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**Chairman:** Mr. Adnan M. PACHACHI (Iraq).

**Requests for hearings (*continued*)**

**REQUESTS CONCERNING AGENDA ITEM 13 (REPORT OF THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL) (*continued*)**

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that a request for a hearing concerning the Trust Territory of Tanganyika had been received from Mr. Michael M. Sanga, General Secretary of the African National Congress, Tanganyika. If there was no objection, the request would be circulated.

*It was so decided.*<sup>1</sup>

**AGENDA ITEM 45**

**Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi (A/4689-A/4692, A/4694, A/4706 and Add.1, A/C.4/471, A/C.4/476, A/C.4/477, A/C.4/L.678 and Add.1, A/C.4/L.679) (*continued*)**

**GENERAL DEBATE AND CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/C.4/L.678 and Add.1, A/C.4/L.679) (*continued*)**

2. U TIN MAUNG (Burma) said that, throughout its long period of trusteeship in Ruanda-Urundi, the Belgian administration had been characterized by paternalism, patronage and the policy of conquest by division. At any time during that long period of colonialism, it would still have been possible for the Belgians to reverse the drift towards discontent and disunity: the Administering Authority had on more than one occasion been urged by the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly to prepare the inhabitants of the Territory for their role as masters of their own destiny, but the Belgians had always resisted such efforts on the part of the United Nations. All the attempts made since the 1959 disturbances in Ruanda to help the Administering Authority to create conditions that would be favourable to national conciliation and the establishment of national democratic institutions had been nullified.

3. In order to prevent the situation becoming so explosive that the United Nations might be compelled to intervene, the General Assembly had urged the Ad-

<sup>1</sup>The request was subsequently circulated in document A/C.4/446/Add.1.

ministering Authority, in its resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV), to avoid past mistakes and to ensure full co-operation with the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi. There was no need for him to elaborate on the extent of the co-operation which that Commission had in fact received; its impartial and factual interim report (A/4706 and Add.1) had sharply criticized Belgian policy and the complete lack of co-operation on the part of the Administration in the Territory. The inescapable conclusions were that the Administering Authority had not implemented General Assembly resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV) and that the course of events, deliberately planned by the local Administration—not without the knowledge and approval of the Administering Authority—had rendered the duties of the Commission infinitely more difficult to perform. Moreover, Belgium had already on a previous occasion failed to implement resolutions adopted by the Trusteeship Council. Although the Belgian representative had once again stated his desire to co-operate with the United Nations, he would remind the Committee of his warning during the first part of the session at the 1080th meeting, that the assurances given by Belgium must be accepted with a good deal of caution.

4. As soon as the local representatives of the Administering Authority in Ruanda-Urundi had been detected in the act of sabotaging the constructive efforts of the United Nations, the Belgian Government should at once have taken whatever action was necessary to ensure that its policy was carried out. That had not been done: indeed, in one instance, the dispatch of the official communication conveying Belgium's decision to postpone the legislative elections had been deliberately delayed in order to enable the local Administration to make such arrangements as might be required for the successful consummation of the Gitarama *coup d'état*. Again, the departure of the United Nations Commission had been delayed with the deliberate object of confronting the Organization with a *fait accompli*. The *coup d'état* was illegal and could not be justified on any grounds. The Administering Authority had not indeed declared the *coup d'état* to be legal, but the *de facto* recognition granted to it by governmental bodies in Ruanda had given further impetus to those political parties which had engineered it.

5. Nor could the setting up of governmental bodies in Urundi on the basis of communal elections be regarded as legally valid; in fact, all the governmental bodies both in Ruanda and in Urundi had been constituted illegally. Any attempt to justify their existence on the ground that the Administering Authority was anxious to maintain law and order had to be condemned, because the bodies in question were composed of representatives of political parties which, in the name of national unity, were suppressing the legitimate expression of national aspirations and the political activi-

ties of parties which did not see eye to eye with the Administering Authority.

6. The United Nations considered the Belgian Government to be solely responsible for the administration of the Trust Territory and accountable for it to the United Nations. The trusteeship had to be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement; it could not be handed over as a gift to certain political parties in recognition of their support of Belgian colonial policy. Pending the establishment of governments derived from the legislative elections to be held in the Territory during the year, the Administering Authority must bend all its efforts to constituting broadly-based caretaker governments immediately in both parts of the Trust Territory. In order to carry out the General Assembly resolutions and to achieve the objectives of the Trusteeship System, political leaders and workers held in prison or under house arrest must be released immediately, those abroad must return. All men of goodwill in the Territory should sink their personal differences and devote their energies solely to ensuring that the legislative elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage were held fairly and freely under the supervision of the United Nations.

