

United Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY

TWENTIETH SESSION

Official Records



FOURTH COMMITTEE, 1565th
MEETING

Tuesday, 23 November 1965,
at 3.25 p.m.

NEW YORK

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Chairman: Mr. Majid RAHNEMA (Iran).

Requests for hearings (continued)

REQUESTS CONCERNING SOUTH WEST AFRICA (AGENDA ITEM 69) (continued) (A/C.4/641/ADD.5)

1. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to a request for a hearing concerning South West Africa submitted by Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) (A/C.4/641/Add.5). If there was no objection, he would consider that the Committee acceded to the request.

It was so decided.

REQUESTS CONCERNING TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION (AGENDA ITEM 23) (continued)

2. The CHAIRMAN announced that a further request for a hearing concerning Territories under Portuguese administration had been received. If there were no objections, it would be circulated as a Committee document.

It was so decided. 1/

AGENDA ITEMS 69 AND 70

Question of South West Africa: reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

^{1/} The request was subsequently circulated as document A/C.4/650/Add.2.

(continued) (A/5690 and Add.1-3; A/5781; A/5800/Rev.1, chap. IV; A/5840; A/5949; A/5993; A/6000/Rev.1, chap. IV; A/6035 and Add.1)

Special educational and training programmes for South West Africa: reports of the Secretary-General (continued) (A/5782 and Corr.1, Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1; A/6080 and Add.1)

HEARING OF PETITIONERS (continued)

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Mburumba Kerina, representative of the National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO), the Reverend Markus Kooper, representative of the South West Africa United National Independence Organization (SWAUNIO), and Mr. Nathanael Mbaeva, representative of the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), took places at the Committee table.

3. The Reverend Markus KOOPER (South West Africa United National Independence Organization) thanked the Committee for giving him an opportunity to speak on the crucial problem of South West Africa.

4. The twentieth session of the General Assembly was of particular importance for South West Africa, not only because of the deterioration of the situation in the Territory, but also because the International Court of Justice would hand down its judgement a few months after that session and the United Nations would have to establish a committee to see that the Court's judgement and the resolutions of the General Assembly were implemented.

5. The United Nations had abundant documentation describing the appalling conditions and the state of slavery in which the people of South West Africa had been living for almost forty years. The documentation testified to the fortitude and patience of the people of South West Africa, and to their confidence in the noble ideals of the United Nations Charter. If they were disappointed in their hopes and turned their backs on the United Nations to seek for help wherever they could get it so as to rid themselves of the apartheid régime of South Africa, it would be hard to blame them. But conscious of its responsibilities towards the people of South West Africa, the Organization could not fail to act.

6. The Committee was already familiar with the intolerable conditions in which the Territory's population lived, and he would not dwell on them. The most alarming features of the situation were the build-up of military bases in the Territory, the intensification of military preparations, and the training of settler civilians, including women and children, in the use of fire-arms, while the authorities continued to implement the recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa Affairs, known as the

Odendaal Commission. The strategic location of the bases—one of which lay on the Atlantic coast, at Walvis Bay, and the other in the Caprivi Strip, south-west of the Republic of Zambia—and the training of South African soldiers sufficed to make it clear against whom war was being prepared. There could be no doubt that those bases were there to resist the United Nations if, after the Court's ruling, the Security Council should decide to implement the ruling. It was clear that the South African Government would not abide by any decision of the Court of which it did not approve, and would resist its implementation and that of the General Assembly's resolutions. The military preparations and the training of settlers in the use of fire-arms spoke more clearly than words in that regard.

7. In view of the threat hanging over the population of South West Africa, he urgently invited the Committee to set up a committee to ensure a United Nations presence in the Territory as soon as the Court's ruling was announced. Whatever that ruling might be, there was no doubt that the South African Government was determined to apply the political recommendations of the Odendaal Commission, which it had shelved only temporarily on the advice of its allies, the United Kingdom and the United States. Those recommendations were principally directed towards the removal of the African population from regions where they had traditionally lived to so-called separate development areas. Certain persons, such as Mr. Johannes David Gerbe, and Chiefs H. S. Witbooi and A. Thomas, had informed him that the South African Government had appointed spies among the various indigenous groups in order to learn the names of those who were opposed to the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission. The removal of population would thus be preceded by mass arrests and by the imprisonment of all opponents. It was consequently essential that the United Nations should be present in the Territory as soon as the Court handed down its decision, and it must categorically oppose the move to expel the indigenous population from its land.

8. He gave examples of barbarous acts committed by the South African settlers against the indigenous inhabitants, quoting extracts from two newspapers, the Windhoek Advertiser and Die Suidwes Afrikaner, which had reported those crimes. Those examples showed in whose criminal hands the South African Government had deliberately placed dangerous weapons. If there was still any doubt as to the heartlessness of the settlers towards the Africans, it would suffice to recall that in 1923, when the Bondelswarts Namas had refused to pay taxes, the Administrator of South West Africa had himself led a repressive operation which in a few hours had caused the death of 200 persons. Similarly, on 11 December 1959, twelve innocent Africans had been murdered and more than fifty others wounded by police forces led by the Mayor of Windhoek, for no other reason than that they had refused to move to an apartheid camp at Windhoek. In view of the inhuman treatment to which the population was subjected, it was difficult to explain why, on 29 January 1959, a number of people had been spared when the magistrate of Rehoboth had tried to expel them from their ancestral lands. Such

were the sad realities of the situation in South West Africa.

9. The struggle for the liberation of the whole of southern Africa had entered a new phase following the act of piracy committed in Rhodesia, an act like that which the imperialists and their powerful allies had vainly attempted in Katanga a few years previously. The fate of the Rhodesian people was inseparably bound up with that of the peoples of South and South West Africa. The present rebellion by Rhodesia was not only a continuation of that which had begun in 1960, and a new attempt to prevent the independence movement from spreading southwards, but was part of a plan carefully drawn up by South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States at Pretoria in 1958, under the blue flag of the United Nations. In the course of secret talks, the Governments of those three countries had decided that South West Africa should be annexed to South Africa and some parts of it placed under United Nations trusteeship. Ensuing events, and the support subsequently given to the South African Government by the United Kingdom and United States, and the attitude of the latter, proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that it had been decided at Pretoria, at the insistence of South Africa, that the independence movement must not be allowed to reach the borders of South Africa. Portugal had of course become a party to that agreement.

