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Chairman: Mr. ACHKAR Marof (Guinea).

AGENDA ITEM 23

Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (chapter on Territories under Portuguese administration) (A/5446/Rev.1, chap. II; A/C.4/618) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. IDZUMBUIR (Congo, Leopoldville) said that, in his delegation's opinion, there was nothing new in the statement that the Portuguese representative had made at the 1475th meeting. The arguments put forward were those that the Fourth Committee had been hearing ever since the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration had been placed on its agenda. All that the Portuguese statement showed was that through blindness, bad faith or lack of courage the Portuguese leaders refused to change their colonial policy and were trying to frustrate the efforts of the international community to help them to understand the situation and to correct their mistakes.
2. His delegation considered that the arguments adduced by the Portuguese representative could be summed up as follows: first, the United Nations was not competent to discuss the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration; secondly, Portugal did not practise racial discrimination; and thirdly, Portugal wanted to live in peace with Africa and to maintain good relations with the African countries which were its neighbours. He would like to make a number of comments on those three points.
3. In denying the competence of the United Nations with regard to the Territories it occupied in Africa, Portugal based itself on an interpretation of the Charter which was different from that of the majority of Member States. If it were only a matter of discussing a text, his delegation would gladly leave that question to the jurists. The main factor in the problem, however, was something different; Portugal was practising a ruthless form of colonization in the Territories and

was cruelly repressing the deep-rooted aspirations of an unhappy people. The Committee could not, therefore, be content to make an analysis of a text while men were suffering and dying, women and children were being massacred and civilian refugees were being machine-gunned by Portuguese aircraft. In many respects the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration was reminiscent of certain episodes in the Second World War. In both cases there was the same savage imperialism and the same wretched state of innocent people. His delegation accordingly asked the European Powers which had united to fight against nazism to persuade Portugal to abandon its stubborn policy and to show a little humanity at last. It was to be hoped that the time had not gone by when men who had the means went to the rescue of other peoples, in the defence of freedom. Nations which, like the United States of America, had received help from outside in attaining their independence should understand that the African countries could not stand by unconcerned when they saw their brothers dying. Nevertheless, he was quite prepared to hear it said before the Fourth Committee that peace was not threatened in Africa, for apparently it was only when there was danger of a clash between the great Powers or when those Powers thought that their interests were in jeopardy that there was talk of a threat to peace. Yet at the present moment launching pads were being constructed in Mozambique and in South Africa. It was to be hoped that the United Nations would not wait until the African countries in their turn had their coasts patrolled by submarines and constructed launching pads for themselves before it understood the danger that the Portuguese and South African fascists brought to their very door. His delegation therefore appealed urgently to the friends of Portugal to persuade that country to change its policy before Africa itself compelled it to do so.

4. With regard to the second argument put forward by the Portuguese delegation, he pointed out that whenever self-determination was mentioned Portugal spoke about its multiracialism, as if those two ideas were linked one to the other. The representative of Guinea had already drawn attention to the absurdity of such an idea. No one chose his colour or his race and it could not be held against anyone that he had been born in such and such an ethnic group. Everyone could and must, however, have the right to choose the country to which he wanted to belong. If, therefore, Portugal wanted to respect the principle of self-determination, it must give the inhabitants of its Territories the right to be non-Portuguese if they so wished and it must refrain from making them Portuguese citizens by a unilateral decision. That was the true meaning of self-determination and it was obvious that it had nothing to do with multiracialism. He pointed out, in that connexion, that Brazil, too, was a multiracial country that had been under Portuguese domination, but that had not prevented Portugal from granting it inde-

pendence and subsequently maintaining good relations with it. Such an example should open the eyes of the colonialists; it was to their advantage to seize forthwith the opportunities offered to them to make peace and establish new ties. A few weeks earlier, the head of the provisional government of Angola had said in an official speech that it lay with Portugal alone to bring the fighting in the Territory to an end and that he himself was convinced that independent Angola would of necessity have to co-operate with Portugal. Nevertheless, such statements had not deterred Portugal from sending fresh troops into the Territory, as reported in a recent dispatch from the France-Press agency. In the face of such wilful blindness, the independent countries of Africa could not remain indifferent and could not complacently observe the influx of refugees whom the war had driven from their homeland. They therefore asked Portugal to allow the inhabitants of the Territories under their administration to choose whether or not to be Portuguese and to refrain from forcing a nationality upon them.

