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Chairman: Mr. FAKHREDDINE Mohamed  
(Sudan).

## AGENDA ITEM 23

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Southern Rhodesia (continued) (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III)

### GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. LORINC (Hungary) said that, in a note verbale dated 17 February 1966 (A/6268), his Government had reaffirmed its recognition of the right of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence, its condemnation of the machinations of neo-colonialism in Southern Rhodesia and its support for the actions of the Organization of African Unity against the unlawful régime in that Territory. Despite the United Kingdom's so-called decisive measures, the white racist régime not only was still in power but was even more firmly convinced that it could count on the support of the upholders of apartheid and of the countries which helped Portugal to retain control over the African Territories under its administration. The report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III) clearly demonstrated the hypocrisy of those Western countries which exploited the Africans for their own profit.

2. Although the United Kingdom could have brought down the régime of Ian Smith, and still could, it did not wish to do so and concealed its unwillingness behind a barrage of excuses and legal jargon. The United Kingdom Government was fully responsible both for the general situation in Southern Rhodesia and for every case of murder or ill-treatment of the indigenous inhabitants during the previous year. All such crimes

could have been prevented. The United Kingdom used force in its colonies when it considered that to be in its interests and the very fact that it had not done so in Southern Rhodesia was proof that it considered that the downfall of the Smith régime would be against its economic, military and political interests. A similar view had been expressed by the representative of Mali in the Special Committee (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III, annex, para. 65). All the so-called negotiations were nothing but a smoke-screen behind which assistance was being given to the racist régime. The delay in implementing the decisions of the General Assembly and the Organization of African Unity had given Smith's allies time to muster the necessary help in organizing supplies of oil either through the Beira-Umtali pipeline or by convoys from South Africa, and in arranging for middlemen in neighbouring countries to buy and sell for Southern Rhodesian businessmen. If there were still some who wondered why economic sanctions had failed to achieve results, he would refer them to the conclusions in the report of Sub-Committee I of the Special Committee (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III, annex), which gave details of United Kingdom, United States, Japanese, South African, West German and Portuguese companies which were still trading with Southern Rhodesia. His delegation fully supported the recommendations in paragraph 1134 of chapter III of the Special Committee's report and would be grateful if the Secretariat could inform the Committee of what steps had been taken to implement sub-paragraph (g) of those recommendations.

3. The report of the Special Committee showed that the United Kingdom had acted in collusion with the Republic of South Africa, Portugal and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), especially the United States. One fact that had been to some extent overlooked was that the United Kingdom appeared to approve of the Smith régime politically since it still stood by the 1961 Constitution, which barred more than 4 million Africans from participating in free elections. It was to that Constitution that the United Kingdom wished to return if it overthrew the Smith régime and it was to that Constitution that it wanted Ian Smith to return. If that were not the case, the United Kingdom would not be negotiating with the Smith régime. As the representative of Iran had said in the Special Committee, negotiation would only be effective if it resulted in the ending of the régime, but Mr. Smith could hardly be expected to negotiate his own downfall (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III, para. 971). The United Kingdom should be asked to alter its racist policy as expressed in the 1961 Constitution. In his statement at the 1436th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had spoken of a constitutional settle-

ment to be negotiated by a representative and legal government and to be directed towards achieving the objective of majority rule, but he had not said when majority rule would be achieved.

4. The tasks lying ahead had been clearly set out in the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 31 May 1966 and reproduced in paragraph 1097 of chapter III of its report. His delegation supported the provisions of that resolution. The United Kingdom was fully responsible for everything that had happened or was happening in Southern Rhodesia and, since all other measures had failed, must use force in order to put down the illegal régime. The much-advertised "selective mandatory sanctions" were merely another excuse to keep that régime in power. Its continued existence was a crime against humanity, a threat to international peace and security and an obstacle to the immediate independence of the people of Zimbabwe. In taking decisive action, the United Kingdom should receive the full support of all United Nations Members, including the NATO countries. The power of the "unholy alliance" must be broken before it led to a new world conflagration. The United Kingdom had the right, the obligation and the responsibility to act at once; it could not divest itself of that responsibility in the eyes of the world.

5. The CHAIRMAN said that the Secretariat had taken note of the request made by the representative of Hungary concerning the implementation of paragraph 1134 (g) of chapter III of the Special Committee's report.

