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MEETING**

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Chairman: Mr. Adnan M. PACHACHI (Iraq).

Requests for hearings (continued)

REQUESTS CONCERNING AGENDA ITEM 13 (REPORT OF THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL) (A/C.4/445/ADD.2) (continued)*

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that a request for a hearing in connexion with agenda item 13 had been received from Mr. Ndeh Ntumazah, who wished to speak in particular about the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration. As the time was short, he suggested that the Committee might wish to dispense with the usual procedure whereby such requests were distributed as documents before a decision was taken on them.

It was so decided.

2. The CHAIRMAN read out the telegram from Mr. Ntumazah. If there was no objection, Mr. Ntumazah's request for a hearing^{1/} would be granted.

It was so decided.

REQUESTS CONCERNING AGENDA ITEM 45 (QUESTION OF THE FUTURE OF RUANDA-URUNDI) (A/C.4/444/ADD.10) (continued)**

3. The CHAIRMAN said that a cable had been received from Mr. Mushatsi-Kareba requesting a hearing for himself and two other representatives of the Unité et progrès national (UPRONA) of Urundi and asking that the Committee should postpone its discussion on Ruanda-Urundi until their arrival. As the time was short, the Committee might wish to dispense with the usual procedure whereby requests for hearings were distributed as documents before a decision was taken on them.

It was so decided.

*Resumed from the 1012th meeting.

**Resumed from the 1064th meeting.

^{1/} Subsequently distributed as document A/C.4/445/Add.2.

4. The CHAIRMAN read out the cable from Mr. Mushatsi-Kareba^{2/} and suggested that if there were no objections, the request should be granted.

It was so decided

5. The CHAIRMAN, acting on a proposal by Mr. RASGOTRA (India), requested the Secretariat to invite the petitioners to travel to New York as soon as possible, the Committee being unable to interrupt its work.

Organization of work

6. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) noted that the Committee had to settle several urgent questions before Christmas. He therefore proposed that the Committee should sit while the General Assembly was considering agenda item 87, concerning colonialism.

7. Mr. Najmuddine RIFAI (United Arab Republic) seconded that proposal.

The proposal of the United Kingdom representative was adopted.

AGENDA ITEM 45

Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi (A/4404, part I, chap. VI, sect. G and part II, chap. II; A/C.4/455-457) (continued)

HEARING OF PETITIONERS (continued)

8. The CHAIRMAN said that fifteen of the twenty petitioners who had asked to speak on the future of Ruanda-Urundi were in New York. He hoped that they could make their statements as soon as the Committee was ready to hear them, as otherwise it was possible that they might lose their right to speak.

9. Mr. VITELLI (Italy) wondered whether it might not be preferable for each political group which had sent petitioners to have its views made known by one of its representatives only.

10. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) objected to that course, which would be tantamount to limiting the petitioners' right to a hearing.

11. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee would hear the petitioners to whom, individually, it had granted hearings. It was for them to decide how they would present their views.

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Aloys Munyangaju, representative of the Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse (APROSOMA), Mr. Jean Birihanyuna, Mr. Joseph Biroli, Mr. Pierre Burarame and Mr. Pascal Mbuziyonja, representatives of the Front commun. Mr. Anastase Makuza, representative of the Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation

^{2/} Subsequently distributed as document A/C.4/444/Add.10.

hutu (PARMEHUTU), Mr. Prosper Bwanakweri, representative of the Rassemblement démocratique ruandais (RADER), Mr. Michel Kayihura, Mr. Barnabas Nkikabahizi, Mr. Cosmos Rebero, Mr. Joseph Rutsindintwarane and Mr. Michel Rwaagasana, representatives of the Union nationale ruandaise (UNAR), and Mr. Alexandre Rutera took places at the Committee table.

12. Mr. MAKUZA (Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu) said that his party wished to see the Bantu people freed forthwith from the dual colonialism imposed upon it by history: feudal imperialism and European trusteeship. The liberators of Africa, who were accustomed to struggling only against European colonialism and were not very well informed about the true situation in Ruanda, were liable to take up what would in fact be a colonialist position. Ruanda had 2,350,000 inhabitants, 2 million of whom were Hutu (Bantus), 300,000 Tutsi (Hamites) and 50,000 Twa (pygmies), representing respectively 85 per cent, 14 per cent and 1 per cent of the total population. The Tutsi minority had invaded the country around the sixteenth century, establishing a feudal system which ensured its supremacy and placed the Bantu majority under serfdom. That entire feudal structure was based on a theocratic monarchy, the Mwami—an absolute monarch who was considered to hold a divine right—being able to dispose of the life and property of all his subjects, who enjoyed no right of appeal. His emblem was the so-called Kalinga, or royal drum—a symbol of fear and humiliation for the enslaved Bantu—which was guarded by the Council of the Abiru, custodians of feudal traditions and occult source of the Mwami's colonial policy. If that triple myth were perpetuated, the Bantu people would undoubtedly suffer the fate of its ancestors. The Ruandese feudal front held to that myth, and was thus imitating all the colonial Powers which sought to preserve their flags and their high commissioners.

