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Chairman: Mr. FAKHREDDINE Mohamed
 (Sudan).

AGENDA ITEM 23

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Southern Rhodesia (continued) (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III; A/C.4/L.835)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. OULD DADDAH (Mauritania) recalled that almost a year had elapsed since the white minority in Southern Rhodesia had unilaterally declared independence and that since that time the Labour Government of the United Kingdom had been promising to put an end to that intolerable situation. The United Kingdom had, however, met the arrogance of those racist adventurers with empty words only. A close examination of the United Kingdom Government's actions inevitably led to the conclusion that it had all been a manoeuvre to gain time and to strengthen the Smith régime. Long before the unilateral declaration of independence, the United Kingdom Government, while talking about establishing majority rule and putting an end to discrimination, had refrained from doing anything that might offend the white minority. Later, the Wilson Government had stated that it would not use force in Southern Rhodesia. It was therefore clear that a crime had been committed, with the complicity of the United Kingdom, against the Zimbabwe people and against Africa. All those who were playing a direct or indirect part in the perpetuation of that travesty of justice should remember that all honest and right-minded Africans would never accept such a situation

and would continue their struggle with the support of all those who opposed man's exploitation of man.

2. The cardinal responsibility rested with the United Kingdom and dated back to 1922, when a referendum had been held to enable the Territory to choose between union with South Africa and the status of a self-governing British colony. Thus the intention of sacrificing the Zimbabwe people had been clear even then. The 1923 Constitution had subsequently given the United Kingdom the means of opposing the discriminatory measures adopted by the white minority, but it had never used those powers. Finally, in 1961, the United Kingdom had renounced its rights under the 1923 Constitution and by so doing had enabled the racist settlers to establish a system of political, economic and social discrimination. Its talks now about sanctions could deceive no one; the Wilson Government was well aware of the ineffectiveness of such sanctions and had probably enacted them with that in mind.

3. That serious situation was in every respect similar to the situations in Palestine and South Africa, where colonialism had used every means to trample underfoot the most cherished human rights. Moreover, the United Kingdom, which was unwilling to resort to force in Southern Rhodesia, did not hesitate to do so in Aden and in various parts of South Arabia. His Government considered that the United Kingdom owed it to itself, to Africa and to the Zimbabwe people to take vigorous action to put an end to that situation. If it continued to turn a deaf ear to the appeals directed to it, it would take upon itself the grave risk of perpetuating a hotbed of tension and of flagrant injustice to which Africa could not remain indifferent.

4. Mr. SEINER (Czechoslovakia) observed that, according to reports in the Press, Smith had stated some hours after the United Kingdom envoy had left Southern Rhodesia that the dispute was drawing to an end and that, in his opinion, it was worth while continuing the talks. In other words, instead of taking the necessary strong action, the United Kingdom was agreeing to negotiate with a régime which it had itself called illegal. The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had expressed its opposition to those talks and its concern about the possible harm that they might do to the rights of the Zimbabwe people.

5. The United Nations had no information on what was really going on between the parties and the United Kingdom representative should give it some particulars. In any event, the Committee should express its opinion clearly and should not permit a

handful of racists to set up a neo-colonialist system in Southern Rhodesia. That was part of a plan to establish a colonialist cordon sanitaire, which might have unforeseeable consequences.

6. It must be asked how the situation in Southern Rhodesia could have deteriorated to such an extent and who was responsible. The reply had already been given and was clear from the Special Committee's report (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III): the Zimbabwe people were the victims of the Western monopolies that Smith represented. Everything served to confirm the full responsibility of the United Kingdom and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as the Special Committee pointed out in paragraph 1134 of chapter III of its report. Moreover, the results of the action taken by the United Kingdom since the unilateral declaration of independence were well known: the Smith régime had gained time and had secured its position.

7. The United Nations should do everything in its power to liquidate that régime. It could and should ask the United Kingdom to abandon that unacceptable policy, to refrain from negotiating with Smith and to take effective coercive action, using armed force if necessary. The Security Council should adopt a resolution calling upon all countries to break off their relations with the rebel régime and applying the measures provided for in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

8. Mr. NYIRINKINDI (Rwanda) said that the United Kingdom representative should provide information on the negotiations between Smith and the envoy of Mr. Wilson, who had stated that his Government could not negotiate with that rebel and illegal régime. Almost a year had elapsed since the unilateral declaration of independence had been issued and since Wilson himself had said that the rebellion would be crushed and that the Zimbabwe people would enjoy their legitimate rights. That had not happened, however, and the people continued to be oppressed.