5. Turning to the third argument, namely that Portugal wanted to live in peace with the African countries which were its neighbours, he pointed out that Portugal had no common frontier with any African State. Nevertheless, despite the distance between them, the African States and Portugal could not maintain good relations so long as Portugal behaved as an occupying Power and usurped the sovereign rights of the Africans, and so long as it went on massacring men and women, machine-gunning defenceless fugitives and carrying on a war of extermination. It was a well-known fact that Portugal was a poor country and that it was circumstances that had impelled it to turn its attention to Africa. It had no cause to be ashamed of that, but it should move with the times. France and the United Kingdom had had colonies, too, but they had understood how matters were developing and had realized that friendship must be based on reciprocity. Portugal, however, refused to learn that lesson and claimed to have the monopoly of truth. It would not, however, be able to defy world opinion as it was doing unless it had the support of a number of friendly countries. He therefore appealed in all urgency to the great Powers which under the Charter had been given special responsibilities with regard to the maintenance of peace. He reminded them that it lay with them to ensure respect for the wishes of the international community and he expressed the hope that they would heed that appeal and would not fail in their duty.

6. Mr. SMIGANOWSKI (Poland) pointed out that the problems arising in a number of colonial territories in Africa and the problems connected with the application of the policy of apartheid were closely inter-related and constituted the most urgent colonial problems confronting the United Nations and the world as a whole. In the richest part of the African continent, the colonial Powers were using every means available to them to prevent the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, carrying out a policy of terrorism and repression in order to suppress the national liberation movements, and thus creating a permanent source of tension and international conflict.

7. The situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration had always been a source of concern to the United Nations and since the admission of Portugal to the United Nations various organs had

dealt with the question. The problem had been approached from three different but closely related angles. First, it had been studied from the point of view of Chapter XI of the Charter: General Assembly resolutions 1541 (XV) and 1542 (XV) had defined the Territories under Portuguese administration as Non-Self-Governing Territories and had confirmed Portugal's obligation to transmit the information required under Article 73 e of the Charter. Secondly, the General Assembly had examined the situation in those Territories from the point of view of the application of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples and had adopted resolutions 1807 (XVII) and 1819 (XVII). Thirdly, the Security Council had studied the situation in Angola as related to the maintenance of international peace and security. Recently, in July 1963, thirty-two African States had declared in their request to the Security Council (S/5347)<sup>1/</sup> that the state of war prevailing in some of the Territories following the persistent refusal of Portugal to comply with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and particularly those of the Security Council resolution of 9 June 1961, (S/4835)<sup>2/</sup> constituted a definite breach of peace and security in the African continent as well as a threat to international peace and security. He recalled, too, that the almost unanimous opinion of Member States on each of the aspects of the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration was reflected in Security Council resolution S/5380,<sup>3/</sup> to whose main provisions he drew attention.

8. Although the Security Council had by that resolution reaffirmed the previous resolutions of the General Assembly and requested the Secretary-General to ensure the implementation of the resolution's provisions, the Portuguese Government, as in the past, had failed to heed the resolution. According to The New York Times of 13 August 1963, the Prime Minister of Portugal had reiterated his country's determination to pursue administrative reforms and decentralization in the "provinces" but had given warning that Portugal would defend its right to the "overseas provinces" even at the risk of war with the African States. The report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (A/5446/Rev.1, chap. II) and the report (S/5448)<sup>3/</sup> submitted by the Secretary-General in pursuance of resolution S/5380 made it evident that despite the efforts of the international community, Portugal had not changed its position and was unwilling to carry out its obligations under the Charter.

9. In his opinion, there was not the slightest indication in the Secretary-General's report to justify the assumption that Portugal accepted the principle of self-determination for the peoples of its colonies. What was more, Portugal still arrogated to itself the right to give its own interpretation to its obligations under the Charter and frankly opposed the right of the peoples to independence as set forth in the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. The statement in section V of document S/5448 that "the Portuguese Government is

<sup>1/</sup> See Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1963.

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid., Sixteenth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1961.