13. By adopting a system of indirect government, the German Government and then the Belgian Government had taken advantage of that feudal structure because it made it easy for them, in their turn, to rule the country. The colonial Powers had bought the Bantus by making a tacit compact with the feudal authorities. On the eve of the revolution of November 1959, the feudal oligarchy had been mercilessly exploiting the working people, who were compelled to do servile unpaid work and were subject to numerous exactions, as emphasized in the reports of the United Nations visiting missions and of the Administering Authority. The Tutsi had enjoyed the monopoly of representation in the General Council of Ruanda-Urundi (which included only one Bantu) and in the High Council of Ruanda (in which only one Bantu held a seat), as well as in the higher administration of the State, which consisted of a Tutsi Mwami assisted by a purely Tutsi secret council and forty-five provincial chiefs, all of whom were Tutsi. They enjoyed an equally powerful monopoly in the judiciary and in education. Despite the over-population of the Territory, the Tutsi oligarchy held all the agricultural and pastoral land, and the land occupied by the Bantu peasants was subject to a grazing right which allowed the Tutsi to ravage it. Finally the Tutsi enjoyed full civil and social rights, because an unwritten feudal custom allowed the customary judicial and administrative authorities to legalize social injustices and abuses of power committed at the expense of the Bantus.

14. What he attacked was not the Tutsi race as such, but the discrimination which inevitably resulted from the alliance between the feudalists and the European colonialists. What particularly shocked him was the fact that the Tutsi representatives refused to recognize the problem created by their theory of the innate superiority of their race. In order to appreciate the revolting nature of that monopoly, it should be borne in mind that the Tutsi represented only 14 per cent of the population. That had been the basic cause of the Ruandese revolution of November 1959, which had been set off by social injustice just as glaring as that against which other African colonies were protesting. If the end of European colonialism were to mean the maintenance in slavery of 85 per cent of the Territory's population, it would be to the eternal shame of Africa and of all the free peoples which had undertaken to see all the inhabitants of Ruanda freed.

15. The Belgian Administration had no doubt been guilty of complicity with the feudal administration, but it was at least to its credit that it had abolished the discretionary right of life and death which feudal tradition had given to the Mwami and his deputies. Under popular pressure, which had become irresistible since the publication in 1957 of the "Manifesto of the Bahutu" (T/1346, annex I), demanding equal rights for the various races of Ruanda, the Belgian Administration had broken its compact and, in the Government statement of 10 November 1959 (T/1502), had provided for a form of democracy which would prepare the country for national independence. As early as 1957, seeing this awakening of the Hutu people, the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1957, had asked itself whether the Bami^{2/} would be able to transform their régime rapidly into a constitutional monarchy and whether the aristocrats would be wise enough to yield to the march of events before it was too late. It was now clear that they had preferred to deny the existence of the problem, in order not to have to solve it. Their aim had been to deceive international opinion and to make African nationalism serve their imperialist goals, in order to achieve a national independence from which they alone would profit. They had therefore set themselves up as progressives, while at the same time instructing their partisans to launch a campaign of terror, lying and violence—a campaign designed to bring the entire Bantu population, willingly or under compulsion, into the Union nationale ruandaise (UNAR), their single party. From 13 September to 2 November 1959, acts of violence, threats of death, atrocities and plunderings had multiplied. Tiring of constant submission, the Bantu people had replied with an explosion of rage which had rapidly become a regular rising, and it had thrown out the feudal authorities. The Mwami had then launched punitive expeditions which had committed vandalism, pillage, arson and genocide; the leaders of the Bantu opposition had been arrested, assassinated and even, sometimes, tortured in the residence of the Mwami himself. Only the intervention of the Public Force ("Force publique") of the Congo, to which he wished to pay a formal tribute, had stopped the civil war. It was then that certain members of UNAR had fled in order to escape prosecution, while proclaiming themselves to be martyrs for independence.

16. Even when forced to retaliate, however, the Hutu people had never sought the lives of the Tutsi; there

^{2/} "Bami" is the plural form of the word "Mwami".

had been bloodshed only on the rare occasions when the feudalists had resorted to violence rather than to flight or submission. The Tutsi had claimed that the Bantu leaders had organized the uprising. The court records proved the falsity of such an accusation. It might be asked why the political leaders should have attacked the puppets of the system and not the puppet-masters, namely the leaders of UNAR, the Mwami and his council. The fact was that the rising had been a general movement on the part of the masses, who, exasperated by provocation and outrage, had struck blindly at those who were locally responsible for social injustices.

