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Chairman: Miss Angie BROOKS (Liberia).

AGENDA ITEM 49

Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi: report of the United  
Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (A/5126 and  
Corr.1 and Add.1; A/C.4/516 and Add.1-5, A/C.4/550,  
A/C.4/551) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. DEDEI (Albania) noted with satisfaction that the peoples of Rwanda and Burundi would be independent in a few days. The Committee was taking up the question of Ruanda-Urundi for the last time, and all that remained for it to do was to put into effect the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI) and to dispose of the remaining problems concerning the independence of the Territory.

2. The Committee had a grave responsibility in the matter, since, although the decisive role concerning their future belonged to the peoples of the two countries, much depended on the decisions to be taken by the United Nations, *inter alia*, to ensure the freedom and stability of Rwanda and Burundi, or to leave them in a state of semi-colonialism. In reaching its decision, the United Nations should be guided by the interests of the peoples of Rwanda and Burundi and the wishes expressed by representatives of their Governments.

3. In the view of the Albanian delegation, the Committee's most important task was to terminate the trusteeship and to grant the inhabitants of Ruanda-Urundi unconditional independence, so that they might live in freedom and utilize the natural resources of their countries in their own interests. The inhabitants of Rwanda and Burundi must be in a position, like the rest of the peoples of the world, to form their own social and economic policies. The demands of the representatives of the Governments of those countries in that respect were fully justified, and the delegation of the People's Republic of Albania was determined to support them.

4. General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI) set 1 July 1962 as the date for the accession of Ruanda-Urundi to independence. The Albanian delegation agreed to that date, and its only regret was it had not been possible, at the Addis Ababa Conference, to bring about

political union between Rwanda and Burundi. It was encouraging, however, that at the same Conference an Agreement on Economic Union had been concluded on 19 April 1962 (A/5126/Add.1, annex XVI), and it was to be hoped that that would lead to political union; it was important for the Governments of both countries to make every effort to strengthen the union, since that would at the same time consolidate their independence.

5. With respect to the Belgian troops stationed in the Territory, the Albanian delegation considered that their withdrawal was imperative under resolution 1743 (XVI), operative paragraph 3 (e). The President of the Legislative Assembly of Burundi had confirmed, in his statement at the 1316th meeting, that his Government wanted the troops to leave before Burundi became independent, and he had stated that the country would not celebrate its independence until the last Belgian soldier had left. That attitude was fully justified, since the retention of colonial troops in a country's territory was incompatible with its independence. Besides, history showed that a nation was not independent so long as there were foreign bases or foreign troops in its territory.

6. It was to be regretted that, although the question had already been decided by the General Assembly, the Administering Authority had taken no steps to evacuate its troops from Ruanda-Urundi within the time-limit laid down and had pleaded, as justification, technical and political reasons which were totally invalid. If the Administering Authority had really wanted to withdraw its troops, it would have had time to take appropriate measures, since the General Assembly had reached its decision almost five months previously.

7. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in explanation of his attitude, had expressed concern for the maintenance of order in Rwanda and Burundi, but there were no grounds for misgivings on that point. The representatives of both countries had repeatedly said that they were prepared to assume full responsibility for the maintenance of public order, and thus there was no possibility of a lapse into chaos. Belgium had remained in the Territory solely to safeguard colonialist interests and, in particular, to continue to extract profits from the rich gold and silver mines there. It was well known also that Belgium, at the time of the Congo crisis, had used Ruanda-Urundi as a base to assist the Government of Katanga Province and to protect the interests of colonial monopolies in that province of the Congo.

8. The Albanian delegation deplored the Belgian Government's refusal to carry out a decision of the General Assembly and considered that the United Nations should take steps to compel Belgium to withdraw its troops from Ruanda-Urundi before independence, regardless of what had been said by those who had endeavoured to draw a sombre picture of the situation.

9. Colonial exploitation was to blame for the fact that the economic, social and cultural development of the Territory was not more advanced, a situation for which the Administering Authority was responsible. There was no doubt that the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi would be confronted with great difficulties after independence, but the Albanian delegation was confident that they would overcome them in the best interests of their peoples.

10. The Albanian delegation congratulated the peoples of Rwanda and Burundi on the threshold of independence and wished them full success in their new undertaking.

11. Mr. HASEGANU (Romania) noted that the Committee had reached the last stage of its efforts before Ruanda-Urundi became independent; at that stage it must display, more than ever, its sense of responsibility, sagacity and political foresight. The proclamation of the Territory's independence must be accompanied by the adoption of measures calculated to ensure real independence for the two new States and to give them a solid basis for their economic, political, social and cultural development in conditions of peace and security.

12. The situation in Rwanda and Burundi was marked by economic backwardness, a lack of trained personnel and of funds, and the existence of political and tribal rivalries, all of which evils had been caused by the colonial system. The report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (A/5126 and Corr.1 and Add.1) clearly established the Administering Authority's responsibility in the matter, notably in connexion with the failure to achieve political union between Rwanda and Burundi (A/5126 and Corr.1, paras. 51 and 293) and the part played by colonialist troops in the maintenance of order (para. 345).