10. Mr. COSTA DE MORAIS (Portugal), speaking on a point of order, requested that the petitioner should be reminded that the Committee's present discussion should be limited to the question of South West Africa.

11. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) said that it was natural for the petitioner to refer to Portugal since what he wanted to draw the Committee's attention to was the collusion of which the Territory of South West Africa was a victim.

12. The CHAIRMAN invited the petitioner to continue his statement within the context of the item on the agenda.

13. The Reverend Markus KOOPER (South West Africa United National Independence Organization), continuing his statement, said that the present rebellion in Southern Rhodesia had only apparently been instigated by Ian Smith, for the truth was that the United Kingdom Government had in practice granted independence to the minority of white settlers on the basis of the racist Constitution of 1961, in accordance with the secret agreement reached at Pretoria in 1958. Mr. Smith's rebellion was only a screen behind which the United Kingdom was hiding, as history would show. The South African Government was only awaiting the decision of the International Court of Justice to proclaim South West Africa an integral part of South Africa, and the reason why the United Kingdom had refused to suppress what it itself called a rebellion was in order that the Court's decision should come at a time when the rebellion had involved both South Africa and Rhodesia.

14. The United Nations should not lend credence to the argument, advanced by the United Kingdom and the United States, that the Africans would suffer most from economic sanctions. The problem facing southern

Africa was indivisible, since it was confronted with a league of well-organized forces of international imperialism. No economic sanctions or embargo on petroleum exports would have any effect on Southern Rhodesia if the same treatment was not given to South Africa and Portugal, on which they should be imposed immediately and in full.

15. Mr. KERINA (National Unity Democratic Organization) thanked the Committee for giving him an opportunity to voice the aspirations of the people of Namib (South West Africa), who were at present held in slavery and treated like beasts of burden in the country of their birth, but who were firmly resolved to free themselves from South African colonialism.

16. South West Africa, which had been colonized and occupied by Germany, had fallen into that country's clutches as a result of the Berlin Conference of 1885, which had fixed the spheres of influence of various European colonial Powers among the dismembered nations and empires of Africa. It had been occupied by South African troops during the First World War, finally being ceded to the Allies under article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles and placed under mandate. It was interesting to note in that connexion that South West Africa had been given to South Africa during the First World War by the British Imperial War Cabinet, of which General Smuts had been a member. The United Kingdom Government, under the terms of a secret agreement, had asked South Africa to annex South West Africa in the event of an Allied victory. That agreement, which had been reached before the United States' entry into the war, had met with strong opposition from President Wilson. The Territory had then been mandated to the Union of South Africa, a pseudo-independent country, which had had neither the resources to develop it nor the administrative experience required of Mandatory Powers. Furthermore, the Legislative Assembly established under the South West Africa Constitution Act of 1925 had consisted solely of Whites, and questions concerning the Africans had been settled by the Administrator in Advisory Council, a body which had consisted solely of Europeans. At the present time, the Territory, which ought to have been placed under trusteeship in 1945, had suffered de facto annexation by South Africa, which refused to recognize the role of the United Nations and was imposing its system of racial classification on South West Africa.

17. At no time had the Africans accepted their servitude and they had risen up on several occasions against the successive occupying Powers. Chief Hosea Kutako, leader of NUDO, was one of the last survivors from the era of true African sovereignty and he was the living symbol of the Africans' rejection of European domination. It had been on the occasion of the 1923 rebellion that the Nama and Herero peoples had become acquainted for the first time with the barbarous methods of the South African military forces, who had used machine guns, bombs and aircraft against defenceless African men, women and children.

18. The missionaries, too, had played an important role in the enslavement of South West Africa, contributing to the destruction of African civilization,

collaborating with the South African Administration, inter alia, in the appointment of "chiefs" and sometimes even participating actively in massacres, as had Heidrick Vedder, an alleged specialist in South West African history, who had asserted that the black race was inferior and who had been one of the architects of so-called Bantu education and the so-called Bantustan system.

19. Turning to the question of the political organizations in the Territory, he said that South Africa's policy of apartheid had been conceived and applied with a view to making national unity and the creation of nationalist political parties impossible. It had not achieved its aim, however, for the inhabitants of the Territory had succeeded in forming political organizations despite the difficulties and despite all the restrictions placed on them including confinement to so-called Native Reserves, restriction of their movements by strict application of the pass laws, economic pressure, imprisonment, deportation and murder. The African masses of the Territory were, however, handicapped by the fact that they could not take the slightest initiative in the political field, so that, with a few exceptions, no dynamic leaders had yet emerged. That situation was due in large part to the fact that the people of South West Africa had been encouraged from various quarters to place great reliance on United Nations intervention to free their country, and the attitude which had resulted had probably contributed more than anything else to the success of South Africa's efforts. Some had recently begun to understand, however, that the revolutionary political organizations could not content themselves with awakening the people's consciousness and appealing for foreign aid and that they suffered from the lack of leaders with organizational ability, capable of mobilizing the awakening masses within the country itself for disciplined action against South Africa. Those handicaps, however, were gradually being overcome through a growing awareness of the imperatives of the situation and a trend towards national unity, planning and discipline.

