



**Chairman: Mr. Vernon Johnson MWAANGA**  
(Zambia).

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Sadry (Iran),  
Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

**AGENDA ITEMS 62, 63 AND 64**

**Question of Namibia (continued) (A/8023/Add.2, A/8024)**

**Question of Territories under Portuguese administration  
(continued) (A/7923 and Corr.1, A/8023/Add.3, A/8104)**

**Question of Southern Rhodesia (continued)  
(A/7959, A/7963, A/7965, A/8023/Add.1)**

**GENERAL DEBATE (continued)**

1. Mr. TADESSE (Ethiopia) quoted from paragraph 113 of the introduction to the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization (A/8001/Add.1) and said that unless the determination now shown by the forces of colonialism in persisting in their domination was out-matched by that of the forces of freedom, there was a danger that all attempts to restore the inalienable rights of the peoples in bondage would be futile. The Committee had made a wise decision in giving priority to the discussion of the items under consideration, because it was in southern Africa that the greatest challenge to the authority of the United Nations was to be seen, that massive violations of human rights were being perpetrated and that the principles proclaimed by the General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 had not been put into practice.
2. With regard to the Territories under Portuguese administration, it should be noted that Portugal insisted on considering them overseas provinces and asserted that any concern displayed by the United Nations and other States was nothing more than interference in its internal affairs. The real fact of the matter, however, was that Portugal, being an impoverished and under-developed country, needed the immense natural wealth of the Territories and needed to exploit them industrially. One example of its economic interests was the Cabora Bassa hydro-electric scheme, a joint venture of the Lisbon-Pretoria-Salisbury axis.
3. At the same time Portugal continued to pursue a policy of oppression in Africa and was spending 51.5 per cent of its revenue on the war against the liberation movements. It was also committing acts of aggression against Zambia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Senegal and Guinea, in defiance of United Nations resolutions, thus aggravating the threat to peace and security in the region. Moreover, together with South Africa it was actively engaged in helping the Southern Rhodesia régime to evade the sanctions imposed by the Security Council.
4. South Africa was now exporting *apartheid* to Southern Rhodesia and Namibia. Notwithstanding the United Nations resolutions which had terminated its Mandate and had called for its withdrawal from Namibia, it was intensifying its efforts to take over certain administrative functions of the Territory and was establishing Bantustans in accordance with the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission, persecuting Namibians who resisted the illegal occupation.
5. Meanwhile, as if what was lacking in the search for a solution to the problem was a legal mandate, the United Nations was once again resorting to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. Ethiopia, having been one of the two countries actively involved for many years in the case before the Court, saw no wisdom in referring the situation back to that tribunal. South Africa's Mandate over Namibia had already been revoked and the only thing which remained to be done was for the Organization to take political action to end the illegal presence of South Africa in Namibia.
6. Ethiopia would co-operate in the efforts to strengthen the machinery established by the United Nations to assume the administrative responsibilities in Namibia. To that end, his Government would shortly convey to the Acting United Nations Commissioner for Namibia its acceptance of all the basic points in the draft agreement concerning the issuance of travel and identity documents to Namibians. Furthermore, together with the other members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), it would continue to assist Namibians in the field of education and training.
7. In Southern Rhodesia, the discriminatory legislation of the Smith régime and the proclamation of a so-called republic on the basis of an illegal constitution showed that the situation had deteriorated during the past year. There was nothing surprising about that, since at the very start of the rebellion by Ian Smith, it had been made clear by the administering Power, the United Kingdom, that it was not going to use force and that it thought that persuasion would suffice to change the course of events. Ethiopia had always held that sanctions against Southern Rhodesia would have no effect as long as the settlers could count on assistance from the Portuguese and South African régimes. That opinion had been corroborated by the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968), as could be seen from paragraphs 48 and 49 of

its second report.<sup>1</sup> A move had subsequently been made to widen the scope of the sanctions to include South Africa and the Portuguese colony of Mozambique, but the Security Council had rejected that suggestion. Even so, certain Member States were still insisting that only peaceful measures should be employed.

