



Chairman: Mr. Zdeněk ČERNÍK
(Czechoslovakia).

AGENDA ITEM 66

Question of Southern Rhodesia (*continued*) (A/8650,
A/8663, A/8664, A/8723/Add.1, A/8759 and Add.1)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. PSONČAK (Yugoslavia) said that his country's approach to the problem of Southern Rhodesia had been set forth in detail in the Security Council just over a month previously.¹ Concerning appropriate means for solving that serious international problem, the representative of Yugoslavia had said that the rejection of the draft resolution submitted by Guinea, Mali and the Sudan because of the negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council was regrettable and gave cause for further grave concern.² By vetoing that draft resolution on Southern Rhodesia, in which basic principles were set out for the solution of the problem,³ the United Kingdom, as administering Power, had shown that it was not prepared to make any positive move in the matter. Because of that, the world community should keep a close watch on developments in Southern Rhodesia.

2. The purpose of the draft resolution that had been vetoed in the Security Council had been to establish a minimum platform and strategy for more resolute and effective measures against Ian Smith's illegal racist régime and lend support to the legitimate struggle of the people of Zimbabwe for freedom and independence. The repeated failures of the Security Council might possibly be encouraging the illegal Salisbury régime to maintain its intransigent attitude and to continue to defy the international community. Since the publication of the Pearce Commission's report⁴ on the rejection of the proposals for a settlement by the great majority of the African population, the racist régime had been resorting to ever more drastic measures in order to suppress resistance. However, the firm resolve of the people of Zimbabwe to persevere in their struggle, their political maturity and the courage they had shown in insisting that the problem should be

solved on the basis of the principles "one man, one vote" and "no independence without majority rule" showed that even the most brutal intimidation could not change the categorical rejection by the people of Zimbabwe of the agreement between Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Ian Smith.

3. The Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, the imprisoned leader of Zimbabwe, had sent a letter to Sir Alec Douglas-Home in which he had explained that if the Africans had accepted the proposals for economic reasons, they would have worsened their own political position without improving their economic position, thereby placing themselves completely at the mercy of the white man. If the Africans had agreed to the proposals, it would have been tantamount to passing a vote of confidence in the racist Government, which could then claim that it had the full support of the African people. Fortunately the Africans had seen the trap. The Reverend N. Sithole had gone on to say that another consideration which had weighed heavily with the African population was the intended legalization of the unilateral declaration of independence. If the Africans had accepted the proposals, it would have helped to legalize the declaration, which would have been a form of political suicide. The author of the letter had further stated that the rejection of the proposals would not cause the African population any new suffering. The physical suffering which resulted from lack of food, water, clothing and shelter was bearable, but the spiritual suffering caused by oppression, exploitation and humiliation was quite unbearable. The African people had known very well that when they rejected the proposals, their suffering would be intensified, but it was a price which they had been prepared to pay to achieve self-determination in the land of their birth. In considering, subsequently, the principles and methods conducive to a lasting and peaceful solution to the problem, the Reverend N. Sithole had reminded Sir Alec Douglas-Home that the Rhodesian Government had been elected by an exclusively white electorate and therefore did not in any sense represent African opinion. The results of the inquiry undertaken by the Pearce Commission had amply demonstrated that the Government was out of touch with African feeling. If a compromise solution implied acceptance of a watered-down form of white supremacy, the African people could not agree to it. Nor could they agree to any compromise involving independence for the minority even under conditions that were very favourable for the Africans. There could be no compromise on majority rule. The African people knew from bitter experience what minority rule meant politically, economically, socially, educationally and judicially.

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year*, 1664th meeting.

² *Ibid.*, 1666th meeting.

³ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1972*, document S/10805/Rev.1.

⁴ *Rhodesia: Report of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion under the Chairmanship of the Right Honourable the Lord Pearce*, Cmd. 4964 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972).

4. It should therefore be understood from the outset that not only were the people of Zimbabwe conscious of their rights but that they were prepared to fight for them and, in so doing, they expected assistance and support from the world community. The obligations of the General Assembly and other United Nations bodies were all the greater in that the United Kingdom, as administering Power, was not only reluctant to take more energetic measures to remove the illegal minority régime but was also, through the use of its veto, preventing the Security Council from taking effective action. World public opinion was demanding with growing insistence that the necessary steps should be taken to enable the people of Zimbabwe to achieve self-determination and independence. Accordingly, the Yugoslav delegation would be prepared to support any resolution designed to attain those ends.

