue to provide assistance to the Territory after it became independent.

43. The administering Power had often referred to the differences among the various racial groups in the Territory. In his delegation's view, the administering Power was exaggerating that aspect of the situation as a pretext for delaying the granting of independence. The United Republic of Tanzania acknowledged the contribution made by Tanzanian citizens of European and Asian descent and was proud of the contribution which people of African origin had made in the Caribbean and the United States of America.

44. With regard to the electoral system in the Territory, he stressed that general elections should be held in accordance with the principle of "one man, one vote" and that no distinction should be made on the basis of ethnic origin.

45. Paragraph 4 was a new provision and endorsed the Special Committee's decision (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. VIII, para. 120) to appoint a sub-committee to visit Fiji for the purpose of studying the situation in the Territory at first hand. The proposed sub-committee would help the Fourth Committee to fulfil its task and the sponsors hoped that the administering Power would not oppose the sending of such a mission. The United Kingdom Government and people had always welcomed constructive measures dictated by reason, and the Tanzanian delegation was certain that that Government would accept the draft resolution if the Committee spoke with one voice.

46. Mr. ABDEL-WAHAB (United Arab Republic) said that the problems facing the people of Fiji were the result of the systematic colonial policy of the United Kingdom. Instead of taking the necessary steps to bring about a sense of unity and common purpose among the various ethnic groups, the United Kingdom Government had carried out its usual policy of "divide and rule" by promoting racial antagonisms among the inhabitants. Faithful to that policy, the United Kingdom Government had introduced an elec-

\*Resumed from the 1652nd meeting.

toral system which was based on ethnic origin and designed to separate the various groups. His delegation could not, therefore, believe the United Kingdom representative when he claimed that such a system would lead to political integration and racial harmony among the people. The United Kingdom's action was contrary to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which stated that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity of a country was incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Furthermore, the universally recognized principle of one man, one vote should be applied in Fiji.

47. The draft resolution was clear and self-explanatory. If the situation in Fiji was as the United Kingdom Government said, that Government should have no reason to object to the sending of a mission and should vote in favour of the draft resolution. His delegation hoped that the Committee would adopt the draft resolution unanimously.

48. Mr. GHAREKHAN (India), referring to the statement made by the United Kingdom representative at the Committee's 1652nd meeting, said that it was pathetic that the administering Power should have had to rely on an article which had appeared in The New York Times on 20 November 1966 and which contained many false statements, in order to defend its position. As the representative of Tanzania had said, it was an amazing coincidence that the article should have appeared at that particular time, when the question was about to be discussed by the Committee.

49. The United Kingdom representative had referred to steps which had been taken to protect the Fijians from unscrupulous exploitation and to prevent the alienation of their land. He wondered who they were being protected from, the Europeans or the so-called Indian community. As the same article pointed out, the sale of land had been halted in 1875 after 400,000 acres had been sold to Europeans. The United Kingdom representative had referred to the fact that by 1885 immigrants had started arriving from India, but The New York Times article described the miserable conditions which they had experienced in Fiji, where they had been used as indentured labour on the sugar plantations owned by Europeans. The United Kingdom representative had been guilty of a gross understatement when he had stated that one or two representatives in the Special Committee had thought the ethnic differences had been exaggerated; fifteen delegations in fact shared that view, which was now reflected in the draft resolution under consideration. The United Kingdom representative had referred to the social, religious and economic differences between the ethnic groups and had pointed out that they went to different schools for language reasons. As The New York Times article stated, however, it was in the field of education that the greatest steps towards racial harmony could have been achieved, and it had been the United Kingdom Government's policy to keep the races apart for fear that the Fijians might become unsettled. Progress was now being made, but was years too late.