8. The problem therefore needed a much more serious approach than that so far adopted. Ethiopia was still convinced that Southern Rhodesia was the responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom and that any failure to end the rebellion was an abdication of that responsibility. Whether the 4 million Africans in Zimbabwe were to live in freedom or slavery would be determined by the choice the United Kingdom made between resolute and immediate action, on the one hand, and continued vacillation, on the other.

9. Lastly, he declared that recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of colonial peoples to achieve freedom was not sufficient in itself; those peoples must be given material assistance in their hour of greatest need.

10. Mr. NEKLESSA (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the situation that had arisen in southern Africa was giving rise to justifiable alarm among the peoples of Africa and other peoples of the world. The imperialists were clinging desperately to the remnants of their colonial possessions in that area. To achieve their purposes they had established, by means of colonial racist régimes, a system of racial barriers. They were subjecting the African population to humiliating discrimination, they were depriving it of elementary political and civil rights and were reacting savagely against those who demanded national independence and freedom. In southern Africa, with the support of world imperialism, a reactionary military-political alliance had been established to help maintain the racist colonial order, to impose the ideology and practice of *apartheid*, and to suppress the national liberation and democratic movement of the African peoples.

11. It could clearly be seen from the material submitted by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to the Fourth Committee that a single front of the imperialist Powers had been created against the national liberation movement in Africa.

12. The imperialist monopolies and the racist colonialists of southern Africa had common interests and purposes. Both were endeavouring to perpetuate colonial domination over the peoples of southern Africa, so that they would be able to go on exploiting those people and robbing them.

13. The selfish economic interests of imperialist monopolies which were mercilessly exploiting the African population and extracting huge profits, the military and strategic objectives of the countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in southern Africa, and above all the establishment in that area of a spring board for attacking independent African States: those were the basic factors underlying the policy of the Western Powers towards southern Africa.

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fourth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1969, document S/9252.

14. The racists of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonialists were receiving help from the NATO countries for conducting punitive expeditions against the patriots; and it was precisely the position taken by the leading NATO countries that enabled the ruling circles of South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia to be confident of their impunity. Without the political, economic and military support provided by NATO countries to the colonialist racist régimes of southern Africa, those régimes would not have been able to withstand the pressure of the national liberation movements.

15. In that connexion he read out an extract from paragraph 15 of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Group of the Special Committee which had visited Africa to establish contact with representatives of national liberation organizations (see A/8086, annex II).

16. He referred to certain new features in the development of co-operation between the NATO countries on the one hand, and South Africa and Portugal on the other. He noted that the Government of the United Kingdom had openly declared its intention to repudiate the embargo on the supply of arms to South Africa—an announcement which had caused general indignation in the world. The British press, commenting on that decision of the United Kingdom Government, had stated that it was intended to supply aircraft, including bombers and helicopters, as well as patrol vessels, rockets and other types of weapons.

17. Although the representatives of the United States had frequently stated that the United States would comply with the embargo on the supply of arms to South Africa, the United States was supplying South Africa with weapons and military supplies under so-called “previous” contracts. Between 1962 and 1969 total deliveries had amounted to \$38.6 million. A noteworthy statement in connexion with the United States interest in South African bases and ports had been made by the former United States Assistant Secretary of State Mr. Williams, who had said that the position of South Africa near the sea routes round the Cape of Good Hope made its ports very useful for the United States Navy, particularly in providing assistance to ships of the Atlantic Fleet going to and from Viet-Nam.

18. The Republic of South Africa and Portugal were trying to enlist still more political and military support from the Western Powers. Plans had recently been prepared to create a so-called South Atlantic alliance on the basis of the strategic and political principles of NATO.

19. Speaking of the economic ties between the Western countries and South Africa, he said that United Kingdom investments in South Africa were estimated at \$1,500 million. Over 500 United Kingdom companies were operating there. United States investments exceeded \$750 million. Over 300 United States companies were operating in South Africa. The profits derived by those companies were among the highest in the world.

20. Such were the facts underlying the stand of the Western Powers on the solution of the question of Namibia and other questions relating to southern Africa. That was precisely why they were opposing the adoption by the United Nations of effective measures against the racist

régimes, why they were trying to side-track the consideration of problems of southern Africa into fruitless discussions, and why for decades they had been calling for a dialogue with the racist colonialist régimes, but had at the same time been conniving at the policy of oppressing the African population.

