



Chairman: Mr. Keith JOHNSON (Jamaica).

AGENDA ITEM 66

Question of Namibia (*continued*) (A/8388,  
A/8423/Add.3 (part I), A/C.4/735/Add.1)

HEARING OF PETITIONERS (*continued*)

*The meeting began immediately after the showing of the film announced at the 1921st meeting.*

*Tribute to the memory of His Excellency Mr. Ramón Villeda Morales, Permanent Representative of Honduras to the United Nations*

1. The CHAIRMAN expressed deep regret at the sudden death of Mr. Ramón Villeda Morales, Permanent Representative of Honduras to the United Nations, and on behalf of the Fourth Committee expressed condolences to his family and to the people and Government of Honduras. He asked the members of the Committee to observe a minute of silence in tribute to his memory.

2. Mrs. COLMANT (Honduras), speaking on behalf of the Government and the people of Honduras, expressed gratitude for the tribute paid by the Committee to the memory of Mr. Ramón Villeda Morales, Permanent Representative of Honduras to the United Nations.

*Requests for hearings (continued)*

REQUEST CONCERNING NAMIBIA (AGENDA ITEM 66), TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION (AGENDA ITEM 67) AND SOUTHERN RHODESIA (AGENDA ITEM 68) (A/C.4/736)

3. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to document A/C.4/736, containing a request for a hearing submitted by Mr. Romesh Chandra, Secretary General of the World Peace Council, in connexion with the questions of Namibia, Territories under Portuguese administration and Southern Rhodesia. He asked whether the Committee wished to grant the hearing.

4. Mr. DA COSTA LOBO (Portugal) expressed his delegation's reservations concerning the request contained in document A/C.4/736, which were based on the reasons set out in an earlier statement and were applicable to any other requests for hearings which might be made with regard to the Portuguese Territories.

5. The CHAIRMAN said that, if there were no other objections, he would consider that the Committee decided to grant the hearing requested.

*It was so decided.*

6. The CHAIRMAN recalled that at the preceding meeting the Committee had decided to grant the request for a hearing submitted by Miss Barbara J. Rogers, of the Friends of Namibia Committee in London.

*At the invitation of the Chairman, Miss Barbara J. Rogers, representative of the Friends of Namibia Committee, took a place at the Committee table.*

7. Miss ROGERS (Friends of Namibia Committee) said that she wished to inform the Committee of the results of almost two years of study on South Africa and Namibia, in particular their relations with the United Kingdom and the United Nations, and to present some proposals for constructive action to put an end to South Africa's presence in that Territory.

8. Between June and August of the current year she had visited the so-called Bantustans in South Africa and the Territory of Namibia, obtaining first-hand information on the situation and on the feelings and aspirations of the indigenous people. Of all the questions involved in the problem of southern Africa, the question of Namibia was the one which offered the greatest scope for constructive action from outside.

9. The International Court of Justice, in giving its Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971 on Namibia,<sup>1</sup> had declared unequivocally that legal responsibility for Namibia rested with the General Assembly of the United Nations. It could be held that that authority had been delegated, by General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, to the United Nations Council for Namibia. South Africa's occupation of Namibia was illegal, and it was under a legal obligation to withdraw without delay. Everything that happened in that area of the world was now the responsibility of the international community, and a failure to act constructively also carried heavy responsibilities. Opportunities were open to the United Nations for action outside the sphere of the Security Council, which did not depend on the invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter. The Fourth Committee, therefore, should be under no illusions as to its responsibility for advising the General Assembly on

<sup>1</sup> See *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971.

courses of action which should be adopted to implement the Court's decision and to ensure that Member States fulfilled the obligations resulting from the Advisory Opinion.

