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Chairman: Miss Angie BROOKS (Liberia).

AGENDA ITEM 49

Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi: report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (A/4856, A/4865 and Corr.1, A/4970, A/4994 and Add.1 and Corr.1; A/C.4/516, 517 and Corr.1, 518, 519, 521, 522 and Add.1) (continued)

HEARINGS OF MR. PIERRE NGENDANDUMWE, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF BURUNDI, AND MR. AMANDIN RUGIRA, PRESIDENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF RWANDA (continued)

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Pierre Ngendandumwe, Deputy Prime Minister of Burundi, and Mr. Amandin Rugira, President of the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda, took places at the Committee table.

1. Mr. GRINBERG (Bulgaria) said that his delegation was greatly concerned with the question of the unity of Ruanda-Urundi. At the 1262nd meeting, Mr. Ngendandumwe had replied to the representative of Mali that the situation with regard to the political unity of Rwanda and Burundi would have been practically the same if conditions in Rwanda had been different and the elections had had different results. In another statement however, Mr. Ngendandumwe had said that his Government was considering the possibility of a union with other neighbouring countries. Was it not likely that Burundi would encounter the same difficulties with regard to the unions under consideration as in the case of union with Rwanda, especially in view of the fact that the other countries under consideration would not have had the experience of common administration shared by Rwanda and Burundi?

2. Mr. NGENDANDUMWE (Deputy Prime Minister of Burundi) said that he intended, if the Committee agreed, to confirm and explain the positions he had already taken in a statement he would make at a later meeting. He would therefore ask the members

of the Committee to await the publication of those confirmations and explanations in a document.

3. He had been asked if the obstacles to a political union of Rwanda and Burundi would be removed if the systems of the two States were not different. Of course, any two systems could always be reconciled, in one way or another, if special factors did not make such a reconciliation impossible. However, Burundi had well-defined institutions and the situation in that state was clear and calm, whereas the situation in Rwanda, seen from Burundi, was extremely confused. In those circumstances, Burundi could not make political commitments and that was why the Government of that state asked to be allowed to wait, before seeking a formula for union, until the situation had again become clear in Rwanda, after the accession of both states to independence.

4. With regard to the obstacles to union with other countries, he did not wish to prejudge the matter for the time being; the unions in question should be considered within the scope of specific situations, bearing in mind the aspirations of the populations involved, and would only be viable if all the partners desired them.

5. Mr. GRINBERG (Bulgaria) asked Mr. Rugira what date he would regard as appropriate for the accession of Rwanda to independence.

6. Mr. RUGIRA (President of the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda) said that it was difficult for him to answer that question, as accession to independence was a matter to be decided by the Legislative Assembly and the Government of Rwanda, rather than a mere representative. In order to fix an approximate date, it was necessary to refer in particular to the Protocol (A/C.4/517 and Corr.1), as the date of accession to independence should be linked to the application of that agreement if a dispute was to be avoided. In order to leave sufficient latitude to make an agreement with Burundi possible, 30 June 1962 might be fixed as a final date for the accession of Rwanda to independence. In any case, the Government of Rwanda did not intend to wait longer than the end of the first half of 1962.

7. Mr. GRINBERG (Bulgaria) referred to the assassination of Prince Rwagasore and asked whether Mr. Ngendandumwe would be able to furnish details of that crime, which had deeply disturbed the members of the Committee.

8. Mr. NGENDANDUMWE (Deputy Prime Minister of Burundi) recalled that at the 1263rd meeting he had said that he intended to speak in detail on the assassination of the Prime Minister of Burundi when the time came to do so. He asked members of the Committee to allow him to wait until a later meeting to take up a question with which not only the Committee but the people and Government of Burundi were greatly concerned.

9. Mr. DOE (Liberia) said that his delegation was also giving close attention to the question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi. The discussion so far had been very informative but the statements by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs at the 1259th meeting, the Deputy Prime Minister of Burundi and the President of the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda at the 1261st meeting, as well as the text of the Protocol, on the contrary were discouraging, and disappointment at what might be regarded as a failure was understandable. His delegation reserved the right to speak on the question in more detail in connexion with the discussion of the report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (A/4994 and Add.1 and Corr.1).

10. His delegation was greatly interested in the question of the political unity of Rwanda and Burundi. However, the parties concerned had stated that historical and other factors made such a union "impossible". The word "difficult" might perhaps have been preferable, for it would leave open the possibility of a compromise.