20. It was unfortunately true that because of the splitting up of the population, and to a certain extent the personal ambitions of some of the politically conscious individuals, the members of all South West African political groups prior to NUDO had been bound less by a political programme or principles than by kinship, tribal affinity or personal friendship. Despite their defects and superficial differences, however, those tribal and other groups, as also the powerful Chief's Council of Hosea Kutako, had been an important and necessary step towards the formation of a national revolutionary party in South West Africa. That party would provide the vanguard of revolutionary action and a basis for the establishment of an independent government of South West Africa in the near future. Under the able leadership of such people as Chief Hosea Kutako and Chief S. H. Witbooi, a radical change was taking place in the Territory, where the inhabitants had realized that in order to construct a future worthy of the African heritage and to overcome the forces of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, national unification and solidarity must be achieved. That was only possible through

the action of a revolutionary party resolved to give the problems of South West Africa a revolutionary solution, with or without the help of the United Nations and no matter what the verdict of the International Court of Justice might be. In the last analysis, it was the people who would determine the country's destiny. NUDO was determined to free South West Africa and its people from South African colonialism, and the Africans of the Territory would show that they were as well endowed as anyone with a sense of responsibility and political imagination. As the President of Ghana, Mr. Nkrumah, and the President of Guinea, Mr. Sekou Touré, had said, battles and revolutions that were undertaken for the achievement of human dignity and freedom were justified.

21. The political situation of South West Africa, particularly as it had been represented abroad, was chaotic and confounded even the most dedicated supporters, in Africa and elsewhere, of the people's struggle for independence. In order to assess it correctly, it was necessary to understand that the meaning of the South West African struggle for freedom was to be found within the Territory itself and that the solution of the problem would be generated from within South West Africa in accordance with the political and economic realities and the social conditions of the people.

22. The fact was that those who wanted to maintain the political status quo in the country were obscuring the problem. Conflicts among South West Africans were not personality conflicts, tribal rivalries or inter-party and intra-party struggles; they were conflicts resulting from different approaches to the general situation and different definitions of political struggle. At the present day, in order to succeed in an African country under imperialist domination a statesman must call himself a nationalist if he wished to be sure of the support of African and Asian countries and organizations, and he must speak the language of anti-imperialism and pan-African nationalism. Unfortunately for South West Africa, the world outside had had no means of understanding the dynamics of that country's politics and few South West Africans had really studied the national situation of their country in its entirety or correctly analysed its problem. Personality conflicts, tribal rivalry and other explanations that had been given were not the source of the crisis but were unfortunate outgrowths of conflicts arising from different conceptions of the nature of the struggle and how it was to be waged.

23. Although the situation in South West Africa had many ingredients for popular political revolution, there had been no organized offensive against South Africa in the Territory, which remained a South African colony. It was still the intention of the settler Government to annex the Territory and absorb it completely, and at the present time South Africa possessed all the physical means to do so. Thus any possibility of constitutional evolution was ruled out and the immediate political objective of the people's struggle must be the complete and unconditional removal, by revolution, of the South African Government and influence.

24. So far the South African Government had had all the time it needed to forestall concerted African States African-Asian or United Nations action, to consolidate its military capacity and to destroy African opposition by its policy of Bantustans and the fragmentation of the African people. The Verwoerd Government could thus present the world with a fait accompli that it would take decades to reverse. During the past two years of political stagnation in the Territory, South Africa had been able to neutralize the opposition and prevent possible Afro-Asian and United Nations intervention. The Verwoerd Government was now ready to hasten the establishment of Bantustans at all costs and its intentions with regard to South West Africa were explicitly enunciated in the report of the Odendaal Commission.^{2/} No African tribe, or no group of tribes, could face the South African Government alone; the only solution lay in non-tribal unity, without which the struggle could not be undertaken with any prospect of success.

25. In the early stages of their political awakening, the African masses had wrongly supposed that the struggle could be waged on their behalf from outside, by leaders outside the country or by élite politicians in the Territory itself. There had, it was true, been an active minority, confident in their African tradition and their essentially pan-African orientation, who had insisted that action undertaken by sympathizers could be helpful only in so far as it reflected a popular force existing in the country itself and remained under the guidance and control of the people, but that minority had for many years been overruled by the will of the traditionalists.

26. That situation had given rise to the mistaken notion that somehow South West Africa was unique in international politics and that it enjoyed an international status that made its people, as it were, wards, dependent upon the benevolence of international public opinion expressed through international organizations, in particular the United Nations. The "international status" of the Territory, presented thus as a means of salvation, had proved to be a formidable barrier that had impeded the unification of the revolutionary nationalist forces and had created a political vacuum, so much so that the greatest handicap by far had been the absence of a revolutionary political ideology evolving out of and serving as a basis for the struggle.

27. In the Territory, politics had been largely in the hands of the tribal, educated and political élites, few of whom had realized the necessity of working to establish the foundation of a mass revolutionary movement. Moreover, despite the principles that they claimed to follow, the various tribal groups, in practice, served individual interests and had failed miserably to prepare and carry out programmes of action against South Africa within the Territory. Consequently, some of them had played into the hands of Mr. Verwoerd, whose agents had encouraged the tribal identity of political groups in order the better to use them for their own ends.

^{2/} Republic of South Africa, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into South West African Affairs, 1962-1963 (Pretoria, Government Printer, 1964).

28. At the present time, South West Africa was experiencing the emergence of a revolutionary force that would be based upon the direct participation of the masses, who were becoming aware that their salvation would depend upon their own initiatives. Unfortunately many of the inhabitants of the Territory were only just beginning to understand the situation and a long and difficult task lay ahead in order to bring about an organized collective effort.

29. In the fact of that new development, the reactionary elements who had hitherto manipulated the masses for their own purposes were allying themselves with Mr. Verwoerd, determined to undermine, block and defeat the united non-tribal revolutionary liberation movement. In order to understand the present situation, it was necessary to establish the identity of the opposition to non-tribal unity and to examine the sources of its power.

30. The most powerful and persistent enemies of African unity in the Namib were the South African Government and the invisible international interests it represented. The strength of the South African Government and its ability to produce cheap African labour, to maintain minimal rates of taxation and to provide inexpensive land expropriated from the African people guaranteed the security and profits of the foreign investors, who in turn compensated the South African Government handsomely for its services. However that might be, the foreign interests, particularly the mining and petroleum cartels, were a tremendous power to be reckoned with and they would undoubtedly intensify their subversive activities among the Africans in South West Africa as they had done in the Congo.

