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CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda item 49:	
Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi: re- port of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (continued)	
Requests for hearings (continued) . . . . .	951
Statement by Mr. Thaddée Siryuyumunsi, President of the Legislative Assembly of Burundi . . . . .	951
General debate . . . . .	952
Organization of work . . . . .	956

*Chairman:* Miss Angie BROOKS (Liberia).

AGENDA ITEM 49

Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi: report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (A/5126 and Corr.1 and Add.1; A/C.4/516 and Add.1-5, A/C.4/550) (continued)

REQUESTS FOR HEARINGS (A/C.4/549) (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that Mr. Christian Mushatsi-Kareba, who had asked to be heard as a petitioner (A/C.4/549), had arrived in New York. Other requests for hearings had been submitted by Mr. Michel Kayihura and Mr. Michel Rwagasana, members of the Union nationale rwandaise (UNAR), and by Mr. Pappias Gatwa, who wished to speak on behalf of Mr. Jean-Baptiste Ndahindurwa (Kigeli V). The Chairman felt that it was important that the Committee should decide immediately whether it should grant hearings to the petitioners and therefore suggested that the Committee should dispense with the usual procedure regarding the circulation of documents before voting.

*It was so decided.* <sup>1/</sup>

2. Mr. BINDZI (Cameroun) said he had no objection to the petitioners being heard by the Committee. However, he had certain reservations regarding the petitioner who wished to speak on behalf of the former Mwami of Rwanda. To address the Committee on behalf of a group or party was quite in order, but the delegation of Cameroun considered it a little exaggerated to give a hearing to someone who had come to speak on behalf of a single individual. It was true that in that particular case the person represented had in the past played an important role, but, as a result of events, he was today an ordinary citizen. The delegation of Cameroun would have no reservation to make if the former Mwami himself came before the Committee.

<sup>1/</sup> The text of the requests for hearings was subsequently circulated as document A/C.4/549/Add.1.

3. The CHAIRMAN asked the representative of Cameroun if he was entering a formal objection to the request for a hearing presented by Mr. Gatwa.

4. Mr. BINDZI (Cameroun) replied in the negative.

5. The CHAIRMAN stated that, if there were no objections, the requests for hearings would be granted.

*It was so decided.*

STATEMENT BY MR. THADDEE SIRYUYUMUNSI,  
PRESIDENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY  
OF BURUNDI

6. Mr. SIRYUYUMUNSI (President of the Legislative Assembly of Burundi) said that his statement would supplement the one made by the Prime Minister of Burundi at the 1311th meeting on 13 June 1962. He would, however, have to go back a little.

7. By virtue of the duties and obligations incumbent upon it under the Trusteeship Agreement, Belgium had had to receive several United Nations Visiting Missions in its own territory as well as in the Trust Territory. In January 1961, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1579 (XV), a United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi had attended the Ostend Conference, which had brought together representatives of the Territory's major political parties. At the end of that Conference the representatives of Belgium had solemnly promised that thereafter no decision would be taken that did not accord with the terms of the United Nations resolution providing for the holding of legislative elections under the supervision of the United Nations Commission. Immediately after the Conference, however, the Gitarama coup d'état had taken place in Ruanda-Urundi and a provisional Government had been found in Burundi. The two Governments resulting from the colonialist intrigues had been given *de facto* recognition by Belgium, in consequence of which the United Nations Commission had had to return to New York. During the resumed session of the General Assembly held in March and April 1961 a campaign of persecution had been waged against the nationalist parties in the Territory. At the end of that session the General Assembly, by resolution 1605 (XV), had again called for the holding of legislative elections in the two countries.

8. After briefly reviewing the organization and conduct of those elections, he spoke of the first part of the resumed sixteenth session of the General Assembly, at which there had been a lively debate on the Protocols between Belgium and the Governments of the two countries which had been signed on 21 December 1961 (A/C.4/517 and Corr.1). Some delegations had then been able to see for themselves that the Protocols were nothing but a sham and that the Administering Authority had no serious intention of transferring real power to the independent Governments which had resulted from the legislative

elections. At the same session, at the 1259th meeting, the representative of Belgium had solemnly promised that the transfer of powers to the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi would be completed by 30 April 1962 at the latest. Yet today, in the case of Burundi at any rate, that promise had still not been fulfilled. Nothing had been done, despite the express recommendation contained in General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI).

