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Chairman: Mr. Théodore IDZUMBUIR
(Democratic Republic of the Congo).

AGENDA ITEM 65

**Question of Territories under Portuguese administration
(continued) (A/7623/Add.3 and Corr.1, A/7694, A/C.4/
L.938 and Add.1 and 2, A/C.4/L.939)**

**CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION
A/C.4/L.938 AND ADD.1 AND 2 (continued)***

1. Mr. SADRY (Iran) said that in the previous year many delegations, including his own, had cherished the hope that the new Government of Mr. Caetano would change Portugal's obsolete colonial policy and recognize the right of the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese administration to self-determination and independence. That hope had been reflected in General Assembly resolution 2395 (XXIII) of 29 November 1968, which had received the support of the great majority in the United Nations.

2. A few months previously, when the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had been meeting in Africa, a number of representatives of the liberation movements of Angola and Mozambique had expressed the hope that the new Portuguese Government would reconsider its colonial policy and would seek a peaceful solution of the problem in accordance with the provisions of the Declaration. At the 672nd meeting of the Special Committee, held at Kinshasa, a petitioner had expressed the hope that the new situation might hasten a fair solution to the problem of Angola, and had said that the people of that Territory would not prolong the fight for one minute if the cause for which they were fighting, namely, freedom to choose their own destiny, were to prevail.

3. At the 679th meeting of the Special Committee, held at Lusaka, another petitioner had affirmed that if Portugal agreed to apply United Nations resolutions, his movement would not be opposed to a peaceful solution through negotiation; and at the 690th meeting of the Special

Committee, held at Dar es Salaam, another petitioner had stated that it was Portugal's persistent refusal to co-operate with the United Nations in the matter of decolonization that was responsible for the lack of progress in promoting the self-determination of the people of Mozambique by peaceful means.

4. In the Manifesto on Southern Africa (see A/7754), all the African States had declared that if Portugal should change her policy and accept the principle of self-determination, they would urge the liberation movements to desist from their armed struggle and to co-operate in the mechanics of a peaceful transfer of power from Portugal to the peoples of the African Territories.

5. Those unequivocal views reflected a genuine desire to solve the colonial problem in the Territories under Portuguese administration by peaceful means. It lay with Portugal either to respond positively to that friendly attitude or to continue its intransigent policy, which would no doubt lead to further resistance and bloodshed.

6. He stressed once again his delegation's hope that the new Government of Portugal would agree to enter into a dialogue with the peoples under its administration in order to seek a peaceful solution to the problem in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. His delegation also hoped that Portugal would learn from history that no people could be kept under colonial domination for ever and that colonized peoples sooner or later attained their freedom.

7. In conclusion, he quoted a statement made at an earlier meeting (1836th meeting) by the representative of Portugal, to the effect that in his Government's view all men were equal and had equal rights to dignity and to respect for the human person, without distinction as to colour, race, creed or sex. He hoped that, in order to prove the sincerity of those words, the Portuguese Government would allow the peoples of the Territories under its administration to exercise their fundamental right to choose their own destiny.

8. Mr. MATHIAS (Portugal) reiterated the reservations which his delegation had expressed regarding the resolutions on the Portuguese Territories. His delegation had hoped that the text of draft resolution A/C.4/L.938 would have something to show for the long days spent in drafting it.

9. The friendly tone of the statements made by the delegations which had introduced the draft resolution, recalling Portugal's contribution to world culture and civilization, recognizing that Portugal detested racism, and

* Resumed from the 1845th meeting.

even begging it not to commit suicide, had made his delegation wonder whether such things could be happening in the Fourth Committee. It was true that the representatives of the African and Asian countries had also referred to Portugal's insensitivity to winds of change and had criticized it on other grounds with an abundance of literary images stating, for example, that Portugal refused to face reality. In studying the draft resolution, however, his delegation had come to the conclusion that it was the Committee that insisted on adopting resolutions which bore no relation to reality or to the root of the problem. The fate of millions of human beings could not be made to depend on rhetorical exercises.

10. He also recalled that one delegation, in introducing the draft resolution under consideration, after marking its respect for Portugal had justified the brutal act of military aggression which its own country had carried out in defiance of the Security Council with the words "Charter or no Charter, Council or no Council".

11. He pointed out that, although it was currently acknowledged that Portugal did not practise racial discrimination, operative paragraph 12 of the draft resolution recommended that the Security Council "put an end to colonialism and racial discrimination in Africa". He also objected to operative paragraph 4, in which Portugal was accused of using its Territories in Africa for violations of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of independent African States.

12. When the text of the draft resolution had been introduced it had been pointed out that not all the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were helping Portugal to carry on an alleged colonial war. He therefore wondered what was the purpose of the quibbling in operative paragraph 13, which was addressed to all States and particularly the States members of NATO.