31. A brief look at diamond industry profits would give an idea of the magnitude of foreign interests in South West Africa: and it must not be overlooked that there were also other mining industries, and that the Administration's tax income from them, which had trebled over the past ten years, had helped to finance European economic expansion and agricultural development and to encourage European migration into the Territory. Over the period 1959-1963, net profits from sales and exports of South African diamonds had amounted to a total, after taxation, of 167.5 million rands, or almost \$235 million. Diamond extraction had been still further intensified since the discovery in 1964 of new offshore diamond fields. The fact that South West Africa's economic potential was being despoiled was practically unknown abroad, since the Government of South Africa made no distinction in its published statistics between South West African and South African production. The new Marine Diamond Corporation (MDC) formed to exploit the new field would soon be able to extract 5,000 carats of diamonds, or about 125,000 rands in value, a day; he contrasted that with the annual income of a reserve-bound African, which stood at less than 20 rands. MDC was part of a monopoly whose Chairman, Mr. Sam Collins, had recently secured from the South African Government oil-prospecting rights in South West Africa. The Territory's oil resources were believed to be considerable, and their exploitation would thus frustrate the efforts being made by the African and Asian countries to

secure an international oil embargo against South Africa. Mr. Collins had publicly declared his admiration for the work and vision of the Prime Minister of South Africa and his approach to South African problems. South Africa pursued the classical colonialist objectives of exploitation and oppression, and its strategy for maintaining its hold on the Territory's manpower and resources rested upon force.

32. Thus there were enormous material and ideological obstacles facing any revolutionary nationalist movement in southern Africa. South Africa possessed the largest and best equipped military machines on the continent, with modern weapons bought abroad; and its military alliances with the United Kingdom and Portugal had the effect of enhancing its capacity for suppressing resistance within its own borders and in its colony of South West Africa. Its 1964 defence budget was twenty times greater than in 1959, amounting to 200 million rands, 49 million of which went to the police force. That police force had been reorganized; the security branch had become an autonomous unit directly responsible to the Ministry of Justice, and there was a secret police force patterned after the Nazi Gestapo. South Africa thus had every attribute of a military State mobilized for internal and international war. Its existence as such was a serious threat to the entire African continent, for all of its power was concentrated in the hands of European racists for use against the black man.

33. The frontier between South Africa and South West Africa was a meaningless symbol: South West Africa was governed and occupied by the military-police organization as an integral part of South Africa. The latter's intention had never been concealed: it was to absorb South West Africa as a fifth province. Legally, South Africa's ambitions had so far been frustrated, but *de facto* absorption was a long accomplished reality and would be completed under the Odendaal scheme.

34. South Africa had several military bases and camps in South West Africa, in defiance of the provisions of the League of Nations Mandate, under which the establishment of military installations anywhere in the Territory was expressly prohibited. The presence of numerous well-armed garrisons and posts, the modernization or construction of military airfields and the use or threat of force had so far effectively intimidated and contained the African masses. The situation was further complicated by the presence in the Territory of European South African nationals and other Europeans permanently settled there. From that point of view, the African struggle had a double significance: it was a struggle both against exploitation and against racism.

35. Such minor differences as did exist between the European political parties in South West Africa were differences of degree in the application of apartheid, but the existence of apartheid itself as the basis of the Territory's social and political organization was never challenged. Boer nationalism was firmly entrenched in the country through the governing Nationalist Party, which was reinforced by strong neo-nazi elements from the large German community. The minority United National South West

Africa Party (UNSWAP) advocated a slightly more restrained application of apartheid, but stood for the absolute preservation of European settler and imperialist economic and political interests in the country; it stood with the Nationalist Party for the tribal separation and fragmentation of the African population, and propagated the farcical notion of European representation, in a territorial legislative assembly, of the "various ethnic groupings". To the Africans the Nationalist Party of Mr. Verwoerd could be compared to a wolf and the United Party to a fox: both were enemies of the lamb—the African people. The Europeans were well armed and organized into civilian military units similar in many ways to the units of The Organisation de l'armée secrète (OAS) in Algeria: and the strength of their resistance to African freedom was just as intense. In a trial of strength between the black forces of freedom and the white imperialist forces of oppression, the European population would stand as a solid bloc against the Africans. Moreover, Mr. Verwoerd's ultra-efficient police apparatus extended its tentacles throughout South West Africa and beyond: its agents penetrated into every centre of political activity against South Africa, where they fomented division and intrigue and thus undermined the struggle of the Africans in the Territory and confused supporters of the African cause and won them away from positive action.

36. The isolation of South West Africa from international public opinion was maintained by force: and force stood as a buffer between Africans at home and other anti-colonialist forces abroad and prevented the penetration into the Territory of revolutionary ideas, from which the masses of the African people had been separated by generations of enforced subservience and colonialist indoctrination. Moreover, division of Africans from each other prevented mass organization, undermined mass morale, and virtually paralysed any effective challenge to the colonialist forces. However, the Africans were coming to realize that united and disciplined revolutionary action was required for success in the struggle; that task was the order of the day for African nationalism.

37. To prevent Africans from gaining their political, social and cultural freedom, the South African colonial Government had been forced to develop Bantustans, which were a type of rural ghettos for Africans, while intensifying their campaign to tribalize the Africans. South West Africa had thus served as the guinea-pig for South Africa's refinement of apartheid techniques long before the practices of job reservation, contract labour, influx control, Bantu education etc. had been made into law in South Africa itself. Tribalism was a vital extension of South African colonial policy; the hostility it aroused among African peoples also provided certain opportunists with fertile ground for intrigue among isolated reserve-bound peasants, and such assiduous propagandists for the doctrine of tribalism had done more to sow suspicion, hatred and confusion among Africans in different areas of the country than had the South African Government itself.