17. The feudal repression, on the other hand, had been accompanied by bloodshed on a large scale. It had operated consistently through armed bands, coming from a great distance and obeying precise instructions incorporated in a plan drawn up at the UNAR headquarters, which was installed in the Mwami's palace itself. That party could not pretend that it was struggling against Belgian colonialism and not against the movement for Bantu emancipation, since its acts of violence had been perpetrated against the Bantu and not against the Europeans.

18. Compelled to learn from events, the Belgian Administration had appointed the first Hutu chiefs and sub-chiefs to replace the feudal authorities that had been expelled by the population subject to them, or forced to take refuge abroad on account of the riots and murders which they had instigated. The recent communal elections had confirmed the appointments of the interim authorities. PARMEHUTU and APRO-SOMA had received some 85 per cent of the votes. RADER having shown itself less progressive than they had believed, the truly democratic Tutsi had joined APROSOMA and PARMEHUTU; some of them had been elected communal councillors on PARMEHUTU lists. It was therefore wrong to accuse the Hutu of racialism. The Hutu were opposed not to the Tutsi, but to the feudalism which they patronized—without, it was true, having created it—just as the Tutsi opposed, not the Hutu, but the emancipation which the latter demanded.

19. After the revolution, the Belgian authorities had not proscribed UNAR or interfered with the Mwami, although both had been directly involved. While the Mwami and his party took refuge in a systematically negative and obstructive attitude, their emissaries continued to stir up the people, thus provoking sporadic disturbances. They propagated false and alarmist rumours, to which the exasperated population replied with measures of reprisal. Their object was to show that the new Bantu authorities were incapable of maintaining order and restoring peace—in the vain hope of securing, from the international Organization, the restoration of the previous régime. He could not believe that the United Nations, the guardian of peace and freedom, would be a party to such a Machiavellian scheme.

20. He then explained the position of his party, PARMEHUTU, with regard to the main political problems currently facing Ruanda. The first problem was that of the Mwami. The democratic republican parties, and the immense majority of the people, demanded the immediate deposition of Mwami Kigeli V, in the first place because only a republican régime could guarantee the unity of the Ruandese people. In a feudal and multiracial society, the existence of

a hereditary monarchy stemming from one of the rival races could only perpetuate its position of domination. Such a leader, who was not exposed to the constant possibility of popular pressure, could only favour his own race and thus jeopardize the unity of the people. That was indeed the case with Kigeli V, who was the prisoner of his own group and was interested in his country's supreme good only in so far as it was identified with the privileges of his caste and family. A similar leader belonging to another race would probably act in the same way. PARMEHUTU therefore strongly opposed the substitution of a Hutu monarchy for the Tutsi monarchy, and demanded a democracy affording each race the opportunity of giving to the country a leader chosen by reason, not of his birth, but of his merits and personal qualifications.

21. Secondly, only a republican régime could bring about unity between Ruanda and Urundi. The question of Ruanda-Urundi would not have arisen if the narrow regionalism of the two States ("pays") had not been prolonged by the existence of two rival monarchies. The achievement of unity between the two regions in a unitary or federal form demanded a republican system whose principle organs would be, for example, a federal parliament and a federal president—the latter to be from Ruanda and from Urundi alternately, to be elected by the two regional parliaments, and to be assisted by a vice-president elected in the same manner and originating from the other region.

22. PARMEHUTU was also opposed to the Mwami because he was an unlawful sovereign. Abbé Kagame, Secretary to the Council of the Abiru, had stated that, if the reigning Mwami died childless, the customary rule strictly excluded collateral succession to the throne. Kigeli V had been placed in power through a "coup d'état"—whereas custom demanded another solution, such as popular election.

23. Furthermore, the Mwami had been the person mainly responsible for the murders of November 1959. The Ruandese people asked that he should be brought to trial, so that it might be shown whether he was or was not guilty. A wealth of damning evidence, and the confessions even of his immediate "entourage", showed that the Mwami was responsible for numerous crimes. Of those crimes Mr. Makuza cited several. It was the Mwami in person who had instructed several chiefs to murder their adversaries or to use Twa commandos for expeditions of pillage and arson. Public opinion could not understand why those who had executed his orders should be proceeded against, while the person principally responsible remained unpunished. The people could not see why Belgium opposed the trial of the Mwami. Was Western justice meant to operate against the humble and not against the mighty?

24. The final and, in his opinion, the most cogent reason why PARMEHUTU requested the deposition of the Mwami was that the latter had refused to cooperate in the pacification of the country. At Kigali, on 23 and 24 March, a conference had been held which would have given him the opportunity to redeem himself, since it had considered measures for placing the Mwami above parties: the creation of a cabinet of four advisers chosen or proposed by each of the four main parties; the establishment of rules of protocol for the Mwami's Court; the establishment of the Mwami at Kigali; recognition by the Mwami of the interim authorities; neutralization of the monarchy, on the

model of constitutional monarchies; approval by the Mwami, after a normal period of time, of instruments prepared by the Council; and finally, the abolition of the Kalinga and of the Council of the Abiru. The Mwami had not agreed to be established at Kigali, and had categorically rejected all the other proposals—refusals which had brought three out of the four parties represented at the conference to make a final break with Kigeli V, a decision upon which PARMEHUTU did not intend to go back. The imperative solution was the removal of the man who was continuing to divide the various groups.

