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Chairman: Mr. Adnan M. PACHACHI (Iraq).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Ortiz de Rozas (Argentina), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 45

Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi (A/4689-A/4694, A/4706 and Add.1, A/C.4/471, A/C.4/L.674 and Add.1) (*continued*)*

**STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED
NATIONS COMMISSION FOR RUANDA-URUNDI**

1. Mr. DORSINVILLE (Chairman, United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi) (*translated from French*):¹ In enlarging upon the points raised in the preliminary statement [1108th meeting] by Mr. Moreau de Melen, the representative of Belgium, on the subject of the report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi [A/4706 and Add.1] submitted at the 1106th meeting, I have no intention of entering into a polemical discussion.
2. The present debate on the situation in this Trust Territory transcends personalities, however prominent, and should be regarded in its proper context, which is that of the Territory's progress towards independence and the best method of helping it to achieve this goal. If personalities are involved, this is because the progress is not taking place in a vacuum, but in the framework of human realities, and we must take into account not only the action taken but also the individuals who take it, since, depending on their temperament, their psychological make-up, the positions they occupy and the methods at their disposal, they leave their personal imprint on events.
3. The Belgian representative, referring to the Commission's comments on the lack of co-operation on the part of the local Administration, said that it was the difficulties with which that Administration had been faced at the moment that explained its having been "insufficiently available" to the Commission, as the Belgian Government put it in its note of March 3, 1961

[A/4706/Add.1, annex XXVII], which might have created an unfavourable impression. However, on several occasions before its departure from Brussels, the Commission had told the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for African Affairs that it would make allowance for this, in the best spirit of what it hoped would be a sincere and loyal collaboration.

4. In paragraph 159 of its report, the Commission itself listed a series of factors which were casting a shadow over the Territory, but it certainly did not expect the kind of reception which it was given at Usumbura. I have now no hesitation in quoting an extract from the Usumbura newspaper *Temps Nouveaux* of 5 February 1961, or one week after the Commission's arrival:

"It could hardly be said that it was received with enthusiasm.

"The enthusiasm, if any, was in any case indescribable because it was carefully concealed. High-ranking officials of the country waited for the plane with the pleased expressions of people who have had to get up earlier than usual to do a chore. Apart from this small group of persons 'drafted' for the occasion, there were only casual onlookers who had not come for that particular purpose, but were waiting for their own planes . . .".

The article concludes:

"There is no doubt, however, that if these gentlemen wish to risk their jobs by submitting to the United Nations a nice little report 'which is not prompted by their respective Governments' nor 'a report which must be worded in such a way as to be accepted without any banging of shoes on the desks of the United Nations . . .', if they dare to make this report, they will be escorted to their plane in full-dress uniform, with bugles, drums and embraces. And on that day, we shall take a whole lot of official photographs."

5. The Commission certainly did not have to wait until this article appeared, on 5 February, to become aware of the cordiality of its reception, since this was reflected in the zeal displayed in assisting it by providing various facilities, as stated in paragraphs 160 *et seq.* The Commission could say a great deal on this subject.
6. The representative of Belgium has said that it is understandable that a host receiving visitors at a time when someone in the household is seriously ill might not look after his guests as he should. This is true, but in that case the host makes polite apologies to put his guests at ease, while the latter hasten to express their sympathy and take care not to impose too much on their host.
7. The Commission spent only sixteen days in the Territory—fifteen days at Usumbura and one day at Kitega; it did not visit Rwanda.

* Resumed from the 1108th meeting.

¹ In accordance with the decision taken by the Fourth Committee at its 117th meeting (see A/C.4/SR.1117, para. 28), the text of this statement is reproduced in full.

8. The Commission has given an account of how its time was spent. It stayed only sixteen days in Ruanda-Urundi because after the Ostend Conference it had had to wait at Brussels for over a week for the decision of the Belgian Government concerning the postponement of the legislative elections and a further six days before it could take the plane to Usumbura.

9. The Belgian representative has acknowledged that the Commission had good reasons for not going to Rwanda. It did not go there, not because it did not want to sound public opinion on the spot, but because the Resident-General, after having said that he could not guarantee the reception which would be given by the local officials, expressly declared on several occasions—interpreting the Belgian *communiqué* of 1 February [A/4706/Add.1, annex XX]—that he would be glad if the Commission were to represent the United Nations at the proposed discussions between the Belgian Government, the authorities set up after the Gitarama *coup d'état* and the United Nations. I should like to draw your attention in that connexion to paragraphs 104, 180, 181 of the report and to annexes XX, XXIII and XXIV.