38. "Dominate or be dominated"—such was the monotonous theme developed with endless variations by the

racist oppressor and the tribalist politician. Africans were instigated to fratricidal strife; any African leader who refused to play the tribalist game and to identify himself with a tribe became the target of a barrage of vilification. No holds were barred in the efforts to divide Africans: tribal differences were exaggerated and distorted accounts were spread about African politics. Another tragedy for the people of South West Africa was that African States and other anti-colonial countries based their assessments of the situation on the very forces which, by dividing the Africans among themselves, sought to cut them off even more from progressive support abroad. The colonial Administration had been able to ban South West African political leaders working for unity and the mobilization of the masses without publicly proclaiming that policy in South West Africa, which would inevitably have had international repercussions. On the other hand, publicity-mongering South West Africans operating from abroad, whose statements were calculated to perpetuate confusion and division among the people and disparage efforts at unification of the masses, were quoted in the settler Press. Those statements were then used by the tribalists as evidence to mislead international opinion, while the statements of those who represented the new movement of nationalist liberation, united instead of tribal, were invariably suppressed. The South African Government sought in particular to poison the relations between the Ovambos and the Hereros and to destroy the advocates of their unity. It therefore told the Ovambos daily that the Hereros wanted to enslave them, and it told the Hereros that the Ovambos wanted to dominate the country. The Damaras were characterized as "sell-outs", the Namas as "worthless Hottentots", and the Coloureds as "outcasts".

39. Since the highest population density was in the northern areas of the Territory, in Ovamboland, that was where the South African Government was directing all its efforts to Balkanizing and paralysing South West Africa. It was trying, with the assistance of certain imperialist Powers, to persuade the Ovambos of the need of establishing a Bantustan all for themselves. At the same time, it was indoctrinating them with the idea that they must regard themselves as numerically superior and therefore the "natural rulers of other Natives". It told them about their African identity, which it contrasted with the "pollution" of other Africans by foreign blood and foreign ideas. It exhorted them to have nothing to do with those who agitated against the South African Government, a Government which provided them with work, with food in time of drought, and which was now planning to give them their own government as a reward for faithful support of its policies. Meanwhile Namas, Hereros, Damaras and Coloureds were incited to adopt attitudes of intellectual and cultural superiority over the Ovambos. National liberation movements could not develop in such an environment, and in the long run the interests of the masses were subordinated to opportunism and sacrificed upon the altar of tribal domination.

40. Mr. Kerina detailed the manoeuvres in which the South African Government had engaged to win over the Ovambo people and thus to annex South West Africa or, at least, to achieve the de jure recognition by the

international community of an annexation long since achieved *de facto*. All those manoeuvres had been foiled in the United Nations by the African nationalists, but the Ovambo police had been so intimidated by the South African people and disillusioned by the failure of their politicians that it was now possible to consider their territory as a fief of the South African Government. For practical administrative purposes, Ovamboland was well on its way towards Bantustan: a commissioner-general, leaders and other persons had been appointed to carry out the plan.

41. The result of South Africa's action in South West Africa over the preceding three years, as well as its plans for the future, were embodied in the report of the Odendaal Commission. That Commission had been instructed to formulate a plan for South West Africa designed to mollify international opinion, confuse diplomatic efforts and stave off possible intervention, while the Government consolidated its administrative and military control within the country and completed the country's economic integration with South Africa.

42. The Odendaal Commission had projected three basic schemes by which South Africa was to achieve the permanent annexation of South West Africa. Those schemes were for the complete administrative absorption of the Territory into South Africa, its total economic integration with South Africa, and its Balkanization. All branches of the South West African administration would be transferred to South Africa and placed under the direct control of the South African Government. Under the scheme for economic integration, South West Africa would be forced to finance development projects aimed at its own destruction. Finally, ten Bantustans would be created in order to disguise the economic, political and military aims of the imperialists and neo-colonialists in southern Africa.

43. The only purpose of a Bantustan was the systematic annihilation of the African people except in so far as their physical labour was required for the white man's economic development in the region. The conception of Bantustan had nothing whatsoever to do with African development; it was not even remotely related to the idea of self-determination, nor had it the slightest connexion with the concept or practice of independence. For the racists, it marked the turning point in the road, the point from which the Whites set out towards greater economic security and progress, while the Blacks were herded towards oblivion. The so-called Bantu homelands were nothing more than prison camps where the black man's dependence upon the white man was intensified, and where the black man became a fixed commodity which could be used in European industry and agriculture when imperialist economy so demanded. That was already happening in Ovamboland, at the threshold of Bantustan, where at least 10 per cent of the population was always absent and where at least two of every five able-bodied men were signed away for contract labour with South African or foreign companies. If there were any economic potentialities within the so-called homelands, the Whites would be the last to consider giving them to the Africans. Demarcations of Bantustans were carefully drawn so as to

make of the black man a negligible quantity tied to the barren soil, all the riches of which would be retained the controlled by the European settlers for their own well-being and to meet the requirements of international colonialism.

44. The Africans had never asked the white settlers to develop their country for them or to plan how it should be developed. The Africans could make their own plans for the future. Whatever the settlers might say, it was African labour which had given the country whatever development it now enjoyed. The Africans demanded and would achieve freedom to work for themselves, according to their own requirements, and to create a united nation for themselves, for their descendants and for Africa as a whole.

45. As the result of an eleventh-hour appeal which the United Kingdom and the United States had made to Mr. Verwoerd on the grounds that implementation of the Odendaal Commission's recommendations at a time when the case of South West Africa was still before the International Court of Justice might precipitate international action, application of the recommendations had been shelved. The Western Powers had taken that step to postpone a trial of strength, and to help save South Africa from the consequences of forty-five of oppression of the African people. Another motive had been the desire to protect their extensive interests in South West Africa. But it was essential to realize that Mr. Verwoerd had not given one inch of ground on the question of South West Africa. Recent events in Africa and renewed and intensified support from the imperialists had reinforced his determination to annex the Territory. In the immediate future, perhaps, South Africa might be rather more circumspect regarding South West Africa, but its objectives and methods remained the same.

