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**Chairman: Mr. Adnan M. PACHACHI (Iraq).**

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Ortiz de Rozas (Argentina), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

**Requests for hearings (*concluded*)**

REQUESTS CONCERNING AGENDA ITEM 13 (REPORT OF THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL) (A/C.4/469/Add.8) (*concluded*)

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that the Committee had received two further requests for hearings concerning the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration, which were set out in document A/C.4/469/Add.8. In the absence of objections, the requests would be granted.

*It was so decided.*

**AGENDA ITEM 45**

**Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi (A/4689-A/4692, A/4694, A/4706 and Add.1, A/C.4/471, A/C.4/476, A/C.4/477, A/C.4/480, A/C.4/L.678 and Add.1, A/C.4/L.679) (*continued*)**

GENERAL DEBATE (*concluded*) AND CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/C.4/L.678 and Add.1, A/C.4/L.679) (*continued*)

2. Mr. LAPIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) wished first of all to thank the Chairman and all others who had unofficially congratulated the Soviet Union on its recent scientific success in putting a man into space and bringing him back to earth safely. The success redounded to the credit of all mankind, irrespective of any political differences. He was proud, nevertheless, that it was a socialist country which had performed the exploit first. It crowned the efforts of genuine communism, based on freedom and the struggle for freedom, a system which had already achieved many triumphs.

3. Turning to the examination of draft resolution A/C.4/L.678 and Add.1, he said that a number of speakers had emphasized that it represented a compromise and was particularly moderate in tone. He found that deplorable, as in view of the events in the Congo, the murder of Mr. Lumumba and the disregard for General Assembly resolution 1579 (XV), the

United Nations should no longer approach Belgium in mere terms of persuasion. Rather, since it was plain that Belgium did not intend to implement the new draft resolution, Belgium's mandate over the Territory of Ruanda-Urundi should be revoked, as his delegation had already suggested. In order to stress the need for United Nations action, he would cite not communist ideology but the words of Mr. Nehru, who at one time had stated that it was self-deception to count solely on persuasion, reasoning or even pressing appeals with a view to settling conflicts; it was unreal to believe that States which held power would agree to relinquish it so long as they were not subjected to real pressures amounting, in effect, to force.

4. He unreservedly endorsed the fourth of the amendments proposed by the Bulgarian representative (A/C.4/L.682), since it was absolutely imperative to terminate the state of emergency existing in the Territory under the Legislative Order of 25 October 1960; that order must be unconditionally rescinded, and the Administering Authority should not be left with the slightest possibility of continuing the application of anti-democratic laws. In the absence of guarantees ensuring that the law would be properly applied, there could be no quarrel with a recommendation calling for its out-and-out revocation.

5. On the question of the amnesty, he likewise supported the second amendment submitted by Bulgaria (A/C.4/L.682, para. 2). There was no reason to make an exception to full and unconditional amnesty on the basis of a mere dozen or so cases. The clause as it stood might seriously impede execution of the amnesty measures; while he agreed with the Tunisian representative that the Belgian people should be trusted in the matter, he wished to point out that the United Nations was dealing with the Belgian colonialists and not with the Belgian people, which, during the strikes of January 1961, had protested against the foreign policy pursued by the Belgian monopolies.

6. He further supported the amendment submitted by the Polish representative (A/C.4/L.680). It was unthinkable that the Administering Authority should be authorized to remain in the Territory once free and democratic elections had brought a legal government into existence. That might lead people to believe that the legislative elections would not in fact establish democracy in the Territory, which was an absurdity. All that was necessary was to trust the peoples of the Territory, asking them whether they wanted independence and on what date. In Somalia and Western Samoa, for example, the date of independence had been established long before the practical conditions under which it would be attained. There was no reason to act differently in the case of Ruanda-Urundi.

7. On the matter of the Mwami, he shared the view expressed by the French representative at the 1137th

meeting. It was for the peoples of Ruanda-Urundi themselves to settle the question; the Belgian Government had no right to decide that the Mwami could not re-enter his State.

8. The Soviet delegation would vote for draft resolution A/C.4/L.678 and for the amendments proposed by the Bulgarian and Polish delegations, in the interest of the Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, which presented an especially serious problem in that it could not be regarded in isolation from the war going on in the Congo.

9. His delegation would also vote for draft resolution A/C.4/L.679.

*Mr. Pachachi (Iraq) took the Chair.*

10. Mr. BINGHAM (United States of America) congratulated the representative of the Soviet Union on its great scientific achievement, but said that he hoped the Soviet representative would understand if he differed with his conclusions as to the social and economic implications.