7. The return of the Mwami Kigeli V to his country was opposed by the Administering Authority on grounds which his delegation could not accept. The Belgians were trying to frustrate every effort by the Mwami to serve the interests of his State and to establish national unity before independence; the Mwami realized that sham independence imposed on a people without a national leader to unify it and lead it without bloodshed to freedom would be worthless. The Mwami Kigeli's declaration that he intended to rule his people as a constitutional Head of State was so categorical that the Belgian Administration was worried about the popular support that he would receive on his return to Ruanda. The Administering Authority's hostility to the Mwami had been shown by the refusal in the first instance of the Belgian Minister for African Affairs to receive Kigeli V; when, on the second occasion, the Minister had been instructed to receive the Mwami, the latter had formulated the nine points referred to in his petition as read out by Mr. Ruteru at the 1117th meeting, but that useful conversation had been cut short because of the events at Gitarama.

8. The referendum on the question of the Mwami in Ruanda should be held under conditions which would not give rise to any dispute about the validity of the result and should be supervised by the United Nations. The question of the date of the referendum should be left to the judgement of the United Nations Commission on the spot.

9. The question of a full and unconditional amnesty could only be settled when the Administering Authority fully discharged its obligations in the spirit of General Assembly resolution 1579 (XV). The United Nations could assist the Government of Belgium with regard to remaining cases which were in legal dispute by means of the special commission proposed in draft resolution A/C.4/L.678 and Add.1. The sponsors envisaged a membership of that commission which would be such as to command the entire confidence of all Member States.

10. The United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi would return immediately to the Trust Territory with a clearer mandate. The names of the sponsors

clearly showed that the draft resolution did not reflect the views merely of a group of Asian and African Member States but of a cross-section of the entire body of the United Nations, which was gravely concerned with the course of events and the Machiavellian tactics of the Belgian colonialists in Ruanda-Urundi.

11. The Government of Belgium, through its representative in the Committee, had solemnly declared that it would give the fullest co-operation to the United Nations Commission. If, however, the Commissioners found that they could not discharge their duties as effectively as they were expected to do and that their efforts were impeded either by the Administering Authority or its agents in the Territory, or both, they would be perfectly justified in returning to Headquarters and reporting to the General Assembly, which would have to be convened in resumed session if necessary. Accordingly, his delegation welcomed the amendment to that effect (A/C.4/L.681, para 3) and would support it.

12. He appealed to the Belgian Government to appreciate the spirit in which the sponsors of the draft resolution had put forward their views. The sole purpose was to help the Administering Authority to solve the pressing problems of the Trust Territory in a manner which would redound to the prestige of the United Nations. It was their earnest hope that that Government would not wish to aggravate further the situation in Ruanda-Urundi by withholding its full co-operation from the United Nations and its accredited representatives.

13. Miss IMRU (Ethiopia) said that her delegation regarded the question of Ruanda-Urundi with deep concern. It had read the interim report of the Commission with the utmost interest and realized that the Committee was still confronted with practically the same problems as had faced it during the first part of the session. Despite General Assembly resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV), the question of conciliation was still unresolved and that of a general amnesty was being postponed under one pretext or another. Nor was there any solution to the question of resettling refugees or to that of the Mwami. To crown all, the Committee was confronted with the establishment of an illegal régime, which her Government could not accept since it was contrary to the specific recommendations of the General Assembly in resolution 1579 (XV).

14. Her delegation had also been disturbed at the unfavourable reception given to the Commission and at the attitude adopted by certain political leaders towards the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. It seemed evident from the interim report that the purposes of the resolution had been presented to the people of Ruanda-Urundi in a distorted way. Moreover, if the *coup d'état* had taken place without the knowledge of the Administering Authority, it was difficult to see how the Belgian Government had been ready to grant *de facto* recognition so quickly to the authorities set up after it.

15. The indirect defiance of General Assembly resolutions by the Administering Authority was tantamount to destroying the United Nations. Her delegation appealed to the Belgian Government not to fall into the same error as it had done in the Congo, which had created such bitterness. She urged responsible Governments not to be the means of postponing the evolution of the nations of Africa by sowing discord among them. The African people might have forgiven the exploitation of the past but it was too much to expect them

to allow themselves to be exploited anew under a different guise.

16. Her delegation endorsed the interim report. Believing as it did that the conciliation of the various parties would solve many of the Territory's problems, it had co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.4/L.678. There were several other points in that proposal on which it wished to lay particular stress, notably the paramount necessity that there should be an unconditional amnesty, as envisaged in General Assembly resolution 1579 (XV), as soon as possible. Her delegation could not accept the thesis that certain political prisoners should be kept in custody because their personal safety was at stake. The elections should be held on a basis of direct, universal, adult suffrage, for independence was not the privilege of the educated few but was also for the uneducated masses, both men and women. In view of the differences of opinion with regard to the Mwami, he should return to Ruanda before the referendum took place: the people must be given a chance to decide whether to keep the institution of the Mwami, which at the outset had been their own creation.

17. Her delegation appealed to the various political parties to overlook their differences and ambitions and to work for unity, from which the country would draw its strength.

18. Mr. TRAORE (Mali) said that the Committee was faced with a familiar problem: that of an African people struggling to achieve national independence. Throughout history, whether in Africa or elsewhere, independence had never been offered to a people on a silver platter and it was therefore no surprise that difficulties were arising in the case of Ruanda-Urundi.