13. Draft resolution A/C.4/L.938 made some serious assertions. Some were legally untenable, others were not in keeping with the facts and yet others were expressed in such a way that they could only lead to a dangerous escalation of violence. In the preamble the Manifesto on Southern Africa was mentioned. That text was not a document of the Committee and had only been accepted as a new item on the agenda to be discussed by the General Assembly. Since it had not been discussed, his delegation was surprised that the document should be referred to in the draft resolution.

14. With regard to operative paragraphs 3 to 7 of the draft resolution he observed that the Committee was not competent to condemn, and that resolutions, even after they had been adopted by the General Assembly, were only recommendations. Furthermore, operative paragraph 11 seemed to his delegation to be an incitement to violence, which was deplorable. His delegation wished to point out that the specialized agencies of the United Nations were non-political bodies and that each of them had a specific statute. To call upon them, in the draft resolution, to exceed the provisions of those statutes and take action in an exclusively political sphere was to try to impose an illegal and dangerous doctrine which could put an end to

every form of international co-operation, since, with a precedent of that kind, the same situation could arise again, to the detriment of the agreements and constitutional procedures of the various agencies.

15. In paragraph 12, the Security Council was invited to implement political recommendations by the General Assembly for the purpose of achieving purely political aims corresponding to the desires of the sponsors of the draft resolution. That meant that the Security Council was being asked to exceed the powers granted to it by the Charter.

16. As examples of provisions which were not based on reality, he quoted paragraphs 6, 7, 4 and 5. His delegation had repeatedly stated its position with regard to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. That position contradicted the allegations in paragraphs 6 and 7, particularly the allegation about the supposed presence of South African forces in Portuguese Territories. The allegations in paragraphs 4 and 5 were illegal, because they were not within the competence of the Committee, and groundless, because they bore no relation to the facts. Portugal not only had no aggressive intentions towards the independent countries of Africa but wished to establish co-operation and good-neighbourly relations with them. It had invited any African States which so wished to conclude non-aggression treaties with it, and that invitation was still open. In the same spirit, Portugal had succeeded in establishing bilateral contacts with a few African States, which was one of the most constructive ways of eliminating possible causes of misunderstanding in international relations. Portugal still upheld that principle. There was, however, armed infiltration from most of the countries bordering on the Portuguese Territories, the boundaries of which were violated in defiance of all the rules of international law. If, despite Portugal's desire for peace and co-operation, attacks continued to be made on its Territories and peoples, Portugal would not shirk its duty and would continue to defend itself.

17. With regard to the reference to the Republic of Guinea in operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, his delegation had clearly refuted that accusation in the General Assembly on 8 October (1784th plenary meeting), and had spoken of the kidnapping of twenty-four Portuguese soldiers and their imprisonment for years in the Republic of Guinea. If the Republic of Guinea was prepared to release those Portuguese soldiers, it would receive in exchange the Guinean citizens who had been detained at a much later date in Portuguese Territory, together with their property.

18. His delegation still failed to understand the allegations made in operative paragraphs 8 and 9 of the draft resolution, which deplored political and military activities in the Portuguese Territories, and it would not discuss the alleged settlement of immigrants in its Territories because that allegation was absurd. The strengthening of economic life was one of the most legitimate aspirations of peoples and he could not see how economic stagnation and a suspension of investments, with all the misery that that entailed, could benefit the inhabitants of the Territories.

19. A choice must be made between, on the one hand, the policy of the Portuguese Government, directed towards

economic development and increased progress and welfare for the inhabitants through intensified economic and financial activities in its Territories and, on the other hand, the cessation of all such activities because they obstructed the "struggle of the peoples . . . for self-determination". He wondered on whose behalf the sponsors of the draft resolution were speaking, because he doubted whether they were expressing the desires and interests of the peoples of the Portuguese Territories.

20. He would not dwell any further on the absence of legality, realism and objectivity in some paragraphs of the draft resolution. The refusal to accept the legitimacy of the Portuguese presence in Africa, as also the various interpretations of that presence, could serve as a background for the passions of some and the ambitions of others. The Portuguese delegation would continue to take a position based on a direct knowledge of the facts and on the unshakable conviction that in Africa Portugal was working to promote the development of the Territories, the progress of their inhabitants and the greater access of an increasing number of individuals to the common endeavour, while respecting the equality and dignity of all.

21. Mr. ABDEL-WAHAB (United Arab Republic), replying as a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.4/L.938 to the representative of Portugal, reiterated the hope that the Government of Portugal, under its new leader, would heed the voice of reason. Although the representative of Portugal had said that the United Nations resolutions were unrealistic, the millions of persons under colonial domination who were struggling for self-determination were very real. Portugal must acknowledge the wind of change blowing through Africa. The accusations of illegality which it had made against the United Nations resolutions showed that Portugal respected neither the United Nations nor its Charter.

