



CONTENTS

	Page
<i>Agenda item 23:</i>	
<i>Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Southern Rhodesia (continued)</i>	
<i>General debate (continued)</i>	91

Chairman: Mr. FAKHREDDINE Mohamed
(Sudan).

AGENDA ITEM 23

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Southern Rhodesia (continued) (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. DIALLO Seydou (Guinea) said that he wished to repeat the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zambia that Mr. Wilson, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, was a racist and that the United Kingdom's hands were stained with the blood of African peoples. In Southern Rhodesia a few white adventurers were poisoning international relations: it was appropriate to ask whether the United Kingdom Government, which was chiefly responsible for that situation, was really determined to put an end to the rebel régime of Ian Smith, which threatened to provoke a racial war, and whether there were any fresh developments which might offer hope for a peaceful solution of the conflict.

2. During 1962 the United Nations had repeatedly called upon the United Kingdom to solve the Southern Rhodesian problem in conformity with the provisions of the Charter and with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). On 11 November 1965, in resolution 2024 (XX), the Assembly had condemned the unilateral declaration of independence and invited the United Kingdom to implement immediately the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council in order to put an end to the rebellion. On 20 November 1965, in resolution 217 (1965), the Security Council had called upon all States to refrain from any action which would assist and encourage the illegal régime and, in particular, to desist from pro-

viding it with arms, equipment and military material, and to impose an embargo on oil and petroleum products. On 6 April 1966, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had pointed out in a consensus (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III, para. 532) that the sanctions policy of the United Kingdom had failed and that the time had come to apply Chapter VII of the Charter. On 9 April 1966, at the United Kingdom's suggestion, the Security Council had adopted resolution 221 (1966) calling upon that Government to prevent the arrival at Beira of vessels carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia. In a resolution adopted on 21 April 1966 (*ibid.*, para. 587), the Special Committee had recommended to the Security Council to consider urgently the application of measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter. At its 1285th meeting on 23 May 1966, the Security Council had rejected a draft resolution^{1/} in which the United Kingdom was called upon to take all necessary measures, including the use of force, to abolish the Smith régime, thereby stressing the responsibility of the great Powers. In a resolution adopted on 31 May 1966 (*ibid.*, para. 1097), the Special Committee had expressed its disapproval of the negotiations taking place between the United Kingdom and the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and had recommended to the Security Council that it request the Government of the United Kingdom to apply Chapter VII of the Charter in order, by the use of force, to prevent any supplies from reaching Southern Rhodesia. In chapter III, section VIII, of its report, the Special Committee had studied the activities of foreign interests in Southern Rhodesia, including those that carried on since the imposition of sanctions. Furthermore, additional information was to be found in a press release issued by the Secretariat in September 1966 and in the latest annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization (A/6301).

3. At various international conferences, such as the first session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), held at Cairo in July 1964, and the second session at Accra in October 1965, the United Kingdom had been warned of a unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia and made responsible for the situation. At the sixth extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU, held at Addis Ababa in December 1965, the Foreign Ministers, confronted by the fait accompli of the unilateral declaration, had unanimously recommended the adoption of immediate and practical measures and the severing

^{1/} Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1966, document S/7285/Add.1.

of relations with the United Kingdom if the latter did not put an end to the rebellion by 15 December 1965 at the latest.

4. In an attempt to allay the indignation of the African peoples and to deceive world opinion, the United Kingdom had convened a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers at Lagos. Several participants had already lost confidence in the United Kingdom Government as a result of Mr. Wilson's manoeuvres, and that lack of confidence had been confirmed during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference held in London in September 1966, at which it had been demonstrated that the socialists in the Government were yielding to the stratagems of the British bankers and financiers.

5. Such was the answer to the hopes and appeals of the United Nations and the African Heads of State and Government. In his savage repression of the African people, Ian Smith could count on the complicity of the United Kingdom, the United States, France and the Lisbon and Pretoria régimes. The United Kingdom, which had hitherto not hesitated to slaughter Africans, was unwilling now to use force against Ian Smith and was negotiating with a rebel régime whose illegality had been confirmed by the High Court of Southern Rhodesia itself, a régime which had dismissed the Queen's representative in the Territory, which was murdering Africans, burning down their villages and subjecting the people to indescribable outrages. Empty words were no longer enough; a people was suffering, and solidarity should be shown by deeds.