10. Those countries which refused to accept the Opinion were trying to evade their own responsibilities under the Charter. It should be noted that, among the great Powers, the Soviet Union had commented favourably on the Opinion and the United States had announced that it was prepared to accept it. France and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, had stated that they did not agree with certain aspects of the Opinion and had decided not to accept it. That attitude hardly reflected the traditional respect of those countries for the rule of law in international relations. The Court's Advisory Opinion carried great weight and authority. By rejecting it so casually, the United Kingdom and France had put themselves in the company of South Africa. That rejection of the authority of the International Court was very damaging to the whole judicial process. It was in the vital interests of small States, especially those of the Third World, to insist that the permanent members of the Security Council should recognize the authority of the Court in that matter. The Advisory Opinion gave them increased scope for action on matters of concern to them and had begun to create a situation where the rule of the law, rather than the rule of the strongest, should prevail in international relations.

11. She had visited the Territory about one month after the International Court had announced its Opinion and had been able to observe personally the effect of that decision on the people of Namibia. The reaction had been immediate and enthusiastic, as that was the first time that most of them, particularly the uneducated, had realized that the outside world was concerned with their situation. All the people she had spoken to were outspoken in their condemnation of South African rule and were impatiently waiting for the United Nations to act to give effect to the judgement. The representatives of South Africa, on the other hand, had chosen to give prominence to the articles written by carefully selected foreign journalists who had made an official tour of Namibia. She had preferred to obtain her impressions from the Namibian people themselves, who said that the South Africans had stage-managed the operation from start to finish, excluding anyone with independent views and selecting only those journalists who were likely to accept the official line.

12. The supposed backwardness of the indigenous people, emphasized in the strip of official film used by the BBC, which had just been shown, and which had been made at the suggestion of the Friends of Namibia Committee, was a complete fiction. Far from not wanting to be disturbed, the Namibians were furious at their enforced separation from the outside world. One of the most bitter things for them was the restriction of movement across the "police line", the establishment of which had coincided with the Court's decision, with an outbreak of yellow fever serving as pretext. Only whites had been allowed access to inoculation, apart from teachers and medical staff. It was that kind of blatant injustice and discrimination that was most resented by the Ovambos and other Namibians. They also hated the pass laws which, apart from being a constant reminder of their regimentation by the occupying Power,

prevented them from making contact with each other. Everyone she had spoken to in Windhoek and Ovamboland had emphasized that there were no racial groups among the Africans in Namibia, but only a Namibian people divided by force by the occupying Power.

13. The idea that the Namibian people did not know what they wanted was also unfounded. Interviews with large numbers of non-whites in Namibia had revealed that, on the contrary, they were highly conscious of the issue with regard to their own human rights and rejected the administration of South Africa. Convincing evidence of that could be seen in the public expressions of opinion in the face of threats and intimidation by the South African police and army. The Rehoboth Bastards, the Hereros and the Ovambos welcomed the Court's decision and claimed their rights. Many high school students had dared to state that they rejected South African rule, and many others had written to the United Nations emphasizing South Africa's violation of their human rights. The head of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) had also made a statement welcoming the Court's decision and asserting the right of the Namibian people to reject South African rule. Very strong statements of support had also been made by the two largest churches in Namibia, the Finnish Lutheran and the Rhenish Missions churches, whose membership was well over half the total population of the Territory. In short, the people felt so grateful for that expression of sympathy from the international community that they were willing to risk reprisals to express publicly their support for the judgement. That danger had been averted for the time being by South African nervousness over international opinion now focused on Namibia. If the illegal occupation was allowed to continue, the consequences for those who made public statements of support of the Court's decision and the United Nations could be very severe. Unfortunately, those courageous statements did not appear to have influenced the United Kingdom and France.

14. South Africa had presented, in Mr. Muller's statement at the 1584th meeting of the Security Council, a rosy picture of development in a land of primitive people. In her opinion much of that statement was totally irrelevant; the statistics cited did not reflect reality and the claims based on the supposed evidence were false. It was true that some money had been spent on development in Namibia, but it bore no relation to the fortunes being plundered from the Territory. If as shown in the film, the desert was advancing, it was largely due to traditional Boer farming techniques, which exhausted the soil very quickly. Mr. Muller had referred at length to the exploitation of water resources but he had forgotten to mention, for example, that, as they travelled into town from their ghetto, Khomasdal, where water was strictly rationed, the Coloureds of Windhoek saw whites watering their lawns. As in South Africa, everything was developed for the good of the white minority. Malnutrition of children was widespread, but the whites were too comfortable to take much notice of that. One item of statistics that the South Africans did not cite was the infant mortality rate. Though there were no official statistics, Namibia was the only country in the world whose population was not increasing at all. That meant either that the South Africans were falsifying their figures to minimize the importance of the African population, or that something very sinister indeed was happening in the Territory.