25. Of the great problems facing Ruanda-Urundi, he would discuss, secondly, that of independence. PARMEHUTU desired true, complete and balanced independence, to be achieved by peaceful means; it should also be organized independence, capable of freeing the country from the double colonialism of feudalism and European tutelage. That independence called for three steps: the immediate and unconditional abolition of the threefold obscurantist myth symbolized by the Mwami, the Kalinga and the Abiru; the establishment of a parliament, a government and a president of the republic, all three popularly elected; and the placing of sovereignty in the hands of those three national organs. He considered that for that purpose indirect legislative elections should be organized in the immediate future. PARMEHUTU was not in principle opposed to direct suffrage, but simply feared that the electoral campaign which such a system would demand might revive restiveness in the country and provoke another popular explosion. It was desirable, at any rate, that such elections should take place under the supervision of United Nations observers. Moreover, the future parliament, meeting as a constituent assembly, should draw up a Ruandese constitution, lest the country should soon find itself in an impasse even more serious than that in the Congo. Finally, before the country acceded to independence, a bipartite conference should be held—at which the Belgians and the elected representatives of the country would be represented, and which United Nations observers would also attend—to settle the time and procedures for the ending of the trusteeship, as well as the status of the community of Ruanda-Urundi.

26. Thirdly, there was the problem of the revocation of the Belgian trusteeship. The country still had no "force publique"—a grave shortcoming which the Administering Authority had a duty to remedy as soon as possible. He opposed the proposals of the Mwami and his minority party, who demanded the immediate revocation of Belgium's trusteeship; if the Belgians had taken forty years to discover the essence of the problem and to make a few concessions to the oppressed Bantu masses, it was to be feared that another Administering Authority, whose inexperience the Mwami would doubtless put to his advantage, would find itself paralysed from the start, all the more since nothing proved that its action would be more effective than that of Belgium; it was also to be feared that the various States to which the administration of the Territory might be entrusted would become involved in an ideological conflict with each other, whereby the solution of the problem would be delayed; and finally, he felt that the country would gain nothing by changing its Administering Authority for a few months.

27. The fourth question facing the country was that of pacification. He wished to make it clear that the

sporadic disturbances still plaguing the country always arose from provocation by the feudal group, which aroused a savage reaction on the part of the population. That reaction of the masses was often excessive, but it was the provocation which must be made to disappear. A military intervention could only limit the effects without eliminating the cause, and the disturbances would remain endemic. Independence, perhaps, would be the key to the desired pacification, but if it were granted before the disappearance of the fundamental cause of the disturbances, there would be danger of an explosion so violent as to lead, possibly, to the extermination of the Tutsi minority. Events in the Congo had shown that independence alone could not settle domestic conflicts. Thus, the only cure was to eliminate the sources of provocation, in other words, to induce the feudal clan to renounce that policy of provocation by the removal of the Mwami Kigeli V. Only in those circumstances would the feudal group agree to lay down their arms. In Ruanda the very name of Kigeli meant "King of War", and it would be an illusion to attempt to pacify the country under the rule of a Mwami bearing such a name.

28. The fifth problem was that of national reconciliation; and that, indeed, was the principal problem. There were two parties to be reconciled: on the one hand, the Front démocratique républicain, which included the Hutu and Tutsi adversaries of the feudal régime who were grouped in the majority parties, PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA; between those Hutu and Tutsi, the reconciliation problem did not even arise. On the other hand, there was the Front féodal monarchiste, represented by the predominantly Tutsi minority parties, namely UNAR and its satellites. To reconcile those two antagonistic groups, it would not be enough to abolish the Belgian domination unless the feudal domination, too, was abolished. If it had been true that in Ruanda the Hutu-Tutsi conflict had been the work only of the Belgian colonial Administration, and not of the feudal system of Ruanda, the question might be asked why that same Administration had not created the same conflict in Urundi, where the same races existed. A "rapprochement" was possible, but only within the framework of a policy of understanding and mutual concessions. In that connexion, the Front féodal included partisans of two clearly marked groups. The members of the first group, the moderates, had clearly realized that racial supremacy was outdated, while those of the second group, the extremists, dreamed of restoring their former power. Reconciliation seemed impossible with the supporters of that second group of feudalists unless they modified their extremism and showed a desire to reach a "rapprochement", to which PARMEHUTU would gladly respond. PARMEHUTU earnestly desired a frank discussion with the feudal elements of the first group, provided they ceased to obey instructions from abroad. It was certain that if they had not been coerced by parties outside the country, they would have participated in greater numbers in the communal elections and would have agreed to sit in the present assembly and the Provisional Government. Had not instructions from abroad continued to keep alive the campaign of agitation and forced the UNAR representatives to withdraw from the Provisional Special Council and refuse to participate in the Brussels conference, the hoped-for reconciliation might already have been a reality. It was wrong to believe that the Hutu had a grudge against the Tutsi.