6. Guinea had broken off relations with those who were martyring the people of Zimbabwe and had denounced the collusion of the United Kingdom, South Africa and Portugal. It was well aware of the cynicism of British colonial policy; it knew that the United Kingdom did not withdraw from a colony without leaving blood and ruin, as many recent and present examples throughout the world proved. It was pertinent to recall the sad story of British colonialism, for Southern Rhodesia was a colony from which, once more, the United Kingdom was withdrawing, leaving behind racial and tribal hatred and the threat of war. Only the United Nations could prevent the whole of southern Africa being condemned to follow that path.

7. Sanctions could not bring about the overthrow of the Ian Smith régime; the report of the Special Committee on foreign interests in Southern Rhodesia gave the reasons for their failure.

8. The problem was not a constitutional but a racial, economic and colonial one and the United Kingdom, whether it wished to or not, must fight against Ian Smith, in spite of its alliance with other imperialist countries, if it did not wish to lose the benefits that the Commonwealth brought it. In any case, human lives were more important than trade and dividends.

9. The United Kingdom must crush Ian Smith and impose a democratic multiracial régime in Southern Rhodesia. Otherwise that Territory would be another South Africa, fascist, racist and warlike, which in conjunction with the one already in existence would produce dire consequences for the world, as could already be clearly seen from the declarations of

Vorster and Smith and from the repression which had already begun in Southern Rhodesia.

10. He appealed to international solidarity to put an end to the illegal régime, which wished to impose the supremacy of the white minority in Africa as a sequel to colonialism.

11. Mr. PONOMAREV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the problem of Southern Rhodesia concerned the entire human race and especially the African peoples who were fighting against colonialism and racism. There were two alternatives: either the people would achieve freedom and independence or the racist group, supported by the great colonial Powers, would triumph. In resolution 217 (1965) the Security Council had called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to bring the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia to an immediate end, and had called upon all States not to recognize that illegal authority or to entertain any relations with it and to refrain from any action which would assist and encourage it, to desist from providing it with arms, equipment and military material and to place an embargo on oil and petroleum products.

12. Many Governments had listened to that appeal; the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic did not recognize the racist régime of Ian Smith, had no relations with it and gave it no assistance of any kind. Nevertheless, Ian Smith remained in power, with the collusion of the United Kingdom, the United States and other imperialist Powers. The main responsibility lay with the United Kingdom Government. Despite the high-sounding assurances given by Mr. Wilson at the Lagos meeting that the rebel régime would collapse in a matter of weeks, that Government not only had failed to take any effective measures but was now seeking an agreement with the rebels, thus betraying the people of Zimbabwe. The United Kingdom Government had prohibited trade with Southern Rhodesia, but on 4 July 1966 the President of the Board of Trade had stated that the British exports to the Territory in the first five months of 1966 amounted to £1.7 million or \$4.8 million. The British Government alleged that the sanctions had reduced the Rhodesian exports by 60 per cent. The self-styled Minister of Finance of Southern Rhodesia, however, had stated on 21 July 1966 that exports had decreased by only 17 per cent. Financial sanctions had proved to be futile. On 29 August 1966 The Times of London had reported that Rhodesia's foreign reserves were as high then as they had been on 11 November, when independence was declared. Oil was being smuggled in through Mozambique and South Africa. According to the Rand Daily Mail of 18 April 1966, between 140,000 and 160,000 gallons of fuel a day were arriving in Southern Rhodesia from South Africa, i.e., twice as much as Southern Rhodesia needed. That oil was being carried in vehicles belonging to semi-official British firms, such as British Petroleum. The New York Times of 26 June 1966 had reported that Britain's sanctions had cut off supplies of vitamin pills vital to the well-being of Siamese cats, and animal lovers were outraged; moreover, golf balls were scarce. Those were practical results of the so-called British sanctions.

13. The Federal Republic of Germany was making large profits by importing copper, chrome and asbestos from Southern Rhodesia. According to the report of the Special Committee, in January and February 1966 the Federal Republic of Germany had exported goods to the value of DM6.2 million to Southern Rhodesia and had imported goods to the value of DM19.4 million from that Territory. Those transactions were known to the financial circles of the United Kingdom, where it had been said that West German salesmen were lining up in Rhodesia and South Africa to steal what was formerly British trade.