21. Precisely for the aforementioned reasons the decisions of the United Nations had not led to the liberation of the Zimbabwe people from the murderous tyranny of the Southern Rhodesian racist régime, and sanctions introduced by the Security Council had failed.

22. South Africa and Portugal were openly defying the United Nations; and in violation of Security Council decisions which were binding on all States Members of the United Nations, they were developing extensive economic, political, military and other relations with the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia. The Western Powers, while making statements calling for compliance with the United Nations decisions on sanctions, were in fact undermining the implementation of those decisions and were developing economic, trade and other relations with the allies of the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia—South Africa and Portugal. It was generally known that South Africa and the Portuguese colony of Mozambique were serving as transshipping points through which goods from those Powers were reaching Southern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesian goods were being sold in the West.

23. It was a vicious circle. The Western Powers and above all the United Kingdom were opposing the use of force to overthrow the Smith régime. They said it was possible to change the situation by applying the agreed sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, but at the same time they were opposed to measures aimed at the effective implementation of sanctions, and particularly to the extension of sanctions to South Africa and Portugal, which were disregarding the decisions adopted by the Security Council and whose attitude was nullifying the effect of the United Nations decisions on sanctions. Furthermore the United Kingdom and the other Western Powers were expanding their economic and trade relations with South Africa and Portugal. That was evidence of double-dealing in the policy of the United Kingdom and certain other Western Powers which were its allies in NATO.

24. Not only South Africa and Portugal but many other countries as well were failing to comply with the sanctions arrangements. For example, the Government of the United States had quite recently authorized the Union Carbide Company to import from Southern Rhodesia 150,000 tons of chromium costing \$2.4 million, on the pretext that that deal had been provided for in an earlier contract.

25. The United Kingdom and the United States had fully revealed their position on questions relating to southern Africa, and had shown themselves up as the protectors of the colonial racist régimes in southern Africa when in the Security Council on 17 March 1970 they had vetoed the draft resolution of the countries of Africa and Asia providing for the extension of sanctions to South Africa and Portugal.

26. Eloquent data on relations between imperialist monopolies and the Smith régime were contained in the

documents of the United Nations Secretariat prepared for the Special Committee. Paragraphs 67 to 73 of the annex to document A/8023/Add.1 referred to a "boom" in the development of the mining industry of Southern Rhodesia after the introduction of sanctions and to the flow of capital into that industry from the international monopolies.

27. It is clear that the handful of racists in Salisbury could not have withstood the impact of the struggle of the Zimbabwe people for their national independence if they had not been enjoying powerful financial and economic support, in addition to political protection, from certain Western countries.

28. Portugal would not be in a position to wage a barbarous colonial war if it was not receiving political support and military and economic help from the members of NATO. When the Government had changed in Portugal, some had been inclined to hope that there might have been changes in Portugal's colonial policy, too. It must be emphatically stated, however, that the hopes for a liberalization of the Portuguese régime and of its policy had not been realized.

29. He also stressed the fact that recently Portugal had begun to give the imperialist monopolies wider access to the Territories under its domination, hoping thereby to strengthen the colonial exploitation of the peoples of those Territories and obtain additional support for Portuguese colonialism.

30. The most glaring example in that respect was the construction of the hydroelectric power complex at Cabora Bassa. It was planned to settle more than one million Portuguese and settlers from other European countries in that area. The Cabora Bassa area was to be converted into a military base of the racist colonialist forces in their struggle against the national liberation movements. Moreover the electric power produced by the dam would also be used by Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

31. World public opinion was well aware of the extensive military assistance which the States members of NATO were extending to Portugal. Between 1959 and 1969 Portugal had received military assistance from the United States in the amount of \$400 million, and had used a large proportion of it in its colonial Territories. The committee set up in the Netherlands to support the national liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) had published a pamphlet on relations between Portugal and NATO which said that the military assistance afforded to Portugal had enabled the latter to conduct a colonial war in Africa for a number of years. Portugal was not only intensifying its oppression of the peoples of the colonies, but was also carrying out aggressive acts against independent African States bordering on Territories under Portuguese administration. Those acts showed how seriously the cause of peace in Africa was being endangered by the maintenance of the remnants of colonialism on the continent.