11. In view of the fact that Rwanda and Burundi were not economically viable and that a considerable period of time would be required to prepare plans which would enable them to launch their development, it was his impression that the two States would have to rely solely on subsidies from Belgium and on United Nations technical assistance to prepare themselves to assume the responsibilities of independent nations. His delegation would like to hear the views of the Deputy Prime Minister of Burundi and the President of the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda on that point.

12. Mr. NGENDANDUMWE (Deputy Prime Minister of Burundi) agreed that the word "impossible" was badly chosen. He explained that, in any case, the impossibility of a political union between the two states must be regarded as a temporary state of affairs. It would have been more correct to say that the union was not "opportune" in the circumstances. As he had already said, the Government of Burundi did not reject the possibility of a future union, and was aware that the future of Africa lay in unity.

13. With regard to the aid Burundi might receive from the United Nations or Belgium, he pointed out that when a nation was building itself up it inevitably required assistance. Under the Trusteeship Agreement, the United Nations had a duty to watch over the material and spiritual interests of the people of Ruanda-Urundi and to follow the development of the situation in order to ensure that the period of initial development was not also a period of regression. In requesting that it accede to independence separately, Burundi had adopted not an isolationist position but a realistic one. There was no question of prejudging the future, and it was to be hoped that the unity of the two states would be achieved when conditions were more favourable.

14. Mr. RUGIRA (President of the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda) said that in his opinion union would remain impossible so long as the present state of affairs continued.

15. With regard to the assistance Rwanda and Burundi might receive, he considered that the Belgian subsidies and United Nations technical assistance would not meet the needs of the two states, which would also have to call on neighbouring countries and

on countries whose economies complemented their own. In the modern world, countries needed each other, and the Republic of Rwanda could not hope to be an exception to that rule. It therefore hoped to be able to co-operate with all the economic bodies now in existence throughout the world and not to have to rely solely on the aid it might be given by Belgium and the United Nations.

16. With regard to the future of Rwanda and Burundi, he did not see why some representatives were trying to impose an ill-assorted union on two peoples. In his opinion, if a political union was imposed on Rwanda and Burundi, it would be necessary to call on the United Nations, which would have to send a body to remain in the Territory permanently. That, however, was not the goal sought by the Committee.

17. Mr. DOE (Liberia) asked whether the people of Rwanda and of Burundi would be prepared to co-operate with the United Nations if the General Assembly requested the organization of a popular consultation concerning the future of the two states.

18. Mr. RUGIRA (President of the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda) said that his Government had no intention of opposing the wishes of the General Assembly. He would ask the members of the Committee, however, not to lose sight of the expense which the organization of a popular consultation would entail for a country with limited resources. If political unity was desired by the people of Rwanda and rejected by the people of Burundi, the Government of Rwanda might conceivably emphasize the need for the General Assembly to decide that a referendum should be organized. But in the present circumstances, a popular consultation would not meet the wishes of the peoples.

19. If the Committee recommended that the General Assembly adopt a resolution requesting the organization of a referendum in Ruanda-Urundi, he would request that the United Nations should subsidize the enterprise, the results of which would, he was convinced, be negative in any case.

20. Mr. NGENDANDUMWE (Deputy Prime Minister of Burundi) said that the people of Burundi also had no intention of opposing the decisions of the General Assembly.

21. If the Committee should decide to have a referendum held in Ruanda-Urundi a certain number of people would doubtless be found who would vote in favour of a political union between the two countries. Considering the generally prevailing opinion among the inhabitants of Burundi, however, it could be stated that if a popular consultation was held its result would be negative.

22. The situation was all the more delicate since one of the two régimes established in the Territory had been organized in conditions of peace whereas the other was the outcome of revolution. The situation between the peoples of the two countries had become over-sensitive and trade between Rwanda and Burundi was tending to decrease. He had, indeed, referred at the 1262nd meeting to incidents which had occurred on the frontier between the two countries. All things considered, it did not appear that the referendum could lead to any positive result. Political union could be achieved only in a climate of understanding and calm and when the peoples concerned desired it. That was an important consideration which should be borne in mind. The future would favour

large groupings of countries and Rwanda and Burundi were aware of that fact but a referendum held under existing conditions would lead to a negative result and could only delay accession to independence. He could not oppose the adoption of a resolution by the General Assembly but he asked the members of the Committee to take those considerations into account before reaching a decision.