15. In the face of that dismal picture, what was the United Nations to say and do? The first question that arose was that of a plebiscite. South Africa's offer of a plebiscite, made to the International Court, aroused suspicions that the offer was a device to delay the work of the Court. The proposal had been supported, by implication, by the representatives of France and the United Kingdom. The Africans in Namibia, particularly in Ovamboland, were unanimously opposed to the idea because they assumed that it would be conducted by South Africa in the same way as the earlier so-called plebiscite, which had made a mockery of the whole concept and whose result bore no relation to the people's real feelings about South African administration. If the South Africans wished to propose another plebiscite, they should agree to the conditions normally imposed for plebiscites conducted by the United Nations. SWAPO had formulated six conditions for any plebiscite, which included, *inter alia*, withdrawal of the South African administration, the presence of international observers and the return of all political prisoners and exiles—a particularly important condition for the people in Namibia. However, the South Africans were not prepared to accept those conditions because they realized that a plebiscite conducted in that way would be disastrous for them. The people were tired of their rule and were prevented from speaking out only by reprisals and intimidation.

16. The decisive point about a plebiscite was the option offered to the people. It would be an insult to the people of Namibia to ask them to opt between deciding their own future and forfeiting such a right. That was in effect what they would be asked to do in choosing between an illegal, unrepresentative régime and the possibility of self-determination, which was the policy of the United Nations.

17. As to the constructive action which the United Nations could undertake, she noted that it depended on some structure within the Organization that was able to take initiatives and in particular to legislate for the external relations of the Territory and then enforce the law in that respect. Although a few States might choose to reject the International Court's decision vesting legal authority in the United Nations, that decision was applicable in many cases, particularly international transactions, thus allowing litigation to take place.

18. The appropriate United Nations body might do that, either in the International Court or in national courts, as a legal personality or acting as a State bearing responsibility for a Territory.

19. At the present time the competent United Nations organ would be the United Nations Council for Namibia, which could be strengthened and rationalized. The Council's composition could easily be reorganized to make it more effective. In particular, it would be valuable if the delegations concerned could nominate an expert to serve on the Council in his own name. It would also be useful to appoint a permanent Commissioner for Namibia as proposed in General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V).

20. It would appear from the Advisory Opinion that all licences and concessions issued by South Africa since 1966 were invalid, unless confirmed by the United Nations. That

ought to be made relatively easy in order to encourage companies with doubts about supporting South Africa to start negotiations with the United Nations as the legal authority. Foreign companies investing in Namibia were vulnerable at the point where dividends were repatriated. An enormous proportion of the gross national product was exported in that form. If that flow of money could be challenged, or brought under even the partial control of the United Nations, it would represent a major victory. That could be done by individuals or organizations in the countries concerned, and such actions were in fact being contemplated in the United Kingdom and the United States.

21. Payments made illegally to the South African Government since 1966 for the use of Namibian resources would be considered recoverable from that Government. Conversely, the expenditure of money or resources properly belonging to the Namibian people and which had not been licensed by the United Nations would be considered as stolen property and thus permit demands to be presented for reparations as stated in the Advisory Opinion.

22. The question might also arise as to the legal status of goods in transit to and from Namibia and the use of patents and industrial and technological licences within the Territory.

23. Double taxation agreements protected investors in Namibia from paying tax to their home Government. Like all treaties and international agreements, they had to be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. Under Article 102 of the Charter, no such treaty or agreement could be invoked before any organ of the United Nations if it had not been registered.