6. Mr. KAPWEPWE (Zambia) said that, as far as his country was concerned, the problem of Southern Rhodesia was a matter of life and death. To understand that fully, it was necessary to consider its geographical situation. Zambia was a land-locked country which shared frontiers with about eight other countries. Its communications lay through the Congo, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and, more recently, Tanzania. Its main industry was copper, although it also produced other commodities such as tobacco, ground-nuts and cotton. Its annual consumption of coal was 1,000 tons, which went to the copper mines. With 1,000 tons of coal, 10,000 tons of copper could be mined. Its consumption of other fuel had increased to 17,000 tons per month and, as a result of economic development, it was still increasing and was expected to reach 20,000 tons per month before long. Those facts would give some idea of the difficulties Zambia was facing because of the Southern Rhodesian problem.

7. The British South Africa Company, which had gained control over the territory of what was now Zambia by signing treaties with the local chiefs in about 1900, had later become almost bankrupt and had handed over the territory to the United Kingdom Government in 1924. From 1924 to 1964 the economy of the country, which had then been known as Northern Rhodesia, had been married to that of South Africa. The United Kingdom Government had divided Africa into trading zones: one zone had covered the area from South Africa to Northern Rhodesia; another had consisted of Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda; Sudan and Egypt had made up a third; and West Africa, including Nigeria and what was now Ghana, had formed yet another zone. Northern Rhodesia had not been en-

couraged to have any contact with what was now Tanzania and had only been linked to that country by one small road, intended for administrative rather than trade purposes. The railways and main roads all went to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Even after the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953, Northern Rhodesia had never been allowed to develop any industry other than copper. Other industries had been established in Southern Rhodesia, but Northern Rhodesia had been intended to be a market. In addition, Northern Rhodesia, the richest partner in the Federation, had lost about 70 million to the Federal Government by contributing to the growth of industries in Southern Rhodesia.

8. The Western Powers hoped to maintain white supremacy south of the equator for all time and students of neo-colonialism believed that there were plans to recolonize the Congo, Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda and bring them under white control by the year 2000. They would provide a larger market for the European Powers, which thought that those countries offered good economic possibilities.

9. The problem of Southern Rhodesia was not new. In 1893, the British South Africa Company, claiming only friendship for the people, had taken possession of the Territory after capturing Chief Lobengula and killing many Africans. That was the stand still taken by those who believed in European supremacy. It was an attitude which could provoke a racial conflict, because the world had changed and the Africans no longer accepted slavery but wished to speak for themselves and to manage their own affairs. It might, indeed, provoke not only a racial clash but even an ideological war with very grave consequences. There were many people who did not want another war which, thanks to technological advances, would result in many more being killed than had been killed in the Second World War. All the peoples of the world, both black and white, must join together to kill the germ of imperialism and colonialism in the interests of all mankind, black and white alike. If one people did not wish to be enslaved, it should not enslave another. The situation in southern Africa should be remedied by the elimination of imperialism and colonialism.

10. Before Ian Smith had made his unilateral declaration of independence, the President and Government of Zambia had discussed the situation with the United Kingdom Government and had told the latter that it should handle the matter carefully and firmly in order to avoid creating a situation which would cause problems not only to Zambia but to the whole of southern Africa. The United Kingdom had replied that it could not use a firm hand because the Whites in Southern Rhodesia were its own kith and kin, who had fought side by side with the British to defeat Hitler. It had been pointed out to the United Kingdom that the Africans also had kith and kin in Southern Rhodesia and that Africans, too, had fought alongside the British to defeat Hitler, and that therefore the "kith and kin" policy was primitive and out of date. The world had changed and progressed. No country could remain an island; the trade and politics of all were interlocked. The United Kingdom Government, however, had been unable to act firmly. For the first

time, the world had seen the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom going to negotiate with a colony. He himself had condemned that move. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had made an irresponsible statement that his Government would never use force in Southern Rhodesia, no matter what took place. That statement had been an encouragement to Ian Smith, who had then known that even if he took power by force the United Kingdom would not act. A few days later he had made his unilateral declaration of independence.

11. Zambia had said from the very beginning that the only way to bring about the downfall of the Smith régime was by the use of force. It was well known that power was sweet, even if it was wrongly used. When any government was formed, it created an army and police force to protect itself, and it was therefore useless to ask the head of such a government to give up his power. That was what the United Kingdom Government was doing with Ian Smith and the result had been negative. The result would indeed remain negative.