10. It should be stressed here that the Commission had wanted to send its Principal Secretary to Kigali on a reconnaissance mission. Arrangements had even been made for him to fly there when the Commission was informed that Colonel Logiest, the Special Resident, would come to Usumbura instead. The Commission had a meeting with Colonel Logiest on Sunday, 12 February.

11. As regards the visit to Kitega, which was planned for 7 February and took place on 8 February, the Commission adheres strictly to what it said on this subject in paragraph 115 of its report. Neither before, during, nor after the visit to Kitega was the Commission given the explanation which the Belgian representative has kindly furnished to the General Assembly. This is one more illustration of what the Commission points out in paragraph 162 of its report—the reluctance and the delay with which the local Administration informed it of events in Rwanda and Burundi, contrary to the statements in the Belgian Government's *communiqué* of 1 February.

12. The Belgian representative was surprised that the Commission should have said that “a by no means negligible part of public opinion” [A/4706, para. 109] was disturbed by the turn of events in the Territory, since the Commission did not visit Rwanda.

13. Whatever the Belgian representative may think, the Commission did not use two different yardsticks. On the basis of this same by no means negligible part of public opinion, it was able to say that it had no reason to doubt the statement of the Administering Authority that the Belgian forces in Ruanda-Urundi numbered about 1,200 men. In all fairness, the Belgian representative should express unreserved approval of the discernment and objectivity which the members of the Commission displayed at all times.

14. He also said that one member of the Commission, having been trained to defend the “minority”, had listened too sympathetically to the claims of the opposition. I have heard this argument before. When the United Nations Commissioner for the Supervision of the Elections in Togoland under French Administration was forced by the circumstances to support the legitimate claims of those who considered themselves to be the injured party, the Togolese Government at that

time did, however, recognize that it was the desire to preserve the balance between all the parties that had led the United Nations Commissioner to take certain positions which did not coincide with those of the Government.

15. Need I add that the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi knows no “majority” or “minority” and that it used these expressions in its report only within the context of the statements made either by the political parties or by the local Administration? Statistics have been quoted here to show, for example, that at the Ostend Conference the so-called majority parties were not as well represented as the so-called minority parties. The Commission's comment on the way in which the law of numbers was applied in that case is still valid.

16. The results of the communal elections have been used for political purposes, despite the fact that the Belgian Government itself had stated that these elections were purely administrative, and especially the fact that the occasion called for a return to the spirit in which the General Assembly, on the advice of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, had recommended the holding of a conference of freely chosen representatives of the different political persuasions to seek practical solutions for effecting a reconciliation to erase the memory of injuries and grievances.

17. On three occasions, the Belgian representative, drawing attention to paragraphs 170, 175 and 223 of the report, accused the Commission of having ascribed Machiavellian intentions to the Belgian Administration. Further explanation is needed.

18. The Commission tried as far as possible to describe the events as they occurred, endeavouring to reduce its comments and opinions to the minimum necessary to give an accurate assessment of these events. Often it even preferred to refrain from drawing conclusions, although it considered that it was entirely able to do so. For this reason, among others, in the three paragraphs in question the Commission refrained, with perhaps excessive prudence, from making specific comments, considering that it was preferable to leave the General Assembly to decide, on the basis of the facts, for example, who fostered the atmosphere of hostility towards the United Nations, who could be the originators of the plan to be put into action if the legislative elections were postponed and who helped to prepare the draft constitution for Rwanda.

19. There are many things which the Commission did not include in the report in order to avoid polemics, for example, what the Special Resident of Rwanda said to the Commission on the subject of the Constitution: that it had been drafted by a Belgian lawyer and sent from Brussels. We could have quoted other comments by no less prominent personages, such as the remarks of the Resident-General who was interviewed by the correspondent of a Belgian weekly, which were printed in the *Dépêche du Ruanda-Urundi* of Friday, 3 February 1961. This report included the following question and answer:

Q. “Is it true that because of the new Belgian attitude you intended to hand in your resignation?”

A. “It is true that I meant to turn over my full powers to the minister—which strictly speaking is not a resignation. If I have adopted a different attitude, after reflection, it is because the situation

has changed and I am convinced that there is another possible solution . . . However, I can tell you nothing further about this for the time being . . .”.