22. The Manifesto on Southern Africa (see A/7754) was an appeal to Portugal and other countries to achieve a peaceful settlement of the problems of Africa. If that appeal was not heeded, the peoples of the continent would continue their fight.

23. It was Portugal which was quibbling in speaking of good-neighbourly relations with the African countries, because Portugal was in Europe and not in Africa. Moreover, the Africans had every right to assist the liberation movements until they achieved their objectives.

24. He was disappointed in the Portuguese statement, for the African and Asian countries sponsoring the draft resolution, and the Latin American group, which they had consulted, had hoped that the new leaders of the Portuguese Government would change that country's colonial policy. That lack of consideration for the international community would simply cause the Afro-Asian countries to redouble their efforts to help the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese administration to free themselves from the yoke of colonialism.

25. Mr. CONDE (Guinea), speaking as a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.4/L.938, rejected the mendacious statements made by the representative of Portugal. The tone employed by that representative in reply to the moderate

terms in which the sponsors had appealed to Portugal when they had introduced their draft resolution was indeed discouraging. On that occasion the sponsors had referred to Portugal's contribution to civilization and culture, but they had used the past tense. Today it was known that Portugal was a racist country, not because it practised that policy directly, like South Africa or Southern Rhodesia, but because it supported those countries. It was an adage that "the friend of my enemy is my enemy" and therefore a régime which supported a racist régime was also racist. In seeking to refute operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, the representative of Portugal had referred to the Republic of Guinea. None of the States bordering on the Territories under Portuguese administration was unaware of the acts of violence and brigandage perpetrated by Portugal. The existence of independent States in Africa was the very antithesis of the stubborn colonial policy practised by Portugal, and that made them enemies which must be disarmed.

26. The representative of Portugal had spoken of the Portuguese soldiers imprisoned in the Republic of Guinea. If Portugal had not been waging war against the States bordering its Territories, how did it explain the presence of Portuguese soldiers in the Republic of Guinea? Portugal was certainly a long way from Africa.

27. In his statement, the representative of Portugal had had recourse to various evasions, which could deceive no one. The incontrovertible fact was that Portugal's policy had been condemned by history; draft resolution A/C.4/L.938 merely recorded that fact. Despite the appeals directed to it, Portugal stubbornly persisted in living in the colonial past. As far as the Republic of Guinea was concerned, that was not a problem between Portugal, an independent State and the Republic of Guinea, another independent State. The problem went further than that, and included the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration. His delegation stated as an unassailable fact that Portugal was using those Territories in order to violate the territorial integrity of its neighbours.

28. To engage in polemics with Portugal would be to exaggerate its importance; nevertheless, he wished to provide some particulars. Portugal had committed acts of brigandage: a boat carrying students returning from their vacation had been attacked by Portuguese naval vessels; some of the young people had been captured, while eight had managed to escape. The case had been brought up in the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at its meeting at Addis Ababa and again at the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, and a resolution had been adopted condemning that act of brigandage by Portugal. Guinea had had to appeal to the African group and to the peace-loving States for Portugal to restore its property to it, but everyone knew that that country's obstinacy could not be overcome by a resolution, as the representative of Portugal had just shown. The statement of the representative of Portugal which he had just heard reflected the obstinacy and short-sightedness which had always characterized that country's policy in its relations with the Africans.

29. Mr. CHADHA (India) said that there was nothing to add to what the representatives of the United Arab

Republic and the Republic of Guinea had said, but he wished to state that he too had been disappointed by the linguistic acrobatics of the representative of Portugal. That representative's whole statement had been characterized by rhetorical devices to distract attention from the substance of the question. The representative of Portugal had denied that his country refused to face reality, yet by discounting in advance the results of the voting on the draft resolution under consideration, he was certainly refusing to face reality.

30. Mr. TEVOEDJRE (Dahomey) said that he, too, was disappointed by the Portuguese representative's statement and wished to reply frankly to that representative's allegations, which were nothing but sophistry whereby he sought to evade the facts. To refuse to face reality was a suicidal attitude. Portugal must be prevented from following that road and from dragging other countries along with it.

31. The representative of Portugal had referred to the Manifesto on Southern Africa, but there was reason to doubt whether he had taken the trouble to read it carefully. Among the concepts set forth in the Manifesto were the principles of respect for legality and for human dignity. If the régimes in power in Africa had observed those principles, hostility to colonialism and racial discrimination would be unjustifiable, but in Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa the people were being denied the right to self-determination. The rest of the world must understand that human dignity was universal and indivisible: if it was denied to some it was denied to all.

32. The representative of Portugal seemed to forget that the age of empire had ended long since, swept away by the wind of change, and that the world was now living in an era in which man had put an end to slavery, a fact which the Portuguese régime stubbornly refused to understand. That was why his delegation, like the majority of delegations, would say "No" to Portugal. The draft resolution under consideration was the result of painstaking deliberations and consultations and it would be adopted almost unanimously. No civilized country could fail to support it.

