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Chairman: Mr. Adnan M. PACHACHI (Iraq).

AGENDA ITEM 43

Question of South West Africa (continued):

- (a) Report of the Committee on South West Africa (A/4464; A/C.4/L.652/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2, A/C.4/L.653/Rev.2, A/C.4/L.655);
- (b) Report on negotiations with the Government of the Union of South Africa in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1360 (XIV)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/4464, ANNEX I; A/C.4/L.652/REV.1 AND ADD.1 AND 2, A/C.4/L.653/REV.2, A/C.4/L.655) (continued)

1. Mr. ANSTENSEN (Canada) explained his delegation's vote on the draft resolutions put to the vote at the 1076th meeting.
2. The Canadian delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.652/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2 because it agreed with the operative paragraphs in which the General Assembly noted that Ethiopia and Liberia had instituted proceedings in the International Court of Justice^{1/} and commended them upon their initiative. The Canadian delegation had, however, certain reservations about the wording of other parts of the resolution. A firm attitude was justified in a matter with which the United Nations had been concerned for so long and it was clearly understood that the General Assembly was dealing with the political, and not the legal aspects. Nevertheless, the Canadian dele-

^{1/} I.C.J., *South-West Africa Case, Application instituting proceedings* (1960 General List, No. 47).

gation would have preferred the original version of the draft resolution (A/C.4/L.652). Operative paragraph 1 of the revised version must not be understood as derogating in any way from the authority of the International Court of Justice. The words "cannot be settled", in operative paragraph 2, seemed much too categorical. He agreed with the Indian representative that the paragraph should not mean that the United Nations closed the door on all further negotiations with the Union of South Africa. The Canadian delegation thought that, generally speaking, the General Assembly should avoid considering questions which had been explicitly laid before the International Court of Justice but that that did not prevent it from considering the whole question of South West Africa, and particularly the supervisory functions which the United Nations had inherited. It was important that the Assembly should not be able to place undue pressure on the International Court of Justice, either by its debates or by its resolutions, in an issue which was directly before the Court and the outcome of which should not be prejudged in a political forum for reasons which were not juridical.

3. The Canadian delegation had abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.4/L.653/Rev.2. It was sorry that the Committee had not been willing to go into the serious arguments that the Irish representative had put forward at the 1073rd meeting. As the Indian representative had pointed out at the 1076th meeting, the Mandate continued to exist, as did all the obligations which flowed from it. The proceedings instituted by the Ethiopian and Liberian Governments were based on that assumption. The Irish representative, too, had based his reservations on that principle when he had said that, as long as the matter was before the Court, the United Nations should respect the terms of the Mandate and should be careful not to take any action which was not in conformity with the Mandate or with the existing relations between the Mandatory Power and the United Nations. He agreed with the Irish representative that, if the terms of the Mandate were to be observed, the degree of supervision to be exercised by the General Assembly should not exceed that which had applied under the League of Nations.

4. The same draft resolution recognized that the Territory of South West Africa had an inalienable right to independence. The Canadian delegation interpreted that to mean that only the people of South West Africa could decide their own future and that, on the basis of the principles laid down by the Special Committee of Six on the Transmission of Information under Article 73 e of the Charter (A/4526, sect. V, part B), they could decide in favour of complete independence, free association with an independent State or integration with an independent State.

5. Lastly, he would like to be allowed to speak about the draft resolution submitted by Mexico and Venezuela (A/C.4/L.660), which the sponsors had later withdrawn. In the first place, it seemed obvious that

delegations would have had to consult their Governments before they could make any useful statement. In the second place, it seemed equally obvious that the United Kingdom's racial policy in Africa was clearly designed to bring about a rapid and methodical advance towards the objectives laid down in the Charter. All the countries of the Commonwealth were proud to belong to a multiracial association.

6. Mr. CUEVAS CANCINO (Mexico) said that he did not see why the Canadian representative, in explaining his vote, should speak of a draft resolution which had not been put to the vote.

7. Mr. ANSTENSEN (Canada) pointed out that he had asked permission to make some remarks about a draft resolution which the Canadian delegation considered to be so closely related in substance to all the other draft resolutions that his delegation could not have made its position completely clear without touching upon it.

8. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that, before it completed its consideration of the question of South West Africa, it had to elect the members of the Committee on South West Africa, to adopt part of its report to the General Assembly, and to consider the preliminary report to be prepared by the Committee on South West Africa, in accordance with operative paragraph 6 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.653/Rev.2, after that resolution had been adopted by the General Assembly.

9. Mr. KENNEDY (Ireland) said that the Minister of External Affairs of Ireland and the Irish delegation felt strongly about the implications of the mission which that resolution instructed the Committee on South West Africa to carry out immediately, and was very anxious that the Fourth Committee should consider the preliminary report before it was submitted to the General Assembly. He hoped that the Rapporteur would be able to submit the Fourth Committee's draft report very shortly.

10. The CHAIRMAN said that the draft report would be ready on Saturday, 10 December.

AGENDA ITEM 45

Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi (A/4404, part I, chap. VI, sect. G and part II, chap. II; A/C.4/455-457) (continued)

REPLIES TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY (continued)

11. Mr. CLAEYS BOUAERT (Belgium) invited the members of the Committee to attend a showing of two short documentary films, one made during the journey of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, in Ruanda-Urundi and the other during the preparation of the communal elections. The films might throw light on some aspects of the situation in Ruanda-Urundi.

12. He went on to explain the Belgian Government's views on some of the matters raised by the petitioners or by certain representatives.

13. With regard to the refugees, the Committee had been told that there were 60,000, or even 100,000, of them. Those estimates had no basis in reality. Since November 1959 there had been 60,000 victims, 30,000 of whom had since returned to their homes. Thus, there

still remained 30,000, of whom 14,000 were outside the Territory, some 7,500 in reception centres in the Territory and about 9,000 resettled in various regions with relations or friends. Of the 14,000 exiled from Ruanda, about 1,000 were in Tanganyika, about 500 in Urundi, about 3,000 in Uganda and at the most 10,000 in the Republic of the Congo. Every one of those exiles could return to the Territory. The representative of India would be glad to hear that the Administering Authority had done more than issue proclamations to that effect: it had organized resettlement. The Provisional Government included a special department for that purpose which was very active in making arrangements for repatriation, opening files and organizing compensation for damages; all of those measures were the responsibility of the Provisional Government and would soon be that of the legislative assembly. Only in two cases did resettlement encounter difficulties: the case of people whose land tenure rights were challenged by their neighbours, in which case the problem had to be settled before their return; and that of people whose return was unadvisable in the interests of their personal safety, in view of the hostility shown by their neighbours. Such cases, however, were exceptional and represented only a very small proportion of the victims.

14. The Nyamata reception centre, in which the number of refugees was steadily decreasing, had been referred to by some petitioners as a "concentration camp". The Visiting Mission had been able to see for itself that the refugees lived there in individual houses, were free to leave the reception centre whenever they wished, were fed and had a hospital and a school. The refugees had been encouraged to grow food crops for their own consumption; the failure of such efforts had been due to political propaganda aimed at keeping the situation as acute as possible. In July 1960 that reception centre had already cost the Administering Authority a total of 10 million Belgian francs. In the centre the refugees were reclassified and a file with records of inquiries was established for each head of family; the local authorities were then approached with a view to either the restoration of property or the resettlement of the people in question.

15. It had been asked what was the present strength of the Belgian troops in the Territory. At the present moment there were about 1,220 men, corresponding to the strength of the Congolese "gendarmérie". One of the petitioners had complained of the cost of maintaining these troops; in actual fact all expenses relating to the troops were charged to the Belgian budget. One delegation had been anxious to know whether the presence of the troops hampered freedom of political expression; the truth was that, on the contrary, the troops were there to safeguard freedom of political expression and to prevent any intimidation.

16. With regard to the communal elections, one of the petitioners had mentioned an abuse he had witnessed during the counting of the votes. It was unfortunate that the petitioner had not immediately reported the matter to the arbitration tribunals or to the supervisory commission.

17. With regard to the method of voting used in the communal elections, the petitioner had said that his party had not been consulted and a representative of the Union nationale ruandaise (UNAR) had said that he did not approve of the use of scribes. At the political meeting held at Kigali on 23 and 24 March 1960—at

which all the political parties had been represented—UNAR had approved of the use of ballots written with the help of scribes, as had also the *Rassablement démocratique ruandais* (RADER). Only the *Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse* (APROSOMA) had pointed out the dangers of that method of voting but had ended by supporting it. Those details could be found in annex 7 of No. 22 of the records of the Provisional Special Council.