11. The United States delegation, aware of the prime importance of the land-tenure problem in the Territory, would gladly vote for draft resolution A/C.4/L.679.

12. Turning to the Nepalese amendments (A/C.4/L.681) to draft resolution A/C.4/L.678, he stated that the first two, and the fourth, were acceptable to his delegation. His delegation could not, however, support the third amendment. In agreement with the Argentine delegation, it believed that it would be a dangerous precedent for the General Assembly to be maintained thus in continuous session. Moreover, no such procedure had been proposed when United Nations commissioners such as the United Nations Special Representative on the Question of Hungary had been unable to carry out the missions assigned to them. In addition, contrary to what the Indian representative had stated, he considered that the paragraph proposed might be interpreted by the Press and public as a veiled threat. The move was inadvisable at the present stage; for the time being it would be best to assume that the Administering Authority would implement its assurances of co-operation, and there would always be time, if the Assembly's expectations were disappointed, to convene an emergency special session. The United States delegation would vote against that amendment, whose adoption would make it harder rather than easier to secure the implementation of the draft resolution.

13. With respect to the amendment submitted by the Polish delegation (A/C.4/L.680), he shared the view expressed by the Indian representative at the previous meeting and considered that it would be premature to set a date for independence before consultation had been held; it would be better to fix the date at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly. He was, moreover, surprised at the extreme degree of optimism implied in the amendment, which seemed to contradict other observations made by the Polish representative. If the amendment were put to the vote, the United States delegation would support the sub-amendment suggested by the Indian delegation.

14. Turning to the amendments submitted by the Bulgarian representative (A/C.4/L.682), he approved without reservation the first; to the second, on the other hand, he had the same objections as those voiced by the Indian representative: operative paragraph 9,

sub-paragraph (b), of draft resolution A/C.4/L.678 provided for the establishment of a special commission to examine grave cases in order that the matter should not be left entirely to the Administering Authority. That sub-paragraph should, in his view, be retained. As for the new paragraph proposed by the Bulgarian representative in his third amendment, first of all it was pointless to reaffirm "the recommendation contained in operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1579 (XV)" of the General Assembly, since the preceding operative paragraph 2 called upon the Government of Belgium to ensure that the provisions of that resolution were fully implemented. Moreover, and above all, the first part of the paragraph proposed was highly objectionable: in the light of the conclusions of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (A/4706, para. 199), the assertion that Belgium used Ruanda-Urundi for military purposes against the Republic of the Congo in violation of the provisions of the Trusteeship Agreement would be unjustified. The Bulgarian representative had said that his amendment had been based mainly on the last sentence of paragraph 201 of the Commission's report, but there was nothing in that part of the report to support such an accusation against Belgium. The United Kingdom representative had also stated that the adoption of that amendment would make it impossible for the United Kingdom delegation to vote for the draft resolution as a whole. For his part, he too would be placed in great difficulty by the adoption of the amendment. He saw no value in the Bulgarian representative's fourth amendment. The purpose of operative paragraph 12 of the draft resolution might be achieved by suitable amendment of the order in question. If the Bulgarian amendment was adopted, Belgium would find it more difficult to implement the provisions of the resolution, since it would have to reverse completely an action it had taken. There was no point in making co-operation particularly difficult for Belgium; on the contrary, the sponsors of the draft resolution should try to achieve their purpose in the most reasonable way.

15. He associated himself with the observations made at the 1135th meeting by the Tunisian representative concerning operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, but indicated that he was not in agreement with some of that representative's other statements. He reminded the Committee that the draft was a result of mutual accommodation. He noted that several delegations had indicated that they would vote for the draft resolution if it was not substantially amended. In order to preserve the compromise, he joined the Indian representative in urging the sponsors of the amendments submitted to withdraw them. However, if the amendments were put to the vote, he hoped they would not be adopted, so that the draft resolution could be approved by the largest possible majority, which had already expressed support for it.

16. Mr. DARMAN (Somalia) believed that, despite the differences in the opinions expressed by the petitioners and by the Administering Authority, a solution could rapidly be found for the problem of Ruanda-Urundi, in view of the fact that neither the petitioners nor the Administering Authority had raised objections to the principle of independence. The Administering Authority could not escape from its responsibility, under the Trusteeship Agreement, of being accountable to the United Nations for the situation in the Territory, and the United Nations for its part could not escape

the duty of overseeing the transfer of powers, which must take place in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the population.