12. When the United Kingdom Government had refused to use force, it had said it would apply economic sanctions. A meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers had been held at Lagos in January 1966, at which the United Kingdom Prime Minister had promised that the problem would be resolved within a matter of weeks. Almost a year had elapsed since then. Yet, since the statement had come from such a high authority, it had been believed. The statement had either been a bad miscalculation or had been intended as a smoke-screen for the benefit of those Africans and others in the world who hoped for a solution. The policy of voluntary economic sanctions had been continued until July 1966, when he himself had addressed the Commonwealth Sanctions Committee—a body created at the Lagos meeting to look into the policy of sanctions and discover how they were working and decide whether the United Kingdom Government should call a Commonwealth conference to review the situation and submit recommendations. He had proved to that Committee beyond a doubt that voluntary sanctions were failing and could not achieve positive results. He had given figures for all the commodities sold by Southern Rhodesia and for the amount of oil and fuel received by Southern Rhodesia from South Africa. He had pointed out that Southern Rhodesia had sold almost half its tobacco crop as well as asbestos, iron and other commodities, that it was receiving enough oil to carry on its trade and that, in short, the régime was not feeling the pinch.

13. What was more, United Kingdom businessmen were still trading with the Smith régime. The United Kingdom Government had even criticized Zambia for inflicting wounds upon itself by closing the railway to Southern Rhodesia. Yet it was the United Kingdom Government which had called for joint efforts to prevent Southern Rhodesia from obtaining foreign currencies. After Zambia had closed the railway, the United Kingdom Government had allowed its companies to buy copper from Zambia and transport it through Southern Rhodesia, paying currency to Southern Rhodesia. While asking the world not to trade with Smith, the United Kingdom had continued to do so itself. At first it had cut trade with Southern Rhodesia

by 65 per cent only, and it was thanks to Zambia's pressure that the percentage had been increased to about 95 per cent. Thus it was the United Kingdom itself which was undermining economic sanctions.

14. Was the United Kingdom sincerely concerned to bring down the Smith régime? He did not believe that it was. When Smith had declared "independence", the United Kingdom had been the first to denounce him as a rebel. The United Kingdom Prime Minister had stated in Parliament that Smith was a rebel and that the United Kingdom Government would never negotiate with a rebel. Despite that declaration, the same Government had subsequently embarked on negotiations with Smith. To describe those negotiations, the United Kingdom had coined the expression "talks about talks"; in Zambia, the expression used to describe them was "nonsense about nonsense". The "talks about talks", which were still continuing, were actually negotiations to prepare the ground for negotiations proper. Upon closer examination, it was found that what was involved was a "sell-out" of the 4 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom was not interested in ending the oppression of the Zimbabwe people and bringing about their freedom and independence; it was interested only in its "kith and kin". According to United Kingdom spokesmen, the aim was to persuade Smith to accept the 1961 Constitution, but that meant that power would remain in the hands of the minority. It was proposed that the 1961 Constitution should be amended and new principles included in it which would safeguard the position of the majority; then, perhaps, the United Kingdom Government would recognize Southern Rhodesia's independence. That was very dangerous; clearly, it was nothing more than a "sell-out". It was unrealistic to accept that Mr. Smith would abide by any commitment to observe democratic principles and grant the majority their rights. The notion of safeguards granted by the minority for the protection of the majority was an odd one. The obvious protection for the majority was a government elected by the people on the basis of one man, one vote. As long as a minority remained in power, it could throw out any safeguards whenever it chose to. If Smith had had no compunction about declaring independence illegally, why would he have qualms about abrogating subsequently any safeguards that might be agreed upon? It should be recalled that, when the Union of South Africa had been established in 1910, the Constitution had included certain safeguards for the "Coloured" population, but the white minority Government, once it had obtained independence, had abolished those safeguards and the situation in South Africa remained the same today. That manoeuvre was now being repeated in Southern Rhodesia in a different form.

15. It was very difficult to follow the logic of the United Kingdom Government. At the recent Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London, the question of new constitutional arrangements in Southern Rhodesia had been discussed, and he himself had asked the United Kingdom Government to declare that no independence would be given to Southern Rhodesia until majority rule had been established there. The Conference had worked for ten days on that issue and at the end of that period the United

Kingdom Government still would not accept the principle in question. It should be clear to all members of the Committee that the United Kingdom Government was not interested in establishing democratic institutions in Southern Rhodesia but wanted to maintain fascism there. If the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference had been unable to prevail upon the United Kingdom Government to accept the principle of democratic rule in Southern Rhodesia, it was clear, as he himself had stated, that Mr. Wilson was an imperialist. Otherwise, how could he refuse to accept the basic democratic principle that independence should not be granted until majority rule was introduced?

