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CONTENTS

Agenda item 23:

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Southern Rhodesia (continued)

General debate (continued) 65

Chairman: Mr. FAKHREDDINE Mohamed
(Sudan).

AGENDA ITEM 23

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: Southern Rhodesia (continued) (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. Ahmed ALI (Pakistan) said that his delegation had hoped that after the adoption of Security Council resolution 217 (1965) the previous year and the almost universal condemnation of the usurpers in Salisbury, the Ian Smith régime would realize the folly of its action; but those who believed that might was right were not amenable to counsels of persuasion and caution. The Committee was once again facing a situation in which a racist minority, having usurped powers in full defiance of justice, morality and reason, was threatening peace in the region. It was painful to see that some States Members of the United Nations were aiding and abetting the Smith régime.

2. Pakistan had made its position on Southern Rhodesia abundantly clear: it had stated in the Security Council in 1965^{1/} and at the recent Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London that it not only would not recognize the unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith régime but would demand that effective action should be taken to restore the land of the Zimbabwe to its rightful heirs. His Government regarded the Ian Smith régime as illegal and its continuance a challenge to international morality and a threat to peace. That régime should be boycotted economically and politically. Like most Member

States, Pakistan had imposed a complete and effective boycott of the Smith régime. He wished to state categorically that his Government would favour any measure, including the use of force, which the General Assembly might recommend to the Security Council to promote the establishment of a legally constituted and truly representative Government in Southern Rhodesia.

3. Pakistan knew from its own experience how important and how sacred was the right of self-determination to the people struggling against all odds to exercise that right. It was still not too late for the Smith régime to see reason. If a catastrophe was to be averted, it was incumbent on those who were directly and primarily concerned with the constitutional situation in Southern Rhodesia to take effective and prompt steps. Those who expressed pious hopes and counselled patience and understanding should search their conscience and see to what extent they were responsible for the present situation in Southern Rhodesia.

4. The time had come for the General Assembly to make a clear recommendation to the Security Council for speedy and decisive action, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to put an end to an explosive situation which could have fearful consequences for an area much larger than Southern Rhodesia.

5. Mr. JHA (Nepal) said that the question of Southern Rhodesia had become much more serious since the unilateral declaration of independence on 11 November 1965 by Ian Smith and his group of white minority settlers. The white minority rebel régime, which continued to hold power in Southern Rhodesia despite United Nations resolutions and diplomatic and economic sanctions imposed against it, had been able to consolidate its position, owing entirely to the wavering action and policy on the part of the United Kingdom.

6. It was clear from an objective evaluation of the Southern Rhodesian question that the United Kingdom Government had always shown irresolution and half-heartedness in dealing with the matter. The United Kingdom, which had claimed sole responsibility for the ultimate self-government and welfare of the people of Southern Rhodesia, had not only failed to discharge that responsibility but had questioned the jurisdiction of the United Nations in the matter. Since 11 November 1965, the United Kingdom had shifted from its position that the United Nations had no authority to deal with the question of Southern Rhodesia and that the United Kingdom Government could not interfere in the internal affairs of the Territory. On the one hand, it had shirked its responsibility and refused to comply with the recommendations of the United Nations when it had

^{1/} Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, 1259th meeting.

seemed that milder action on its part could produce the desired result; on the other hand, when the situation had become extremely complicated following the unilateral declaration of independence it had sought to absolve itself of further responsibility by referring the question to the Security Council

7. The Nepalese delegation wondered whether the United Kingdom's half-heartedness and lack of policy had not acted as a direct stimulus to the Smith régime to proclaim independence unilaterally. The United Kingdom had stated in advance that it would not take military action even if the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia declared independence unilaterally. When that had happened, the United Kingdom had termed the declaration an act of rebellion, defiance and treason. Those who had studied United Kingdom colonial practices would note that, save in the case of Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom Government had rarely failed to bring to book, almost always by use of force, those who had carried out acts which it had regarded as rebellion, defiance and treason in colonial territories. It was that strange phenomenon in the history of United Kingdom colonial policy which had led the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nepal to doubt whether the entire Southern Rhodesian drama was not a shrewd bid to continue to establish white supremacy in the entire southern part of the African continent.

8. It was a matter of deep regret that, one year after the unilateral declaration of independence, no positive result had been achieved in spite of all the assurances given by the United Kingdom Government. The will and aspirations of 4 million Africans continued to be flouted and the inherent right of man to freedom and independence was denied with impunity.