9. Now the Belgian representative was proposing that the Fourth Committee should authorize the maintenance of Belgian troops in the two countries, presumably to be withdrawn two and a half to three months after independence, on the pretext that Belgium was still responsible for maintaining order in the Trust Territory. The Belgian representative had also asserted that a part of those troops had already been withdrawn.

10. He found it difficult to understand why Belgium should decide to withdraw its troops two and a half or three months after independence when in practice it had not been able to do so while the United Nations still had supervisory rights over the Trust Territory. With regard to the Belgian instructors currently engaged in training the gendarmerie and the national army of Burundi, there was no need to consider them differently from the Belgian military and paramilitary personnel, since the Government of Burundi had requested the United Nations to provide it with instructors. If the withdrawal was to take place, it should include the Belgian instructors as well, apart from any whom the Government of Burundi might freely express the desire to retain in the country.

11. Finally, he considered that the Administering Authority had kept neither the promises given at the Ostend Conference in January 1961, nor those which it had made in February 1962, regarding the transfer of powers of self-government to the Governments of the two countries, and that it had taken no step to implement General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI), particularly as regards the withdrawal of the Belgian troops before 1 July 1962.

12. Since it expected no change of attitude on the part of the Administering Authority, the Government of Burundi itself accepted responsibility for maintaining order before 1 July 1962. Since all Belgian troops had to be withdrawn by that date, it had formally undertaken to preserve order throughout the territory and it would guarantee the safety of foreigners, both Belgian and others, who were living in the country. Since the military forces were the keystone of that safety, the Government of Burundi felt that it had to do without the services of the Belgian instructors and it demanded their withdrawal as well.

13. Since the delegation of Burundi was demanding the unconditional independence of its country on 1 July 1962, it would be difficult to reconcile a decision of the General Assembly to maintain Belgian troops in the territory after that date with the sovereignty which Burundi would then enjoy. It would also be necessary to determine the legal status of foreign troops in a national territory. In any case, the Government and people of Burundi would not regard themselves as independent until the last Belgian soldier had left the national territory.

14. The Government of Burundi appealed to the United Nations and stressed that the presence of foreign troops in its territory after 1 July 1962 would con-

stitute a violation of its sovereignty for which the international Organization would alone be responsible. Furthermore, if Belgian troops were to be stationed in one of the countries bordering on Burundi, the Government of Burundi would ask for its frontiers to be protected by United Nations troops.

15. The Government of Burundi therefore requested the United Nations to do everything to ensure that the Belgian troops were withdrawn before 1 July 1962, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI), in order that the country could enjoy real independence.

#### GENERAL DEBATE

16. Mr. YOST (United States of America) congratulated the Chairman of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi and her colleagues on the work which they had accomplished, particularly their efforts to assist the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi in finding the bases on which unity could be achieved. He also commended the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi and the two Governments for the economic and administrative agreements which had finally been concluded.

17. His delegation was not in full agreement with all the views and conclusions set forth in the Commission's report (A/5126 and Corr.1 and Add.1), but it recognized the difficulties which the Commission had faced in drawing up the report and it had given full weight to that document in reaching its own conclusions. Those conclusions had also been influenced by the position of the Administering Authority, which had been set forth in great detail and with notable clarity by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium. The precision and honesty with which the Belgium representative had presented the position of his Government early in the debate had helped appreciably to advance the work of the Committee and dispel misunderstandings. Finally, in reaching its position his delegation had taken into account the views expressed by the representatives of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, who had demonstrated great patience in replying to the many difficult questions put to them.

18. One fundamental point was clear to his delegation: Rwanda and Burundi should accede separately to independence and sovereignty on 1 July and the General Assembly should accordingly decide to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement on that date. Such a decision would meet the wishes of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi and would be in conformity with the recommendations of the Administering Authority and of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi.

19. It was obvious that the peoples of Rwanda and Burundi were not going to accede to independence in particularly easy circumstances. For months, perhaps even for years, they would be beset with the difficulties of every kind which newly independent countries faced and some of which were particularly acute in the case of Rwanda and Burundi. Nevertheless, he was convinced that with perseverance, hard work and internal and external co-operation the two peoples would succeed in overcoming those obstacles and establishing a lasting independence to their own satisfaction.