33. Mr. BENSID (Algeria) said that he had looked forward to a different statement from the Portuguese representative, for he had hoped that there would be a change in the policy of that country. The representative of Portugal should be asked on whose behalf he was addressing the Committee. The General Assembly had affirmed that the rights of the peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau) to self-determination and independence were inalienable, and had likewise recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of the liberation movements which were operating in those Territories. Who were the allies of Portugal? South Africa, Rhodesia, the imperialists and some NATO Powers, together with the United States. But the majority of countries supported the just aspirations of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). The Portuguese representative had mentioned some General Assembly resolutions. It might be wondered how Portugal could take issue with the resolutions of the General Assembly when it did not recognize the authority of the United Nations.

34. Whether Portugal liked it or not, and whether by peaceful or by violent means, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) would one day attain their independence.

35. Mr. BGOYA (United Republic of Tanzania) said that the representative of Portugal had been ironic and cynical in accepting the compliments paid to his country, referring to the time when, like other European countries, Portugal had embarked on adventures of exploration, slavery and colonialism. In his astute statement the representative of Portugal had claimed that his country's régime was not a racist one and that it had brought civilization to other peoples. The delegation of the United Republic of Tanzania, however, certainly could not praise a régime which was more retrogressive, fascist and recalcitrant than any other.

36. Portugal had spoken of "assimilation", but that assimilation was tantamount to racism because it presupposed the possibility of one group imposing it on another. The selling of inhabitants of Mozambique to the tyrannical and racist régime of South Africa to be sent to work in the mines was but a manifestation of that racism which constituted a source of foreign exchange for Portugal. Portugal alleged that it was fulfilling a civilizing and humanitarian mission, but if that was true it would not be involved in the slave trade.

37. With extraordinary audacity, the Portuguese representative had questioned certain technical points in the resolution, saying that the Committee was not competent to condemn. If Portugal did not wish to be condemned, it should not, for its part, condemn the peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau) to a degrading fate.

38. It was apparent from the statement of the representative of Portugal, characterized by its arrogance and narrow-mindedness, that for Portugal the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) were Portuguese and that it was the Portuguese people who were suffering from the harassment and the attacks originating in the neighbouring African countries. It might well be asked what had given Portugal that idea. The words of the Portuguese representative, taken together with the action of the fascist régime aimed at abolishing the rights of the African people, clearly demonstrated how great were the dangers referred to in the Manifesto on Southern Africa adopted at Lusaka.

39. The representative of the fascist Portuguese régime had said that there should be no reference to that document in the draft resolution. The attitude of that régime could only mean that those who had first resorted to violence to keep the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese administration subject to their rule were now opting unequivocally for violence as the sole means of strengthening their authority, fearing that they would otherwise be overthrown.

40. Among other things, the representative of Portugal had said that his country was not giving support to South Africa and that there were no South African soldiers in the Territories under Portuguese administration. Those, however, were false allegations, as could be seen from the statements not only of the South African authorities but also of the Portuguese authorities and the reports from authoritative sources which had been put before the Committee.

41. The representative of Portugal had stated that Portuguese soldiers were being held prisoners in Guinea. But the

Government of Guinea had not sent troops to Lisbon to capture and imprison Portuguese military personnel; it was Portugal which had criminally attacked Guinea, as it had attacked Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania. Could Portugal deny that in the previous year it had captured and detained a Guinean civil aircraft with its crew, which had had to make a forced landing in Guinea (Bissau)? Obviously not.

42. The Portuguese delegation must not be allowed to persist in its cynicism and arrogance, for the Committee could not give the impression that it had no conscience or lacked information. The Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) and the other national liberation movements in the Territories under Portuguese administration could not tolerate that situation.

43. The representative of Portugal had asserted that his country did not receive support from other nations in oppressing the peoples of those Territories. Yet the Tanzanian delegation knew that Portugal was a poor country, in which arms, aircraft, military vehicles and bombs could not be manufactured, and that all such equipment came from other sources. It was therefore obvious that Portugal would not be able to wage three colonial wars at once if it were not receiving support from the members of NATO.

44. Portugal had opted for violence to repress the peoples of the Territories under its administration, and those peoples had chosen the same means to defend themselves. Neither Mozambique nor Angola nor Guinea (Bissau) would ever be Portuguese.

45. The draft resolution should be supported by all those who believe that slavery could no longer be tolerated and that colonialism was obsolete. The peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) would fight for freedom, and all the other African countries would do the same.