9. The United Kingdom had never failed to make far-reaching assurances and promises. Immediately after the unilateral declaration of independence, it had optimistically announced that the illegal régime would soon fall. That optimism had been carried to fantastic heights at the Lagos Commonwealth Conference in January 1966, when the United Kingdom Prime Minister had announced that the measures enacted by his Government might well bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months. In September 1966, during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in London, the United Kingdom Government had again assured the world that if some solution was not found before the end of the year it would seek mandatory sanctions from the United Nations to deal with the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. In an address to the General Assembly at the 1436th plenary meeting on 11 October 1966, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had given an assurance that the United Kingdom would join in sponsoring in the Security Council, before the end of the year, a resolution providing for effective and selective mandatory economic sanctions against the rebel régime.

10. While the Nepalese delegation did not wish to prejudge the effectiveness of the actions promised by the United Kingdom Government, it could not refrain from expressing the view that that assurance was even weaker than the one given to the Commonwealth Heads of Government and consequently far less satisfying. The fact remained that the responsibility for

the entire situation in Southern Rhodesia lay squarely on the shoulders of the United Kingdom, which had failed to take timely and effective action. Instead of putting to the test the allegiance of the Royal Army stationed in Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom Government, in utter disregard of the advice and recommendations of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, had conducted diplomatic negotiations with the rebellious régime and had in essence transferred the attributes of sovereignty to that régime. He would remind the Committee that those negotiations had been carried on by the same Government which had announced some time previously that it would have no dealings with the rebel régime.

11. The situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a danger to the peace and security of the entire continent of Africa. The rebel minority régime had consistently defied the United Nations resolutions and violated the fundamental human rights of the great majority of the population. Moreover, the total lack of policy on the part of the United Kingdom Government had given that régime comfort and support, both material and moral, and had been a source of encouragement to other Governments such as South Africa and Portugal in their racist and colonial practices. It was therefore imperative that the United Nations should redouble its efforts to put an end to the illegal régime and to ensure the establishment of democratic rule based on the principle of one man, one vote.

12. His delegation would be in general agreement with any resolution aimed at bringing down the present illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and establishing majority rule in accordance with the principles of the relevant United Nations resolutions. It sympathized with the people of Zimbabwe in their natural aspirations for independence and would give its whole-hearted support to any effective move designed to attain that noble goal.

13. Mr. WAZIRI (Afghanistan) said that the situation in Southern Rhodesia had always been a matter of concern to the international community, but since the unilateral declaration of independence by the racist minority the problem had assumed exceptional proportions and constituted a serious threat to peace and security in Africa. Although all States in the world condemned the policy of the Smith régime, the administering Power had allowed that minority to establish an unholy alliance with Portugal and South Africa and it was that support which had enabled the rebel régime to declare independence unilaterally on 11 November 1965.

14. Despite Security Council resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, calling upon all States to impose an oil embargo against Southern Rhodesia, that country continued to receive oil from South Africa. After the unilateral declaration of independence, which had been a violation of the 1961 Constitution, the United Kingdom and some other countries had blocked the application of the mandatory sanctions and effective measures provided for under the United Nations Charter. All would agree that the situation could only be rectified by the overthrow of the rebel régime and the granting

by the United Kingdom of independence based on a democratic constitution guaranteeing majority rule. Anything short of that would be incompatible with the right of the Zimbabwe people to self-determination.

15. His delegation would whole-heartedly support any constructive proposal aimed at liberating the African majority from oppression by the minority and at safeguarding peace and justice on the African continent.

16. Mr. TALEB (Algeria) said that nearly a year had elapsed since the European minority in Southern Rhodesia had unilaterally declared independence and tried to impose a fait accompli on the international community. The indignation provoked by that act of rebellion, as also the statements of good intentions on the part of the administering Power, had given the impression that vigorous action would be taken to restore the rights of the 4 million Africans of the Territory. It had been hoped that the United Kingdom Government would adopt a firm stand against the new Salisbury régime; the statements made in the United Nations and the proposals put forward by the United Kingdom Prime Minister at the Lagos Commonwealth Conference had encouraged that hope and allayed the anxiety felt about the deteriorating situation in southern Africa.

17. Today, after a year of "negotiations", shilly-shallying and manoeuvres, it was necessary to make a detailed examination of United Kingdom policy in Southern Rhodesia in order to reveal the real reasons that had enabled the Smith régime to establish and consolidate itself. In the light of the developments in the situation, his delegation had come to the conclusion that the United Kingdom was endeavouring to put an end to the crisis by following a policy dictated by the primary concern to safeguard its strategic and economic interests in southern Africa: that entailed the maintenance of the European minority there and explained the categorical opposition of the United Kingdom to the use of force and its friendly attitude towards the Republic of South Africa, which was openly giving the Smith régime vital assistance.