9. Secret negotiations were in progress and political developments were causing anxiety. United Kingdom policy had always been dangerous for the Zimbabwe people; it had been so in the case of the 1923 and 1961 Constitutions, especially the latter, which had proved to be really harmful and had given rise to the present situation. At the very time that the Zimbabwe people had been asking for independence, the United Kingdom had given independence to Smith, condemning the indigenous people to a life of hopeless suffering.

10. It should be pointed out that the United Kingdom had never been willing to listen to the United Nations, or other organizations, or other States. Since 1963 the United Nations had been drawing the United Kingdom's attention to the danger that the Whites in Southern Rhodesia would declare independence, which would constitute a threat to international peace. The United Kingdom, however, had held secret conversations with certain Governments to prepare for the Territory's independence in its present form and the other States had clearly replied that if that happened the position of the United Kingdom would

be indefensible. After the unilateral declarations of independence, the United Kingdom had not changed its policy; nor had it succeeded in deceiving world public opinion.

11. Thus it was obvious that little faith should be placed in economic sanctions, which clearly could not be effective owing to the assistance which Southern Rhodesia was receiving from South Africa, Portugal and other countries.

12. The United Kingdom should take more effective action and expunge its past failures by a worthy gesture; it should not sacrifice basic principles to political opportunism, which was unworthy of it.

13. Mr. ABDEL-WAHAB (United Arab Republic) said that, as early as 1923, the administering Power had laid the foundation of the present régime of Southern Rhodesia in order to build up a white empire in southern Africa, thus betraying the Africans. That was neither the first nor the last such episode in its colonial policy.

14. When the unilateral declaration of independence had been made, the United Kingdom had tried to create the impression that it was determined to topple that régime; yet the fact remained that Ian Smith was still in power. The behaviour of the United Kingdom cast doubts on the sincerity and seriousness of its intentions. At the outset, it had said that through sanctions the régime would be overthrown in a matter of weeks, not months, which even then had seemed doubtful. It was now clear that the sanctions had failed because South Africa, Portugal and other countries did not apply them and Southern Rhodesia was receiving oil and selling its tobacco, while United Kingdom and United States investments were increasing in the Territory. According to the Financial Times of 19 September 1966, Southern Rhodesian trade with West Germany had increased by comparison with 1965.

15. Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia would be ineffective unless South Africa and Portugal were forced to comply with them; the United Kingdom Prime Minister's advisers were aware of that fact. On 21 September 1966, Mr. Vorster had said that South Africa would not take part in sanctions and would carry on normal trade with Southern Rhodesia even if that meant taking risks. Portugal was following the same policy and if the United Kingdom was sincere it should ask for complete sanctions against South Africa and Portugal, or seal off Southern Rhodesia's borders with those countries, for it was a well-known fact that United Kingdom policy was guided only by its economic interests rather than the principles of the United Nations Charter or the standards of civilization and that it would not hesitate to use force to defend those interests, as was proved by its 1956 aggression against the United Arab Republic and the aggression it was now committing against Yemen and Aden.

16. Failing the use of force, the only course of action which would enable the Zimbabwe people to be freed, the Ian Smith régime would survive. It was the duty of the United Kingdom, as administering Power, to pro-

tect the Zimbabwe people. The United Kingdom Prime Minister himself recognized that Southern Rhodesia was a police State repugnant to civilized people because of the methods it used: the death penalty, murder, deportation, detention without trial, and terror.

17. The United Kingdom alleged that it could not intervene, but it had done so in many cases. The rule of law and the rights of the people of the Territory must be restored, and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations called for the use of force to achieve that end. The problem was not whether there would be a return to constitutional rule, but whether the United Kingdom would grant independence to Southern Rhodesia on the basis of one man, one vote, instead of seeking to legalize the Ian Smith régime and to protect its own economic interests without giving the impression that it was betraying the Africans. Yet that was exactly what it was doing by negotiating with Ian Smith. On 23 September 1966 the Smith Government had said that it would not deviate from its aims. The subject of the talks was not the search for a basis of agreement, but the fate of 4 million Africans, and the United Kingdom should discuss that with the leaders of the people and not with the illegal régime. The present negotiations were illegal because they were being carried on with illegal authorities and because Mr. Wilson's six principles did not appear in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Only a direct agreement between the United Kingdom and the leaders of the Zimbabwe people would be valid. A betrayal of that people by the United Kingdom must not be tolerated. He wondered what those who counselled patience and moderation would do if their own people were in a similar situation.