19. Belgium had administered Ruanda-Urundi since 1919 and the trusteeship was governed by the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter. If those provisions had been properly complied with, the Territory would not have found itself, after forty years of Belgian rule, still asking for self-government. It was paradoxical that the Congo (Léopoldville), which had not been a Trust Territory but had been administered as a colony pure and simple, had achieved independence before Ruanda-Urundi; in the latter Territory, all that Belgium had done during some forty years had been to delay the coming of independence. That was a fact which Belgium could hardly deny; the Belgian Government had itself stated that it was still applying obsolete laws dating from 1924. At that time, and indeed up to the end of the Second World War, no democratic measures had been introduced by the colonialist Powers in their possessions; on the contrary, they had sought to suppress by force any movement towards independence by the colonial peoples. France, for example, under the hated *indigénat* system, had made use of corporal punishment; so far as Ruanda-Urundi was concerned, in the light of part II, chapter II, paragraph 225, of the report of the Trusteeship Council (A/4404), it was impossible to say definitely that such punishment had been abolished there.

20. Everything had been done to prevent the political evolution of the Territory. Elsewhere in the world, such evolution was due to the work of political parties and naturally the colonialist Powers had done nothing to facilitate the creation of such parties. Belgium indeed had gone to such extremes that no political parties had been set up in Ruanda-Urundi before 1959. The awakening of political consciousness was also brought about by mass democratic organizations such as trade

unions, youth organizations and women's organizations, which could also do much to create political unity. The Belgian Government, however, had done nothing to ensure the establishment of any such organizations; on the contrary, it had always tried to support the forces of reaction and feudalism and to set the different tribes and families against one another. The various *coups d'état* and palace revolutions which had taken place in Ruanda had always been directed against the interests of the people and had had the blessing of the Administering Authority. It had not been until the opening of the Ostend Conference on 7 January 1961 that the Belgian Government had recognized that the institutions it had imposed on the Territory had become out of date. In any case, it would have been impossible to maintain those institutions in being after the Congo had become independent, especially as Ruanda-Urundi had previously been bound to that Territory by an administrative union. Even so, the Administering Authority had failed to learn its lesson and to change its policy to one favourable to the interests of the masses. That was something that colonialism could not do; it merely tried to adapt itself, and neo-colonialism faithfully reflected those efforts.

21. After paying a tribute to the excellent work done by the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, he noted that, at the 1108th meeting, the Belgian representative had wondered how the members of the Commission could have produced a commentary on events in the two States after so brief a stay; yet in the course of his statement at that meeting the Belgian representative had been glad to make use of the statement in the Commission's interim report that there were only 1,200 troops stationed in the Territory.

22. With regard to the independence of Ruanda-Urundi, the Belgian representative had concluded with a reference to entrusting the future of the new State to "worthy and capable hands"; yet, at the 1133th meeting, when replying to a question with regard to a statement made by Mr. Gitera at Ostend, the Belgian representative had observed that such people were not always able to express their views properly in French. In other words, people from the Territory were "worthy and capable" only when they spoke in favour of Belgium. Even the Constitution had been drawn up by a Belgian jurist.

23. Again, women did not possess the vote in Ruanda-Urundi; yet it was well known with what enthusiasm African women had taken part in the struggle for freedom, whether in the Congo, at Sharpeville or in Algeria. The fact that women were not entitled to vote was characteristic of the efforts made by persons directly concerned to prove that people were incapable of exercising a given function.

24. Thus, contrary to the Charter, everything had been done in Ruanda-Urundi to prevent the inhabitants of the Trust Territory from developing progressively towards self-government. The Administering Authority still maintained that it was not under an obligation to pay heed to the Charter or to carry out the recommendations of the United Nations; that had been made clear in the preliminary address delivered by Mr. Van den Abeele at the Ostend Conference (A/4706/Add.1, annex VII). Belgium was not without support in taking that attitude: there were international monopolies interested in the wealth of Africa which supported the Belgian Government since it had enabled them to establish their mining enterprises in the Congo and

Ruanda-Urundi. It was regrettable that States Members of the United Nations which voted for the application of the provisions of the Charter were constantly implicated in the intrigues of the Belgian Government and of international finance. That had been well brought out by President Nkrumah in his statement at the 961st plenary meeting. The fact that the Belgian Government was supported by the members of the European Common Market which had invested capital in Ruanda-Urundi and by the Powers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was contrary to the real interests of the people of the Territory and to the prestige and future of the United Nations.

25. It was not enough to vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.678: what was important was that its provisions should be carried out, and in that connexion help was needed not only from Member States but from the political leaders of Ruanda-Urundi, since, in his delegation's view, the people alone were able to find a complete solution for their problems. His delegation was grateful to the petitioners for the information which they had provided but felt bound to warn them, in the name of African solidarity, that they could not serve their country if they were treated as pawns by the very persons with whom they sought to co-operate, or if they placed their trust in people who were monarchists in Belgium and republicans in the Territory. It was no service to the country to take part in a *coup d'état* and to be elected to a so-called republican assembly: such behaviour was more characteristic of puppets than of true representatives of the people. Solutions would be forthcoming to all difficulties if the representatives of every political trend in Ruanda-Urundi agreed to meet round a table and discuss them, but experience had taught his country that such meetings should take place in the Territory itself and not at the capital of the metropolitan Power, where opportunities for intimidation and corruption were numerous. Such a round-table conference should be held in Ruanda-Urundi itself and the leaders should set up an anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist front to which both monarchists and republicans could belong. If such a front were formed, the Mwami himself could belong to it and the question of the Mwami could easily be settled.