<sup>3/</sup> Ibid., Eighteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1963.

not opposed to the principle of self-determination as embodied in the Portuguese concept of the term and within its context" was only too obvious; Portugal could not be opposed to its own concepts. However, the Portuguese concept of self-determination, based on the theory that the Portuguese Territories were provinces tied to the metropolitan country within the framework of unitary sovereignty, was a colonial concept and one which on that score had been rejected by the United Nations.

10. His delegation was fully aware of the concern of the African States to see their brothers in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea liberated from colonialism. That solidarity was only too well justified. It was obvious that only the peoples concerned should decide their future and that administrative reforms were no substitute for the right of peoples to self-determination. No colonial policy, however paternalistic, would ever satisfy the aspirations of the peoples dominated by it, as was demonstrated by the increasing resistance to Portugal's colonial rule, and most particularly by the struggle of the people of Angola and Guinea to recover their dignity and independence.

11. Portugal was using various pretexts to preserve its domination over the people of its colonies. The principal reason why it was pursuing that anachronistic policy and disregarding the decisions of the United Nations was economic. In order to conserve the economic advantages bestowed by its Territories, Portugal was hiding behind a legal fiction and alleging that it had nothing but overseas provinces. That argument did not, however, suffice to disguise the classical colonial relationship between Portugal and those Territories. As had been pointed out in chapter III of document A/AC.108/L.7, the Portuguese Government had always looked to the overseas territories to contribute to the economy of the metropolitan country. Its second national development plan and its long-announced intention to establish a common market in the escudo area showed how the wealth of Angola and Mozambique was to be used to help Portugal. The Territories were being used to earn foreign exchange, particularly hard currency. According to The Three-Monthly Economic Review of Portugal and its Overseas Provinces: Annual Supplement, published in May 1963 by the Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd., the dollar and gold earnings of Angola and Mozambique had helped Portugal to build up large foreign exchange reserves, thus contributing to the stability of the escudo. Furthermore, the surplus earnings of the overseas territories helped to reduce Portugal's trade deficit. The same issue of the Economic Review indicated that Portugal's adverse trade balance in 1961 had been 7,697 million escudos, which had been partly offset by a favourable trade balance of the Territories amounting to 2,420 million escudos. Portugal's trade deficit in 1962 had been \$218 million, which had also been partly offset by the surplus earnings of the Territories.

12. Angola and Mozambique were not only foreign-exchange earners; they also supplied Portugal's needs in raw materials which it would otherwise have to buy on the world markets. Since textiles constituted one of Portugal's most important exports, special efforts had been made in Angola and Mozambique to guarantee supplies. Those measures had included the granting of privileges to companies holding large land concessions, the institution of price and export controls and even practices such as forced labour or similar forms of recruitment. In that connexion he referred

to paragraphs 134-139 of document A/AC.108/L.8. The whole cotton-growing régime had undergone reform. Thus, as The Economist of 19 October 1963 had reported, concessions were being replaced by a system that was leaving the indigenous grower little or no better off than before. Although theoretically independent, he had to sell his crops to buyers licensed by the authorities, but at the present time there existed only two licensed buyers—one a former concessionary and the other still a concessionary. The price the grower received under the new scheme was hardly any better than before, if it was remembered that he now had to buy his seeds instead of getting them free. Even if Portugal liberalized the prices to make them comparable to world prices, it was still saving on its foreign exchange, because the overseas territories were in the escudo zone. Although since January 1963, export licences had no longer been required for goods exported to any other part of the escudo zone, yet in Angola they were still required with regard to exports of raw cotton, ground-nuts, coffee and several other products, as could be seen from the Boletim Geral do Ultramar for January-February 1963, page 202. The fact that exports of cotton and sugar were made to Portugal alone, reported on pages 54 and 55 of the Relatório e Contas do Banco de Angola for 1962, and the retention of export licences for certain products, even for trading within the escudo area, showed that Portugal could not afford to lose its traditional sources of raw materials.

13. It was also interesting to note that in 1962 the value of coffee exported from Angola had exceeded that of the exports of textiles and tinned fish from Portugal. The real significance of Angolan coffee was that it earned United States dollars and other foreign currencies for the metropolitan country. Page 229 of the Boletim Geral do Ultramar for June-July 1963 showed that the United States of America had been for many years the largest buyer of Angolan coffee.