46. Mr. OULD HACHEME (Mauritania) said that the Committee had once again seen the United Nations and the decisions of its organs challenged. The arrogance with which the representative of Portugal had just treated draft resolution A/C.4/L.938 revealed nothing new in the attitude of that country towards resolutions of United Nations bodies. In its statement, which was unacceptable in both form and substance, the delegation of Portugal had attempted to give the Committee a lecture on literature and history which bore no relationship to the question under consideration. The representative of Portugal had said that the draft resolution was lacking in meaning and objectivity. He wondered whether that representative had been objective in his own statements, which he had surely made reluctantly, for he had not appeared to be very convinced of the truth of his utterances. The Portuguese delegation had had the audacity to ask in whose name the African and Asian sponsors of the draft resolution were speaking. He reminded the representative of Portugal that the Africans were sharing the sufferings of their brothers who had been imprisoned and subjected to the ill-treatment described in the *United Nations documents*. In any case, it was not for Portugal to speak on behalf of the peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau).

47. Mr. RIFAI (Secretary of the Committee) drew attention to a correction to be made in the English text of the draft resolution (A/C.4/L.938), which would replace, in operative paragraph 13, "to withhold and desist" by the words "to withhold or desist".

48. Mrs. JIMENEZ (Cuba), speaking in explanation of her vote on the draft resolution, reiterated her delegation's view that United Nations action was totally ineffective in solving the problems of southern Africa, a region subjected to an imperialist, colonial and racist group which could not be persuaded to release its prey of its own accord. Ever since December 1960, when the General Assembly had declared the right to self-determination of all peoples, Portugal had been systematically disregarding the provisions of the Charter and refusing to comply with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) concerning the Territories under its administration. In the criminal war that it was waging against the population of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), Portugal had made prodigal use of the resources and weapons of mass destruction provided by its NATO allies—the same weapons which were being used in the war against the people of Viet-Nam. During the past few years the crusade of extermination waged by the metropolitan country had been intensified, as was shown by the recent incursions into neighbouring countries. In carrying out its acts of vandalism, Portugal relied on the aid of the racist régimes of Pretoria and Salisbury, which supplied it with military equipment and men for the perpetration of the gravest crimes against humanity.

49. It was pointless for the General Assembly and the Security Council to adopt resolutions of formal condemnation which were without practical effect. Year after year those resolutions were mocked by the colonial régime of Portugal and only helped to diminish the prestige of the Organization. The one thing which had a restraining effect on the violence of Portuguese colonialism was the advance of the guerrillas in the Territories under its administration, where the insurgents were freeing villages and highways and were showing the people that there was only one effective weapon against imperialist violence, namely, revolutionary violence.

50. Her delegation would abstain on the draft resolution, since it did not think that its adoption would help the peoples of those colonies to make progress in winning their freedom.

51. She paid tribute, on behalf of her delegation and the Cuban Government and people, to the heroic guerrillas who were fighting for freedom in Africa and she reaffirmed once more their solidarity with and support for the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau).

52. Mr. NAVA CARRILLO (Venezuela) said that, although his delegation would vote for draft resolution A/C.4/L.938, it regretted that it could not support the last sentence of operative paragraph 4 for technical reasons and because it had been unable to obtain sufficient information on the subject.

53. Mr. MELLBIN (Denmark) said that his delegation would vote for draft resolution A/C.4/L.938, since it continued to insist that the question of the Territories

under Portuguese administration should be solved through the strict application of the principle of self-determination and because it deplored the fact that no progress had been made towards a solution of those colonial problems. His delegation had also taken into consideration the fact that, in preparing the text of the draft resolution, the sponsors had endeavoured to accommodate the views of other delegations.

54. His delegation still had some reservations concerning the text, even in its present form, and it wished to place them on record. Denmark could not share the concern expressed in the sixth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 9, since it seemed to imply the existence of a general connexion between economic activities and the struggle of the peoples in dependent Territories for self-determination and freedom, to the detriment of that struggle. It was not, and never had been, convinced that that was justified.

55. His delegation took strong exception to the seventh preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 13, in that they appeared to imply the existence of a connexion between the policies and activities of NATO and the policies pursued by the Government of Portugal in the Territories under Portuguese administration. It should be emphasized that there was no such connexion.

56. With regard to operative paragraph 4, his delegation, while not wishing in any way to minimize the seriousness of the problems involved, considered that the text was too sweeping and too general in its scope. It could not accept the appeal addressed to the specialized agencies in operative paragraph 11; it had always considered, and it continued to do so, that when the United Nations called upon States to render assistance to peoples in colonial Territories, such appeals applied to assistance which could be rendered in accordance with the rules of international law and the provisions of the United Nations Charter. The involvement of the specialized agencies in the complex of problems dealt with in the draft resolution would raise a number of constitutional questions in relation to the activities of those agencies. The General Assembly could in no way oblige any specialized agency to engage in any activity which went beyond the limits set by its constitution, by established practice or by international law in general.

57. His delegation would have preferred it if operative paragraph 12 had simply drawn the Security Council's attention to the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration rather than making the recommendation now set forth in that text; however, it recognized that the recommendation was without prejudice to the attitude of the Security Council in the matter.