20. Recalling that under the terms of General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI) the United Nations was

to ensure that Ruanda-Urundi acceded to independence in the most favourable conditions, his delegation considered that the Fourth Committee should be frank about the difficulties which Rwanda and Burundi would face once they became independent and that it should avoid taking action at the current stage which would render more difficult the maintenance of economic and political stability in the two countries after independence. If the United Nations attempted to limit the free exercise of the sovereignty of the two Governments after their accession to independence it would be assuming a very grave responsibility. While its legal responsibility would come to an end on 1 July its moral responsibility would continue after that date and it should accordingly assist the two Governments concerned in establishing the best possible conditions for effective and viable independence. The United Nations should grant Rwanda and Burundi real independence and offer them the co-operation which other Member States expected from the Organization.

21. In the view of his delegation Rwanda and Burundi would encounter particularly serious difficulties in three fields: the technical aspects of administration, economic and budgetary viability, and the maintenance of law and order. With regard to the first point, the report (A/5126 and Corr.1) noted the critical shortage of indigenous personnel trained in administration (paras. 275-284). According to the United Nations Commission, a minimum of 350 to 400 foreign technicians or experts would be required in 1962 to keep the administrative services in operation, and to judge by the information given in the report it was to be expected that that requirement would not be noticeably reduced until 1964.

22. The economic problems confronting Rwanda and Burundi, which had also been set forth with clarity in the report, had been brought into even sharper focus by the statement which the Vice-Chairman of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi had made at the 1310th meeting on 13 June. At the 1309th meeting, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, for his part, had drawn the Committee's attention to the Trust Territory's economic and budgetary difficulties. It should be remembered that the budgetary deficit for the current year in each of the two countries amounted to about \$3 million, not counting the cost of the technical assistance now being provided by Belgium, and that an annual deficit of roughly that amount could be anticipated for several years to come. At the 1310th meeting the Vice-Chairman of the United Nations Commission had further indicated that Rwanda and Burundi together would require approximately \$10 million per year for the development of the essential branches of their economies during the coming years, and from all appearances those expenditures could not be covered by funds obtainable from internal sources. If the cost of the technical and other assistance currently provided by Belgium was added to those estimates, it could be anticipated that the two countries would require about \$20 million in foreign aid each year.

23. The maintenance of law and order would hardly be facilitated by the fact that the national forces were at an embryonic stage of development in both Rwanda and Burundi, as noted by the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi. His delegation for its part wondered whether the existing forces would be able to deal with serious disorders should any occur. In Rwanda the situation was further complicated by the existence of political factors which were covered in detail in the report.

24. It should also be realized that those difficulties could not be isolated or resolved separately. Administration, law and order, and economic conditions were interrelated and if law and order were not guaranteed, technicians, whether furnished by Belgium or by the United Nations, would leave the country no matter what the Belgian Government or the United Nations might say or do. Their departure would greatly reduce the effectiveness of external economic assistance, for money was useless in the absence of the technical expertise to put it to work. In seeking to ensure the Trust Territory's accession to independence in the most favourable conditions the General Assembly should take all those factors into account and bear in mind that a proposed solution in any one field would have repercussions in the other fields.

25. Furthermore, the respective responsibilities of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, as also those of the Administering Authority and the United Nations, should be carefully defined.

26. The United Nations was going to grant independence to the Trust Territory on 1 July and after that date all direct responsibility would pass from Belgium and the United Nations to the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, which would be responsible to their people for the administration of the two countries, their economic development and the maintenance of law and order. They would be responsible to the United Nations, however, for the observance of human rights and adherence to the principles of international peace and security.

27. He was sure that the two Governments had carefully weighed the situation before stating that they were capable of discharging their responsibilities. The United Nations was counting on them to do so, but it would not leave them unassisted in that task. They had, in fact, made clear their readiness to accept external assistance. In that connexion the General Assembly should take special note of the willingness of the Belgian Government to furnish extensive aid to Rwanda and Burundi after independence. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated very clearly at the 1307th meeting that his country was prepared to provide Rwanda and Burundi unconditionally with technicians and advisers and to assist them economically and in the maintenance of law and order, not only now but also after the attainment of independence. In doing so Belgium had shown a sympathetic attitude towards the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi and had made several proposals aimed at assuaging the apprehensions of the two Governments and guaranteeing their sovereignty. Furthermore, Belgium was for the moment the only country which had offered assistance to Rwanda and Burundi. It was to be hoped that the United Nations would provide those two countries with generous technical assistance but it could not do so overnight and in any case there was no indication at the present time that the United Nations would be in a position to provide economic and budgetary aid in the amounts which would be required by the two Governments.