50. The United Kingdom claimed to have great regard for the principles of the Charter, and he believed that

that was generally, but not always, true. For instance, at a press conference in Fiji in August 1966, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies, when asked whether a visit to the Territory by a delegation from the Special Committee might eliminate future argument, had replied that he thought such a mission would have predetermined views. He had gone on to say that while the United Nations as such was a vital organization, the Special Committee was something which had been added since, that it lacked knowledge and experience and that the United Kingdom was not bound to honour its resolutions and would continue its policy of proposing a new constitution whenever the people in the dependencies felt that they would like to make further progress.

51. The representative of the United Kingdom, speaking of the latest so-called constitutional reforms, had said that there would be a significant break from the previous communal roll voting system, but not by abolishing it because that was not generally acceptable to the Fijians. He wondered whom he had meant by "Fijians"; he had apparently not included those of Indian origin, yet all—Europeans, Chinese, Indians—were now Fijians. The Executive Council and the Legislative Council had no real authority. Of the ten members of the former, four were officials appointed by the Governor and they held important portfolios. Moreover, he did not see how members of the Legislative Council who were appointed to oversee and speak for particular departments could do so without being in full administrative control.

52. He was grateful to the United Kingdom representative for providing information concerning the elections held in October–November 1966. That information would help the Committee. His delegation was only interested in seeing that the people of Fiji as a whole, without any discrimination, should be given an opportunity to decide their own future. The United Kingdom Government should stop referring to Indians and Fijians and to those who were "neither Indian nor Fijian"—presumably the Europeans—in the Fijian Constitution.

53. His delegation had co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.4/L.844 and Add.1 and 2 because it provided the essential elements for any solution to the question of Fiji. Only the implementation of the measures called for in operative paragraph 3 could lead the people of Fiji to their objective in a spirit of harmony among all ethnic groups. He hoped that the subcommittee recommended in paragraph 4 would be acceptable to the administering Power, which had recently shown its willingness to co-operate with a United Nations mission to another Territory. If the administering Power refused to allow a mission to visit Fiji, his delegation would have to draw the necessary conclusions. His delegation fully supported the draft resolution and hoped it would meet with the approval of all members of the Committee.

54. Mr. NKAMA (Zambia) said that his delegation that the administering Power had disregarded the various General Assembly resolutions calling for the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) on the basis of "one man, one vote" and had insisted upon retaining an unrepresentative constitution in the Territory. Such out-dated tactics as the introduction

of a system of cross-voting were preventing the people of Fiji from exercising their right to self-determination and from attaining sovereign independence. His delegation rejected any assertion by the United Kingdom that the people of Fiji did not seek full independence and wondered what democratic process had been applied in reaching that conclusion.

55. His delegation was seriously concerned about the static political situation in Fiji and felt strongly that the administering Power should not be allowed to repeat its policy of "divide and rule". A United Nations sub-committee should be formed immediately to find out, *inter alia*, whether the people of Fiji wanted freedom and independence or subjugation by the United Kingdom Government. As long as the *status quo* existed, the administering Power would continue to exploit and plunder the natural resources of the Territory at the expense of the indigenous population as a whole. Full independence was the only way of ensuring that those resources were used for the benefit of the people themselves.

56. It was clear that the racial situation in the Territory was explosive and that it had resulted from the United Kingdom's policy. Constitutional and other devices introduced by the administering Power had encouraged disunity among the various ethnic groups. The Committee should do everything possible to persuade the United Kingdom to change its policy so that racial harmony would prevail. He appealed to the administering Power to face up to its responsibilities and implement, without further delay, the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly, so that the Fijian people could attain independence and nationhood as soon as possible, in harmony, unity and brotherhood.

57. Mr. JOUEJATI (Syria) said that it was clear that the steps so far taken by the administering Power towards the full implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) in Fiji were inadequate. There were three major factors responsible for the delay in granting self-determination and independence.