26. He had just heard that Kigeli V had proposed that there should be a federation comprising Ruanda, Burundi and Tanganyika; his delegation thought that the increasing signs of solidarity between the peoples of East Africa were a subject for congratulation.

27. The political leaders of Ruanda-Urundi should place their trust in the living spirit of the people, who were determined, like all African peoples, to be master of their own resources, hitherto stolen, and to process those resources themselves, with a view to securing a better future.

28. He hoped that the draft resolution would be supported by a majority of the members of the Committee: whatever difficulties might arise from the inexperience of the political leaders of Ruanda-Urundi, they were preferable to the difficulties created by the presence of Belgium and its intrigues. For that reason, his delegation would also support the various amendments that had been submitted.

29. Mr. ABDEL WAHAB (United Arab Republic) expressed appreciation of the work done by the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi in very difficult circumstances.

30. His delegation had already had occasion to express its views on the future of Ruanda-Urundi in both the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly. New complications had, however, arisen through the failure of the Belgian Government to implement General Assembly resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV), in particular the measures of full and unconditional amnesty urgently recommended in resolution 1579 (XV). It was true that Belgium had put an end to the emergency régime in Ruanda-Urundi but under the Legislative Order No. 221/296 of 25 October 1960 (A/4706/Add.1, annex XXIX), it had arrogated to itself powers exceeding those wielded under the emergency régime. If the pre-electoral conference recommended by the General Assembly was to be a success, the participants must be the true representatives of the political parties even if they happened to be refugees abroad or prisoners serving sentences as a result of recent disturbances in the Territory. He reminded the Committee that the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi had pointed out in its report how little had been done before the Ostend Conference to make responsible leaders aware of what the real objectives of the Conference should have been and that the Belgian Government had prevented leaders of some political parties from attending it.

31. The Administering Authority still seemed to be serving its own interests and not those of the people of Ruanda-Urundi. When the General Assembly had recommended the postponement of the elections scheduled to take place in January 1961 the first reaction of the Belgian Government had been to set up governmental bodies in Urundi on the basis of communal elections, contrary to the assurances it had given that communal elections were purely administrative and had no political character. It had also encouraged the *coup d'état* in Ruanda establishing illegal governmental bodies. His delegation would like to see such illegal institutions abolished immediately and a national government formed from all the political parties in Ruanda-Urundi. It deplored the use of Ruanda-Urundi as a military base in defiance of the injunction in paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1579 (XV). It was convinced that the best future for Ruanda-Urundi lay in its accession to independence as a single, united and composite State. Furthermore it urged the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1580 (XV), which would enable the Mwami to function as ruler of the country until the referendum had been held to ascertain the wishes of the people.

32. Draft resolution A/C.4/L.678, of which his delegation was a sponsor, seemed to meet the needs of the situation and reaffirmed the recommendations in General Assembly resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV). His delegation shared the view of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi that the elections and the referendum on the Mwami should be held simultaneously. He hoped that when the Commission returned to Ruanda-Urundi to assist and advise the Administering Authority it would be given suitable supporting staff to enable it to perform its duties effectively. His delegation supported the amendments submitted by the representative of Nepal (A/C.4/L.681) but would prefer to define its position on the Polish (A/C.4/L.680) and Bulgarian (A/C.4/L.682) amendments at a later stage.

33. Mr. FORSYTHE (Australia) said that since the Committee had discussed the future of Ruanda-Urundi during the first part of the session a new and even more complex situation had arisen. Moreover, the differences

which had existed between the parties were no nearer a settlement, as had been shown by the failure of the commendable effort of the Ghanaian delegation to bring the petitioners together. If the Territory was to attain true independence in 1962, steps must be taken immediately to establish a framework of stable institutions representing the will of the people.

34. Draft resolution A/C.4/L.678 was a constructive attempt to deal with the main issues of legislative elections, the future of the Mwami and the question of amnesty. He felt sure that the Administering Authority had been seeking to avoid violence by its recognition of the provisional Government in Ruanda, a step which need not prejudice the composition of a later government established as a result of legislative elections held under the terms of paragraph 6 of the draft resolution. That resolution, quite rightly, did not attempt to impose a specific date for the elections and he shared the view of some other delegations that there should be an interval between the elections and the referendum, to avoid confusing the electorate.

35. With regard to the important question of the amnesty and national reconciliation, he noted with satisfaction that operative paragraph 9 took some account of the Administering Authority's views on the treatment of people guilty of very grave crimes and provided a reasonable compromise. The two sub-paragraphs seemed, however, to be somewhat contradictory, since sub-paragraph (a) spoke of "full" amnesty and it was to be assumed from sub-paragraph (b) that not all the persons concerned should be released automatically, regardless of the merits of the case.