20. The interview, which was held at Usumbura, was published in the 27 January issue of *Pourquoi Pas?*. As far as the Commission knows, to this date no denial or even explanation has been given of this interview, which contains a number of other interesting remarks.

21. You may consider that I have spoken at considerable length, but I should be failing the General Assembly, I should be failing Mr. Gassou if I did not express the amazement of his colleagues at the remarks which Mr. Moreau de Melen felt it necessary to make, when he spoke of the arrival of the Commission at Usumbura, on 28 January, without saying that one of the members had made a detour. No one regrets more than Mr. Gassou himself the fact that his arrival was further delayed for the very reasons mentioned by the representative of Belgium.

22. However, any attempt to invalidate the report on that ground is, to say the least, unexpected and as unflattering to the representative of Togo as to the representatives of Iran and Haiti. In my capacity as Chairman of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, I should simply like to stress, if this is necessary, that Mr. Gassou, like his colleagues, attended the Ostend Conference, that during the three days spent in Ruanda-Urundi he was kept informed of all the events which occurred and of the discussions held by the Commission, and that he took part in two official interviews, received a number of visitors, and participated in the discussions at Brussels on the Commission's return from Usumbura. Finally, he signed without any reservations the report prepared with his help in New York.

23. I am afraid that I have spoken for longer than I intended, although I have refrained for the time being from commenting on a number of points raised by the Belgian representative. It is high time that I let other representatives have their turn.

AGENDA ITEM 43

Question of South West Africa (*continued*)

PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SOUTH WEST AFRICA ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1568 (XV) (A/4705; A/C.4/L.675 AND ADD.1) (*continued*)

24. U TIN MAUNG (Burma) welcomed the initiative taken by the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.675 and Add.1 and thanked them for their efforts to hasten a solution of the problem of South West Africa, which had already given rise to so many General Assembly resolutions. He thought, however, that the draft did not go far enough, given the intransigence of the Union Government and that after adopting draft resolution A/C.4/L.671/Rev.1 the Fourth Committee should have taken more energetic measures. Nevertheless, he would support the draft resolution, which was constructive, since it recommended that the Committee on South West Africa proceed to the Territory. At the same time he had certain doubts as to the somewhat inexplicit terms employed in operative paragraph 5, and wished to know the exact meaning and scope of that paragraph. The Union Government had never been willing to listen to the voice of reason, and had once again snapped its fingers at the Committee on South West Africa and even at world opinion. In operative para-

graph 5, however, the General Assembly gave the Committee on South West Africa no new mandate but simply recommended it, with more insistence, to proceed immediately to the Territory, without even knowing whether difficulties would be placed in the way of its effective presence there.

25. With regard to paragraph 4, which had given rise to many comments, some representatives had seemed alarmed at the idea of complete independence for the Territory. That paragraph dealt, not only with the regular functions assigned to the Committee, but with the wider task which it had never yet been able to undertake and which would have to occupy it for many months. If it could carry out its inquiries on the spot, it could report to the General Assembly both on the situation in the Territory and on the full measures to be taken for the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Since complete independence had already been mentioned as an objective in resolution 1568 (XV), which had been adopted four days after the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, the terms of operative paragraph 4 introduced no new element. It was agreed that the United Nations should come to the assistance of the people of South West Africa. Some representatives thought it well to stress that the population should be assisted towards self-help. But he could not see why it should be presented with any objective other than complete independence. His delegation would oppose any amendment that would materially weaken the fundamental idea expressed in paragraph 4. That paragraph should be retained in its existing form, if the scope of the draft resolution as a whole were not to be reduced.

26. Burma was not a member of the Committee on South West Africa and had no intention of becoming a member, but would be prepared to extend its assistance to that Committee as requested in paragraph 6. At the same time, he thought that that paragraph was addressed mainly to certain groups of Member States which continued to have close ties with the Union Government and had the moral duty of using their influence with that Government. Paragraph 7 reproduced the terms of a preambular paragraph of resolution 1568 (XV), but omitted the word “serious” before the word “threat”. In his view the adjective should be retained, since it was in fact to be feared that the situation in the Territory would only deteriorate during the coming few months. With regard to paragraph 8, his delegation understood the motives prompting the sponsors of the draft resolution, but wondered whether they would obtain any tangible results.