5. Mr. PETROPOULOS (Greece) said that the process of decolonization had met with many difficulties and setbacks. In Southern Rhodesia, the international community was faced with an illegal régime which was continuing to consolidate its position despite a universal outcry and the application of sanctions by the United Nations. Although the sanctions had not yet yielded significant results, the Greek delegation believed that their further enforcement would have a great impact inside Southern Rhodesia. The financial circles which were currently supporting Ian Smith would, sooner or later, have to consider who was responsible for the decline in their business fortunes.

6. Furthermore, public opinion in Southern Rhodesia could not always turn a deaf ear to the message of universal condemnation of the régime and would eventually no longer be prepared to accept the state of isolation in which the Territory lived. When matters reached that point, the inevitable fall of Ian Smith would not merely signify the departure of a scapegoat; it would also symbolize the beginning of a new era in Southern Rhodesia. The United Nations might have to meet several times more before the question of Southern Rhodesia was resolved, but the international community should not underestimate the importance of the sanctions just because of temporary disappointments.

7. For its part, Greece had taken administrative and legislative measures to apply an all-inclusive system of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. As a result, not only had it discontinued all trade with Southern Rhodesia—as could be seen from the relevant statistics transmitted to the Secretary-General—but it had also prevented Greek ships from carrying cargo to or from Southern Rhodesia. The magnitude of the Greek contribution to the sanctions system, especially in the field of transport, could be gauged from the size of its merchant fleet.

8. But the United Nations was not only employing coercive measures against the Salisbury régime; it was also endeavouring to assist the local population in their educational needs through the programme of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories. Greece contributed to that programme by

granting a number of scholarships each year to students from Southern Rhodesia to enable them to study in Greece. Furthermore, in compliance with United Nations resolutions, Greece had decided not to maintain consular relations with Southern Rhodesia in spite of the fact that there were Greek communities in the Territory.

9. Mr. NGERAGEZE (Rwanda) congratulated the members and the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples on their work, and the representatives of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) on the helpful statements they had made to the Committee (1988th meeting). His delegation, which had been pleased to find them attending the meetings of the Committee as observers, hoped that they would soon take part in the debates as full members of the Organization.

10. Rwanda's position on the question of Southern Rhodesia was unequivocal. As his country's Minister for International Co-operation had stated at the 2054th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 5 October 1972, Rwanda had always condemned the racist policy applied by the white minority to the detriment of the black peoples of Rhodesia. The Minister had then reaffirmed the determination of the people of Rwanda to give their unreserved support to the national liberation movements of southern Africa without, however, losing sight of the possibility of achieving the same objective by peaceful means. Rwanda had always complied with the political and economic sanctions imposed against Southern Rhodesia by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations. A Presidential Order of 1 February 1964 provided that, until there was a change in the situation, Rwanda would establish no diplomatic or consular relations with Southern Rhodesia. The import of goods from Southern Rhodesia had also been banned and Rwanda's airports were closed to aircraft registered or chartered by Southern Rhodesia. Such aircraft were also forbidden to fly over Rwandese territory. All those provisions were reproduced in documents A/8758 and A/8759.

11. The complicity of the economic and financial interests of the Western Powers and, in particular, of the United Kingdom was the main obstacle to self-determination for the people of Zimbabwe. The situation had not changed appreciably during the current year. The rebel régime had maintained its discriminatory policy and was continuing to apply principles of the kind that made it impossible for Africans to progress beyond parity of representation with the Europeans in the House of Assembly, as well as the provisions governing land ownership and occupation—which in effect divided the land of Southern Rhodesia, apart from certain areas designated national land or unreserved land, almost equally between Europeans and Africans—and the provisions enabling it to detain persons arbitrarily. The so-called amendments to the 1969 "Constitution" had served only to maintain the privileges of the minority over the majority.

