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*Chairman: Miss Angie BROOKS (Liberia).*

**AGENDA ITEM 49**

**Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi: report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (A/5126 and Corr.1 and Add.1; A/C.4/516 and Add.1-5, A/C.4/550, A/C.4/551) (continued)**

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. TRAORE (Mali) said that his delegation welcomed the coming independence of two African countries and fully approved of the report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (A/5126 and Corr.1 and Add.1). The Governments of Rwanda and Burundi had demanded unconditional, full and effective independence, but in small under-developed States such independence could only exist if certain political, economic and military conditions were fulfilled. Economic development required political independence, and it was not possible, for instance, under a régime which agreed to the presence of foreign troops in its territory. Independence implied the sovereignty of the State over its economy and its military forces.

2. His country felt that small under-developed States should unite in larger and more viable units, and it fully agreed with paragraph 290 of the Commission's report (A/5126 and Corr.1). However, Rwanda and Burundi had been unable to agree on a political union. His delegation deplored the intrigues which had led to their separation and hoped that they would be reunited in the near future. The establishment of an economic union between Rwanda and Burundi was a welcome step in that direction.

3. With regard to the question of the maintenance of order, he noted that operative paragraph 3 (e) of General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI) called for the withdrawal of Belgian military and paramilitary forces, to be completed before independence. The Government of Burundi had made it clear that it would not allow foreign troops to remain in its territory after independence, and the Commission had upheld that attitude in paragraph 352 of its report. The Government of Rwanda had also said in its letter of 14 April 1962 to the Commission that termination of the Trusteeship Agreement would make illegal the presence of Belgian troops in its territory (A/5126/Add.1, annex XXXVII). His delegation fully agreed

with that view, since it was convinced that the maintenance of foreign troops in the territory of a sovereign State was an alienation of sovereignty. He was happy to note that the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said at the 1309th meeting that his Government fully recognized that foreign troops must not be stationed in the territory of a sovereign State, save in exceptional circumstances. All Belgian troops should be withdrawn before 1 July 1962, when both Rwanda and Burundi should become fully independent. If there were technical reasons for delay, it should be possible to complete the withdrawal within one month from 1 July, under United Nations supervision — which might be carried out by a representative of the Secretary-General — and in consultation with the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi.

4. Political independence was an essential condition of economic development, because it freed a country's productive forces from colonial exploitation, and it should raise the level of living of the masses in an atmosphere of peace, understanding and solidarity. Any aid the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi might obtain under bilateral or multilateral agreements could only supplement their own efforts to develop their countries. However, both countries would need generous international technical assistance, in which both Belgium and the United Nations should play their part. Belgium, in particular, had a duty to help both countries. The Commission had said rightly in paragraph 376 of its report that the United Nations could not "abdicate its special responsibility for a Territory of which it has taken charge for the past fifteen years", and he appealed to the Special Fund, the regular programme and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the specialized agencies to give particular attention to the urgent case of Rwanda and Burundi. The independent African States should also give the two countries the benefit of their experience and any economic assistance they could spare, and should help to solve their internal problems by guaranteeing their external security.

5. Mr. MESTIRI (Tunisia) thanked the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi for all it had achieved. The Commission had not been able to put all the recommendations contained in General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI) into effect, because time had been against it. It had been necessary to grant separate independence to Rwanda and to Burundi, and he regretted that it had not been possible for them to co-ordinate their defence plans and foreign policy. His delegation welcomed the establishment of an economic union between them, which might eventually lead to some system of political co-ordination. It was not yet clear, however, whether the Addis Ababa Agreement (A/5126/Add.1, annex XVI) would be implemented, since the Government of Burundi had made the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Rwanda a condition of its implementation. The United Nations should make a par-

particular effort to ensure that the economic union should be the first step towards a real union and not the last stage of complete separation.

6. Although the problem of the transfer of powers of internal autonomy had not been solved, independence would soon make it non-existent.

7. The Committee had succeeded in reconciling the political factions in Rwanda. If it had had more time, it might have attempted the same thing in Burundi, although the Government of Burundi was both stable and representative. The statements of representatives of the Government of Rwanda and of the Union nationale rwandaïse (UNAR) showed that their reconciliation was genuine, although they had not abandoned their convictions or programmes, and he hoped that the two main popular parties in Rwanda would continue to co-operate in the solution of the many problems facing their country. Republican institutions had been accepted by UNAR and it should now help to find an honourable status for the former Mwami, since the Commission had made it clear, in paragraph 132 of its report, that the solution of the refugee problem depended largely on the future of the Mwami. He hoped that the co-operation of UNAR would make it possible to separate that problem from the question of the Mwami's return. He also hoped that the New York Agreement of 8 February 1962 (A/C.4/532 and Corr.1) would be applied in full and that a member of UNAR would be offered a senior post in the Commissariat for Refugees. Any organs representing the United Nations in the period of transition should give particular priority to the refugee problem, which was directly bound up with the maintenance of order.

8. Now that there was a coalition Government, he trusted that no serious incidents would recur. The United Nations should help the Government of Rwanda to build up sufficient police forces to act quickly in the event of any disturbances.