24. In the light of the Advisory Opinion, double taxation agreements with South Africa concerning Namibia were illegal, and the United Nations Secretariat should therefore be requested to remove them from the register of international treaties. There were no precedents for such a step, but the effect would be to nullify the agreements or at least make it impossible to invoke international law to enforce them. That would achieve a major objective of the United Nations in the preliminary stages of its programme, namely, establishing the initiative and devising new forms of pressure for any Powers refusing to fulfil their international legal obligations.

25. As an alternative, the United Nations Secretariat could add a rider to all double taxation agreements covering Namibia to the effect that they did not apply to the Territory. The first method would be preferable, however. Since South Africa was dependent on foreign capital, taxation agreements were vital to it.

26. Where the specialized agencies were concerned, Article 103 of the Charter was crucial, since the United Nations having declared South Africa's occupation of Namibia illegal, it could request the specialized agencies to suspend South Africa from the privileges of membership so long as it failed to fulfil its obligations under international law. The United Nations Council for Namibia should as a matter of priority establish its claim with all the agencies to represent Namibia. In many forums, such as the humanitarian

agencies, the International Labour Organisation and the Economic Commission for Africa, the African States and their allies had a majority and could easily decide to admit the Council as the legal authority. In other more important agencies, notably the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, it might not be possible to achieve so much because of the preponderance of the Western Powers. It was essential, however, that pressure be brought to bear and that South Africa's claim to represent Namibia be challenged at every opportunity.

27. Where individual States were concerned, the United Nations Council for Namibia should initiate correspondence especially with South Africa's major trading partners. One of the topics should be the question of diplomatic representation in Namibia, in contravention of Security Council resolution 283 (1970). The Federal Republic of Germany in particular should be approached, since it had recently appointed a new consul in Windhoek. It also maintained cultural and economic links with Namibia, and large numbers of German tourists and emigrants travelled to Windhoek directly from the Federal Republic of Germany.

28. Another topic that should be raised with Governments was the provision of export credits and investment guarantees for firms involved in Namibia. It would be extremely useful for the United Nations Council for Namibia to correspond with the United Kingdom on the subject of trade and investment concessions provided for South Africa, which were specifically extended to Namibia. Those were anachronisms dating back to South Africa's membership of the Commonwealth. They consisted of Commonwealth Preferences, which gave South African exports an enormous advantage in the British market, and exemption from exchange control, which meant that British investors could transfer unlimited amounts of capital to South Africa and Namibia. The preference would inevitably disappear when the United Kingdom entered the European Economic Community, and the same might be true of the investment concessions. The United Nations Council for Namibia might request the United Kingdom Government to remove immediately the privileges with regard to Namibia. It might be convenient and logical to remove the privileges for South Africa at the same time.

29. In spite of the terms of Article 2, paragraph 5 of the Charter, the United Kingdom was virtually subsidizing South Africa by protecting its exports and offering unlimited inflows of capital to cushion its balance-of-payments problems. In 1969 the subsidy, in the sense of the deficit to the British balance of payments, had amounted to almost £100 million. South Africa was in fact highly dependent on such hidden subsidies from the United Kingdom and other countries. It enjoyed all the benefits of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, while in fact violating rules and being one of the most protectionist of nations.

30. She wished to propose that countries sympathetic to the application of pressure to ensure a favourable solution to the Namibian issue should agree to impose a tariff of 5 per cent on all imports from South Africa, rising at regular intervals by another 5 per cent if the illegal

occupation continued. Such a step, which was easy to take since it would not require legislative action, would produce revenue, some of which could perhaps be used for a Trust Fund for Namibia.

31. The position of the United Kingdom previous to the International Court's Advisory Opinion had been that South Africa had forfeited the right to administer the Mandate but that in the absence of any statement of international law on the issue, the obvious conclusion that South Africa was therefore in Namibia without any right, in illegal occupation, need not be admitted. During the debate on General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), the United Kingdom representative had pointed to a number of legal questions affecting the future of the Territory on which the Assembly had had no guidance from the Court. The conclusions which the Assembly had been obliged to reach from a study of the legal and factual aspects of the question of South West Africa had been that, by its disavowal of the obligations under the Mandate, the South African Government had forfeited the right to administer the Mandate.