13. The problem of economic and political development and that of maintaining order and security in countries which became independent could not, therefore, be solved merely by formally terminating their colonial status; it was necessary also to eliminate colonial domination in all its aspects and, in particular, to put an end to military occupation, which was its most acute expression. Thus, the Romanian delegation considered the total withdrawal of Belgian troops essential if Ruanda-Urundi was to attain full independence.

14. It would be asserted that the question had already been settled by General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI) and by the assurances given to the Committee by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Yet it was precisely the position taken before the Committee by the representative of Belgium which caused serious misgivings to the Romanian delegation. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated that the Belgian Government, for both political and technical reasons, did not intend to withdraw its troops from Ruanda-Urundi before the proclamation of independence, despite the unequivocal provisions of resolution 1743 (XVI) on the question.

15. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said at the 1315th meeting, that the withdrawal of Belgian troops before the Territory was proclaimed independent would be unprecedented in the history of decolonization. It should be recalled that at the 1300th meeting, during the debate on resolution 1743 (XVI), the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had acknowledged that the complete withdrawal of Belgian troops before independence would be the ideal solution,

and that at the 1301st meeting, he had agreed to the text of operative paragraph 3 (e) of that resolution, which provided for the withdrawal of Belgian troops before Ruanda-Urundi became independent. The arguments which were now advanced against the withdrawal of Belgian troops before independence could have been advanced at that time, particularly since the Belgian Government's stand appeared to be one of principle.

16. The Romanian delegation believed that the reason why the Belgian delegation had not advanced those arguments at that time was that it had still hoped to conclude an agreement with the authorities of Rwanda and Burundi for the retention of Belgian troops in the two countries. With that prospect in view, it had felt able to accept the terms of the resolution, which provided both for the possibility of such an agreement and for the evacuation of Belgian troops before independence was proclaimed. Unfortunately, those hopes had been dashed, and Belgium had had to seek other means of justifying the continued presence of its troops in the Trust Territory. In those circumstances, what hope was there that the new time-limit for the evacuation of Belgian troops proposed by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs would be observed?

17. The Belgian delegation had tried to prove that the withdrawal of its troops from Ruanda-Urundi would be followed by chaos and anarchy. That view had also been expressed by the United States Assistant Secretary of State in a statement to a correspondent of the magazine U.S. News and World Report (issue of 4 June 1962). The tendentious nature of that campaign had been revealed by the categorical statements of the representatives of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, who had affirmed before the Committee that their Governments were fully able to maintain domestic order and security after independence.

18. The facts showed that Ruanda-Urundi, like other colonial territories before it, must overcome the resistance of the colonialist circles which were trying to prevent its independence and to perpetuate their domination, in particular by the prolongation of their military occupation. His delegation was therefore one of the many delegations which were asking the General Assembly to take a clear-cut decision in favour of the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Ruanda-Urundi before 1 July 1962 in accordance with the terms of resolution 1743 (XVI).

19. His delegation was convinced that, with the help of the united efforts of all countries sincerely desirous of carrying out the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), it would be possible to ensure for the peoples of Rwanda and Burundi favourable conditions for their independent development in accordance with their aspirations and interests.

20. His delegation hoped that the delegations of Rwanda and Burundi would soon take their places in the General Assembly as the delegations of sovereign States and Members of the United Nations.

21. Mr. VALENCIA (Ecuador) extended his special congratulations to the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi for the excellent work it had done. The Commission's report (A/5126 and Corr.1 and Add.1) was of invaluable assistance to the Fourth Committee. With the facts it contained and the particularly helpful information given by the Governments of Burundi and

Rwanda, the Assembly would be able to take a decision in full knowledge of the facts. His Government had been greatly disappointed that it had not been possible at the Addis Ababa Conference to find a formula for bringing about a political and administrative union between the two countries. The existence of two distinct political entities must therefore be acknowledged in future. The Agreement on Economic Union which had been concluded at the Conference, however, represented a success with which there was reason to be satisfied. In view of the economic and social difficulties which the two countries faced, the implementation of the Agreement on Economic Union would be a most desirable goal.

22. From the point of view of national reconciliation, the situation continued to be better in Burundi than in Rwanda. Despite the fears expressed at the time, the murder of Prince Louis Rwagasore had not led to a series of reprisals and the present Government enjoyed wide respect. It could therefore be said that the problem of national reconciliation did not arise in Burundi. In Rwanda, on the other hand, there still prevailed an atmosphere of suspicion and tension. The New York Agreement of 8 February 1962 (A/C.4/532 and Corr.1) had nevertheless represented an important step towards national reconciliation in Rwanda, and the United Nations Commission, the Government of Rwanda and the opposition party, the Union nationale rwandaise (UNAR), were to be congratulated for the considerable efforts they had made to apply that Agreement, which, if fully carried out, would greatly serve the interests of the people of the country.