18. The United Arab Republic, which believed in self-determination and equal rights for all peoples, had undergone an experience which it hoped the Zimbabwe people might avoid. In Palestine, in spite of assurances given to the Arabs, and while it was negotiating with them, the United Kingdom had encouraged clandestine immigration from Europe so as to form a national home for the Jews and had supplied the immigrants with arms. Once the problem had been created, it had thrown it into the lap of the United Nations, with the result that a minority group of racist settlers had illegally declared independence after usurping power from the indigenous population with the support of the colonial Power. The same thing was now happening in the case of the Zimbabwe people.

19. The United Kingdom should be called upon to abrogate the 1961 Constitution of Southern Rhodesia immediately, to stop the negotiations with Ian Smith, whose results the United Nations should not recognize, to use force if necessary to put an end to that régime by the end of the year and to undertake negotiations with the leaders of the Zimbabwe people, promising not to grant independence to the Territory until majority rule was established on the basis of one man, one vote. The security Council should be asked to apply Chapter VII of the Charter against States which assisted the illegal régime, and the United Nations should consider that those States whose nationals gave such assistance were violating the principles of the Charter and obstructing its authority.

QUESTION OF PROCEDURE

20. Mr. MALECELA (United Republic of Tanzania), speaking on a point of order, said that several delegations had observed that, while the question of Southern Rhodesia was being debated in the Committee, events were taking place which might endanger the Zimbabwe people, such as the talks between the United Kingdom and the Ian Smith régime.

21. Most of the members of the Afro-Asian bloc considered that there was a danger of the United Nations being faced with a fait accompli, perhaps within a few hours, and that it should anticipate the possible result of those talks so as not to be overtaken by events. They had therefore drawn up a draft resolution of an interim character, which would not prejudice the final decision of the Committee on the question. For lack of time it had been impossible to consult all delegations, but those that wished to do so could join the sponsors immediately. Introducing the draft resolution,^{1/} he read out the list of sponsors and asked the Secretariat to have the draft resolution circulated as soon as possible and the Committee to vote upon it at the same meeting.

22. The CHAIRMAN said that he assumed that the Tanzanian representative had moved that the general debate on the question of Southern Rhodesia should be adjourned and that the Committee should proceed to consider the draft resolution which he had just submitted. In accordance with rule 117 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, two representatives might speak in favour of, and two against, that motion.

23. Mr. DIALLO Seydou (Guinea) said that he thought the United Nations was already faced with a fait accompli on the question of Southern Rhodesia. He did not wish to accuse anyone or to allot any blame or even responsibility, but was only interested in avoiding a further terrible massacre in that Territory, whose population had the right to be represented in the United Nations. He supported the interim draft resolution submitted by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania and asked all those who wished to help the Zimbabwe people to support it.

24. Mr. COLLIER (Sierra Leone) supported the draft resolution and stressed the urgent need for the Committee to take steps to reaffirm the United Nations position on the question. The United Kingdom had previously issued a communiqué at the end of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference held in London, in which the Ian Smith régime had been called illegal, and now it was negotiating with that régime—that signified a change of position. He did not think that the United Kingdom would find it difficult to support the Tanzanian draft resolution, which condemned any agreement with that régime, which the United Kingdom itself had called illegal. The situation was changing rapidly and it was imperative that the United Nations should reaffirm its position, which the United Kingdom itself appeared to share.

25. The Committee could decide to vote on the draft resolution that same day, as a matter of urgency; there had already been cases in which it had not

^{1/} Circulated later, during the meeting, as document A/C.4/L.835.

waited for twenty-four hours after the submission of a draft resolution. The Committee was, after all, master of its own procedure.

26. The sponsors hoped that the draft resolution would be put to the vote that day, so that it could be submitted to the General Assembly the following day. It was an urgent matter and, as the subject had already been discussed for years in the United Nations, it could hardly be claimed that time was needed in order to study the text.

27. Mr. LUBEGA (Uganda) supported the draft resolution, for he understood its urgency. The Committee knew that it was imperative to forestall events in Southern Rhodesia.