14. Ian Smith was receiving aid from the United Kingdom, South Africa and Portugal, but his activities had a further dimension, for his régime was a puppet of the international monopolies of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, which saw in Africa a source of revenue and had no intention of losing the fabulous profits derived from the exploitation of gold, diamonds, uranium, copper and other minerals. The action of the monopolies was making southern Africa the bastion of colonialism and their control was demonstrated by the report of the Special Committee, which showed that foreign investments formed 80 per cent of the capital in Southern Rhodesia. In that country the racists had set up a police State against the Africans, while Ian Smith's régime allowed the monopolies to grow rich by plundering Southern Rhodesia after the unilateral declaration of independence. The figures were clear: the dividends of the monopolies operating in Rhodesia had increased by 20 to 30 per cent in 1965 compared with 1964. Influential United Kingdom Government circles were protecting the monopolies and in Parliament Mr. Arthur Lewis had revealed that forty-one Ministers and Members of Parliament were directors of firms which had interested in Southern Rhodesia. The same thing was happening in the United States, where Mr. Arthur Dean was a member of the board of directors of the American Metal Climax, which had interests in Southern Rhodesia, and where the association known as the Friends of Rhodesia had been established, which had 13,000 members and was providing financial aid to the racist régime by purchasing bonds issued by the Smith régime. That régime offered its troops for use in the American aggressive war in Viet-Nam, and that offer had evidently not been unwelcome to the Pentagon.

15. Despite the verbal denunciations uttered against Ian Smith it was clear that representatives of the United Kingdom Government were trying hard to conclude a secret agreement with him in order to maintain his prestige and that of the United Kingdom.

16. In view of the facts set forth in the report of the Special Committee, there could be no doubt that under the Smith régime the Africans could expect nothing but poverty, ignorance, disease and racial discrimination. It was a fact that the average wage of a white worker was ten times that of his African equivalent.

17. The petition from Mr. George W. Brind (A/AC.109/PET.439) had given precise facts about the dismally low wages of African workers. African sugar-cane cutters earned only \$15-16 a month and African farm labourers—\$8.5 a month. In 1965 the

Smith régime had earmarked £113 for the education of each white child as against £9.5 for each African child. There were only 200 African pupils in the two highest primary grades.

18. Ian Smith was keeping the African people down by terror and, as a petitioner from Zimbabwe had stated before the Special Committee on 27 May 1966 (A/AC.109/SR.423), there were more than 34,000 prisoners or exiles. New laws were being adopted, which were a blueprint of the repressive laws of South Africa. The Smith régime was increasing its armed forces, and its air force was equipped with combat aircraft of United Kingdom and United States makes. The country was a military and political camp; compulsory military registration had been introduced for all Europeans between the ages of seventeen and sixty, and the period of military training was to be increased. All that was a real threat to peace and security in Africa.

19. Responsibility for that state of affairs rested with the United Kingdom and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Government circles in those countries condemned Ian Smith but kept him in power and tried to dominate southern Africa by means of that racist régime and those of South Africa and Portugal.

20. The Byelorussian SSR, which took a permanent stand against colonialism and imperialism, supported the peoples who were fighting against colonial oppression, and would do so particularly in the case of the Zimbabwe people in their fight for independence. It would support every measure aimed at a rapid solution of the problem which would benefit the Zimbabwe people by removing the racists from power and fixing a date for independence, the holding of elections based on the principle of one man, one vote, and the transfer of power to the indigenous people. The United Nations should vigorously denounce the monopolies which were preventing the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and especially the racists of South Africa, the Portuguese colonialists and all those who rendered the Smith régime assistance and gave it support or who overtly or covertly refused to implement the resolutions of the United Nations.

21. Mr. RAMIN (Israel) noted that almost a year had passed since the unilateral declaration of independence by the minority régime of Ian Smith. During that period the world had witnessed further advances in the great process of liberation of dependent peoples, but Southern Rhodesia had remained one of the dangerous exceptions. The illegal régime was still in power and was pursuing its policy of discrimination and ever greater oppression against the African majority. Information from all available sources, including the valuable report of the Special Committee, indicated that the situation in Southern Rhodesia had steadily deteriorated. The state of emergency declared in November 1965 had been extended several times; a strict censorship had been imposed and the régime had assumed new powers to suspend and appoint chiefs and had enacted other measures of repression.

22. Meanwhile no concrete progress had been made to bring the rebellion to an end and to open the way for genuine independence. It had hoped that resolution 217 (1965), adopted by the Security Council on 20 November 1965, would be an important step towards the achievement of that goal, but despite the fact that many Governments, including his own, had co-operated in the implementation of that resolution, the measures had remained ineffective.