9. By accepting operative paragraph 3 (e) of General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI), the Belgian Government had agreed to complete the withdrawal of its military and paramilitary forces before independence. While it was true that the General Assembly had not fixed a definite date for independence, it had "envisaged" setting 1 July 1962 as the date for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement so that the withdrawal of the troops might be carried out within a reasonable time; in that regard the date of 1 July would serve as an indication to the Belgian Government of the General Assembly's wishes. The number of Belgian troops in Ruanda-Urundi had been reduced from 1200 to 900, but it should have been possible to reduce it to 300 or 400 without endangering the maintenance of order.

10. The only true solution to the problems of Rwanda and Burundi was independence. Since both peoples expected independence on 1 July 1962, and the Commission had so recommended, it would be unthinkable to delay it any longer. Although Rwanda might not become independent in the best possible circumstances, national reconciliation, an essential condition for independence, had been achieved.

11. The leaders of both countries seemed aware of the problems they would face after independence. The Commission had made imaginative proposals for the solution of those problems in paragraph 285 of its report, and his delegation agreed particularly with the proposal to set up a special fund for assistance to

Rwanda and Burundi. Belgium's offer of continued assistance to the two countries, which did not depend on the presence of its troops, and its proposal that the United Nations should co-operate with it in providing assistance showed that it had put an end to its colonial relationship with them.

12. His delegation would vote for any draft resolution providing for the emancipation of Rwanda and Burundi on 1 July 1962 and for measures designed to solve the two countries' political, economic and social problems in co-operation with the United Nations. The attention of the two new States should be drawn to the fact that the presence of foreign troops on their territory not only constituted a permanent threat to their own sovereignty but also a threat to the neighbouring countries. The General Assembly should recommend, to Rwanda in particular, that the presence of any foreign troops on its territory should be brought to an end as quickly as possible. The only true security lay in reconciliation. The Government of Rwanda could act as it chose in regard to that recommendation, but his delegation considered it its duty to state what it felt to be true and just.

13. The road of independence was a difficult one, but with the help of the United Nations and Belgium all difficulties would be overcome. Tunisia for its part would spare no effort to make its own modest contribution to the development of the two new African States, which would soon be working for the liberation of the other African peoples still under foreign domination.

14. Mr. ASTAPENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that Rwanda and Burundi would not be truly independent until all Belgian troops left the country. The Belgian colonizers were trying to keep their troops in Rwanda and Burundi, although Belgium had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI) which required it to withdraw its troops before the date of independence, 1 July 1962. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had shown that Belgium had no intention of complying with that requirement. The Belgian Government maintained that it was necessary for the troops to remain after independence because disturbances would break out when they left, and it had threatened to end Belgian technical assistance to Rwanda and Burundi if the troops were withdrawn. In fact, the Belgian colonizers had stirred up enmity between tribes in order to perpetuate colonial rule, and order in both countries would benefit from the withdrawal of the troops. In any case, both Governments had said that they could maintain law and order by themselves.

15. Colonialism was on its way out, and the peoples' struggle against colonial rule had gathered momentum since the United Nations, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, had adopted the historic Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The colonial Powers, being unable to withstand the liberation movement, were granting independence to their colonies, while reducing that independence to a fiction by leaving troops in the countries concerned. Belgian troops were to be left in Ruanda-Urundi not to maintain order but to enable Belgian monopolies to exploit the countries' wealth with cheap labour. The cost of governing the two countries had been only a small part of the riches taken from them by Belgian companies, yet Belgium had not offered to return that plunder. Belgium also wanted

to use Rwanda and Burundi as military bases for the suppression of national liberation movements elsewhere in Africa.

16. Since his delegation thought that independence should be granted rapidly to all countries still under colonial rule, it supported the demand of the peoples of Rwanda and Burundi for independence on 1 July 1962. It was the duty of the United Nations to grant those peoples' just demands and to defend them against the Belgian colonizers' attempts to undermine their forthcoming independence.

17. Mr. ROS (Argentina) agreed with most members of the Committee that there was no possible justification for postponing independence beyond 1 July 1962. As the Ivory Coast representative had pointed out at the 1316th meeting, the Administering Authority would no doubt continue to regard itself as responsible for maintaining order until independence, no matter what date was fixed.

18. With regard to the international security of the newly independent States, there was no reason to suppose that any neighbouring State represented a threat to their sovereignty; the one possible source of conflict was the presence of large numbers of refugees on the frontiers, and his delegation endorsed the Commission's recommendations in paragraph 367 of its report that "States bordering on the two countries should undertake to make all the necessary arrangements to guarantee the national frontiers of Rwanda and Burundi". It would be very helpful if all the neighbouring countries could make a categorical statement to that effect, such as had already been made by the delegation of Tanganyika at the 1315th meeting. Where internal security was concerned, both Governments had claimed that they would be able to maintain order after independence. Belgium had said that it would continue to be responsible for the maintenance of order until independence; it was therefore clear that Belgian troops would still be in Ruanda-Urundi on 1 July, and that the question of their withdrawal would arise only after that date. Belgium had furthermore presented a time-table for the withdrawal. Thus, whatever interpretation might be placed on General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI), that text was now somewhat academic. What the United Nations had to do now was not to discuss the "legality" or otherwise of the presence of foreign troops, but simply to see that they were withdrawn in accordance with a time-table expressly agreed to by the two Governments and to ensure that their temporary presence should not prejudice the free exercise of sovereignty by the new States. United Nations observers could then report on that process to the General Assembly.