12. Progress towards majority rule to be achieved through the establishment of a new African electoral roll, which would include only those Africans with an educational and financial status equal to that required of persons registered on the European roll, was illusory in view of the educational restrictions imposed upon Africans and the fact that most property was in the hands of Europeans. The main public and private services were mostly run by Europeans, and even the agricultural sector, an important source of resources for the Africans, was about to fall into the hands of the European settlers. The Land Tenure Act, which reserved half of the land for the European minority, played a significant role in that respect.

13. As long as that situation lasted, it would be impossible to support the granting of independence to Southern Rhodesia or the abolition of the political and economic sanctions imposed upon that country. The nonchalant attitude of the United Kingdom, which bore immense responsibilities in the matter, was disquieting. First of all the United Kingdom should intensify efforts to find means of enabling the people of Zimbabwe to attain self-determination as soon as possible. Instead, the administering Power had not only failed to react energetically to the seizure of power by the rebels but had actually persisted in discussing the question of the independence of the people of Zimbabwe with those rebels when it should have discussed the matter with the party directly concerned, namely the people of Zimbabwe, as represented by the national liberation movement. Besides approving the so-called Constitution of 1969, the administering Power, through the use of the veto, had opposed the Security Council's resolutions on the matter. That callous attitude was simply a tactic designed to enable the rebel Government to consolidate its position by setting up political, economic and social institutions that suited its philosophy of supremacy.

14. It was clear that the colonialists would never adopt a policy designed to restore the rights of the subjugated people, for that would be tantamount to renouncing their own privileges. His delegation therefore urged the United Kingdom to alter its attitude and called on the United Nations to maintain the economic and political sanctions imposed on Southern Rhodesia, give material and moral support to the freedom fighters, promote a dynamic policy to improve the political position of the people of Zimbabwe and set up, as soon as possible, a commission to organize and supervise elections in which the entire population could take part.

15. Despite present difficulties and the obstinacy of the colonialists, Rwanda was convinced that the people of Zimbabwe would finally win their freedom. Meanwhile, Rwanda reaffirmed its unreserved support for the freedom fighters, who were demanding genuine national independence, and its categorical opposition to the racist and colonialist policy of the European settlers in Southern Rhodesia.

16. Mr. THUNE ANDERSEN (Denmark) commented on the thorough and objective manner in which the Pearce Commission had fulfilled the terms of refer-

ence assigned to it by the British Government. The conclusions arrived at in the report were quite clear: the people of Rhodesia as a whole did not find the proposals acceptable as a basis for independence.

17. His delegation was also favourably impressed by the political maturity of the African population of Southern Rhodesia. Although isolated from the rest of the world, the majority had clearly and courageously expressed its view that the proposals did not accord them dignity, justice or fair opportunities. One point had been clearly reaffirmed. A solution of the Rhodesian question must be acceptable to the population as a whole.

18. In the present situation, there was no alternative to the policy of sanctions, as had been confirmed in Security Council resolution 320 (1972) and in the statement made by the representative of ZANU in the Fourth Committee (1988th meeting).

19. His delegation believed that, despite the strengthening of the machinery established by the Security Council to ensure proper implementation of its resolutions, it was also necessary for all Member States to increase their vigilance in all matters relating to sanctions. He quoted a passage from Security Council resolution 318 (1972), which he hoped would underline the responsibility of all Member States to cooperate fully with the Committee established by the Council in pursuance of its resolution 253 (1968), not least when violations were committed by citizens of their own countries.

20. In that connexion, he informed the Committee that over the past two years violations by Danish firms or individuals of the pertinent Danish legislation implementing the decisions of the Security Council had been carefully investigated. That action had led to convictions resulting in confiscations and fines.

21. The results of the sanctions, apart from symbolizing the world community's determination to see an end to the oppressive policies of the Smith régime, had not been totally insignificant. However, with the combined efforts of the membership to strengthen the machinery, they might well assume even greater significance. In his delegation's view, it would hasten the attainment of the declared goal of the United Nations—to give the people of Rhodesia their inalienable right to self-determination—if Portugal and South Africa applied the sanctions. His delegation therefore made a further appeal to the Governments of those two countries to observe their obligations under the Charter.