23. Everyone knew his Government's position on the question of Southern Rhodesia. It believed in the principle of equality of all men and in the right to self-determination and independence of all peoples, and rejected racial discrimination. Faithful to that attitude, his Government had, on 12 November 1965, condemned the illegal unilateral declaration of independence and had stated that it would not recognize it and was taking steps to prohibit all relations with Southern Rhodesia, including economic relations, and that it would support such action as the United Nations might take in favour of the people of Southern Rhodesia.

24. His delegation did not underestimate the difficulties the United Kingdom had to face in reaching a solution and was well aware of the efforts it had made in that direction, but the fact remained that, so far, the desired effect had not been achieved. Consequently, it hoped that the United Kingdom would be prepared to act with firmness and persistence.

25. More than 90 per cent of mankind were now living in sovereign States of their own. The elimination of the remaining vestiges of domination and discrimination was one of the most urgent prerequisites of world peace and stability, and it was the duty of the United Nations to persist in its action towards that goal.

26. Mr. EREZ (Turkey) noted that although the General Assembly and the Security Council had adopted a number of resolutions concerning Southern Rhodesia on the basis of the valuable work of the Special Committee, there had been no improvement in the situation; in a country of 4.3 million inhabitants, a small minority had achieved absolute domination over the majority—a situation which was unacceptable in the twentieth century and contrary to fundamental human rights. It was the Committee's duty to protect the rights of the people of Zimbabwe and to promote their independence and sovereignty.

27. The position of his Government was well known: it was opposed to the domination of one segment of the population by another, to the notion of racial superiority and to any régime that did not grant equal rights to its citizens. His Government had therefore condemned the unilateral declaration of independence, had stated that it did not recognize the illegal Smith régime and had closed the office of its honorary consul at Salisbury.

28. The economic sanctions imposed for the purpose of overthrowing Smith had not been effective. The illegal régime was intensifying its oppression, and a number of countries, in defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, had unfortunately allied themselves with Smith and were helping him to withstand the effects of the sanctions. Nor had anything been gained from the talks between

the United Kingdom and the Smith régime, whose latest statements offered no hope of a solution. New means must therefore be found. Africa could not be divided into two parts, one free and the other delivered over to slavery. Turkey would co-operate in United Nations efforts to secure independence for all peoples and races.

29. Mr. ARAVENA (Chile), observing that the urgent problem now under discussion was of very great concern to his delegation, said that the Committee had heard many statements, some of which had perhaps been somewhat strongly worded; however, his delegation understood the feelings of those who had actually suffered injustice and oppression. Some doubt had also been expressed regarding the effectiveness of the United Nations; his delegation wished to state once again that it had full confidence in the Organization and that it was essential for all Member States to use its machinery in seeking the best means of solving the problem.

30. Within a few days, a year would have elapsed since the unilateral declaration of independence. The minority régime of Ian Smith was still in power and continued to oppress the people of Zimbabwe. The General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee had adopted numerous resolutions with which Member States had undertaken to comply, but there had been no results. The economic sanctions imposed by the United Kingdom had been a failure, many Governments had permitted their nationals to trade with the rebel régime, and numerous States which claimed to be co-operating in efforts to overthrow that régime were not doing so. It was therefore essential for the United Nations to deal boldly with the huge problem confronting it. The United Kingdom Government must recognize that, as its Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had pointed out, time was short and that it should take measures with the support of the Commonwealth countries and of all States which sincerely desired the triumph of justice.

31. Specific decisions had been taken by the members of the Commonwealth, and clear-cut resolutions had been adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council. His Government felt that the Security Council should take up the problem once again and recognize that it involved a genuine threat to peace and a flagrant violation of the basic rights of the individual. His delegation hoped that concrete measures would now be taken and considered it essential to apply Chapter VII of the Charter and take the most drastic action possible under Articles 41 and 42. One difficulty stood in the way of such measures and gave rise to some concern, namely, the position of Zambia, which would suffer the consequences of any action that was taken. Zambia was unquestionably prepared to endure those consequences and much more, but his delegation wished to stress that it was incumbent upon the United Nations to take that problem into account and provide special assistance to Zambia.

32. The freedom of Africa was at stake, and the people of Rhodesia could not go on waiting. It was therefore essential that the General Assembly should

at its current session call upon the Security Council to use the powers conferred upon it by the Charter.