58. First, the basis of popular representation in the organs created by the administering Power was still improper and inequitable. One sector of the population, whose origin was foreign to the whole continent and who enjoyed the position of privileged settlers, held ten seats in a Legislative Council consisting of forty members, although they comprised only 10 per cent of the population, while those of Indian origin, who comprised 51 per cent of the population, held only twelve seats. That was clearly a case of discrimination. The Executive Council also had a basic defect in that its composition depended largely on the choice of the Governor rather than on the popular will.

59. The second factor was that the process of the transfer of power appeared to centre on form rather than on substance. The legislature was constitutionally inhibited from even introducing a bill which would increase expenditure or change the conditions of public service. It was thus immobilized in two areas which were of vital importance to developing nations, namely development and modernization. Effective power was therefore not being transferred to the elected repre-

sentatives of the people in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), but was being concentrated in the hands of the Governor. The latter could, if he so wished, appoint or dismiss officials, invalidate a bill passed by the legislature, activate a bill rejected by the legislature, and so on. There was no limitation to his powers.

60. The third factor was that the administering Power was still obstructing the dispatch of a United Nations mission to the Territory to learn about the complexities of the situation which the United Kingdom representative himself had stressed. Such a mission would also have a positive role, as was increasingly the case with United Nations missions in similar situations.

61. The administering Power, which had been in the Territory for over a century, was still complaining of the lack of harmony among the various ethnic groups and had only just been able to announce that an inter-communal party had been formed. He hoped that the membership of that party would grow rapidly.

62. His delegation still maintained that what was important was not the assurances given to the Committee by the administering Power, but the kind of welcome that might at last be extended to a United Nations mission. As the representative of India had said, if the administering Power did not agree to the proposal for a visiting mission to go to Fiji, the necessary conclusions would have to be drawn. It was hard not to agree with that view. In that spirit, his delegation had co-sponsored the draft resolution and hoped that it would have the support of the Committee.

63. Mr. CALINGASAN (Philippines) pointed out that at previous sessions the question of Fiji had been discussed together with some fifty other Non-Self-Governing Territories. He was happy that it was now being considered as a separate item and given the importance it deserved.

64. The administering Power had emphasized the problems arising from the existence of disparate groups based on ethnic origin and from the fact that those of Indian descent now outnumbered the original Fijians, and had claimed that those problems had delayed progress towards self-government. On the other hand, certain members of the Special Committee had felt that the differences based on ethnic origin had been exaggerated in order to perpetuate European minority rule in the Territory. His delegation regretted that no petitioners had appeared before the Committee to provide further information on the situation in Fiji and that none had been heard by the Special Committee. His delegation would like more adequate information on the Territory before stating its position definitively. It therefore welcomed whole-heartedly the decision of the Special Committee to appoint a sub-committee to visit Fiji to study the situation and would vote in favour of the draft resolution, which endorsed that decision in operative paragraph 4. He appealed to the United Kingdom Government to allow such a mission to visit the Territory and to assist it in its task. The United Kingdom owed it not only to all the people of Fiji but to the world community and to itself to allow the United Nations to learn at first hand the facts of the present situation in Fiji.

65. Mr. SLOWIKOWSKI (Poland) said that the question of Fiji, despite its specific character, was no less important than that of colonial domination in Africa or the situation in Southern Arabia, since neither the Charter of the United Nations nor General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) made any distinction among colonial territories as to their size, geographical situation or population.

66. He had hoped to learn from the United Kingdom representative's statement at the 1652nd meeting that progress had been made towards the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1951 (XVIII) and 2068 (XX) with respect to Fiji, but the United Kingdom did not appear to have a positive attitude and the statement had dwelt rather on the differences between the various racial groups which, it was claimed, made it impossible to apply the principle of "one man, one vote" in the Territory. The United Kingdom representative had gone further and had implied that the delegations which, during the debate in the Special Committee, had asked the administering Power to apply that principle had taken an unreasonable position. It appeared that the United Kingdom did not consider itself to be in a position to implement without delay the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) and other pertinent resolutions with respect to Fiji.