16. The United Kingdom Government had even wanted the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference to give it a mandate to continue its "talks about talks". It had asked to be allowed to go to Southern Rhodesia to give Smith a final warning. If one was to apply logic, it was clear that the United Kingdom Government, after originally declaring that it would not negotiate with rebels, had, already started to recognize the Smith régime as a government, since both it and the Smith régime were being represented in the "talks about talks" by government officials and Smith clearly regarded the talks as between one government and another. Did not that mean that the United Kingdom Government was recognizing the Smith régime?

17. In his view, more pressure must be brought to bear on the United Kingdom Government, for its aim was clearly to establish another South Africa in Southern Rhodesia. All who loved democracy should speak out and condemn the actions of the United Kingdom Government, which was attempting to deny self-government to the majority in the interests of the white minority. If it was sweet for the people of the United Kingdom to govern themselves it must be sweet, too, for the Zimbabwe people to govern themselves and enjoy the fruits of democracy.

18. That was not all. Zambia was suffering economically. Its economy, its budget and the everyday life of its people had been upset. Zambia held the United Kingdom responsible for the economic problems confronting it. It was the United Kingdom that had married Zambia's economy to that of Southern Rhodesia. There was no reason why a road had not been built through Tanganyika; the money had been available. A survey had been carried out for a railway, but it had never been built. Under the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Zambia had been milked for the benefit of Southern Rhodesia; now it was unable to export its copper through Tanzania. The United Kingdom Government had come to Zambia with a promise of £14 million in aid. The Zambian Government, however, did not regard that sum as aid but as compensation for the damage done to Zambia's economy by the events in Southern Rhodesia, for which it held the United Kingdom responsible. Even as compensation, the sum was small. Nor was Zambia being offered £14 million in cash: the United Kingdom wanted the money to be used for the purchase of planes and other equipment from the United Kingdom. Thus the United Kingdom was trying to use it to boost its own trade, just as it had done in the case of Kenya on a previous occasion, when it had offered compensation to the Kenyan Government.

Zambia had not yet accepted the sum and was still discussing the details with the United Kingdom.

19. The economic situation in Zambia was now critical, and it had had to start cutting down its production of copper. The Zambians were not asking the United Kingdom Government to use force out of a desire to see blood shed, but because they wanted the problem to be solved as quickly as possible for the good of the Zimbabwe people and of all Africa. Zambia could see no other method, in the circumstances, of bringing down the Smith régime. The United Kingdom Government had used force in the past to maintain its empire all over the world, as many of the African and Asian representatives present knew from experience. Many of the United Kingdom's former colonies had had to use force to obtain freedom and some of their people had been killed. The United Kingdom had used force in Kenya, in Cyprus and in British Guiana—now the independent State of Guyana. The United Kingdom was using force at that moment in Aden. Yet, because of the "kith and kin" argument, force could not be used in Southern Rhodesia. It could be used against coloured people, but not against Whites. That was why he had referred to Mr. Wilson as a "racialist". He could see no other reason why force could be used only against coloured people. The United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking at the 1436th plenary meeting of the General Assembly recently, had stressed that he was a socialist, but surely a socialist Government would have taken steps to put an end to racialism and fascism in Southern Rhodesia.

20. The United Kingdom Government should come before the Security Council and seek assistance. It should acknowledge that it had failed to solve the problem on its own and should bring it to the family of nations to see whether a solution could not be found through concerted action. There was another consideration, too. It had been shown beyond doubt that Mozambique and South Africa—in addition to the United Kingdom itself—were to be held responsible for the failure of economic sanctions against the Southern Rhodesian régime. Not only had the United Kingdom Government continued to trade, directly or indirectly, with Southern Rhodesia; it had also refrained from speaking out against the oil being delivered to Southern Rhodesia by South Africa. It had refrained for the simple reason that the United Kingdom's trade with South Africa amounted to £261 million a year. Zambia could sympathize with the concern of the United Kingdom regarding the economic situation in which it found itself and with its fears regarding the effects of losing the South African market. The answer was clearly to take the problem to the United Nations without delay. Zambia knew that no Government could govern people with empty stomachs. But the United Kingdom should frankly admit that it was unable to solve the problem.