19. He was sure that the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi would make it possible for Belgium to withdraw its forces in order and dignity, for it was of the utmost importance that cordial relations should be maintained after independence so that Belgium could go ahead with its generous assistance programme. No responsible Government would wish to jeopardize the harmonious bilateral arrangements so necessary to the future prosperity of those States. It would be most unrealistic to expect the United Nations to bear the main burden of such assistance. The special fund suggested in paragraph 285 of the Commission's report might perhaps offer a solution, but it would take time to raise the necessary capital; in that connexion, the comments of the Mexican and Brazilian representatives had been most significant.

But the immediate task was to maintain the existing services, for the economies of Rwanda and Burundi must on no account be allowed to collapse. To that end there were three prerequisites: firstly, the maintenance of internal security; secondly, implementation of the Agreement on Economic Union between Rwanda and Burundi; thirdly, the early admission of both States to membership in the United Nations and the specialized agencies. Responsibility for fulfilling the first two conditions rested with the Governments concerned, and the way in which they measured up to that responsibility would show how ready they had been for independence.

20. Mr. MUFTI (Syria) remarked that General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI), which had embodied the desire of the majority of Member States to see Ruanda-Urundi become independent as early as possible, had stipulated a number of conditions which should be fulfilled to ensure that the transition to independence should take place in the best possible conditions. Unfortunately, it would not be an exaggeration to say that not one of those conditions had been adequately met. Political union had not been brought about between Rwanda and Burundi; the conflicting parties in Rwanda were not yet definitively reconciled; the return of the refugees was not yet assured; no agreement had yet been reached over the future of the Mwami; human rights were still subject to serious violations; no practical steps had been taken to train national security forces; Belgian troops were still present in the Territory; Rwanda and Burundi had not yet achieved internal self-government; finally, no clear indication had yet been given concerning possible United Nations assistance to overcome the economic and social difficulties of the Territory.

21. That failure was not the fault of the Commission, which had done everything humanly possible in difficult conditions and could not have been expected to remedy overnight a situation which had been deteriorating for years. However, his delegation did not believe that independence should for that reason be postponed, for the General Assembly had already decided that lack of preparedness was no pretext for delaying independence. Moreover, both Rwanda and Burundi should become independent simultaneously. While the General Assembly must make a decision as soon as possible, so as to allow the representatives of the two Governments to return home, it must not fix the date of independence without regard to any other considerations, and his delegation could not therefore support the suggestion that a separate resolution should be adopted on the date of independence. What the Assembly must do was to seek out the positive elements in the situation and base its recommendations thereon, as the best guarantee for the stability and prosperity of the future independent States.

22. The first of those positive elements was the Agreement on Economic Union signed at Addis Ababa on 19 April 1962 (A/5126/Add.1, annex XVI); that Agreement, if faithfully implemented, could help to restore the mutual confidence without which no unity was conceivable. While he did not wish to make the fate of that Agreement dependent on any guarantee concerning the withdrawal of foreign troops, he considered that the position of the Government of Rwanda concerning the presence of foreign forces had not changed since its letter of 14 April 1962 to the United Nations Commission (A/5126/Add.1, annex XXXVII).

23. The New York Agreement of February 1962 (A/C.4/532 and Corr.1) represented an important step towards the reconciliation of the various political factions in Rwanda. His delegation hoped that further such measures would be taken in the same spirit in Burundi as well, for the opposition party in that country still appeared to harbour certain grievances against the Government.

24. His delegation welcomed the statement of the Mwami's representative (1317th meeting) to the effect that the Mwami was not trying to cling to power but wanted justice for the people of Rwanda. Such assurances would make it easier for the Mwami to return to Rwanda, and also facilitate the repatriation of most of the refugees, without which national reconciliation could not be finally consolidated. Nevertheless, positive steps, such as those recommended by the Commission, must be taken by both Governments as well as by the United Nations to deal with the refugee problem.

25. His delegation attached particular importance to the question of the withdrawal of Belgian forces, since all other questions depended on it. The position appeared to be as follows: the Government of Burundi was opposed to the continued presence of Belgian troops after independence, and demanded their withdrawal now. For its part, the Government of Rwanda had said that it would regard the presence of Belgian troops after independence as illegal, while recognizing that until then their presence was a matter for the Administering Authority and the United Nations to decide. On the other hand, the opposition in Rwanda demanded that three-quarters of the remaining Belgian troops should be withdrawn before independence. The Administering Authority, for its part, considered that both Governments would bear the sole responsibility for the maintenance of order after independence, and had indicated its willingness to place such troops as might still be there under their control. In connexion with the withdrawal of those forces from Rwanda, it was not necessary to regroup them at Usumbura, for they could as easily be flown from air-fields in Rwandese territory. Moreover, the Assembly should not adopt a time-table which continued to regard Usumbura as a regroupment centre, particularly as the time-limits envisaged seemed rather long in view of the means of transport available to the Administering Authority and the speed with which Belgian troops had been moved into the Territory on certain previous occasions. The time-table presented by the Administering Authority (A/C.4/551) should therefore be regarded as no more than a guide-line.