14. With regard to Angola's next most important export item, diamonds, total production in 1962 had amounted to 986,000 carats, which had been sold to the United Kingdom at a price of 556 million escudos, an average of 600 escudos (\$US22) per carat. Even the Portuguese Press, in particular Diário de Notícias for 12 October 1963, had indignantly commented that that price was well below the price of South West African diamonds sold on the world market, although Angolan diamonds contained a proportion of 85 per cent gem diamonds compared with 65 per cent for the South West African diamonds. In passing, it might be noted that the principal shareholders of the diamond company which had the monopoly for all diamonds found in Angola were the Union minière du Haut Katanga, the Morgan Bank, the Oppenheimer and Guggenheim groups and the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa.

15. Since the discovery of oil and iron deposits in Angola, it had become even more advantageous for Portugal to claim that that country formed an integral part of its territory. In anticipation of a considerable increase in oil production, the construction of a new refinery had been started, not in Angola, but near Lisbon, according to The Times of 12 September 1963. Angola's estimated annual oil production was now 1.2 million tons, of which the local refineries could process only 450,000 tons, as could be seen from pages 182-187 of the Boletim do Ultramar for April-May 1963. Oil production was also in the hands of

foreign financial corporations, such as Petrofina of Belgium and the Chase National Bank.

16. Another important aspect of the Portuguese Territories was their role as captive markets. The development plans were not intended to change that situation, as development spending was mainly designed to increase the exports of agricultural products and minerals from the Portuguese colonies. The main purpose of that policy was to remove wealth from the colonies even faster and more efficiently, and in the second place to promote settlement by Europeans, for the manufacturing industries were keyed mainly to the production of consumer goods for the use of or in the interests of the settlers from Portugal.

17. Furthermore, Portugal's interests were served by the existence in the Portuguese overseas territories of preferential tariffs which favoured goods coming from Portugal or shipped in Portuguese ships. In 1962, for example, 41.2 per cent of Angola's imports, amounting to 1,614 million escudos, had come from the home country. Although Portugal had pointed out that textile mills had now been set up in Angola and Mozambique, imports of textiles into those Territories from Portugal were still increasing: 4,432 tons in 1962 compared to 3,137 tons in 1961, or an increase of over 41 per cent by weight and almost 50 per cent by value.

18. Going on to consider the significance of the Portuguese colonies as land for settlements, he pointed out that because of its economic problems, Portugal was unable to find work for all its active population and had consequently hoped for many years to use Angola and Mozambique for large-scale settlement plans. However, by settling Portuguese immigrants in those Territories, Lisbon was also hoping to further its political aims. As The Christian Science Monitor of 19 October 1963 had pointed out, Portuguese immigration in Angola, which was being pursued at the rate of 7,000 persons a year, was designed not only to relieve poverty and unemployment at home but also to create a white bastion against African nationalism. In connexion with their second development plan for the overseas territories, the Portuguese authorities themselves had said, in Relatório Final Preparatório do II Plano de Fomento: IX) Ultramar, pages 151 and 152, that it was necessary not only to civilize the indigenous inhabitants but also to turn them into Portuguese, and that Africa should therefore be settled with Europeans, as only thus could the stability of Portuguese sovereignty in the Territories be guaranteed and the Portuguese character of the indigenous population be promoted. It was noteworthy that in the context of the development plan, the allocations for public health and education in Angola amounted to less than 5 per cent of the total expenditure, whereas the allocations for settlement schemes represented over 20 per cent of total expenditures in the case of Angola and some 28 per cent in the case of Mozambique. Although some of the settlement schemes also made provision for settling Africans, the underlying objective was to settle families from Portugal in the Portuguese Territories. The 1961 uprising in Angola had resulted in the establishment in Angola and Mozambique of facilities to hasten the implementation of that policy, for Portugal was fearful of losing the Territories under its rule.