28. In answer to questions on the subject, the United Kingdom representative had only replied that he would make a statement at the end of the general debate. So far he had said nothing definite and had not even given a guarantee that the United Kingdom would keep its promises concerning the racist régime of Smith, who had just declared that it did not seem to him necessary to send an ultimatum to Mr. Wilson's Government because such an ultimatum was not relevant in the present case.

29. Mr. QUARLES VAN UFFORD (Netherlands) said that he was not in a position to speak about the draft resolution, but he wished to refer to procedure. The rules of procedure were an indispensable guide for the work of the Committee, but he would not invoke them with the aim of delaying the adoption of measures. When the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania had raised a point of order and spoken on the substance of the matter under discussion, he had not invoked rule 114 of the rules of procedure against him.

30. All representatives had the right to speak in the order in which they were inscribed on the list, and in a subject as important as the present one they could submit draft resolutions, as had been done, if the Chairman authorized it. It would, however, be difficult to take a vote that same day, not only because rule 121 stated that proposals should be introduced in writing on the day preceding the meeting, but also because delegations were not acquainted with the text of the draft resolution and had been unable to study it. In his own case, he would have to seek instructions from his Government. The Netherlands delegation could not take part in a vote on the draft resolution that day.

31. The CHAIRMAN noted that there appeared to be no objection to the proposal to adjourn the general debate and to take up the draft resolution submitted by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania. In the absence of any objections, he would consider that the Committee agreed to proceed in that way.

It was so agreed.

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION A/C.4/L.835

32. Mr. NYIRINKINDI (Rwanda) said that he supported the draft resolution introduced by the Tanzanian representative (A/C.4/L.835) because he considered that the negotiations between the United Kingdom and

the illegal Smith régime were a betrayal of the Zimbabwe people, of Africa and the entire world. With regard to the possibility of voting on a draft resolution on the day that it was submitted, there were various precedents: in the present case the essential thing was to adopt it so that the world would know the opinion of the United Nations.

33. Mr. MALECELA (United Republic of Tanzania), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, reminded the Netherlands representative that it was an interim resolution which would not prejudice the Committee's decision on the whole question of Southern Rhodesia. The procedural aspect was insignificant beside the consideration that, if the Committee did not react at once, it would very shortly be faced with a fait accompli. For that reason he hoped that the Netherlands representative would not dwell upon a question of procedure.

34. Mr. KAYUKWA (Democratic Republic of the Congo) pointed out that under rule 121 of the rules of procedure the Chairman could permit the discussion and consideration of motions circulated the same day.

35. Mr. KANAKARATNE (Ceylon) said that the members of the Committee, in their preoccupation with questions of procedure, should not forget the importance of the problem at issue. It had been hoped that, in view of the concern over press reports on the "talks about talks" at Salisbury, the United Kingdom representative would provide some clarification, but any such hope had proved futile. Therefore, the fact that the fate of 4 million Africans ruled by a racist minority was at stake made it imperative for the Committee to adopt the draft resolution, which simply reaffirmed earlier resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, expressed a very legitimate concern and stressed the rights of the Zimbabwe people to self-determination and independence. The question was too important and urgent to allow of anyone taking shelter behind the rules of procedure.

36. Mr. SY (Senegal), expressing support for draft resolution A/C.4/L.835, said that, despite the provisions of rule 129 of the rules of procedure, the Chairman, in that specific instance, could permit the discussion and consideration of the draft resolution in order that the General Assembly might in turn be able to consider it in plenary meeting on the following day. The Committee should be guided by the spirit rather than by the strict letter of the rules of procedure.

37. Mr. COLLIER (Sierra Leone) moved the closure of the debate, in accordance with rule 118.

38. The CHAIRMAN observed that under rule 118 two speakers were permitted to oppose the closure.

39. Mr. KANAKARATNE (Ceylon) said that despite the urgency of the question, all representatives should be given an opportunity to study the text of the draft resolution and discuss it fully in a democratic debate.

40. Mr. BARRERA (Ecuador) supported the representative of Ceylon and stated for the record that the Committee could neither proceed to a discussion of the draft resolution nor close the debate, much less proceed to a vote, unless the text had been circulated in all the official languages.

41. Mr. COLLIER (Sierra Leone) withdrew his proposal.

42. Mr. PIRSON (Belgium) said that it was difficult for him to express any opinion on the draft resolution because he needed to consult his Government. If it was decided to proceed to a vote, his delegation would not participate in it.