58. With these reservations, which it would like placed on record, his delegation would vote for the draft resolution.

59. His Government wished once more to express its regret that the Portuguese Government which had come to power in 1968 had as yet announced no change in its colonial policy; nevertheless, Denmark hoped that those who held power and exerted influence in Portugal would seek to have that policy changed so that Portugal's future endeavours in the Territories under its administration

would be based on the recognition of the right to self-determination of all the peoples concerned.

60. Mr. LEE WILLIAMS (United Kingdom), referring to the statement of the Portuguese representative, said that in politics the manner in which things were said was important and that the Portuguese representative had expressed himself in a courteous manner; it was to be hoped that in the course of time that courtesy would be reflected in a change of attitude.

61. At the previous session, his delegation had found itself for the first time in a number of years able to abstain on the resolution relating to the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration (General Assembly resolution 2395 (XXIII)). It had done so because, despite its important reservations on a number of points of substance, it had felt that the resolution represented an attempt to return to the language of moderation, to seek common ground and to proceed by the method of general consultation.

62. Draft resolution A/C.4/L.938 was different in several respects from the previous year's text. His delegation regretted that few of the changes seemed to be of a positive character and it noted that there was a greater tendency to move towards condemnation and to invoke the intervention of the Security Council in fields which lay outside its proper concern; however, it recognized that the draft resolution represented not only the outcome of prolonged discussion but also a serious effort on the part of the sponsors to engage in meaningful consultations with the representatives of all shades of opinion in the Committee. He paid a tribute to the sincere endeavours of those who had striven in the past few days to achieve that purpose. The result of those endeavours was a synthesis which, although many delegations would feel it fell short of the ideal, had to a greater or lesser degree been influenced in its final form by the views of a considerable number of delegations.

63. His delegation could not support the draft resolution and had objections to many of its provisions; nevertheless, it was prepared to consider to what extent the purposes of the proposal and the stated intentions of its sponsors corresponded to the United Kingdom's position on decolonization and to its belief that the dependent peoples of the world should be entitled to share in the management of their own affairs. The United Kingdom had repeatedly stated its belief in the fundamental principle of self-determination and had urged the need for its application in the Portuguese Territories. It had adhered no less strongly to the principle of action through persuasion and to the need to promote the adoption of peaceful solutions. It believed that the independent nations of Africa had a positive contribution to make in that connexion.

64. His delegation was prepared to regard the draft resolution on the one hand, and the sum total of its individual provisions on the other, in a different light, since the delegations submitting it had shown their attachment to the method of dialogue and had appealed to Portugal, in a spirit of reasonableness and moderation, to review its policies. In that connexion, it attached particular importance to the appeal addressed to the administering Power in operative paragraph 10.

65. His delegation would therefore abstain on that draft resolution. If it had been decided to take separate votes on each paragraph, his delegation would have voted against operative paragraph 4, 7, 9 and 12 and the seventh preambular paragraph. His delegation could not be a party to condemnation when the facts had not been substantiated to its entire satisfaction. With regard to operative paragraph 13, the policy of the United Kingdom was fully in keeping with Security Council resolutions 180 (1963) of 31 July 1963 and 183 (1963) of 11 December 1963. The United Kingdom was not supplying arms to Portugal for use in the latter's overseas Territories. He was glad to note from earlier statements that the authors of operative paragraph 13 were ready to acknowledge the position in that respect of the United Kingdom Government and of others which were similarly placed. His delegation had reservations on the sixth preambular paragraph and wished to place on record its understanding that that paragraph, in so far as it referred to economic and financial interests, was intended to be limited and not universal in its application. His delegation would have voted against the corresponding operative paragraph, since it felt that it carried other implications.

66. Lastly, with regard to operative paragraphs 2 and 11, his delegation's abstention in no way implied that it approved recourse to the methods of force; on the contrary, it pinned its hopes on the results of example and persuasion.

67. Mr. BOZA (Peru) said that he was in agreement with the general purpose of draft resolution A/C.4/L.938, which was to put an end to the colonial situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration. His delegation supported operative paragraphs 3 and 12, in the belief that the more the authority of the United Nations was strengthened, the better would international peace and security be safeguarded.

68. Despite Peru's anti-colonialist convictions, his delegation would abstain from voting on the draft resolution because technical difficulties and lack of information prevented it from supporting operative paragraphs 4 and 11. It would have been better if operative paragraph 4 had followed the model of paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 2395 (XXIII), whose paragraph 5 was also superior to operative paragraph 11 of draft resolution A/C.4/L.938.

69. As the technical difficulties he had mentioned were not insurmountable, the stand he had taken on operative paragraphs 4 and 11 was not definitive and could change if the necessary information was provided when the draft resolution was taken up in the plenary General Assembly.

