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**FOURTH COMMITTEE, 1150th
MEETING**

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at 11.15 a.m.

New York



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Chairman: Mr. Adnan M. PACHACHI (Iraq).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Ortiz de Rozas (Argentina), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 13

**Report of the Trusteeship Council (A/4404)
(continued)**

THE FUTURE OF THE CAMEROONS UNDER UNITED KINGDOM ADMINISTRATION (A/4695, A/4699, A/4726, A/4727; A/C.4/448, 479, 481, 482, 486, 487, 490, 493, 494; A/C.4/L.684, L.685) (*continued*)

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that Mr. Kapet de Bana, a petitioner representing the Union des populations du Cameroun to whom the Committee had agreed to grant a hearing, would be able to make his statement at the beginning of the 1151st meeting, if there was no objection.

It was so decided.

2. The CHAIRMAN announced that the Federation of Malaya had now joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.685.

3. Mr. FONCHA (United Kingdom), Premier of the Southern Cameroons, said that he was glad to be able to tell the Committee how satisfied the people of the Southern Cameroons were with the conduct of the plebiscite and its results. He wished to pay a tribute to the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner and his assistants, as also to the Plebiscite Administrator. In the Southern Cameroons order had prevailed throughout the electoral campaign and the plebiscite itself. Ever since democratic institutions had been installed, the people had realized that they could cast their secret ballot against a Government of whose policy they disapproved; hence it had not been difficult to make them understand that the plebiscite could be held without any demonstrations of hostility between political opponents.

4. The results of the plebiscite, as set out in paragraph 298 of the Commissioner's report (A/4727), had come as no surprise to him, for he had been aware of the people's keen desire to be attached to the Republic of Cameroun and he had been their spokesman before the United Nations visiting missions, the Fourth Committee and the Administering Authority. Those results had been accepted not only by those who had voted in favour of reunification but also by a large number of those who had voted in favour of union with Nigeria, once they had realized that they belonged to a small

minority. He therefore considered himself authorized by more than 70 per cent of the population of the Southern Cameroons to ask the United Nations to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement, with respect to the Southern Cameroons, on 1 November 1961, which would enable it to achieve independence by entering into a federation with the Republic of Cameroun.

5. He thought it useful, at the present juncture, to lay stress on the profound change that had taken place in the political position of the Cameroons People's National Convention (CPNC), as noted in the Plebiscite Commissioner's report (A/4727, para. 231). The resolution which the CPNC had adopted in December 1960 showed clearly that the Opposition had been determined in advance not to accept the results of the plebiscite if they proved to be unfavourable to it. Yet in October 1960 the CPNC had been aware that the people still favoured the unification policy, despite the warnings showered upon them by the Opposition, and it had already known that it had lost the battle of the plebiscite. Thereupon, instead of rallying to the majority opinion, the CPNC had abandoned the idea of union with Nigeria and had begun to campaign in favour of the creation of an independent State of the Southern Cameroons within the Commonwealth. The CPNC had even gone so far as to ask him to support that new policy with a view to having the plebiscite annulled. He had replied to the leaders of the party that the question had now gone beyond the stage of simple political disputes, since on two occasions in 1959 the Fourth Committee had heard petitioners who had expounded the problem of the political future of the Southern Cameroons before it and the General Assembly had adopted, without a dissenting vote, the compromise solution which the Fourth Committee had recommended after a long debate (resolution 1352 (XIV)). After that radical change of attitude, the same leaders were once again appearing before the Fourth Committee, although they had little standing with the tribes whom they claimed to represent.

6. The Opposition, finding itself obliged to agree to the popular consultation being held under the terms laid down by the General Assembly, had resorted to the most dishonest practices in its electoral campaign. For one thing, mainly through the use of posters, it had distorted the meaning of the questions put in the plebiscite in order to make the people believe that it would not be a matter of choosing between independence in union with Nigeria and independence in union with the Republic of Cameroun, but of choosing between France and the United Kingdom. He himself had had to make representations on the subject to the Administrator, the Plebiscite Commissioner and the Commissioner of the Southern Cameroons. The Plebiscite Commissioner mentioned the incident in paragraph 233 of his report but pointed out that the withdrawal of the tendentious posters and publications would have been to no avail,

since the period remaining before polling day had been too short to permit effective action to be taken. He did not consider that a valid excuse and he wondered what the Committee would think of the ineffectiveness of the Plebiscite Commissioner's interventions. The Opposition's intrigues had won it 97,000 votes.