27. It would have been preferable, in Burma's view, to set up an administrative commission in the Territory, since that would have afforded greater protection to the inhabitants of South West Africa; but he was ready to vote in favour of the draft resolution, which would represent a step forward provided that it was fully implemented and that, in particular, Member States of the United Nations were prepared to respond to the request made in operative paragraph 6.

28. Mr. KADI (Iraq) said that he supported the draft resolution submitted, and hoped that representatives of the people of South West Africa would soon occupy their rightful place in the community of nations. He noted however, with deep regret, that the Government of the Union of South Africa had refused to recognize the competence of the United Nations and to implement General Assembly resolution 1568 (XV).

In defiance of the Organization's resolutions and of world opinion, it was pursuing its *apartheid* policy in the Territory, where it suppressed every movement for the liberation of the inhabitants. Such an unrealistic attitude ran counter not only to world evolution but to the fundamental principles of humanity incorporated in the Charter. One of the petitioners, Mr. Kerina, had quoted many examples to prove that the already deplorable situation in the Territory was only deteriorating. In the Iraqi delegation's view, that situation constituted a threat to the security of the international community, and the United Nations should take immediate steps to protect the lives and the rights of the population. The Union Government took refuge behind the *sub judice* rule, which was all the less applicable since that Government was not prepared to recognize the competence of the International Court of Justice, as its representative had shown by evading the question put to him on the subject by the United States representative (1103rd meeting). In reality the events in South West Africa did not concern the Union Government exclusively; they were part of a vast liberation movement which was going forward in the whole of the African continent. By attempting to swim against the normal current of history, the Union Government was investing those events with international significance.

29. For fifteen years the United Nations had been trying to end the atrocities committed by the Government in the Territory, but had not even succeeded in securing implementation for its resolutions. Peoples could not, therefore, be blamed if they lost the faith they had placed in the Organization. It was time to take realistic and vigorous measures. Since the Union had decided to withdraw from the Commonwealth, it was more difficult to obtain results by requesting the nations of the Commonwealth to bring their moral influence to bear on the Union Government. His delegation thought that the measures proposed in the draft resolution represented the minimum that the United Nations could do to restore the rights of a population claiming its independence. He would ask the United States representative to reconsider the suggestions he had made at the 1110th meeting with regard to operative paragraphs 1 and 4 of the draft resolution; since the United States Government had many times declared itself in favour of the sovereignty of peoples, its representative would presumably have no difficulty in supporting the aspirations of the Territory's inhabitants to independence. The Iraqi representative also expressed the hope that all the other members of the Committee would vote in favour of the draft resolution.

30. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) recalled that the Fourth Committee now for the fifteenth time had before it the question of South West Africa, a Mandated Territory entrusted to the Government of the Union of South Africa, whose policy of *apartheid* had shocked the conscience of the world. It was also the fifteenth time that the Government of the Union, despite repeated appeals from the United Nations in general and the African-Asian countries in particular, had replied with contempt for the legitimate aspirations of the people of South West Africa, thus setting itself against the general movement as a result of which colonialism was being eliminated from the African continent.

31. It was clear from the statements made by the petitioners that, at a time when the Trust Territories were one after the other acceding to independence the vilest oppression continued to reign in the Territory

of South West Africa. History was, of course, full of the crimes of colonialism; and they had not yet completely disappeared, since there were examples to be deplored in other areas of Africa. But the Afrikaners of the Union of South Africa could not hold out indefinitely against a universal determination which had already conquered Asia and a large part of Africa.

