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 MEETING**

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Chairman: Mr. Majid RAHNEMA (Iran).

AGENDA ITEMS 23 AND 71

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Territories under Portuguese administration (continued) (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V; A/5946; A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V; A/C.4/L.823)

Special training Programme for Territories under Portuguese administration: reports of the Secretary-General (continued) (A/5783 and Add.1, A/6076 and Add.1 and 2, A/C.4/L.822)

GENERAL DEBATE AND CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued) (A/C.4/L.822, A/C.4/L.823)

1. Mrs. KONANTZ (Canada) reaffirmed that the Canadian Government was deeply concerned about the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration. The Canadian Government sincerely supported the aspirations to self-determination of the African people, who should be enabled to realize those aspirations freely, in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV). Her delegation therefore fully supported the spirit and intent of draft resolution A/C.4/L.823, but it had some reservations with respect to the last preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 6 and 7. Paragraph 7, in particular, proposed measures which, in the view of her delegation, could be decided upon only by the Security Council.

2. With reference to paragraph 8, she emphasized that Canada had not given any military assistance to Portugal since November 1960. Prior to November 1960, it had been understood that its contributions were for use only in the area of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since 1960, the Canadian Government has prohibited the export to Portugal or to the Territories under Portuguese administration of any arms or equipment which, in its judgement, would be used for military purposes in the Portuguese overseas territories.

3. It had been said in the Security Council and in the General Assembly that the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal were negotiating the sale to Portugal of Canadian-built military aircraft. She would like to state that the Canadian Government had good reason for believing that no Canadian-built military aircraft had been or would be sold or transferred to Portugal by the Federal Republic of Germany.

4. Mr. Chiping H. C. KIANG (China) recalled that when the Territories under Portuguese administration had been discussed in the Security Council in November 1965^{1/} his delegation had made it clear that, in its view, the crux of the problem was the right of the people of those Territories to self-determination. His delegation interpreted the term "self-determination" in the sense which was generally accepted in the United Nations in the light of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; in other words, it meant the right of dependent peoples to choose either self-government or independence. In the case of the Portuguese Territories, it was for the African people themselves to decide whether they wanted to move towards independence or towards self-government in a multi-racial society. In his view, the Portuguese Government would greatly help towards a solution of the problem if it would agree to enter into consultations with the indigenous population immediately.

5. His delegation would have had no difficulty in supporting draft resolution A/C.4/L.823 were it not for operative paragraph 7. He did not consider it necessary to state his views in detail, since he was sure that the sponsors understood the position of the delegations which were unable to support that paragraph. Unless the sponsors agreed to delete it, his delegation would be obliged to abstain in the voting.

6. The CHAIRMAN said that Yugoslavia had been omitted in error from the list of sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/L.823. The necessary correction would be made in the final text.

^{1/} See Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, 1250th, 1253rd-1256th and 1266th-1268th meetings.

AGENDA ITEM 13

Reports of the Trusteeship Council (*continued*)*
(A/5804, A/6004; A/C.4/L.825, A/C.4/L.826)

7. Mr. SHAKHOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he wished to emphasize that the Trusteeship Council had become an organ devoted simply to extolling the merits of the Administering Authorities, instead of giving serious thought to ways and means of leading the Trust Territories to self-government and independence, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The Administering Authorities were trying by every possible means to convert the Territories entrusted to them into real economic and military dependencies, with a view to annexing them later. The Trusteeship Council endorsed the arguments of the Administering Authorities which, using pretexts that operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) declared to be unacceptable, claimed that the Trust Territories were not ready for independence.

8. It was not by chance that no date had been set for self-government or independence in the case of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands under United States administration or of New Guinea and Nauru under Australian administration. The trusteeship exercised by the United States and Australia was obviously not in conformity with the objectives enunciated in Article 76 of the Charter. As far as the political advancement of the inhabitants was concerned, the Administering Authorities had in recent years taken constitutional steps designed to prevent any true internal self-government or the establishment of legislative organs worthy of the name. In the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Council of Micronesia seemed destined to become merely an assembly without any real legislative power, the Administering Authority had made no plans for the political advancement of the Territory, and the draft Constitution envisaged no date for the attainment of independence by the Territory.

9. Mr. GRIGG (United States of America), speaking on a point of order, said that the Committee was not dealing with the report on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, which was subject to the scrutiny of the Security Council, but only with the reports of the Trusteeship Council on New Guinea and Nauru (A/5804, A/6004). He therefore requested that the Chairman should direct the Soviet representative to confine his remarks to New Guinea and Nauru.

10. Mr. SHAKHOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the sole purpose of the account he had given had been to prove that the Trusteeship Council was not properly performing its task.

11. In New Guinea, too, the House of Assembly had only a semblance of legislative power, since the consent of the Administering Authority was required for the implementation of the laws it adopted, and twenty-six seats in the House were reserved for Australians, while the majority required for the adoption of laws was twenty-two. Foreigners also played too large a part in the local government

councils. The Australian authorities sought to minimize the people's desire for independence. The Australian Minister for Territories had hinted on several occasions that independence was only a remote possibility for New Guinea and that, in any event, it was ill-suited to the particular conditions of the Territory, for which limited sovereignty in close association with Australia would be much better. He had also stated that the people should be made aware of the dangers of undue haste and of the fact that the inhabitants might be misled by the fine words of some educated New Guineans, who preferred speedier self-government; he had argued that, because of its backwardness and the designs which some Asian Powers had on it, New Guinea would always need help from Australia. Such alleged designs were obviously a mere pretext for increasing the number of Australian troops in the Territory and making it a bastion for attacks on the peoples of South-East Asia.