23. Mr. DOE (Liberia) asked if it could be expected that, after the Administering Authority withdrew, the authorities in Rwanda and Burundi would be able to prevent the revival of old quarrels and to maintain order in such a way as to prevent the occurrence of unfortunate events such as those that had taken place in the Congo.

24. Mr. RUGIRA (President of the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda) said that that question did not fall within the scope of his responsibilities. Guarantees had been given for the future, but that was a matter which concerned his Government.

25. Mr. NGENDANDUMWE (Deputy Prime Minister of Burundi) explained that the only Rwandese in Burundi were refugees. As regarded the possibility of a union between the two countries after their accession to independence, it should be borne in mind that their populations felt no need for political association and had chosen radically different régimes. It was possible, of course, that the psychological climate might improve and that a union might be effected in the future, for that was the direction history was taking. For the time being, however, both countries needed to reach the stage of independence; it would therefore be preferable not to impose a political union which would be likely to disintegrate immediately but rather to create conditions in both countries which would be conducive to a political union in the future.

26. Mr. DOE (Liberia) thanked the representatives of Rwanda and Burundi for their replies. It should be pointed out that new countries which were striving to keep abreast of the times and to catch up with the older countries should not let themselves be held back by the ideas of earlier centuries. Each should subordinate its national "amour-propre" to the wider ideas of unity. He reserved the right of his delegation to intervene again at a later stage.

27. Mr. BINGHAM (United States of America) congratulated the representatives of Rwanda and Burundi, who had replied to all the questions asked by the Committee with remarkable frankness. He would like Mr. Rugira to explain the attitude of the Government of Rwanda with regard to the Tutsi population and to say whether it was willing to admit the Batutsi into its own ranks or into the administration.

28. Mr. RUGIRA (President of the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda) said that the question called for a detailed reply. He could, however, state that the Government of Rwanda not only was willing to admit Batutsi into the administration but had already done so. A distinction should be made, however, between political power and administrative power. The former was conferred by elections; if the Tutsi parties won an election or if the number of seats which they won was almost equal to those won by the Hutu parties, the present Government might consider forming a coalition with them. After the recent elections, however, he did not think that the Fourth Committee would consider imposing on Rwanda a minority Government. In the administration, on the other hand,

Batutsi occupied quite a large number of posts in public health, education and public works; Batutsi were employed in all the Ministries, where they were perhaps even in a majority. Figures in support of that statement could be furnished later if the Committee so desired.

29. Mr. BINGHAM (United States of America) said that such figures might be useful. He would also be grateful if Mr. Rugira could give the essentials of the talks which had taken place at Brussels on the question of political unification of the two countries, which was of such concern to the Committee.

30. Mr. RUGIRA (President of the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda) recalled that the talks at Brussels had led to the signature of the Protocols which had been communicated to the Committee (A/C.4/517 and Corr.1). The atmosphere had been quite heavily charged and in Belgium the representatives of Rwanda and Burundi had, surprisingly enough, met with opposition which was in a sense the same as that which they were now encountering in the Committee: the Administering Authority, perhaps fearful that it would be accused of dividing the Territory, had sought to impose union on Rwanda and Burundi. The categorical opposition of the representatives of the two countries had led it to conclude the Protocols in question against its wishes.

31. Mr. BINGHAM (United States of America), referring to the Liberian representative's question concerning the possibility of holding a referendum on the issue of political unity, asked if Mr. Rugira could indicate the approximate percentage of voters in his country who would vote in favour of unity.

32. Mr. RUGIRA (President of the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda) thought that in the circumstances 1 or 2 per cent of the electorate could be persuaded to vote in favour of unification if a large-scale propaganda effort was made. Should the opposition parties, on the other hand, decide that they too would vote for union in the hope of thus upsetting the parties in power, the total might be 8 to 10 per cent.

33. Mr. BINGHAM (United States of America) asked the representatives of Rwanda and Burundi if political union would not in their opinion be conducive to the economic unity to which the two countries aspired.

34. Mr. RUGIRA (President of the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda) said that he thought the reply given to that question at the preceding meeting by Mr. Ngendandumwe was sufficient. He himself was of the opinion that in the circumstances political union would be an obstacle to the attainment of the economic unity which the two countries were already in a position to achieve.