21. The United Kingdom spoke of coming to the Security Council to ask for selective mandatory sanctions. He did not believe that such sanctions could succeed, even if commodities such as tobacco and iron were chosen. As he had himself pointed out to the United Kingdom Prime Minister in January 1966, economic sanctions had failed against Mussolini. They were a very difficult weapon to employ

because of the complexity of the factors involved in world trade. Zambia was not in a position to deprive itself of earnings from exports of copper for six months, because its people had to eat. While countries such as Zambia were being asked to close down factories, the United Kingdom continued to buy tobacco from Southern Rhodesia through agents in South Africa. It was clear that selective sanctions would not work, unless it could be shown that Portugal and South Africa would support them.

22. The same was true even of total, or "comprehensive", mandatory sanctions. Trade was still likely to continue through Mozambique and South Africa. Zambia might perhaps agree, however, to the imposition of comprehensive sanctions, on the understanding that, if they failed, force would be used. In the long run, force was bound to be used in any event, because, if all else failed, the people of Zimbabwe would have to fight for their freedom. If force had been used from the beginning, the problem would already have been solved.

23. Zambia would like to see the United Kingdom Government come to the Security Council immediately rather than at the end of the year. The longer the problem was left unresolved, the more complicated it would become. The United Kingdom Government had now admitted that the problem could have been solved if force had been used at the outset. The future of Zambia, too, was at stake, because the longer the problem continued the more Zambia's economy would suffer. Did the United Kingdom want to destroy two countries? Zambia thought that it was time for the United Kingdom Government to seek the aid of the United Nations in solving the problem and thus allow the Zambians to live in peace. The people of Zambia did not want to go on suffering because of the irresponsibility of another Government, any more than they would want others to suffer through their mistakes. They wished to live in prosperity and freedom, and to be allowed to prove that they could govern themselves. All they asked was that the United Kingdom Government should leave them alone.

24. He appealed to the United Kingdom Government not to create another South Africa in Rhodesia but to act in a manner in keeping with its professed socialist principles. Actions spoke louder than words. If the Labour Party was socialist, it should act as such, not only in Southern Rhodesia but also in South West Africa. Africa had been exploited more than enough already. Was it not strange that, after the white minority in the Union of South Africa had thrown out the safeguards in the 1910 Constitution, a Mandate should have been conferred on South Africa in 1920? The consequences could have been foreseen. Zambia asked the United Kingdom to shoulder its responsibilities, both in South West Africa and in Southern Rhodesia; it urged the United Kingdom to stop promoting fascism in Southern Rhodesia and to abandon the policy of maintaining white supremacy in southern Africa. Africa belonged to the Africans, although it was always ready to receive guests. Africans had never discriminated against anyone. They welcomed those who came as guests, but not those who came to dominate. Europe had been given to the Europeans, Asia to the Asians and Africa to Africans; visitors

were always welcome in Africa but the Africans intended to be hosts, and not guests, in their own land.

25. The problem should not be treated lightly. A racial clash could lead to worse consequences than the Second World War, and perhaps to the destruction of the human race. The age of imperialism was past. The time had come for men to live together sensibly, like human beings.

26. Mr. BENSID (Algeria), supported by Mr. MGONJA (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. KANAKARATNE (Ceylon) and Mr. GHAREKHAN (India), proposed that the important and revealing statement made by the Foreign Minister of Zambia should be included in extenso in the summary record of the meeting.

*It was so decided.*

27. Mr. BRUCE (Togo) said that all those who had been present in the Security Council the previous year and had heard the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs categorically condemn the illegal Smith régime now wondered whether they had not been the object of a deception unparalleled in modern history.

28. For the past eleven months the United Kingdom Government had been promising to quell the Southern Rhodesian rebellion. Yet it had shown nothing but hesitation and indecision, and the ridiculous economic measures which it had applied under the name of "sanctions" had been completely ineffective. Indeed, history had shown the futility of such sanctions, which had not prevented Italy from invading Ethiopia in 1935. The United Kingdom Government had declared that it would not use force. It would be remembered that a Prime Minister had gone to Munich to assure Hitler of the British people's desire to settle any dispute with him by peaceful means. As a result of that strange bargain, 50 million persons belonging to all races had died.

29. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, and in view of the indecisive attitude of the Wilson Government, the Togolese delegation feared that the world might be faced with an African Munich and that untold numbers might lose their lives as a result of the United Kingdom Government's refusal to use force—or at least the threat of force—where there was still time. In his delegation's view, it would be extremely dangerous to make the psychological error of believing that 200,000 settlers could keep the 4 million Africans of Zimbabwe in bondage. There was still time for the United Kingdom Government to restore its authority in the rebel colony, whose illegal régime had been condemned by a number of General Assembly resolutions.

30. At the opening of the Committee's debate on Southern Rhodesia (1606th meeting), the United Kingdom representative had assured the Committee that his Government would not grant independence to Southern Rhodesia unless the majority of the population favoured such independence. The Togolese delegation wondered how much value could be attached to that statement, since eleven months had elapsed since the unilateral declaration of independence by the fascist Salisbury régime.

31. The Togolese delegation considered that the United Nations was entitled to ask the United Kingdom what positive steps it intended to take to enable the majority of the population of Southern Rhodesia to attain independence, namely whether it planned to use force or the threat of force to put an end to a situation which might result in disaster.

32. Mr. KULAGA (Poland) said that during the year which had elapsed since the illegal declaration of independence by the Smith régime the problem of Rhodesia had virtually become the symbol of the aggressive and concerted opposition of the colonialist and racist forces to the process of decolonization.

33. In its strictly Southern Rhodesian context, the problem was that the racist régime, imposed by a rebel minority, had remained in power despite its condemnation by the United Nations and the measures undertaken by a number of States; it had enacted a number of new measures in order to enforce the application of principles which had been repeatedly condemned by the United Nations and qualified as crimes against humanity.

34. In its African context, the problem of Southern Rhodesia had become part of the whole problem of colonialism in southern Africa, which was based on the system of apartheid and the economic and military potential of South Africa. The events in Southern Rhodesia were helping to make the situation in Africa worse and to increase the threat which the maintenance of colonialism in its southern part constituted to the peace and security of the continent.

35. Southern Rhodesia had been converted into a northern stronghold of apartheid, a situation whose inevitable consequences had been repeatedly pointed out during the debate.

36. In their international context, the events in Southern Rhodesia were directly opposed to one of the fundamental processes of the present era: the liberation of the colonial peoples and the affirmation of their independence and equality. They were an expression of the concerted reaction of all the forces which opposed that process. The report of the Special Committee on the activities of foreign monopolies in Southern Rhodesia, together with the reports of the activities of monopolies in the Portuguese colonies, South West Africa and South Africa, confirmed the existence of a close-knit community of interests between the racist régimes of southern Africa and the economic and financial circles of the Western Powers, in particular the United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany, directed against the interests of African peoples. Those reports explained why those Powers were opposed to any radical measure which would put an end to the racist régimes and why the United Kingdom, under international pressure, had enacted such ineffective measures. They also showed the wisdom of the Special Committee's proposals that the activities of foreign monopolies in all the countries of southern Africa should be examined as a whole since those activities constituted one of the principal obstacles to the independence of those countries.

37. In his statement at the opening of the general debate, the United Kingdom representative had

characterized the present situation in Southern Rhodesia as "intolerable". With that part of his statement the Polish delegation was in agreement and considered that it was incumbent upon the General Assembly to recommend, at the current session, all the measures which the legal and political situation in Southern Rhodesia so urgently demanded.

38. In his delegation's opinion, it was the responsibility of the United Kingdom to ensure that Southern Rhodesia attained independence under the conditions prescribed by the United Nations Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The United Kingdom had that responsibility towards the people of Rhodesia and towards the United Nations. The United Kingdom had constantly claimed responsibility in respect of the people of Southern Rhodesia, although it had exercised it solely for the benefit of the white settlers and to the detriment of the people of Zimbabwe. Its responsibility towards the United Nations had been clearly set out in General Assembly resolution 1747 (XVI), which stated that Southern Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing Territory within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter and that the terms of resolution 1514 (XV) were fully applicable to it.