43. Mr. APPIAH (Ghana) said that the rules of procedure should not be an obstacle to voting on the draft resolution. Those representatives who remembered the sufferings of their countries when they had been occupied by the Nazi invaders should have no difficulty in understanding the sufferings of the Zimbabwe people and voting for the draft resolution.

44. Mr. KAYUKWA (Democratic Republic of the Congo) said that some representatives had stated that they had not received instructions from their Governments. Nevertheless, the preamble of the draft resolution recalled resolutions which had been adopted by the United Nations and expressed a concern which no one denied. The operative part of the draft resolution condemned, not a country or the administering Power, but any arrangement reached between the latter and the Smith régime, which would not recognize a right admitted by all, including the administering Power. Finally, it reaffirmed an obligation which the administering Power had accepted. There was nothing, therefore, to prevent those representatives from voting for the draft resolution. In any case, if they could not do so at the present meeting, it was to be hoped that they would do so at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly on the following day.

45. Mr. DIALLO Seydou (Guinea) said that he had refrained from invoking the rules of procedure because he believed that the urgency of the question should give it precedence over any procedural problem. Some members said that they did not have time to consult their Governments, but it could not be denied that modern technological progress made it possible for them to do so at very short notice. It was most important to prevent the world from being confronted with a *fait accompli*.

46. Mr. PEEL (Liberia) said that the question of Rhodesia strongly influenced the attitude of the African peoples. He regretted that he had not been consulted by the co-sponsors of the draft resolution but realized that that had been due to the urgency of the matter. He was in full accord with the text of the draft.

47. Mr. GOMA-NGANGA (Congo (Brazzaville)) said he was surprised that in such an important and urgent matter some representatives were trying to postpone a decision under the pretext of consulting their Governments. Delegations had full powers to vote on behalf of the countries which they represented. He moved the closure of the debate and requested that a vote should be taken immediately.

48. The CHAIRMAN announced that the final list of sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.835 was as follows: Albania, Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana,

India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. If there was no objection to the motion for the closure of the debate, he would take it that the Committee approved it.

It was so decided.

49. The CHAIRMAN said that the Sierra Leonean delegation had proposed that the draft resolution should be put to the vote immediately. He asked whether there were any objections to that proposal.

50. Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Ireland) said that he had no objection to a vote being taken, but that, although he understood the Africans' feelings, it was difficult for delegations to vote without instructions from their Governments. He requested a separate vote on the third preambular paragraph of the draft resolution.

51. The CHAIRMAN said that since no one objected to a vote being taken, the members of the Committee could proceed to explain their votes.

52. Mr. COX (Canada) said that he would not participate in the voting. Although the matter was extremely important to his Government, it had not been given time to consider it. Furthermore, his delegation knew of no new fact which could justify such urgency. He asked that his position should be noted in the record.

53. Mr. ZOHRAB (New Zealand) said that he would not participate in the vote because of lack of time to seek instructions from his Government.

54. Mr. HICKEY (Australia) said that he, too, would not participate in the vote because of lack of time to study the draft resolution.

55. Mr. WITMAN (United States of America) said that, despite the importance and urgency of the question, no decision on the substance of the draft resolution could possibly be taken without affording the possibility of full consideration and consultation with governments. If such opportunity was not granted because of the precipitate manner in which the vote was being demanded, he regretted that his delegation would have no choice but to refrain from participating in the vote without prejudice to the substance of the matter. He requested that that position be recorded.

56. Mr. MARQUES SERE (Uruguay) said that insufficient information was available to judge the urgency of the draft resolution. Furthermore, in view of the number of sponsors, the importance of the question and the intrinsic injustice of the situation in Southern Rhodesia, a vote on the draft resolution demanded a very high sense of responsibility. Uruguay had clearly expressed its views on the substance of the issue. It preferred not to vote at that stage, although it hoped to be in a position to do so at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly.

57. Mr. F. D. W. BROWN (United Kingdom) stated for the record that he would not participate in the vote because of lack of time to consider the text.

58. Mr. PIÑERA (Chile) said that although in principle he was against voting on a draft resolution the same day it was submitted, he realized that the situation was one of urgency. Rule 121 of the rules of procedure provided for a departure from the prescribed procedure if the majority so desired. His delegation agreed with the basic ideas of the draft resolution. The concern expressed in the third preambular paragraph might perhaps be unjustified, but the points put forward by Prime Minister Wilson must be taken as a pledge of honour. He would therefore vote for the draft resolution.

59. Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Ireland) said that too much importance was being attached to statements by Ian Smith which were merely in the form of unconfirmed press reports.