18. Another petitioner had complained that the Administering Authority had created separate European and African communes on the principle of racial discrimination. That allegation was untrue. The Administering Authority had proposed the establishment of uniform communes, in which the so-called European centres would have been merged with the adjacent areas. The Provisional Special Council had unanimously rejected those proposals and had demanded the formation of urban "circonscriptions", on the pretext that in centres with a large non-African minority the interests of the population were very different from those of the inhabitants of neighbouring rural communities, who were Africans.

19. With regard to the same petitioner's complaint of gerrymandering, he explained that the Council of Kigali, for example, comprised four Europeans, two Africans and two Asians, representing an electoral body of sixty Europeans, 300 Africans and thirty Asians. The elections had not, therefore, been conducted on a racial basis. In Ruanda only three communes, those of Kisenyi, Astrida and Kigali, had European mayors.

20. In reply to another question, he said that the military rule and state of emergency declared at the beginning of the disturbances of November 1959 had been lifted by ordinance on 15 January 1960; their purpose had been to make all the crimes and misdeeds committed at that time subject to court martial. All the emergency measures, and in particular the system of assigned residence, had been repealed by Ordinance No. 322 of 14 November 1960.

21. The representative of Guinea had asked why the electoral law was not the same in Ruanda and in Urundi, why the Belgian Government seemed wedded to the idea of deliberately separating the two States ("pays") by setting up commissionerships in the one and a provisional government in the other and why its attitude was not the same towards the two Bami.^{2/} In point of fact the Belgian Government had always wanted to see the two States united. Moreover, the Interim Decree, the "loi-cadre" that governed the organization of the two States, was a single decree. It was the local councils composed of indigenous inhabitants that had demanded different electoral rules, for example. The Belgian Government had adopted the same attitude towards the two indigenous sovereigns. Its policy towards the Mwami of Ruanda was not different from the policy that governed its relations with the Mwami of Urundi. It was the attitude of the Mwami towards his people that differed from one State to the other.

22. The sub-chiefdom councils that had been elected by indirect suffrage three years earlier, had no longer accurately represented a population whose ideas had evolved very rapidly. They had therefore been broadened by the addition of groups that had been insufficiently or badly represented. They had adopted many

measures, including measures to help the refugees, to combat false rumours and to maintain law and order.

23. Contrary to what had been said by one petitioner, no priest in Ruanda had been subjected to ill-treatment; one had been charged with having taken part in armed operations but had been acquitted for lack of evidence. It was true that he had been sentenced to a light term of imprisonment, but that had been for having moved about in an area where that had been forbidden while the emergency measures were in force. The Bishop of Nyondo had not been placed in assigned residence. On the contrary, shortly after the Visiting Mission had been in the area he had requested the Administration to protect him from the people, who had adopted a hostile attitude; the Administration had granted him protection, but had withdrawn it as soon as the tumult had subsided.

24. The temporary increase in the number of European cadres had been due to the need to speed up the training of the Territorial guard, which was to replace the Congolese troops—and the metropolitan troops before long—in the Territory; the strengthening of police measures; the assignment of technicians to services which had until then been shared with the Congo—telecommunications, air services, customs, economic affairs etc.; and the increase in the number of teaching staff.

25. The Administering Authority was more interested in national reconciliation than was any one; it had been tireless in its endeavours to bring together the various sections of the population, particularly in Ruanda. For instance, it had approached all the parties, including UNAR, when the interim Council and Provisional Government had been set up; on at least four occasions it had asked UNAR to agree to join the other parties in preparing for the future of the State. Nearly all the parties had made constructive proposals; UNAR alone had instructed its members to refuse all collaboration. RADER had declined to join as a party but had authorized its members to help, and some of them had done so. Those provisional institutions had proved extremely useful since their establishment, for they had made for co-operation among Ministers belonging to various ethnic groups and had promoted the resettlement of the refugees which, should it continue without hindrance, might be completed within a few months. Acts of violence having ceased to all intents and purposes, it had proved possible to lift the system of assigned residence.