26. In making a decision, the General Assembly should be guided by the following considerations: the maintenance of Belgian forces in either country after independence would present an obvious danger to the other country; the withdrawal of those forces was necessary if the work of general conciliation was to be consolidated; Belgian military personnel remaining for training purposes should no longer occupy positions of command; the General Assembly should not tolerate the continued presence of such personnel unless they could be placed under the direct control of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi—a state of affairs which the Belgian Constitution appeared to preclude, despite the Administering Authority's remarks to the contrary. In that connexion, his delegation wished to support the suggestion by the Camerounian representative (1319th meeting) that the status of the Belgian military personnel still in the process of

withdrawal after independence should be established, and suggested further that the status should also be specified in respect of such personnel as it was decided to retain there.

27. With regard to the question of internal self-government, his delegation supposed that the only reason why the transfer of powers had not yet been carried out satisfactorily was that the Administering Authority wished to discharge its responsibility under the Trusteeship Agreement; however, by virtue of that very Agreement, it was supposed to promote the development of Rwanda and Burundi towards self-government and should not therefore have sought to maintain control except in areas where it was absolutely necessary. A definitive solution must be found in the next few days for the transfer of powers in accordance with both the Brussels Protocols (A/C.4/517 and Corr.1) and the Addis Ababa Agreement.

28. His delegation welcomed Belgium's expressed intention of providing assistance without any conditions which might infringe the sovereignty of Rwanda and Burundi, such as the continued presence of Belgian military forces. His delegation also welcomed the efforts made by the Administering Authority to encourage its technical personnel to remain after independence. As regards the possibility of United Nations assistance, the General Assembly would do well to adopt the recommendations in paragraphs 285, 377, 378 and 379 of the report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi (A/5126 and Corr.1).

29. Lastly, the General Assembly should look favourably upon the desire of Rwanda and Burundi to join the United Nations immediately after independence. It should also consider the possibility of sending a mission to Ruanda-Urundi to observe the implementation of decisions taken by it during the present session and to report to the United Nations thereon.

30. Mr. LOKMAN (Mauritania) congratulated the Commission on its good work, and in particular commended its achievement in enabling the two Governments to agree on an economic union; such an agreement might lead to political union later.

31. After a careful examination of the various reports and the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the subject of Ruanda-Urundi, his delegation wished to reaffirm its unshakable conviction in the right of all peoples to self-determination, and expressed the hope that all the peoples of Africa would soon be enabled to exercise that right. The peoples of Rwanda and Burundi had clearly expressed their desire for independence, and there now only remained for the United Nations formally to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

32. Of the various problems which would confront the new States, that of the refugees was one of the most pressing. However, now that a measure of political reconciliation had been brought about in Rwanda, there was a good chance of solving the problem; perhaps with the help of the United Nations, the refugees could be repatriated and join their fellow-citizens in building up their young country. However, their return would no doubt add to the already great economic problems facing Rwanda and Burundi, and the United Nations must therefore carefully study ways and means of avoiding the ensuing economic misery. The five-year investment programme looked promising, and his delegation also endorsed the three recom-

mendations of the Commission in paragraph 285 of its report.

33. With regard to the withdrawal of Belgian military and paramilitary forces, the Committee must recognize that the situation had changed since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI), as the Commission had indicated in paragraph 337 of its report: "if the departure of Belgian forces were to entail . . . the departure of the Belgian technicians, the two countries would be faced with a serious crisis".

34. Another serious problem was the lack of national forces, the training of which was still as urgent a necessity as it had been when resolution 1743 (XVI) had been adopted.

35. Like other members of the Committee, his delegation was eager to see Rwanda and Burundi independent and to see them both admitted to the United Nations. The Committee must now conclude its examination of the Commission's report and set 1 July 1962 as the date for the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. In recommending that the General Assembly should grant complete and unconditional independence to Rwanda and Burundi, the Committee should also ask the specialized agencies to offer the necessary assistance in order to protect that independence and to assist the two countries to develop their resources. However, whatever action the Committee took must clearly and explicitly emphasize all the necessary safeguards to ensure tranquillity and stability after independence.

36. Mr. SUGAIR (Saudi Arabia) said that his delegation shared the fears expressed by the petitioners at the 1317th meeting. It considered that the solution of many problems facing the Territory would largely depend on the speedy withdrawal of the Belgian troops and the repatriation of the refugees. Despite the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI), operative paragraph 3, the Belgian troops were still in the Territory and according to the plan for withdrawal submitted by the Belgian delegation (A/C.4/551) would remain there for a further two and a half to three months. The representatives of Rwanda and Burundi had categorically stated that they did not wish those troops to remain in their countries after 1 July, and the same view had been expressed by the petitioners. The Committee should therefore request definite assurances from the Belgian Government that it would evacuate the troops and should require additional guarantees that they would be confined to barracks and would refrain from any activities in the host country. The Committee should also endeavour to obtain a joint declaration by the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi pledging themselves to settle their differences in a peaceful manner.