67. Resolution 2068 (XX) had stated that the constitutional changes contemplated by the administering Power would foment separatist tendencies and stand in the way of the political, economic and social integration of the people as a whole, and had requested the administering Power to take urgent measures to repeal all discriminatory laws and to establish an unqualified system of democratic representation based on the principle of "one man, one vote". The recommendations of the Constitutional Conference had been approved by the administering Power on 16 December 1965, the very day on which the General Assembly had adopted resolution 2068 (XX). The United Kingdom had ignored the provisions of that resolution, and the constitutional changes had been put into effect on 20 September 1966 and had been followed by elections in October 1966.

68. The existence of various ethnic groups admittedly had a bearing upon the situation in Fiji, but they could not be fully integrated if the existing differences were encouraged and if one ethnic group was given a privileged position which was harmful to the interests of another. By stressing the differences between the original Fijians and those of Indian descent, the administering Power appeared to be protecting the interests of the former, but if that was true it was hard to understand why similar measures had not been taken to protect them from the European community. It was clear from the way in which the seats in the Legislative Council had been allocated whose interests were being protected by the administering Power. Instead of promoting harmonious co-operation, the United Kingdom's policy might result in racial disturbances.

69. The administering Power had so far ignored resolutions 1951 (XVIII) and 2068 (XX). In his statement at the 1652nd meeting, the United Kingdom representative had made no mention of the provisions of those resolutions and it was clear that his country

had no intention of complying with them. The principle of "one man, one vote" had certainly not been applied and no date had yet been fixed for the exercise of the right to self-determination and independence. His delegation fully subscribed to the view that the only effective way of ascertaining the true situation and the wishes of the people was to send a visiting mission to the Territory to recommend practical steps towards a solution. Such a mission should be sent before the situation became worse. His delegation would support draft resolution A/C.4/L.844 and Add.1 and 2.

70. Mr. ISMAIL (Malaysia) said that in its struggle for independence Fiji was faced with the complex problems inherent in a multiracial society. Such circumstances could lead to ugly situations, but the future could also be bright, as had been proved in other countries. When the tentacles of colonialism had just reached Fiji, a United Kingdom official on the spot, acting independently of his Government, had taken advantage of local dissensions among the indigenous tribes. However reluctant the United Kingdom Government might have been to assume control of Fiji, that Territory had suffered the fate of colonial exploitation and all the ramifications of colonialism.

71. In 1885, indentured labour had been brought in from the Indian sub-continent. The population of Indian origin now numbered some 50 per cent of the total population of Fiji, the indigenous Fijians making up 41 per cent and those of European and Chinese origin accounting for 9 per cent. One of the United Kingdom's motives in bringing in the immigrants had certainly been to ensure a supply of seasoned labour; another might well have been that of preparing the ground for a policy of "divide and rule". Recriminations about the past, however, would not bring a solution any closer. The existing situation must be squarely faced.

72. One of the characteristics of the social situation in Fiji was an excess of people of immigrant races over the indigenous inhabitants. Moreover, the immigrant races, as a result of the relative state of development of their countries of origin, enjoyed economic and educational advantages over the indigenous people; they also usually resided in urban areas, being thus more exposed to the influences of modern civilization. Meanwhile, the indigenous people, living mainly in the rural areas, were left to pursue their traditional life, based on a subsistence economy. They enjoyed none of the amenities of modern life; adequate medical facilities, adequate schools, an economic infra-structure and development projects were unknown to them. The popular politician's contention was that they were deliberately kept in isolation and ignorance so that they would not yearn for independence. Yet, despite the conditions in which they lived, the indigenous people survived and multiplied. They felt a spiritual and physical attachment to the land of their fathers and therefore felt that, when the white man left, they should take his place. At the same time, the people of immigrant races who had been born and brought up in the Territory considered that they were entitled to political representation on the basis of "one man, one vote".