36. In the light of the assurances of future co-operation given by the Administering Authority it seemed undesirable to adopt the new paragraph proposed by the representative of Nepal (A/C.4/L.681, para. 3). Nor could his delegation support the Polish amendment (A/C.4/L.680), which it considered premature at the present stage. The draft resolution as it stood had much to recommend it.

37. Mr. ZADOTTI (Italy) said that his delegation was in general agreement with draft resolution A/C.4/L.678, which embodied the wishes of the General Assembly with regard to the holding of legislative elections and of a referendum on the constitutional issue of the Mwami and which suggested that pending the establishment of popular governments on the basis of those elections broad-based caretaker governments should be constituted immediately to attend to current affairs of administration. The draft resolution also recognized the valuable role which the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi could play in the arrangements to be made for the forthcoming popular consultations. His chief misgiving was with regard to paragraph 9, which suggested a procedure for the implementation of amnesty measures which was incompatible with the full powers entrusted to the Administering Authority by the Trusteeship Agreement and with general legal principles. He would prefer the cases of very grave crimes to be examined by a committee of judges, whether national or international.

38. His delegation could not support the Polish amendment (A/C.4/L.680), which not only seemed premature but prejudged the position both of the Administering Authority and of the people of the Territory, who were entitled to express their wishes on that important issue. Nor could his delegation support paragraph 3 of the Nepalese amendments (A/C.4/L.681),

which not only seemed to anticipate, with unwarranted pessimism, a lack of co-operation on the part of Belgium, but was also contrary to the decision of the General Assembly to close the fifteenth session on 21 April.

39. His delegation would be pleased to support the Bolivian draft resolution (A/C.4/L.679).

40. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) congratulated the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi on its valuable contribution to the solution of the problem which had arisen in connexion with the future of Ruanda-Urundi. He also appreciated the efforts made to the same end by the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.678. Some of his delegation's views on that resolution had already been well expressed by the representative of Tunisia at the 1135th meeting, but there were certain points which he would like to stress in particular.

41. His delegation fully endorsed the statement in paragraph 13 concerning the unity of the Territory; it regretted the recognition of the institutions set up by the *coup d'état* in Ruanda, which were not truly democratic or representative, and it agreed that the Administering Authority should be urged to observe the letter and spirit of General Assembly resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV). The wishes of the people with regard to the Mwami should be respected. The recommendations on the subject of full and unconditional amnesty seemed to his delegation to recognize suitably the difficulty of releasing prisoners guilty of grave crimes. While his delegation agreed with the delegation of France that the wording of operative paragraph 3 was not entirely satisfactory, it found the draft resolution as a whole acceptable as it stood.

42. With regard to the amendment submitted by the delegation of Poland (A/C.4/L.680), he understood that delegation's desire to see a definite date fixed for the accession of the Territory to independence, but the amendment discounted the element of popular consultation. It was surely preferable to ascertain the wishes of the people themselves. He had certain misgivings with regard to paragraph 3 of the amendments submitted by the delegation of Nepal (A/C.4/L.681), which might have the effect of prolonging the present session of the General Assembly indefinitely. Moreover, he felt that the Administering Authority should be given every chance of showing its willingness to co-operate with the United Nations in the implementation of its resolutions without being subjected to the kind of veiled threat that was implicit in that paragraph.

43. With regard to the Bulgarian amendments (A/C.4/L.682), he felt that the deletion of operative paragraph 9 (b) would undo some of the most intelligent and careful work of the sponsors of the draft resolution. He was consequently unable to support that amendment.

44. Mr. GRINBERG (Bulgaria) said that it was obvious that Belgium, far from seeking to implement the United Nations resolutions, had been creating conditions for imposing new forms of colonialism. There was no guarantee that a new resolution would be more respected than former ones; in fact, it had been proved recently that illegal actions by certain parties had been supported by the Administering Authority in Ruanda-Urundi. His delegation held that the first condition for a solution of the problems of that Territory was the withdrawal of the trusteeship from Belgium.

45. It was the duty of the General Assembly to take resolute measures in Ruanda-Urundi. While draft reso-

lution A/C.4/L.678 recommended a different course of action from that which his delegation would suggest, his delegation was prepared to support it as a means of giving Belgium one last opportunity of living up to its responsibilities. His delegation thought it very important, however, that the amendments submitted by the representative of Nepal (A/C.4/L.681) should be incorporated into the draft resolution to provide against any setbacks in its implementation.

46. Introducing his delegation's amendments (A/C.4/L.682) to draft resolution A/C.4/L.678, he observed that the first was self-explanatory and had already won the support of a number of delegations. The second amendment had been submitted both because there was a contradiction in the draft resolution between sub-paragraph 9 (a), which recommended a full and unconditional amnesty, and sub-paragraph 9 (b), which allowed for exceptions, and because it would be neither advisable nor justifiable to reverse the General Assembly's previous decision on that point.