7. The only reason he was dwelling on that point was that the CPNC was demanding that the Southern Cameroons should be partitioned and was still challenging the validity of the results of the plebiscite, although it had known—for it had spread that warning far and wide among the voters—that the decision was to be binding upon the Cameroonian nation. The seven petitioners, all members of the CPNC, who had appeared before the Committee were even less entitled to demand the unconditional partition of the Southern Cameroons, since they claimed to represent traditional tribal organizations such as the Molongo, which were not at all political in character. The leaders of the CPNC were the only advocates of the idea of partition, an idea which was not shared by the voters who had been in favour of union with Nigeria. Moreover, from the practical point of view, partition would be so difficult to carry out that the United Nations and the Administering Authority would be unable to undertake such a task without resorting to force. He rejected the Opposition's argument that partition would make it possible to avoid a repetition in the Southern Cameroons of the disturbances that had taken place in the Congo. The masses of the people remained loyal to the Government of the Southern Cameroons. He wished to affirm that his Government would be careful to take the necessary steps to prevent any exacerbation of tribal disputes. His party had, moreover, already given proof of its willingness to co-operate with all elements in the interests of the whole population. The opposition could take advantage of that offer without any difficulty.

8. Turning to the main object of his mission to the United Nations, which was to obtain the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement with respect to the Southern Cameroons, he quoted paragraphs 68 to 72 of the Plebiscite Commissioner's report, in which the formula that had been considered at the London Conference of 9 to 17 November 1960 for effecting the union of the Southern Cameroons with the Republic of Cameroun was set out. He asked the Committee to approve that formula, which had already been agreed to by all the parties in the Southern Cameroons and by the President of the Republic of Cameroun. The Union contemplated between the Republic of Cameroun and the Southern Cameroons would be in the form of a federation, which would remain outside the French Community and the Commonwealth. He and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cameroun had consulted Mr. Ahidjo, the President of the Republic, who considered that the date of 1 November 1961 could be set for the achievement of the union. The "body representing the future federation", mentioned in paragraph 71 of the Plebiscite Commissioner's report, could be composed only of members of existing assemblies. That meant that it would be necessary to elect a new Chamber in the Southern Cameroons, while in the Republic of Cameroun the present Constitution would have to be amended. He proposed that, if the Committee approved the formula that had been recommended, the General Assembly should also, before the close of the fifteenth session, appoint the United Nations commission that would take part in the proposed conference and fix the date and place of the meeting.

9. Replying to the representative of Haiti, who had asked at the 1147th meeting what matters the proposed conference would discuss and whether the opposition parties would take part in it, he said that there had already been preliminary talks between the representatives of the Republic of Cameroun, the Administering Authority and the Southern Cameroons Government; the proposed conference would have to be of a more official character and deal with the problems arising out of the unification of the Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroun. With regard to the organization and date of the conference, he expected to have a talk with representatives of the Administering Authority in London shortly and then with the Government of the Republic of Cameroun. It was intended that the opposition parties would be brought into those talks at the appropriate time and he hoped that those parties would take advantage of the opportunity offered to them. The representative of Haiti had also asked whether the General Assembly would be informed of the results of the conference: on that point he would prefer to await the decision that the General Assembly would take at the present session.

10. Other questions asked by the representative of Haiti had concerned the way in which the unification was to be brought about, what would be the "body" that was to be established, and whether the various proposals would be examined by the House of Assembly of the Southern Cameroons. The steps to be taken would obviously depend upon the results of the conference. While a number of questions would not have to be settled until after the union had come about, the immediate problem was to set up the proposed body, to which sovereignty would be transferred; after consultation with Mr. Ahidjo, he thought that it might be composed of representatives in the Assembly of the Southern Cameroons, appointed following general elections, and members of the National Assembly of the Republic of Cameroun, who would together constitute a provisional federal government, which would have the task of drawing up a federal constitution. It would, however, be the responsibility of the proposed conference to settle the details of those proposals, which he would submit later to the Assembly of the Southern Cameroons.