18. Under the pressure of world public opinion and in particular that of the African States, the United Kingdom had tried to give the impression that it was seeking to restore the rights of the Zimbabwe. The sole aim of its action both in the United Nations and at the Commonwealth Conference had been to neutralize the opposition to Ian Smith in order to enable him to consolidate his régime. It must be recognized that the United Kingdom Government, supported by certain great Powers of the West which had joint interests in southern Africa, had succeeded in imposing a policy that did not hamper its plans in any way.

19. Long before 11 November 1965, the United Kingdom Government, informed of the projects of the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia, had declared that it would never resort to force in the event of a unilateral break. Following Ian Smith's act of rebellion, the United Kingdom Government had not hesitated to bring the conflict to the supreme authority of the United Nations, at the same time claiming full responsibility for seeking ways and means of restoring United Kingdom authority at Salisbury. The United

Kingdom had sought an endorsement from the Security Council for the measures it had proposed as a solution to the problem. It had gone so far as to state that even limited economic sanctions would put an end to the Salisbury rebellion. With the support of certain great Powers and despite the justified reservations of the majority of its members, the Security Council had given its approval to the United Kingdom delegation, thus opening the door to duplicity and manoeuvring.

20. At the Lagos Conference, the United Kingdom Government had even set a date for the settlement of the problem. It had later addressed itself once again to the Security Council in order to halt an oil tanker bound for Beira. The clumsiness of that manoeuvre had been revealed by Portugal, which had disclosed in a letter to the Security Council that the United Kingdom Government had known of the departure of the tanker from Rotterdam. In any event, that spectacular action had done nothing to change the facts of the situation and Southern Rhodesia was still receiving oil from the Republic of South Africa. An amendment submitted by three African delegations^{2/} and designed to put an end to the shipment of oil from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia had been declared unacceptable by the United Kingdom and rejected by the Security Council at its 1277th meeting.

21. The ambiguity of the United Kingdom's attitude had led the Smith régime to become more demanding and intransigent. On the eve of the resumption of talks, Ian Smith had said at Bulawayo in April 1966 that his régime would in no event renounce the principles it had adopted and the policy it was pursuing, that it would never abandon its independence and that he had come to the conference table in order to try to persuade the United Kingdom Government to recognize that independence.

22. At the recent Commonwealth Conference in London, the United Kingdom had sought to obtain the approval of the member States, while reaffirming its authority, responsibility and intention of keeping the initiative in respect of its political action.

23. The obvious failure of the United Kingdom's policy and of economic sanctions had dispelled all doubts and had confronted the London authorities with a choice: the consolidation of the minority racist régime of Ian Smith or the determination to restore the legitimate rights of the Zimbabwe people and enable them to attain sovereignty and national independence. The United Kingdom had said that no solution of the problem was possible unless it was based on certain principles, but if those principles were examined closely it would be seen that they were perfectly consistent with the United Kingdom policy of evading responsibility, while at the same time allowing the United Kingdom to achieve its objectives. In the present political context, a considerable increase in the number of African deputies in the Assembly, the broadening of the franchise in favour of the majority and the abandonment of discriminatory legislation would not change the situation in any respect. The political, economic, social and cultural realities in Southern Rhodesia were such as to ensure continued domination by the minority, while racial discrimina-

^{2/} Ibid., Supplement for April, May and June 1966, document S/7243.

tion was an evil which must be eradicated forthwith and not by gradual process.

24. The Zimbabwe African People's Union had pointed out that Mr. Wilson's so-called principles were only vague statements intended to allow room for manoeuvring in order to sell the African people of Zimbabwe into domination by the white minority; that it could not accept the idea that accession to political power should be based on economic and educational criteria; and that the only criterion in the case of the 4 million Africans of Zimbabwe was that each one possessed human rights by virtue of the very fact that he was a human being. The London authorities had completely disregarded the views of the authentic representatives of the Zimbabwe people and had continued to negotiate with the Salisbury racists.