If the Tutsi would bow to the laws of democracy, the basis of an agreement would be found.

29. The sixth problem was that of the communal elections. The feudal coalition demanded that the communal elections of June–July 1960 be set aside. On behalf of PARMEHUTU, he flatly rejected those claims. UNAR had in fact participated in those elections, although claiming not to have done so, and had presented lists of candidates at all the polling stations where it had thought it had acquired support, without ever withdrawing those lists. PARMEHUTU had received 75 per cent of the votes cast, while UNAR had received only 1.7 per cent of the votes. However had UNAR might have advocated abstention in some communes and participation in the voting in others, the average participation for all Ruanda had reached 78.21 per cent of the registered voters, an unprecedented figure. UNAR had claimed that the people had voted under threats and coercion, which was likewise false. UNAR had also claimed that the electoral body had voted for PARMEHUTU because PARMEHUTU scribes had been forced upon illiterate voters, which was also an unfounded statement. In any case, UNAR now realized that it could count only on the uncast votes, in other words on only 22 per cent of the electorate. It should also be borne in mind that the representatives of all the parties that claimed to be victims of dishonest manoeuvres had attended the voting operations and the count and had been unable to report any irregularity, since they had made no protests to the appeal and electoral supervisory commissions. The report of the Belgian electoral supervisory commission, established at the Trusteeship Council's request, further confirmed the regularity of the operations. PARMEHUTU would have preferred to see United Nations observers also on the spot, but their presence was not within its control. From that study of the facts, he concluded that there could be no question of having new communal elections before the expiration of the term of the elected candidates. If the trusteeship authorities decided otherwise, PARMEHUTU would order a general abstention: 85 per cent of the voters would abstain, therefore, at the time of the consultation.

30. The seventh problem was that of the general amnesty called for by the feudal party. Such an amnesty would be regarded by the masses as a reward for crime and might provoke a civil war, with each person thinking he could with impunity rid himself of his political adversaries by violence. The people would never understand an assassin being released before he had served his sentence. A partial and gradual amnesty, on the other hand, might take place without causing disturbances.

31. The last of the great problems confronting the country was that of the refugees and persons living in assigned residence. A distinction ought to be made among them between criminals under the general law who had fled abroad and all the other persons who had been expelled or had left voluntarily for various reasons. With regard to those in the first category, PARMEHUTU would not accept their restoration to civic rights until they had really proved that they wished to come to terms with the representatives of the people; as to those in the second group, PARMEHUTU desired their immediate resettlement, provided that they renounced all provocation and agitation. When the Provisional Government had been formed, a Ministry of Refugees, under the direction of

a Tutsi Minister, had been established specifically with a view to bringing about that resettlement. A similar measure could be taken with regard to persons living in assigned residence.

32. In conclusion, he adjured the liberators of Africa to uphold the legitimate claims of the authentic representatives of the Ruandese people. The Bantu leaders of Ruanda were fighting for the liberation of their people from both foreign domination and the traditional feudal régime, which was resorting to terror and bloodshed. He protested against the slanders uttered by the black feudal group, who were accusing the Bantu leaders of having sold out to the whites, and asked what other colonialists were financing the propaganda campaigns of the November criminals who had fled abroad. He warned the United Nations against all attempts to deceive the Organization and asked it to send observers to the country; they would themselves draw the necessary conclusions and would feel bound to recommend, as PARMEHUTU had done, the establishment of a republican system in Ruanda-Urundi.