23. The problem of the Rwandese refugees should also be settled by their repatriation, their integration in their countries of asylum or in other countries. The efforts of the international organizations, specially in the economic field, would be particularly welcome in that regard.

24. With regard to the question of the former Mwami, it would seem in the present circumstances inadvisable to proceed to a new election. The question should be settled in a spirit of mutual understanding between the Rwandese Government and the former Mwami, and the statements of the latter had done much to facilitate a solution.

25. With regard to the problem of the maintenance of public law and order, which involved the difficult question of the presence of Belgian troops, he recalled that the Governments of the two countries intended to ensure law and order themselves without outside assistance. Some representatives had, however, expressed the view that the two Governments, and in particular the Rwandese Government, would not be able to do so. Yet there remained one essential principle: no one could oblige a sovereign State to agree against its will to the presence of foreign troops on its territory. His Government, for its part, had no doubt that the two Governments would be able to assume the responsibilities implicit in the maintenance of order.

26. No difficulty arose in Burundi over the withdrawal of Belgian troops: the Prime Minister of Burundi had stated at the 1311th meeting that he did not wish Belgian troops to remain in the country after independence and Belgium was prepared to comply with his wishes. The manner of the evacuation could be settled between the two Governments concerned.

27. As far as Rwanda was concerned, there was apparently a difference between the position expressed

by President Kayibanda in his letter of 14 April 1962 (A/5126/Add.1, annex XXXVII) and the position now taken by the delegation of the Rwandese Government. In his letter of 14 April, President Kayibanda had stated that the stationing of foreign troops on the territory of Rwanda after independence would be contrary to the principle of self-determination and that the presence of Belgian troops would therefore be illegal. The Rwandese Government now affirmed, however, that after the country's independence, it would, in regard to the foreign troops, take whatever decision seemed to it most in conformity with the interests of the country. The Committee might consider a position the most satisfactory, but had no right to oblige a Government which was on the threshold of independence to adopt it and the Rwandese Government undoubtedly had good reason for asking that its new position should be respected.

28. Nevertheless, the problem was complicated by the fact that the Burundi Government had stated on 27 April 1962 (A/5126/Add.1, annex XXXVI) that the Agreement on Economic Union could not continue in force if foreign troops remained stationed on the territory of Rwanda after independence. That in fact amounted to a veritable pre-condition. His delegation hoped that the Prime Minister of Burundi would provide the necessary clarification with regard to the final attitude of his Government in that respect, because the success or failure of the economic union might depend upon it.

29. Moreover, Belgium had stated that the Belgian experts who would remain in Rwanda and Burundi and who were greatly needed by the two countries, were asking for guarantees in regard to their personal security, which was only natural, and had added that in its opinion the guarantees which the two Governments were able to offer were inadequate. In the view of the Belgian Government, the presence of its troops, even if only a symbolic force, would constitute a sufficient guarantee so that the Belgian experts would remain in the two countries and the economic activities of Rwanda and Burundi would not come to a standstill.

30. In that regard, paragraph 375 of the report (A/5126 and Corr.1) was deserving of attention. The question had already been the subject of a special study carried out by the two Governments concerned, which were hoping that a satisfactory solution would be found after independence.

31. His delegation had taken special note of the statement made by the Belgian representative at the 1309th meeting, when he said that his country would continue to provide Rwanda and Burundi with economic and technical assistance in all fields and that such assistance would in no way be linked to the presence of Belgian troops in the two countries.

32. In view of all the above problems, the United Nations should endeavour to find the means of creating the most favourable conditions for Rwanda and Burundi to achieve their independence with all possible guarantees for their future. It was therefore its duty to indicate to the two Governments the dangers that threatened them and the ways in which it thought they could best overcome their difficulties.

33. The United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi had recommended in paragraph 285 of its report the creation of a special fund for assistance to Rwanda and Burundi. That was a proposal which his delegation fully supported, on the understanding that

the fund would be made up with the help of voluntary contributions from various Governments. His delegation also supported the other proposals made in paragraph 285.

34. With regard to the date of independence, he thought that it should be fixed for 1 July 1962 and could not be delayed. In that regard, his delegation entirely endorsed the recommendations made in paragraphs 390 and 391 of the Commission's report.

35. In view of the proximity of the date of independence, his delegation thought it necessary that the Committee should urge the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi to devote all due attention to the problems they would have to face in the near future and to take account of the views expressed by the majority of the members of the Committee during the consideration of the problem of the future of Ruanda-Urundi in order to avoid the dangers which might arise.

36. At the same time, his delegation wished to ask the Belgian Government to take account of the aspirations of the peoples and the Governments of the two countries. Belgium had stated that it would continue to provide Rwanda and Burundi with technical and economic assistance without conditions of any kind; that was an encouraging offer. He had no doubt that the Belgian Government would carry out that promise in all good faith and in a spirit of understanding and international solidarity.