37. His delegation noted with satisfaction that the New York Agreement of 8 February 1962 between the representatives of the Government of Rwanda and the representatives of UNAR had been implemented by the participation of that party in the Government. His delegation urged the parties which had now been reconciled to encourage the refugees to return home so as to participate in the development and reconstruction of their country and it hoped that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees would contribute towards the solution of the problem.

38. His delegation also hoped that 1 July 1962, which would mark the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement, would mark the liquidation of colonialism and

the birth of two sovereign independent nations. On behalf of the people and Government of Saudi Arabia he congratulated the people and leaders of Rwanda and Burundi on their successful struggle for independence and trusted that they would soon become members of the international community.

39. Mr. TSURKAN (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) observed that in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and of the Trusteeship Agreement the Trust Territory should on reaching independence have been provided with the necessary personnel and economic means to ensure its independent development and place it in a sound economic position. The responsibility for such preparatory measures devolved upon the United Nations and above all on the Administering Authority. Obviously the choice of Belgium as Administering Authority had been a mistake, since it had taken advantage of its trusteeship to exploit the Territory and treat it as a colony. At the 1315th meeting, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated that no colonial country had ever withdrawn its troops before the achievement of independence by the Territory in question and had expressed surprise that the United Nations should require the withdrawal of the Belgian troops before independence. He had even suggested that the Belgian troops and administrative personnel should remain in the Territory after independence and had alleged that in a number of former colonies which had now become independent States the administrative machinery set up by the former colonial Powers was still in existence.

40. Belgium had violated all its pledges to the United Nations and to the peoples of the world. Instead of assisting the people of Ruanda-Urundi, it had ruthlessly exploited them and plundered the wealth of the Territory. As a result the Territory would have to start from the beginning.

41. Under General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI) Belgium was required to transfer all powers to the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi and to withdraw its troops before the date of independence. Belgium had made no attempt to comply with those requests and clearly intended to continue to exploit the wealth of the country. The argument that there would be no time to withdraw the troops before 1 July was specious, since resolution 1743 (XVI), which called for the rapid withdrawal of Belgian military and paramilitary forces, to be completed before independence, had been adopted on 23 February 1962. Belgium's violation of that resolution was fraught with danger for the peace and security of Ruanda-Urundi. No credence could be given to the Belgian Foreign Minister's undertaking that the troops would not be retained in the Territory after independence without the consent of the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi, since their consent would be obtained by pressure. The General Assembly must insist that Belgium should comply with resolution 1743 (XVI) and withdraw its troops immediately. The argument that disturbances would break out after the withdrawal of the Belgian troops was a mere pretext for retaining them in the Territory. The immediate withdrawal of the troops and the transfer of all powers to the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi were necessary prerequisites for the independent development of the two countries as sovereign States. His delegation would support any resolution designed to achieve that end.

42. Mrs. MENESES DE ALBIZU CAMPOS (Cuba) remarked that Belgium had failed to carry out its

pledge under the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement to promote the advancement of Ruanda-Urundi and its progressive development towards self-government or independence. It had imposed a colonial régime on the Territory for decades with the result that on the very eve of independence, Rwanda and Burundi were virtually bankrupt, economically under-developed, politically divided, and unable to ensure their own security. The true nature of that colonial régime was reflected in the bloody riots in Rwanda, in the flight of hundreds of refugees to neighbouring territories, in the restriction of the opposition's freedom of movement in Rwanda and in the close surveillance, to say the least, kept by the Belgian authorities over those who openly protested the continued presence of Belgian troops in the Territory after independence.

43. Belgium now sought to justify its demand that its troops should remain in the Territory for three more months, even after independence, on the ground that the evacuation of troops and equipment was necessarily a slow process. However, that pretext had been rejected by the Committee and by the peoples of Rwanda and Burundi, which stood to gain most from the presence of a security force. The Government of Burundi had requested the immediate and total evacuation of the troops, while that of Rwanda had stated that their presence after independence would be illegal. Moreover, the comparison which had been drawn between the situation in Ruanda-Urundi and that in certain independent States which allowed foreign troops to remain in their territory was not valid because the Belgian troops in the Trust Territory were not friendly forces, but the tool of the former colonial Power. The United Nations had already had to intervene in one of the new African republics which had found itself in a similar situation. Clearly, there could be no effective independence so long as foreign troops remained in the Territory.

44. An attempt was being made by the colonial Powers to exaggerate the obstacles which would have to be overcome before Rwanda and Burundi could exist as viable independent States. While it was true that they suffered from a lack of trained administrative staff, experts, resources and good prospects for development, they were no different in those respects from other independent States to which colonialism had bequeathed a similar legacy. The experts so urgently needed could be provided partly by the United Nations and partly through the co-operation of the international community; the financial needs of the two countries could be met in the same way. Like many other States, Rwanda and Burundi were poor in natural resources and found it difficult to provide sufficient impetus to economic development. Yet, the first condition for economic development was freedom from colonial rule. Once that freedom had been achieved, the two new States should be able to depend on full economic co-operation from the United Nations for the first few years.