33. Mr. RUTERA, speaking as a priest who had left Ruanda at the beginning of the events of November 1959, denounced the machinations of the Belgian Administration, which he deemed incompatible with the aims of the Trusteeship System. In that connexion, he read a letter addressed in June 1960 by the Abbé Kagame to Mr. de Schryver, then Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. The author of that letter considered only the moral issues—and not the political ones—involved in the problem created by the organization, in the present circumstances, of the communal elections in Ruanda. He brought up in that connexion the electoral tactics of APROSOMA and PARMEHUTU, whose members did not balk at setting fire to the homes and property of their political opponents, who had subsequently been deported as "undesirables" by an accomplice Administration. No publicity had been given to those sinister events, which constituted a genuine scandal to any Christian mind, for it was imperative that the elections take place regardless of circumstances and despite the confusion prevailing in a country plunged into anarchy. When, on the other hand, UNAR had publicly and categorically declared that the elections had been "fixed" and designed merely to hoodwink international opinion, the Administration had not even bothered to reply to that accusation. Yet a decree of December 1959 had declared persons placed in assigned residence to be ineligible: that decree had been an electoral weapon favouring the so-called Government parties, for it had removed from the scene the innumerable leaders and activists of a party considered to be opposed to the Administration by confining them at Kigali or elsewhere, or by restricting them to their homes. Apart from the fact that those measures were arbitrary and had been taken in a spirit of vengeance, their result had been to drive whole families to ruin and misery. The Administration, far from availing itself of the elections as a means of uniting Europeans and Africans, had made the additional error of discriminating among the localities inhabited by whites and those inhabited by Africans, the districts having been delimited so as to favour the European and Asian sectors and to spare the whites the humiliation of sitting with the Africans in a single communal council.

34. The author of the letter went on to denounce the Administration's policy, which had systematically de-

stroyed—at the orders of the Minister himself—the very structure and concept of authority by rescinding judicial decisions or by modifying court procedure. Since then, no one could place any credence in an Administration which spoke of free elections and yet used violence, and which stressed the necessity for national reconciliation and yet busied itself in creating internal strife. Following the conference held at Brussels, the Belgian Government had announced that Mwami Kigeli V would not be removed from office; but it allowed him to be publicly insulted without giving him the opportunity to defend himself; it also imposed on him a Provisional Special Council, expressly composed of opponents of the monarchy, and reproached him with not collaborating with that Council. In addition, even while stating that it acknowledged his legitimate authority, it was giving active support to an opposing leader, who proclaimed himself the Mwami of the Hutu. Abbé Kagame accordingly concluded that the Administration, by not respecting the agreement reached with the United Nations Visiting Mission and by proceeding in such manner, was following a desperate plan mindless of the morality of its methods.

35. Whatever the judgement of history might be, the author of the letter he had read hoped only for the speedy independence of Ruanda in an atmosphere of better relations with Belgium. It was therefore up to Belgium, and Belgium alone, to pacify Ruanda by legal and honourable methods. It could do so if it wished.

36. He next took up the question of the refugees, who to the number of some 100,000 had been expelled, under unjustifiable conditions, from their homes and taken to camps where they were prey to misery and disease. He was requesting United Nations intervention on their behalf, for a human problem was involved, the solution of which required immediate measures to ensure the subsistence and improve the health and sanitary conditions of the refugees and provide for their re-classification and compensation. The Belgian Administration, which bore the responsibility for that state of things, could no longer merit the trust of the United Nations: having failed to achieve the fundamental purposes of the Trusteeship System and violated the provisions of Article 76 b and c of the Charter, it could no longer retain the trusteeship of Ruanda-Urundi. He therefore urged the United Nations to take the fate of the indigenous population in hand, so that peace and harmony, the only safeguards of a beneficent independence, might prevail in the Territory.

37. Mr. MUNYANGAJU (Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse) thanked the Committee for giving him a hearing, and emphasized that the presence of numerous representatives of the political parties in Ruanda-Urundi showed the immense moral standing which the United Nations enjoyed among the peoples of the Territory.

38. He said that it was not his desire to transform the Ruandese dispute, which was an internal political one, into a dispute between Belgium and Ruanda. Such problems as the form of government, pacification or reconciliation and the resettlement of refugees could be solved only by the Ruandese themselves. They must in no circumstances be internationalized.

39. He made a brief survey of the country's situation. The Belgian Administration had long put up with the Territory's feudal structure, which enabled it to govern

with ease: thus it had concluded a tacit agreement with the feudal Tutsi guaranteeing them local power, in return for which those feudalists allowed the Belgians to prolong their trusteeship. Thus shielded by the colonial Authority, the Tutsi had exploited the mass of the Bantu population, had secured all the positions in local administration and in the indigenous courts, and had obtained a monopoly of access to secondary and higher education. The Hutu manifesto of 1957 had come as a surprise to the colonial Administration, which until then had been content to improve the material well-being of the masses and had deliberately neglected their political emancipation. The manifesto had for the first time condemned the injustices inherent in the feudal régime, and had called for equal rights as between the Territory's various ethnic groups. The Tutsi in power had not taken that warning seriously, and had simply denied that any problem existed. Yet, with the events of November 1959 and the succeeding months, their feudal régime was to collapse at the behest of the country's tolling masses, tired of exploitation by dual colonialism.