37. Lastly, his delegation appealed to the technical bodies of the United Nations to aid the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi to the extent of their possibilities in solving the problems the latter would have to meet.

38. On the eve of the independence of Rwanda and Burundi, he wished, on behalf of his delegation, to congratulate the peoples of the two countries on the struggle they had waged for their independence, and extended to them his best wishes for their future prosperity.

39. Mr. JARGALSAIKHAN (Mongolia) thought it was high time that a permanent solution was found for the question of Ruanda-Urundi, in accordance with the aspirations of the Territory's peoples. The report of the United Nations Commission and the statements by the representatives of Rwanda and Burundi showed that the peoples and Governments concerned were perfectly capable of self-government.

40. The presence of foreign troops in a country's territory against the wish of the people constituted a serious threat, not only to the country's independence but also to peace and security in the region. The position of the Administering Authority, which intended to maintain its troops in the Territory after independence, was contrary to the principle of respect for the sovereignty of States and to the spirit of the Charter. That position was certainly in no way motivated by a desire for the maintenance of order. As the United Nations Commission had rightly pointed out in its report (A/5126 and Corr.1, para. 351), the continuing presence of the Belgian troops could become a cause of tension and disorder. In fact, it was a new manoeuvre by the colonialists who were loath to abandon their former possessions.

41. Belgium was even threatening to withdraw its experts, thinking thus to paralyse normal life in the country. However, experience showed that the peoples liberated from the colonial yoke always found the

strength and the means to defend their freedom and to lead their country along the road of progress. They even obtained results which the colonial Powers had not, despite all the resources and technical means at their disposal, managed to achieve. Rwanda and Burundi would be no exception to the rule. The Mongolian People's Republic hoped that the General Assembly would without delay decide to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement, grant complete independence to Rwanda and Burundi on 1 July 1962, ensure the final withdrawal of the Belgian troops before the proclamation of independence and grant assistance to those countries according to their requests and needs, without prejudice to their sovereign rights.

42. Mr. JHA (India) paid a tribute to the Chairman and members of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi for the report before the Committee. It was regrettable that all the objectives of resolution 1743 (XVI) had not been attained, but at least the report gave a remarkable picture of the situation and would be of great help in the finding of a solution.

43. Generally, the Trust Territories' accession to independence was accomplished smoothly and the General Assembly had only to give its sanction. Unfortunately, that was not so in the case of Ruanda-Urundi, because of various factors, in particular the differences of view between Rwanda and Burundi. The United Nations and the Administering Authority must share the responsibility for having failed to achieve unity between the two countries. There had been serious disturbances in Rwanda because of the hostility between the two principal elements in the population. There were 135,000 refugees in Tanganyika, Uganda, the Kivu province of the Congo (Leopoldville), and Burundi. The resulting bitterness was still very much in evidence. A sizable contingent of Belgian troops—900 men—remained in the two countries, and most members of the Committee felt that the size of the Territory did not justify the presence of those troops on the eve of independence. Finally, there were doubts about the economic viability of the Territory in existing world conditions and about its ability to face its international responsibilities and its duties in connexion with the advancement and well-being of its population. As the report showed, the annual budget deficit amounted to \$6 million and, in order to ensure the development of the Territory, \$10 million would continue to be needed for a number of years.

44. In connexion with the question of the unity of Rwanda and Burundi, he recalled General Assembly resolutions 1579 (XV), 1605 (XV) and 1743 (XVI) which had expressed the belief, based on extremely pertinent considerations, that the Trust Territory should accede to independence in the form of a single entity. Operative paragraph 4 of resolution 1743 (XVI) had requested the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi to convene a conference at Addis Ababa for that purpose. Like the Commission, the Indian delegation had regretted the failure of the conference from a political view-point, but it heartily welcomed the agreement reached concerning an economic union. While he was still convinced that Ruanda-Urundi should try to achieve political unity, he had to admit that, for the time being, there would be no such unity. Since the large majority of the African States had reached the same conclusion, the Indian delegation could only accept the fact that two States, instead of one, would gain independence after the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement.

45. So far as the internal situation was concerned, he expressed the hope that calm would again reign once the question of the former Mwami of Rwanda had been settled, as recommended in General Assembly resolution 1744 (XVI). If the different elements of the population could be reconciled and live in harmony, it could be expected that Rwanda would have a promising future. As shown by paragraph 3 (a) of resolution 1743 (XVI), the United Nations attached considerable importance to the reconciliation of the various political factions. The report of the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi clearly showed that the question was not solved and that there were reasons to fear new disturbances. He hoped that the leaders would work to achieve such a reconciliation, and noted with satisfaction paragraph 361 of the Commission's report. He accepted the assurances given by the representatives of the Government of Rwanda concerning their ability to ensure the maintenance of order. As the Commission's report stated, the maintenance of order ultimately depended on the people's good will and desire to co-operate in peace and harmony. He thought it could therefore be concluded that, if conditions were favourable, the Government of Rwanda would be in a position to maintain internal order.