32. She wondered whether, when the United Kingdom representative had referred to "dialogue" in the Security Council meeting of 6 October (1598th meeting), he had had in mind the process by which South Africa offered "aid" as the price of dominating a neighbouring country economically, politically and militarily, instead of coming to terms with the aspirations of its people. For the United Kingdom, dialogue seemed to be synonymous with "appeasement"; but appeasement was the way to war, not peace.

33. The consequences of the United Kingdom policy—discredit in the United Nations and third-world attacks on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—were not the result of deliberate policy, but rather of an absence of coherent policy and of any long-term strategy in Britain's real interests. Life in the international community demanded the fulfilment of some minimum obligations, the observance of certain norms of behaviour and the assignment of priority to the general good over personal interest. By rejecting the Opinion of the International Court of Justice, the United Kingdom had reasserted a view of international law which most States Members of the United Nations had discarded decades ago; with France, it had put itself firmly on the side of South Africa against the world community.

34. Summing up, she observed that South Africa maintained that its control of Namibia presented no threat to peace. The Western Powers could accept that rationalization and continue protecting their economic and other interests while closing their eyes to the privations and struggle of the Namibian people, for whom there was no peace and no security because there was no justice. The Preamble to the Charter, however, gave equal weight to human rights and fundamental freedoms and to the maintenance of peace and security.

35. The people of Namibia had first appealed to the United Nations through the Reverend Michael Scott two decades previously. The issue had thus been kept alive, while subsequent appeals had given some added impetus. The representatives of the majority of the Namibian people had welcomed the International Court's Opinion, rejected

South Africa's illegal administration and appealed to the United Nations to take action which would restore to them their basic human rights. She asked what more the United Nations needed in order to act. If bloodshed and threats to the peace were needed, South Africa had provided them in militarizing the Caprivi Strip and in violating Zambian territory. The Prime Minister of South Africa, an unrepentant Nazi, had ordered his troops to pursue even as far as Lusaka the freedom fighters who were waging the United Nations own battles. It should be recalled that they had been forced to take up arms by the decision of the International Court of Justice in 1966 not to resolve the dispute.<sup>2</sup> The United Nations was accordingly responsible for every death of a freedom fighter as it was a direct result of its refusal to fulfil its responsibilities.

36. For the United Nations, set up "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", that fact was a blight from which it could not easily recover. It would not be forgotten by those who, like the Members of the United Nations, were determined "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained".

37. She did not advocate the use of force or the application of Chapter VII, but she did ask that some constructive work be done by the competent organs of the United Nations towards ending South Africa's occupation of Namibia, and that Member States observe their legal obligations under the Charter.

38. Mr. ABDILLEH (Somalia), supported by Mr. ALDEGHATHER (Saudi Arabia), Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus), Mr. TEYMOUR (Egypt), Mr. RAOUF (Iraq), Mr. ANDERSON (Jamaica) and Mr. OULD HACHÈME (Mauritania), proposed that the statement by Miss Rogers should be issued *in extenso* in view of the important information and suggestions in it.

39. Mr. KHAN (Pakistan) thanked Miss Rogers for her excellent report on Namibia and suggested that it be drawn to the special notice of the international community and the members of the Committee.

40. Mr. TOMEH (Syrian Arab Republic) asked Miss Rogers whether the policy of the Labour Government of the United Kingdom with regard to South Africa had differed from that of the current Government, and whether the delivery of helicopters to South Africa, which had been mentioned in the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, the Special Committee dealing with colonial countries and peoples and elsewhere, had caused a reaction on the part of the British people. Since South Africa was producing missiles and arms on a large scale, the petitioner might wish to comment on that problem and the reaction to it in Africa. He noted that Miss Rogers had called Mr. Vorster an "unrepentant Nazi"; he asked her whether there were links between Mr. Vorster and any European States. Furthermore, he would like to know whether any non-European countries were co-operating with South Africa.