70. Mr. FONSECA (Colombia) said that, as in previous years, Colombia would vote in favour of the draft resolution on Territories under Portuguese administration. It upheld the principle that matters which, because of their political character, fell within the exclusive competence of the General Assembly and Security Council, should not concern the specialized agencies, by which he meant that the reference to such agencies in operative paragraph 11 applied only to the administrative and technical training programmes described in operative paragraph 14.

71. Mr. FINGER (United States of America) said that the United States believed that the Government of Portugal should, in its own interest, grant self-determination to the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). His delegation also believed it was the business of the Committee to consider the Portuguese administration of those Non-Self-Governing Territories and to make constructive suggestions with regard to the goal of self-determination and majority government for their peoples.

72. The United States had been encouraged by the emphasis the Lusaka Manifesto laid on the attainment of self-determination through peaceful means and was convinced that Portugal would serve its own interests by initiating discussions with a view to reaching a solution which would be equitable for peoples of all races in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau).

73. Draft resolution A/C.4/L.938 would not lead towards that goal, since it negated the spirit of the Lusaka Manifesto and shut the door on a possible dialogue with Portugal. The draft repeated prescriptions which had failed in the past and could not result in self-determination for the African peoples under Portuguese administration. Because of its uncompromising and condemnatory character, it would only discourage any tendency of the Portuguese Government in the direction of conciliation.

74. His delegation believed it was wrong that the draft resolution tarred the Portuguese people with the same brush of racism so richly deserved by the régime of Ian Smith and the Government of South Africa. That could push the Government of Portugal in the direction of those racist régimes of southern Africa. It would be advisable to attempt a conciliatory approach towards Portugal, for experience showed that the harsh attitude reflected in draft resolution A/C.4/L.938 would fail.

75. Although his delegation was disappointed with the draft, it appreciated the sponsors' attempts to hold a constructive discussion with it on the subject. Although one of the sponsors, showing great courtesy and understanding, had tried to take the United States delegation's suggestions into account, the gap had been too wide and the time available too short. It would have been better if the consultations had been undertaken before the first draft was written, rather than after several drafts and days of discussion among the sponsors and on the eve of the vote.

76. Apart from the general thrust of the draft, there were certain provisions which his delegation found particularly objectionable. As a member of the Security Council, the United States Government had given careful consideration to the evidence presented to substantiate the charges made in operative paragraph 4 and had found it far from conclusive. Furthermore, the blanket condemnation in operative paragraph 5 was hardly likely to achieve a constructive dialogue with the Government of Portugal. As for operative paragraph 7, while there might be individual armed South Africans in the Territories under Portuguese administration, there was no evidence that they constituted "South African forces".

77. Operative paragraph 12, which recommended that the Security Council take effective steps "with a view to the

immediate implementation of resolution 1514 (XV)", was in flagrant contrast to the Lusaka Manifesto which advocated a more gradual movement towards self-determination. Paragraph 13 made particular reference to the members of NATO when in fact that organization was concerned exclusively with the defence of the North Atlantic area and there was no evidence that any military equipment provided to Portugal was being used outside that area.

78. The United States delegation shared the sense of frustration felt by many of the Committee members at seeing that colonialism was not being brought to an end. Nevertheless, it might be asked whether that objective could be achieved by passing resolutions of increasingly violent content. His delegation had been in favour of following the guidelines suggested by the Lusaka Manifesto.

79. His delegation would abstain from voting on the draft resolution for two reasons: first, to signify its support of the concept of self-determination although it disagreed with the ways of obtaining that goal proposed in the draft; and second, in recognition of the efforts made by some of the sponsors to consult with his delegation. Despite last minute efforts to correct some of its worst defects, the draft was still a bad one. If the text was approved, the main losers would be the very people whom it was desired to help in their fight for self-determination and political dignity—the people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). The Organization would also suffer since its credibility, relevance and effectiveness would be further undermined by the addition of that text to the long list of ineffective resolutions.

80. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) said that Saudi Arabia was not one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.938, because it knew very well that the following year, as had happened the previous year, the Committee would approve another resolution of the same kind, which would also be of no avail, causing the United Nations to lose the world's respect. It would be necessary to find a new approach to the problem, for otherwise no progress would be made. Furthermore, he could not help noticing that the sponsors of the draft resolution were all Asian and African countries, with the exception of one European country, Yugoslavia, and one socialist country, Mongolia. It was significant that Latin America was represented neither among the sponsors of the resolution under discussion nor among those of its predecessors.

81. Some clauses of the draft might have been worded differently. For instance, there had been talk of conciliation. Many Africans who had had relations with the Portuguese would prefer to settle the question amicably. However, it was quite evident that the great Powers knew full well that, so long as action was confined to speech-making and to producing lengthy resolutions, little would be accomplished in actual fact. Frequent reference was made to means and expedients, and to self-determination, *but the results were purely academic*. Self-determination had unfortunately never been achieved by peaceful means; people had to fight for it. Had it not been for Hitler and Mussolini, the process of liberation would have been very much slower in many countries.