19. In Angola, where the fight was continuing and where some 40,000 to 50,000 Portuguese troops were stationed, a new scheme had been approved under which the Portuguese soldiers would settle in the country as farmers after finishing their two-year tour of duty in the Territory. In its desire to encourage such settlement, the Portuguese Government, acting through the facilities that had been set up, was offering special inducements to soldiers who agreed to settle in the country. According to the Diário de Notícias of 28 March 1963, ten to thirty-five hectares of land were given free of cost of each soldier-settler, as well as free technical assistance, and subsidies during the first two years to a maximum of 1,500 escudos monthly the first year and 1,000 escudos monthly the second year. There was no need to emphasize the peculiar character and the significance of such a settlement policy.

20. The official Portuguese thesis was that the two main objectives of the settlement policy were the building of stable and fully integrated multiracial communities, and the economic and social development of Territories under Portuguese rule. Nevertheless, there were different kinds of settlements for the Portuguese from Europe and for the indigenous inhabitants. It was stated on page 302 of the Boletim Geral do Ultramar for June-July 1963 that the individual could not be considered independently from the community in which he was integrated or from the inherent limitations of his stage of culture. As thus defined and interpreted, Portuguese policy was tantamount to a form of cultural apartheid and reminiscent of the distinction between the "civilizado" and the "não-civilizado". The influx of settlers and the widely publicized administrative reforms were clearly aimed at speeding up the colonization of the Portuguese Territories and allowing the non-African elements greater freedom of action so as to enable them to take over political power. By strengthening the political and economic position of the non-Africans, the way was actually being paved for the establishment of a minority Government in that part of Africa.

21. In his statements in the Security Council in July 1963, the Portuguese Foreign Minister had persisted in saying that in Angola, Mozambique and its other African Territories, Portugal was primarily concerned with the interests of the indigenous inhabitants. He had also stressed that 400 foreign newspapermen had been invited to visit those colonies or had gone there on their own initiative. However, despite the efforts being made by Portugal to disguise the truth, it was pursuing its traditional policy of economic and cultural imperialism. The so-called civilizing mission invoked by Portugal was just an example of the classical excuse advanced by the colonial Powers to justify their occupation and exploitation of the Territories ruled by them.

22. Without the support of its allies, Portugal, with its limited resources, would have had to abandon its colonial policy long ago. But as other representatives had already repeatedly stressed and as the petitioners had demonstrated, Portugal's membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was not the only factor which enabled that country to pursue its repressive policy in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea. There were close links between Portugal's attitude and the activities of certain foreign financial and industrial corporations which brought pressure to bear on the Governments concerned. Portugal, being assured of

their support, was intensifying its fight against the national liberation movements. A colonial war had been going on in Angola for the last three years; another colonial war had been waged in Portuguese Guinea; and preparations to suppress the independence movement in Mozambique were being intensified. Portugal was constantly building up its military strength in its colonies, and the number of indigenous refugees had increased considerably. Those facts, which had been highlighted in the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and in the statements of the petitioners, showed that the situation had deteriorated since the seventeenth session of the General Assembly.

23. Portugal's colonial policy had serious international repercussions which went far beyond the boundaries of the Territories under that country's domination. The issue was not, as Portugal claimed, a purely domestic one, but was the concern of all nations, especially the African States. The anxiety felt by the latter was illustrated by the unanimous decisions of the Summit Conference of Independent African States held at Addis Ababa in May 1963, in the course of which the Heads of African States and Governments had made it clear that they were ready to lend every support to the efforts of the peoples of the Portuguese Territories to shake off colonial rule.

24. Poland, which fully shared Africa's anxiety, was convinced that only concerted action by all States Members of the United Nations, as contemplated in the resolution adopted at the Addis Ababa Conference, could bring Portugal to its senses and make it abandon its position. The United Nations could not indefinitely condone Portugal's non-compliance with its obligations under the Charter, nor could it deviate from its principles by accepting Portugal's own interpretation of those obligations, for if it did so, the whole process of decolonization and the integrity of the Organization itself would be jeopardized.

25. There was no doubt that Portugal had failed to implement the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 31 July 1963 (S/5380), and it was therefore indispensable that determined and effective steps should be taken which would put an end to the colonial wars that were still raging, would enable Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea to attain independence and would re-establish peace in Africa.

26. Before concluding, he wished to thank the petitioners for taking the trouble to appear before the Committee and thus making a substantial contribution to the Committee's work. His delegation wished to assure them of its support in their just and heroic struggle.