25. The United Nations should warn the United Kingdom not to continue its policy of seeking a compromise with the racist minority. The solution to the problem lay in the complete, faithful and immediate application of all of the recommendations of the Special Committee and the General Assembly. In order to be fully effective, those recommendations should be strengthened by the following three conditions. First, no Member State should have any relations with the racist Salisbury authorities. Secondly, Southern Rhodesia should be entirely sealed off, so as to prevent the delivery of any supplies, for no economic blockade could be effective unless it was total. Lastly, no measure should be considered unless it was accompanied by sanctions to ensure its execution, for compliance with such measures must be enforced by every means, including, if necessary, the use of armed force.

26. In his delegation's opinion, reluctance to take action against Smith was tantamount to accepting him as a *de facto* authority. The Algerian delegation, therefore, urged all Members of the United Nations to denounce the complaisance of certain Powers towards the Salisbury régime. Member States should realize the danger of the situation, which had been aggravated by recent manoeuvres and which might seriously weaken the Organization.

27. Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) said that, in order to understand the problem of Southern Rhodesia correctly, it should be considered in relation both to the Commonwealth and to the process of decolonization being carried out by the United Nations. With regard to the relationship between Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom within the Commonwealth, there were two events of special importance: the granting of autonomy in 1923, and the adoption of the 1961 Constitution, both in complete disregard of the interests of the population as a whole. General Assembly resolution 1747 (XVI) of 28 June 1962 had described Southern Rhodesia as a Non-Self-Governing Territory within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and had affirmed that resolution 1514 (XV) applied to it. As far as the United Nations was concerned, therefore, Southern Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing Territory whose institutions established by the Acts of 1923 and 1961 were not representative of the wishes of the majority of the population.

28. From the very beginning of negotiations for the independence of the Territory, considerable differences of opinion had arisen between the United Kingdom and the Southern Rhodesian régime over the terms on which independence should be granted. The subsequent unilateral declaration of independence had been described by the United Kingdom Government as an act of rebellion which it intended to put down. Both the Security Council, in resolution 202 (1965), and the General Assembly, in resolutions 2012 (XX) and 2022 (XX), had drawn attention to the risks inherent in any unilateral declaration of independence, and after that declaration the Security Council, in resolution 216 (1965), and the General Assembly, in resolution 2024 (XX), had condemned it and had called upon Member States not to recognize the illegal régime. Subsequently, the Security Council had adopted resolution 217 (1965), which *inter alia* had asked that no military material or oil should be sent to Southern Rhodesia, and resolution 221 (1966), aimed at preventing supplies of oil from reaching the Territory by sea.

29. Certain conclusions could be drawn from that brief summary of events. First, it was an undeniable fact that the present authorities in Southern Rhodesia were considered illegal both by the United Nations and by the United Kingdom. Secondly, despite the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council, and despite the fact that many Members had complied with them, the main goal had not been achieved. Although it was generally agreed both by the United Nations and by the United Kingdom Government that the rebellion should be ended, there was no agreement on how that should be done. Despite the statements of the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the 1436th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, there was no prospect of any immediate solution to the problem and it was difficult to see how the situation would develop. It was to be hoped that the Security Council would be convened to consider the proposal for economic sanctions to be submitted by the United Kingdom, together with any other appropriate proposals. The successful implementation of such measures, however, might be a long process.

30. For all those reasons, his delegation was seriously concerned over the situation. There was no clear prospect of a settlement and the Assembly might find itself meeting yet again at a later date without any positive steps having been taken. The Tanzanian representative had raised a number of important points at the Committee's 1607th meeting; the answers given in response to those questions by the country bearing the major responsibility for the problem might help the Committee in reaching its conclusions.

31. Mr. SOUZA E. SILVA (Brazil) said that it was clear from the report of the Special Committee (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. III) that there was general agreement in the United Nations on several specific points, namely, that the problem of Southern Rhodesia was one of world concern; that the United Kingdom was mainly responsible for resolving it in accordance with United Nations decisions; that the Smith régime was violating the principles of the United Nations Charter, especially

with regard to the right of peoples to self-determination, non-discrimination and equality of opportunity; that since the situation was an explosive one the United Nations would have to take the necessary steps to restore peace and security in the area; and that the implementation of United Nations measures should lead to the re-establishment of legal authority with a view to enabling the whole population to determine freely the future of the country.

32. There was, however, disagreement about the methods to be used in order to achieve those results. Some were in favour of using armed force, while others thought that a peaceful settlement could still be achieved. His delegation had consistently supported all the provisions of United Nations resolutions designed to put an end to the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, short of the use of armed force, and it would continue to maintain that position. His delegation had notified the Secretary-General that its Government had no intention of recognizing the present régime in Southern Rhodesia or of providing it with arms and military equipment or with oil and petroleum products. In so doing, his country had associated itself with the common efforts of the international community to find a solution which would respect the basic principles of majority rule in a multiracial society and of the right to self-determination.