47. The third amendment, which was more controversial, took account of one of the most important matters mentioned by the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, namely, the incident of 1 January 1961, when permission had been granted to Congolese troops to pass through the Territory. That had occurred after the adoption of resolution 1579 (XV) and had an important bearing on Belgium's compliance with that resolution. It was only right that the Fourth Committee should take a stand on that point, since its resolutions should reflect the Commission's most important conclusions. Moreover, it would be strange if the Committee failed to mention such a gross violation of the Trusteeship Agreement and of paragraph 6 of resolution 1579 (XV). In proposing the amendment, his delegation had been concerned solely with the implications of the military use of the territory of Ruanda-Urundi on the Trust Territory itself.

48. With regard to the fourth amendment, his delegation felt that the present wording of operative paragraph 12 of the draft resolution left escape clauses in that the Legislative Order referred to might be amended in a completely unacceptable way; it would be best for that Order to be rescinded. If some parts of it were good, they could always be embodied in other instruments.

49. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) said that two conclusions emerged clearly from the Committee's discussion. The first was that the discussion of the affairs of Ruanda-Urundi had been bedevilled by suspicion—between the various political parties, between Ruanda and Urundi, and between the Administering Authority and other Member States. Whether those suspicions were justified or not, they had greatly impeded the progress of events. The Fourth Committee's primary purpose was, therefore, to remove them and to achieve a reconciliation of all parties for the welfare of the Territory. The second conclusion was that progress towards independence was impossible without understanding and co-operation between the United Nations, the Administering Authority and the people of the Trust Territory. The Committee's task, and indeed its obligation, was to promote that objective and all its efforts must be directed towards that end.

50. He understood the reasons for presenting the third Nepalese amendment (A/C.4/L.681, para. 3), but the use of threats was not the best means of obtaining co-operation. Moreover, there were other means of calling

the General Assembly into session should the need arise. He was convinced that reconciliation and conciliation would take place, as the Administering Authority had indicated. His delegation would therefore vote against that amendment.

51. While he appreciated the efforts made by the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.678, he did not agree with everything in that text. For example, although the preambular expressions of regret concerning the actions of the Administering Authority were couched in moderate and courteous language, it was a pity that they had been included. Such views were better expressed in the Committee's records. His delegation would ask for a separate vote on the paragraphs concerned.

52. The essential part of the draft resolution, however, lay in its operative paragraphs. While his delegation would have preferred a different wording for operative paragraph 4, it understood that the co-sponsors wanted popular governments to be established in Ruanda and Urundi which would include representatives of all principal parties, as the words "broad-based caretaker governments" implied. He hoped that the Administering Authority would be able to secure that aim in co-operation with the people; such governments could not be forced on them.

53. With regard to paragraph 7, his delegation would have preferred a single question to be put to the electorate; that would be the most appropriate procedure and the one most likely to be effective in Ruanda, as the New Zealand representative had pointed out.

54. Although his delegation would have preferred a different wording for paragraph 9 (b), the present text of which was not altogether clear, it welcomed the proposal for the establishment of a special commission to examine very grave crimes and would support the paragraph.

55. In his opinion, the major merits of the draft resolution lay in three essential points: firstly, legislative elections under United Nations supervision, which was the crux of the problem concerning the degree of support enjoyed by the various political parties, a matter which could only be settled to the satisfaction of the international community by such elections; secondly, the amnesty; and thirdly, the referendum concerning the Mwami. He was convinced that all the major petitioners were agreed on those points, despite their differences over methods, and that the Administering Authority itself was broadly in sympathy with them.

56. His delegation would vote against the Polish amendment (A/C.4/L.680), on the grounds that it would be wrong to prejudge the results of the legislative elections and the views of the bodies emerging from them. The United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, and the Trusteeship Council had both felt that the question of the termination of the trusteeship for Ruanda-Urundi should be considered at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly. Any time-limit which the Committee might now impose could not help the process of reconciliation, nor would it be fair to the minority parties, whose views should be taken into account.

57. While there had been many resolutions dealing with the question of the amnesty, the present draft resolution offered the most hope in that sub-paragraph 9 (b) set up machinery for handling the matter. If that machinery was removed, as was proposed in

the second Bulgarian amendment (A/C.4/L.682, para. 2), the chances of achieving that objective would be materially reduced. For that reason, he would vote against the amendment.

58. He agreed with the Argentine representative that the third Bulgarian amendment (A/C.4/L.682, para. 3) was inappropriate. In paragraph 199 of an otherwise critical report, the Commission had stated that it had found no indication that the Administering Authority might use Ruanda-Urundi as a base for military operations. He therefore felt that the amendment was not justified and he would vote against it.

59. With regard to the fourth Bulgarian amendment (A/C.4/L.682, para. 4), he pointed out that under Legislative Order No. 221/296 the Resident might, in the public interest, suspend decisions by the authorities and councils of the State; that was the power the Administering Authority possessed to ensure that its decisions were carried out. If the amendment was adopted and that power removed, the Administering Authority would be placed in the position of being obliged to compel its local authorities to obey its orders while its power to do so had been taken away. For that reason he would vote against the amendment.