60. Mr. COLLIER (Sierra Leone) said that he disagreed with the remarks by the Irish representative who, moreover, should confine himself to explaining his vote without going into the substance of the question.

61. Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Ireland) said that he was explaining his vote. He understood the reasons for the draft resolution but felt that it lacked a firm base. The operative part was acceptable. That was not, however, true of the third preambular paragraph because it prejudged the content of the "talks about talks". If that paragraph was to stand, he would be obliged to abstain.

62. Mr. EDWARDSSEN (Norway) said that he agreed with the Irish representative's stand. He too understood the anxiety of the sponsors and approved their objectives but he was unable to accept the third preambular paragraph, since nothing was known about the talks. For that reason and also for lack of time to consult his Government and other delegations, he would abstain from voting, and he requested the sponsors of the draft resolution to give the matter their further consideration. If that preambular paragraph could have been amended as he suggested, Norway would have voted for the draft resolution as a whole.

63. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he would vote in favour of the draft resolution because it had been submitted at an opportune moment and met the wishes of many countries. The wording of the draft resolution faithfully reflected the views of the Committee on the "talks about talks", the term that had been used by the representative of the United Kingdom. His own delegation did not need to consult its Government and urged the other delegations to vote without awaiting fresh instructions.

64. Mr. DITHMER (Denmark) said that his Government's policy was well known. Though generally in favour of the draft resolution, he had not had enough time to study it and would therefore have to abstain.

65. Mrs. SKOTTSBERG-AHMAN (Sweden) said that, although agreeing with the purpose of the draft resolution, she had not had time to consult her Government and would therefore abstain.

66. Mr. YAMANAKA (Japan) said that he too would abstain, as he had not had time to consult his Govern-

ment. That stand was taken without prejudice to the substance of the matter.

67. Mr. BOZOVIC (Yugoslavia) recalled that many of the Committee's resolutions on Southern Rhodesia had been branded inopportune. Due to the lack of information about the talks, one could only rely on the statements of Ian Smith, who appeared to be already celebrating a victory. On that basis it was highly probable that the talks were jeopardizing the rights of the Rhodesian people. The Government of the United Kingdom seemed prepared to accept Ian Smith's assurances that the articles of the Constitution would not be altered, but Mr. Wilson himself had said earlier that no one could trust those men, and another member of the United Kingdom Government had called them liars. That being so, it was to be wondered what assurances the United Kingdom had that they were now going to keep their promises. In his view it was essential to condemn any agreement that recognized the independence of Southern Rhodesia unless the rights of the people of Zimbabwe were guaranteed beforehand. For that reason he had no misgivings about the third preambular paragraph and would vote in favour of the draft resolution.

68. Mr. CAWEN (Finland) said that he agreed with the objectives of the draft resolution but not with the third preambular paragraph; he would abstain from voting.

69. Mr. GLEISSNER (Austria) said that as he had no time to receive instructions, he would abstain. In doing so, however, he was not compromising his position with regard to the substance of the question.

70. Mr. XYDIS (Greece) said that he would feel the same hesitation as the previous speakers if the United Kingdom had informed the Committee of the content of the talks. He suggested that the wording of the third preambular paragraph should be amended to express the earnest wish that the talks would not jeopardize the rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia. He would in any case vote in favour of the draft resolution.

71. Mr. PINTO ACEVEDO (Guatemala) said he was concerned by the fact that the Government of the United Kingdom was engaging in talks with a group of usurpers who did not even constitute a *de facto* government. The draft resolution was consistent with the known facts, and, although it might be improved, it did represent the wishes of the majority. For that reason he would vote in favour of the draft.

72. Mr. WARSAMA (Somalia) said that he was prepared to vote in favour of the draft resolution on the understanding that it was provisional in character and did not prejudge the question as a whole. He asked that the name of his country should be included in the list of sponsors.

73. Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) said that he had not had time to study the draft resolution, to engage in consultations or to receive instructions. He would abstain but would do so without prejudice to the substance of the question.

74. Mr. HATTINGH (South Africa) said that the vote of his delegation would reflect the view of the South African Government that the United Nations was not competent to consider the affairs of Rhodesia, which

had been self-governing since 1923. Apart from the fact that the South African delegation did not agree with the assumptions contained *inter alia* in the last preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 1, it considered that the issues raised in the draft resolution concerned only the United Kingdom Government and the Rhodesian Government.