35. Mr. NGENDANDUMWE (Deputy Prime Minister of Burundi) recalled his earlier statements that in ideal circumstances political union would favour economic progress. As things were, however, that would not be the case if Rwanda and Burundi were united, for economic progress was possible only when certain conditions existed, namely confidence in capital, conditions of security and a normal atmosphere in which work could be carried on. A political union of the two countries under the conditions obtaining would not guarantee any of those prerequisites and would therefore be negative. Furthermore, States concluded political unions in order to strengthen their position in relation to the rest of the world or because they had no reason to remain apart. The establishment of

a single State of Ruanda-Urundi would not meet those conditions; it would not be stronger and it might even be that friction would arise between the two countries because there was no "will to live" as a single entity.

36. Mr. LAPIAN (Indonesia), recalled the tragic situation of the refugees from Rwanda and said that no responsible Government could ignore that extremely serious problem. He asked Mr. Rugira if he had studied ways of reintegrating those displaced persons into the population.

37. Mr. RUGIRA (President of the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda) said that he would reply to that question later.

38. Mr. SOLTYSIAK (Poland) recalled that under the terms of annex A of the Protocol concluded between the Belgian Government and the Government of Rwanda "the budget shall be put into effect by the Government of Rwanda and on its responsibility". The Protocol concluded with the Government of Burundi included the same formula but specified that the Burundi Government would "be provided with the necessary staff for the purpose: supervisors, accountants and auditors". He would like to know what were the reasons for that difference between the two countries and who would provide the necessary staff in the case of Burundi.

39. Mr. NGENDANDUMWE (Deputy Prime Minister of Burundi) replied that almost all of the officials concerned had already been appointed: the controller "contrôleur des engagements" and the disbursing officer "ordonnateur" were indigenous inhabitants of Burundi; auditors "contrôleurs comptables" were being trained but had not yet been appointed. At the present time the bureau of the budget was under the authority of the Minister of Finance of the Burundi Government, but consisted of persons who had formerly been officials of the Administering Authority. The question therefore was whether those officials would remain in their posts.

40. Mr. RUGIRA (President of the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda) said that he was unaware of the reasons for the difference between his country and Burundi. So far as Rwanda was concerned, while the bureau of the budget might not have sufficient resources, it at least had the necessary staff.

41. Mr. SOLTYSIAK (Poland) wished to know to what extent the authorities of the two countries had relied on the presence of Belgian armed forces for the maintenance of order after the recent elections and what their attitude was to the withdrawal of such forces.

42. Mr. RUGIRA (President of the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda) replied that, since reinforcements had been sent in to maintain order during the electoral campaign, it would have been natural for the Belgian forces to be reduced to the minimum after the elections. But since responsibility for maintaining order was vested in the Administering Authority, the question should more logically be put to its representative.

43. Mr. NGENDANDUMWE (Deputy Prime Minister of Burundi) endorsed that view. The Administering Authority itself should state the reasons why its armed forces remained in the Territory. In point of fact, since the situation in Burundi was normal and since an indigenous force was being organized, there was no justification for the maintenance of Belgian forces apart from considerations of prestige. After

the two countries had attained independence, each must protect its territorial integrity and maintain public order with its own resources. If the Burundi army proved unequal to the task, the Government might have to request the assistance of foreign forces.

44. Mr. YOMEKPE (Ghana) asked Mr. Rugira, who had stated that he was willing to reply to questions raised in his absence, if he could describe the relationship existing between the Batutsi and the Bahutu in the two parts of the Territory.

45. Mr. RUGIRA (President of the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda) asked whether he should discuss the question from the sociological or political point of view.

46. Mr. YOMEKPE (Ghana) said he had asked the question from a sociological point of view, since Mr. Rugira had already said that the Batutsi and the Bahutu of the two regions had been unable to agree on political matters.

47. Mr. RUGIRA (President of the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda) said that he could say nothing concerning Burundi. So far as Rwanda was concerned, it was difficult for him to reply because the question was rather one of relations between individuals or, at most, families. In any case, there could be no doubt that total integration was possible and that in Rwanda life was, little by little, settling down to normal. At a later meeting he would give more detailed information on the Government's policy in the matter.

48. Mr. YOMEKPE (Ghana) said that he had laid emphasis on the question only because he found it hard to conceive that two peoples supposedly so similar should have nothing in common. He therefore asked to be informed if, for example, the Bahutu living in Rwanda and in Burundi all spoke the same language and shared the same customs.