32. The United Nations had taken steps to eliminate the racist and colonial régimes in southern Africa. As a result of the obstructionist stand of the Western Powers they had

not produced the desired results, but the United Nations must not slacken its efforts against colonialism and racism.

33. The representatives of the Western countries sometimes said that the United Nations adopted resolutions which were not realistic in their approach; but the real reason why effective results had not yet been achieved was that the colonial Powers refused to comply with those resolutions.

34. In connexion with the tenth anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the General Assembly, by resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970, had adopted a programme of action for the full implementation of the Declaration. That programme contained guidelines for United Nations activity on the questions related to South Africa as well. It was now necessary to achieve the implementation of the measures proposed and to consider methods for the realization of those measures as soon as possible.

35. In the view of the delegation of the USSR, the Fourth Committee should in its recommendations confirm that the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples were applicable to the Territories under consideration; it should unanimously condemn the racist colonialist régimes, and point out that responsibility for the dangerous situation that had arisen in southern Africa lay also with the member countries of NATO, which were co-operating with those régimes. In order to bring pressure to bear on the colonialist racist régimes it was necessary to ensure their political and economic isolation at the international level. Countries which had economic, trade, military and other relations with the colonialist racist régimes must break off those relations. Measures should be taken to curb the rapacious activities of the foreign monopolies in southern Africa and stop them affording assistance to the racist régimes.

36. In order to put an end to the colonialist régimes, it was essential that genuine and practical assistance should be given to the national liberation movements. In the programme of action adopted by the General Assembly, the continuation of colonialism was declared to be a crime, and the right of colonial peoples to struggle by all necessary means at their disposal was reaffirmed. The programme contained an appeal to Members of the United Nations to render all necessary moral and material assistance to colonial peoples in their struggle to attain freedom. It was the duty of the Members of the United Nations to respond to that appeal.

37. Miss BOSSMAN (Ghana) said that the problems of southern Africa were of crucial importance and constituted a threat to the authority of the United Nations; the Fourth Committee's decision to give priority to the items now under consideration was therefore justified. Ghana's position on the question was in keeping with the principles which had been clearly outlined at the preceding session of the General Assembly by its Prime Minister, who had stated that philosophies that were based on maintaining divisions among peoples were not acceptable, since they were based

on assumptions that constituted a threat to world peace and on false and pernicious doctrines.<sup>2</sup>

38. Ghana could not accept colonialism, *apartheid* or racial discrimination, which denied the legitimate rights of peoples. The persistent refusal of certain Member States to support United Nations resolutions had assumed alarming proportions and in the United Nations there was a noticeable feeling of disillusion and apathy which appeared to be exerting a considerable influence on the will of Members to solve those problems in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

39. After twenty-five years, the situation in Namibia still posed a constant threat to world peace and security. Despite General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 terminating the South African racist régime's Mandate over the Territory, that régime had gradually grown stronger and was still resorting to the harshest methods to maintain its illegal occupation of Namibia. The South African racist authorities were defying the United Nations by implementing new repressive measures under the Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South West Africa Act, 1968, and the South West Africa Affairs Act, 1969. They were arresting and detaining Namibians without due process of law under the Terrorism Act, 1967, and the Suppression of Communism Act, 1950. They were continuing to divide the Territory into Bantustans, forcing Namibians to leave their homes and resettle against their will in other parts of the Territory. The policy of establishing separate communities on a racial basis had no other purpose than to destroy the sense of national unity of the people of Namibia.

40. Her delegation would continue to oppose the measures adopted by certain States Members of the United Nations to strengthen the authority or presence of South Africa in Namibia. It therefore favoured the convening of a conference on the Territory, as recommended by the United Nations Council for Namibia (see A/8024), and urged the liberation movements to take the action needed to strengthen their unity and solidarity. It also supported the recommendations in Security Council resolution 283 (1970), which, if properly applied, would further isolate the Government of South Africa, and noted with satisfaction that some countries had responded favourably to those recommendations and had closed down their diplomatic and consular missions in Namibia. As to the Security Council's request to the General Assembly made in that resolution to establish a United Nations Fund for Namibia, her delegation would support any proposal to set up that Fund in a way in which it could function effectively. Similarly, it endorsed the recommendations of the Economic and Social Council for setting up a judicial committee for Namibia which could take action for the exposure and repression of crimes against Namibians. It also supported the recent Security Council decision (resolution 284 (1970)) to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia. She hoped that the Court would show a high sense of responsibility consistent with the principles of the Charter.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1786th meeting, para. 14.