<sup>2</sup> See *South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966*.

41. Miss ROGERS, replying to the first question, said that, generally speaking, there had been no basic changes. The somewhat more rigid position currently adopted by the United Kingdom Government resulted from action by high-ranking civil servants who possessed all the necessary information, but did not allow it to be published. With regard to the second question, she said that the sale of helicopters had caused a widespread reaction in the United Kingdom. Many organizations which were working against what they considered the betrayal of United Nations policy, and the public in general, were opposed to the sale of arms. It was essential that the United Nations should bring pressure to bear and co-ordinate its action with that of individuals and organizations in various countries. With regard to the large-scale production of arms by South Africa, that country was not only trying to obtain weapons from the United Kingdom and France to defend its territory and what it called "Western Christian civilization", but was also in a position to manufacture weapons as a result of the co-operation of Imperial Chemical Industries, which was controlled by British interests. South Africa was being transformed into an armed camp; force was used both there and in Namibia to control the population. South Africa's forces were concentrating on anti-guerrilla warfare. There might also be a risk of attacks on other countries: the Caprivi base constituted a direct threat to Zambia.

42. With regard to Mr. Vorster's political ideology, she quoted a statement he had made in 1943 before being interned as a saboteur, in which he had said that his political creed, known as fascism in Italy and nazism in Germany, was called "Christian nationalism" in South Africa. All his activities indicated a nazi attitude, but some European States had decided to ignore that fact and to co-operate with him. There were obvious links with the Federal Republic of Germany, which was pouring great quantities of financial and human resources into Namibia. Thousands of Germans who had supported the Nazis during the Second World War were currently in Namibia, where many war criminals had taken refuge.

43. With regard to the question whether non-European countries were co-operating with South Africa, she said that in a certain sense all countries were co-operating with it directly or indirectly. Furthermore, Japan and the United States were increasing their commitments in South Africa.

44. Mr. TOMEH (Syrian Arab Republic) asked whether other countries, too, were collaborating with South Africa and whether the petitioner was aware of the list of countries having links with South Africa drawn up by the Special Committee on *Apartheid*. He would also like to know whether she was familiar with that Committee's activities.

45. Miss ROGERS replied that some important African countries, too, had links with South Africa, ignoring the negative consequences which those relations could have for them. South Africa, which was the most developed country in Africa and had a powerful industrial complex, needed the large market for its manufactures provided by the developing countries of the continent. As a result of the current economic process whereby the prices of raw materials were declining while those of manufactures increased, those countries would become South Africa's

economic captives. If Malawi associated itself economically with South Africa, its balance of payments would eventually suffer. South African interests in that country would obtain a form of control over it. Consequently, she hoped that no other African countries would follow Malawi's example.

46. With regard to the last question, she said that she had participated in the work of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, which had made her visit to Namibia possible. She was not in a position to pass judgement on the Committee's work, but felt that it could be very useful to anyone, like herself, who was deeply interested in Namibian problems.

47. Mr. RAOUF (Iraq) said that Miss Rogers' constructive suggestions, if approved and implemented, would do much to help weaken South Africa's presence in Namibia. He nevertheless felt that the most serious obstacle was precisely the physical presence of South Africa in the Territory, and he wondered whether the petitioner had any idea as to how it might be eliminated. Furthermore, he proposed that in addition to the petitioner's statement, the questions put by representatives and Miss Rogers' replies thereto should be reproduced *in extenso*.

48. Miss ROGERS said that the theoretical courses of action open to the United Nations were clearly set out in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. She herself was interested in practical possibilities. She did not advocate the use of force, although that was a course which the United Nations could lawfully choose to take. However, she doubted that it would do so. That being so, economic measures would be the most effective way of exerting pressure on South Africa. Despite its apparent prosperity, South Africa was experiencing financial difficulties and its trade balance was deteriorating. One effective method would be the application of sanctions designed to limit South Africa's export income, which permitted it to maintain the level of living of the electorate which was keeping the South African Government in power. Another method, which she had already mentioned in her statement, would be the imposition of tariffs.