17. His delegation supported the conclusions and recommendations of the Trusteeship Council and of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, concerning the problem of national reconciliation. In that connexion a round-table conference in which all the political parties without exception would be represented should be held, in the presence of United Nations observers, before the elections. To facilitate the holding of such a conference, the Administering Authority should proclaim an amnesty, since that was essential to the reconciliation of the peoples and their leaders. The return of the refugees before the elections was also indispensable.

18. Having endorsed the conclusion of the Trusteeship Council to the effect that the Territory must accede to independence as a united but composite State, and being convinced that the United Nations should give the peoples of the Territory the means of establishing the political institutions which were essential to the securing of independence, the delegation of Somalia had made a point of being a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.4/L.678 and Add.1. It whole-heartedly approved the comments which the Tunisian representative had made in introducing the draft resolution at the 1135th meeting, and sincerely hoped that that draft would be adopted unanimously.

19. Mr. CASTAÑEDA (Mexico) felt that the third Nepalese amendment (A/C.4/L.681, para.3) would provide the United Nations with the best and perhaps the most effective guarantee that its resolutions would be implemented. It was perfectly normal for it to provide, in advance, for procedures that would enable it to attain its objectives.

20. In the first place, it should be remembered that the three members of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi had a reputation for integrity and a sense of responsibility which nobody had questioned. They would certainly not decide to request the reconvening of the General Assembly unless extremely serious events proved likely, if not remedied in time, to hinder the performance of the Commission's duties, e.g. by making the holding of elections impossible.

21. In the second place, it should be admitted that such fears were not gratuitous but were based on past experience. Moreover, some procedures, such as the formation of provisional governments as a result of *coups d'état*, were difficult to reverse once they had been started. Accordingly the General Assembly ought not, simply because it had awaited its September session, to find itself faced with further *faits accomplis*, about which it could then do no more than express its regret.

22. Lastly, the suggested procedure for convening the General Assembly should be simple and effective. Hitherto, the only way of convening a special session of the General Assembly had been to invoke resolution 377 (V) on uniting for peace or to secure the approval of seven members of the Security Council. Requests made by individual States had never been successful; in the case of such requests the Secretary-General had to ask all the other Member States whether they desired such a session—a lengthy procedure which was rarely effective, since many States were reluctant to approve the convening of emergency sessions.

23. Some representatives had thought that it would be a very grave precedent for the Assembly to decide to remain in permanent session. But that precedent had already been established, since on at least three or four occasions the General Assembly session had not officially closed until the following session had begun or until the consideration of a specific item outstanding had been concluded. Nor did the procedure proposed by the Nepalese representative conflict with Article 20 of the Charter or with the rules of procedure concerning the summoning of the General Assembly, since it would be a question, not of summoning the Assembly, but merely of reopening a session which had not been officially closed.

24. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) said that, while she appreciated the intentions of the representative of Poland, a country which had always upheld the cause of oppressed peoples, she would ask him to withdraw his amendment (A/C.4/L.680), since it was no longer so important as in the past to fix a date. Henceforth it was for the people themselves to choose a date and to make it known, through the Administering Authority, to the General Assembly, which could terminate the Trusteeship Agreement at its sixteenth session. In any case the representative of Poland could raise the question in September.

25. She accepted the first of the Bulgarian amendments (A/C.4/L.682). The second one was less acceptable, for although there was no denying that subparagraphs (a) and (b) of operative paragraph 9 were not entirely consistent, it was nevertheless true that the establishment of a special commission would in practice speed up the granting of amnesty. She therefore requested the representative of Bulgaria to withdraw his second amendment. With regard to the third amendment, she considered that it should be redrafted to bring the wording into line with the resolutions which the Committee had adopted on the use of Trust Territories for military purposes; it should also include a reference to paragraphs 201 and 202 of the report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi. The fourth Bulgarian amendment was not absolutely necessary, since it was well understood that Belgium would have to amend the Legislative Order in question in order to take into account the views of the General Assembly, and a minor amendment would not suffice.

26. With regard to the Nepalese amendments (A/C.4/L.681), she shared the opinion expressed by the representatives of India, Venezuela and Mexico.

27. Finally, her delegation would support the draft resolution submitted by Bolivia (A/C.4/L.679), since it concerned a very important question which had not been sufficiently studied.