40. Claims that the struggle between the Hutu and the Tutsi was merely a manifestation of tribal hatred only betrayed ignorance of the facts. The Ruandese constituted a single people; their language, culture and government were the same. Actually the Hutu, far from holding a grudge against the Tutsi, were only protesting against a régime of abuse and exploitation; the Tutsi, for their part, bore the Hutu no ill-will because of the fact that they were Hutu, but because of the Hutu liberation movement which, by freeing the former slaves, destroyed a system of privileges from which the entire Tutsi group had profited. The true explanation for the civil war in Ruanda was that, on the one side, there was a desire to break with a political and social order of inequality and with economic exploitation by those who were economically strong, and, on the other side, the scarcely concealed desire to maintain the old privileges. The underlying reason for the revolt remained the desire to be freed from an age-old feudalism and to secure by force the dignity of the despised class of toilers.

41. With regard to the recent communal elections organized by the Belgian Administration in Ruanda, he recalled their results: 78.21 per cent of the registered voters had taken part in the voting, and the popular emancipation parties had won an indisputable victory. From those elections had emanated the communal institutions, which were already functioning, to the great satisfaction of the Ruandese people. Thus the Belgian Government had responded to the population's deep wish to see the communes administered by representatives who had the people's confidence. A genuine advance had been made towards the objective set by the United Nations: an independence resting on the basis of universal suffrage and of institutions accepted beforehand by the inhabitants of the Territory.

42. Certain parties had sent numerous petitions to the United Nations, claiming that those communal elections had been gerrymandered. There again, it was the former feudal lords who feared that genuine equality between the Tutsi and the Hutu would bring about the ruin of the Tutsi supremacy. He said that his party opposed the quashing of the communal elections, although it had obtained only 233 out of the 3,125 seats available. That defeat was, in fact, a normal occurrence in truly democratic and free elections;

it simply meant that other parties had been able to offer a more concrete programme, better suited to the deep aspirations of the masses. Those who claimed that the elections had been gerrymandered, and called for their quashing, were the same people who were trying to sow disorder and anarchy in Africa. The Hutu people refused to turn backward; the partisans of the feudal régime must realize that.

43. The African countries which supported UNAR were deluding themselves if they thought that in doing so they were fighting colonialism; they were only supporting the feudal exploiters; that could be easily verified by sending to Ruanda-Urundi observers who would study the situation and could readily convince themselves of the justice of the Hutu cause.

44. Now that the communal elections had taken place, the people of Ruanda-Urundi wanted legislative elections which would enable it to choose its national representatives. Wishing once more to ensure the impartiality and complete freedom of those elections, Belgium had asked that United Nations observers be sent. He hoped that all the political parties would be able to conduct their electoral campaign as freely as they desired. But if some of them continued to think that the only way of securing the voters' support was to indulge in acts of terrorism, intimidation and provocation, it was almost certain that the legislative elections, far from allowing the losers to play a constructive role in public life, would mark their complete eclipse for a long time. All the parties, therefore, should reach agreement beforehand in determining a certain line of conduct; but he doubted whether all were prepared to make the effort which that would require.

45. The question of the Mwami was the most serious problem of the day. Mwami Kigeli V had been brought to power by a "coup d'état", and was the creature of those who had supported him. He was the prisoner of an "entourage" which never left his side, and had given himself heart and soul to UNAR. But the Belgian Administration had not dared to tell the whole truth about the Mwami's actions, although he had been directly criticized by public opinion and had been named in the statements of certain prisoners accused of murders and tortures committed during the incidents of November 1959. The Belgian Administration had merely tried to persuade Kigeli to revert to his position as a constitutional ruler; but its efforts had been vain. The Mwami had refused all offers of co-operation made to him by the political parties and the Provisional Special Council, and as a result the three main political parties in the country had broken with him. Kigeli had chosen to go abroad to live, to pass himself off as a martyr for independence and a victim of colonialism, and to woo the sympathy of States Members of the United Nations. Do what he might, Kigeli had forfeited the confidence of his people, which he had chosen to desert at the most critical period in its history. But true enemies of colonialism would soon realize that the intrigues of Kigeli and his "entourage" were merely the traditional stratagems of a feudal aristocracy which for centuries had been in the habit of double-dealing.

46. The question of the office of the Mwami as an institution was one for the elected representatives of tomorrow, met together in a constituent assembly, to decide. Only the inhabitants of a country had the right to say what form of government they wanted at

a given period in their history and in the given circumstances.

47. There were some, however, who maintained that the matter should be decided by referendum. Although not in principle opposed to a referendum, APROSOMA feared that its result would be invalidated by the people's ignorance of the very subject on which they would be consulted, coupled with the many difficulties involved in organizing another electoral campaign. Moreover, it was by no means certain that the population at large would be more clear-sighted than an assembly of forty-four men well acquainted with the many ways of administering public affairs.

48. The question of an amnesty and of national reconciliation and the return of refugees was being considered by UNAR, and had also been the subject of a definite recommendation by the Trusteeship Council at its twenty-sixth session.^{4/} APROSOMA, for its part, believed that all prison sentences for political offences should be immediately rescinded; but it would never agree to an amnesty for criminal offences which had been committed during the November troubles; that would be a denial of justice. Belgium was in Ruanda-Urundi to maintain order and to protect the lives of individuals. If all the killers of November and the following months were released, the people would take the law into its own hands. The prisoners were the first to fear such an eventuality; an amnesty was certainly not the solution which would be most to their liking.