46. Some of the enemies of African unity and freedom for South West Africa—such as the South African colonial Government acting as a façade and instrument for international imperialist and neo-colonial interests, the European settler population and the various agents of tribalism and division within the country—were easily recognizable. But there was another equally dangerous group to be reckoned with—the "freedom fighters" and "nationalists" who were not immediately recognizable as agents of imperialism. It was a tragedy for South West Africa that in their operations abroad persons of that kind posed as genuine nationalists. There were, in fact, some genuine patriots and revolutionary nationalists in South West Africa, but few of them had gone abroad. Those who had left the country had disassociated themselves from the fictitious political organizations whose main activity was collecting funds for subversive activities against the South West African people.

47. South West African freedom fighters abroad were the product of many different and contradictory forces. Some had left home when the myth of United Nations infallibility was the prevailing sentiment, thinking that their appearance abroad would act as a catalyst for United Nations intervention. The sudden intensification of political persecution following the Windhoek boycott, together with the shootings in December 1959, had also contributed to the exodus. Some of those who had escaped had helped in the

establishment of new political organizations within the Territory: others had tried to avoid deportation to the reserves or exile to Angola; some had fled the country merely to seek abroad the education which they were denied at home. But each group was infiltrated by spies planted by the South African police and the Special Branch.

48. Meanwhile the tide of African independence had been moving irresistibly ahead. Heads of States had met at Accra, Monrovia and Addis Ababa; and the All-African Peoples' Conferences at Accra and Tunis, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conferences at Cairo and Conakry and the Freedom Fighters' Conference at Winneba had all given a powerful impetus to the freedom fighter movements. Africa had become a powerful anti-colonial force in the United Nations, and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had been proclaimed. Afro-Asian States had welcomed the refugees, and several overseas "Africa" committees and bureaux had introduced them to techniques of political organization and pan-African and revolutionary theory, while others had obviously tried merely to divert their attention from co-operation, unity and direct action in South West Africa and involve them in activities in which their energy was entirely wasted.

49. Furthermore, enforced isolation, lack of political experience and ignorance of the real nature of international diplomacy had prevented the people of the Territory from acquiring a proper understanding of its revolutionary struggle. Many young people who had left the Territory with the best of intentions, but without any disciplined political organization behind them, had quickly developed many of the ills associated with refugees and political exiles. New "leaders" arriving from the Territory with "fresh news" had challenged the authority of their predecessors; and that had led to a proliferation of organizations with grandiose titles, all of them claiming similar objectives but all entirely dependent on international charity. Lacking any popular following, they had been left to their own devices in defining and executing their strategies, regardless of the needs of the situation existing in the Territory.

50. Competition between those organizations was clouding all the really important issues, and their misleading propaganda against the advocates of a united, non-tribal revolutionary struggle was undermining popular initiatives in the Territory. Most of their charges were, in fact, devoid of substance and completely irrelevant to the struggle in South West Africa. The imperialists were, of course, delighted at the discord which they were sowing among the peoples of South West Africa, and which gave them time to consolidate their interests and eventually, perhaps, to create a neo-colonialist government in the Territory. He and his friends were doing everything in their power to unite the entire people in a single revolutionary movement, despite the imperialists' efforts to perpetuate a tribal system which was devoid of any ideological purpose or political principles and merely served the interests of the country's main enemy—the Verwoerd régime.

51. As freedom and independence for the Territory became a reality, new philosophical and political ideas, new concepts of law and social justice and clearer ideas of the kind of government which the country needed would be advanced. Some of the individuals he had mentioned, however, would be trying, with the support of international imperialism, to pose as genuine spokesmen for the exploited masses in the Territory. But the patriots were determined to defend the freedom and the unity of their people, and to crush anyone who wished to plunge the country into a bloodbath of tribalism. They were opposed to the idea of one tribe dominating the others, just as they were opposed to European domination of the indigenous population. That should be clearly understood by all Africans working under the instructions of Mr. Verwoerd and certain imperialist Powers.

52. Next, he wished to explain to the Committee how the people's political consciousness and determination had been forged into a militant, non-tribal national liberation movement, and how that movement was operating in South West Africa.

53. The organization of which he was President was a national revolutionary liberation movement, which represented the awakening of his people's national and political consciousness. It was a political and non-tribal party, created by the people for the people.

54. The political manifesto of the National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO) had been gradually worked out over the past decades by those who had dedicated themselves to the struggle for the freedom and independence of Namib (South West Africa). It defined, both in theory and in practice, the programme of the liberation movement, which was designed to establish a national, independent, progressive and democratic government. It described the national aims, and outlined the transformation of the country's economic and political foundations for the benefit of all. It contained some general laws of national development, and defined the tasks and responsibilities of the national leaders of NUDO in the social, economic and political fields. It was not a statement of dogmatic principles but rather an ideological guide, since practical experience would be the final arbiter of the soundness of the theories expressed in the manifesto.

55. The manifesto of NUDO laid down humanitarian, political and economic objectives. It called for the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the country. It called for immediate political independence for Namib on the basis of universal adult suffrage, according to the principle of "one man, one vote", and the establishment of an independent central government responsible to Parliament. With regard to economic objectives, NUDO proposed to maintain side by side government enterprises, joint public and private enterprises and national co-operatives. The publicly owned enterprises would seek to ensure the growth of employment to increase the revenues of the State, in order to raise the standard of living of the people. They would also make it possible for the government to influence the market and in particular to stabilize prices and the national currency. They would also fill the

vacuum in the private sector. NUDO would allow the operation of enterprises owned by foreign private interests, in order to accelerate the growth of the country's capital stock. The nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning of basic industries should be based on reasons of public utility, security or national interest, recognized as overriding individual and private interests, both domestic and foreign. Lastly, the State would exercise its sovereignty over natural resources in the interests of national development and the well-being of the people, irrespective of race, tribe or economic status.

56. The leaders of the organization, and the Party Leader, Hosea Kutako, were all men who had played a prominent role in the political awakening of the people of South West Africa. They had been elected by the people and instructed to remain in South West Africa and to suffer with the people in their struggle for freedom and independence.