28. Mr. DE RIDDER (Belgium) announced that his delegation would vote against draft resolution A/C.4/L.678. He reaffirmed the unwavering determination of his Government to lead the people of Ruanda-Urundi to complete independence, with the most scrupulous respect for the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement. Belgium sincerely desired to enable the organs of the United Nations to exercise the supervision prescribed in the Charter, and to co-operate with them, but it felt that it had the right to expect them to respect the functions and responsibilities which devolved upon it. Day after day in the Fourth Committee tendentious, lying speeches full of hatred had been directed against Belgium and its officials in Ruanda-Urundi. The Belgian

Government could not submit to the insulting judgement passed on it in the preamble of the draft resolution. It had made every effort to reconcile the wishes of the United Nations with the needs of the Administration and the aspirations of the people. It had not engaged in any intrigues designed to confront the United Nations with a *fait accompli*, as it had been accused of doing. It had known that in deciding to postpone the elections which had already been arranged and promised to the people, it was assuming responsibility for a measure contrary to the wishes of an overwhelming majority. The postponement had allowed all the possibilities of co-operation with the United Nations to be better preserved, but self-determination, in the eyes of the inhabitants of Ruanda-Urundi, could not wait. Their aspirations had centred upon the application of the plans and dates approved by the Trusteeship Council, and the people of the Territory were reluctant to accept delays and deferments.

29. There were some striking contradictions in the draft resolution. While paragraph 3 recognized the full and exclusive responsibility of the Administering Authority, a number of measures were imposed on that Authority in paragraphs 6, 7 and 9. Paragraph 6 could be accepted by the Belgian delegation as a recommendation only, for the Belgian Government was responsible for fixing dates and for the organization of the legislative elections and the referendum. The Belgian Government was therefore obliged to express reservations on what appeared to be an encroachment by the General Assembly on its administrative powers. Any decision in that field would be taken by the Administering Authority after consultation with the United Nations Commission responsible for supervising the elections. Belgium had no objection, in principle, to the proposed date. It was essential, however, that the United Nations Commission and the Administering Authority should secure the co-operation of the people, whose agreement must be obtained on the organization and methods of a popular consultation.

30. With regard to paragraph 7, the Belgian delegation expressed the same reservations and considered that the questions which it was proposed to put to the electors on the Mwami of Ruanda took no account of the facts. It was useless to try to dissociate the institution of the Mwami from the person of Kigeli. The draft resolution reproduced the proposals of the interim report of the Commission, which had been drawn up without detailed study and were likely to cause serious confusion in the minds of the local voters. The alternatives should be put to the voters in a much more explicit way, to enable them to give a definite decision one way or the other.

31. The drafting of paragraph 9 seemed very obscure. It was based on a plan of the Belgian Government for the setting up of a commission of judges who would examine the case-records of the most important of those who had been convicted and suggest criteria for giving effect to the amnesty measures. The Belgian Government had offered to allow the United Nations Commission to inspect the court records relating to the most serious cases, so that it could gain an idea of the whole question and form an objective view of the decisions of the Administering Authority. The Belgian Government could not allow decisions to be imposed upon it within the field of its duties and responsibilities for the maintenance of public order.

32. The draft resolution gravely infringed the Trusteeship Agreement and recommended measures which would run counter to its application. Contrary to Article 76 of the Charter and article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement, it made no attempt to ascertain what were the feelings of the people concerned, although their active participation was imperative at the present stage of their political development.

33. Mr. DIALLO TELLI (Guinea) thought that the situation in Ruanda-Urundi was still confused and the opposition between the different parties more marked than ever. The Administering Authority was still sheltering behind arguments which could not stand up to the slightest objective analysis. The Committee was therefore called upon to take an important decision and any weakness or mistake on its part would be very serious. Its essential duty was to oblige Belgium to respect both the spirit and the letter of the Trusteeship Agreement and to fulfil its obligations.

34. The United Nations had made many efforts to improve the situation in Ruanda-Urundi during the first part of the fifteenth session. It had already, in two General Assembly resolutions, recommended impartial, effective measures for a just and democratic solution of a very delicate problem. All those recommendations retained their full validity.