73. Thus both the indigenous and the immigrant communities were in favour of independence. The

conflicts arose from differences of emphasis, from suspicions due to economic and educational disparities, and from the fear of domination of one race by the other. It seemed arguable that the framers of United Kingdom colonial policy in the nineteenth century had seen how those circumstances could be used to the advantage of the colonial Power, though in the light of the present situation it might seem somewhat far-fetched to argue that the tendency of Fijians of different racial and cultural backgrounds to live separately was something deliberately contrived by the United Kingdom Administration. Given the existing conditions, racial unity could best be achieved through common sense, tolerance and a spirit of give and take, and the realization that the stability and progress of Fiji depended on co-operation between the various communities.

74. His delegation had no doubt that the Fijians themselves would overcome their problems. The Committee's task was to inquire what the administering Power intended to do to bring independence to Fiji in the shortest time and the most peaceful manner possible. At a cursory glance, the present constitutional situation revealed certain glaring faults. The disproportionate representation of the European community, for example, was to be deplored. The most serious fault, however, was the attempt of the administering Power to slow down the pace of advance towards independence. For the sake of peace and stability, progress must be accelerated. The colonial Power should awake from its torpor and prepare vigorously for independence.

75. The administering Power had done little to redress the economic and educational backwardness of the indigenous people. Economic projects should be carried out and crash educational programmes undertaken in order to remove the handicaps under which they suffered. It might also be necessary for the administering Power to make arrangements for the potential leaders of the Territory to tour other countries where similar racial problems had been successfully solved and to study the constitutional arrangements there.

76. His delegation supported the view that representatives of the Special Committee should be allowed to visit the Territory. It might also be useful for the administering Power to invite qualified people from countries which had succeeded in solving racial problems to observe the situation at first hand and offer recommendations. The Fijians should be given every opportunity to profit from the experience of others and no stone should be left unturned in the effort to build a united nation.

77. The indigenous Fijians were of Melanesian stock. At some time in the past, people from an area somewhere in southern China had migrated southwards to Malaysia and Indonesia, some even going as far afield as Madagascar and Hawaii. They were a calm, peaceful people, endowed with statesmanlike qualities. Those characteristics, combined with the distinctive qualities of the Indian and Chinese races, could lead to the creation of a dynamic nation which would be a valuable member of the world community.

*Mr. Kanakarathne (Ceylon), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

78. Mr. KARASIMEONOV (Bulgaria) recalled that, in resolution 2068 (XX), the General Assembly had requested the administering Power to repeal all discriminatory laws in Fiji and to establish an unqualified system of democratic representation based on the principle of "one man, one vote". He pointed out that that recommendation had been formulated by the General Assembly after it had been informed of the results of the Constitutional Conference held in July and August 1965. In his statement at the 1652nd meeting, the United Kingdom representative had dwelt on the supposed favourable results of the Constitutional Conference, but he had failed to mention that the new arrangements did not take into account the General Assembly's recommendations, and the latest information provided showed no evidence that the administering Power was acting on those recommendations. Instead, the United Kingdom had introduced a new system, based on the division of the population by community and race and preserving the disproportionate voting strength of the Europeans. Out of the thirty-six seats in the Legislative Council, the Europeans, representing 4 per cent of the population, would have ten, or 30 per cent, of the seats, not counting the official members appointed by the administering Power. The "reforms" were clearly a stratagem to perpetuate European minority rule. It was thus hard to accept the assertion that the United Kingdom was guided by the interests of all the communities equally. As had happened earlier in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom was doing its utmost to preserve economic and political domination by the white minority. Ethnic origin was the main criterion with regard to both political and economic rights. The United Kingdom claimed that it had no favourites in Fiji, but it was clear that the European minority were its favourites, as in other colonies. In an article in *The New York Times* of 20 November 1966, it had been pointed out that, under the present system, true power in fact remained in the hands of the European minorities.