26. With regard to the amnesty measures that had been advocated for political prisoners and refugees, it should be remembered that the expression or spreading of an opinion was not offence in Ruanda-Urundi; consequently, there were no political prisoners or refugees, but only prisoners serving sentences for offences under ordinary law, such as arson, assault and battery, torture or murder. Between 15 November 1959 and 15 April 1960 the Military Court had tried 1,210 defendants, who, in all important cases, had had the assistance of counsel appointed by the Court. In principle, the Administering Authority was in favour of an amnesty, but in the present circumstances it could not apply or proclaim it itself. To be the symbol of reconciliation, amnesty should be decided upon by lawmakers who would be certain of interpreting the will of the people and it should be applied by a Government responsible to the legislature and to the people. Any measures decreed by an outside authority might pro-

^{2/} "Bami" is the plural form of the word "Mwami".

voke a fresh outbreak of disorders. The important thing was to cease marking time and to provide Ruanda-Urundi with definitive institutions; for that purpose it was necessary to liquidate the interim institutions, including the trusteeship itself, at the earliest possible moment.

27. The Indian representative had stated that a United Nations commissioner for the elections should have a clearly defined role and real scope for action. The Administering Authority had certainly never contemplated assigning a passive role to the observer for whom it had asked. He would have to have access to all available documentation and be able to move about and inspect the premises and the proper compilation of the voting registers in order to make sure that the voting and the electoral programmes were entirely free. There would therefore be no question of his playing the role of a mere tourist. Measures relating to the organization and conduct of the elections were, however, the exclusive and direct responsibility of the Administering Authority, in accordance with the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement. The most important of those measures was that of fixing the date of the elections, for any extension of the period of inaction could not fail to produce fresh outbreaks of violence and the legislative elections were already behind schedule. To meet the people's expectations, the Administering Authority had fixed 15 January 1961 as the election date. It would, however, be prepared to postpone the elections until the beginning of February in order to allow the mission of observers a month in which to travel about the country and see what measures had been taken.

28. He would be glad to supply the Committee with additional details if it wished. He reserved his delegation's right to speak again in the debate.

29. Mr. WEEKS (Liberia) asked that the full text of the Belgian representative's statement should be circulated as a document.

It was so decided.^{3/}

30. Mr. DIALLO Alpha (Guinea) thanked the Belgian representative for the replies which he had given to his questions. He reserved his delegation's right to make some comments at a later stage.

31. Mr. RASGOTRA (India) recalled that, according to one petitioner, steps should be taken to facilitate the Mwami's return to Ruanda. He would like to know what stood in the way of the Mwami's return.

32. Mr. CLAEYS BOUUAERT (Belgium) replied that the Mwami of Ruanda had left the State in July 1960 of his own accord in order to go to Leopoldville for talks with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. He had not been back since then and had not responded to the appeals sent to him on several occasions—in September 1960, in particular—by all those who wished him to return. He had, by his conduct, made it impossible for himself to reign and had been replaced by a Provisional Government. It would therefore be necessary to decide upon the future of the monarchy as an institution and of the person of the Mwami after the legislative assembly had been set up. Although the Mwami could no longer go back to Ruanda as a sovereign, his return as a private individual could be considered.

33. Mr. RASGOTRA (India) asked that the text of the above statement should also be circulated as a document.

It was so decided.^{3/}

34. Mr. ZULOAGA (Venezuela) said that he would like the Belgian representative to give him his opinion on the questions which he had put to the petitioners at the 1068th meeting regarding the adoption of the written ballot in a country where a great many of the people were illiterate. The replies of some petitioners seemed to him to be unacceptable, particularly in connexion with the use of photographs; since it had been a question of municipal elections, the candidates were well known. Moreover, the United Nations had a wide experience of methods of voting other than by written ballot.

35. He also noted that the Belgian representative had spoken of the dispatch of an observer by the United Nations. Did the Administering Authority consider that a single person would be enough to supervise elections which would take place under a system so unfamiliar to the people as a written ballot? The United Nations should reflect before deciding, for its responsibility was all the greater in that it was to some extent faced with an accomplished fact in regard to the method of voting. The present situation was better than that which had faced the United Nations in another Territory where the Administering Authority had opposed elections under United Nations supervision before the termination of the trusteeship, but the United Nations could not agree to supervise the elections in Ruanda-Urundi until it had obtained additional information.