39. In addition, the United Kingdom was entirely responsible for the events which had brought about the present "intolerable" situation in Southern Rhodesia. A brief review of the positions adopted by the United Kingdom in the United Nations since 1962 would show that that country had deliberately pursued a policy the result of which had been inevitable. In 1962, in asking for the question of Southern Rhodesia to be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly, a number of countries, including nineteen African countries, had stated in an explanatory memorandum<sup>1/</sup> that it was well known that the African population of Southern Rhodesia was bitterly opposed to the proposed new constitution, and that therefore its promulgation might add to the complexity and gravity of the prevailing situation. The United Kingdom representative had replied that a debate on Southern Rhodesia at that stage could do harm in the Territory and might raise passions and make the task of those responsible for the political evolution of the Territory more difficult;<sup>2/</sup> and that the essence of the position in the Territory was the need to compromise and conciliate.<sup>3/</sup> The result of that policy of compromise and conciliation had been the entry into force of the racist Constitution of 1961.

40. In 1963 Ghana, Morocco and the Philippines requested the Security Council to adopt a draft resolution inviting "the United Kingdom Government not to transfer to its colony of Southern Rhodesia the armed forces and aircraft as envisaged by the Central Africa Conference, 1963".<sup>4/</sup> Maintaining that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was neither critical nor explosive, the United Kingdom representative vetoed the draft

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 97, document A/5127 and Add.1 and 2.

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid., Sixteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, vol. III, 1109th meeting, paras. 16 and 23.

<sup>3/</sup> Ibid., 1120th meeting, para. 52.

<sup>4/</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1963, document S/5425/Rev.1.

resolution at the 1069th meeting of the Council. The result, in that case, was to give the racist régime the military means to enforce its doctrine.

41. Whenever the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had drawn attention to the gravity of the situation in Southern Rhodesia and called on the United Kingdom to take steps to put an end to the activities of the racist régime, the United Kingdom had replied that it had the situation under control. When everything had pointed to the fact that the Smith régime had been preparing to declare independence, the United Kingdom had told the Salisbury régime that it would in no event use force to prevent such an illegal act.

42. After the unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965, the world had witnessed a series of spectacular, contradictory and ineffective measures. Although it had claimed for years, when apartheid in South Africa was discussed, that economic sanctions could not be applied, the United Kingdom had itself proposed such sanctions as the most effective means of crushing the Smith régime. It had done so, however, solely in order to prevent recourse to the use of force and after making sure that those sanctions would be neither complete nor mandatory. While the attempt by two oil tankers to unload their cargo in defiance of the oil embargo had been described as a threat to peace, the Western Powers said nothing about a much more serious threat—the export of great quantities of petroleum from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia. One year after the application of those "infallible" sanctions the Fourth Committee—and Ian Smith, too—was being told several months in advance that the United Kingdom intended to submit a proposal to the Security Council for mandatory, but selective, sanctions.

43. It was thus on recorded facts, on a series of acts in favour of the Smith régime, that the Polish delegation based its conclusion that the United Kingdom was responsible for the present situation in Southern Rhodesia. It was the duty of the United Kingdom to redress the situation in the Territory and to solve the problem in the only manner acceptable. That could not mean a return to the situation that had existed before the illegal declaration of independence, as was directly implied by the recent statements of the United Kingdom Government. It could only mean a solution in accordance with the guiding principles of the United Nations contained in repeated General Assembly resolutions. In order to achieve that solution, the United Kingdom would have to utilize all the means necessary to deal with a rebellion and a crime against humanity, the means provided under Chapter VII of the Charter, including the use of armed force.

44. The Polish delegation considered that the role of the United Nations in the problem was based upon two principles: its position in respect of the administering Power, i.e., the United Kingdom, and its general mandate under Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Under the first principle, the United Nations should call upon the United Kingdom to take all the steps necessary to quell the rebellion of the racist régime and to enable the people of Zimbabwe to

exercise their right to self-determination and independence. Under the second, the United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, should ensure that no State assisted the Smith régime in any way whatsoever and coercive measures should be imposed against any State failing to conform with such a decision of the United Nations.

45. It had been shown that the activities of foreign monopolies constituted one of the fundamental obstacles to the solution of the problem. The least that the United Nations could do was to appeal to the States concerned to ensure that their nationals who were directly engaged in such activities should halt them forthwith.

46. Mr. FEZZANI (Tunisia) said that the inability of the Security Council and the General Assembly to ensure the implementation of the various resolutions adopted for the purpose of restoring legality and justice in Southern Rhodesia was due to the attitude of the United Kingdom Government, which had from the outset announced its firm determination of not resorting to the use of force. Even the harassment to which the Ian Smith Government had subjected the United Kingdom authorities had not shaken that determination. Such a pacifist attitude would have been admirable were it not for the fact that it was an exception to the practice followed hitherto by the United Kingdom, which had had no such humanitarian scruples in the case of indigenous liberation movements. Such an attitude was all the more perplexing in that United Kingdom policy in the matter of decolonization had often been exemplary. Some representatives had regarded that "pacifist" attitude as somewhat naïve, others as unduly optimistic and others as deceptive. His delegation considered all those views valid.