79. His delegation had supported the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 7 September 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. VIII, para. 120) in which the administering Power had been called on to hold general elections on the basis of "one man, one vote" for the purpose of setting up a constituent assembly which would have the task of drawing up a democratic constitution. The draft resolution just submitted seemed to reflect the same basic ideas as the Special Committee's resolution, and his delegation supported it in principle. In particular, Bulgaria supported the proposal in operative paragraph 4 that a sub-committee should be sent to Fiji to study the situation at first hand.

80. Mr. MWASHUMBE (Kenya) said that it was to be regretted that the Committee had not had an opportunity to hear any representatives of the indigenous people of Fiji and that the only voice that had been heard was that of the administering Power. The question of Fiji was essentially a colonial question. The Committee had been told that the United Kingdom had originally been reluctant to accept the responsibilities of sovereignty in Fiji; nevertheless, once those responsibilities had been accepted, Fiji had become a United Kingdom colony and it thus



fell within the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

81. While he did not ignore the rights of Fijians of immigrant races, he attached special importance to the plight of the indigenous people because they had been neglected. They were at a disadvantage educationally and did not play a proportionate role in the economic life of the Territory, nor had they any posts in the Administration. As in many former colonies, the scene was dominated by the Europeans, who had taken over a large share of the land. People of Indian origin now made up 50 per cent of the population and, whatever the circumstances that had brought the different peoples to Fiji, the various communities now had to live together. The administering Power had failed to integrate the various communities into a single nation. A question which must be considered, however, was whether the indigenous people were ready for self-government. All agreed that the principle of self-determination and independence should be applied, but when one community had been neglected educationally there were certain difficulties. His delegation feared that trouble would arise if the principle of "one man, one vote" was applied immediately, before the disparity in educational levels between the indigenous community and other communities had been corrected. Such a situation could lead to violence.

82. He would support the draft resolution which had been submitted, including operative paragraph 4, which would provide an opportunity for ascertaining the views of the indigenous and other groups. He hoped that the administering Power would agree to a visiting mission so that, on the basis of its report, the United Nations would be able to help the Fijian people towards self-determination and independence as soon as possible.

83. It had been said that the indigenous people were of Melanesian origin. There was also a theory that they had come originally from Africa. At any rate, the Fijians were a black people and had suffered from racial discrimination at the hands both of Europeans and of other groups. They had been at the bottom of

the social ladder and other more advanced communities had practically monopolized the commercial world. In the view of many people, there was consequently a danger that, if independence were given to the Territory before the indigenous Fijians had an opportunity to participate fully in the administration, they would feel frustrated and trouble might arise.

84. His delegation felt that it was important that, before the Territory attained independence, the people, including the indigenous people, should have an opportunity to gain experience in self-government. Only thus could the achievement of independence in peace and tranquillity be ensured.

85. Mr. HUNEEUS (Chile) said that his delegation's views on the question of Fiji had been expressed in the debates of the Special Committee. Chile attached particular importance to the introduction of an electoral system based on a common roll. It seemed inconsistent to speak of encouraging integration and at the same time to maintain a system like the present one, based on a division of the population by community and race. The recent elections had shown the failure of the mixed system. Certain reforms had been introduced by the administering Power, but they had not gone far enough.

86. Chile fully supported the draft resolution. Its text was in line with the Special Committee's resolution of 7 September 1966, which his delegation had likewise supported without any reservations. Like the representatives of the Philippines and Kenya, his delegation regretted that the Committee had not the benefit of the views of petitioners. That fact made it all the more essential for a sub-committee to visit Fiji. The mission would help to elucidate the problems and enable the General Assembly to approach the task of decolonization in full knowledge of the facts. He hoped that the administering Power would ensure the prompt implementation of the United Nations resolutions. The Fijian people, without distinction as to race, should be enabled to decide their own future at the earliest possible date.

*The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.*