36. Mr. CLAEYS BOUUAERT (Belgium) said that, after careful consideration, technical experts in electoral methods had decided that the written ballot was best calculated to disclose the will of the electors; that was why it had been chosen. Contrary to the opinion of the Venezuelan representative, they had not considered it possible to use photographs in communes which consisted of from 2,000 to 2,500 families and in which there were sometimes 50 or 100 candidates. Not only might the photographs be of unequal quality, but many Africans had never seen photographs, and in the matter of representation of the human form their ideas differed from those of Westernized populations. On the other hand, all the electors could know and pronounce the name of the candidate of their choice. Moreover, the Venezuelan representative could see, on the screen, how the method of voting used for the communal elections in Ruanda-Urundi had worked.

37. The title given to the person who was to supervise the elections was of no great importance. Whether he was an observer or a commissioner, he could be assisted by as many United Nations observers as he wished. The Administering Authority would have no objection to there being one commissioner for the elections in Ruanda and another for those in Urundi, if that would make the task of the United Nations easier, although it did not believe such division to be necessary and considered it preferable to have only one individual with whom it would discuss matters and negotiate.

38. Mr. ZULOAGA (Venezuela) thanked the representative of Belgium for his replies, and said that he would gladly attend when the film on Ruanda-Urundi was shown. He had noted with satisfaction that the

^{3/} See A/C.4/462.

Belgian representative thought it would be possible for several observers to be sent to Ruanda-Urundi. On the other hand, he did not share that representative's opinion about the written ballot, nor his objections to the use of photographs, as in illiterate people the senses of sight and hearing were generally extremely well developed. Further, he was surprised that the Belgian representative had mentioned only the system of photographs, since many other systems had been successfully used, sometimes even under United Nations supervision. That part of the Belgian representative's reply did not, therefore, seem to him acceptable.

39. U TIN MAUNG (Burma) said that he might comment on the Belgian representative's statement at a later stage. For the time being, he would only ask whether the accused persons who had been tried by military courts had had indigenous or non-indigenous lawyers to defend them, and whether the Administering Authority had given them permission to have foreign lawyers in the country.

40. Mr. CLAEYS BOUUAERT (Belgium) replied that all the lawyers who had defended the accused had been non-indigenous persons, as there had not then been a single indigenous lawyer called to the Ruanda-Urundi bar. The Administering Authority had done nothing to prevent an indigenous lawyer from defending the accused Africans. Moreover, the latter had been defended by a lawyer who was a member of the Paris bar and two others who were members of the Brussels bar.

41. U TIN MAUNG (Burma) wished to know the proportion of officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of indigenous origin among the troops sent by Belgium to replace the Congolese Public Force ("Force publique").

42. Mr. CLAEYS BOUUAERT (Belgium) replied that there had been no indigenous military personnel among the troops sent from Belgium to assist, temporarily, in the maintenance of order. But African soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers were currently receiving a short and intensive course of military training, either in Belgium or in the Territory, with a view to the formation of the Territorial guard.

43. Mr. GASSOU (Togo) said he would have been surprised had the Belgian representative stated that sentences had been passed for political offences following the incidents of November 1959. He asked whether, among those sentenced by the military courts, there had been influential members of political parties and, if so, to which parties they belonged. He also inquired how many political leaders were currently under detention.

44. Mr. CLAEYS BOUUAERT (Belgium) observed that the military and civil courts neither asked, nor a fortiori took into account, when considering the case of an accused person, what his political affiliations were. Political affiliations had absolutely nothing to do with the administration of justice. That fact notwithstanding, several political leaders of Ruanda-Urundi had been brought before a court martial; the Chairman of UNAR was in prison; three influential members of that party who were abroad had been sentenced in absentia; and several warrants to compel attendance had been issued for various crimes and offences, particularly in respect of Mr. Rwagasana, the General-Secretary of UNAR.

45. Mr. GASSOU (Togo) asked whether, in view of the detention of several influential political leaders, there was any justification for expecting from the forthcoming elections, results reflecting the country's political structure and the wishes of its people.

46. Mr. CLAEYS BOUUAERT (Belgium) said he was convinced that the sentencing of certain political leaders would in no way impair the expression of the popular will. The Administering Authority was not against any party; all were free to include the question of the amnesty in their programme; it was for the people alone to decide. He pointed out that, in other Territories, political leaders declared ineligible by the Administering Authority had won the support of the electorate and had thus been able to remedy the situation which they had denounced.