22. The clear voice of the African people of Rhodesia must also be taken as a strong appeal to the Members of the United Nations to give them the opportunity fully to exercise their right to self-determination, and not only to accept or reject concrete proposals. If the people of Rhodesia were to be assisted, it must be borne in mind that real influence could only be exerted in Rhodesia, and in other troubled areas of southern Africa, through joint and realistic action within the

framework of the United Nations. That should be undertaken on the basis of the support and co-operation of a broad and representative part of the membership. His delegation reaffirmed its readiness to play its part in concerted efforts to secure for the people of Rhodesia their right to self-determination.

23. Mr. CHANG Yung-kuan (China) observed that, since the beginning of 1972, the Zimbabwe people had organized strikes, demonstrations and other forms of mass opposition, had frustrated the so-called "proposals for a settlement"⁵ aimed at perpetuating and legalizing the white racist régime, and had proclaimed the bankruptcy of the efforts of the Pearce Commission to dupe the masses. Not long ago, the Zimbabwe people, with the support of the African and other justice-loving peoples, had gained the victory of expelling the Rhodesian white colonialist authorities from the XXth Olympic Games. The Chinese delegation heartily rejoiced over those victories of the Zimbabwe people and wished them further and greater triumphs.

24. The white racist régime of Ian Smith was a direct product of British colonialist policy, and a criminal tool for the colonialists and neo-colonialists to repress the Zimbabwe people and oppose the independent African countries. The Rhodesian question was in essence the struggle of the Zimbabwe people against colonialist rule by the white racists.

25. Over a long period, the Rhodesian régime had promulgated more than 60 racially discriminatory laws and decrees, imposing upon the indigenous people a fascist rule and barbarous policies of racial discrimination in the political, economic, cultural and other fields. It had enforced the inhuman system of "contract labour", reducing the indigenous workers to mere slaves. It had formed a reactionary "holy alliance" with the colonialist authorities of South Africa and Portugal for joint repression of the national liberation movement of the peoples of southern Africa.

26. The racist Smith régime had further tightened its rule after the failure of the British-Rhodesian proposals for a settlement and the efforts of the Pearce Commission. It had carried out arbitrary arrests and had bought over a few local ruffians in an attempt to disintegrate and exterminate the national liberation movement of the Zimbabwe people, who now found themselves virtual prisoners in their own country. Colonialism, which had risen to power through exploitation and plunder, would never change its nature and its was only by becoming organized and united for the struggle that the people of Zimbabwe would be able to win national independence.

27. The struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism and for the achievement and defence of national independence reflected the fervent desire of the broad masses of the people, and it was therefore bound to be a mass struggle. It was only by mobilizing and organizing the broad masses with the constant aim

of weakening the strength of the enemy and enhancing the strength of the people that a movement could grow and become strong. At the same time, the mass struggle was bound to be multifarious. In the final analysis, however, the counter-revolutionary violence of the colonialists could be smashed only through the use of revolutionary violence. The Chinese delegation was convinced that by constantly assessing the positive and negative experiences in their struggle, by greatly increasing their vigilance against the enemy's plot of sowing discord and by constantly strengthening the militant unity of their own ranks, the people of Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa would surely achieve complete victory.

28. The Government and people of China understood the situation of the Zimbabwe people and resolutely supported their just struggle for national independence. The Chinese delegation held that that sacred right of the Zimbabwe people must be reaffirmed and that they should achieve their independence immediately, free from any foreign interference; that the racist Rhodesian régime should be severely condemned and compelled to release all political detainees; that the sanctions should be strengthened and broadened to include the colonialist authorities of South Africa and Portugal; that all violations of the relevant United Nations resolutions on sanctions against Southern Rhodesia should be severely condemned, including the continuing importation by the United States of chrome and nickel from Southern Rhodesia; and that all countries and peoples that cherished justice should be called upon to render greater assistance and material support to the Zimbabwe people.

29. Mr. GICHERO (Kenya) recalled that, in 1965, when the rebel Ian Smith unilaterally declared independence, the world did not treat the problem with the seriousness it deserved, a gross negligence which had resulted in a gradual consolidation of neo-apartheid, as recent events in Southern Rhodesia had shown. Little thought had been given to the fact that Portugal and South Africa were colonialist or racist Governments which protected the illegal régime. It was now necessary for the current session of the General Assembly, realizing that mistake, to face the problem squarely and not merely to adopt resolutions of condemnation which had no possibility of being implemented.