75. Mr. CARRASQUERO (Venezuela) said that he would vote in favour of the first two preambular paragraphs and of operative paragraphs 1 and 2 and that he would abstain from voting on the third preambular paragraph. Although he had not expressed any opinion on the question of procedure, he would point out that the rules of procedure must be observed.

76. Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Ireland) asked for a separate vote on the third preambular paragraph.

77. Mr. GOMA-NGANGA (Congo (Brazzaville)) said that no more time should be wasted. The text of the draft resolution was short, precise and unambiguous. He proposed that the vote should be taken on the draft resolution as a whole.

78. Mr. MALECELA (United Republic of Tanzania) said that a separate vote would not alter the position of any representative and therefore asked the Congolese representative to withdraw his proposal.

79. Mr. GOMA-NGANGA (Congo (Brazzaville)) said that, out of solidarity with the other African delegations, he was withdrawing his proposal.

80. Mr. RWAMAVUBI (Burundi) asked the representative of Ireland to withdraw his proposal.

81. Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Ireland) said that he would be pleased to do so but would not, in that case, take part in the vote.

82. The CHAIRMAN put the third preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.4/L.835 to the vote.

The third preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.4/L.835 was adopted by 73 votes to 3, with 9 abstentions.

83. The CHAIRMAN put draft resolution A/C.4/L.835 as a whole to the vote.

At the request of the representative of Sierra Leone, the vote was taken by roll-call.

The Philippines, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Albania, Algeria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo, (Democratic Republic of), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Maldives Islands, Mali,

Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan.

Against: Portugal, South Africa.

Abstaining: Sweden, Argentina, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, Norway.

Draft resolution A/C.4/L.835 as a whole was adopted by 77 votes to 2, with 9 abstentions.

84. Mr. MALECELA (United Republic of Tanzania) thanked all the representatives who had voted in favour of the draft resolution and so ensured its adoption. He emphasized that the unusual procedure followed in the discussion and in the vote was justified by the urgency of the matter.

85. Mr. NUTI (Italy) understood the sense of urgency which was motivating the Committee's deliberations and, without any prejudice to the position of his delegation on the substance of the matter, he wished to point out that his delegation had been unable to participate in the vote on the draft resolution, because it had had neither the time nor the opportunity of consulting with the Italian Government, whose consent it needed in order to take part in the vote.

86. Commenting on a number of remarks that had been made in connexion with rule 121 of the rules of procedure, he wished to state that those rules had been formulated in such a way that representatives voted not as private individuals, but as representatives of sovereign governments. He submitted that any vote taken in disregard of rule 121 had the effect only of depriving the decision of the Committee of the formal endorsement of a number of Governments whose representatives might otherwise have voted in favour of the draft resolution if sufficient time had been allowed.

87. Mr. DE MIRANDA (Portugal) said that in voting against the draft resolution he had acted in accordance with the position of the Portuguese Government, in whose view the Rhodesian question came within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. He had not therefore expressed an opinion on the substance of the question, which did not come within the competence of the Fourth Committee.

88. Mr. QUARLES VAN UFFORD (Netherlands) said that the Committee, as a number of representatives had pointed out, was competent to interpret its rules of procedure as it saw fit. It must, however, observe certain limits, since any interpretations made for ulterior motives or interpretations that were biased would compromise the usefulness of such a valuable instrument. In a matter of such importance he had thought it necessary to consult his Government, which had repeatedly supported the cause of freedom for colonial peoples.

89. Mr. DIALLO Seydou (Guinea) agreed that the delegation of the Netherlands had supported the Africans in times of difficulty but noted the allegations of some representatives that the African-Asian delegations in the United Nations were exerting undue pressure by virtue of their numerical strength. Such allegations were a misinterpretation of the

solidarity between African and Asian countries, which always asserted itself on grave occasions.

90. Mr. KANAKARATNE (Ceylon) said that the reason why his delegation had been a co-sponsor of the draft resolution just adopted was that the representative of the United Kingdom had refused to give any explanations regarding the present state of the "talks about talks" at Salisbury. As far as the procedural aspects were concerned, it was true that the rules of procedure prescribed a minimum period between the sub-

mission and the discussion of a draft resolution in normal circumstances. The present circumstances were, however, far from normal.

91. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Committee should authorize the Rapporteur to submit a report to the General Assembly on the discussion that had just taken place.

It was so agreed.

The meeting rose at 7.50 p.m.