35. As the report (A/4706 and Add.1) showed, however, the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi appointed by the General Assembly had had to work in very unfavourable conditions. Its members had nevertheless avoided all polemics and had refrained from adopting any unduly categorical position, in order to devote themselves solely to establishing the facts. After many hesitations on the part of the Administering Authority, the Commission had been able to visit the Territory but it had been met with an unprecedented lack of goodwill on the part of the local authorities and had been confronted with *faits accomplis* which complicated the situation. Without allowing itself to be discouraged, it had made all the contacts that were possible and had made some fundamental recommendations which had enabled the delegation of Guinea to place the problem in its real context.

36. His delegation must note, first and foremost, that Belgium had unfortunately not understood where its true interests lay. Belgium maintained that the United Nations resolutions were only recommendations which could have no binding force. With manifest duplicity, it stated that it intended to co-operate loyally, while in fact it was doing everything to prevent the General Assembly resolutions from being applied and to hold them up to ridicule. For example, in order to avoid implementing resolution 1579 (XV), it had carried out pernicious propaganda in the Territory with the object of creating an atmosphere of general discontent; it had then proceeded to set up illegally institutions which it was using for its own ends; it had prevented the return of the refugees, who were constantly threatened by its officials, had opposed the return of the Mwami and, lastly, had drawn up plans for a so-called revolution which had apparently been simply a trumped-up affair. It was therefore not so much a question of non-cooperation, as was stated by the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, as a determination to commit systematic sabotage, all the more disquieting in that it was assisted by the co-operation of puppets that

Belgium had managed to impose on the population, thanks to its armed forces and police.

37. It was not possible to dissociate the Belgian Government from its representatives on the spot or from the instruments that it had created. At all events, so long as the Trusteeship Agreement had not been abrogated, either because the Territory had reached independence or as the result of a well-deserved punishment, the Belgian Government was in duty bound to face its responsibilities and to apply the recommendations of the United Nations in order to prevent a further threat to world peace on the African continent. If those who were entrusted with carrying out its policies were irresponsible, they should be expelled and should be replaced by qualified personnel from the United Nations, in order to safeguard the country's peaceful and rapid development towards independence. Besides, it would be useless for Belgium to try to make out that it no longer exercised internal authority; if it had been able to engineer *coups d'état*, it must also know how to undo their effects. By persisting in confronting the United Nations with *faits accomplis*, it would lead towards a catastrophe similar to that in the Congo. If Belgium wanted to prevent the year 1961 from becoming known in history as "the year of the Belgian crimes in Africa", it should co-operate loyally with the United Nations and cease trying to impose a new and dangerous form of neo-colonialism with the help of other colonial Powers, for that policy had already been condemned by history.

38. He went on to recall the conclusions reached by the African Heads of State who had met at Casablanca in January 1961. He denounced Belgian attempts to divide the Territory into two-pseudo-independent States and protested against the Balkanization of Africa as a result of which the smaller States would remain for a long time to come in a state of dependency on the former colonial Powers, which had dreams of using them for purposes contrary to the interests of the African peoples, as the example of Katanga had shown. In this connexion it was particularly disquieting to observe that the first act on the part of the illegal Governments of Ruanda and Urundi had been to make contact with the rebellious factions in the Congo, and especially with Tshombe and his retinue of Belgian counsellors. Those machinations would not succeed, however, because the nationalists in Ruanda-Urundi would know how to counter them effectively.

39. Every care must be taken to ensure that the resolutions of the General Assembly were applied, and especially the provisions concerning full and unconditional amnesty for all acts committed during the incidents of November 1959, the abolition of the state of emergency, the restoration of democratic freedoms and of basic human rights, the immediate return of all political refugees, national reconciliation and the preservation of the national unity and territorial integrity of the country. It was also necessary to denounce the use of Ruanda-Urundi as a base for aggression against the African peoples in general and the Congolese in particular. Africans would know how to defend themselves against acts of piracy such as the one which had already been brought to the attention of the Security Council. Lastly, it was essential that all the Belgian forces stationed in the Territory should be evacuated at once, so that an atmosphere of peace and security could be restored. Such a measure seemed all the more important in view of all the difficulties that had

been created in the Congo by the Belgian forces, which had not hesitated to resort in cold blood to genocide.