#### HEARING OF PETITIONERS (continued)

*At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Eduardo C. Mondlane, representative of the Frente da Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), Mr. David J. M. Mabunda and Mr. John Sakupwanya, representatives of the União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique, took places at the Committee table.*

27. Mr. NDAWULA (Uganda) recalled that at the 1470th meeting Mr. Mondlane had refuted the statement by the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that the educational system in Mozambique was better than that existing in the other African

countries, with the exception of Nigeria. At the same meeting Mr. Mondlane had said that education in the Portuguese colonies was left for the Catholic Church to monopolize. According to paragraph 22 of document A/AC.108/L.8, between 1950 and 1959 the number of Government rudimentary schools had decreased from 33 to five, while the number of enrolments had dropped from 3,643 to 357; during the same period the number of pupils enrolled in mission schools had increased from 151,000 to almost 400,000. He himself came from a country where the missions took care of education, and did so in a satisfactory manner. The figures that had just been read out seemed, therefore, to indicate an encouraging trend. He would be interested to hear Mr. Mondlane's views on the subject.

28. Mr. MONDLANE (Frente da Libertação de Moçambique) said that, in order to appreciate the situation, one had to know about the new system adopted for the African school children. Since 1961 provision had been made for a period of initiation, followed by a period of transition in which teaching was given in Portuguese so as to facilitate adaptation on the part of the children, who were only given a rudimentary education during that second period. After a few years of that kind of schooling, the children were theoretically ready to enter the educational system of the European type. In practice very few African children attained the level of normal primary schooling, still less of secondary schooling.

29. Rudimentary education was entirely in the hands of the Church, so that the State was not directly responsible for the training of children who were, in principle, supposed to be preparing for Portuguese citizenship. There was no denying that enrolments in Catholic teaching institutions were increasing, and the fact was hardly surprising since every year the Catholic Church spent increasing sums of money on teachers' salaries and school buildings. But the reports published by the Catholic Church itself made it clear that the efforts made so far were not sufficient to meet the needs, and the Church complained of the inadequacy of the grants provided by the Portuguese authorities.

30. He reiterated his view that the Catholic Church should not have a monopoly of education in Mozambique but should, as in the other African countries, supplement State efforts in that field wherever they proved to be inadequate.

31. Mr. NDAWULA (Uganda) asked Mr. Mondlane if he thought that the insufficient effort made by the Portuguese Government to improve education was the result of a systematic policy to prevent the access of young Africans to education and its attendant advantages.

32. Mr. MONDLANE (Frente da Libertação de Moçambique) replied that the situation in Mozambique was the direct outcome of Portugal's philosophy in colonial matters. Portugal—always assuming that it was in good faith—was allegedly seeking to assimilate a population of 7 million Africans, when there were only a few hundred thousand white persons in the Territory. Even if it were at all possible, an assimilation of that kind would take years to achieve. The Portuguese Government considered that the institution best qualified to exert an influence on the Africans was the Catholic Church. The trend that had led to the present situation had begun in 1937, when the European settlers in Mozambique had protested because the Government schools were "over-civilizing

the Natives". As a result of that dispute, responsibility for education had been given to the Catholic Church, which naturally sought to maintain its position in the spiritual field and even to improve it by converting as many Africans as possible. As in other countries, the Catholic Church was more concerned to indoctrinate pupils than to give them the fundamental knowledge they needed. He therefore felt that the State should take charge of education, especially as, for the most part, the Africans were not Christians. The authorities should accordingly finance a neutral system of education, and a religious education would be available for children whose parents wished them to receive one.

33. Mr. NDAWULA (Uganda) thanked Mr. Mondlane for his satisfactory replies.

34. Mr. MONGONO (Nigeria) referred to the statement made by the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs had quoted by Mr. Mondlane, to the effect that the educational system in the Portuguese Territories was better than that existing in the other African countries, except for Nigeria. There could be no comparison between the system of education in his own country and that in the Portuguese African Territories. The system of education which existed in Nigeria and which had been functioning for the past hundred years had always been designed to produce Nigerian, not English, citizens. It had produced people who were capable of taking over the administration of the country and manning the entire civil service. The Nigerian system of education had also turned out politicians capable of presiding over the country's destinies.