41. In Southern Rhodesia, according to the report of the Special Committee (see A/8023/Add.1) the situation had deteriorated. The so-called republican constitution, based on a mock referendum, had entered into force, and South African troops and mercenaries were openly intervening in the Territory. It was essential to take more effective action, not excluding the use of force, to give effect to the decisions of the United Nations. In any event, the primary responsibility for quelling the rebellion rested with the administering Power, the United Kingdom, whose decision in 1965 not to use force in Southern Rhodesia had removed the most effective means for exerting pressure on the Ian Smith régime. Her delegation was aware of the sacrifices made by the Powers which had respected the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia but could not understand why they were unwilling to take decisive action to attain the objective of self-determination. It was apparent that the sanctions would not be fully effective unless they were backed by force and extended to Portugal and South Africa.

42. The political situation in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) showed no sign of improvement so far as the objectives set out in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) were concerned. The sporadic changes made by the new Portuguese Government were intended to strengthen its control over the Territories. Political repression and economic exploitation, in total disregard of the rights of the indigenous inhabitants, were continuing. The discovery of oil in Cabinda and the construction of the Cabora Bassa dam, among other things, were encouraging investors from Western countries to participate in the exploitation and repression of the peoples. The benefit of the economic gains indicated by the statistics went almost exclusively to the exploiting European élite. The countries helping Portugal to consolidate its control by investments in those Territories should reconsider their position.

43. On the military side, the colonial peoples' war of liberation was still going on and would be intensified until Portugal yielded to their irresistible will to achieve freedom and independence. That fact must be borne in mind by the NATO States which were directly or indirectly helping the Portuguese colonialists in their war effort. Ghana would continue to support all resolutions asking for material and moral support to the freedom fighters. Her delegation hoped that the recommendations of the International Conference in Support of the Peoples of Portuguese Colonies, held at Rome in June 1970 (see A/8023/Add.3, annex II), would now be considered by the United Nations and by OAU. The decisive role in effectively solving the problem belonged, of course, to those waging the fight for the liberation of southern Africa. Her Government would continue to support the Liberation Committee of OAU but felt that there was a need for strengthening the existing machinery, reviewing priorities and strategy, keeping attention centred on South Africa through a well-financed and organized liberation struggle and at all times exploring the possibilities of a peaceful solution through the United Nations. Ghana would therefore always support the Manifesto on Southern Africa, which had been drawn up the preceding year at Lusaka. Her delegation reserved the right to speak again during the debate on the draft resolutions.

44. Mr. BRECKENRIDGE (Ceylon) quoted from a pamphlet distributed in 1968 by the American-African

Affairs Association and stating that southern Africa gave United States visitors the impression of being a great "pioneer country" comparable to the Far West of the United States. In his judgement the comparison brought out certain fundamental features of the situation in southern Africa that must be dealt with if colonialism was to be eradicated. Firstly, that concept had led to the acquisition of land by settlers at the expense of the indigenous people, displaced to poorer areas by means of the land appropriation acts of Southern Rhodesia, the labour laws of Portugal and the Bantustans of South Africa. Secondly, it presupposed that southern Africa was open to foreign exploitation, in other words, to the tyranny of a minority over the indigenous majority. Thirdly, it brought about the breakdown of dialogue and made it impossible for any organized political opposition to restore justice under the colonial régime and thus led to the fight for liberation being waged by the peoples of southern Africa. Lastly, the comparison suggested the myth of the white man's civilizing mission, of which Salazarism was one of the final expressions.