82. While he did not wish to single out for criticism any particular paragraph in the draft resolution he would point

out that little was gained by expressing condemnation when no positive action could be taken.

83. Some of the previous speakers had objected to paragraph 9, in which mention was made of activities by financial interests which were obstructing the struggle of the peoples under Portuguese domination. But that was an undeniable fact. The references to the NATO Powers had also been criticized, but again it could not be denied that there were strategic agreements between Portugal and the States members of NATO.

84. For those reasons, and despite the criticism to which several of its paragraphs might give rise, his delegation would vote for the draft resolution, since it reflected the bitterness felt by the Afro-Asian countries towards the European countries because of the position they had taken.

85. He felt that Portugal should follow Spain's example and give up its possessions abroad. The blame in fact lay with the Portuguese Government and not the Portuguese people, who should not be attacked because of their Government's policy. He stressed that he was referring to past policy, since he was confident that the rising generations in Portugal would be progressive and change that policy.

86. He pointed out that in operative paragraph 13 all States and particularly, the States members of NATO, were urged to withhold further military and other assistance to Portugal. However, there was no point in asking whether they would do so, for everyone knew that they would not, since the states concerned were bent on protecting their financial and strategic interests. Could anything be done about it? Should another identical resolution be submitted to the Committee at its next session for all the millions of liberals in the Western and socialist countries to scoff at?

87. The United States of America and the Soviet Union could persuade Portugal to agree to a just solution. Furthermore Portugal would be well-advised to realize that it could not continue to act as it had done hitherto. It should bear in mind that many innocent Africans and Portuguese would lose their lives if it persisted in its policy and that it should adopt a conciliatory attitude in order to enable the peoples in the territories under its administration to exercise their right to self-determination. He wondered why those two great Powers were not bringing all their influence to bear in seeking a solution. They had the right of veto in the Security Council because they were responsible for preserving peace throughout the world; if they did not use their power, a prolonged struggle would ensue and soon foreign guerrillas would infiltrate into Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau) and there would be many innocent victims. When it was finally bankrupt, Portugal would desist and surrender.

88. His delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution and accordingly urged Portugal to speed up the process of liberation by setting up a community of nations or by any other means. He appealed to countries having common economic interests with Portugal to persuade that country to take the necessary steps in that direction. Otherwise the possibilities for reaching a settlement which were still open came to naught and the United Nations

would have done nothing to bring about either peace or justice in the Territories under Portuguese administration.

89. Mr. MOLAPO (Lesotho) said that his delegation's silence when questions such as the present one were being debated in the Committee was sometimes interpreted as reflecting indifference towards the problems of colonialism in southern Africa; in fact quite the opposite was true.

90. His delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution, which it regarded as an appeal to Portugal to modify its colonial policy. It was intolerable that, while man had conquered the moon, peoples under colonial domination continued to be denied the right to self-determination and freedom.

91. Mr. GELBER (Canada) said that draft resolution A/C.4/L.938 was the fruit of intensive and frank consultations among all regional groups. For Canada, those consultations had a double importance: first, they were a demonstration of a desire within the Committee to achieve broad support on the draft resolution, and second, they were another indication that, with few exceptions, all Governments represented in the Committee were in agreement on the basic issues involved in the question.

92. His delegation accepted as a basic principle that the peoples of the Portuguese territories in Africa had an inalienable right to self-determination and independence. Opinion was almost unanimous on the need to call upon the Government of Portugal to show a spirit of accommodation and understanding by taking immediate steps to enable the peoples of those territories to exercise that right.

93. While the draft resolution contained expressions of principle with which his delegation whole-heartedly concurred, it included a number of paragraphs about which his delegation had reservations. It was not certain of the accuracy of operative paragraphs 4 and 7. It also had reservations concerning the propriety of operative paragraphs 11 and 12. Furthermore, his delegation could not accept the implications of the sixth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 9, relating to the effects of economic interests on decolonization.

94. It especially regretted that once again the sponsors of the draft resolution had insisted upon making specific references to NATO. As he had said the previous year, his delegation did not consider that the criticism of NATO

contained in the draft resolution was either accurate or relevant; for that reason, it had doubts about operative paragraph 15. Nevertheless, his delegation was in basic agreement with what the draft resolution sought to accomplish, and for that reason would vote in favour of it.

95. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the statement by the Secretary-General (A/C.4/L.939) on the administrative and financial implications involved and invited the Committee to vote on draft resolution A/C.4/L.938 and Add.1 and 2.

At the request of the representative of Dahomey, the vote was taken by roll-call.

Somalia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Austria, Barbados, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore.

Against: South Africa, Spain, Portugal.

Abstaining: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Cuba, France, Greece, Italy, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru.

Draft resolution A/C.4/L.938 and Add.1 and 2 was adopted by 88 votes to 3, with 16 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 1.40 p.m.