33. Mr. EL HADI (Sudan) recalled that when the Fourth Committee had opened the debate on Southern Rhodesia in October 1965 (1518th meeting), the United Kingdom representative had said that the question was within the exclusive competence of his Government. Although the Sudanese delegation shared that view, it did not agree with the United Kingdom Government regarding the nature and scope of its responsibility and regretted that the United Kingdom's approach to the Rhodesian crisis had always been one of abdication of that responsibility.

34. On 1 November 1965, Mr. Wilson had stated in the House of Commons that whatever might happen in Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom would not use force in any circumstances. As was to be expected, that statement had encouraged Ian Smith to declare independence unilaterally on 11 November. The United Kingdom, which one month earlier had denied the competence of the United Nations, had thereupon hurried to the Organization seeking action to ensure that the purported Government of Southern Rhodesia was understood to be illegal and not recognized by any country in the world, in the hope that isolation would bring it to its senses.

35. Five weeks after the unilateral declaration of independence, the United Kingdom had imposed an embargo on shipments of oil to Rhodesia, and twelve weeks after the declaration it had banned all trade with that country.

36. The United Kingdom Government's half-hearted attitude had encouraged Ian Smith's friends, i.e., South Africa and Portugal, to take a firm stand and declare that they would continue to maintain normal friendly relations with Southern Rhodesia. The latter continued to receive oil through South Africa in quantities exceeding its actual needs, and the hopes placed in the application of economic sanctions had been disappointed. It might therefore be asked whether the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, who had predicted in January 1966 that the rebellion would be brought to an end within a matter of weeks, had realized at the time that the large international companies would help Smith and that Salazar and Vorster would give him all possible assistance. That was an objective fact of which everyone was aware, with the possible exception of the United Kingdom Government.

37. Subsequent developments had brought out even more clearly the equivocal attitude of the United Kingdom. Despite the fact that Mr. Wilson had publicly stated that his Government would never negotiate with an illegal régime, he was now holding "talks about talks" with the Smith Government—a step that was flagrantly at variance with his previous statements.

38. All those facts gave rise to grave doubt regarding the attitude of the United Kingdom, which had declared that it was not prepared to take military action—which had been ruled out in advance—but would impose

selective mandatory sanctions if the Smith rebellion did not wither away before the end of the year. It did not seem very likely that the Salisbury authorities would change their stand by then, and his delegation therefore hoped that the United Kingdom representative would soon inform the Committee of the selective sanctions which his Government intended to impose. The Sudanese delegation also hoped that in deciding upon those sanctions consideration would not be given solely to the fact that United Kingdom trade with South Africa amounted to \$400 million a year and that South African gold provided essential support for the pound sterling.

39. The independence of an African Rhodesia would help to consolidate the independence of Malawi, Zambia and Botswana and would make it possible to open another front in the campaign against Portuguese imperialism; moreover, once racial discrimination was eradicated in Rhodesia, the entire edifice of white domination would be rocked to its foundations.

40. His delegation had never regarded the struggle against colonialism and imperialism as a manifestation of racial conflict in which black racism would be opposed to white racism. Africans had always had a friendly attitude towards Europeans. However, they could not maintain that attitude when their freedom and independence were threatened. The Government of the Sudan had therefore formally prohibited trade and other relations with Southern Rhodesia. The African continent had never been so united as in its struggle against colonialism and, specifically, in its attitude towards the Rhodesian rebellion, which was an affront to the dignity of Africans and a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter.

41. If the United Kingdom should come to an accommodation with the Smith régime regarding restoration of the constitutional rights of the British Crown, it would still remain for the United Nations to restore and reaffirm the supreme right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence. The United Kingdom Government had refused to make a categorical declaration to the effect that independence would not be granted to Rhodesia until majority rule was established on the basis of universal suffrage, but the United Nations should solemnly state that the establishment of a democratic régime was a prerequisite for the granting of independence.

42. His delegation felt that comprehensive mandatory sanctions should be applied against Southern Rhodesia under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. If Portugal and South Africa flouted the United Nations resolutions in that regard, a total blockade of South Africa should be imposed. Neither the enforcement nor the timing of the sanctions should be left to the judgement of the United Kingdom Government, which should recognize that the Smith régime could be overthrown only by the use of force and that comprehensive mandatory sanctions must be regarded as a first move in that direction.

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.