45. Turning to the situation in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau), he said that Portugal, which could establish fruitful economic co-operation with the peoples of those Territories, based on equality and mutual respect was following a diametrically opposite policy, with the aid of its NATO allies. Not only was Portugal confronted with the fight for the liberation of Angola and Mozambique, but it had also virtually lost control over Guinea (Bissau)—which perhaps explained its suggestion that the latter Territory should be excluded from any consideration of colonialism in southern Africa.

46. His delegation feared that the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, by being associated in the deliberations with other Governments, might obtain a cloak of respectability and legality. It therefore wished to state categorically that that régime was not the true Government of the Territory, which remained the responsibility of the United Kingdom. The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, in its resolution 234, adopted at its fifteenth regular session, had declared its firm opposition to any form of government in Zimbabwe which was not based on the principle of African majority rule. It was the responsibility of the administering Power to apply that principle. Faced with such a situation, the United Nations was confined to the imposition of sanctions which, it was hoped, would create a climate in which the administering Power could ensure the independence of Zimbabwe.

47. On the question of Namibia, the United Nations faced a crucial test. Despite Security Council resolution 276 (1970), South Africa persisted in its defiance. The report<sup>3</sup> of the *Ad Hoc* Sub-Committee, established in pursuance of that resolution, was very interesting. Special attention should be paid to paragraph 13 and to the three considerations which had guided the deliberations of the Sub-Committee. Furthermore, in resolution 284 (1970), the Security Council had decided to submit a request to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legal consequences for States of the continued presence

<sup>3</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fifth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1970*, document S/9863.



of South Africa in Namibia. In that regard, his delegation drew attention to the proclamation in paragraph 6 of resolution 231 adopted by the Council of Ministers of OAU at its fifteenth regular session, which stated that, whatever the outcome of the proceedings instituted with the International Court of Justice by the Security Council, the United Nations was fully responsible for Namibia's immediate and unconditional independence. His delegation took special note of the report of the Special Committee on the question of the special programme of activities in connexion with the tenth anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (A/8086), annex II of which should govern any future programme which the United Nations might undertake. It would also have liked to see an early completion of the analytical study of decolonization, especially in the light of the Special Committee's decision that the preparation of the study should take full account of the views of the liberation movements, for which the United Nations at the present stage had direct responsibility. The spirit of Lusaka and the spirit of dialogue which the General Assembly had welcomed in resolution 2505 (XXIV) of 20 November 1969 were possible only if all Member States were willing to act in a responsible manner and to contribute to the common cause.

48. Finally, he proposed that the report of the Fourth Committee should deal separately with the debate on each of the three items being considered together, in order to give them the importance they deserved.

49. Mr. BLAIR (Canada) said that, although the Committee's deliberations so far had not brought significant change in southern Africa, there must be no weakening in the determination to find ways of reducing and eliminating the present inequalities and mobilizing public opinion. The partial failure of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia should not weaken the resolve to pursue those measures ever more stringently. The watch-dog Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) had exercised an important influence on trade with that Territory and, now that all members of the Security Council were included in that Committee, perhaps it would be even more effective. Ultimately, the burden of constant vigilance lay with the national authorities.

50. The situation in Namibia, too, gave cause for deep concern. South Africa was applying there its odious policy of *apartheid* and the inequitable Odendaal plan. The concept of homelands was nothing but a sham. His country emphatically rejected the denial of human rights on which South Africa had established its whole political structure, and firmly rejected any attempt to export it. Nevertheless, the active consideration given to Namibia by the Security Council offered a glimmer of hope. In that connexion, resolution 283 (1970), the fruit of long negotiations in which the delegation of Finland had played a key role, was a significant step forward. Security Council resolution 284 (1970) was also of great importance, and his delegation would give careful study to the opinion of the International Court of Justice.

51. As to the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration, it was disappointing that Portugal had not seized the opportunity to review its colonial policy in its

own interests and in those of its colonial peoples. The peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) were entitled to decide their own destiny.

52. Finally, his delegation disagreed with those which had advocated the use of force. His Government would not cease to hope that there could be a peaceful solution to a tragic situation which could not for long prevail. It was in that spirit that his delegation looked forward to working with other delegations with a view to drafting realistic and meaningful resolutions on the problems of southern Africa.

53. Mr. BICAMUMPAKA (Rwanda) regretted that so little had been done during the past year with regard to decolonization and that at present forty-five Territories—some twenty-eight million inhabitants—remained under colonial domination.