32. The draft resolution (A/C.4/L.653) which his delegation had submitted at the 1063rd meeting during the first part of the fifteenth session jointly with the delegations of Libya, Mali, Morocco, Togo and Tunisia, had called for the revocation of the Mandate entrusted to the Union through the British Crown, and for the establishment of an administrative commission, composed of representatives of Member States appointed by the United Nations, that would assume the administrative tasks for which the Union of South Africa had hitherto been responsible. However, some delegations had thought the Union should be granted a reprieve, in the hope that it would modify its attitude at least with regard to the Committee on South West Africa. The preliminary report of the Committee on South West Africa (A/4705) made it clear not only that the Government of the Union was refusing to co-operate and did not intend to change its policy, but that its attitude was more aggressively insolent than ever. In fact, in answer to the provisions of resolution 1568 (XV) which merely invited the Committee on South West Africa to go to the Territory in order to investigate the situation prevailing there, the Government of the Union of South Africa stated that discussion of, and the adoption of resolutions on, matters pending before the International Court of Justice would violate the *sub judice* rule. But the Union had never intended to abide by the judgement which the International Court was to give on the case brought before it by the Governments of Liberia and Ethiopia,² as could be seen from the Union representative's embarrassed reply at the 1103rd meeting to the question which the United States representative had put to him on the subject.

33. In view of the South African Government's categorical opposition to a visit by the Committee on South West Africa to the Territory, the most energetic action by the United Nations was called for. Article 41 of the Charter provided for sanctions to be taken against States which created a threat to international peace and security. It was high time that the United Nations, in order to safeguard its prestige, should apply those sanctions to the Union with a view to persuading it to change an attitude entailing danger to the peace of the African continent and, indeed, of the world. The African States were in any case determined to do all that lay in their power to free the Territory of South West Africa from colonialism and would no longer be satisfied with pious hopes, particularly since the adoption by the General Assembly of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (resolution 1514 (XV)). The African States therefore asked particularly the allies of the Union, and in the first place the United Kingdom, to make it clear to the Union that the African peoples would emerge victorious from the struggle; it was in that spirit that the African countries represented in the United Nations had recently voted in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the delegations of Mexico and Venezuela (A/C.4/L.671/Rev.1).

² I.C.J., *South West Africa Case. Application instituting proceedings* (1960, General list, No. 47).

34. He urged the United Nations to take all necessary action to see that the provisions of the Mandate were applied until such time as adequate measures were taken for the complete independence of the country; to fix a date for the establishment of a democratic Government based on the principle of universal suffrage without distinction as to race, sex, religion or creed, such Government to be set up during 1961; to fix a time-limit for the Territory's complete accession to independence, which should be in 1962 at the latest; and to draw the Security Council's attention to a question constituting a threat to international peace and security.

35. He was convinced that, once Africa was completely liberated, it would be a factor for peace, harmony, and stability in the world, and that backward colonialism should not be allowed to bring about disasters. The United Nations ought not, in any case, to be hesitant in face of the legitimate demands of a people whose destiny had been entrusted to the international community. That was why his delegation had attached importance to being one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.675 and Add.1, which it hoped would be adopted as soon as possible and applied with the highest degree of effectiveness within a very short time.

36. Mr. DJIKIC (Yugoslavia) said that, during the first part of the fifteenth session, his delegation had thought it would be desirable to await the report and recommendations of the Committee on South West Africa, which under resolution 1568 (XV) had been requested to investigate the situation in the Territory, instead of insisting straight away, as certain African States had wished to do, that the Mandate authorizing the Government of the Union of South Africa to administer the Territory of South West Africa should be withdrawn.

37. However, that new experiment had ended in failure, as had been foreseen by certain delegations

which had believed that the South African Government would not observe the provisions of resolution 1568 (XV); indeed the situation in the Territory seemed to have become even worse, as had emerged, for instance from the statements of the petitioners, and the Committee on South West Africa had not even been able to go there.

38. In those circumstances, he thought the time had come to revert to the idea of withdrawing from the Government of South Africa the Mandate entrusted to it, and of placing the Territory under direct United Nations trusteeship; a precise date would have to be fixed for the implementation of that measure, which should constitute the first step towards the total independence of South West Africa.

39. His delegation had desired to be one of the sponsors of the draft resolution because, as the representative of India had shown at the 1110th meeting, the Government of the Union of South Africa had not implemented any of the numerous resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the question and was thus continuing, with its policy of *apartheid*, to violate the provisions of the Charter and ignore the decisions of the General Assembly. The new resolution would be a step forward, and might put an end to the situation which had prevailed in the Territory for several decades and eliminate the threat to international peace and security created by that situation.

40. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea), speaking on a point of order, said that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.675 and Add.1 wished to consult together with a view to submitting, if necessary, a revised version of the draft. He therefore moved that the meeting should be adjourned.

The motion of the representative of Guinea was adopted by 62 votes to none, with 4 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.