46. Regarding the presence of the Belgian forces, he could not help thinking that, when it stated that its troops were necessary for the maintenance of order, Belgium was considerably exaggerating the matter. If it was true that the integrity of the country would depend on the troops' retention, it would be a poor sort of independence that was gained. The question should be judged in the light of the principle that the Territory should be completely free of foreign troops once it had become independent. He recalled that paragraph 3 (e) of resolution 1743 (XVI) had stipulated that arrangements would be made for the withdrawal of Belgian forces before independence, with the exception of such personnel whose retention, in the view of the Commission, might be considered necessary for training purposes. The report of the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi did not go into details on that subject but the Indian delegation thought that the majority of the Belgian troops should have been evacuated before 1 July. However, out of 1,400 men, 900 still remained.

47. The General Assembly therefore, while not departing from the principles of the illegality of the presence of foreign troops after independence, should take into account the fact that those troops were still present. Since the representative of Belgium had stated at the 1315th meeting that, for technical reasons and even with the best will, the troops could not be withdrawn before 1 July, Belgium should be asked to withdraw as many troops as possible before that date and then to place the evacuation under United Nations control. The Indian delegation thought that the responsibility and obligation of solving that problem should not be left to the two Governments after their independence had been proclaimed. With the co-operation of Belgium, the operation could be speedily effected and thus the presence of the troops would in no way threaten the independence of the two new States. As the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said at the 1313th meeting, the troops would have no role to play after independence; and he had even agreed that they should be confined to barracks and that their weapons should be placed in store. The Indian delegation thought that such a solution would have the advantage of being practical and not sacrificing the

principles at stake. If, after their independence, the new States wanted to use the services of foreign forces, that would no longer concern the United Nations.

48. On the subject of the economic situation, he welcomed the Agreement on Economic Union concluded at Addis Ababa, and hoped that it would be implemented and would lead to a closer union. The two countries would have vast needs and would be bound to count on technical assistance from Belgium. He was glad that Belgium was ready to give such aid without linking the question to that of the presence of Belgian troops, despite its fears about the possible effect on the Belgian technicians if the troops were evacuated too rapidly without guarantees of safety. He therefore hoped that the two Governments would ensure the safety of the Belgian technicians, who would make it possible to train the administrative and technical cadres which the two countries so greatly needed. He supported the recommendation of the Commission for assistance to Rwanda and Burundi and hoped that due account would be taken of the two States' requests for technical assistance. In that connexion, the Secretary-General should perhaps be requested to make an inquiry and submit recommendations to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session.

49. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the two States would be able to play their full role in the international community—although he regretted that it had not been possible to achieve their unity, since Africa was already divided into too many entities. He hoped that the two States would soon be admitted to membership of the United Nations.

50. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) pointed out that as he was speaking for the last time on the general situation in Ruanda-Urundi before a draft resolution would be submitted, the statement which he was about to make should be considered of exceptional significance.

51. He was grateful to the many delegations that had clearly done their best to consider the problem with the utmost objectivity and sense of responsibility; in particular, he wished to mention the statement made by the representative of the Congo (Leopoldville) at the 1320th meeting, which clearly marked a reconciliation between Belgium and the Congo and gave evidence of considerable wisdom.

52. On the other hand, he had had to exercise considerable self-control in order to hear out the statements of the twelve representatives of the Communist bloc without protesting. It was an ordeal for the representative of a small country to listen to such an accumulation of falsehoods and imputations of bad faith on the part of the representative of a great country such as the Soviet Union. The great Powers belonging to the free world might find it possible to remain silent under such circumstances, but a small country could hardly do so. He himself was a determined advocate of peaceful coexistence, but the latter could only be achieved with a minimum of confidence, good faith and mutual respect. Unfortunately, the oft-repeated allegations of the Communist bloc might make some impression in certain quarters. The line taken by the representatives of that bloc was that Ruanda-Urundi was a rich country which was being oppressed by Belgium and that Belgium wished to keep its troops there in order to go on battering on the country. Those who took that line either had not read the report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi and were acting in ignorance of

the facts, or else they had read the report and were acting in bad faith. With regard to the suggestion that Ruanda-Urundi was a rich country, he would refer to that report (A/5126 and Corr.1) and in particular to paragraph 253. The conclusion drawn by the Commission in paragraph 254 was that Ruanda-Urundi was a poor and over-populated country. The proponents of the Communist line had either been insincere in congratulating the United Nations Commission on its work, or else they should take the report duly into account. Only persons who knew nothing whatsoever about the situation in Ruanda-Urundi could possibly maintain that it was a rich country which a colonialist Power could profitably exploit.