11. As many petitioners had levelled accusations against his Government, he asked the Committee to allow him to circulate to the members a statement in which Mr. Muna, the Minister for Commerce and Industry, replied to those accusations.

*It was so decided.*¹

Mr. Pachachi (Iraq) took the Chair.

12. Mr. CARPIO (Philippines) asked the Premier of the Southern Cameroons, who had referred only to the southern part of the Territory, to indicate briefly what his views were on the results of the plebiscite in the Northern Cameroons.

13. Mr. FONCHA (United Kingdom), Premier of the Southern Cameroons, recalled that he had submitted to the Committee a petition concerning the Northern Cameroons and referred the Philippine representative to his statement at the 1142nd meeting.

14. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) said that, while he had nothing to add to Mr. Foncha's statement on the Southern Cameroons, he wished to

¹ See A/C.4/495.

confirm what the Premier of the Southern Cameroons had said about the attitude of the Administering Authority. In reply to the Haitian representative, he also confirmed that at the appropriate time the opposition parties would be invited to take part in consultations regarding the arrangements for uniting the Southern Cameroons with the Republic of Cameroun. That intention had been made clear at the London Conference in November 1960, and the Commissioner of the Southern Cameroons had also referred to it in the Southern Cameroons Assembly. It would be for the parties concerned to make the necessary arrangements for unification. While the Administering Authority had certain responsibilities in the Southern Cameroons, such responsibilities would cease when the Territory was united to the Republic of Cameroun.

15. Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France) said that he could well understand why the present debate on the future of the Cameroons under British administration should prove a difficult one for the Committee, because the decision it would have to take concerned the fate of more than a million and a half human beings who had advanced to self-government in accordance with the terms of the Charter. Moreover, the complaint of the Government of the Republic of Cameroun, the report of the Plebiscite Commissioner, the statements of the Administering Authority and the appeals of the petitioners illustrated the complexity of a situation which it was the imperative duty of the United Nations to consider in all its aspects and consequences, since it might endanger peace and security in that part of Africa.

16. France had no interest, either direct or indirect, in the matter and was not called upon to choose between the friendship of the United Kingdom and that of Cameroun; its policy was based on right and justice. The question before the Committee did not oblige the members to take a position for one African State as against another; the representative of the Republic of Cameroun had, moreover, stressed that there was no quarrel between his country and Nigeria, which were far more inclined to co-operate than to clash. Nor was it a question of prestige, because neither the Federation of Nigeria nor the Republic of Cameroun could expect to gain much additional strength by the incorporation of a territory of 750,000 inhabitants; as far as the Administering Authority was concerned, it could endure some justified criticism which did not challenge its good faith or damage its reputation. Lastly, no issue could be taken with the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, whose sincerity, honesty and devotion were evidenced by the fact that his own report furnished sufficient grounds for casting doubt on the validity of the results of the plebiscite in the Northern Cameroons. The real subject of debate was the higher interests of the peoples who had been placed under the International Trusteeship System in accordance with a contract containing specific provisions, and there could be no acceptable solution other than one in conformity with the basic objectives of that System as set out in the Charter.

17. He then proceeded to analyse the causes of the present situation. In 1958, following the Administering Authority's announcement to the Trusteeship Council of the forthcoming independence of Nigeria and its statement to the General Assembly at its thirteenth session to the effect that in 1960 the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration would achieve the ob-