47. Mr. GASSOU (Togo) said that the existing situation in Ruanda-Urundi and the situation which might have existed in Togo, while similar in certain respects, were basically different. In contrast to what was happening in Ruanda-Urundi, the political parties in Togo had been in existence for a fairly long time and had been sufficiently strongly organized to be able to put forward candidates despite the absence or ineligibility of their leaders. Moreover, in Ruanda the population was still not well informed on political matters. Two facts, however, were evident—that the population of the Territory was claiming independence, and that the spokesmen of one section of opinion were in prison or in exile. His delegation therefore believed that, before any election took place, it was essential to give all political parties the opportunity to conduct their electoral campaigns and to put forward their candidates; for that purpose an amnesty, at least for the country's political leaders, was imperative.

48. Mr. RASGOTRA (India) asked whether it was true that the Executive Committee of UNAR, as constituted before the events of November 1959, was currently in exile and not entitled to exercise any activity in Ruanda-Urundi.

49. Mr. CLAEYS BOUUAERT (Belgium) repeated that there was no question of a conflict between the Administering Authority and a political party. It was one of the Administering Authority's main duties to ensure freedom of political expression, within a framework of order and security. If certain persons interfered with the rights of their compatriots, it was the Administering Authority's duty to prosecute them. The Administering Authority was bound to take account of the rules which must be observed if the people were to express its opinion by constitutional and peaceful means. UNAR was perfectly entitled to defend its programme, and it was doing so; but orderly political life could be based only on respect for fundamental human rights. So long as the Administering Authority was responsible for order, it could not agree to political activity founded on violence; if it did, it would be helping to rekindle civil war.

50. Mr. RASGOTRA (India) recalled that the representative of UNAR had stated, before the Trusteeship Council during its twenty-sixth session that his party disapproved of violence and that it was prepared to act in accordance with the law.

51. Mr. CLAEYS BOUUAERT (Belgium) said that he had taken note of that statement, which he welcomed.

52. Mr. CUEVAS CANCINO (Mexico) said he wished to revert to a question which had been raised by one of the petitioners, Mr. Biroli, representative of the Front commun, but which had not been answered. Mr. Biroli, after saying that the Administering Authority and the local authorities of Ruanda-Urundi had apparently concluded an agreement on the equivalence of the Territory's currency, had stated that his party was worried about the introduction of a "soft", inconvertible currency. Since the date of independence was approaching and the Territory was a large-scale producer of tin, he would like to know what steps the Administering Authority had taken in that particular matter.

53. Mr. CLAEYS BOUUAERT (Belgium) said that the problem required careful study and that the difficulties encountered were mainly of a technical nature. The Administering Authority had thought it necessary to proceed to a currency reform whereby the currency of Ruanda-Urundi would be dissociated from that of the Congo, because of the instability of the Congo's financial position. As a result of certain difficulties, the new currency of Ruanda-Urundi was not yet freely convertible, but the Administering Authority intended to take the necessary action with a view to ensuring its stability and convertibility.

54. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) asked what percentage of the electors had taken part in the communal elections of June 1960 in Ruanda; he also inquired whether all the political parties had put forward candidates, and to what extent UNAR had participated.

55. Mr. CLAEYS BOUUAERT (Belgium) said that 78.2 per cent of the registered electors had voted.

That percentage was an improvement by comparison with the previous elections (when only 72 per cent had voted), and compared favourably with the results recorded in other African territories. On the occasion of the communal elections, UNAR had put forward candidates in a very large number of communes and several of its candidates had been elected; in two communes, for instance, the majority of the council members elected belonged to that party. Although, before the elections, UNAR had called upon its supporters to abstain from voting, it was impossible to say to what extent the total percentage of abstentions reflected that instruction.

Organization of work

56. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom), referring to his statement at the 1064th meeting, informed the Committee that as a result of new developments in the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration, Mr. Foncha, the Premier of the Southern Cameroons, no longer thought it necessary to raise the matter of the elucidation of one of the questions to be put in the forthcoming plebiscite in the Southern Cameroons, and that the Committee was therefore no longer confronted with that problem.

57. The CHAIRMAN noted that the two petitioners from the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration to whom the Committee had already granted hearings and who were now in New York would be heard whenever it was possible for the Committee to interrupt its discussions of agenda items 45 and 44.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.