57. He then proceeded to give the Committee the historical background of NUDO. The people of South West Africa had begun the formation of tribal political organizations in 1958: the Ovambo people had founded the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO); the Herero people, the South West Africa National Union (SWANU); the Nama people, the South West Africa United National Independence Organization (SWAUNIO); the Damara people, the South West Africa Democratic Union (SWADU); the South African Coloureds living in South West Africa, the South West Africa Coloureds Organization (SWACO); and the Rehoboth people, the Rehoboth Burgers Association or "Bastersraad". The Herero people had also worked through the Council of Chief Hosea Kutako, which had played a vital political role. All those tribal groups had been strongly opposed to the apartheid policy of the South African Government, with the exception of SWACO, which had become the instrument of the Verwoerd Government's policy of oppression.

58. In 1962, the African people in the Territory had begun to realize that national unity was a vital factor and must be achieved if they wished to obtain results, especially as the South African Government was constantly strengthening its machinery of oppression. After several attempts at unification, which had failed because of the excessive tribalism of each of the movements and because of lack of funds, an appeal was addressed in March 1964 to all South West Africans living in the Territory and abroad to contribute to the achievement of national unification through the establishment of a single liberation movement. Many leaders and individuals had responded favourably to that invitation and a national convention was called for April 1964. Two successive meetings were prevented by the South African Government, but the Convention finally convened and formed the United Namib Independent People's Party (UNIPP) of South West Africa. The South African Government had employed various tactics to prevent the national unification of the people, but had failed completely to do so.

59. Following the formation of UNIPP, people from various tribes had called for the convening of a final national convention, in which the whole popula-

tion would be represented and which could thus decide on the formation of a united, non-tribal liberation movement. That convention had also been given the task of formulating a constitution and a political manifesto and of electing the national leadership. It was in that way that the National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO) had come into existence at the historic national convention in which, on 19 and 20 September 1964, the people of South West Africa had met at Winhoek in defiance of the orders of the South African Government. Today, all political, ideological and tribal differences had been submerged and the people of South West Africa were united in a single movement of their own creation determined to overthrow the colonial régime imposed in the Territory by the Government of South Africa.

60. The women of South West Africa were called upon to participate fully and in the same conditions as men in the national liberation movement. The greatest concern of those who had dedicated themselves to the freedom of their country should be the emancipation of women, still kept by anachronistic traditions in an inferior social situation. The movement also called upon the young people of the country, in whom it placed all its hopes and who were to constitute the future citizens of a free Namib.

61. The National Convention of the people of Namib, by which NUDO had been formed, had made the following declaration concerning the report of the Odendaal Commission:

"The National Convention...

"1. Condemns and rejects in its entirety the colonialist report of the Odendaal Commission, a document designed to fragment, Balkanize and dismember our country in the interest of South African colonialism.

"2. Strongly condemns the act of aggression, theft and plunder by the South African colonialists upon our territorial integrity, sovereignty, dignity and unity of our people.

"3. Expresses the determination of our people to resist the implementation of the Odendaal Commission report by all means, including force, if necessary."

62. There could be no legitimate government in South West Africa without the direct participation of the African people. He was not calling for the United Nations to intervene to avert a revolutionary situation; he was calling for it to enter the struggle on the side of NUDO. The time had come for South West Africa to shake off the yoke of oppression, and no power on earth could stop it. The people were prepared to suffer and die for the freedom of the country and were determined to end South African exploitation and colonialism and its degrading policy of apartheid. A century of colonialism and exploitation had left its mark on both the oppressor and the oppressed. Bitterness and resentment remained with the people of South West Africa, and the Europeans' fear and hatred was increasing. However, despite the existence of such an atmosphere, the United Nations must help in the establishment of an independent, democratic government in South West Africa. That government

would base its institutions on democratic principles and on equality of rights for all citizens without discrimination as to race or tribe.

63. NUDO proposed the creation of an ad hoc committee of three members for the purpose of drawing up plans, in consultation with the inhabitants of South West Africa, for the establishment of an interim government following the judgement of the International Court of Justice—i.e., in the autumn of 1966. The ad hoc committee would be responsible for facilitating the effective transfer of powers from the South African Government to a duly elected South West African government. To that end, the ad hoc committee might consider the possibility of taking the following measures: revocation of the Mandate; establishment of a United Nations presence in South West Africa; measures to facilitate the transfer of political power from South Africa to a South West African government; supervision of the election of members of the interim government; advice and assistance to the interim government in the creation of the permanent structure of government.

64. In view of the South African Government's determination to oppose any United Nations intervention, by military force, if necessary, the United Nations would have to create a superior force, which must be carefully constituted and sufficient in numbers. NUDO therefore proposed that the ad hoc committee should consider the possibility of creating a United Nations peace force drawn from all States Members of the Organization of African Unity for the purpose of restoring and maintaining law and order and a climate of peace and security; protecting the lives of all inhabitants; requesting the great Powers to provide arms, transport and "matériel"; and establishing South West African military and police forces in the Territory. The ad hoc committee must also study the possibility of creating a fiscal commission and an economic commission to examine the fiscal and budgetary problems of South West Africa.

65. In conclusion, he wished, on behalf of NUDO, to thank the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia for bringing the question of South West Africa before the International Court of Justice. He also thanked all the African Governments for their support to the cause of South West Africa.

66. Mr. MBAEVA (South West Africa National Union) thanked the Member States for the assistance in the form of scholarships which they were giving to South West Africa under the United Nations training programme. He was particularly grateful to the United States of America, Sweden and Poland, and to some African States, which had contributed to the training and educational programmes so badly needed in South West Africa.

67. He regretted, however, that most of the students receiving their scholarships direct from the United Nations had not been altogether satisfied with the management of the scholarships. He wondered whether the scholarship administration could perhaps be transferred to the Government of the host countries. The students also had difficulties in obtaining passports. They have been obtaining them from the independent African States, but the latter were having to cope

with an increasing number of refugees, and their ability to help was therefore limited. Needless to say, neither Mr. Ian Smith nor Mr. Salazar would give South West African students the assistance they wanted in order to enjoy equal treatment abroad. He understood that the League of Nations had issued passports to certain categories of refugees, and he did not think that the United Nations would have any difficulty in doing the same. He would be grateful, therefore, if the Organization would give the problem its favourable consideration.