45. The Cuban delegation congratulated the peoples of Rwanda and Burundi on the eve of their independence and looked forward to their contribution to international peace and security as independent nations. While it regretted their decision not to restore a unitary State, it welcomed the Agreement on Economic Union which they had concluded and hoped that it would rapidly lead to political union. It should be noted, finally, that the Burundi Government had stated that the presence of Belgian troops in Rwanda would seriously hamper the achievement of economic union.

46. Mr. CERNIK (Czechoslovakia) observed that the United Nations faced the serious and difficult task of ensuring the development of Rwanda and Burundi on the basis of genuine independence and, from the wider international point of view, their peaceful development in the community of African countries which were striving to eradicate the last remnants of colonialism or neo-colonial supremacy. The Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), expressed the desire of all oppressed peoples for freedom and independence and represented a pledge by all States Members of the United Nations and of progressive mankind as a whole that an end would be put to colonialism. The negotiations which had taken place regarding the future of Ruanda-Urundi proved how difficult it was to implement the Declaration in individual cases. The Belgian colonizers had been obstinately resisting their final expulsion from Africa and the monopolistic mining companies, such as the Union minière and others, economically dominated a considerable part of Equatorial Africa, including Ruanda-Urundi.

47. The debate had shown that the difficulties surrounding the question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi had been aggravated still further. Although the provisions of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, and particularly resolution 1743 (XVI), were quite clear, Belgium was apparently trying to create a situation which would lead the Fourth Committee to make concessions and would instill doubts about the usefulness and practicability of solving the problem in the spirit of past decisions of the United Nations. An attempt was being made to introduce new forms of neo-colonialist supremacy into Rwanda and Burundi.

48. At the 1316th meeting, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had rightly observed that not much time remained before the declaration of independence of the two countries on 1 July. The lack of time to give thorough consideration to the question was, however, due to the fact that Belgium had not satisfactorily prepared the conditions for the transfer of powers to the respective Governments of those countries, in accordance with its obligations. The United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi had noted that the posts held by Africans in the Administration were not as a rule of a kind which would prepare them to take on higher responsibilities.

49. Among the measures called for by General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI) was the rapid withdrawal of Belgian military and paramilitary forces to be completed before independence. That resolution had been adopted in February, over four months before the target date for independence. The United Nations would expect that period of four months to be considered as a transitional period during which all conditions for the emergence of sovereign and independent countries and for the gradual transfer of powers could be established. Instead, the Committee was told that Belgium would maintain all the powers of an Administering Authority to the last day and that even after the granting of independence three or four months would be required for the withdrawal of 900 soldiers. The motives for such tactics became even clearer in the light of the statements made by the representatives of Burundi and Rwanda at the 1315th meeting of the Committee to the effect that both Governments had asked for important powers, but had been unable to obtain them. The words and actions of

the Belgian Government did not show willingness to give up its position in the Territory and to carry out all its obligations in connexion with the transfer of powers and of administration. So far only 300 Belgian soldiers had been flown out of the country and all their military equipment had been left behind. Insufficient care had been devoted to the training of a national army, particularly of officers and non-commissioned officers, to the training of administrative personnel, and to the transfer of jurisdiction and powers in the fields of economy and finance. The United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi had noted that fifty officers of the National Guard in Rwanda would finish their training only in 1965 and that the Africanization of that army and of the national army of Burundi could not be expected before that year. To justify its course of action Belgium had expressed the fear that all Belgian technicians would leave the territory if Belgian troops were to be withdrawn before the declaration of independence. The same arguments had been advanced by the Belgian delegation at the second part of the session (1296th meeting), in an attempt to induce members to adopt conditions linking the question of economic, technical, financial and other assistance to Ruanda-Urundi with that of the presence of Belgian troops. Such a procedure would be contrary to the granting of unconditional independence to the two countries. The General Assembly could not agree that Belgium should restrict the sovereignty of the two States from the outset of their independence, and the Commission explicitly stated in its report that neither Government would agree to such a restriction. That position reflected the will of the people of the two countries, who strongly objected to the maintenance of the troops of their former colonizers after the declaration of independence, and corresponded to the views of a majority of States Members of the United Nations.

50. In support of the Belgian attitude it had been asserted that the ability to conclude treaties with other States, including treaties with regard to the presence of foreign troops, was one of the attributes of sovereignty of an independent State and could not be restricted. In principle there could be no objection to that assertion, but its application would depend upon the conditions in which such a decision was reached. If made without pressure and in co-operation with a friendly State there could be no objection; if it were imposed, as Belgium was trying to do, it would be contrary to the principles of international law. The dangerous aspect of that manoeuvre was that an impression might be generated that the conclusion of an agreement on the presence of Belgian forces was tacitly approved by the United Nations. In his delegation's view such a procedure would simply create conditions for the establishment of neo-colonialism under the auspices of the United Nations. It was the duty of the United Nations resolutely to defend the rights of emerging States which were unable to do so themselves.