47. The United Kingdom had proposed the adoption of economic sanctions rather than the use of force against the rebel régime of Ian Smith. His delegation could not question the good faith of the statements of the United Kingdom leaders or deny that the United Kingdom had made praiseworthy efforts. Those efforts, however, had proved useless and the sacrifices made by the United Kingdom had been in vain.

48. The embargo on 95 per cent of Southern Rhodesian exports to the United Kingdom had done nothing to shake the Ian Smith régime. The decision of the Government of South Africa to cease making a distinction between its exports and re-exports had been further proof of its complicity with the rebel régime. That device enabled importers who had continued to purchase their supplies in Southern Rhodesia via South Africa to falsify the origin of their goods.

49. The Tunisian delegation had reason to believe that the Wilson Government could not be unaware of the fact that the complicity of South Africa and Portugal would nullify the effects of the economic sanctions that it was advocating. The report of the Special Committee had shown that the failure of the sanctions had been due not only to the attitude of the Governments of South Africa and Portugal but also to the interrelationship of the private interests of certain Powers. His delegation wondered why those Powers sought to safeguard their immediate profits in Southern Rhodesia at the risk of compromising



their relations with the developing countries and of jeopardizing their long-term interests in an independent Southern Rhodesia. His delegation, which held that the best guarantee for peace and stability in the world was genuine and faithful co-operation between countries, wondered whether such sordid calculations of private interests in Southern Rhodesia did not cast grave doubts on the importance those Powers attached to such co-operation.

50. The statement in paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 217 (1965) that "the working of the Constitution of 1961 has broken down" seemed unfortunate in the light of paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 2022 (XX), in which the United Kingdom was requested to suspend the Constitution of 1961 and to convene a constitutional conference with a view to making new constitutional arrangements on the basis of universal adult suffrage and to fixing the earliest possible date for independence. In any event, the Committee's main objective should be to ensure that the indigenous inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia attained independence in accordance with Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

51. It was clear from the statements of the United Kingdom leaders that the United Kingdom's aim was to persuade the Smith régime to negotiate with it or, failing that, to replace that régime by another régime more loyal to the Crown and perhaps less racist.

52. In the opinion of the Tunisian delegation, however, the only goal was the complete liberation of the people of Zimbabwe, and not the replacement of one colonialist régime by another.

53. With regard to the final communiqué of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in London, the Tunisian delegation considered that that document merely repeated well-known facts. Moreover, the carefully worded statement of the United Kingdom representative made his delegation wonder whether another transitional period of preparation for independence was being planned for the Zimbabwe people. While his delegation was not in a position to appraise

the degree of political and intellectual evolution of the Zimbabwe people, it could question the good faith of the Ian Smith régime and of any other government by which the United Kingdom might replace it.

54. The United Kingdom representative's statement had made no positive contribution to the Committee's work. After more than a year of procrastination, the Committee had been asked to await the results of the United Kingdom's last offer to the rebel régime. The time had come for the United Kingdom delegation to tell the Committee what action its Government wished the United Nations to take, if the need arose.

55. The Tunisian delegation was convinced that the action of the rebel régime had affronted the honour of the United Kingdom no less than that of Africa and that it was in that country's interest to seek an appropriate solution to the problem. The United Kingdom had responsibilities towards the Zimbabwe people and the United Nations and his delegation was certain that the United Kingdom Government could and should apply the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, even if that required the use of force. The Tunisian delegation hoped that the great Powers would support any measure designed to end the suffering of the people of Zimbabwe. Tunisia, for its part, would co-operate with any genuine action aimed at liberating those people and would strongly oppose any attempt to create in southern Africa a situation similar to that of Israel or of the racist régime in South Africa.

56. Mr. RAMIN (Israel), referring to the remarks made by the Tunisian representative, said that there was no similarity between the two situations. There were no foreign settlers in Israel but only people who had returned to the land of their origin.

57. Mr. FEZZANI (Tunisia) reserved his delegation's right to reply to the statement of the Israel representative at a later stage.

*The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.*