33. Mr. APPIAH (Ghana) said that his delegation was convinced that the reason why the United Kingdom had still not found an equitable solution to the problem of Southern Rhodesia was that those responsible had not sought to match their pious statements with effective action. Colonialism and racialism were incompatible with the principles and usages of the twentieth century and his country would oppose them in all their forms until the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia had been put down and conditions established for progress to majority rule. His delegation questioned both the judgement of those who counselled patience in the face of such a serious situation and their sincerity. His country's position with regard to Southern Rhodesia had not changed and its concern was therefore with the disinclination of the United Kingdom Government to honour its obligations and put an end to the rebellion.

34. Before the unilateral declaration of independence, the General Assembly at its twentieth session had adopted resolution 2012 (XX), which had represented a compromise agreed upon in order to achieve the near unanimity believed to be essential in order to prevent such a declaration. Yet independence had been declared unilaterally and all resolutions had proved useless since the illegal régime was thriving. Sanctions, if they were to be effective, must be mandatory and rigidly applied. It was not surprising that the present sanctions against Southern Rhodesia had failed, since South Africa and Portugal violated them daily and the United Kingdom had refused to take any action to make those two States conform. It would appear that the United Kingdom itself did not want sanctions to work effectively and that it had only agreed to them because of pressure from the international community.

35. Since the unilateral declaration of independence, the Southern Rhodesian army, police and security forces had been used to intimidate those Africans

who dared to challenge the legality of the declaration and strict censorship had been imposed on news emanating from the Territory. His delegation was not impressed by the United Kingdom's ineffectual efforts, which would result in 4 million Africans being abandoned to the tender mercies of 200,000 white racists.

36. His delegation wished to clarify its position with regard to the communiqué issued by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference held in London in September 1966, to which the United Kingdom representative had referred at the Committee's 1606th meeting. That communiqué had been an interim compromise designed to prevent the disintegration of the Commonwealth. It restated the principles that should govern any solution of the Southern Rhodesian problem and reflected the contribution that the Commonwealth members should make to a speedy solution. As far as his delegation was concerned, there had never been any doubt that the ultimate responsibility for quelling the rebellion lay with the United Kingdom Government. The members of the Commonwealth had not arrogated to themselves that responsibility, nor did they intend to do so, and they did not wish to impose their conclusion on any other person or country.

37. His country held that the United Kingdom Government should use all available means, including the use of force if necessary, to bring down the rebel régime—and mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter would have to be invoked to that end; when the rebellion had been quelled, it must undertake to assume responsibility for the direct administration of the colony; and it must agree that Southern Rhodesia would not be granted independence except on the basis of a Government elected by the entire population on the basis of one man, one vote. That was the only way to restore peace to the area and to uphold the moral prestige of the Charter in the eyes of the world.

38. Certain other Member States had failed to ensure that their nationals complied with United Nations decisions. The establishment of illegal trade centres outside Southern Rhodesia for the specific purpose of frustrating sanctions could only weaken the authority of the United Nations, and if certain white Powers continued to support the illegal régime because its members were white, they would undermine the Charter. The question of Southern Rhodesia was a challenge to all to uphold the principles which were universally recognized to be the basis of international harmony and peace.

39. In the opinion of his delegation, there was sufficient justification for the United Nations to take action under Chapter VII of the Charter. The United Kingdom, which was negotiating with the rebel leader, should honour its obligations to the 4 million Africans in the Territory; only by so doing could it regain its prestige in Africa.

40. He appealed to all members of the Committee to support every effort to redress the situation in Southern Rhodesia within the framework of the Charter and in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly, so that the people of Southern Rhodesia could achieve independence on the basis of majority rule.

41. The vacillation and timidity of the United Kingdom Government were a source of great disappointment. The United Kingdom had had an enviable record of decolonization since the end of the Second World War but was spoiling that record by yielding meekly to tyranny and the rule of terror, in pursuit of its own economic interests. The United Kingdom could solve the problem if it wished; he urged it to do so at once.

42. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) said that, in spite of all the efforts of the United Nations, Mr. Smith was proceeding calmly with his racist project and continued to deny the indigenous people of Southern Rhodesia their political and social rights and their right to self-determination. Some delegations counselled patience; his delegation recognized the virtues of patience, but the sufferings of the people of the Territory must be borne in mind. The key to the problem lay in the hands of the great Powers. The United Kingdom, it had to be admitted, had fought two wars during the present century; according to the slogans, the First World War had been a struggle against German militarism and the Second World War had been fought to preserve freedom. There had been much talk of a brave new world that would follow upon the latter war. One of the results of that war had indeed been to speed the liberation of many countries in Asia and Africa; surely a third world war was not necessary in order to enable Rhodesia to gain freedom.

43. There was little that the General Assembly could do if the Security Council was unwilling to act. The hesitation on the part of the great Powers to use force was natural, but the method of peaceful persuasion seemed only to encourage Mr. Smith in his arrogance. The United Nations would cease to have any purpose if it resigned itself to accepting the situation. Sanctions and embargoes had frequently proved ineffectual. Sanctions against Mr. Smith and his clique should certainly be continued, but they were unlikely to be fruitful unless they were accompanied by other measures.

44. There were various measures that could be suggested. Perhaps the United Nations could make use of aircraft of the U-2 type and drop educational leaflets over Southern Rhodesia to awaken liberal Whites to the situation and to encourage the Africans to do what they could to overthrow the régime. Since many of the people were illiterate, the United Nations could perhaps establish a "Free Rhodesia" radio station on territory lent by a neighbouring African country. Another suggestion that he had made on a previous occasion was that no country should grant entry visas to white Southern Rhodesians, who would then be unable to leave the country.

45. He felt that a reasonable time limit should now be set for the United Kingdom to find a satisfactory solution to the problem. If, at the end of the period decided upon, the United Kingdom had to report failure, the Security Council should then adopt the measures provided for in the Charter. Naturally, that would not be possible if permanent members of the Security Council exercised their right of veto. Moreover, even when resolutions were adopted by the Security Council unanimously, they could still remain ineffective if the great Powers failed to comply with them. The African

and Asian countries were not in an economic situation in which they could do much on their own. The League of Nations had foundered because the great Powers had been unwilling to act; there was no guarantee that the United Nations would not suffer a similar fate. If the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom were to unite in threatening Mr. Smith with military measures, it would be hard for him to continue his defiance. The Western Powers had been ready to send paratroopers into the Congo; surely that method might be applied in Southern Rhodesia. In that case, at least, the two giant Powers could take a united stand.

46. Although the African and Asian countries could hardly wage an effective crusade against Mr. Smith, the fact remained that the continuance of situations which were an offence to the dignity of the coloured races could eventually touch off a world-wide racial revolution, and it would then be too late to safeguard the interests of the Western Powers and of the white race.

47. Mr. CARRASQUERO (Venezuela) said that in November 1965, when the racist minority Government of Southern Rhodesia had unilaterally declared independence, the United Nations had been faced with the task of preventing 4 million Africans from being robbed of their right to freedom and independence. The Southern Rhodesian régime was obstructing the self-determination of the Zimbabwe people and frustrating the efforts of the international community to ensure the transfer of powers to representatives of the majority. The paradox was that in the present case "independence" had meant freedom for the racists to continue oppressing the Zimbabwe population.

48. His Government has supported all the resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia adopted by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and had complied with the decisions of the Security Council on the same subject. It had refrained from recognizing the Southern Rhodesian régime and prohibited all relations, including economic relations, with that régime. It had prohibited the delivery of petroleum or petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia as long as the present situation continued. The measures adopted so far, however, seemed to have proved inadequate and it was therefore necessary to consider more effective steps in accordance with the Charter. There seemed little purpose in efforts to bring about constitutional change in Southern Rhodesia, for the situation had clearly passed beyond the stage where it could be resolved by means of the progressive development of constitutional law. Justice and law had been replaced in the Territory by force and violence.

49. The events in Southern Rhodesia must be seen as part of a broader conspiracy against freedom and the basic principles of the civilized world, involving also the South African régime—a régime which was now brazenly trying to justify its inhuman policies in South West Africa. The South African Government had shown no hesitation in offering the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia both political and economic support. The United Nations must do all in its power

to restore justice in southern Africa. The world community could not allow its basic principles to be undermined. The problem of Southern Rhodesia must be resolved promptly, through the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The United Kingdom, as the administering Power, had, through its complacency, encouraged the unilateral declaration of independence and it was for the United Kingdom

to take appropriate action to remedy the situation. Its action so far had been inadequate and tardy. The Venezuelan delegation appealed to all countries to remain firm until the final objective of self-determination and independence for the people of Southern Rhodesia was achieved.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.