51. The Czechoslovak delegation therefore categorically rejected the argument that the conclusion of treaties between Belgium on the one hand and Rwanda or Burundi on the other for the maintenance of Belgian troops in those countries did not violate international law. Belgium was misusing its position as Administering Authority to the last moment and was trying to complicate the discussion of the question. The new States would face enormous difficulties in the first stages of independence because the colonizers had

always intended to maintain their power in the Territory even after the Trusteeship Agreement had been formally terminated. The Czechoslovak delegation was confident that an overwhelming majority of Member States shared its views and that the resolution to be adopted would request the unconditional withdrawal of all Belgian troops from Rwanda and Burundi before the achievement of independence.

52. The decision to grant independence to both countries on 1 July 1962 would be in conformity with previous decisions of the General Assembly. Any further delay would cause serious disappointment to the peoples of Africa.

53. Satisfactory progress had been made in regard to national reconciliation in Rwanda which augured well for the future. The formation of a coalition Government in which two Ministers were members of UNAR was a good beginning and his delegation hoped that such co-operation would be further developed at all levels and would form the basis of a genuine reconciliation and wide democratization of the life of Rwanda. If those conditions were achieved it would be possible to solve Rwanda's most urgent problem, namely, the return of the refugees to their homes and their participation in the life of the newly independent State. In view of the promising developments in the country and the desire of the people of Rwanda to rid themselves of colonial oppression, the Czechoslovak delegation believed that they should be granted full and unconditional independence.

54. It was regrettable that the attempt at the Conference of Addis Ababa to achieve the political unification of the States had been unsuccessful. The fact that the two Governments were unable to find a formula for political unification was in his delegation's view the consequence of Belgian rule. His delegation was confident that the other countries of Africa would give every assistance to Rwanda and Burundi in strengthening their freedom and independence and would help them to work towards political unity in the future.

55. The economic situation of the two countries was very unsatisfactory. Diversification of their economy through industrialization and the modernization of agriculture was necessary in order to abolish their dependence on the export of a limited number of commodities and to solve the problem of the balance of payments. Particular attention should be paid to assistance in training national cadres in all branches of the national economy. At the same time the United Nations should ensure that economic and technical assistance to the two countries was granted without any conditions whatsoever.

56. In conclusion, he wished Rwanda and Burundi success as independent States and was confident that together with other African countries they would strive for the eradication of all vestiges of colonialism not only in their own territories but in Africa as a whole.

57. Mr. MATITI (Congo, Leopoldville) stated that the close bonds which united the Congolese people with the peoples of Rwanda and Burundi and the common struggle of the two countries for independence endowed the relations between them with a special character and accounted for his Government's vital interest in their future. His Government had consistently supported the legal Governments brought to power in Rwanda and Burundi as the result of free

elections, and it was prepared to subscribe to a formal pledge guaranteeing non-intervention in those States, respect for their national sovereignty, and all possible assistance in resolving the problem of refugees. In contrast to certain Powers which were playing a double game in Katanga, the Congolese Government would never act against the legitimate interests of the peoples of Rwanda and Burundi. A solemn undertaking to that effect had already been given by the Congolese Minister for Foreign Affairs in his address at the 1035th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, on 13 October 1961.

58. In pursuance of that policy, his delegation was wary of rigid solutions which did not have the full support of the peoples concerned in respect of the problems of Rwanda and Burundi. For that reason, it could not unreservedly endorse the report of the United Nations Commission. Moreover, it was futile to focus attention on the past errors of the colonial Power. Belgium was not the only European Power which had laid itself open to the charge of not having adequately prepared the African territories under its administration for independence. The Committee should be encouraged by the laudable efforts Belgium had made in recent years to remedy that situation, and it should be guided in its endeavour to ensure a viable future for Rwanda and Burundi solely by the interests of the peoples directly concerned. No two situations being identical, there could be no uniform solutions. There had been few instances in which the transfer of powers from the colonial Power to the newly-independent State had proceeded without difficulty; there was always a possibility of disturbances arising from factors which had not been deliberately created and were not subject to control. In order to avert such incidents in Rwanda and Burundi, the Governments concerned should exert every effort to ensure the uninterrupted functioning of administrative and technical services and the continued implementation of plans for economic and social development.

59. In his Government's view, Rwanda and Burundi should accede to independence on 1 July 1962, as anticipated. Any delay might set off serious disturbances. The decision of the two States to remain separate political entities did not appear to have been made under pressure of foreign influence; similarly, the forms which their economic or other relationships should assume should not be a matter for decision by any outside Power or organization, including the United Nations. The bonds between Rwanda and Burundi were not such as to compel them to adopt a common political structure; but they would enable the two countries to enter into various other forms of political association and co-operation. In that connexion, it was gratifying to find that the people of Rwanda, having formed a coalition Government, were already on the road to democracy. The inclusion of two members of the opposition in the Government was a first step towards national reconciliation.