60. Although his delegation had certain reservations regarding the draft resolution, he would vote in favour of it in its present form but would be unable to do so if the Polish amendment or the second or third Bulgarian amendments were adopted. His delegation hoped that, if the draft resolution was adopted as it stood, the Administering Authority would feel able to carry out its terms despite the criticism of its administration, which would have been better omitted, and despite its own reservations with regard to certain operative paragraphs. The Belgian Government had assured the United Nations of its desire to co-operate; the draft resolution could provide the means of doing so and could encourage a reconciliation between the parties in the Territory and between Belgium and many Member States.

61. He was sure the United Nations Commission would return to Ruanda-Urundi anxious to co-operate with the Administering Authority. Its task had been difficult until the present but it would return with the encouragement and, he hoped, the co-operation of all.

62. His delegation would also vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.679.

63. Mr. KENNEDY (Ireland) said that his delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.678 for one essential reason: because it felt that the resolution would really help the people of Ruanda-Urundi to create a genuine atmosphere of co-operation and understanding between all parties and groups before independence was attained. The creation of such an atmosphere was essential before the Fourth Committee could feel justified in endorsing the Territory's independence. It was regrettable that such understanding had not yet been achieved; indeed, the Fourth Committee had seen that the forum of the United Nations had been used by the petitioners not as a centre for reconciliation, but as a sounding-board for dissension revealing serious and fundamental differences. What made those differences dangerous, especially in Ruanda, was the fact that, on the eve of independence, they impeded the formation of a united front and caused a severe social and political struggle between rival racial groups within the State. A house divided against itself could not hope to stand.

64. The Fourth Committee should therefore proceed with extreme caution and should try to foster an atmosphere of conciliation. It was the more to be regretted that the manner in which some of the petitioners had been cross-examined in the Committee had not helped to create such an atmosphere. He commended the initiative of the representative of Ghana, who had organized an informal meeting of the petitioners which had proved to be very useful, but his delegation deeply regretted that not all the parties had been effectively represented. The Fourth Committee must face the fact that what it had to strive for in Ruanda-Urundi was national reconciliation and unity, which was, regrettably, far from attainment. Until a climate of nationhood, a sense of belonging to a united and viable State and a concern for the good of the nation as a whole had been developed, there could be no essential foundation for independence, as had been tragically proved in the case of the Congo.

65. It was his delegation's hope that the draft resolution would help to build a national foundation for Ruanda-Urundi. One feature which was particularly encouraging was the fact that the sponsors constituted a representative cross-section of the membership of the Fourth Committee, which he hoped would set a valuable precedent for future draft resolutions and enable them to gain the widest possible support. General Assembly resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV) had unfortunately not been drafted in that spirit and, as a result, had not reflected the potential harmony in the Fourth Committee. Just as it was important that minority views should be respected in Ruanda-Urundi, so was it desirable to bear in mind the honest and conscientious views often expressed by members of the Fourth Committee who were not always in the majority. It was to be hoped that, instead of dividing the Fourth Committee, the question of Ruanda-Urundi might bring its members closer together.

66. Draft resolution A/C.4/L.678 dealt with the four matters which were essential for any solution of the problem: the amnesty, early legislative elections under United Nations supervision, the referendum on the Mwami and the effort to broaden the basis of the provisional Governments in both parts of the Territory before independence. It was his delegation's confident hope that, with the co-operation of the Administering Authority and of the people of the Territory, the United Nations Commission would be able to carry out the second part of its task. The success of its mission would depend in the final analysis, not on whatever machinery the Fourth Committee might set up, but on the co-operation of the indigenous inhabitants themselves. He hoped that the petitioners would return to the Territory convinced of the need to settle their differences and that the Committee itself would do everything possible to help. If national reconciliation was not achieved, disintegration and a dangerous political vacuum might result. The responsibility for trusteeship lay, not exclusively on the Administering Authority, but on all the Members of the United Nations; if Ruanda-Urundi became independent in a state of discord and division, that responsibility would also rest upon the Fourth Committee.

67. He hoped that the draft resolution, which his delegation would support, would succeed in creating the political infrastructure essential for the Territory's freedom. If that was not achieved, however, his delegation would be obliged to reconsider its position with regard to independence for the Territory in 1962. It

would therefore, with regret, have to vote against the Polish amendment (A/C.4/L.680). It would be better for the General Assembly to assess the situation at its sixteenth session and to reach a decision at that time in the light of the results of the Commission's work.

68. His delegation supported the Bolivian draft resolution (A/C.4/L.679) because it held that, just as a political infrastructure was essential for viable independence, so also was a firm economic foundation which would ensure that all the indigenous inhabitants of the Trust Territory, and not merely a privileged few, would enjoy the benefits of freedom. The system of land tenure was a subject to which the Irish delegation attached particular importance, and the majority of the petitioners were agreed that the problem of the pressure of population on the available means of production, which had in recent years led to food shortages and much suffering, was of vital importance to the Territory.