jectives outlined in Article 76 b of the Charter, the question of the future of the peoples of the Cameroons had become an urgent one, less because of the progress they had made towards the achievement of the objectives of the International Trusteeship System than because of the imminence of the independence of the Federation of Nigeria and the Republic of Cameroun. Despite the doubts expressed by the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa, 1958, about the progress made towards the achievement of the objectives of the International Trusteeship System, the Assembly, forgetting that there lay the crux of the problem, had discussed plebiscites and the wishes of the people, and had perhaps overlooked the principal requirement of the Charter. There had been much criticism of the Visiting Mission's opinion that there was no point in holding a plebiscite in the Northern Cameroons because public opinion was almost unanimously in favour of union with Nigeria, an opinion which had not been endorsed by the Fourth Committee, for reasons of principle. But even when it had seemed that the plebiscite would be a mere formality, the people of the Northern Cameroons, to everyone's surprise, had in November 1959 refused to join the Northern Region of Nigeria and had preferred to leave a decision on their future to a later stage. It seemed, indeed, that those people, who had been isolated for many years, who were 97 per cent illiterate and who were living under a tightly knit feudal régime, had felt the influence of the liberation movement which had been sweeping Africa since 1958 and had learned of the imminent independence of their brothers in the Republic of Cameroun. Once they had been awakened from their sleep of half a century, it was only natural that their hope of emancipation should alienate them from those whom they had come to identify with their state of subjugation. That fact also explained why, despite all kinds of difficulties, the Republic of Cameroun had still obtained 40 per cent of the votes in the last plebiscite.

18. The General Assembly had not merely taken note of the results of the 1959 plebiscite; the Administering Authority had stated that the explanation of those results was to be found in the local administration and that at least part of the plebiscite must be held again and the question of union with Nigeria put anew. The Assembly had therefore interpreted those results in the light of the Plebiscite Commissioner's first report (A/4314 and Add.1) and in the political and social context in which the plebiscite had been held. He asked why the second plebiscite should not also be interpreted in the light of the present political and social context and why it should not be held again if there were good grounds for doing so. It was unthinkable that the United Nations could refuse to grant Cameroun what it had granted to the United Kingdom.

19. The immediate and principal consequence of the outcome of the 1959 plebiscite had been to raise the question of the conditions imposed on the Administering Authority in carrying out its task and in resolution 1473 (XIV) the General Assembly had recommended the decentralization of governmental functions, the effective democratization of the system of local government and, above all, the separation of the Northern Cameroons from Nigeria before 1 October 1960.

20. In his statement at the 1148th meeting, Sir Andrew Cohen, referring to article 5 of the Trusteeship Agreement, had emphasized that it would be wrong to blame the United Kingdom now for something to which

neither the Assembly nor the Trusteeship Council had ever objected. Under paragraph (b) of that article, the United Kingdom was entitled to constitute the Cameroons, if not as an integral part of Nigeria, at least into an administrative union with it and in a manner not inconsistent with the basic objectives of the Trusteeship System, but that interpretation raised the question of administrative unions. Paragraph 109 of the section on Article 76 of the Charter contained in the *Repertory of United Nations Practice*, volume IV,² stated: "Action taken by the General Assembly and Trusteeship Council in respect of administrative unions and other arrangements which affect a number of Trust Territories by associating their administration in varying degrees with that of territories not submitted to the International Trusteeship System has also been related directly to the question of the attainment of self-government or independence in the Trust Territories concerned. After the Trusteeship Council had made its first examination of the operation of the then existing arrangements, the General Assembly by resolution [224 (III)] endorsed the observation of the Council that an administrative union must not have the effect of creating any conditions which would obstruct the separate development as a distinct entity of the Trust Territory concerned". United Nations jurisprudence in the matter had been established on the basis of the last-mentioned principle. Moreover, in resolution 293 (VII), the Trusteeship Council had decided to establish a procedure for the regular examination of the operation of administrative unions and had adopted the safeguards it considered necessary to avoid the possibility of any administrative union operating in such a manner as to prejudice the attainment of the objectives of the Trusteeship System, including the maintenance of the boundaries, separate status, and identity of the Trust Territories. Thus, since administrative unions might prevent the development of the Trust Territories' own individuality and *ipso facto* constitute an obstacle to their political and social progress, measures of administrative separation were essential to enable the people to express their views freely regarding their future. While the Administering Authority could not be criticized for having brought the Cameroons into an administrative union with Nigeria, there were limits and conditions to such a union. By asking in resolution 1473 (XIV) for the administrative separation of the two Territories, the General Assembly—and later, in 1960, the Trusteeship Council—had imposed a requirement, a *sine qua non* for the validity of the future plebiscite.