60. In approaching the complex problem of the withdrawal of Belgian troops, the Committee should again be guided solely by the interests and wishes of the two Governments concerned. The Belgian Government was prepared to evacuate its troops at their request; it was not officially making its technical assistance contingent upon the maintenance of its troops in the two countries. Yet those familiar with the situation in that part of Africa were convinced that a troop withdrawal on 1 July would inevitably result in the departure of overwhelming numbers of Belgian administrative and technical personnel without whom

the new State could not function. The Congo had experienced the disastrous situation which could result from a premature exodus of those officials and would not wish it upon any other country. On the contrary, its firm hope was that the transfer of powers could be effected in Rwanda and Burundi smoothly and without provoking a crisis. To that end, and to ensure genuine rather than nominal independence, flexible measures should be taken. The two Governments should formulate their request for a troop withdrawal on the basis of a serious evaluation of all the human and social factors involved, and not merely in the light of military or security considerations. While the Congolese Government did not question the efficiency of the existing security forces of the two countries, it wished to avert possible catastrophe. Moreover, his delegation did not share the view that the Belgian Government had deliberately created a dilemma for the two Governments. In any event, recriminations concerning the past were futile. As a realistic solution, his delegation proposed that the United Nations should suggest to the three Governments concerned that they draw up a time-table for the evacuation of Belgian troops, possibly through bilateral agreements. For its part, the United Nations would guarantee their independence and stand ready to provide assistance if the new States should encounter difficulties in asserting their rights during the elaboration of those agreements.

61. Following the departure of the Belgian troops, the United Nations might further assist the new States, not by such artificial means as a civilian and military mission, as it had done in the Congo, but rather by such practical measures as technical assistance through the specialized agencies or a special education programme. On no account should the United Nations contemplate a comprehensive reorganization of administrative and technical services. In view of the reluctance of Member States to bear the costs of the Congo operation, there was little likelihood that they would be prepared to finance a similar undertaking in Rwanda and Burundi. The United Nations could not be a substitute for Belgian technical assistance.

62. The Congolese Government looked forward to welcoming the two countries, which would attain their independence on 1 July, as Members of the United Nations. It hoped that they would weigh their decisions carefully and reach a genuine understanding with Belgium.

63. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary) said that the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement for Ruanda-Urundi and the granting of independence to Rwanda and Burundi brooked no delay and should be set for 1 July 1962. Belgium, having oppressed the population of the Territory for decades and exploited its natural resources without compensation, thus paralysing its economic, social and cultural development, could not be said to be leaving it "with honour", as the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs had suggested at the 1309th meeting. Belgium, as Administering Authority, had failed to carry out its obligations under Article 76 b of the Charter and had not created the most favourable conditions for independence to which General Assembly resolution 1743 (XVI) had referred. Indeed, Belgium was still attempting to maintain the Territory in a state of economic, and therefore political, dependence. As the Chairman of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi had stated at Addis Ababa (A/5126/Add.1, annex VI), economic weakness in the Territory would invite neo-colonialist manoeuvres to



secure advantages for certain foreign States on the pretext of providing technical or other assistance. The Administering Authority, by creating conflicts among the population and disrupting the unity of the Territory, had laid the groundwork for future interference in its internal affairs.

64. The question of the total withdrawal of Belgian troops was decisive for the attainment of unconditional independence. The spokesmen for both Governments had endorsed the provision of resolution 1743 (XVI) that those troops should be withdrawn before independence. Moreover, the resolution had instructed the United Nations Commission specifically to make arrangements for the rapid withdrawal of Belgian forces to be completed before independence. In the circumstances, the Belgian proposal to maintain its troops for some three months after independence was inadmissible. The United Nations should create conditions enabling newly independent nations to defend their freedom against such neo-colonialist manoeuvres. Even if the Belgian troops were formally placed under the authority of the two national Governments, it was doubtful that, in the space of three months, Belgium could overcome all the difficulties it had cited as preventing an immediate withdrawal. Moreover, there was a clear danger that the Belgian Government would refuse to withdraw its troops on the pretext that they were necessary to protect the European population in the event of an outbreak of disorders, such as the deliberately provoked Biumba incidents.

65. As the United Nations Commission stated in its report, experience of decolonization had shown that the lack of facilities and personnel had not prevented

countries from attaining emancipation in an orderly manner. Given an authority capable of mobilizing the efforts of the people, a newly-independent nation, however ill-prepared for its independence, could accomplish what the colonial system, despite its superior resources and technical efficiency, had proved incapable of achieving. The Hungarian delegation's doubts concerning Belgium's reluctance to withdraw its troops were supported by the example of the tragic events in the Congo. Moreover, it was not convinced that technical difficulties prevented a withdrawal by 1 July in view of the fact that paratroopers and their equipment could be moved from one country to another in hours.

66. It was the Committee's responsibility to adopt a resolution providing for full national independence and sovereignty for the peoples of Rwanda and Burundi. It was its further duty to create the conditions for liquidating Belgian influence and to prevent new colonialist plots, so that power would be transferred on 1 July to two Governments exercising full authority in the new States. Those Governments' freedom of action could be ensured only if no military, political or financial commitments were imposed upon them in the final days of colonial rule. The Governments and peoples of Rwanda and Burundi should be the sole judges of the best means for consolidating internal order, defending their independence, achieving economic and social progress and ensuring co-operation with other countries and with the United Nations as fully-pledged members of the international community.

The meeting rose at 6.55 p.m.