49. Mr. RUGIRA (President of the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda) said that the Ghanaian representative was looking at the question from a purely ethnological point of view, which was irrelevant in the present instance. Experts admittedly distinguished three groups in the Territory: the Bantus, called Bahutu; the Hamites, called Batutsi; and the Pygmoids, called Batwa. The three groups were scattered throughout both parts of the Territory, their main concern being whether they belonged to Rwanda or Burundi.

Mr. Pierre Ngendandumwe, Deputy Prime Minister of Burundi, and Mr. Amandin Rugira, President of the Legislative Assembly of Rwanda, withdrew.

STATEMENT BY MR. ERNEST GASSOU, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSIONER FOR RUANDA-URUNDI

50. Mr. GASSOU (United Nations Commissioner for Ruanda-Urundi) said that he wished to give his views on the results of the elections in Rwanda, those views being based on the conditions prevailing during the period before the elections. The General Assembly, in its resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1605 (XV), had stressed the importance of the pre-electoral atmosphere and had considered that the question of public freedoms was essential for all political parties if the people of Ruanda-Urundi were to be able to express their opinion freely. Yet in most of Rwanda it had not been possible for the legislative elections to take place "in an atmosphere of peace and harmony". In paragraph 256 *et seq.* of its report (A/4994 and Add.1

and Corr.1), the Commission had described serious disorders in several districts which had done considerable damage, had forced tens of thousands of refugees to leave and had caused the death of several dozen persons, almost all of whom had been active or passive supporters of the opposition parties. A detailed study of how those disorders had developed showed that they had always occurred in the same way and in areas where the opposition appeared to have great influence, that the burgomasters responsible for maintaining law and order in those areas had always been members of the parties in power and that the final result of the disorders had been the violent elimination of the opposition. With regard in particular to the burgomasters, he said that authority had declined to such an extent in Rwanda that it had been impossible to take effective disciplinary action against those who had interfered with the freedom of the public. The opposition parties had not had the same degree of freedom in their electoral campaigning as had the parties in power.

51. In the circumstances, it might well be asked whether the people of Rwanda had been able to make up their minds freely and in full knowledge of the facts. As stated in paragraph 465 of the report, the fact alone of providing for the physical exercise of the right to vote lost its real significance when the voter's will and freedom of choice were alienated by external and intrinsically corrupt forces. Indeed, in countries which had long been under colonial domination, the individual could only form his own opinions to the extent that he was able to benefit from the awakening of the collective awareness of the more advanced elements of his society. In a country which had neither a Press nor collective and objective information media, the freedom of action and propaganda of the political parties could alone enable him to become familiar with complex problems and was indispensable for his freedom of choice. The decisive factor in the formation of public opinion was the possibility open to enlightened leaders of the political parties to make their opinions known to the whole people. Once an external power prevented them from operating freely, or from reaching the public as a whole, it was a delusion to think that the majority of the individuals could express themselves freely. The victim of colonization who was thus shut off from that driving force which was the party, or from its leader, was apt to lose all confidence in it and often, despite himself, to obey the forces which oppressed him. The opinions which he expressed might be the complete opposite of his deepest desires.

52. Although the electoral laws and regulations in Rwanda had been very fair, and in spite of the good intentions of the Belgian Government and the higher levels of the Trusteeship Administration, a peaceful atmosphere and the equality of all political parties in the electoral contest were impossible to guarantee if the burgomasters, as the authorities responsible for carrying out the electoral rules and regulations at the local level, did not comply with the instructions of the higher authorities. The fact was that the people of Rwanda had been subjected day after day to the whims and constant pressure of the burgomasters. The opposition parties had repeatedly complained to the United Nations Commission of the arbitrary actions of burgomasters, but the Commission had been unable, under its terms of reference, to do anything except pass on such complaints to the Administering Authority.

53. He thought that in any objective appraisal of the results of the legislative elections and of the referendum on the question of the Mwami, the atmosphere in which they had been held must be taken into account. He also considered that a belief in United Nations supervision of elections did not necessarily imply that the results of those elections must be accepted regardless of the conditions in which they had been held or that, in other words, an attempt to justify them must be made at all costs. The General Assembly must be able to appraise those results by evaluating the relative importance of the various factors leading up to such popular consultations. The Commission had said clearly, in paragraph 447 of its report, that it would have been "naively optimistic to imagine that, given the narrow scope of the whole operation and the very limited time and particularly slender means contemplated in the General Assembly's resolutions, the situation in the Territory could be transformed to the point of bringing it into absolute conformity with the wishes expressed in those resolutions". The Commission had at the same time recognized that, except for the question of the Mwami, the Belgian Government's co-operation had enabled a satisfactory legal framework to be established, but, as to the question on the achievement of the "atmosphere of peace and harmony" and the creation of the requisite conditions for "normal, democratic political activity" referred to in paragraph 446, the Commission concluded in paragraph 451 that it could not reply affirmatively.