69. Mr. MAGHERU (Romania) regretted that the results which might have been anticipated from the Committee's previous discussions and its decisions on the problem of the future of Ruanda-Urundi had not been achieved and that the situation had become more complicated than ever. The United Nations must now consider that new situation, determine the responsibility for it and adopt the necessary measures for implementing the General Assembly's resolutions in the new circumstances obtaining. Despite the fact that the Assembly had urged the granting of a full and unconditional amnesty, the return of the refugees and the preparation of legislative elections, and despite the fact that Belgium had all the powers necessary for accomplishing those tasks, a so-called provisional Government composed of representatives of parties closely linked to the Administration had been set up in Ruanda with the support of representatives of the Administration; a republic had been proclaimed and the Mwami had been deposed in advance of the referendum. A similar situation had been created in Burundi. The United Nations Commission had been so hampered in its movements that it had been unable to forestall a *fait accompli*, effected, allegedly, without the knowledge of the Administering Authority.

70. For two years the Administering Authority had sought to circumvent the General Assembly's resolutions. In the face of the irresistible pressure of the colonial peoples for independence, it had sought to retard the independence of Ruanda-Urundi and, if that proved impossible, to set up a government of compliant indigenous inhabitants who would serve as its intermediary. Thus, while ostensibly leaving the Territory, it would in fact remain and escape United Nations control, just as it had tried to do in the Congo. For that purpose, it had held communal elections in 1960, without United Nations supervision and without the participation of the opposition parties; those elections had been used, not for the establishment of local authorities with purely administrative functions but for the designation of burgomasters with considerable powers over the legislative elections. It had then taken steps to prevent the holding of legislative elections: that had been the situation which had led to the so-called *coup d'état*.

71. To attain its ends the Administering Authority had used traditional colonialist methods: administrative and police powers, corruption, and political intrigues designed to divide the citizens of the two States. As far as efforts at conciliation were concerned, the Com-

mittee had itself witnessed how the representatives of the pro-Belgian parties had refused to discuss that question with the other parties. Thus the Committee was confronted with a typical case of neo-colonialism, in which the Administering Authority wished to remain the dominant political force in the Territory even after the achievement of independence.

72. Ruanda-Urundi, which had been described as a poor country, had in fact potential resources of zinc, gold, uranium, oil and natural gas, in addition to a fertile soil and an abundant supply of cheap labour. The colonialist agents in the country did their best to serve the interests of foreign monopolies. That explained why, according to a statement by Mr. Tshombe, the political leaders of Ruanda-Urundi had asked for a federation of their country with Katanga and why the Belgian Prime Minister had stated on 9 August 1960 that the future of Ruanda-Urundi depended on the maintenance of the military base at Kamina, which had been constructed at the urging of NATO. In addition, Ruanda-Urundi enjoyed an important strategic position.

73. Those facts proved that Ruanda-Urundi was intended to be only a pawn at the disposal of the colonialist Powers either in a trusteeship status or under the guise of a fictitious independence.

74. It was the duty of the United Nations to ensure that the necessary steps were taken to achieve the real independence of the Territory. The Belgian representative had said that the Belgian Government was pursuing the same objectives as the United Nations. If that were so, why had the Belgian representative stated that Belgium had known nothing of the preparations for the so-called *coup d'état* and why had Belgium tried to evade its responsibilities by saying that it was for the so-called local Government to decide such questions as the amnesty? If those statements were to be believed either the power of the Administering Authority in the Territory was crumbling or else it was displaying a culpable weakness. There could be only one logical conclusion: that the Administering Authority should be relieved of its responsibilities. That conclusion emerged inescapably not only from a consideration of the recent action taken by the Administering Authority in the Territory but also from an analysis of the results of Belgium's forty years in Ruanda-Urundi. The economy of the Territory was entirely subordinated to the interests of Belgian and foreign monopolies; famine periodically gripped the country; forced labour was exacted; and less than half the children of school age were attending school.

75. His delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.4/L.678, though with some doubts. The draft resolution provided an illustration of the fact that the Administering Authority had failed to implement the previous General Assembly's recommendations. In his delegation's opinion, full and unconditional amnesty and the return of the refugees were urgently required before free elections could be held. The Commission should establish the exact number of the refugees and steps should be taken to ensure that they could return without fear of prosecution and that they were able to participate in the electoral campaign and in the elections. While the draft resolution provided for such measures, he felt it would be illusory to assume that the present Administration would carry them out successfully. Moreover, the draft resolution was vague about the primary objective: namely, the date of the Territory's accession to independence, and he would there-



fore support the Polish amendment (A/C.4/L.680). There was some contradiction between paragraph 13, which spoke of the formation of a single, united and composite State, and paragraph 4, which provided for the establishment of two provisional governments and would seem to represent a step taken with the support of the General Assembly towards the recognition of the *de facto* division of the Territory.

76. He would vote in favour of the Bulgarian amendments (A/C.4/L.682), since there could be no true independence if the Territory was used as a base for aggression. He would also vote in favour of the Nepalese amendments (A/C.4/L.681), for it was essential that

the General Assembly should be immediately informed of any obstruction the United Nations Commission encountered in the Territory.

77. His delegation was convinced that, despite the difficulties created by the Belgian Administration, the people of Ruanda-Urundi would obtain real independence, for which there was one prerequisite: that the patriotic forces in the country should be united and therefore able to avoid the pitfalls placed in their path by the Administering Authority.

The meeting rose at 12.5 a.m.