28. His delegation was glad that the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi intended to assume responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, which was essential if it was desired that technical assistance experts and technicians should remain in the country, but he hoped that no action would be taken by the United Nations which would deny Rwanda and Burundi any assistance they might seek to obtain in that field. In

that connexion, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had made it clear at the 1312th meeting that his Government would consider retaining troops in Rwanda and Burundi only at the request of one or both of the Governments concerned; there was accordingly no question of maintaining troops in those countries against the will of their Governments. He was surprised, however, to note that some speakers seemed to feel that the presence of foreign troops, even of a single foreign soldier, on the soil of a State was incompatible with that State's independence. It was normal for a State to request the dispatch of foreign military missions to organize or train its armed forces or to instruct them in the use of recently purchased military equipment. Many States Members of the United Nations had taken advantage of such arrangements. Other reciprocal agreements governing the temporary presence of the troops of one country in the territory of another were likewise possible. To deny to Rwanda and Burundi the possibility of concluding such agreements would be to infringe their sovereignty and it was to be hoped that the United Nations would not be guilty of such an infringement. His delegation was of the opinion that the two Governments in question should be left free, in that matter as in others, to conclude such agreements as they deemed appropriate for the training of their armed forces, for the strengthening of order and security and for extending to foreign technicians the necessary guarantees to induce them to remain at their posts.

29. With regard to the role which the United Nations itself could play, he considered that, at the present juncture, it was not in a position to provide the economic, technical or military assistance required by the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, or the assistance which had been offered by the Government of Belgium. What it should do, in his opinion, was to supplement the economic, technical and military assistance provided by Belgium, within existing programmes. In that connexion, the United States did not favour the establishment of a special fund for Rwanda and Burundi, and thought that United Nations commitments for the benefit of the two countries should be financed from the 1962 budget or, if necessary, from the funds set aside for unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for the financial year 1962 under the provisions of resolution 1735 (XVI).

30. In addition, the United Nations could and should, in matters of co-ordination, advise and assist the Governments of Burundi, Rwanda and Belgium, as well as any other Government that wished to conclude aid agreements with them and to establish the conditions of co-operation which would be of the greatest benefit to the peoples of Rwanda and Burundi. Further opportunities for the United Nations to be of use would certainly come to light as time went on, and his delegation believed that the United Nations could best act upon them through a representative or representatives of the Secretary-General in Rwanda and in Burundi. He understood that it was the intention of the Secretary-General to dispatch such representatives to those countries if the two Governments agreed, and the United States Government would look with favour on such an arrangement.

31. The United States Government accordingly considered that the General Assembly should adopt a resolution welcoming the accession of Rwanda and Burundi to independence, proclaiming the termination of the trusteeship on 1 July 1962 and inviting the two new sovereign States to apply for admission to the

United Nations. In the resolution, the General Assembly should recognize that the two countries would need economic and technical assistance, and should encourage the Belgian Government to continue to provide a substantial part of that aid. The United States delegation hoped that the General Assembly would also request the United Nations, within the limitations of existing programmes, funds and resources, to provide economic and other forms of assistance and would invite the Secretary-General to appoint a representative whose functions would be to assist, without prejudice to the sovereign rights of the two Governments, in co-ordinating the economic and other technical assistance extended to the two countries, to advise the Governments of Belgium, Rwanda and Burundi and to perform such other functions as those Governments might request. The resolution should also settle the matter of the organization of local forces and the disposition of Belgian troops in accordance with the wishes of the local Governments; the Belgian troops could only remain in Rwanda or Burundi temporarily, according to the wishes of the Governments concerned and with the approval of the Secretary-General's representative. The resolution would of course have to be drafted in such a way as to avoid any impairment of the sovereignty of Rwanda and Burundi after their independence.