54. In the circumstances, he thought that there were three ways in which the United Nations could judge the results of the popular consultations in Rwanda. It could reject the results of the elections, but, unless the whole administrative infrastructure built up before and after the Gitarama coup d'état was changed and the local Administration was deprived of its political influence—a step that would mean the taking over of the Territory by the United Nations itself—it would be impossible for elections in Rwanda to be held under normal conditions. It could accept the results of the elections and grant independence on the basis of the institutions which had emerged from the elections. Such an attitude might be interpreted by the victims of the events as an endorsement of violence and might give rise to a new explosion of violence immediately after the achievement of independence. It could, as a third alternative, regard the results of the elections as a *de facto* situation but try, in co-operation with the Administering Authority and all interested parties in Rwanda, to find a solution which would improve the present situation, guarantee the freedom and security of all political groupings and ensure the protection of minorities. That would facilitate national reconciliation and the establishment of a Government and institutions having the necessary authority to plan for the future and to safeguard democracy in the country after it achieved independence.

55. The delicate problem of Rwanda weighed heavily upon the conscience of the international community, which could not shirk the problem by adopting facile solutions that in the long run would be likely to harm the people of the Trust Territory. The United Nations and the Administering Authority must shoulder their full responsibilities and summon up their wisdom and long-sightedness in order to bring the work to a successful conclusion.

56. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea), supported by Mr. NABAVI (Iran), thought that the statement which Mr. Gassou had made on his own behalf and, apparently, on behalf of the other member of the Commission, was especially important and should enable the Committee to extricate itself from its present impasse. He proposed that the statement should be reproduced in full and circulated as a Committee document.

It was so decided.^{1/}

57. Mr. RAHNEMA (United Nations Commissioner for Ruanda-Urundi) informed the Guinean representative that he would give his own interpretation of the facts at the following meeting.

58. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) agreed that Mr. Gassou's statement was important and raised difficult problems of conscience for all. He agreed with the Guinean representative that the Committee had come to an impasse which was becoming ever more pronounced.

59. According to Mr. Gassou, there were three possible ways in which the results of the elections in Rwanda could be judged. Two consisted of refusing to recognize the validity of the elections, and it seemed that Mr. Gassou would favour either one. He asked Mr. Gassou what, in that event, would be the situation in Burundi.

60. Mr. GASSOU (United Nations Commissioner for Ruanda-Urundi) pointed out that only his first proposed solution would involve a refusal to recognize the validity of the elections in Rwanda. The second possible solution would be to accept the results of the elections and to grant independence on that basis. The third would be to consider the results of those elections as an established fact and to take that situation as a point of departure.

61. Without wishing to state more precisely his own position, he could say that he would support any solution enabling the peoples of the Territory to protect themselves against future dangers. To recognize the results of the elections in Rwanda without taking any steps to improve the situation would be to condemn the people to an unenviable future. On the other hand, it would undoubtedly be difficult to begin the electoral operations all over again, unless the General Assembly decided otherwise; in that event, the Assembly must have the necessary means at its disposal to improve the local situation in every possible way. If the elections were held again under the same circumstances, the result would also be the same.

62. The third possible solution was related to the second: the General Assembly would take note of the actual results, while making every effort to improve a highly dangerous situation.

63. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) wished to return to a particular point in his question to which Mr. Gassou had not replied. If the General Assembly were indeed to adopt the third solution, what would happen to Burundi, where Mr. Gassou himself recognized that the elections had been carried out in an atmosphere of unquestionable legality and where, consequently, the political consequences of those elections must flow? He was somewhat disconcerted by the idea that the General Assembly, while wishing to maintain the unity of the Territory, might consider two different immediate solutions for the two regions concerned.

64. Mr. GASSOU (United Nations Commissioner for Ruanda-Urundi) said that the decision relating to Burundi would depend on the solution to be adopted by the General Assembly on the question of the political union of the Territory. The question would not arise if the Assembly decided to set up two separate States. On the other hand, if the Assembly decided that the Territory should remain united in independence, the question would have to be solved. He would refrain from prejudging the General Assembly's decision. The United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi had been instructed to provide the Assembly with all possible information on the elections in the Territory; it was not the responsibility of its members to propose a final solution.

65. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) asked Mr. Gassou, in the light of the question raised by the Belgian representative, whether the unrest in Rwanda would not exert a harmful influence on the situation in Burundi. In that case, would it not be in the interests of Burundi itself to have the situation in Rwanda restored to normal, whatever the solution to be adopted by the General Assembly on the political unity of the Territory?

66. Mr. GASSOU (United Nations Commissioner for Ruanda-Urundi) felt that disturbances occurring in any State necessarily had repercussions on its neighbours. At the 1263rd meeting, the Deputy Prime Minister of Burundi had himself spoken of the problem caused, for example, by refugees from Rwanda in Burundi. The representatives of Burundi should obviously state their views on that matter if they felt able to do so.

67. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) felt that Burundi might be wise to suspend certain of its projects and wait until the situation in Rwanda was restored to normal. Care should be taken to avoid any conflicts which would jeopardize the newly-won independence of the Territory, as had been the case in another country which had also been administered by Belgium.

68. Mr. HOOD (Australia) said it was difficult to see how the remainder of the discussion was to be organized. He feared that, in the absence of clear and immediate guidance, the Committee would spend a large part of the following week, during the hearing of petitioners, in discussing political theories. Of course, the Committee must be informed more fully of the situation in the Territory; but it must also know how the discussion could be concluded.

69. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that she had begun discussions with the President of the General Assembly concerning the probable duration of the debate. Before drawing up a precise time-table, she had preferred to wait until the Committee had before it all the requests for hearings from petitioners.

70. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) observed, in reply to the representative of Guinea, that there was no question and never had been any question of jeopardizing the independence of the Congo.

71. Echoing the remarks made by the Australian representative, he felt that, in order to avoid duplication, the Committee should make provision for the conclusion of the debate. As the Iranian representative had pointed out as early as the 1260th meeting, the Committee should first take a decision on the report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi. The situation would be entirely different depending on whether or not the Committee endorsed

^{1/} The complete text of the statement made by Mr. Gassou was circulated as document A/C.4/524.

the results of the elections for one or other region of the Territory. It seemed premature to question the details of a protocol which had never yet been completely explained, appeared sometimes to have been badly interpreted and perhaps would never be applied. The United Nations must certainly assess the results of its declared policy. The elections and referendum which were dealt with in the report under study (A/4994 and Add.1 and Corr.1) had taken place following a decision which the General Assembly had adopted unanimously, except for the vote of Belgium whose moral and material interests were very much at stake. He wondered whether that question should not be settled before the hearings.

72. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the Committee's usual policy was to have before it all the information possible, including that given by petitioners, before starting a debate. To study the report of the United Nations Commission without all the necessary facts might serve little purpose.

73. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) thought that in that case the opinion of the petitioners should be asked only concerning the elections; the question of elections should be kept separate from the question of the future of the Territory. It would indeed be very difficult to envisage the future of the Territory without having taken a decision about the elections.

74. Mr. ABDEL WAHAB (United Arab Republic) said that the question confronting the Committee was the future of the Territory and the report of the United Nations Commission taken together; there was no point in treating it as two separate questions.

75. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) said that the General Assembly resolutions under which the Committee was studying the question were concerned not solely with the elections but with several other points, particularly the political unity of the Territory. In spite of their importance, the elections were only one element in the discussion. The petitioners were therefore entitled to speak of all the aspects of the problem at the next meeting.

76. Sir Hugh FOOT (United Kingdom) said that he realized the concern of the Belgian representative but thought it was impossible to start the discussion on the Commission's report before having heard the petitioners. The procedure was slow because questions addressed to petitioners and their replies had been accompanied by many statements of principle. Members of the Committee should surely try to keep such statements for the general debate later.

REQUESTS FOR HEARINGS (continued)

77. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to the requests for hearings which were reproduced in documents A/C.4/522 and A/C.4/522/Add.1. If there were no objections, the requests for hearings by Mr. François Rukeba, on behalf of the Union nationale rwandaise (UNAR), Mr. Valentin Bankumuhari, on behalf of the Union et progrès national (UPRONA), and Mr. Mushatsi-Kareba, on behalf of the Rassemblement populaire africain, would be granted.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.