40. His delegation was ready to support any draft resolution which reminded Belgium that its real interest lay in carrying out loyally a process of decolonization, and that there was still time for it to listen to the voice of reason. As Ruanda-Urundi was a Trust Territory, the United Nations had full responsibility there and it was essential that it should not make any mistakes or show any signs of weakness. For all the above reasons, his delegation had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.678 and Add.1. Although the draft resolution did not propose all the forceful measures that might be necessary, it nevertheless included provisions which if quickly and honestly applied would greatly contribute to the restoration of an atmosphere of peace and tranquillity in the Territory and would create better conditions for the unconditional attainment of independence in the near future. In the draft resolution the General Assembly reaffirmed resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV), rejected the non-co-operative attitude of the Power whose illegal acts it denounced, called for the setting up of caretaker governments of national unity, in which the various political shades in the Territory would be represented on a basis of equality, in order to attend to current affairs in complete neutrality, until such time as responsible governments were established as a result of free elections on the basis of direct universal suffrage. Finally, the General Assembly called for the abrogation of the Legislative Order of 25 October 1960, which had established an intolerable reign of terror, and reiterated its determination to safeguard the territorial unity and integrity of Ruanda-Urundi.

41. His delegation was convinced that Belgium had completely disqualified itself and that, as a punishment, the mandate which had been entrusted to it should be withdrawn. For the lack of anything better, however, his country would support the ideas expressed in the draft resolution, whose adoption and rapid and loyal application would enable the United Nations to fulfil its responsibilities and to lead the Territory towards independence along the path of democracy and law and order. His country welcomed in advance Ruanda-Urundi's admission to the family of free nations.

42. Mr. GRINBERG (Bulgaria) presented the Bulgarian delegation's revised amendments (A/C.4/L.682/Rev.1) to draft resolution A/C.4/L.678. His delegation maintained its amendment to the first paragraph of the preamble, because it considered it essential to mention the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples in every resolution of the General Assembly that referred to the evolution of the Trust Territories and the Non-Self-Governing Territories prior to their attainment of independence.

43. However, in order to ensure the largest possible majority in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, his delegation would not insist that its second amendment, which called for the deletion of sub-paragraph 9(b), be put to the vote.

44. Despite the criticisms that had been formulated by certain delegations, he considered that the wording of the new paragraph which he had originally proposed for addition after operative paragraph 9 (A/C.4/L.682, para. 3) was perfectly justified, because it referred to an incident which constituted a violation of the provisions of operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly

resolution 1579 (XV) and because it was desirable that the Assembly should make known its opinion with regard to that incident. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that some delegations who were in favour of the draft resolution in principle might have voted against it if that amendment had been included, his delegation was now proposing a new amendment whereby the Administering Authority was called upon "to observe strictly its international obligations under the Trusteeship Agreement."

45. With regard to the fourth amendment submitted by his delegation, he expressed the hope that it would be adopted.

46. Mr. CHATTI (Tunisia) replied to the remarks of the many delegations which had made an objective contribution to a delicate and complex question and gave some explanations regarding draft resolution A/C.4/L.678.

47. As the representative of Venezuela had rightly pointed out, the interpretation put by some delegations on the Tunisian delegation's remarks at the 1135th meeting had caused a certain amount of confusion. For example, contrary to what the representatives of France and the United Kingdom had implied, there had never been any question of recognizing the governmental bodies set up in Ruanda as a result of the Gitarama *coup d'état*. The fourth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution was very clear in that respect: since the sponsors had regretted the *de facto* recognition by Belgium of those bodies, they obviously did not themselves recognize them. When the Tunisian delegation said that it agreed to the maintenance of the institutions in the Territory, it was referring to those which had existed before 28 January; it considered that the men who had seized power on the date had no other status than that conferred upon them by their party functions.

48. Where operative paragraph 9 was concerned, he said in reply to the representative of Bulgaria that the sponsors of the draft resolution were not taking a step backward compared with resolution 1579 (XV), since they stated, in sub-paragraph (a), that the amnesty should be granted "immediately". Furthermore, sub-paragraph (b) was intended to make the amnesty effective by appointing a special commission of three members to decide on cases which the Administering Authority considered to be liable to prosecution. The Italian representative claimed that the appointment of that commission was contrary to the Trusteeship Agreement; however, in fact it would not be a court of appeal but a body appointed to assist in carrying out a conciliation measure and thus create an atmosphere of confidence in the future. The implementation of sub-paragraph (b) could not delay the amnesty, as the Ukrainian representative feared, since, on the contrary, the General Assembly was taking steps to provide against any possible deficiencies on the part of the Administering Authority in that connexion. Nor could there be any confusion about the interpretation of that paragraph, contrary to the view expressed by the New Zealand representative: sub-paragraph (a) confirmed that the amnesty should be full and unconditional, while sub-paragraph (b) specified the functions of the proposed special commission.