49. Mr. TENTHANI (Zambia) praised the petitioner's excellent description of South Africa's activities in Namibia and her proposals, which would certainly be very useful to the Committee. He also thanked her for having drawn the Committee's attention to the violations and acts of aggression against Zambia committed by South Africa.

50. Mr. TEYMOUR (Egypt) asked the petitioner whether she thought that military aid to South Africa was as important as economic aid, and whether other countries in other regions were providing South Africa with assistance, including military technical assistance. He considered it important not only to determine whether France and the United Kingdom were supplying South Africa with large quantities of arms, but also whether other countries were supplying it with light weapons. Other countries in Europe and the Middle East were also co-operating with South Africa.

51. Miss ROGERS said that she specialized in economic, not military matters. Nevertheless, it was clear that military

aid went further than the mere supply of arms. A good example was the delivery of aircraft by the United Kingdom and France, the technical assistance provided by Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, the light aircraft supplied by the United States and the provision of anti-guerrilla equipment, especially transportation equipment.

52. She agreed with the view of the representative of Egypt that the military sphere was very important.

*Miss Rogers withdrew.*

53. Mr. TEYMOUR (Egypt) said that in order to avoid difficulties and delays in circulating the complete text of the petitioner's statement, he would like it to be circulated to members of the Committee as a working paper. He did not think anyone would object to the text being reproduced *in extenso*.

54. Mr. RIFAI (Secretary of the Committee) said that if the Committee decided to have the petitioner's statement reproduced *in extenso*, he would have to inform it of the financial implications of that step. The circulation of the document might be delayed for some days owing to the current heavy workload. If the Committee decided to have the statement circulated in English only, it would be available in a couple of days.

55. Mr. TOMEH (Syrian Arab Republic) endorsed the comments made by the representative of Egypt. The fact that there had been no objection to the idea of reproducing the petitioner's statement *in extenso* indicated the tacit approval of the members of the Committee.

56. Mr. MANET (France) said that although he did not think it necessary to reproduce Miss Rogers' statement *in extenso*, if the Committee decided otherwise, the statement should be circulated not only in English but in the other working languages as well.

57. Mr. AHMAD (India) recalled that at the previous meeting, when he had proposed that the statement by the Reverend Michael Scott should be reproduced *in extenso*, he had pointed out that South Africa was spending millions of dollars on propaganda, in addition to the free propaganda given it by its main trading partners.

58. If there were financial difficulties, they did not derive from the *in extenso* reproduction of statements but from other reasons, known to all.

59. The full text of the statements was of fundamental importance to research workers, and was also necessary in order to inform future generations and history of the Committee's work.

60. Although he considered it necessary to reproduce the statement *in extenso*, he believed that it could be reproduced in mimeographed form.

61. Mr. RIFAI (Secretary of the Committee) said that if the proposal of Somalia, as amended by Iraq, was adopted, the financial implications would be \$105 per page if a

transcript of the sound recording was used, and \$100 per page if the document prepared by Miss Rogers was used.

*Since there were no objections, it was decided that the statement of the petitioner, as well as the subsequent questions and answers, should be reproduced in extenso.*<sup>3</sup>

***Organization of work (continued) (A/C.4/734)***

62. The CHAIRMAN observed that at the next meeting, to be held on Monday morning, the Committee would

<sup>3</sup> The complete text of the statement was subsequently circulated as document A/C.4/738; that of the questions and answers, as document A/C.4/738/Add.1.

begin its general debate on Namibia, Territories under Portuguese administration and Southern Rhodesia. He urged the members of the Committee to be ready to participate in the debate. If a delegation wished to make more than one statement, it could do so. At that meeting, the Rapporteur of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples would introduce chapters VI, VII and VIII of that Committee's report, concerning southern Africa.

*The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.*