35. He personally could not see how the education provided in the Portuguese African Territories could possibly turn the inhabitants of Mozambique, Angola or Guinea into Portuguese citizens. The sooner Portugal realized that it could no longer deceive anyone and that it was for the Africans alone to determine their own future, the better it would be for Portugal itself and for the rest of the world.

36. He asked Mr. Mondlane if he thought that the present system of education in the Portuguese Territories, and particularly in Mozambique, was suitable for training not only capable African civil servants, but persons who would be able to work out and implement a political programme for the administration of their country. He wondered whether the councils and boards of education included Africans who participated in the planning and application of the education policy and at the same time looked after the interests of the indigenous inhabitants.

37. Mr. MONDLANE (Frente da Libertação de Moçambique) said that the aim of the education system applied in the Portuguese Territories was to assimilate the Africans with a view to incorporating them in Portuguese civilization. However, the Mozambicans who had had occasion to receive that type of education and who had witnessed successive changes of policy in that field had concluded that Portugal's sole purpose was to keep the Africans in ignorance and under European control.

38. The policy of assimilation was bound to end in failure, if only because the Africans constituted the majority of the population and it was impossible for a minority to absorb a majority. Besides, the methods employed were so alien to the African mentality that only a very few Africans were able to assimilate them.

It was very hard for an African to wax enthusiastic over Portuguese heroes or to imagine that the Portuguese were his ancestors. Portugal's education policy thus had the effect of turning the Africans who were exposed to it into ardent nationalists.

39. Mr. DIALLO Seydou (Guinea) said that most of the African delegations were refraining from putting questions to the petitioners because they were perfectly well acquainted with the situation in the Portuguese colonies. However, a number of other delegations appeared to take no interest in the question whatsoever, thus giving proof of their indifference to the fate of oppressed peoples. The Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs had recently stated, at Washington, that the United Nations was now subordinate to the will of a majority of States which in no way represented the real forces existing in the world; he had gone on to say that, on that account, Portugal would not carry out any United Nations recommendations or decisions pertaining to it. Why, in the circumstances, continue the discussion since Portugal's mind was already made up? There was one question, however, which the delegation of Guinea would like to ask with a view to determining responsibilities. It wished to know how many NATO bases there were in Portugal and the Portuguese colonies.

40. Mr. MONDLANE (Frente da Libertação de Moçambique) replied that the purpose of NATO's direct intervention in Portuguese affairs was to support the Salazar régime. According to the English weekly papers *The Observer* and *The Economist*, Portugal had undertaken to make 80,000 soldiers available to NATO; since the population of Portugal was only 9.5 million, the total strength of the Portuguese Army could hardly be more than 80,000 men. It followed that the entire Portuguese Army was armed and equipped by NATO. Out of that total there were, it was estimated, 30,000 men in Mozambique, 40,000 in Angola and probably 5,000 in Guinea.

41. A further example of the part played by NATO in Portuguese policy was the fact that in March 1961, when the war had broken out in Angola, a contingent of United States naval and air forces normally stationed in Spain had been sent to Angola for two or three weeks. They had been sent there because NATO was prepared to defend all parts of Portugal and its empire. He had also learnt that a large number of photographs which had been taken for the purpose of producing a documentary film on Angola for American television had not been used because they showed weapons and material manufactured in the United States or in Western European countries and delivered to Portugal in accordance with the NATO agreements. It was also known that during the past ten years the United States had granted to Portugal military assistance to the extent of some \$500 million. Portuguese officers were trained in American camps and the United States was assuming responsibility for maintaining the Azores base. Furthermore, the United Kingdom Government had undertaken to support Portugal, while France continued to supply it with arms and the Federal Republic of Germany with large-scale financial aid. Portugal alone would not be able to hold out for a week against the pressure brought to bear upon it.

*Mr. Carducci-Artensio (Italy), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

42. Mr. MABUNDA (União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique) said that Portugal would have been unable to construct its military bases in Mozambique

without considerable financial help from its allies. There were five military bases and three naval bases in the Territory. It was reported that, according to Portuguese statesmen, Portugal's struggle in Africa was a struggle on behalf of NATO.