49. It was unusual to find the representative of France, a member of a law enforcement institution, reconciling himself so easily to the Gitarama *coup d'état*;

that representative had called the preamble exaggerated and described the consequences of the *coup d'état* in such a way that it almost seemed as though the event should be welcomed. The General Assembly should not encourage forcible seizures of power by sanctioning them, although they were sometimes necessary to combat feudalism, despotism or dictatorship. Could the French representative explain why Belgium had so belatedly decided to combat feudalism, after having supported it for so long? It should be noted in passing that monarchy was not synonymous with feudalism and that such advanced countries as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium itself had a monarchic régime. The monarchy in Ruanda-Urundi was a national institution and only the indigenous population could decide to abolish it. In reply to the French delegation's criticisms of the second question which it was intended to include in the referendum regarding the Mwami, he said that it was not a matter of filling a vacancy and that it was premature to claim that the Mwami had lost all his rights. The sponsors of the draft resolution therefore asked the people of Ruanda to state their views both on the institution and on the person of the sovereign. Moreover, whenever the administering Powers had tried to settle the problem of monarchic institutions in their own way in the countries under their rule, they had been sorry afterwards. The United Nations would not make the same mistake.

50. Turning to the amendments to the draft resolution, he said that the sponsors unreservedly accepted the first, second and fourth of the Nepalese amendments (A/C.4/L.681). The third amendment constituted, in his view, an extremely important security measure which could not fail to contribute to the success of the resolution. What would happen if the United Nations Commission were unable to carry out its task? A remedy should be provided if the worst happened. The Belgian representative's statement in that regard was not reassuring, and his reservations suggested that the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi would encounter serious difficulties. As the representative of Bulgaria had stated, it was Belgium's last chance; however, unfortunate precedents forced the United Nations to take precautions. The measure recommended by Nepal was, as the representatives of India and Mexico had rightly said, not a threat against Belgium, but merely a safeguard in the event of the failure of the United Nations Commission. With regard to the fear expressed by the United States representative that the proposed text might be given a different interpretation from that put on it by the Fourth Committee, the world Press and public opinion did not usually distort perfectly clear, precise and definite statements. He made a last appeal to the members of the Committee to adopt the Nepalese amendment.

51. The sponsors of the draft resolution accepted the first and fourth of the Bulgarian amendments, but rejected the other two because, first, the deletion of sub-paragraph 9 (b) would make the amnesty more difficult to carry out and, secondly, the new paragraph which the Bulgarian delegation had originally suggested inserting was a repetition of provisions already contained in resolution 1579 (XV), which were mentioned in the earlier paragraphs of the draft resolution.

52. Lastly, Tunisia unreservedly supported the draft resolution submitted by Bolivia (A/C.4/L.679) and welcomed it as a constructive measure.

53. Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) thanked the delegations which had spoken in favour of the Polish amendment (A/C.4/L.680). The amendment was not intended to fix the final date for the independence of Ruanda-Urundi, or to fix it unconditionally. His delegation merely wished to place the draft resolution in its proper context, since the aim of the United Nations was to end the Trusteeship Agreement and grant independence to the Territory as soon as possible.

54. There were two alternatives: either, if the resolution was applied in its entirety, there would be all the necessary conditions to enable Ruanda-Urundi to achieve independence at a date which should in no case be later than 1 January 1962; or, in the opposite case, the United Nations would be confronted with an entirely new situation requiring special measures. The fears of the Indian representative were unjustified; however, in order to meet all objections, the Polish delegation withdrew the amendment in document A/C.4/L.680 and proposed that the following new paragraph should be added at the end of the draft resolution:

*“Considers that the full implementation of the provisions of this resolution will enable the General Assembly at its sixteenth session to consider the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement at the earliest possible date.”*

55. That text had the advantage of leaving it to the General Assembly to fix, at its sixteenth session, the date for the termination of trusteeship, taking into account the conditions then prevailing in the Territory. If the resolution was implemented in its entirety, the date of 1 January 1962 would be quite practical.

56. Mr. LAPIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), in answer to the appeal for co-operation made by the Tunisian delegation and fearing that the Bulgarian amendment to operative paragraph 12 (A/C.4/L.682/Rev.1, para.4) might be misunderstood, proposed that the following sentence should be added to that paragraph: “in addition, articles 9 to 14 of the above-mentioned Order, should be unconditionally revoked as contradicting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” An examination of those articles showed that their provisions were perhaps admissible in war time, but certainly not in peace time, as they prohibited the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms. It would no doubt have been easier to rescind the whole Order, but in view of the reservations expressed by some delegations, it would be sufficient to rescind its most obnoxious articles.

57. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) proposed two sub-amendments to the third Bulgarian amendment (A/C.4/L.682/Rev.1, para.3). That amendment failed to mention paragraph 199 of the report of the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, which was inseparable from the following paragraphs. He therefore proposed that the words “in paragraphs 200-203” should be replaced by the words “in paragraphs 199-203”. Furthermore, since the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi had found nothing to indicate that the Administering Authority had used the Territory as a base for military operations, there was no need to express concern on that subject; he therefore suggested deleting the words “with concern” in the Bulgarian amendment.

58. Mr. GRINBERG (Bulgaria) said that the Argentine sub-amendments completely altered the mean-

ing of the amendment proposed by the Bulgarian delegation.

59. Following an observation by Mr. CASTAÑEDA (Mexico), Mr. CHATTI (Tunisia) said that the sponsors of the draft resolution agreed to insert in their text the first, second and fourth of the Nepalese amendments (A/C.4/L.681, paras. 1, 2, 4).

60. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the third Nepalese amendment (A/C.4/L.681, para. 3).

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Nicaragua, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal.

*Against:* Norway, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand.

*Abstaining:* Niger, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Léopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Greece, Israel.

*The amendment was adopted by 47 votes to 22, with 18 abstentions.*

61. The CHAIRMAN asked the Committee to vote on the first Bulgarian amendment (A/C.4/L.682/Rev.1, para. 1).

62. Mr. CASTAÑEDA (Mexico) asked whether, if the sponsors of the draft resolution had no objection, the amendment might be incorporated in their text.

63. The CHAIRMAN suggested that, if there was no objection, that procedure should be adopted.

*It was so decided.*

64. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) requested that a separate vote should be taken on the paragraph thus added to the draft resolution.

65. Mr. GRINBERG (Bulgaria) withdrew his second amendment (A/C.4/L.682/Rev.1, para. 2).

66. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Argentine representative's oral sub-amendment to delete the words “with concern” from the new paragraph proposed by Bulgaria (A/C.4/L.682/Rev.1, para. 3).

*The sub-amendment was adopted by 34 votes to 32, with 12 abstentions.*

67. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Argentine representative's oral sub-amendment to replace the number “200” by the number “199”, in the new paragraph proposed by Bulgaria (A/C.4/L.682/Rev.1, para. 3).

*The sub-amendment was adopted by 36 votes to 29, with 21 abstentions.*

68. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the third Bulgarian amendment (A/C.4/L.682/Rev.1, para. 3) as amended.

*The amendment, as amended, was adopted by 31 votes to 22, with 24 abstentions.*

69. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the fourth Bulgarian amendment (A/C.4/L.682/Rev.1, para. 4).

*The amendment was adopted by 22 votes to 18, with 39 abstentions.*

70. The CHAIRMAN said that, in view of the adoption of the fourth Bulgarian amendment, there was no need to vote on the USSR oral amendment.

71. He put to the vote the Polish oral amendment calling for the addition of a paragraph at the end of the operative part.

*The amendment was adopted by 72 votes to none, with 10 abstentions.*

72. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the new first preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.4/L.678.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Dahomey, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Léopoldville), Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia.

*Against:* None.

*Abstaining:* France, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Australia.

*The new first preambular paragraph of the draft resolution was adopted by 82 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.*

73. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs of the preamble.

*Those paragraphs were adopted by 70 votes to 1, with 9 abstentions.*

74. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the seventh paragraph of the preamble.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*The United Kingdom, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Vol-

ta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Léopoldville), Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic.

*Against:* None

*Abstaining:* Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*The seventh paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 83 votes to none, with 4 abstentions.*

75. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote operative paragraph 7.

*The paragraph was adopted by 66 votes to 1, with 16 abstentions.*

76. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the draft resolution (A/C.4/L.678) as a whole as amended.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Iceland, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Léopoldville), Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary.

*Against:* Belgium.

*Abstaining:* Portugal, Spain, France.

*Draft resolution A/C.4/L.678 as a whole, as amended, was adopted by 83 votes to 1, with 3 abstentions.*

77. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote draft resolution A/C.4/L.679.

*Draft resolution A/C.4/L.679 was adopted unanimously.*

The meeting rose at 7.15 p.m.