30. The Government of the United Kingdom had sought to push through a settlement regardless of whether it amounted to a sell-out of the African majority to white extremists. He noted with satisfaction that the Africans of Zimbabwe had unanimously rejected the proposals in question. Their refusal was a clear expression of their wish that there should be no independence before majority rule. Any settlement that failed to take that desire into account would be a camouflaged attempt to create another apartheid country like South Africa, since, after all, the South African problem had been created through the granting of independence by the United Kingdom to a minority racist group in its South African colony. The world community would be failing in its moral obligation if

⁵ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971*, document S/10405.

it stood by while the Smith régime reached a situation comparable to that of South Africa.

31. The sanctions against Southern Rhodesia had failed because their effects had been weakened by the actions of South Africa and Portugal, as well as by those of some other countries which had continued to trade with Rhodesia. It was therefore necessary to take practical steps to save the United Nations from the disaster of finding itself unable to deal with the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

32. The African countries, and in particular Zambia, had repeatedly pointed out that the situation in southern Africa was becoming worse since Western nations were sending arms to Rhodesia and investing in that country. It was characteristic of the super-Powers rhetorically to condemn the oppression of Africans by the racist régimes while they continued to allow profiteers from their own countries to violate the sanctions by trading in "strategic materials". The United Kingdom claimed that it alone maintained the sanctions, but it was evident that through the trading activities of British subsidiaries in South Africa, it continued to help the Smith régime.

33. His delegation therefore suggested, as a practical measure, that the sanctions should be extended to South Africa. That was not only possible, but it was the only practical method of dealing with the problem of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. It was possible for the world to blockade both South Africa and Rhodesia by maritime surveillance. In support of that view, he referred to a statement by David Owen, a Minister in the Labour Government, in his book *The Politics of Defence*.⁶

34. The reaction of the Western Powers to that idea, and particularly their reaction in the Security Council, showed that they would never support the authorization of the use of force against the minority racists. His delegation thought that a maritime blockade offered potentially one of the most effective ways of enforcing the authority of the United Nations with the minimum use of force. It should be recalled that Rhodesia had no direct link with South Africa and that trade between the two countries was effected through Botswana or Lourenço Marques. It was therefore clear that a blockade of those routes would directly affect Rhodesia.

35. In addition to their support of the illegal Rhodesian régime, South Africa and Portugal had committed far too many crimes against the African people in their defiance of the resolutions of the United Nations. A consolidated action against all of them was therefore necessary in order to break their unholy alliance. The time had now come for the United Kingdom to exercise its rights over Rhodesia, as its colony, in order to set free the African nationalist leaders who had been detained by Smith for years. His delegation called on the United Nations to instruct the Secretary-General to begin negotiations with the United Kingdom aimed at achieving the release of the nationalist leaders, who were the authentic leaders of the African people of Zimbabwe.

⁶ New York, Taplinger, 1972.

36. The Kenyan delegation therefore proposed that, instead of seeking to reach a settlement which would amount to a betrayal of the African majority of Zimbabwe, there should be a conference between all the interested parties under the auspices of the United Nations. His delegation considered that the world community could demonstrate its concern over the situation in Rhodesia by convening such a conference in which African leaders, the United Kingdom and whites from the Ian Smith group would participate and the purpose of which would be to put an end to the rebellion and to establish the machinery for achieving a majority government. Secondly, his delegation proposed that the United Nations should call on Member States to seize any cargoes exported from Rhodesia in violation of the sanctions, that such cargoes should be sold and that the proceeds should be donated to the United Nations to be used for the refugees from southern Africa. He congratulated the Egyptian Government on having seized a cargo of Rhodesian tobacco and hoped that other nations would follow that example. Thirdly, his delegation proposed that the United Nations should call on the Governments of Member States to hold talks with those Governments which continued to trade with Southern Rhodesia and Portugal, with a view to persuading them to stop aiding the racist minorities and to take effective action against firms and businesses which broke the sanctions. In addition, the United Nations should, after informing them of its decision, give maximum publicity through all the public information media to the activities of those countries which violated the sanctions. Fourthly, his delegation proposed that the sanctions should be extended to communications and to any other activity which had been exempted so far.