21. He went on to deal with the organization, holding and results of the plebiscite, basing his remarks, not on the Camerounian White Paper³ or on the statements of the petitioners, but solely on the report (A/4727) of Mr. Abdoh who, together with his all too limited staff, had been unanimously congratulated. As far as the organization of the plebiscite was concerned, it appeared from the report that certain irregularities, no doubt harmless in themselves, had joined to bring about an atmosphere which had helped to distort the purpose of the ballot. Paragraphs 526 and 527 of the report showed that there had been obstacles to the normal and impartial conduct of the plebiscite, since Mr. Abdoh

himself had had to intervene in order to remove them. His delegation deplored the rigidity and arbitrary conduct of the authorities in the Territory in sanctioning a slanderous poster in connexion with the Republic of Cameroun, which had been printed in the Federation of Nigeria, while prohibiting a poster calling for union with the Republic of Cameroun because the name of the printer was not on it. It was also unfortunate that twelve out of thirty-five requests for meetings of parties in favour of union with the Republic of Cameroun had been refused, as compared with only two out of a total of eighty-six, in the case of those parties in favour of integration into the Federation of Nigeria. Similarly, before the United Nations Commissioner had intervened, the indigenous courts of law "could arrest and bring speedily to trial persons affiliated with or supporting political views which were different from those held by the Native Authorities" (A/4727, para. 460). The presence of twenty-five Nigerian students without their Camerounian counterparts was also a disturbing feature, as was, too, the limited time, owing to the obstacles raised by the authorities, during which those parties in favour of union with the Republic of Cameroun could carry on their campaign. The incident at Michika recorded in paragraphs 469 *et seq.* was also significant: thirty-four persons had been arrested and given heavy sentences without any clear and sufficient reason, and a detachment of sixteen police had later been dispatched to the locality for the duration of the plebiscite "in order to relieve the District Head and the Native Court of pressures engendered by charges of partiality and victimization" (A/4727, para. 474). Seeing that in the electoral district of Michika those in favour of integration into Nigeria had obtained only 3,000 more votes than those in favour of reunion with the Republic of Cameroun, no one could be certain that the opposite would not have occurred if the police forces had not intervened.

22. With regard to the polling arrangements, he did not wish to dwell upon the disputes arising out of the colour of the ballot boxes, the question of the two polling days, with regard to which Mr. Abdoh had had to choose between two equally bad alternatives, or the security precautions taken in connexion with the ballot boxes between the first and second polling days. However, he considered that the system used necessitated strict supervision of the counting. That had been done in the Southern Cameroons, but in the other part of the Territory, and on the pretext of avoiding possible reprisals later on, the Deputy Plebiscite Administrator had successfully arranged that the results should be announced by electoral district and not by polling station. Yet the plebiscite campaign had been at least as lively in the Southern as in the Northern Cameroons and there had been no need to take different measures in the two parts of the Territory. Furthermore, and above all, the votes had not been counted in public. The secrecy of the ballot was always an individual and never a collective form of secrecy. It was true that the United Nations observers had been told of the results by polling station, but it was none the less true that the arrangements for counting votes and proclaiming the results were illegal, since the public had not been able to supervise, polling-station by polling-station, that the counting was properly carried out. Consequently, the plebiscite was vitiated and any court of law would pronounce the results null and void because of improper procedure. The General Assembly could only take the same view.

² United Nations Publication, Sales No.: 1955.V.2 (Vol. IV).

³ Republic of Cameroon, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Secretariat of State for Information, *Position of the Republic of the Cameroon following the plebiscite of 11th and 12th February 1961 in the northern portion of the Territory of the Cameroun under the administration of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.*

23. Secondly, even if all those criticisms were unfounded and even if there had not been any impropriety of substance or of form in the plebiscite operations, it was none the less true that the administrative separation had not taken place. It was interesting to note that the representative of the Administering Authority had deemed it necessary to deal at length on that point, in replying to the criticisms, already of long standing, formulated by the French delegation in the Trusteeship Council and to the objections raised by the Republic of Cameroun as early as 31 December 1960. It was true that the Administering Authority had carried out certain local reforms; it had separated the electoral districts from the neighbouring electoral districts of Adamawa and Bornu, and had appointed an Administrator. However, as the Plebiscite Commissioner showed in paragraph 96 of his report, on 1 July 1960, by Legal Notice No. 81, "a new Province to include the Northern Trust Territory" had been created. The object of creating that new province had been to protect the status of the new Native Authorities. The Governments of the Federation of Nigeria and of the Northern Region of Nigeria had both announced that if the Northern Cameroons were to unite with Nigeria, it would form part of the Northern Region. The Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria has also declared that the area would "continue to be administered as a separate Province of the Northern Region". The statement that the Northern Cameroons would "continue" to be a Nigerian province implied that it had never ceased to be one. Actually, the results of the reforms had been to deepen the administrative dependence of the Northern Cameroons on the central authorities of the Northern Region of Nigeria.