53. In order to show the real significance of Belgium's so-called attempts to exploit the Territory, he quoted paragraphs 260, 262 and 267 of the Commission's report, which showed how the Territory's chronic and increasing deficit had regularly been covered by Belgium and how that country had advanced a total of no less than \$93 million between 1950 and 1960. He wondered how many under-developed countries would have been happy to be able to count on assistance such as that provided by Belgium. Paragraphs 264 to 266 of the report recounted the spectacular progress that had been made, thanks to Belgium, in the Territory's economic development. He would like to be certain that all the Communist countries could provide equally flattering reports on their own economic development.

54. Of course, things were far from perfect, and the future would be fraught with difficulty. The United Nations Commission itself recognized that failing extensive aid from abroad, it was difficult to see how the Territory could make ends meet. Did anyone think that Belgium wished to hold on to the Territory, perhaps, for the purpose of solving such grave problems? Yet, if assistance was to be forthcoming for Ruanda-Urundi from any quarter, that quarter would be not Albania, or Yugoslavia, or Czechoslovakia, or even perhaps the Soviet Union, but Belgium itself. The majority of the members of the Committee recognized the extensiveness of the efforts that Belgium had made to date in the Territory.

55. In the last few days, his state of discouragement and indignation had reached such a pitch that he had been on the brink of giving up in despair, as he could not accept to be subjected to a certain policy and then be treated as the scapegoat when that policy only produced unfortunate results. Whenever Belgium wished to go on doing something in a former colonial Territory, it was accused of neo-colonialism, and whenever it wished to quit the Territory, it was accused of shirking its responsibilities. At the 1319th meeting the representative of Cameroun had shown very clearly that such a policy tended to establish new hotbeds of disorder favourable to the unleashing of the world revolution that certain quarters were still seeking to foment.

56. The most difficult question, one indeed in which he found himself in contradiction with certain delegations which he respected and with which he was anxious to remain on friendly terms, was that relating to the maintenance of Belgian troops in the Territory and to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI). It was particularly irksome to find oneself accused of deliberately refusing to apply a resolution of the United Nations, when the accusation stemmed from Member States that only complied with the Organization's decisions when it suited their pur-

poses. He was not receptive to such sermons on international probity; however, he owed it to himself to explain his position.

57. At the 1319th meeting, the representative of the Ivory Coast had had the courage to point out that resolution 1743 (XVI) was not devoid of a measure of ambiguity. There was an overriding principle, to which it was necessary to revert and which was stated in article 4 of the Trusteeship Agreement: "The Administering Authority shall ensure the maintenance of peace and order as well as the good government and defence of the Territory." That principle had never been contested, and resolution 1743 (XVI) could not be interpreted without reference to that fundamental text. He had never felt that by voting for resolution 1743 (XVI), he had been waiving article 4 of the Trusteeship Agreement. Moreover, the said resolution 1743 (XVI) did not state that the two countries, or the United Nations, would be responsible for maintaining order. He could consequently conclude with certainty that that resolution in no wise modified the fundamental principle that the responsibility for maintaining order fell upon Belgium.

58. In February 1962, when that resolution had been submitted, conflicting arguments had been heard, and even then some representatives had asked Belgium to withdraw its troops immediately, before the date of independence. He had opposed that argument. The debate had resulted in a compromise, to which the provisions of operative paragraph 3 (e) of the resolution bore witness. Paragraph 3 (e) should be read as a whole, without considering its provisions in isolation from one another. It had been provided that Belgian troops were to be withdrawn before independence, and Belgium had been in agreement on that point, with the reservation that other effective means of preserving order should be found and implemented. He had never supposed for a moment that Belgium should withdraw its troops before such means had been found. There had therefore been a need for measures that would have had to be carried out as a whole, but it had not been possible to implement such an over-all policy. It would have been wrong, illegal and politically dangerous to have carried out only a part of that policy, without replacing the Belgian troops by other bodies responsible for maintaining order. He considered, as did the other members of the Commission, that it was inadmissible, in principle, for foreign troops to be stationed on the territory of an independent Government, unless that Government expressly requested their presence; such a case had occurred for example in Hungary. It was possible, and consequently also accepted, as a matter of principle, that independent Governments might enter into arrangements of that kind without their sovereignty being called into question by the United Nations.

59. The situation as between Rwanda and Burundi differed. It was true that in Burundi order reigned and that Belgium would have been able to withdraw its troops if the other conditions set forth in operative paragraph 3 (e) of General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI) had been carried out. In Rwanda, on the other hand, there had been disturbances. He would not embark on yet another rebuttal of the argument, which had again been put forward at the current meeting, that those disturbances might have been specifically ascribable to the presence of Belgian troops. He himself was convinced that the fact that the disturbances had not been more numerous was very probably due to the presence of the troops. If Belgium had decided

to withdraw its troops during that uneasy period, not a single Belgian technician would have stayed behind. It was easy to allege from a distant vantage-point that such panic would have been unjustified. However, he would have had neither the political nor the moral right to order a single one of his citizens to remain behind in the event that the situation had become serious. It had consequently been impossible for him to withdraw his troops from Rwanda, and at the time he had not considered that Burundi should be treated differently during the period before independence.