37. Since 1945, at least 80 resolutions had been adopted on the question and he considered that the time had now come for the United Nations to solve the problem and to devote itself to other meaningful causes.

38. He extended his sympathy and compliments to Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania, countries which, in spite of having suffered from the effects of the sanctions—perhaps more than Smith's Rhodesia itself—had demonstrated their integrity and courage by calling for the reinforcement of the sanctions even though their own economies were jeopardized.

39. The majority of African countries, including the people of Zimbabwe, preferred to achieve their independence on the basis of majority rule and by peaceful means; consequently, it was deplorable that the régimes ruling Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Guinea (Bissau) and South Africa did not accept the principle of self-determination. Those white, minority, racist régimes insisted on maintaining a white country in southern Africa in defiance of world opinion.

40. Armed conflicts, of whatever kind, always resulted in unnecessary destitution for civilians, who usually suffered the most. One of the cardinal aims of the United Nations was to provide a forum in which all nations could discuss their differences without

resorting to armed conflict. In Kenya, the struggle for independence had been bloody because the people had concluded that the use of force and armed struggle was the only language understood by the colonialists. Although, having undergone that experience, Kenya would be the last country to advocate violence, it felt that there was a limit to the tolerance of the Zimbabwe people. If the United Kingdom continued to accept the system of *apartheid* in Rhodesia, it would sow the seeds of hatred between the races which would generate such violence as it had not witnessed in its colonial history. If the whites in Rhodesia refused to co-operate in ending the rebellion, then the people of Zimbabwe should be urged to unite and to resort to armed struggle against the white racist minority, and to be prepared to die for their rights. In that event, an appeal should be made to the world community to offer the Zimbabwe people all necessary aid in organizing internal resistance. The experience gained in its former colonies should help the United Kingdom to understand that the will of a people struggling for its independence was stronger than the most sophisticated weapons.

41. Despite all that had been said, the situation in Southern Rhodesia was not totally beyond control. Africans, by nature, were tolerant and forgiving. The leaders of the African population in Zimbabwe and in the Territories under Portuguese administration had already indicated their desire to live harmoniously with the other races, in a free society and governed by the majority, without bitterness or revenge. Moreover, if the African peoples did not act in that spirit, they should be condemned.

42. Kenya was an excellent example of tolerance. On taking the reins of government, its President, whom the colonialists had imprisoned for nine years, had led his people towards stability and racial tolerance and today the races were working side by side to build the nation. He then quoted from the book by Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, *Suffering without Bitterness*,⁷ in which

⁷ New York, International Publications Service, 1969.

the President, soon after his release from prison, said, among other things, that when the Africans, who being the majority had the right to govern the country, had obtained their freedom, they would welcome all who wished to live in their country, provided they accepted the African way of life. They would adopt a system in which all citizens would be equal before the law and they would promote friendship with all peoples. Those words, coupled with their subsequent implementation, should convince the British and the whites of Rhodesia that they had nothing to fear from living under an African Government; he invited them to visit Kenya to see for themselves how tolerant Africans could be. In the light of that background, Kenya could never compromise on issues of domination by a minority group.

43. His delegation welcomed the decision of the International Olympic Committee to exclude Southern Rhodesia from the XXth Olympic Games, and called on all peace-loving countries to discontinue all social relationships with the racist minority régime in Salisbury.

44. He reminded the United Kingdom that, in the last century, it had heroically fought against slavery. But the United Kingdom of today was different. It pretended not to see the suffering of the African peoples and turned a deaf ear to the cries of those writhing under the new slavery of *apartheid*. In the United Nations, it supported, by its vote or by abstention, the minority régimes that were oppressing the African people. It seemed to have forgotten that it had fought against slavery and in defence of the equality of all men. The United Kingdom had to make a choice between support for freedom or slavery and between immediate gain or a long-term economic accommodation with Africa. It was evident that not even the United Kingdom could, at the same time, love and hate the racist régimes of Salisbury and Pretoria.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.