49. It was in vain, therefore, to look to an amnesty as a step towards reconciliation. In any case, even if such an amnesty were possible, the political agitators of UNAR—who claimed, as proof of their victory, that the United Nations was going to come and liberate all the Tutsi, massacre all the Hutu leaders, and reinstall Kigeli on the throne of Ruanda—had made the idea so detestable that it was universally rejected.

50. The same applied to the resettlement of refugees. The fate of the refugees was of great concern to the country, and for that reason, there was a Ministry of Refugees in the new Provisional Government. But the problem was very complicated. For some time, irresponsible persons had been inciting Tutsi families to join Kigeli in the Congo, where, they asserted, UNAR intended to train guerillas, who, when the time was ripe, would descend on the country to spread terror and anarchy. The refugees were being encouraged to stay out of the Territory, so as to provide pawns for UNAR and its supporters. That was Machiavellian, but there were people who cared little for the life and liberty of others, and to whom their own interests were paramount. Such people were unforgivable.

51. It was those very people, however, who were demanding an unconditional amnesty, the annulment of the local elections and, consequently, the removal of all regional authorities, the departure of Belgian troops and immediate independence. They wanted Kigeli and his "entourage" to return. In short, they refused to make any concession, and the only word they knew was "unconditional". Were those the people with whom to discuss reconciliation? For the question of independence was not one which could be resolved overnight. It was obvious that the current idea of independence, namely, the absence of political de-

^{4/} See A/4404, p. 67.

pendence or subordination, was actually a purely negative one. If a country was to be really independent, it must, above all, be free to make its own decisions, and must not be limited in its jurisdiction by any foreign Power. It followed that true independence required some preparation, even if it was only the adoption of a basic law and the setting up of a first purely indigenous government. APROSOMA wanted real independence, which would enable the people to live in liberty, not under oppression. For that reason, there should be legislative elections as soon as possible, so that the representatives elected could decide what form of government and institutions should be adopted, and work out a time-table for the transfer of powers.

52. The Belgian Minister for African Affairs had been accused in the Fourth Committee of dividing Ruanda-Urundi. APROSOMA, and many other parties, wished to affirm that Ruanda-Urundi would remain united, but in whatever form which it pleased the two contracting parties to adopt. The reason why the union of Ruanda and Urundi was still in doubt was that despite the efforts of the United Nations and the Belgian Administration the two Bami had always refused to hold out the hand of friendship to each other. The two peoples wanted unity, but, there again, the solution depended on the abolition of the feudal system.

53. With regard to the economic development of the Territory, it was true that in spite of the interest-free loans which the Belgian Treasury had granted Ruanda-Urundi to finance its ordinary and its special budget, the standard of living of the people was still extremely low. In addition, a population increase amounting to 3.2 per cent per year was already giving rise to the serious problem of the race between population and subsistence. As for the charge made against the Belgians that they had unscrupulously exploited the country, the economic mission which would be going to Ruanda-Urundi would be in a position to judge whether there was any foundation for that assertion.

54. The time was past for seeking to place responsibility for the troubles which had steeped Ruanda in blood on one group or another. All had had their share in the responsibility; what was important now was that all should unite to ensure the Territory's advancement and progress towards independence and democracy. Belgium had made remarkable efforts to further the material, intellectual and social development of the country. That progress and its results could only bear fruit if the people were inspired by a profound love of truth and justice.

55. The masses of the people in Ruanda had shaken off the yoke of Tutsi colonialism, and were mistrustful of those who clamoured for immediate and unconditional independence. The Ruandese people knew that true independence required the training of indigenous personnel, democratic institutions, and the replacement of vague customary law by written laws; in short, safeguards to ensure respect for personal and public rights. All that could not be achieved overnight. Above all, no one should fear that the Hutu would seek to reduce the Tutsi minority to slavery. They wanted nothing but complete democracy, under which everyone would enjoy the same rights and have the same obligations. It was not impossible that tomorrow, when peace had been restored, the head of the country would be a Tutsi; that would be a matter for the people to decide.

56. He hoped that the Fourth Committee would examine the problem of Ruanda-Urundi from the viewpoint of justice and equity. For nearly twenty years the United Nations had been working for the peace and unity of the peoples of the world. It would be unfortunate if some Member States supported this or that faction which had vowed to disturb that peace and to prevent the realization of that unity by spreading terror and disorder in one part of the world or another. But that would not happen; and for that he would like to express his sincere thanks and the thanks of the people of Ruanda to the United Nations and to all members of the Fourth Committee.

The meeting rose at 7.30 p.m.