12. Australia sought to prove by every means that the Territories placed under its trusteeship lacked the means to survive as sovereign States. Instead of striving to bring about the economic advancement of New Guinea, as it was required to do under Article 76 of the Charter, the Administering Authority tried to hold it in check and, through the indirect medium of its annual allocation of funds, to make the Territory's economy increasingly dependent on the economy of the metropolitan country. It prevented the expansion of local industries and of the agricultural sectors, such as that of sugar-cane, for instance, which might compete with Australian agriculture. The Australian delegation had asserted that New Guinea was a great expense to his country, which received nothing in exchange for the sums it allocated. The fact was, on the contrary, that not only was New Guinea a source of very cheap labour and raw materials for Australia and a market for Australian products, but it was also of great importance to a whole range of Australian and foreign companies. For instance, it was planned to triple the production of timber in the Territory; large forestry concessions had accordingly been sold to a number of companies, despite the protests of the indigenous people, who were incensed at the land policies of the Administering Authority. In recent years, a number of United Kingdom, United States and Canadian companies had obtained a foothold in the Territory, where they had reaped fabulous profits. He did not think that investments of foreign capital were reprehensible in themselves, but he considered them out of place in a Territory where the people were not in control of their own affairs and had no protection against grasping monopolies. It was to be feared that the activities of unscrupulous foreign companies were a serious obstacle in the way of the Territory's attainment of independence.

13. Social conditions in New Guinea were a standing reproach to the Administering Authority. After fifty years of Australian rule, over 80 per cent of the population and 98 per cent of the electorate were illiterate, 60 per cent of the children were not attending school and there was not a single university or college graduate. Racial discrimination was practised in all spheres, including wages.

*Resumed from the 1588th meeting.

14. The Territory had become a veritable military bastion, where military bases and installations were being set up at a frantic pace; there were already more than 200 airfields and landing-strips linked to the metropolitan network. The strategic importance which Australia attached to the area was shown by the fact that, early in 1965, it had been classified as an autonomous military and naval region under the direct control of Canberra. Its airfields were used by aircraft en route to Viet-Nam. Australian and United Kingdom troops were given "specialized" military training there, and such military training also served as a pretext for the periodic reinforcement of the Australian forces in the Territory. As the United States Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands had also been fitted out as a vast military base, it could be said that all the Trust Territories were now being used as bases for aggression against Viet-Nam and South-East Asia.

15. Since any proposal advanced in the Trusteeship Council with a view to securing the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was doomed to failure because of the stubborn opposition of the colonial Powers, the General Assembly could no longer be content to take note of the reports of the Trusteeship Council. The Fourth Committee should make positive recommendations concerning the action which the Administering Authorities should take in the Trust Territories and it should at least endorse the observations of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It should demand of the Administering Authorities the unconditional implementation of the Trusteeship Agreements and the recommendations of the General Assembly and should, in particular, take steps to help Nauru to gain independence by 1968, after first recovering all the wealth obtained from the exploitation of the phosphate.

16. Mr. McCARTHY (Australia), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, noted that the USSR representative had repeated himself once more. He asked delegations to refer to the reports of the Special Committee and of the Trusteeship Council. His delegation would revert to the matter if it found it necessary to do so.

17. Mr. EASTMAN (Liberia) read out draft resolution A/C.4/L.825, which he introduced on behalf of the sponsors. In connexion with the preamble he recalled that, when he had been in Nauru as a member of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of Nauru and New Guinea, 1965, he had seen a peaceful and healthy people suffering neither from poverty nor from ignorance. In fact, the Nauruans were in every way capable of managing their own affairs. At the present rate of extraction of the Territory's phosphate, the island of Nauru, which had no other resources, would soon

be uninhabitable. As was known, consultations on the subject had been held between the Australian Government and the Nauruan people, as recommended by the Trusteeship Council. The Australian Government had offered to resettle the Nauruans on Curtis Island, on condition that they took Australian citizenship, but that offer had been rejected by the Nauruans, who wished to preserve their national identity; the plan for resettlement on Curtis Island had therefore been dropped. The Nauruans had preferred to ask the Administering Authority to restore the island of Nauru for habitation by them as a sovereign nation. He did not think that that was asking too much; in view of the considerable profits earned by the British Phosphate Commissioners, the Administering Authority certainly had the necessary means. For instance, instead of arriving empty at Nauru, as was usually the case, Australian vessels calling there could easily unload volcanic soil taken from the small islands nearby.

18. Turning to operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, he recalled that the Nauruan delegation to the Conference between the Nauruans and the Administering Authority held at Canberra in June 1965 had proposed the establishment of a Legislative Council by 31 January 1966 and the granting of independence on 31 January 1968, which was in conformity with the Trusteeship Agreement and with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The Australian Government had apparently agreed to the first request. As far as the date of independence was concerned, he regretted that the representative of Australia had given no particulars on that subject in the statement he had made during the general debate (1588th meeting). With respect to paragraph 4, the Nauruan people had expressed the desire to know what profits the British Phosphate Commissioners made, what proportion of those profits was paid to them as royalties and how much it would cost to restore their island. The Phosphate Commissioners had apparently made a profit of £250 million sterling in 1964 and the cost of restoring the island had been estimated at £12 million sterling. The Nauruans had offered to participate in the restoration of their land, suggesting that a part of the royalties paid to them should be placed in a deposit account in Australia for that purpose. Apparently, however, the Administering Authority balked at expenditure which it considered prohibitive and persisted in asserting its right of ownership over the Nauruan phosphate under old contracts; in that connexion, it was supported by powerful allies.

19. He therefore urged the Committee to give its full support to draft resolution A/C.4/L.825, so that the Nauruan people might have a homeland where they would soon be able to live a prosperous and independent life.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.