60. Some members of the Committee continued to maintain even now that the Belgian troops should be withdrawn from the Territory before independence. In essence, that position was ridiculous, for Belgium was prepared to begin withdrawing its troops from Burundi on 2 July if necessary, and the General Assembly's resolution could scarcely be adopted before 27 or 28 June at the earliest.

61. If some were making that matter a question of principle, he could only reply that it was a new principle and that in doing so that were creating a precedent. When he had said that the United Nations had never called upon a former colonial Power to withdraw its troops from a Territory acceding to independence before the date of independence (1315th meeting), the representative of the Soviet Union had interpreted that statement to suit his own convenience. It was not the speaker's understanding that the question had been treated as a matter of fundamental principle.

62. If he had objected to any decision whatsoever calling for the withdrawal of the troops after independence, the Committee might justifiably have been alarmed. The Government of Burundi had, however, made itself very clear. Its position was a disappointment to his hopes, but he bowed to it without protest. In Rwanda the situation was more complex. Some had tried to shake the judicial position of the representatives of Rwanda, but it was a valid one. The Rwandese Government held that until the trusteeship was terminated, the question of the withdrawal of Belgian troops concerned only Belgium and the United Nations. After independence, on the other hand, it wanted full power to settle that question for itself, and it knew that at that date there would be Belgian troops in the Territory. If an independent Rwanda wanted to keep Belgian troops on its soil, that would be perfectly legal. He did not yet know what Rwanda would ask of him. Had it so desired, Rwanda could have called for the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops, as Burundi had done, and that would at least have had the merit of being very clear. However that might be, for Belgium the situation was the same with regard to both Rwanda and Burundi; if the Rwandese Government called for the departure of Belgian troops on 2 July, those troops would be withdrawn from Rwanda just as quickly as from Burundi.

63. The question whether the withdrawal of Belgian troops would take four or seven weeks was no longer a question of principle; it was rather a question of technical arrangements. All he asked of the United Nations was that it should refrain from representing that withdrawal either as a flight or as a sanction. From the psychological standpoint it would be disastrous for the future relations of Belgium and of those newly independent countries if the first step taken there was one showing a lack of trust in Belgium.

64. In conclusion, he wished to make clear to the Committee the cause of his anxiety. Whenever he

said that the situation was serious and unfavourable, some delegations claimed that that was simply black-mail. Yet there was good reason to feel anxious when contemplating the task which the United Nations wished to entrust to Belgium. All Member States had surely taken note of the offer made by Belgium to assist the newly independent countries and all Member States knew that only Belgium could do so. They all knew how serious was the Territory's financial situation, and they knew that if assistance from Belgium suddenly came to an end, the very life of the new countries would be seriously endangered. He therefore deeply regretted that he had not succeeded in convincing the Committee. He had offered full and faithful co-operation between the two Governments, Belgium and the United Nations. Indeed, a certain sector of public opinion in Belgium considered that he had been weak and had gone much too far. For his own part, however, he was convinced that the success of the independence of Ruanda-Urundi depended on that threefold co-operation, for the help which could be given by Belgium alone would not suffice. He had accordingly turned to the United Nations with the offer of a military, economic and political programme.

65. Belgium had put its troops either at the disposal of the Governments of the two countries or under the command of the United Nations, and in any case it had insisted on United Nations supervision so that no one could accuse Belgium of trying to interfere in the domestic affairs of the two countries. He would not try to reply to those who had accused Belgium of wishing to foment a coup d'état in Burundi after the attainment of independence—a course of action that would be senseless. He would merely say that he had hoped that the idea of co-operation outlined by him would find a favourable response, for he thought that a transitional arrangement would be in the interests of the two new countries. He had gone so far as to suggest a period of three months. No one, however, had wanted to consider even the possibility of such an arrangement, and in replying to it speakers had simply made contradictory statements, saying that after all Burundi would be free to recall the troops after independence if it wished to do so.

66. He had also hoped to make Ruanda-Urundi's economic situation better understood. No one, of course, had denied the gravity of that situation, but if it was to be corrected, it was not enough to reject the idea of the special fund proposed by the United Nations Commission and simply to call upon the existing technical assistance bodies to deal with the matter. That would not be sufficient unless it was understood that Belgium's support would be forthcoming and that Belgium would offer effective co-operation, which in the immediate future would take the form of covering the budgetary deficit of the next six months.

67. He would accordingly find it difficult to vote in favour of a draft resolution limited to expressing hopes as far as economic matters were concerned. In the present context the responsibility would lie with all those who voted for such a text.

68. He would therefore seem to have failed, possibly because of the charges of colonialism levelled against him. Yet no intelligent person in Europe still believed in colonialism or neo-colonialism. Everyone knew that the time had come to establish a different kind of human relationship with the States of Africa and Asia and subsequently, on a footing of equality, extensive economic relations. First, however, it would obviously

be necessary to dissipate prejudices which were still strong and which were being nurtured by some, and to which the mistakes still to be made could be attributed. There was, however, only a small margin between a good solution and a bad one. He hoped that at that late stage some of his listeners had been convinced by his sincerity and his offer of co-operation and that his final appeal would be heeded by the sponsors of the draft resolution which was to determine the fate of Ruanda-Urundi.