32. If, moreover, the provisions adopted at the current session should prove inadequate, the General Assembly should be prepared to consider the situation again in the light of developments. His delegation considered that United Nations responsibility towards Rwanda and Burundi would not end with the adoption of the resolution he had outlined.

33. He hoped that the recommendations he had submitted would help to expedite the Committee's work. His delegation was prepared to collaborate with other delegations in preparing a resolution which the Committee might consider simultaneously with the general debate. The sooner that was done, the sooner it would be possible to give Rwanda and Burundi the assurance that they would be independent on 1 July and that they would receive the assistance and co-operation of the United Nations and its Members after having achieved total, unconditional and viable independence.

34. Mr. YOMEKPE (Ghana) congratulated the Chairman in her capacity as Chairman of the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, as well as the other members of the Commission, the Secretariat and the experts upon their work, and expressed his satisfaction concerning the co-operation afforded the Commission by the Administering Authority, the local authorities and people of Rwanda and Burundi. After pointing out that it was urgent for the Committee to conclude its debate, he emphasized that political unity and the reconciliation of political factions were closely interrelated. His delegation noted the efforts that had been made by the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi to bring the party in power in Rwanda together with the opposition party, the Union nationale rwandaïse (UNAR), and considered that, while the formation of a national Government of Rwanda should be welcomed, it should have been constituted sooner so that the views of UNAR could have been heard at the Addis Ababa Conference. For some years, the General Assembly had been saying that the formation of a single State was the best solution for the future of Ruanda-Urundi, both economically and from the point of view of national defence and foreign relations. The Ghanaian delegation was therefore

disappointed that the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi had not succeeded in inducing the two countries to agree to a political union, however, loose. In his opinion, the national interest should have taken precedence, and in that connexion he endorsed the UNAR note dated 29 March 1962 (A/5126/Add.1, annex XLIII).

35. Nevertheless, his delegation hoped that the Agreement on Economic Union concluded between the two countries would be the starting point for greater efforts in other fields, and that they would adopt a joint policy for the planning of economic and industrial development. He referred in that regard to paragraph 290 of the report of the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (A/5126 and Corr.1), which, in his view, went beyond the framework of Ruanda-Urundi and represented an appeal by which all African countries should be guided. The failure of the two Governments to achieve political unity should not cause undue concern, and once they understood the responsibilities of independence, it was to be hoped that they would reconsider their decision.

36. With regard to the question of reconciliation and the problem of Rwandese refugees, his delegation noted with satisfaction that the Agreement of 8 February 1962 which had been concluded in New York between the representatives of the Rwandese Government and UNAR (A/C.4/532 and Corr.1) had come into force and that national unity had been achieved. Stressing the importance of that Agreement, he quoted the statement made by Mr. Michel Rwagasana on 17 May 1962 to the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda (A/5126/Add.1, annex XXIX) in which he had said that UNAR would spare no effort in working for the achievement of genuine understanding with the majority, and that, having entered the Government, UNAR no longer constituted an opposition, but had become a partner. He himself shared the hope expressed by the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi in paragraph 362 of its report concerning the consequences of that historic event. The problem of the refugees discussed by the Commission in paragraphs 106 to 135 of its report (A/5126 and Corr.1) was bound up with the problem of the Mwami of Rwanda. He hoped that the latter question could be settled peacefully, particularly through the efforts of President Kayibanda and the Mwami. Since the New York Agreement provided for the repatriation of the refugees, he expressed the hope that UNAR would prevail upon them to return to their homes, and he thought that the Rwandese Government might benefit from the experience and assistance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

37. In his view, the question of maintaining order should not, as Belgium was doing, be exaggerated, although he did not underestimate the seriousness of the Biumba and Runyinya incidents and the danger of an outbreak of hostilities in Rwanda. It would even appear that agents of the Administering Authority, in collusion with certain subversive elements, were trying to undermine the independence and stability of the two States, and particularly of Rwanda. He hoped that the Administering Authority would do its utmost to avert such a situation, that the Secretary-General would keep a close watch and that the Governments of the two States would accept bilateral or multilateral assistance for that purpose. Paragraphs 175 to 205 of the Commission's report dealt with the organization and training of national forces. Rwanda had a National Guard consisting of 1,300 men responsible for internal order. It could be expanded to 3,000 men at an initial