68. He regretted to state that, at the present hearing, he was representing only the South West Africa National Union (SWANU) because the South West Africa National Liberation Front, which he had also represented at his hearing before the Special Committee in 1964 (255th meeting) had left the United Front. The South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), carried away by the success of its efforts for recognition as a popular movement, had embarked on crusades against any unity of the people of South West Africa. The political calculations of SWAPO seemed to have superseded its zeal for the national cause. As evidence of what had become of SWANU-SWAPO unity, he quoted a letter written on 2 January 1964 by Mr. Nelengane, Vice-President of SWAPO, to Mr. van Fortune, Secretary-General of SWANU, at Dar es Salaam, in which Mr. Nelengane rejected the decisions adopted at the SWANU-SWAPO meeting of 22 December 1963 because he found the whole idea of the National Liberation Front unacceptable and calculated to undermine the progress already made. That letter had been written three months after SWAPO and SWANU had decided to form the South West Africa National Liberation Front, on 1 October 1963, and only one month after SWAPO and SWANU had drawn up a joint unity memorandum which had been presented to the African Liberation Committee by Mr. Nujoma, head of the SWAPO delegation, and Mr. Kozonguizi, head of the SWANU delegation. SWANU-SWAPO unity had therefore been deliberately destroyed, and the breach had been confirmed by several events following upon the letter in question. For instance, Mr. Nujoma, the President of SWAPO, had made a statement in Bechuanaland supporting Mr. Nelengane's attitude, and at a SWAPO meeting at Philadelphia recently Mr. Nujoma had told students who were members of that movement that his organization had decided to act alone because it had nothing to fear, being in the majority. If he were to define the SWAPO "majority", he would say that SWAPO was simply another name for the Ovamboland People's Organization and that, since the Ovambos constituted the biggest tribe in the country, SWAPO would like to be accepted as the biggest political organization. In fact, SWAPO had been given its name by Mr. Kerina in New York, in the hope of making the Ovamboland People's Organization a national organization. Mr. Kerina now had completely different views on SWAPO and its programme.

69. He did not intend to start a discussion on SWAPO, but he wished to inform the Committee on the situation in South West Africa, a step which was particularly necessary at the present time, when the country was expecting the United Nations to take direct measures. He wished to make clear the

position of SWANU in relation to other organizations. To that end, it was sufficient for SWAPO to speak for itself: according to an article in the Windhoek Advertiser of 14 September 1961, Mr. Nebela, at that time President of SWAPO, had defined the members of his organization as "moderates", recognizing the white man, who should not be fought against because he had an educational task to carry out. Of the seventy chiefs and tribal headsmen, thirty-five were now from Ovamboland. He then read out a passage from a work by Ruth First entitled South West Africa referring to a petition signed by eighty Ovambos, which stated that the tribal society of the Ovambos had not been conquered and that the Ovambos approached white rule, on the whole, with tolerance and trust. Because of that historical background, Ovamboland, in the eyes of most South West Africans, constituted a South African Protectorate, just as Basutoland or Swaziland were United Kingdom Protectorates. Mr. Kerina went still further, as was shown by a circular in which he analysed the views of his party and stated that the reactionaries of Ovamboland had decided to unite with Mr. Verwoerd to wreck the common struggle.

70. Despite all those differences, Mr. Kozonguizi had informed the Committee on South West Africa in 1961 that SWANU was prepared to dissolve and merge with SWAPO. In Mr. Kozonguizi's opinion, the name of the national front organization mattered little so long as it symbolized the unity of the nation. Mr. Mbaeva said that he wished to repeat at the present time that SWANU still left the door open to unity. In a country where national unity was lacking and where certain elements were more devoted to their tribes and families than to the concept of their nation, internal feuds were unfortunately possible, if not inevitable. Having established a stronghold in Ovamboland, South Africa was preparing to use that area as a springboard to perpetuate its domination over the country and over the chiefs as its tools.

71. In all their statements, the petitioners had tried to inform the Committee of the oppression, repression, torture, imprisonment and segregation which their compatriots had to undergo. They had stressed that wages were too low and were barely enough to cover the subsistence of workers; they had complained of the lack of secondary schools, let alone universities. All their information had been substantiated by the refusal of the South African Government to submit reports to the United Nations on the

situation in the Territory and its efforts to prevent a United Nations presence in the Territory.

72. Since that was the case, it remained for him only to state what, in his opinion, the United Nations could and should do. The national elements in the Territory had invited persons of goodwill from the European community to join with the forces of progress. They had tried to make known, through the medium of the Press, that they were carrying on a struggle for freedom and self-determination; they had tried to make people understand that apartheid was contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter, that it was politically grotesque and morally inhuman, and therefore had no place in any society of human beings. All those efforts had ended in failure, for the white man had been inoculated with the virus of apartheid. But to SWANU the issue was not solely that South West Africa must be freed from apartheid. The heart of the matter was that South West Africa belonged to its inhabitants, had been illegally handed over to South Africa and must be returned to its legitimate owners. The people of South West Africa were ready for independence; they were certainly better prepared for it than the racists of South Africa and the rebels of Rhodesia.

73. He was convinced that the cause of South West Africa would triumph at the International Court of Justice. In the unlikely case of a different outcome, he wished to inform the Committee that SWANU would not abide by any decision of the Court which was not consistent with the resolutions of the United Nations on the matter. On behalf of SWANU and the people of South West Africa, he asked that, immediately after the decision of the Court, the Security Council should send a United Nations force to the Territory to replace all the South African police, and that the United Nations should establish a commission to organize a constitutional convention in the Territory. The convention would decide the form of government and the constitution of the country and would give it an administration entrusted to Africans, excluding elements which supported the policy of South Africa.

74. After an exchange of views between Miss BROOKS (Liberia), Mr. KISAKA (Kenya), Mr. MALECELA (United Republic of Tanzania) and Mr. DIAZ GONZALEZ (Venezuela), the CHAIRMAN suggested that the texts of the statements made by the petitioners should be circulated in the original language.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.