54. In the case of Namibia, the fascist Government of South Africa maintained its odious presence in the Territory, despite General Assembly resolutions 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 and 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967. Ignoring the lessons of political history, South Africa had mocked the League of Nations and the United Nations and, instead of leading the Namibian people to self-determination and independence, it had preferred to set up an iniquitous régime based on racial discrimination, ruthless exploitation, arbitrary uprooting of the indigenous populations and crimes that were even more odious. Although the United Nations had adopted many resolutions aimed at placing Namibia under international control, the South African authorities, knowing themselves to be well protected by the interests of certain great Powers, had purposely ignored those decisions. In that regard, he shared the view of the representative of the Byelorussian SSR (1880th meeting, para. 36) that the Territories of southern Africa were colonies of international capital monopolies. In his delegation's view, the Mandate exercised by South Africa should have been definitively transferred to the United Nations Council for Namibia. In that connexion, the efforts of the Council's mission, which had opened negotiations with various Governments (see A/8024, paras. 19-23), deserved praise. His Government called upon all those countries capable of influencing the Government of South Africa to indicate the path which the latter should follow.

55. With respect to the Territories under Portuguese administration, he wondered how it was possible that the self-styled champions of colonial integration had as natural allies the advocates of racial discrimination. Moreover it might be noted that South Africa was giving military aid to Portugal, which as one of the oldest colonial Powers ought to know that it was not possible to go on oppressing people for ever, even by maintaining 200,000 men on a war footing. Portugal was also trying to buttress its economic presence in Africa by constructing the Cabora Bassa dam project, which had been described by President Kaunda as a political project and which relied on imperialist aid. In that connexion special praise was due for the attitude of the Governments of Sweden and Italy, which had refused to participate in the project. Portugal would have to change its policy as set out by Prime Minister Caetano when he said that a conscientious and worthy head of Government in Portugal could not accede to the requests of the United Nations.

56. Rwanda considered that the United Kingdom was responsible for the situation in Southern Rhodesia, where a group of white colonialists continued to oppress the African majority. In the face of challenges such as the proclamation of a so-called republic, the Government of the United Kingdom had not reacted because Southern Rhodesia was a community with which it was linked by the same ties of blood as had led it to resume the sale of arms to another of its relatives.

57. If the ideals of peace, justice and progress which marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations were to become a reality, the Organization would have to examine its conscience and do things of which it could be proud.

58. Mr. HAMILTON (United Kingdom) said he was gratified, as a parliamentarian, to be able to co-operate in the work of the Fourth Committee. As he represented Salisbury in the Parliament of his country, he wished to explain that the Salisbury which was his constituency was in Wiltshire, England.

59. He had been surprised at the statements of the representative of the Soviet Union concerning the resumption of the supply of arms by the United Kingdom to South Africa. Since his Government had still to take a decision on that matter, he was puzzled about the source of the precise data supplied by the USSR representative. Apart from that, unlike the Soviet Union the United Kingdom was proud to be one of the main contributors to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa.

60. In view of the fact that, since the twenty-fourth session, a new Government had been elected in the United Kingdom, it should be pointed out that the present administration had inherited from its predecessor the situation presented by the state of illegality which existed in Southern Rhodesia. The immediate aim in that connexion must be to seek a solution acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. In seeking that, the present British Government was in wholehearted agreement with its predecessor in rejecting the notion that force could contribute to a solution of the problem. In its view, such a course could not help to improve what was already a tragic situation. What it sought was to avoid bloodshed and if at all possible a conflict which could have incalculable consequences. While he could understand a sense of impatience, he stressed that the attitude of his Government was firmly based on what was and what was not within the realms of practicability; in that connexion he had been glad to observe a coincidence of views between his delegation and that of Canada.

61. The British Government continued to apply the policy of sanctions against the illegal régime. No country had done more than the United Kingdom or had suffered greater loss in cutting off foreign trade with Rhodesia. In addition the United Kingdom had co-operated fully with the Committee on sanctions established by the Security Council, and all but a handful of the 137 notes on sanctions evasions which the Committee had received had been submitted by the United Kingdom.