24. In annex IV of document A/C.4/479 the United Kingdom dealt more particularly with the appointment of an Administrator. In point of fact that was only a façade on a building which remained Nigerian. According to paragraphs 419 and 420 of the Commissioner's report, because of the extremely low level of education in the Northern Cameroons, there was at the time of separation of administration an insignificantly small number of trained Cameroonians capable of being absorbed into the central administration of the Northern Cameroons local government, and it would have been, in the Administrator's view, wholly impracticable to bring to the territory and to employ in its administration expatriate officials from the United Kingdom; the Administering Authority had therefore decided to retain on a secondment basis from the Northern Region Government the services of such numbers of officials (British as well as Nigerians) as were required. Those officials, however, had been seconded only temporarily and all their past and future interests lay with Nigeria. The members of the police and of the communications units had worn Nigerian uniform. The local officials with whom the population had been in contact had not changed; they were all Nigerians who might have wished to avenge their failure in the 1959 plebiscite. The Nigerians had not sent observers to the 1961 plebiscite because they had been already on the spot.

25. For all those reasons his delegation considered that the United Nations could not endorse the results of the plebiscite without reversing its own decisions. In view of the fact that despite the failure to carry out administrative separation, and therefore despite the undoubted pressure that had been brought to bear, the Republic of Cameroun had obtained 40 per cent of the votes cast in the Northern Cameroons, thus catch-

ing up in a campaign lasting only a few weeks the handicap of forty-two years under British and Nigerian administration, it was obvious that the pro-Camerounian feelings of the population were very strong and that the results would have been different if the administrative separation had been effective. Since those results were in doubt, the inevitable conclusion was that the plebiscite would have to be held again. It was better to repair a mistake in time than to sanction an injustice and create an irredentist state of mind. The prestige of the United Nations was at stake, as were also peace and security in that part of Africa, as well as the interests of Cameroun, Nigeria and the Administering Authority itself; above all the matter involved the interests of the people of the Northern Cameroons, who must not be abandoned in such dubious circumstances.

26. It was untenable to claim that there was no escape from the *fait accompli*; within three months, it would be possible to establish the necessary representative institutions—an elected legislative body and a government of the Northern Cameroons—which would make an administrative separation possible. Three months later, a genuine popular vote could be taken under the supervision of the same United Nations Commissioner but with a larger staff—a referendum which, on that occasion, would not be challenged. Whatever its results, they would readily be accepted by all. How could the interests of Nigeria and the United Kingdom be prejudiced by such a fair and common-sense solution? Everything would be settled by the beginning of 1962, and the Territory's accession to independence would not be delayed. The position would be clear, the friendship between Nigeria and Cameroun would be strengthened, and the United Nations prestige would be enhanced.

27. What was now proposed was to endorse, in haste and confusion, the results of a questionable popular vote which might be interpreted in very different ways. The report of the United Nations Commissioner—a purely technical document from which each side had drawn conflicting arguments—could not be used as an excuse for no further action. All must shoulder their responsibilities towards peoples which, so long as the trusteeship had not been terminated, were still in the charge of the United Nations.

28. It was in the light of those conclusions that the French delegation would vote on the two draft resolutions before the Committee. It reserved the right briefly to explain, later on, its views as to those two texts.

29. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) said that he was keenly surprised by the conclusions which the representative of France had thought fit to draw from Legal Notice No. 81 published in the Gazette of the Northern Region of Nigeria on 1 July 1960, since paragraph 3 of the text quoted in paragraph 89 of the Plebiscite Commissioner's report recorded clearly the statement by the Northern Regional Government that the Northern Cameroons would continue to be administered as a separate province of the Northern Region "if the result of the Plebiscite is in favour of joining Nigeria". All that referred to the future, and it could not be deduced from it that administrative separation had not taken place. Such separation was a fact, and would continue to be a fact until the General Assembly had taken the necessary measures.

30. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) asked for permission to enter her delegation's name on the list of speakers, despite the fact that that list had been closed.

31. She also asked, under instructions from her Government, that her delegation's name should be added to the list of sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.685.

32. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Committee, by way of exception, should grant the Liberian delegation's request.

It was so decided.

33. Mr. RASGOTRA (India), on behalf of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.685, thanked the Liberian delegation.

34. Mr. KIANG (China) said that he desired, above all, not to do anything to encourage dissension within the African continent. He congratulated the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, as well as the members of the Secretariat who had ably and devotedly helped him to discharge his task of supervision. He was pleased to note, likewise, that Mr. Abdoh had been able to co-operate with the Commissioner of the Southern Cameroons, the Administrator for the Northern Cameroons, and the plebiscite officers in both parts of the Trust Territory. In the past, the General Assembly had approved the results of the first plebiscite in the Northern Cameroons, and of the popular votes organized in Togoland under British administration and Togoland under French administration which had enabled the Trusteeship Agreements for those two Territories to be terminated. But now the Government of a Member State was calling in question the regularity of the voting operations which had taken place in the Northern Cameroons on 11 and 12 February 1961. No Government, of course, would advance such complaints unless it was already convinced that it was justified in doing so. He had been much impressed, in that connexion, by the statesmanship with which the representative of Cameroun had presented his country's case, and he was pleased to note that that representative had congratulated the Plebiscite Commissioner on his impartiality.

35. The only point at issue was in fact whether, by 1 October 1960, the administration of the Northern Cameroons had been separated from that of Nigeria and local government democratized. It was not the task of the United Nations Commissioner to establish whether the recommendation to that effect in resolution 1473 (XIV) had been implemented, and he could not be regarded as responsible if it had not been. The Commissioner had in fact been careful to ask the Administering Authority to assure him that that separation had taken place, and the Administrator had given him that assurance. It was therefore that assurance from the Administrator which should be examined.

36. In order to reach a conclusion, the Chinese delegation had carefully read paragraphs 523 to 528 of the Plebiscite Commissioner's report and, in particular,

paragraph 525. It could not refrain from concluding that the system of local administration existing, and the problems created by that administration's separation from the administration of the Northern Region of Nigeria, had from the outset had an influence on the plebiscite operations. The Chinese delegation had, moreover, several times had occasion—particularly in the Trusteeship Council—to raise the question of the reconstitution of the Dikwa Native Authority. It had reverted to that question with the Plebiscite Commissioner, with a view to obtaining explanations and assurances. In doing so, it had not wished to suggest that that Authority's reconstitution had in itself had a decisive influence on the results of the plebiscite. In the Chinese delegation's view, the United Nations could not dismiss the Cameroun representative's complaint without taking all possible steps to arrive at a true assessment of the situation. Nor could it express an opinion without granting to the Administering Authority that to which the latter was entitled—an impartial investigation. That, indeed, might be the only way of solving the problem and giving satisfaction to all concerned.

37. In the Southern Cameroons, the results of the plebiscite had been accepted in their entirety, and it only remained to proceed to the consultations which were required before the United Nations could fix the date for accession to independence through union with the Republic of Cameroun. The latter country's representative had stated that the conference to be held should establish the date and the conditions for the transfer of sovereignty to a body representing the future Federal Cameroun Republic. The United Nations could not, therefore, act before the end of the autumn of 1961. Hence the adoption of the ten-Power draft resolution (A/C.4/L.684) would not delay termination of the Trusteeship Agreement for the Southern Cameroons. The Chinese delegation was, however, disturbed by the continuing cleavage between the Southern Cameroons Government and the opposition parties, and hoped that the various parties, which were more or less in agreement on the territory's economic and social problems, would be able to work together in the interests of their country's future.

38. In conclusion, he wished to thank the Administering Authority for having expedited the Territory's economic development, especially in the Southern Cameroons, in the period immediately preceding independence, and also to thank the petitioners for their concern to give the Committee information. He said that his delegation might later on explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.4/L.685, which it was at present studying.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.