69. Mr. OBEREMKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), speaking on a point of order, said that he could not let certain allegations made by the Belgian representative pass without an immediate reply. The representative of Belgium had attacked the position taken by the socialist countries, and he had adopted a violent tone in order to conceal the fact that he had no valid arguments. The emotion and heat with which he had spoken seemed in fact to be superficial.

70. The representative of Belgium denied that Ruanda-Urundi was a rich country and accused the representatives of the socialist countries of not knowing the facts. The delegation of the Soviet Union knew very well that the Territory was at present in a state of utter poverty, but the representatives of the Territory had themselves stated in the Trusteeship Council that the country had enormous potentialities and that its resources had simply not been adequately utilized or investigated. It could not be claimed that the Congo was poor, and yet when the Belgians had left that colony, the people had certainly not been rich.

71. The representative of Belgium spoke of Ruanda-Urundi's chronic deficit and of the fact that the Territory could not find the revenue to cover its expenditure, but the reports sent by the Administering Authority to the Trusteeship Council showed exactly where the deficit came from and how it was met. The actual cost of printing those reports to the Trusteeship Council, the salaries of Belgian officials and even the cost of maintaining European cemeteries in the Territory were included in the Territory's budget. None other than a Belgian professor had shown that Belgium had not spent one franc in order to meet the Territory's budget.

72. Let the Territory be given its independence, and in five or ten years it would be seen how capable it was of developing its resources. The Administering Authority drew attention to the enormous amount of capital it had invested in order to develop the Territory and had gone so far as to say that the rate of development there had been higher than that in the socialist countries. That was somewhat immoderate, and in any case there was a very clear contradiction between the two arguments put forward by the Administering Authority, which said, on the one hand, that the country was poor and, on the other hand, that it had developed at a greater rate than the socialist countries.

73. The representative of the Administering Authority had urged the argument that colonialism was defunct. No doubt he had forgotten Nyasaland, Angola, Mozambique, Northern Rhodesia and the Union minière of the Haut Katanga. Not content with that, the Administering Authority had protested the purity and generosity of its intentions. Without going very far back into history, one could mention certain facts which were

not to Belgium's credit: it had refused to help republican Spain and to recognize the Emperor of Ethiopia; more recently, there had been the Congo affair; more recently still, petitioners from Ruanda-Urundi had shown that Belgium had not even fully respected the Brussels Protocols signed in December 1961 (A/C.4/517 and Corr.1) and had not given full internal self-government to Rwanda and Burundi. Those were facts. Belgium had not taken any steps to carry out General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI). That was also a fact, and it was recognized in the report of the United Nations Commission.

74. When the representatives of Rwanda and Burundi said that they would regard the presence of Belgian troops in their territory after independence as illegal, the representative of Belgium gave them an ultimatum, saying that in that case no Belgian technicians would remain there. Thus it was not, as he claimed, for technical reasons that Belgium stubbornly refused to evacuate its troops, but rather for political reasons. The Administering Authority's reasoning was therefore transparent: the country was poor, it needed technical assistance—that was to say, Belgian assistance—but since that was the case, Belgian troops must be allowed to remain in order to ensure the safety of the Belgian technicians who stayed. The Constitution of Burundi, however, was extremely clear on that point, stating that the presence of foreign troops on Burundi territory would be unacceptable after independence. Belgium's ultimatum must therefore be rejected, and the Committee must insist that all Belgian troops should be withdrawn before 1 July 1962.

75. The mere fact that Belgium had not complied with General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI) should arouse the suspicions of those delegations which had so far trusted in Belgium's good faith. It was a fact, after all, that there were still 900 Belgian soldiers in the Territory. The representative of Belgium was an excellent speaker, but he was defending a bad cause.

76. Mr. JHA (India) noted that the representative of Belgium, without specifically mentioning the statement made by Mr. Jha during the meeting, had said that it was evil to insinuate that Belgian troops could have been responsible for the massacres which had occurred in Rwanda. He himself wished to explain that he had merely put forward certain views on the basis of a fact recognized by the United Nations Commission itself (A/5126 and Corr.1, para. 346), which was that the most bloodshed had occurred in Rwanda at a time when the security forces had been at their greatest strength, saying that there seemed to be no relation between the numerical size of the security forces in a particular country and the extent to which law and order was maintained. The maintenance of law and order depended on other things, and above all on the citizens themselves. In that respect, he fully endorsed the United Nations Commission's comments (A/5126 and Corr.1, para. 347).

77. The CHAIRMAN appealed to the Committee to practise what it preached, in view of the presence of the representatives of Rwanda and Burundi, and to conduct its debates in a more amicable spirit.

The meeting rose at 2.5 p.m.