62. Like the representative of Canada, he did not share the view that sanctions had had no effect. Rhodesia at present

suffered from a serious shortage of foreign exchange and had announced only a week ago that the criteria for deciding on its allocation to private industry would be made even stricter. In order to ease the burden of sanctions, Rhodesia needed to increase its foreign exchange income by increasing its exports, but in order to do so it needed to have more foreign exchange to acquire capital equipment and replacements. The rate of development had been checked and the Rhodesian economy was unquestionably feeling the strain.

63. However, the original object of sanctions had been, and still was, to bring about political change, and as yet there was little sign that that was being achieved. The United Kingdom shared the feelings of anxiety and frustration expressed during the debate and was conscious of the state of near-deadlock which existed. His Government, which had to take the initiative, intended before long to make a direct approach and to start a new initiative to determine whether or not there was a basis for renegotiation. That could be achieved only within the framework of the principles which the United Kingdom had constantly enumerated in the United Nations.

64. It should perhaps be recalled that it was a conservative Prime Minister who had first recognized the wind of change in Africa and that it was a Government of the conservative party which had first insisted that independence could be given to Rhodesia only according to the principle of unimpeded progress towards majority rule; nothing had arisen since then to modify that insistence.

65. In conclusion he quoted statements by the Foreign Secretary of his country to the effect that he hoped Mr. Smith would be as aware as he was that there remained only one possibility of reaching agreement, and that it was necessary for the Rhodesians to devise a fair constitution for all the races in a genuine multiracial society.

66. Mr. GRIGG (United States of America), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that since early 1962 his country had voluntarily imposed an embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa and was scrupulously abiding by that embargo. It was also fully applying the resolutions of the Security Council imposing sanctions on Southern Rhodesia. With regard to the importation of 150,000 tons of chromium from that Territory by the Union Carbide Company, he explained that the Executive Order had been issued on 5 January 1967 approving the measures necessary for the implementation of Security Council resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966.

67. In recognition of the time—twenty days—that had elapsed between the adoption of the resolution and the Executive Order, the United States Government had announced that it would give consideration for hardship exceptions for transactions commenced before the issuance of the Executive Order. That requirement was met if the goods had already been paid for and the funds transferred before the issuance of the Executive Order.

68. That was the case of the importation of 150,000 tons of chromium. The funds had already been transferred to Southern Rhodesia and no additional foreign exchange transfers were involved. The purpose of sanctions was to

place the Rhodesians in a less favourable position by denying them the benefit of keeping both the goods and the funds.

69. Mr. NEKLESSA (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that in its previous statement his delegation had pointed out the causes of the situation in southern Africa, had mentioned the obstacles to decolorization, and had pointed a finger at those responsible. In that connexion he had agreed that the United States and the United Kingdom, among other Western Powers, were maintaining economic relations with South Africa and affording it military assistance, as well as giving it political and diplomatic support in the United Nations. Those were irrefutable facts. With respect to the military assistance of the United States to South Africa, proof of its existence could be found in the Record of the United States Congress dated 15 October 1969. Moreover, the representative of the United States had not denied the import of 150,000 tons of chromium from Southern Rhodesia.

70. Nor should it be forgotten that the facts mentioned were only a few of those which could be cited as examples of the aid afforded to the régimes of southern Africa. In the United Kingdom there were conservative members of

Parliament who were members of the boards of directors of companies operating in South Africa and who had an interest in the profits they made.

71. The Soviet Union had taken all the necessary measures to implement the Security Council's resolutions, and as far as educational assistance to the peoples of southern Africa was concerned, it should be pointed out that many persons from the region were studying in the USSR, and his delegation had supplied specific data on the subject to the Secretariat.

72. Mr. GRIGG (United States of America) maintained that, in the case of the importation of chromium from Southern Rhodesia, the point was to prevent the Smith régime from keeping the funds already received and the merchandise as well, for sale through other means. With regard to military assistance in the amount of \$3 million to South Africa, referred to by the representative of the Soviet Union, he said that that related to spare parts only, in fulfilment of commitments contracted before the application of the embargo. For some time now, the United States had not been sending heavy military equipment.

*The meeting rose at 6 p.m.*