43. The situation in the so-called overseas provinces might endanger peace and involve a number of great Powers, including the United States and the United Kingdom. It was for that reason that those countries continued to supply Portugal with arms. In that, however, they were not alone: a number of technicians from the Federal Republic of Germany had taken part in the construction of the military bases in Mozambique. Furthermore, Spanish soldiers had been seen in the Territory wearing Portuguese uniforms, and it was well known that officers of the South African Army had visited the Territory on a number of occasions.

44. Mr. DIALLO Seydou (Guinea) thanked the petitioners. He observed that the reasons for the massacre and sufferings of the inhabitants in the Portuguese Territories were well known. If certain States Members of the United Nations tried to evade their responsibilities, the problems of Africa would never be solved. Certain Powers were trying to deceive world opinion by claiming to be fighting for freedom, but it was they that were murdering the people who demanded independence. There could be no real friendship between those Powers and the African States so long as innocent people were daily attacked, pursued and massacred with NATO armaments. Guinea would not be satisfied with fine words, but would deal with the substance of the problem and blame those who were truly responsible.

*Mr. Achkar (Guinea) resumed the Chair.*

45. Mr. MGONJA (Tanganyika), after recalling that Portuguese aircraft had violated Tanganyikan air space on several occasions, asked the petitioners whether they had any comments to make on such deliberate provocation on the part of the Portuguese authorities, which none the less persisted in issuing false statements in order to screen their activities.

46. Mr. MONDLANE (Frente da Libertação de Moçambique) said that he had in his possession many reports on the doings of the Portuguese Government in the neighbouring African States. For example, a Portuguese aircraft of American manufacture had landed at Dar es Salaam, having violated Tanganyikan air space, and the two Portuguese pilots had asked for asylum in Tanganyika. The Portuguese Government had immediately issued a communiqué explaining that the aircraft had gone off course in a routine flight and had landed at Dar es Salaam by mistake. He pointed out that that city was over 500 kilometres from the frontier of Mozambique and, moreover, that the pilots had themselves stated that they had seized the aircraft in order to escape and seek asylum in Tanganyika. They had also said that the flights in question had been continuing for some years and that military patrols had been crossing the Tanganyikan border in pursuit of members of the nationalist move-

ments. He had himself participated in activities of those movements in Tanganyika, and could confirm those statements. If Portugal was telling the truth when it alleged that conditions in Mozambique were quiet, why should it be concentrating so many troops in the Territory, why should it be arresting so many Africans and why should it be so concerned to distort the facts? In his view all that agitation was due to fear, because every day thousands of Mozambicans were crossing the frontier of Tanganyika to join the forces of liberation. The number of refugees was now so large as to constitute a serious problem, and he had already appealed to the competent international organizations for help in resolving it.

47. Mr. MABUNDA (União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique) recalled that despite the declarations of the Lisbon Government, which claimed to be anxious to maintain good-neighbourly relations with all the African States, the Portuguese police continued to kidnap Mozambicans living outside the country. It was obvious that because of the assistance rendered by the African States, especially Tanganyika, to the nationalist movements, Portugal was unable to give full effect to its intention of arresting all members of such movements. The Portuguese authorities were certainly using every possible means of intimidation, including the violation of Tanganyikan air space, and were trying to persuade the world that Portugal had no evil intentions with regard to its African neighbours. But it was clear that Portugal would continue to act as it was acting so long as the nationalist movements enjoyed the support of the independent African States.

48. Mr. SAKUPWANYA (União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique) added that the movement which he represented was much disturbed by the threat to international peace and security constituted by Portugal's activities. He himself, in company with other members of nationalist movements, had in June 1962 had occasion to observe the marked activity at a large air base in Mozambique, where at least eight aircraft were to be seen. He had also seen the bones of people who, while trying to cross the Tanganyikan border, had been killed by Portuguese patrols. It was in order to put an end to such barbarous doings that UDENAMO was proposing that an international group of journalists should visit Mozambique with a view to learning about the situation.

49. He added that he could make available to Committee members who might wish to see them certain photographs taken in Mozambique and showing the wretched conditions in which the indigenous inhabitants lived.

50. Mr. MGONJA (Tanganyika) thanked the petitioners for their information, which made it clear that the Africans were being used as targets for NATO. That should bring back memories to the independent African States which had long suffered under domination and oppression by the so-called free world. Tanganyika, for its part, was determined to carry on the fight until the whole of Africa had been liberated

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.