cost of about 450 million Belgian francs. If it was to ensure internal order, it would have to be organized and be given adequate means of transport. In Burundi, the national army was made up of 787 soldiers, including forty-one Belgian officers and non-commissioned officers; it was poorly equipped and had no transport vehicles. The gendarmerie consisted of 825 men. He quoted paragraphs 197 and 198 of the Commission's report and concluded that both in Burundi and Rwanda, the military forces could ensure the maintenance of internal order. He deplored the fact that the Administering Authority had not managed to train a single officer for the national army, and he regarded that as an example of its short-sighted colonial policy and its failures.

38. With regard to the withdrawal of Belgian military and paramilitary forces, he recalled that his delegation had expressed its strong opposition to the presence of foreign troops on the national territory of any sovereign, independent State. The positions of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi on that question were described in paragraphs 214 to 222 of the Commission's report, and he quoted from the letter of the Government of Burundi dated 27 April 1962 (E/5126/Add.1, annex XXXVI), and the letter of the Government of Rwanda dated 14 April 1962 (A/5126/Add.1, annex XXXVII). It was the view of the Government of Ghana that Belgian military and paramilitary troops must leave the soil of Rwanda and Burundi before the day the two countries became independent. Since the obligations and responsibilities of Belgium under the Trusteeship Agreement would cease on the day of independence, the Belgian position would be indefensible as from that date. It was therefore for Belgium to take the necessary practical and technical steps to withdraw its troops in accordance with the wishes of the two Governments.

39. The material on the economic and social problems of the two countries in paragraphs 252 and 285 of the Commission's report was so complete that there was no need for him to review it. He wished to emphasize, however, that both countries would be in great need of economic and technical assistance both from the United Nations and from various countries, and he was gratified that the Administering Authority was prepared, in view of the precarious nature of their economies, to provide them with considerable assistance. Belgian assistance would not, on the other hand, be enough, and the two Governments had requested the United Nations to send experts, including, in the case of Burundi, military instructors. His delegation urged the Secretariat to deal with those requests on an emergency basis, in particular so far as training for the indigenous armies was concerned, in order to prevent the collapse of administration in the two countries. It supported the recommendations of the Commission regarding a Technical Assistance Board presence in the two countries and the efforts that international organizations and specialized agencies should make to meet the requests of the two Governments. It would like to give further study to the question of establishing a special fund for assistance to Rwanda and Burundi. He had listened with the greatest attention to the statement made by the Prime Minister of Burundi at the 1311th meeting and wished to assure him that the Ghanaian delegation would do everything in its power to see that Burundi achieved genuine independence. In connexion with the statement made by the President of the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda at the 1313th meeting he saw no valid

grounds for postponing the date of independence, and he suggested that the Fourth Committee should recommend the General Assembly to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement and declare the two countries independent on 1 July.

#### ORGANIZATION OF WORK

40. The CHAIRMAN announced that the petitioners who had been granted a hearing had arrived in New York and could be heard at the night meeting planned for 19 June. She hoped that the general debate could be closed at the end of the afternoon meeting on 19 June.

41. Mr. OBEREMKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) did not think that such a procedure would be logical, since the statements of the petitioners would have a most important bearing on the substance of the statements to be made by certain delegations. The general debate should therefore not be closed before they were heard. What was more, he did not think that it would be possible to complete the general debate on 19 June. For his own part, he would be ready to speak on 20 June.

42. Mr. KIDWAI (India), supported by Mr. TRAORE (Mali) and Mr. MUFTI (Syria), suggested postponing closure of the general debate to 20 June, in view of the number of speakers still to be heard.

43. Mr. MUFTI (Syria) asked whether the representative of Belgium was prepared, as he had indicated at the 1313th meeting, to provide the Committee with additional information concerning the time-table for the evacuation of Belgian troops from the Territory, since that matter was of some significance for the general debate.

44. Mr. OBEREMKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) supported the request of the representative of Syria, who, at 1313th meeting, had not pressed for a vote on the matter. It would be useless to try to hurry the closure of the general debate so long as Belgium had not observed the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI) concerning the evacuation of Belgian troops.

45. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) pointed out that there was a need for rapid progress in the Committee's work because of the urgency to decide whether or not the Territory should be given independence on 1 July. There were certain physical arrangements that were necessary for a transfer of powers. The general debate could be closed on the morning of 20 June if necessary, unless all the speakers on the list were prepared to speak on 19 June. The Committee could also save some time by starting to hear the petitioners on 18 June, if necessary at the afternoon meeting.

46. With regard to the time-table for the evacuation of Belgian troops, to which the representatives of Syria and the Soviet Union had again referred, he was afraid that there was some misunderstanding, for he did not have any evacuation plan for the period prior to 1 July 1962. If those delegations wished to have a note on the evacuation plan for the period after independence, he was ready to prepare one. If what they desired was a note on a time-table for evacuation before independence, he would not be able to comply, because he felt that such an operation would be technically impossible and politically dangerous.

47. Mr. MUFTI (Syria) recalled that, in order to avoid any controversy on the interpretation of reso-

lution 1743 (XVI) in connexion with the time-table for the evacuation of Belgian troops, at the 1313th meeting he had made a suggestion which did not specify whether the evacuation was to take place before or after independence. Belgium could therefore submit technical data on such a time-table in accordance with its own interpretation of the General Assembly's decision. In that light, he asked when the representative of Belgium could submit his note.

48. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) thanked the representative of Syria for simplifying the problem and stated that his technical note could be ready some time on 18 June, late in the day.

49. Mr. YOMEKPE (Ghana) agreed with the representative of Belgium that the Committee could start to hear the petitioners in the afternoon of 18 June.

50. The CHAIRMAN said that the petitioners wished to inform the Committee that they would not be able to speak before the morning meeting of 19 June. The Committee would therefore hear them at that meeting and then continue with the general debate; she hoped that all the speakers on the list would be ready to speak.

51. Mr. BINDZI (Cameroun) suggested that, in the circumstances, the Committee should voluntarily refrain from asking the petitioners questions so as not to hold up its work unduly.

52. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) observed that the Committee must carefully weigh the decision it was about to take and hence must first provide itself with all the factual data it could obtain. Considerations of time should not be given excessive importance. Provided that its final decision was wise, the General Assembly would have nothing to regret if circumstances compelled it to postpone the date of independence by a few days.

53. Mr. JHA (India) thought that the representative of Cyprus was right. The Committee was as yet not in a position to decide when it could close the general debate. There had to be a full exchange of views. However, it was to be hoped that statements would be as short as possible.

54. Mr. TCHOBANOV (Bulgaria) observed that by the very terms of resolution 1743 (XVI), there were two fateful dates for the Territory: the date of independence, on 1 July, and the date of withdrawal of Belgian troops, which had to be completed before independence. However, the Committee, instead of being concerned with the fact that according to the Belgian representative that withdrawal could only be effected months after independence, seemed to be particularly concerned with the fact that the general debate might take one or two days longer.

55. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) explained that he had never said the departure of Belgian troops would take several months. The plan for the evacuation of Rwanda and Burundi covered a period of two and a half to three months. If only Burundi was to be evacuated, the period would be reduced by half. What was more, he had stated that it might be possible for the process of evacuation to be accelerated and that it would conform to the General Assembly's decisions on the subject.

56. As to the interpretation of resolution 1743 (XVI), there should be either a thorough discussion or none at all.

57. Mr. USHER (Ivory Coast) agreed that there were two fateful dates: 1 July for independence and 30 June for the evacuation of Belgian troops. However, the representative of Belgium took the position that his Government was responsible for the maintenance of order up to the date of termination of trusteeship and that it needed troops for that purpose. If the Committee deferred the date of the termination of trusteeship, the Belgian troops would only have to remain that much longer in the Territory. The Committee, however, could not thus do something that amounted to penalizing the population of the Territory by postponing the date of independence. The Committee should therefore adopt a separate resolution without

delay fixing the date of independence as 1 July 1962, and then discuss as long as necessary the ways and means of evacuating the Belgian troops.

58. Mr. GASSOU (Togo), Vice-Chairman of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, wished to explain to the United States representative that the special emergency fund for Ruanda-Urundi envisaged by the United Nations Commission would not require \$10 million a year but would be limited to \$10 million for the next three years, and that that sum was expected to cover all the emergency expenditure of the two countries taken together.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.